1

Respect for Civil Liberties during the Third Wave:

Levels and Sequences

Jørgen Møller

Associate professor, PhD

Department of Political Science, Aarhus University

Bartholins Allé 7

8000 Aarhus C, Denmark

E-mail: jm@ps.au.dk

&

Svend-Erik Skaaning

Associate professor, PhD

Department of Political Science, Aarhus University

Bartholins Allé 7

8000 Aarhus C, Denmark

E-mail: skaaning@ps.au.dk

Paper prepared for presentation at the Danish Political Science Association’s annual meeting, Vejle,

October 25-26.

2

Respect for Civil Liberties during the Third Wave:

Levels and Sequences

Abstract

The literature on state repression has been preoccupied with electoral rights and personal integrity

rights whereas the repression of civil liberties has received much less attention. In this paper, we

present a new dataset on respect for civil liberties, which includes indicators on freedom of

expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of religion, and freedom of movement

for 198 countries in the period 1976-2010. Interrogating this dataset, we identify a hierarchical

pattern between the four civil liberties: freedom of expression is generally repressed at least as

much as freedom of association and assembly, which is generally repressed at least much as

freedom of movement, while freedom of religion is only rarely repressed more than any of the other

liberties. Moreover, we find convergence in the respect for the different kinds of civil liberties after

the Cold War as the global averages for the freedom of expression and the freedom of association

and assembly have increased more than those for the freedom of movement and the freedom of

religion. However, on both accounts this increase has been surpassed by that for electoral rights,

meaning that the democratization which has occurred since 1989-91 suffers from a liberal deficit.

Keywords:

Civil liberties, dataset, developmental trends, hierarchical patterns, Mokken scale analysis

3

Introduction

The widespread violations of civil liberties, the consistency with which they have been championed

by social movements in modern times, and their prominent position in liberal political theory,

international human rights conventions, and most national constitutions (Berlin 2002; Ishay 2004;

Keith 2002; Landman 2006) all speak in favour of systematically analysing patterns in their

repression. The near-absence of large-N comparative studies of First Amendment-type civil liberties

is therefore paradoxical (cf. Davenport 2007: 1), especially considering the explosive increase in

empirical studies of neighbouring freedoms such as electoral rights and physical integrity rights

(Berg-Schlosser 2007; Munck 2009; Davenport 2007; Landman 2006). Accordingly, we know little

about the general development in the relative repression of these liberties on the one hand and vis-à-

vis electoral rights and physical integrity rights on the other hand, and we do not know whether

strong patterns exist in the sequencing of civil liberties.

Arguably, this lack of attention to civil liberties is, at least partly, a consequence of the

absence of disaggregated, cross-temporal data. Extant measures of civil liberties are characterized

by a very limited coverage of countries, years, and/or rights, and they do not offer fine-grained,

disaggregated data (Skaaning 2010). In this paper, we introduce a new dataset on government

respect for civil liberties (the Civil Liberty Dataset), which covers four First Amendment-type

rights, i.e., freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of religion, and

freedom of movement. The scope of the dataset is virtually all independent countries (198) in the

period 1976-2010.

Interrogating the Civil Liberty Dataset, we demonstrate that the more political civil

liberties of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association are generally repressed

more than the more private civil liberties of freedom of religion and freedom of movement.

Furthermore, a sequencing analysis strongly indicates the existence of a more fine-grained, four-

4

step hierarchy across the civil liberties. Next, interesting temporal dynamics occur. The

developments in global repression levels of the four civil liberties show a partial convergence over

time, especially because respect for the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and

association increase remarkably at the end of the Cold War. However, for all four kinds of civil

liberties the post-1989 increase is smaller than that for electoral rights, lending support to the notion

of a liberal deficit of recent democratization processes.

The Civil Liberty Dataset

The Civil Liberty Dataset (henceforth CLD) includes measures of civil liberties “understood as

certain freedoms to perform actions that individuals might wish to perform, which (it is thought) the

state should not restrict” (Waldron 2003: 195). These freedoms are also known as First

Amendment-type rights (Goldstein 1978: xxx-xxxi; Davenport 2007: 2). In the creation of the CLD,

only the actual practices of states and their agents have been taken into account in the assignment of

scores, which means that neither merely formal-legal guarantees nor citizens’ missing abilities to

make use of the freedoms due to lack of initiative, commitment, financial means, etc. have

influenced the coding of the following civil liberties:

Freedom of expression: To what extent do citizens, groups, and the press have the right

to hold views freely and to seek, obtain, and pass on information on political issues

broadly understood without being subject to actual limitations or restrictions?

Freedom of assembly and association: To what extent do citizens have the right to

gather freely and carry out peaceful demonstrations as well as to join, form, and

participate with other persons in political parties, cultural organizations, trade unions, or

the like of their choice without being subject to actual limitations or restrictions?

5

Freedom of religion: To what extent do citizens have the right to have and change

religion or belief of own choice and alone or in community manifest their religion or

belief in practice, worship, observance, and teaching in private or public as well as

proselytize peacefully without being subject to actual limitations or restrictions?

Freedom of movement and residence: To what extent do citizens have the right to settle

and travel within their country as well as to leave and return to their country of own

choice without being subject to actual limitations or restrictions?

The source for the coding has been the US State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights

Practices, a set of annual country reports that provide systematized information on violations of

civil liberties and other human rights over several decades. After the first reports, issued in the mid-

1970s, were met by severe criticism, the scope, quality, and independence of the information

improved significantly (McNitt 1988: 97-98; Innes 1992), and the “results of careful, critical

examinations over the years … tend to agree that the annual State Department Reports are an

invaluable source accurately reporting on the conditions of most of the countries most of the time”

(Poe et al. 2001: 651).

The four indicators have been coded based on a four-point scale.1 The points denote

situations where the respective civil liberties are severely restricted (1), fairly restricted (2),

1 In transforming the information into the scores constituting the dataset, at least two independent coders (trained

graduate students well-versed in comparative politics and, regarding the (post-)communist and Latin American

countries for the period 1977-2003, also AUTHOR) assigned scores to all the country-years. In case of the Latin

American and (post-)communist countries 1979-2003, disagreements were settled by discussions among the coders, and

for the remaining disagreements a third coder was authorized with the final judgment. For a more detailed set of coding

standards we refer to the codebook: www.xxx.xx. Regarding inter-coder reliability tests, these have been run for all four

freedoms for all years. The percent agreement ranges from .70 (freedom of movement) to .77 (freedom of expression).

Cohen’s kappa is 0.61 for the freedom of religion scores, .64 for the freedom of movement scores, .64 for the freedom

6

modestly restricted (3), and not restricted (4). The four points are anchored in an overall distinction

between ideal typical characteristics of liberal, semi-liberal, illiberal, and anti-liberal regimes,

where the two intermediate categories are inserted symmetrically between the endpoints (cf. Munck

2006).

The four-point scale thus parallels the often employed division of political regimes

into democratic, semi-democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian types (cf. Merkel 1999; Linz 2000).

Noting that many contemporary countries fit poorly into the end points of democracy and

totalitarianism, the need for intermediate categories between democracies and authoritarian regimes

has long been recognized by scholars studying regime change (Diamond 2002; Merkel 2004;

Zakaria 1997). A similar reasoning can be extended to civil liberties. Indeed, many of the adjectives

attached to the democracy concept, such as ‘illiberal’ and ‘delegative’, denote combinations where

electoral competition occur in the absence of adequate protection of one or more civil liberties (cf.

Collier & Levitsky 1997: 438-441). Hence, it seems reasonable to include the semi-liberal score

into the scale. The term anti-liberal makes up a negative end-point of the scale which takes into

account the existence of extremely repressive (i.e., totalitarian) regimes.

The virtues of our dataset come into relief when comparing it with the civil liberties

rating included in the Freedom in the World survey provided by Freedom House (2011) and the

indicators for First Amendment-type rights included in the CIRI Human Rights Database (see

Cingranelli & Richards 2010), respectively. The widely employed civil liberties index by Freedom

House suffers from a number of shortcomings2 (Munck 2009; Coppedge & Gerring et al. 2011),

of assembly/association scores, and .67 for the freedom of expression scores. In all cases, this is within the range of

what Landis & Koch (1977) regard as good (substantial) agreement.

2 For example, the underlying coding scheme is merely a checklist that has undergone several changes over the years

and it does not specify the meaning of the different scores. Furthermore, the measure is rather incoherent – besides civil

liberties and personal integrity rights it also covers aspects such as personal social freedoms, absence of economic

7

most notably a blatant lack of disaggregate scores for the years 1972-2004. This problem does not

affect the impressive CIRI Human Rights Dataset, which includes scores for no less than seventeen

different human rights in the period 1981-2010. Among these are indicators for a number of First-

Amendment type rights: freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of

foreign movement, freedom of domestic movement, and freedom of religion. But even the CIRI

data has certain limitations compared to our dataset. First, in the case of freedom of speech and

freedom of assembly and association, scores for 33 small countries are only available for the years

after 2000. Second, inter-coder reliability tests have just been performed on the coding of one year

(2004). Third, the CIRI indicators are only measured on three-point scales.

To elaborate the third point, CIRI (Cingranelli & Richards 2008) score what they term

the freedom of speech by determining whether “Government censorship and/or ownership of the

media (including radio, TV, Internet, and/or domestic news agencies)” is (0) Complete, (1) Some,

or (2) None. One might make the critical observation that censorship and ownership of the press is

at most a subset of the freedom of speech. Moreover, the jump from ‘some’ censorship to

‘complete’ censorship is relatively big, meaning that the CIRI coding rules are unable to tease out

relevant differences among countries with low levels of the freedom of speech. Similar problems

affect the coding rules for “Citizens’ rights to freedom of assembly and association”. The three-

point scale here distinguishes between (0) Severely restricted or denied completely to all citizens,

(1) Limited for all citizens or severely restricted or denied for select groups, and (2) Virtually

unrestricted and freely enjoyed by practically all citizens. The code of 0 once again collapses

important differences, such as whether the freedom of assembly and association is very or next to

completely restricted.

exploitation, the right to own property and establish private business, gender equality, and freedom from war and

insurgencies.

8

Furthermore, the distinctions between no censorship, some censorship, and complete

censorship and between restricted, limited, or virtually unrestricted freedom of association and

assembly do not seem to be anchored in more general theoretical distinctions. Rather, they tend to

be of a more pragmatic nature, which is also reflected in the fact that the concepts linked to the

different levels differ between the coding of these rights, which makes it difficult to carry out

meaningful comparisons of absolute repression levels across the different liberties.

Considering these differences between the CIRI dataset and the CLD, it is not overly

surprising that the respective scores for the four civil liberties only correlate (Kendall’s Tau-b) in

the range of .544 -.727, even though they are based on the same source. Especially the pairwise

correlations between the two measures for freedom of expression/speech (.544) and the freedom of

assembly and association (.605), respectively, are rather low whereas the highest correlation (.727)

is found between the freedom of religion indicators. These correlations are of course not low in an

absolute sense, but compared to pairwise correlations between many measures of democracy (cf.

Casper & Tufis 2003), they are relatively low. This indicates that the two datasets capture different

aspect of the empirical variation in civil liberties and that the addition of the CLD is therefore not

superfluous.

In Table 1, we report the bivariate correlations between our civil liberties measures

and between these and the Freedom House (2011) civil liberties rating and the Political Terror Scale

(PTS) (see Wood & Gibney 2010; Gibney et al. 2011). The results show that the four civil liberty

indicators are highly correlated – especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and

association – but clearly not on a level where it makes no analytical sense to distinguish between

them.

[Table 1 about here]

9

Moreover, the results demonstrate that our civil liberties measures are consistently higher correlated

with Freedom House’s measure than with the (combined3) PTS. This finding is as expected

considering that our indicators should obviously tap into a more general measure of civil liberties to

a higher extent than they co-vary with violations of physical integrity rights.

Global trends, 1979-2010

One thing is co-variation; another is the absolute levels of repression across the four civil liberties.

As mentioned in the introduction, the four civil liberties included in our new dataset can be divided

into two sub-species based on the distinction between the more political civil liberties of freedom of

expression and freedom of assembly and association and the more private civil liberties of freedom

of movement and (especially) freedom of religion. Generally speaking, one would expect the

political liberties to be repressed more than the private liberties because the former are likely to

threaten the political power holders the most (cf. Davenport 2007). Indeed, the political liberties are

often treated as defining attributes of democracy (Dahl 1989; Merkel 2004; O’Donnell 2007), which

underlines that governments normally have a more direct interest in curtailing these compared with

less political liberties. Finally, among the political liberties, freedom of expression is likely to be

repressed more than freedom of assembly and association. Power holders have always fought open

criticism of their rule and according to Gearon (2006: 129): “If truth is the first casualty of war,

freedom of expression is the first target of the totalitarian”.

3 I.e., the average of the version based on Amnesty International’s Annual Report and the version based on Country

Reports on Human Rights Practices.

10

To what extent are the actual repression levels in line with these expectations?4 Figure

1, which depicts the global average scores rescaled to range from 0 (low respect) to 10 (high

respect), shows that freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association have indeed

been violated more than freedom of religion and freedom of movement over the entire period.

Moreover, as one would expect due to the boost of a liberal-democratic Zeitgeist (Fukuyama 1993;

Linz & Stepan 1996) and the emergence of a Western liberal hegemony in international affairs

(Levitsky & Way 2010), there was a sudden increase in respect for, first and foremost, the political

liberties at the end of the Cold War. This trend has clearly narrowed the gap between the two sets of

rights. Nonetheless, the absolute differences have remained clear-cut throughout the post-Cold War

era, which has generally been characterized by stagnation after the spike around 1989-91.

[Figure 1 about here]

But how do tendencies compare to the developments in respect for electoral rights. To

investigate this issue, we employ a recoded version of POLITY IV, which we have weighted and

aggregated in a way that secures a higher degree of concept-measure consistency than the standard

democracy-autocracy scale.5 Figure 1 shows that the 1989-91 juncture produced an abrupt increase

in the respect for electoral rights, which was followed by more gradual improvements. Hence,

electoral rights have experienced a much higher relative jump than the civil liberties. This

4 We only use the data from 1979 onwards due to the alleged biases and selective country coverage in the very first

years covered by the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

5 Based on the POLITY IV dataset, we have used the scores assigned to three indicators, viz. competitiveness of

participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, and openness of executive recruitment, weighted as suggested

by Goertz (2005: 97). The scores are then aggregated by taking the maximum value of the two latter (highly

overlapping) indicators in a single competition dimension (ass also suggested by Goertz) which is then multiplied with

the score of the first indicator as recommended by Munck (2009).

11

observation lends support to scholars (e.g., Diamond 2002; O’Donnell 2007; Zakaria 1997) who

have emphasized that the latest wave of democratization has been characterized by a remarkable a

liberal deficit.

We have also included the average (combined) PTS scores in the overview. It

demonstrates that the violation of physical integrity on average seem to have been relatively

resistant to the changes in 1989-91; actually the global mean scores during and after the Cold War

are not significantly different. This interesting finding indicates that the increased electoral

competition can have had cross-cutting (liberal vs. illiberal) effects (cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al.

2005; Cederman et al. 2010; Davenport 2004; Hegre et al. 2003).

The sequencing of civil liberties

Whereas differences in repression levels across different rights were clearly identifiable from the

graphs in Figure 1, we need further scrutiny of the data to see if they also lend support to the

existence of a more particular sequencing in the respect for civil liberties. In Table 2, we report the

means for each of the four measures over the entire period of 1976-2010. A mean score of 1 would

indicate that the civil liberty in question was severely violated everywhere in all years. Conversely,

a mean score of 4 would indicate that the civil liberty in question was not restricted at all across

space and time. In the table, the indicators have been ordered according to their mean value from

low to high.

[Table 2 about here]

The ordering suggests that for a particular country-year, a high score on any indicator

is matched by at least the same score on the indicators listed below this indicator in the table.

12

Hence, the numbers suggest that, in most cases, governments respect the freedom of religion and

the freedom of movement at least as much as the freedom of assembly and association, which they

respect at least as much as the freedom of expression. In addition, the differences in the average and

standard deviation (i.e., the frequency distribution) of the indicators indicate that if the indicators

are unidimensional, one needs to apply a method that is able to capture systematic differences in

‘difficulty’.

Mokken Scaling Analysis is of way of testing the presence of a systematic hierarchy

(Mokken 1971; Schuur 2011) as it “is a nonparametric probabilistic version of Guttman scaling”

(Schuur 2003: 139), i.e., a probabilistic cumulative scale. The scaling analysis tests whether

countries do indeed cross thresholds on our four civil liberties in an ordered/cumulative way,

meaning that we should only rarely find instances of other sequences. It does so, in the first

instance, by producing an H coefficient which indicates the homogeneity/scalability of such a

cumulative scale. This figure is achieved by comparing the number of deviations from a Guttman

scale with the expected number of deviations (based on a random distribution), given the hierarchy

between indicators indicated by the mean values. Running the scaling analysis, we also obtain H

coefficients for each of the scale items (the four civil liberties), which show the homogeneity of

each item with the rest of the items in the scale.

Mokken’s (1971) rule of thumb says that H>.5 indicates a strong scale. In their

attempt to scale physical integrity rights (i.e., disappearances, political killings, torture, and political

imprisonment), Cingranelli & Richards (1999) find a total H value of 0.59 and H coefficients for the

individual items between .55 and .64. The H coefficients for our scale and the individual

coefficients of the four indicators are reported in Table 2 above. The total scale coefficient is very

high (.767), with the coefficient for the four scale items ranging from a low of .694 (freedom of

religion) to a high of .818 (freedom of expression). Based on the H coefficients, the cumulative

13

scale is strongly one-dimensional and – allowing for its probabilistic nature – characterized by a

unique way to reach any combination of attributes if these are awarded a particular score. In other

words, such a unidimensional scale contains information about both the level and sequence of

government respect for civil liberties.

The scale runs from a low of 4 (all civil liberties severely restricted) to a high of 16

(no restrictions on any of the four civil liberties). As already indicated, these aggregate scores tell us

much more than that, say, Chile in 1990 (with a score of 13) ranks higher than, say, Burma in 2010

(with a score of 6). From the overall scale scores (the level of respect for civil liberties in general),

we can (probabilistically) infer the particular level of respect of each of the four civil liberties. To

exemplify, an aggregate score of 13 means that the country in question scores 4 on freedom of

religion and 3 on the other civil liberties.

In spite of the very high H coefficients, the established scale does not take the form of

a perfect hierarchy, however. In Table 3, we report the actual sequence of government respect for

the different civil liberties that finds most support in the data.

[Table 3 about here]

The pattern indicates that for all values of the scale, none of the private liberties are repressed more

than any of the political liberties, and – consistently across the scale – freedom of religion is not

repressed more than freedom of movement. However, freedom of assembly and association changes

from severely restricted to fairly restricted subsequent to freedom of expression. Table 3 also

reveals some additional exceptions to the stepwise hierarchical pattern as freedom of religion is

predicted to be unrestricted when freedom of expression is still fairly restricted, and freedom of

assembly and association only changes from severely restricted to fairly restricted at the scale value

14

of 10, although this, according to the logic of the proposed simple order scale, should already

happen with a combined score of 7. Taken together, the results thus indicate some noteworthy

violations of a stepwise difficulty (double monotonicity) in the fulfillment across the full spectrum

of civil liberties.

It is pertinent to note that if we had only used three-level scales – such as those

constructed by CIRI – we would have missed the surprising findings about exceptions to the

stepwise hierarchical pattern at high levels violations of civil liberties. This clearly comes out when

we rerun our Mokken scaling analysis using the CIRI indicators mentioned above.6 Such an

analysis furthermore shows that the extent to which the CIRI measures conform to a sequencing

hierarchy are much lower. The H coefficient for the four scale items ranges from a low of .58 to a

high of .69, meaning that the highest scale item coefficients using the CIRI data are lower than the

lowest coefficient using the CLD. Thus, while we do find the general hierarchy between the

political liberties and the more private liberties when using the CIRI data, we do not find nearly as

systematical a stepwise hierarchy across the board. We take this to show not only that the two

datasets are not identical but also as an indication of the higher validity of our data considering the

theoretical expectations about the existence of such a hierarchy.

Returning to the general patterns in the CLD data, in spite of the misfits discussed

above, the very high coefficients of homogeneity (H) lend strong support to the scalability of the

indicators. Based on the empirical patterns, it is thus possible to aggregate the civil liberties scores

into a unidimensional scale, running from 4 to 16. This can be done because Mokkan scaling uses

the proper aggregation rule given the hierarchical nature of the data, as opposed to using

aggregation procedures that assume similarity in means and standard deviations. Notice, however,

that the combined measure is by definition an ordinal scale. Creating an interval scale would entail

6 In our analysis, we have used CIRI’s ‘freedom of domestic movement’ measure to replace our more composite

‘freedom of movement’ measure.

15

assigning weights to the attributes. The advantage of a Mokken (as of a Guttmann) scale is exactly

that the weights are irrelevant “as long as the countries’ ratings match the perfect scale types”

(Coppedge & Reinicke 1990: 56).

Conclusions

In this paper, we have presented a new, global dataset on civil liberties, the CLD. We have used it

to reveal some strong patterns in the repression of civil liberties. Our data show that political

liberties have generally been repressed more than private liberties in all years between 1979 and

2010. Moreover, based on a Mokken scale analysis, we have identified a stepwise hierarchical

pattern across the four civil liberties: in general, freedom of expression is repressed at least as much

as freedom of association and assembly, which is repressed at least much as freedom of movement,

while freedom of religion is not repressed more than any of the other liberties. Despite some

interesting exceptions to this pattern, the result demonstrates that the civil liberties tap into a

common, underlying dimension, which lends support to the construction of a cumulative ordinal

scale.

We urge scholars to use this composite scale or the disaggregated scores to shed more

light on the violation of civil liberties since the third wave of democratization took off in the late

1970s. A first attempt to pursue some prominent issues has been carried out in this paper as we have

used the CLD to show that the end of the Cold War produced a spike in both electoral rights and

civil liberties. But though a rising tide lifts all boats, this abrupt increase has been asymmetrical in

that the average respect for electoral rights increased much more than the average respect for civil

liberties, and among the civil liberties, improvement in respect for political liberties were higher

than for the more private liberties. These findings go to show that a disaggregated, comparative

16

approach to regime change is necessary to understand important dynamics when it comes to

governments’ repression of fundamental rights.

17

References

Berg-Schlosser, Dirk (ed.) (2007). Democratization: The State of the Art. Opladen: Barbera Budrich

Publishers.

Berlin, Isaiah (2002). Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, B.; G. Downs; A. Smith & F. Cherif (2005).”Thinking Inside the Box: A

Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights.” International Studies Quarterly 49(3):

439-457.

Casper, Gretchen & Claudiu Tufis (2003). “Correlation Versus Interchangeability: The Limited

Robustness of Empirical Findings on Democracy Using Highly Correlated Data Sets.”

Political Analysis 11: 196-203.

Cederman, Lars-Henrik; Simon Hug & Lutz F. Krebs (2010). “Democratization and Civil War:

Empirical Evidence.” Journal of Peace Research 47(4): 377-394.

Cingranelli, David L. & David L. Richards (1999). “Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of

Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights.” International Studies Quarterly 43(2):

407-417.

Cingranelli David & David Richards (2008). The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data

Project Coding Manual. http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation.asp

Cingranelli, David & David Richards (2010). “The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights

Data Project.” Human Rights Quarterly 32(2): 401-424.

Collier, David & Steven Levitsky (1997). “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in

Comparative Research.” World Politics 49(3): 430-451.

Coppedge, Michael & Wolfgang Reinicke (1990). “Measuring Polyarchy.” Studies in Comparative

International Development 25(1): 51-72.

18

Coppedge, Michael & John Gerring, with David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Steven Fish, Allen

Hicken, Matthew Kroenig, Staffan I. Lindberg, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Holli A.

Semetko, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton & Jan Teorell (2011). “Conceptualizing and

Measuring Democracy: A New Approach.” Perspectives on Politics 9(2): 247-67.

Dahl, Robert A. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Davenport, Christian (2004). “The Promise of Democratic Pacification: An Empirical Assessment.”

International Studies Quarterly 48(3): 539-560.

Davenport, Christian (2007). “State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace.” Journal of Peace

Research 44(4): 485-504.

Diamond, Larry (2002): “Elections without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes.” Journal

of Democracy 13(2): 21-34.

Freedom House (2011). Freedom in the World. www.freedomhouse.org.

Gearon, Liam (2006). Freedom of Expression and Human Rights. Brighton: Sussex Academic

Press.

Gibney, Marc; Linda Cornett & Reed wood (2011). Political Terror Scale.

www.politicalterrorscale.org.

Goertz, Gary (2005). Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide. Princeton: Princeton University

Press.

Goldstein, Robert J. (1978). Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present.

Cambridge, MA: Schenkman.

Hegre, Håvard; Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates & Nils Petter Gleditsch (2001). “Toward a democratic

civil peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992.” American Political

Science Review 95(1): 33–48.

19

Innes, Judith E. (1992). “Human Rights Reporting as a Policy Tool: An Examination of the State

Department Country Reports.” Pp. 235-257 in Thomas B. Jabine & Richard P. Claude (eds.).

Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight. Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press.

Ishay, Micheline (2004). The History of Human Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Keith, Linda (2002). “Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1976-1996): Are

They More than Mere Window Dressing?” Political Research Quarterly 55(1): 111-143.

Landis, J.R. & Koch, G.G. (1977). “The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical

Data.” Biometrics 33(1): 159-174.

Landman, Todd (2006). Studying Human Rights. London: Routledge.

Levitsky, Steven & Lucan A. Way (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the

Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Linz, Juan J. (2000). Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Linz, Juan J. & Alfred Stepan (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:

Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Societies. Baltimore: The Johns

Hopkins University Press.

McNitt, Andrew D. (1988). ”Some Thoughts on the Systematic Measurement of the Abuse of

Human Rights.” Pp. 89-103 in David L. Cingranelli (ed.), Human Rights: Theory and

Measurement. Houndmills: Macmillan.

Merkel, Wolfgang (1999). Systemtransformation. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.

Merkel, Wolfgang (2004). “Embedded and Defective Democracies.” Democratization 11(1): 33-58.

Mokken, Robert (1971). A Theory and Procedure of Scale Analysis. The Hauge: Mouton.

20

Munck, Gerardo (2006). “Drawing Boundaries: How to Craft Intermediate Regime Categories.” Pp.

27-40 in Andreas Schedler (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree

Competition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Munck, Gerardo (2009). Measuring Democracy: A Bridge between Scholarship and Politics.

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

O’Donnell, Guillermo (2007). Dissonances: Democratic Critiques of Democracy. Notre Dame:

University of Notre Dame Press.

Poe, Steven, Sabine Carey & Tanya Vazquez (2001). “How are These Pictures Different? A

Quantitative Comparison of the US State Department and Amnesty International Human

Rights Reports, 1976-1995.” Human Rights Quarterly 23(3): 650-677.

Schuur, Wijbrandt H. van (2003). “Mokken Scale Analysis: Between the Guttman Scale and

Parametric Item Response Theory.” Political Analysis 11(2): 139-163

Schuur, Wijbrandt H. van (2011). Ordinal Item Response Theory: Mokken Scale Analysis.

Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Skaaning, Svend-Erik (2010). “Measuring Civil Liberty: An Assessment of Standards-Based Data

Sets." Revista de Ciencia Política 29(3): 721-740.

Waldron, Jeremy (2003). “Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance.” Journal of Political

Philosophy 11(2): 191-210.

Wood, Reed & Mark Gibney (2010). “The Political Terror Scale: A Re-introduction and

Comparison to CIRI.” Human Rights Quarterly 32(2): 367-400.

Zakaria, Fareed (1997). “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs 76(6): 22-43.

21

Table 1: Correlation between civil liberty indicators, 1976-2010

Freedom of

Expression

Freedom of

Assembly and

Association

Freedom of

Religion

Freedom of

Movement

Civil

Liberties

(FH)

PTS

(combined)

Freedom of

Expression

1.00

(5999)

.771

(5999)

.551

(5999)

.634

(5999)

-.751

(5815)

.438

(5399)

Freedom of

Assembly and

Association

1.00

(5999)

.535

(5999)

.621

(5999)

-.762

(5815)

.391

(5399)

Freedom of

Religion

1.00

(5999)

.535

(5999)

-.501

(5815)

.334

(5399)

Freedom of

Movement

1.00

(5999)

-.615

(5815)

.477

(5399)

Civil Liberties

(FH)

1.00

(6710)

-.476

(5403)

Note: Entries are correlations coefficients (Kendall’s tau-b), number of country-years in parentheses.

22

Table 2

Mean, standard variation, and H coefficients for the civil liberties, 1976-2010

Mean Standard deviation H coefficient (Loevinger)

Freedom of Expression 2.52 .963 .818

Freedom of Assembly and

Association

2.67 1.126 .796

Freedom of Movement 3.23 .810 .744

Freedom of Religion 3.38 .783 .694

Note: H scale 0.767, N=5999

23

Table 3

Sequencing of respect for civil liberties: Mokken scale predictions of patterns

Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and

Association

Freedom of Movement Freedom of Religion

4 Severely restricted Severely restricted Severely restricted Severely restricted

5 Severely restricted Severely restricted Severely restricted Fairly restricted

6 Severely restricted Severely restricted Fairly restricted Fairly restricted

7 Fairly restricted Severely restricted Fairly restricted Fairly restricted

8 Fairly restricted Severely restricted Fairly restricted Modestly restricted

9 Fairly restricted Severely restricted Modestly restricted Modestly restricted

10 Fairly restricted Fairly restricted Modestly restricted Modestly restricted

11 Fairly restricted Modestly restricted Modestly restricted Modestly restricted

12 Fairly restricted Modestly restricted Modestly restricted Unrestricted

13 Modestly restricted Modestly restricted Modestly restricted Unrestricted

14 Modestly restricted Modestly restricted Unrestricted Unrestricted

15 Modestly restricted Unrestricted Unrestricted Unrestricted

16 Unrestricted Unrestricted Unrestricted Unrestricted

24

Figure 1

Development in average respect for civil liberties, political terror, and democracy, 1979-2010

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

19

79

19

80

19

81

19

82

19

83

19

84

19

85

19

86

19

87

19

88

19

89

19

90

19

91

19

92

19

93

19

94

19

95

19

96

19

97

19

98

19

99

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

20

10

Fredom of religion Freedom of movement

Freedom of assembly/association Freedom of expression

Political terror (PTS) Democracy (Polity)