resolution - sandiganbayansb.judiciary.gov.ph/resolutions/2017/h_crim_sb-10... · prosecution,...

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBAY AN

Quezon City

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILI PINES,Plaintiff,

-versus- S8-10-CRM-0086-0087For: Falsification of Public

Document (Art. 171,paragraph 4 of the RevisedPenal Code and Perjury

DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO,Accused.

Present:

DE LA CRUZ, J., ChairpersonECONG, J. andCALDONA, J.

PROMULGATED:..,

AUG 0 Z 2017 -~

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CALOONA, J.:

Before the court for resolution is the Urgent Motion to Dismiss [by

reason of Res Judicata Based on the Decision dated 10 February 2015

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affirmed with Finality by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 220420] dated May

1, 2017 filed by accused Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio, through counsel, as well

as the Comment/Opposition thereto dated May 1,6, 2017 filed by the

prosecution, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which elicited the

Reply dated June 29, 2017.

Accused-movant Villa-Ignacio seeks the dismissal of the instant

criminal cases for falsification of public document and perjury in view of the

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 10, 2015 dismissing the

administrative complaint against him for Dishonesty and Conduct

Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, which was affirmed with

finality by the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated December 7, 2015.

According to the accused-movant, the Court of Appeals found the

administrative case wanting in substantial evidence which is the requisite

quantum of proof for charges of that nature. He thus contended that the

instant cases which require a higher quantum of proof, that is, beyond

reasonable doubt, should be dismissed considering that all these charges

arose from his single act alleged to be a clear and deliberate falsehood in

filling out Question No. 24 of his 2005 Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)

Personal Data Sheet (PDS) in connection with his application for the

position of Ombudsman quoted hereunder:

Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or otherwiseimposed a sanction for the violation of any law, decree, ordinanceor regulation by any court, tribunal, or any other government office,agency or instrumentality in the Philippines or any foreign countryor found guilty of an administrative offenses or imposed anyadministrative sanction?

He posited that the Court of Appeals found that the act complained of

does not constitute "betrayal of public trust" as a ground for dismissal as a

special prosecutor as defined in the case of Gonzales vs. Office of the

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President', He further contended that the CA ruling characterized his non-

disclosure in his PDS as "plain error of judgment, where circumstances

indicate that there is good faith and a lack of any attendant bad faith

necessary to constitute betrayal of public trust" which thus negates the

crimes of falsification of public document and perjury. Considering that the

same judgment is already final and executory, the accused-movant

asseverated that the instant criminal cases are dismissible under the

doctrine of res judicata.

For its part, the prosecution countered that res judicata is a doctrine

of civil law and cannot be applied in the instant criminal proceedings.

Furthermore, the administrative case and the criminal case do not involve

the same cause of action which is one of the indispensable elements for

the doctrine to apply. The prosecution likewise maintained that the criminal

case is of an independent nature and the Sandiganbayan must determine

the accused-movant's liability without its hands being tied by what

transpired in the administrative case. Additionally, the prosecution pointed

out that the CA did not categorically rule that accused-movant acted in

good faith when it cited the case of Gonzales but it merely emphasized and

discussed the phrase "betrayal of public trust" as a ground for the dismissal

of a special prosecutor. Thus, whether accused-movant's act or omission

was a plain error of judgment which indicates good faith and lack of bad

faith is a matter to be threshed out when he presents his defense in a full-

blown trial.

In his Reply, the accused-movant contended that the Supreme Court,

In a number of cases, applied the doctrine of res judicata by

conclusiveness of judgment in dismissing criminal cases. He further

I G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012


contended that conclusiveness of judgment does not require identity of

causes of action.

As a general proposition, it is well-entrenched rule that public officials

are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a

wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and

administratively liable for the same act. Administrative liability is thus

separate and distinct from penal and civil liability2. Thus, the dismissal of

the administrative case does not preclude the filing or continuation of the

criminal case against the erring public official.

A circumspect consideration, however, of the decision of the CA in

dismissing the administrative case against herein accused-movant which

was later affirmed by the Supreme Court, leads this Court to depart from

the aforecited general rule. The CA held that the failure of Villa-Ignacio to

disclose in his 2005 PDS the administrative case wherein he was

reprimanded by the Supreme Court on account of his failure to act on a

motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period in a case pending

before his sala while he was an RTC judge does not constitute "betrayal of

public trust". In its decision, it quoted at length the definition of the said

phrase as discussed in the case of Gonzales vs. Office of the President',

VIZ:

While it was deemed broad enough to cover any violation of theoath of office, the impreciseness of its definition also createdapprehension that "such an overarching standard may be too broadand may be subject to abuse and arbitrary exercise by thelegislature." Indeed, the catch-all phrase betrayal of public trustthat referred to "all acts not punishable by statutes as penaloffenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue inoffice" could be easily utilized for every conceivable misconduct ornegligence in office. However, deliberating on some workable

Melendres vs Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, et. al., G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012,citations omitted.3 Ibid.

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standard by which the ground could be reasonably interpreted, theConstitutional Commission recognized that human error and goodfaith precluded an adverse conclusion:

MR. VILLACORTA: x x x One last matter with respectto the use of the words "betrayal of public trust" asembodying a ground for impeachment that has been raisedby the Honorable Regalado. I am not a lawyer so I cananticipate the difficulties that a layman may encounter inunderstanding this provision and also the possible abusesthat the legislature can commit in interpreting this phrase. Itis to be noted that this ground was also suggested in the1971 Constitutional Convention. A review of the Journals ofthat Convention will show that it was not included; it wasconstrued as encompassing acts which are just short ofbeing criminal but constitute gross faithlessness againstpublic trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusablenegligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise ofdiscretionary powers. I understand from the earlierdiscussions that these constitute violations of the oath ofoffice, and also I heard the Honorable Davide say that eventhe criminal acts that were enumerated in the earlier 1973provision on this matter constitute betrayal of public trust aswell. In order to avoid confusion, would it not be clearer tostick to the wording of Section 2 which reads: "may beremoved from office on impeachment for and conviction ofculpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, andother high crimes, graft and corruption or VIOLATION OFHIS OATH OF OFFICE", because if betrayal of public trustencompasses the earlier acts that were enumerated, then itwould behoove us to be equally clear about this lastprovision or phrase.

MR. NOLLEDO: x x x I think we will miss a goldenopportunity if we fail to adopt the words "betrayal of publictrust" in the 1986 Constitution. But I would like him to knowthat we are amenable to any possible amendment. Besides,I think plain error of judgment, where circumstancesmay indicate that there is good faith, to my mind, willnot constitute betrayal of public trust if that statement willallay the fears of difficulty in interpreting the term.

The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonablyacceptable for the phrase betrayal of public trust to refer to "[a]ctswhich are just short of being criminal but constitute grossfaithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power,inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise ofdiscretionary powers". In other words, acts that should constitutebetrayal of public trust as to warrant removal from office may be

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less than criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of suchgravity and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment.

x x x

From the foregoing definition, betrayal of public trust refers to acts

which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness

against public trust, among others. Acts that should constitute betrayal of

public trust as to warrant removal from public office "may be less than

criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity and

seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment".

While the CA did not categorically state that Villa-lqnacio was in good

faith, its express statement that the act complained of does not constitute

betrayal of public trust clearly points towards the conclusion that the act

was not "attended by bad faith" as gleaned from the definition of the

phrase. Stated otherwise, the clear import of the pronouncement of the CA

is its finding that there was no bad faith on the part of Villa-Ignacio to

warrant his dismissal from the service. Too, the CA ruled that he cannot be

meted out the extreme penalty of dismissal considering that the case

concealed was not of a serious nature but one which involved his failure to

resolve a motion within the period prescribed by law for which he was only

reprimanded by the Supreme Court. The CA went on to state that what

mitigated his case was the fact that he mentioned in his PDS all the other

cases filed against him. The absence of bad faith therefore negates the

presence of criminal intent sufficient to sustain the instant charges for

falsification and perjury. In fact, good faith is a defense in falsification of

public documents". Anent the crime of perjury, the element of making a

willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood is thus considered lacking in

this case. Verily, the elements for such offenses were not met.

4 Layug vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 121047-57, August 16, 2000.


In fine, the CA held that the standard of substantial evidence was not

satisfied and thus dismissed the administrative complaint against herein

accused-movant. It ruled in this wise:

The quantum of proof necessary for the finding of guilt inadministrative cases is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence ,which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence asa reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support aconclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable. Thestandard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there isreasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for themisconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not beoverwhelming or even preponderant. While substantial evidencedoes not necessarily import preponderance of evidence 'as isrequired in an ordinary civil case, or evidence beyond reasonabledoubt as is required in criminal cases, it should be enough for areasonable mind to support a conclusion.

The finding of the CA that the act of the accused in answering

Question No. 24 does not constitute betrayal of public trust which, on the

basis of its given definition, indicates lack of attendant bad faith, is

conclusive upon this court and thus precludes the prosecution of the instant

criminal cases. The case of Constantino vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. 5 cited

by the accused-movant is instructive, thus:

Although the instant case involves a criminal charge whereasConstantino involved an administrative charge, still the findings inthe latter case are binding herein because the same set of facts arethe subject of both cases. What is decisive is that the issuesalready litigated in a final and executory judgment preclude by theprinciple of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of resjudicata, and even under the doctrine of law of the case, the re-litigation of the same issue in another action. It is well establishedthat when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined bya court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed,it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity withthem. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the caseand what was once irrevocably established as the controlling legalrule or decision continues to be binding between the same partiesas long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue

5 G.R. No. 140656, September 13, 2007,citations omitted.

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to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the bindingeffect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrectedanew since such issue had already been resolved and finally laid torest, if not by the principle of res judicata, at least byconclusiveness of judgment.

It may be true that the basis of administrative liability differs fromcriminal liability as the purpose of administrative proceedings on theone hand is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the otherhand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment ofthe crime. However, the dismissal by the Court of theadministrative case against Constantino based on the same subjectmatter and after examining the same crucial evidence operated todismiss the criminal case because of the precise finding that the actfrom which liability is anchored does not exist.

It is likewise clear from the decision of the Court in Constantinothat the level of proof required in administrative cases which issubstantial evidence was not mustered therein. The sameevidence is again before the Court in connection with the appeal inthe criminal case. Ineluctably, the same evidence cannot withgreater reason satisfy the higher standard in criminal cases such asthe present case which is evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

Additionally, the court finds merit in the contention of the accused-

movant that the presentation of evidence in the criminal cases at bench

based on the same facts and evidence as that in the administrative case

will be a futile and useless exercise as enunciated in the case of People vs.

Sandiganbayan6 which he cited, viz:

Although the dismissal of the criminal case cannot be pleadedto abate the administrative proceedings primarily on the ground thatthe quantum of proof required to sustain administrative charges issignificantly lower than that necessary for criminal actions, thesame does not hold true if it were the other way around, that is, thedismissal of the administrative case is being invoked to abate thecriminal case. The reason is that the evidence presented in theadministrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence tobe presented in the criminal case. The prosecution is certainly notprecluded from adducing additional evidence to discharge theburden of proof required in the criminal cases. However, if thecriminal case will be prosecuted based on the same facts andevidence as that in the administrative case, and the court trying thelatter already squarely ruled on the absence. of facts and/or

6 G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010, citations omitted.


circumstances sufficient to negate the basis of the criminalindictment, then to still burden the accused to present controvertingevidence despite the failure of the prosecution to present sufficientand competent evidence, will be a futile and useless exercise.

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Urgent Motion to Dismiss filed

by the accused-movant is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the criminal

cases for falsification of public document and perjury filed against Dennis

M. Villa-Ignacio are DISMISSED.

The bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is ordered

released, subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures.

The Hold Departure Order (HDO) issued against the accused in

these cases is hereby recalled.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines

~'<'7lll\4,Ou~L'-_DO M. CALDONA

·---+--I"'\~sociateJustice

WE CONCUR:

EFREN ~)ci.J=LA CRUZAsso~~te Justice

Chairperson

~~~GERALDINE FAITH A. EtONG

Associate Justice

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