resilient network coding in the presence of eavesdropping byzantine adversaries

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ISIT 2007. Resilient Network Coding in the Presence of Eavesdropping Byzantine Adversaries. Proof incorrect!. 2009. Hongyi Yao. Sidharth Jaggi. Michael Langberg. Open University of Israel. Tsinghua University. NetCod 2010. OR. Network Codes Resilient to Eavesdropping and Jamming. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • Resilient Network Coding in the Presence of Eavesdropping Byzantine AdversariesMichael LangbergSidharth JaggiOpen University of IsraelISIT 2007Tsinghua UniversityHongyi YaoProof incorrect!2009

  • Network Codes Resilient to Eavesdropping andJammingMichael LangbergSidharth JaggiORHow to share a secretwhen a (bad) persons listeningand trying to fool the receiverOpen University of IsraelTsinghua UniversityHongyi YaoUniversity of CampinasDaniloSilvaNetCod 2010

  • MulticastALL of AlicesinformationdecodableEXACTLYbyEACH Bob Network Model

  • Multicast Network ModelALL of AlicesinformationdecodableEXACTLYbyEACH Bob [ACLY00] With mixing, C = min{Ci} achievable[LCY02],[KM01],[JCJ03],[HKMKE03] Simple (linear) distributed codes suffice

  • Problem!Eavesdropped Links ZIAttacked Links ZOCorrupted links

  • Background

    Existence proofs/ConversesEfficient random distributed schemesCryptographic schemesUniversal schemesPrivacy (Secrecy)[CY02], , [RS07], [FMSS04],[OB08], [SK08],Security (Error Correction)[CY06]/[YC06], , [M06], [JLKKHM07],[CJL06], [GP06], [ZKMH07], [KK07], [SKK08]

  • SetupScheme A B CNetwork CData ACode CBad links CRandomness ATransmission A B CDecode BEurekaEavesdropped links ZIAttacked links ZOWho knows whatStagePrivacy

  • BackgroundEfficient algorithms[SK08][JLKKHM07],[SKK08]Optimal rates (Secrecy) C-ZI (Security) C-2ZOPoly-timeDistributedEnd-to-endPacket-basedTopology unknown a prioriInformation-theoretically secure, private

  • Privacy at rate C-ZI ([CY02],)ZI random symbolsC-ZI rateNetwork coding + one-time padOptimalZI eavesdropped links

  • Security at rate C-2ZO (,[SKK08])Optimal rateR = C-2ZOError-correcting codeNetwork(Operator channel [KK07], Rank-metric codes [SKK08])ZO corrupted links

  • Privacy + Security at rate C-2ZO-ZIOptimal rate for zero-error codesNetwork error-correcting codeRate C-2ZOZI random symbolsOverall rate C-2ZO-ZI[NY09], [SK10]-error?

  • Shared-secret Security at rate C-ZO[JLKKHM07]Invertible w.h.p. [HKMKE03]C2 secret hashes of XLinear list with C2 variables*Secure transmission at rate C-ZO!Secure + private transmission at rate C-ZO-ZI!w.h.p., unique decoding!* Different list-decoding used

  • Upper bound: C-ZO-ZI

  • Just one (secret) bit for Bob[JL07]??

  • Just one (secret) bit for Bob[YSJL10]Privacy: [SK08] (Only sees ZI links)Security:

  • Questions?



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