RESILIENCEAN ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION PERSPECTIVE

Bob Prietowith David Vaughn and Jeff Plumblee

© 2015 by Bob Prieto, David Vaughn, and Jeff Plumblee, Fluor All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a data base or retrieval system, except as permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Printed in the United States of America ISBN 978-1-329-19542-4

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Acknowledgements

Resilience: An Engineering & Construction Perspective reflects my continued research and work on the challenges of large scale engineering & construction programs. At one level, this book considers a special type of such a program, namely the recovery following what I have termed an “event of scale” reflecting the fact that these events may be both manmade as well as natural in origin. At a deeper level, it reflects my observations from witnessing the good, bad and ugly of large scale disaster response and recovery efforts from an engineering & construction perspective. This second perspective was initially built not by design, but rather by happenstance and circumstance, but continues to intersect my professional life to this date. This book is somewhat unique for me in at least two significant ways. First, it is the first book that I have done with co-authors, but I suspect not the last. The contributions by David Vaughn and Jeff Plumblee to the way I think about resilience have been important and have greatly expanded my perspective. The second unique aspect of this book lies in the fact that it is a companion work to Resilience: Managing the Risk of Natural Disaster, co-authored by David Vaughn, Jeff Plumblee, Jonathan Vaughn and myself. Together, these books offer the reader some fresh perspectives on the challenges and opportunities that exist before and after disaster strikes and how to act to improve outcomes. This work further builds on the extensive contributions of TISP – The Infrastructure Security Partnership, with whom I have been able to participate over the years. This book is published with the full permission and encouragement of Fluor Corporation and select graphics throughout this book are copyright and are reprinted by permission of Fluor Corporation. Opinions expressed in the book are those of the authors and not Fluor Corporation.

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About the Author

Bob Prieto Senior Vice President, Fluor Bob is currently a senior vice president of Fluor, one of the largest, publicly traded engineering and construction companies in the world. He focuses on the development and delivery of large, complex projects worldwide across

all of the firm’s business lines. Bob consults with owners of large engineering & construction capital construction programs across all market sectors in the development of programmatic delivery strategies encompassing planning, engineering, procurement, construction and financing. He is author of “Strategic Program Management,” “The Giga Factor: Program Management in the Engineering and Construction Industry,” “Application of Life Cycle Analysis in the Capital Assets Industry” and “Capital Efficiency: Pull All the Levers” published by the Construction Management Association of America (CMAA) and “Topics in Strategic Program Management,” as well as over 500 other papers and presentations. Bob is a member of the ASCE Industry Leaders Council, National Academy of Construction and a Fellow of the Construction Management Association of America. Bob served until 2006 as one of three U.S. presidential appointees to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Business Advisory Council (ABAC), working with U.S. and Asia-Pacific business leaders to shape the framework for trade and economic growth and had previously served as both Chairman of the Engineering and Construction Governors of the World Economic Forum and co-chair of the infrastructure task force formed after September 11th by the New York City Chamber of Commerce. Previously, he served as Chairman at Parsons Brinckerhoff (PB). Bob Prieto can be contacted at Bob.Prieto@fluor.com.

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Other Works by Bob Prieto

“Strategic Program Management” Construction Management Association of America (CMAA) ISBN 978-0-9815612-1-9 July 24, 2008

Topics in Strategic Program Management ISBN 978-0-557-52887-5 July 2010

The GIGA Factor; Program Management in the Engineering & Construction Industry CMAA ISBN 978-1-938014-99-4 2011

Application of Life Cycle Analysis in the Capital Assets Industry CMAA ISBN 978-1-938014-06-2 (eBook) ISBN 978-1-938014-07-9 (Print) June 2013

Capital Efficiency: Pull All the Levers CMAA ISBN 978-1-938014-08-6 (eBook) ISBN 978-1-938014-09-3 (Print) June 2013

Topicsin

Strategic Program Management

Bob Prieto

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David Vaughn Founder and Owner, Integrated Resilience, LLC David is the Founder and Owner of Integrated Resilience, LLC, a full spectrum service offering for pre- and post-event risk management solutions. These services include site-specific multi-hazard modeling and assessments,

multidimensional vulnerability assessments, preventative action plans, recovery plans, tabletop exercises, public/private integration, insurance coordination, and comprehensive recovery services. Beyond the business-focused offering, strategies and tools have been developed to build Community Resilience. These tools and plans leverage a development strategy based upon a resilient engineering framework that focuses on process- and outcome-driven accountability. David is a former Fluor Fellow and the Director of Resilience Solutions, and he has also served as the Secretariat of the WEF DRP in Greenville, South Carolina. There, he developed resilience strategies that offered risk reduction and capability/capacity building in developed and developing regions of the world. David’s experience in rapid deployment, planning, disaster management, and reconstruction is a culmination of his work in support of the U.S. Army Sustainment Command, FEMA, and various private sector companies. David’s passion for his profession is demonstrated by his personal commitment to a number of humanitarian projects, including: • Acting as the Project Manager for Haitian development projects while

mentoring the student group of Clemson Engineers for Developing Countries. Under David’s guidance, this team received awards in 2014 from the Institute of International Education and in 2010 from the university and the State of South Carolina for their efforts.

• In honor of his support for engineering students who are changing the world, David was awarded the 2014 Distinguished Service Award and 2012 Martin Luther King Jr. Excellence in Service Award from Clemson University.

David is a graduate of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte with a B.S. in Civil Engineering.

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Jeff Plumblee Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Clemson University Jeff is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Online Education for Sustainability at Clemson University, working on a number of sustainability and resilience-related research endeavors. Jeff has been working in

resilience/hazard mitigation with government, commercial, and non-profit clients for seven years. Jeff spent two years working at Fluor Corporation to help develop their Resilience Solutions group. Prior to joining Fluor, Jeff earned a Ph.D. and MBA from Clemson University, where he studied the relationship between sustainability and resilience in civil engineering under a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship. Jeff also works to develop the next generation of socially conscious engineers through Clemson Engineers for Developing Countries. Jeff founded the award-winning program in 2009 as a graduate student and has helped oversee numerous projects to build the resilience of the Central Plateau of Haiti. The program began with the renovation and expansion of a water treatment and distribution system in Cange, Haiti. Since, the program has grown to encompass developing the region’s economy, improving construction standards, bolstering other infrastructure, and increasing agricultural yields. Partially based upon the successes of CEDC, Jeff has helped Fluor create ENDURE (Efficient National Development Using Resilient Engineering), a program that helps developing areas realize capability and capacity, while simultaneously building their resilience.

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Table of Contents

Introduction & Perspective Chapter 1 Phases of an Event of Scale from a Relief, Response

and Reconstruct Perspective Chapter 2 Personal Perspective: Program Management and

Events of Scale Resist Chapter 3 Infrastructure Resiliency: Do We Have The Focus

Right? Chapter 4 Identifying, Assessing and Tracking Resiliency for a

Program or Capital Asset Owner Chapter 5 “Black Swan” Risks Respond Chapter 6 Response and Transition to Recovery Recover Chapter 7 A Post Disaster Reconstruction Model Chapter 8 Intersection of Engineering, Construction and

Logistics Post-Disaster Resiliency Chapter 9 System Level Performance – The Seventh Dimension Chapter 10 Program Management Scope for Assessing Business

Continuity & Resiliency of Public and Private Infrastructure and Facility Assets

Chapter 11 Business Continuity and Disaster Management for Industrial Installations

Chapter 12 Emerging Topics in Resilience References Appendices

Appendices Opportunity Analysis Appendix 1 Experience on Projects Requiring Rapid Mobilization Appendix 2 A 7DSM Future is Essential to Support Resilience Appendix 3 References

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Tables

Table 2-1 My Perspective During Events of Scale Table 2-2 Resist Phase Lessons Learned Table 2-3 Respond Phase Lessons Learned Table 2-4 Recover Phase Lessons Learned Table 3-2 Comparison of Public & Private Infrastructure Table 6-1 Emergency Planning Checklist Table 6-2 Emergency Preparedness Checklist Table 6-3 Contingency Operations Teams Supply Checklist Table 8-1 Logistics Affecting Activities Table 8-2 Typical Stabilization and Post-Disaster Labor

Requirements Table 8-3 Cost of Labor and Building Materials in Aceh; Late 2004

to Late 2006 Table 8-4 Cost of Labor and Building Materials in Sichuan; Mid 2008

to Mid 2009 Table 8-5 Logistics Affecting Engineering and Construction

Activities Table 10-1 Map Based Information (Typical) Table 10-2 Resiliency and Business Continuity Assessment Model

Scope Table 11-1 Hazards Checklist for Electrical Installations in Industrial

Locations Table 11-2 Risk Assessment Checklist Electrical Installations in

Industrial Locations Table 11-3 Simplified Risk Assessment Matrix Table 11-4 Simplified Risk Mitigation/Risk Response Plan Table A1-1 Recruiting Capability Table A1-2 Learned and Experiences of Emergency Responses

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Figures

Figure 1-1 Natural Disasters Reported 1900-2011 Figure 1-2 Phases of an Event of Scale Figure 2-1 DRN (Disaster Resource Network) established by World

Economic Forum after Gujarat Earthquake 2001 Figure 2-2 ABAC – APEC Business Advisory Council has

Recommended Regional Disaster Coordination Figure 2-3 Infrastructure is Required to Support “Development” but

is Simultaneously “Deformed” by the Very Development it Supports

Figure 4-1 Resiliency Assessment (Part 1) Figure 4-2 Resiliency Assessment (Part 2) Figure 4-3 Resiliency Assessment (Part 3) Figure 4-4 Phases of an Event of Scale Figure 4-5 Inherent Ability to Resist Off Normal Events Figure 4-6 Inherent Ability to Respond to Off Normal Events Figure 4-7 Inherent Ability to Recover From Off Normal Events Figure 5-1 The Rise of Complexity Figure 6-1 Resiliency Model Figure 7-1 Simplified Construction Model Figure 7-2 Project Inputs Figure 7-3 Business Framework Figure 7-4 Project Environment and Setting Figure 7-5 Social and Stakeholder Framework Figure 7-6 Economic and Political Framework Figure 7-7 Special Challenges Figure 7-8 Project Outputs Figure 8-1 Events of Scale Change the Landscape Figure 8-2 Strong Project Management Practices Required Figure 8-3 Training of Labor is Essential Figure 8-4 Fabrication Drives Logistics Figure 8-5 Temporary Construction Figure 8-6 Fleet maintenance is an Essential Logistical Activity Figure 9-1 Capital Asset Stress Test #1 Figure 9-2 Capital Asset Stress Test #2 Figure 9-3 Post Startup Resiliency Assessment Figure 10-1 Resiliency Model Figure 11-1 The New and Improved Preparedness Cycle under PPD-8 Figure 11-2 Estimated Damage ($ Billion) Caused by Reported

Natural Disasters 1900-2011 Figure 11-3 U.S. Hazard Maps Figure 11-4 Hazard Modeling Hurricanes Figure 11-5 Crisis Response Impact on Shareholder Value

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Figure 12-1 Susceptibility to Cascading Failure Figure 12-2 RTO vs. Cost Figure 12-3 Threat vs. Cost Figure 12-4 RTO vs. Threat vs. Cost Figure 12-5 RTO vs. Threat Breakeven Figure 12-6 Community Resilience Requires Partnership Between

Public, NGO and Private Sectors Figure A2-1 The First Three Dimensions Today Figure A2-2 The First Three Dimensions Tomorrow Figure A2-3 Fuzzy Spatial Positioning Figure A2-4 The Rise of Assemblies Figure A2-5 The Notion of Assemblies is a Key Change Figure A2-6 A Life Cycle Perspective Figure A2-7 Scenario based Futures Figure A2-8 Holistic Life Cycle View Figure A2-9 Important 6th Dimension Time Series Figure A2-10 The Efficient Frontier Figure A2-11 Indirect Asset Costs Figure A2-12 Hierarchy of Financing Structures Figure A2-13 Multi-dimensional Pareto Fronts

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Resilience is the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events of scale.

The effectiveness of a resilient capital asset or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a

potentially disruptive event of scale.

Resilience – The ability to resist, absorb, recover from, or successfully adapt to adversity or change of conditions such as a terrorist attack,

hurricane, earthquake, technological failure (dam collapse or nuclear power plant accident. (DHS 2009)

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Events of scale, whether they are manmade or natural, are becoming increasingly common events in an increasingly complex and networked world. The impact of natural events is further amplified by growing populations in vulnerable areas, prone to earthquake, wind or water driven disasters. Preparing for and addressing these events require increased levels of engineering and logistical support, often requiring the mobilization and reconfiguration of global supply chains. Anticipating and understanding the nature of this engineering and logistical support, and the prerequisites and lead times associated with effectively deploying it, are essential to today’s disaster response and reconstruction efforts.

To assist in better planning for the deployment of engineering and logistical elements post-disaster, a phased event of scale framework is laid out in Figure 1-1. The intent is not to suggest that each of these activities are sequential, but rather to define major phases for purposes of delineating precursor activities and required capabilities. Only then can the often missing event master schedule be created at an early stage.

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Figure 1-1. Natural Disasters Reported 1900-2011. The phases considered include: • Pre-event • Event • First response • Mobilization of initial relief • Initial relief • Mobilization of transitional phase • Transitional phase • Mobilization of reconstruction • Reconstruction • Preparedness assessment

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Figure 1-2. Phases of an Event of Scale. 1.1 Pre-Event Phase

Not all events of scale occur without warning and all do benefit from some degree of pre-planning and preparation. This chapter does not look at preparedness as a precursor condition for an event of scale but rather only look at it in its aftermath. Having said that, certain events of scale do offer a narrow pre-event period. These may be measured in minutes to hours, for tsunami and certain flooding events, to days in the instance of major tropical storms, cyclones and hurricanes. Pre-event periods for human driven events of scale may be harder to ascertain, with pre-event periods only discerned in their aftermath. Pre-event activities during this period should include: • Emergency notification, including a real time assessment of the

emergency notification system for potential use during the event and the first response phase.

− Evacuation or sheltering, including an engineering and logistical assessment of evacuation routes or major shelters for the extent of the event and post-event operation anticipated. For example, attempting to evacuate populations in excess of logistical capability, may result in a more exposed population than under a partial shelter in place scenario. Similarly, sheltering decisions should consider ability to withstand the anticipated event and begin consideration of first response challenges posed by the selected sheltering strategy deployed. Pre-positioning of engineering first response and logistical teams. Engineering first response teams should be focused on assisting first response efforts associated with lifesaving and rescue opportunities. Such activities may include structural advice associated with ruble-entrapped individuals or continued

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habitability of damaged buildings. Risks to first responder operations would also be assessed.

− Damage assessment teams or dispatch and management functions related to such teams may be pre-positioned. Logistical and communication teams may be pre-positioned during this period to quickly bring vital logistical communications up immediately after the event and to quickly identify available logistical routes and staging areas.

1.2 Event Phase

Engineering and logistical activities, during the event and continuing into its immediate aftermath, should be focused on predictive forecasting of the nature, type, extent and pattern of damage. Areas at risk from secondary effects, such as flooding, should be identified and prioritized. Geospatial models may need to be updated to reflect any significant modifications caused by the event itself (new or blocked flow channels or basins as an example). Additional event phase activities should include: • Selection and refinement of disaster assessment checklists to be initially

used

• Pre-mobilization (alert) of first response and initial relief capabilities that were not or could not be pre-positioned as described above

• Updated inventory of engineering, logistical and supply chain capabilities based on initial and evolving predictive modeling of event requirements

• Identification of economic, political, business, social, stakeholder and project environment frameworks that must be activated or modified (see Figure 6-1)

• Activation of disaster response teams associated with supplemental engineering assessment or logistical support to first responders

− These may come in part from established disaster response organizations but, based on the extent of the event, may require supplement from other NGO or commercial organizations. Management plans must be in place for a coordinated engineering and logistical response. Clearly, responsibility for these plans must have been pre-established. This book is intended to aid in their development.

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1.3 First Response Phase

Engineering and logistical activities during the first response phase must, out of necessity, rely largely on resources already on the ground in the disaster area. When it has been possible to pre-position resources during the pre-event phase, these can provide a valuable complement and organizing framework for local resources. Engineering and logistical activities during the first response phase include: • Prime focus on lifesaving activities such as providing assistance on

assessing structural stability of collapsed or partially collapsed structures and ruble

• Focus on minimization of additional loss of life, including loss of first responder lives, by identifying, categorizing and assessing potential life threatening hazards associated with subsequent engineering failures

• Updating disaster assessment checklists to reflect the realities of the specific event

• Identifying evolving engineering and logistical needs during the First Response and Initial Relief phases and providing valuable input into mobilization plans for the Initial Relief phase

− These may include assessments of transitional shelter needs; availability and time to repair potable water, power and sanitary waste systems

− Changing logistical patterns including staging areas and locations for the Initial Relief phase and inputs into option analysis for the Transition Phase

Establishing logistical centers to meet the needs of the First Response phase and identifying engineering or other logistical limitations that must be addressed to meet First Response or Initial Relief phase activities. 1.4 Mobilization of Initial Relief Phase

The mobilization of initial relief activities are typically the domain of the principle national or international disaster relief organizations. The focus during this phase is very much about the saving and preservation of life, either in support of the first responder organizations already on the scene, or as added first responder capability where such capability proved to be inadequate for the scale of event involved. Initial relief activities will consist of continued rescue efforts such as those described above. In this regard, additional engineering resources may be deployed for what are effectively extended rescue operations. These must be fully mobilized early in this

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mobilization phase. Pre-positioned task orders are an essential element of first response. During this phase, emergency sheltering will be defined and part of the mobilization activity must include assessment of existing structures for continued use. In addition, plans for review of selected transitional shelter sites for safety, will also be developed during the Mobilization of Initial Relief such that during the Initial Relief phase, these assessments can be completed in a timely manner before desirable sites become committed to less than optimum usage. These site assessments are important, even in the Initial Relief phase for example, to ensure shelters are not in a potential flood plain as a result of event. Disaster assessment teams should be coming into full swing at this stage and logistical centers for initial relief activities fully stood up. Planning for transitional phase activities, including identification and action on enabling activities, should be started and completed early in the Initial Relief phase. Long lead transitional requirements should be initially established and supply chains organized to meet these needs. This last item will evolve as the post event period plays out. At each stage, engineering and logistical efforts must be focused not only on meeting current phase needs but also on establishing the framework for “vertical launch” of the subsequent phase. Recapping, during the Mobilization of Initial Relief, engineering and logistics activities include: • Continued engineering support for rescue operations including:

− Ruble field assessment

− Structural stability assessments

− Mobilization and deployment of heavy lift equipment

• Assessment of integrity and adequacy of existing sheltering options

• Definition of required emergency shelter requirements and review of selected sites from a safety and logistics standpoint

• Assessment of transitional shelter requirements

• Development of review plans for transitional shelter sites

• Complete deployment of disaster assessment teams

• Standup logistical centers for initial relief activities

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• Planning of transitional phase activities including:

− Identification and initiation of enabling activities

− Establishment of long lead requirements

− Configuration of event specific supply chains

• Planning for subsequent phases of event response initiated 1.5 Initial Relief Phase

The initial relief phase comes quickly on the heels of the First Response phase. In many ways, the two overlap and the transition from one phase to another will likely be uneven at best. While the First Response phase is very much focused on rescue and lifesaving operations, the Initial Relief phase is focused on preserving life and avoiding an even greater human tragedy by ensuring that the most basic human needs of shelter, food, water and basic medical care are met. During this initial relief effort, engineering and logistics are focused on supporting these primary human relief efforts in several different ways, including: • Ongoing assessment of existing shelter stability

• Identification of safe drinking water sources, including emergency restoration of drinking water treatment and distribution systems where possible

• Identification and stabilization of infrastructure essential to relief operations, including airport, port, landing zone, road and rail access Activities may include:

− Removal of debris

− Structural assessment and structural reinforcement as required

− Re-rating of damaged structures for emergency use in the Initial Relief phase

− Emergency dredging

− Reconfigured logistical chains associated with landside cargo handling at airport and seaports

− Restoration of power or provision of temporary power in support of Initial Relief phase logistical operations

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• Ongoing assessment of physical safety of sites associated with Initial Relief activities (structural collapse, flooding, mud slides)

• Operation of Initial Relief phase logistical centers

• Deployment of man camps to support Initial Relief phase activities including:

− Supporting infrastructure such as temporary power, water and waste treatment, and communications

• Assessment of physical infrastructure and potential sites for transitional shelters to:

− Identify current condition, constraints and requirements to restore utility for the Transition phase

− Select and reserve primary locations for transitional housing

− Facilitate long lead procurements

− Mobilize initial design and site preparation activities

− Identify requirements and availability of specialized labor; employment and training requirements to meet Transition phase needs

• Identification of logistical needs for transition phase activities and initiation of enabling activities

1.6 Mobilization of Transition Phase

As Initial Relief operations stabilize the post event situation, attention turns to providing the affected population with transitional assistance until reconstruction and other restoration activities can begin in earnest and ultimate transition to a new permanent condition completed. Much like the shift from First Response to Initial Relief phases, there will be an overlap and staggered shift from Initial Relief to Transition phase activities. This changeover is marked by the undertaking of various mobilization activities in anticipation of the Transition phase. During this mobilization for the Transition phase, engineering, construction and logistical activities grow in relative importance when compared to other relief activities. This shift in relative importance of the engineering and construction role is characteristic of post event periods. By contrast, logistical operations, while growing throughout the post event period, shift increasingly to more normal conditions. Essential engineering, construction and logistical activities during Mobilization of the Transition Phase include:

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• Identification of elements of permanent potable water system to support

Transition phase and mobilization of engineering and construction resources required.

• Identification of elements of permanent waste disposal system (liquid and solid wastes) to support Transition phase and mobilization of engineering and construction resources required.

• Identification of additional infrastructure repairs to be undertaken to support Transition phase and support initial Reconstruction phase activities and mobilization of engineering and construction resources required.

• Identification of permanent power generation repairs and replacements required and mobilization of engineering and construction resources required.

• Identification of reconfigured power distribution networks required to support Transition phase and early Reconstruction efforts and mobilization of engineering and construction resources required.

• Mobilization of engineering and construction resources to deploy Transition infrastructure including and transition shelter site infrastructure.

• Mobilization of construction and logistical resources to deploy transition phase shelters.

• Mobilize labor related training and employment activities including targeted local hire programs.

• Award long lead contracts to support engineering, construction and logistical activities including:

− Package treatment plants

− Power generation and distribution equipment

− Bulk material supply contracts related to aggregate, concrete and steel

− Ruble and debris processing equipment

− Hazardous material cleanup contracts to the extent not addressed in the Initial Relief phase

− Logistical operations

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1.7 Transition Phase

Transition phase activities recognize that in events of scale there may be an extended period after the initial relief phase before permanent reconstruction begins in earnest, providing final solutions to the problems created by the event. During the transition phase the focus is on returning some semblance of normalcy in meeting population and local economy needs while at the same time completing the planning, approvals, resourcing for permanent reconstruction. During this period engineering and construction activities continue to ramp up and logistical efforts shift to a more normalized footing. Engineering, construction and logistics activities during this phase include: • Engineering and construction of elements of permanent potable water

system to support Transition phase

• Engineering and construction of elements of permanent waste disposal system (liquid and solid wastes) to support Transition phase

• Engineering and construction of additional infrastructure repairs to support Transition and initial Reconstruction phase activities

• Engineering and construction of permanent power generation repairs and replacements

• Engineering and construction of reconfigured power distribution networks to support Transition and early Reconstruction efforts

• Engineering and construction of Transition infrastructure including transition shelter site infrastructure

• Construction and logistical support of transition phase shelters.

• Implementation of labor related training and employment activities including targeted local hire programs

• Construction, installation and operation of:

− Package treatment plants

− Power generation and distribution equipment

− Bulk material supply contracts related to aggregate, concrete and steel

− Ruble and debris processing equipment

• Hazardous material cleanup

• Transition phase logistical operations

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• Initial lessons learned assessments from an engineering, construction and logistics standpoint

1.8 Mobilization of Reconstruction Phase

The mobilization activities for the Reconstruction phase are likely not to occur at singular period of time; will likely have different development rates for different regions and different elements of the built environment; and will occur throughout much of the Transition phase, Specific engineering, construction and logistics activities will include: • Reconstruction planning

− Public buildings including government buildings, hospitals, schools, memorials

− Infrastructure

− Privately owned utilities and infrastructure

− Housing

− Industrial and commercial developments

• Surveying to re-establish property lines and rights

• Code modification to build on lessons learned at the earliest stages of reconstruction

• Permitting and approvals

• Estimates and budget development

• Funding and program management, engineering and construction contracting activities

− These will vary by sector and funding source

− Coordination to ensure broad priorities are met and logistical chain is adequate is required

• Construction labor agreements

• Definition of requisite safety, quality and inspection programs

1.9 Reconstruction Phase

Reconstruction activities, while representing the largest engineering and construction efforts post-event, also mark a return to relative normalcy although key framework elements may be significantly modified. Over time, more normal contracting strategies will tend to take hold except for the most critical elements of infrastructure which may be undertaken on an

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accelerated basis. Logistical chains during this period will ultimately normalize to reflect the now stabilized post event conditions which may differ in several significant ways from the pre-event condition. Engineering and construction in the post-event period is covered in Chapters 7 and 8. 1.10 Preparedness Assessment Phase

Key to long term learning and preparation for the inevitable “next event” is the performance of a Preparedness Assessment. This process acts to ensure that we have truly provided for the vital lessons we have learned through each stage of the post-event period. As we have moved through the post-event period not only will our insights have become deeper but so too will our perspective on some of the actions we undertook at the earliest stages of the post-event response. Did decisions on ruble disposal create delays or unneeded costs during the transition phase or reconstruction phase? Did temporary infrastructure decisions result in wasted efforts when permanent fixes could have been accomplished for marginally more time or money? Did management frameworks established at the earliest stages of the post-disaster period represent barriers for efficient reconstruction? The list of post-event lesson learned questions goes on. But more important may be whether what we have rebuilt will provide a better pre-event condition than what existed before the last event, or have we merely reconstructed a built environment that sows the seeds for shortfalls in responding to the next event of scale.

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Since early 2001, I have observed the impact of a series of high-profile events of scale. These events of scale have encompassed both man-made as well as naturally occurring events. The lessons outlined below are derived from a systems perspective and are, to a large degree, independent of the initiating event. Much has been written about individual events, the failures and successes in being prepared, the lessons learned in the immediate aftermath and the challenges during recovery. This chapter looks more broadly, focusing on programmatic features common in our preparation and planning to resist, respond and recover from these events. Careful consideration may improve our overall infrastructure resiliency and improve outcomes in the future. Table 2-1 summarizes my perspective in observing each of these events, and to the extent possible, the lessons learned have been grouped into what I view as the three phases of resiliency: • Resist phase • Respond phase • Recover phase Clearly, the list is not all-encompassing but provides a starting point and framework for future development. 2.1 Where My Involvement Began

Maybe it was the high altitude air and snow covered mountains of Davos, Switzerland or perhaps the eclectic collection of people from around the

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world that inspired nobler ideas. But whether from within or without, I came to a crossroads that very much changed how I thought about many things in life. How I perceived the world, or more specifically, the infrastructure systems that enabled the day to day functioning of the world we live in, changed in several fundamental ways. That day was January 26, 2001 and the Governors of the Engineering & Construction community of the World Economic Forum were due to have their annual meeting. Traditionally, this meeting was a time to renew global friendships and make new ones. But this day was different. We awoke to the news that Gujarat, India, had experienced a terrible earthquake the night before, with widespread failures in buildings and supporting infrastructure. We also awoke to find one of our members from India exhausted from a sleepless night on the telephone. He had been trying to mobilize the heavy equipment and other resources he had to respond to this horrific tragedy. But to his anger and frustration, “doing the right thing” was hampered by the lack of an efficient way for these new first responders, engineers and constructors to engage with the public sector.

Table 2-1. My Perspective During Events of Scale

Event Perspective Gujarat, India Earthquake • World Economic Forum

Engineering Governor 9/11 • Chairman $1 billion NYC

headquartered engineering firm • Co-chair NYC Partnership &

Chamber of Commerce Infrastructure Task Force

SARs • APEC Business Advisory Council (US representative appointed by President)

Tsunami • Co-founder Disaster Resource Network

• APEC Business Advisory Council (US representative appointed by President)

Bird Flu • APEC Business Advisory Council (US representative appointed by President)

Supermarket Fire, Paraguay • Co-founder Disaster Resource Network

South Asia Earthquake • Co-founder Disaster Resource Network

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Event Perspective Hurricane Relief, Grenada • Co-founder Disaster Resource

Network Katrina • Co-founder Disaster Resource

Network • Fluor served as FEMA response

contractor for public assistance and temporary housing

It was out of this frustration, and perhaps the thin air of the Swiss mountains, that the Disaster Resource Network (originally called Engineers without Borders in those early days) or DRN1 was first conceived. Later, we were to learn that at the same time, in another hotel in Davos, the Transportation and Logistics Governors were arriving at the very same conclusion.

The private sector has critical skills that can prove vital in the aftermath of a disaster, including engineering skills to probe collapsed buildings; logistical skills to transport and distribute supplies; technology skills to recover vital data and restore services; and above all, management skills to help organize all of the above. However, getting these skills where they are needed when they are needed is a formidable undertaking. This was the role of the DRN; to create a resource network that can be quickly mobilized in the wake of a disaster.

1 The DRN was later reconfigured and reconstituted as the Disaster Resource Partnership or DRP

Figure 2-1. DRN (Disaster Resource Network) established by World Economic Forum after Gujarat Earthquake 2001.

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Over the years, the DRN and its successor, the DRP, has added value where it can be quickly mobilized in the wake of a disaster. As a co-founder of the DRN and a board member, I have had the opportunity to consider many of the lessons learned from other disaster’s where we have been able to provide assistance. The need for such a clearinghouse was only reinforced by the terrorist attacks of September 11 and in February 2002 the DRN was formally launched by the World Economic Forum (WEF). 2.2 September 11: My Programmatic Focus Begins

in Earnest

I was in New York on September 11, 2001, and at the time serving as chairman of the city’s largest engineering firm and active in a number of the professional and business groups that bound the engineering and construction industry tightly to the fabric of the city. As the attacks unfolded, our response as a company and an industry began. I am proud of what we did and what we were able to achieve during those early minutes, hours and days but remain uncertain about whether we lost the opportunity in the recovery phase that such a disaster offered. Many of the key thoughts and observations that follow in this Chapter draw on my experience as a New Yorker; one who grew up and worked in the city throughout his entire career and who served as co-chair of the Infrastructure Task Force established by the New York City Partnership in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. They also draw on a dimension, which lay hidden until the aftermath of 9/11, namely as a student of the history of great engineering “system” failures. It was only in relatively calmer moments, after those first few weeks, that I realized what we had started in Davos. Namely, linking business more tightly into large scale and systemic disaster response, was the right thing to do. It was also during this period that the notion of the three phases of resiliency (3R’s) first began to develop in my own mind.

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In essence, I believe now, as I did then, that history has handed our profession an unusual challenge as well as an unmatched opportunity. How we respond will say much about the future of the heavily engineered environment we call our cities as well as much about our own profession. Our ability to provide effective and true program management for the broad array of infrastructure systems, which underpin the daily activities that we take for granted, will rest very much on our ability to embrace the lessons of history at their most fundamental level. 2.3 ABAC Experience

During the period of January 2003 to January 2006, I had the opportunity to serve as one of the three U.S. representatives to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Business Advisory Committee or ABAC. This position was held by three business leaders from each of the 21 economies that then comprised APEC. The role of ABAC was to advise the leaders of these 21 economies, as well as the U.S. administration on broad regional economic barriers, challenges and opportunities. This was a group with whom I had interacted with dating back to shortly after its inception. It was also one where my focus had traditionally been around the issues of infrastructure development and the ability to practice engineering in each of the region’s economies. Over time, the experience from my involvement in co-founding the DRN and my attention to how we could we learn from the events of 9/11, took my thinking and actions within this forum into some different directions. There were many drivers to this shift in personal focus. But the events in the APEC economies themselves were enough of an impetus. While 9/11 was an APEC event, in all honesty, I’m not sure it was thought of that way. At least not until the security requirements, which emerged, began to bite into the ability to efficiently move goods and people. If nothing else, APEC was about trade and business and on these, 9/11 had an impact on these. But it was really other events that drove the point home that events of scale had regional, if not global impacts. More importantly for me, the kind of infrastructure systems that they challenged were broader than what I had first considered after Gujarat or 9/11. My perspective from these earlier

Figure 2-2. ABAC – APEC Business Advisory Council has recommended regional disaster coordination.

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events, which by this time was fully a systems perspective, caused me to step back and look at some of the system vulnerabilities and challenges that APEC faced, as well as how the lessons learned, that I was able to articulate after 9/11, might apply. Additionally, this new perspective caused me to consider what might be learned from some other large-scale system failures and to try to articulate these lessons learned as part of a more comprehensive perspective. In many ways, this chapter is about trying to share this work with others who are charged, from a programmatic perspective, for planning and implementing the systems that will be required to deal with the future’s unknown events of scale. Let me turn, just for a second, to the APEC situation though. History has shown that APEC is vulnerable to severe economic shocks, especially those associated with these so called events of scale. Examples include: • Man-made

− 9/11

• Environmental

− SARS − Bird Flu

• Natural

− Earthquake − Tsunami

• NATECH (Natural leading to a failure of technology)

− Fukushima In many ways, APEC is the most vulnerable region in the world to these broad impacting events of scale with: • 60% of the World’s Population • 9 of the10 Largest Earthquakes of Last Century • 8 of the10 Deadliest Tsunami’s in History • All 8 Major Typhoons of Last Century 2.4 The Three Phases of Resiliency (3Rs)

The resiliency of large systems can be thought of as encompassing three temporal phases associated with any event of scale. These three phases

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include: the Resist Phase, or the period of time which precedes the occurrence of an event of scale and more importantly that period of time when actions can be taken to mitigate the impacts directly associated with the event itself; the so called Respond Phase; and the ability to efficiently recover or the Recover Phase. These three phases are independent of whether the event of scale is man-made or naturally occurring to a very high degree. In each phase a true “systems” perspective is required. Later in this chapter I will summarize lessons learned by each of these phases to help those planning and managing large complex programs, consider the risks and management principles which they should be considering at a program level. 2.5 September 11 – The Beginning of My Program

Perspective on Events of Scale

September 11, 2001 provided the personal impetus to think about some of these broader lessons learned, and while developed initially around a singular event of scale, their relevance has continued to ring true in each subsequent event. What are those lessons learned? Lesson #1 – Link between infrastructure and development is highlighted

I sometimes feel this has been a hobbyhorse of mine for too long. Infrastructure and development are intricately linked, often in ways we fail to fully appreciate. Each is the sine qua non of the other. Each of these “systems” is tightly coupled. However, as is often the case with all that we engineer, we can best appreciate the strengths, weaknesses and functionality only in their failure or application in response to some new paradigm. September 11, 2001 highlighted the interrelationships of infrastructure and development. In the “localized” failure of “development” (the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers), we witnessed a “localized” destruction of the attendant infrastructure (1 and 9 subway, local power grid, PATH station at WTC, etc.). In the reconfiguration of “regional development” (an estimated 29,000 employees working outside NYC as a result of September 11 and another 29,000 temporarily backfilled in other existing metropolitan-area space), we reconfigured our “regional” transportation network (mandatory HOV, increased ferry service, increased transit ridership at other river crossings, etc.). Similar analogs exist for utility and telecommunications networks affected on September 11.

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Figure 2-3. Infrastructure is required to support “development” but is simultaneously “deformed” by the very development it supports. However, this ability to reconfigure the infrastructure systems, in response to a new development paradigm, draws heavily from what we find in Lesson #2. Lesson #2 – “Core capacity” of infrastructure systems is essential

At a point shortly after September 11, I had the opportunity to attempt to explain the importance of some planned New York City transportation improvements to members of the political arena. The basic case I tried to make was that these improvements were about enhancing the “core capacity” of a well-developed transportation network in order to improve overall system reliability, availability and performance. By “core capacity” I’m referring to the degree of interconnectivity of the various elements of the system, as well as the number of alternative paths available, its flexibility and redundancy. In fact, these additions to “core capacity” strengthened the overall system, going well beyond the benefits associated with new system connections from some new point “A” to new point “B.” Traditional project evaluation models focused on “new riders” from new connections between points “A” and “B.” But, in complex systems, the dislocations that can be caused by

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even a partial loss of overall system capacity and capability can be much more profound. Similarly, the improved reliability, availability and performance created by adding “core capacity” to a complex system can pay dividends not often not easily seen. Such was the case for the regional transit system in the aftermath of September 11. The “core capacity” of these systems provided the flexibility to deal with commuting patterns literally modified overnight with lines and stations outside the immediately affected area, seeing changed passenger volumes exceeding those often associated with new point “A” to “B” connections. It was gratifying to receive the call from the political arena several days later stating that they now understood “core capacity.” Each of the infrastructure systems impacted by September 11 responded more or less quickly depending on the “core capacity” inherently incorporated in the system as well as the concentration of “critical infrastructure” in the damaged area. Older systems tended to be more “built out” while many newer systems were still heavily focused on building new “A” to “B” connections and as such had not yet achieved the level of “core capacity” of some of the more mature systems. This suggests that “core capacity” needs to be a criterion as we plan and implement the new infrastructure the 21st century will undoubtedly require. Complex systems need a new model. We must recognize that dislocations can be profound. We must also recognize that improved reliability, availability and performance pay hidden dividends. “Core capacity” is not just about the extent of a system or the number of alternate system paths. It is also about the intrinsic “quality” of the system at the point in time when it is stressed. This brings us to the third lesson learned. Lesson #3 – Deferred maintenance represents a real cost and a real risk

The history of our profession is marked by exciting breakthroughs, great works of master builders, and outstanding service to our nation’s and the world’s population. Regretfully, it is also marked by the systemic degradation of some of our greatest achievements. As a society, and perhaps even in some parts of our profession, we do not see sustained maintenance as important as the creation of the next new grand work. Whatever the reason – its routine nature, the ability to hopefully do it tomorrow, the lack of technical complexity, or just plain lack of “sex appeal” – we are collectively guilty of allowing some of our most complex systems to fall

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into disrepair and to have their level of reliability, availability and operational and safety performance degraded. We have seen this most notably in failing rail systems in England and the U.S., but the impacts of deferred maintenance affect every element of infrastructure. My most recent book, “Application of Life Cycle Analysis in the Capital Assets Industry” seeks to put more focus on the importance of a life cycle perspective in the delivery, operation and maintenance of our capital assets and on the linkage to an asset’s resilience. To a large measure, the ability of New York City’s transit system to respond and to fully take advantage of the “core capacity” inherent in its system has its roots back to the time of the system’s nadir. Out of crisis emerged a commitment to fund, reorganize, rebuild, improve and maintain to a well-defined standard. This, too, stands as one of the lessons to recognize as we engineer and operate our increasingly complex infrastructure systems. The strength of a well-maintained system is clearly seen in the aftermath. Other elements of infrastructure with higher backlogs of deferred maintenance are struggling to keep up and for many the challenges are in the years immediately ahead. The condition of the system, how well it is maintained, is critical to sustain its ability to respond. The backlog of deferred maintenance should be viewed as an element of systems risk. On September 11, and in its aftermath, systems in a “state of good repair” fared better in both the response and recovery phases. This ability to respond often to other than design basis events is key to the integrity of “new” security and “safety” systems. Lesson #4 – Operational and emergency response training is an integral element of critical infrastructure response

I won’t belabor the point since in many ways I’ve made it in looking across the prior three lessons. Succinctly, in the same way we factor constructability reviews into our design process and maintainability considerations into our construction details, so must we address operational training as an element of our engineering of critical infrastructure. The events of September 11 show many areas of exceptional performance, but this serves to only underscore the importance of operational training. The operational training for the events of the 21st century changed after September 11. New scenarios need to be considered. New threats in the form of weapons of mass destruction, higher risk of collateral physical and economic damage and more extended response timeframes need to be

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addressed. First responder training (actions, interactions, communications, decision making) needs to be integrated with infrastructure system operational training. Simple items such as establishing evacuation routes and off-property staging areas must be clearly provided by the infrastructure of our “built environment,” but also must be clearly integrated in first responder protocols. Scenario training must be evolutionary as new threats emerge. Emerging response plans must be reviewed regularly and revamped as needed. Unusual incident reporting must be similarly kept up to date and relevant. Training to handle a growing range of threat scenarios must be kept current. On September 11, we saw the impact of having the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) in proximity to a high-profile target. We also saw the importance of having safe, redundant capability and comprehensive integration with other relevant EOCs. Quick response is essential and the importance of interoperability of first responders has not received as much attention in the past as might be currently warranted. But we must not stop there. We must also understand how the first responder team has evolved in light of our increasingly “engineered” environment. Lesson #5 – Today’s highly engineered environment requires a first responder team that goes beyond the traditional triad of fire, police and emergency services

In early 2001, as I sat in the Engineering & Construction Governor’s meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland, I saw, with great frustration, the importance of the role of the engineer and constructor as part of a new first responder team. Out of that frustration grew the WEF DRN. On September 11, we witnessed the engineering and construction industry voluntarily reach out and provide the technical and construction expertise for one of the greatest disasters in a highly engineered environment. All necessary protocols were not firmly in place and response training had never fully factored this dimension in. Yet, this “fourth responder” will be even more critical as the 21st century unfolds as we saw in the immediate aftermath of Fukushima.

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While many good examples do exist, response protocols in our “engineered” urban environment will increasingly need to proactively incorporate this “fourth responder.” New, dedicated first responder training facilities reflecting the unique nature of highly “engineered” environments and their infrastructure need to be deployed, and legislation provided to remove the onerous risks that accrue to engineer “volunteers” who are often not covered by Good Samaritan statutes. Pre-positioned task orders must be considered and building codes for transitional facilities explored. If we learn – and remember – each of these five lessons well, we will greatly enhance our abilities to resist and respond. But this must also be matched by our ability to recover. We design to resist, to avoid, catastrophic failure in our critical infrastructure, to delay the failure as long as possible if it’s not preventable, and to minimize loss of life, collateral damage, and degraded system performance. Having built in as much resistance as makes sense from a risk-weighted and operational and economic perspective, we enhance our ability to respond. We provide “core capacity”; we focus on reliability, availability and performance. We reconfigure inherently resilient systems for both the short- and the long-term. But, for our critical infrastructure, that is not enough. We must recover the capacity and service that was destroyed. We must restore the “engineered” fabric, making it better than it was, if possible. We must engineer for recovery. From an engineering standpoint, this can mean many things: • Providing for accessibility to the sites of “critical infrastructure”

• Ensuring availability of specialized construction equipment, contracts and materials

• Developing a well-documented system with clear interface points

• Preplanning and rehearsing response and recovery scenarios for high-probability events (earthquake, hurricane, flood in areas so prone)

Together, these lessons from September 11 provide our program managers of large infrastructure systems with a solid foundation. But even more lessons must be learned. 2.6 Be SMART: The New Vulnerabilities

The vulnerabilities of September 11 do not represent the full range of threats the future may hold for our critical infrastructure. The attraction to public infrastructure as a likely target is driven by the political statement it makes,

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the potential for destabilizing public confidence as well as the international recognition associated with higher profile targets. By its nature, infrastructure is an open system. Its accessibility is predictable, its demographics known and its behavior on a diurnal basis well established. It provides a target that by its very nature can cause maximum harm. But its vulnerability, or more broadly society’s broad vulnerability, is not limited to man-made events but rather extends to natural phenomena as my subsequent observations as a DRN board member and a member of ABAC unfortunately showed me time and time again. We must be SMART about these vulnerabilities. We cannot eliminate or avoid them. But if we heed the lessons of history, we can learn from them and mitigate their consequences. These SMART vulnerabilities may be broadly grouped into five areas: • Systems • Maintenance & Operations • Attitude • Risk Taking • Transitional The challenge is to build on the “lessons learned” as previously described and to also consider other large-scale, “systems” scale events. Consideration of each of these vulnerabilities, and the lessons learned within the framework provided by the 3Rs, provide a basis for reviewing the adequacy of existing infrastructure systems and planning their enhancement. They provide a framework for truly getting “value for the money.” Let’s look at each of these five types of vulnerabilities. 2.6.1 System Vulnerabilities

The events of September 11 drive us to take a “systems perspective” when reviewing our critical infrastructure. Not surprisingly, the first set of vulnerabilities we need to be SMART about deal directly with the very nature of the system. In particular, we need to understand and learn from the risks associated with:

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• Failure to recognize the “built environment” as a growing and ever more complex system

− This is perhaps the most fundamental risk we have. Development and infrastructure do not exist in isolation.

• Inadequate “system” understanding

− It may not be “rocket science” or a high-technology defense system, but it is no less important to understand what may go wrong, and how to detect and remedy it.

• Positive feedback loop risks

− Also described as “progressive” or “cascading” failures, these considerations affect everything from the structural systems of a building, such as we saw induced by fire in the World Trade Center, to feedback mechanisms that degrade other elements of the “system.” This was seen in the need to relocate the Emergency Operations Center located at 7 World Trade Center.

− This was also seen in the health-related events of scale that struck the APEC region and crippled the very first responders who were in increasing demand.

• Centralized control weaknesses in complex systems

− There is a need for “interoperability” and an ability to “see” the situation. Partial decentralization of systems is required.

− This was an issue faced in the Gujarat earthquake that impeded the initial movements of heavy equipment.

− This was also seen in the APEC health crisis, where economies initially affected, tried to control information flow further abetting the spread of these diseases.

• “Tight Coupling” of systems

− Simply put, an event in one system leads to an event in another in short order. This was previously detailed in “Lesson #1.”

− The health crisis in APEC impacted broader economic performance as business travel became an undesirable risk.

• Failing to KISS

− No, this is not the romantic in me, but rather the importance of “Keeping It Simple, Stupid.” We must recognize some classes of systems and certain technologies are inherently open to chains of

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failure. In such systems, adding additional safety systems only raises the level of complexity.

• Inadequate “core capacity”

− Lesson #2 highlighted the importance of interconnectivity, flexibility and redundancy to system responsiveness to unplanned events. Core capacity was a major factor in New York’s transit systems being able to restructure themselves immediately following September 11.

− All too often we emphasize “reach” (new customers) over “responsiveness” when making key decisions regarding our infrastructure investment.

− The tsunami that impacted the Indian Ocean struck many areas where infrastructure coverage was limited at best before this event of scale.

Consideration of these vulnerabilities will enhance the resiliency of critical infrastructure. Those systems that more fully addressed these considerations responded better on September 11 and in subsequent events of scale. 2.6.2 Maintenance & Operation Vulnerabilities

If “system” vulnerabilities focus on ensuring that the right system is put in place, then “maintenance” vulnerabilities are focused on keeping it that way. Specific risks to learn from include: • Failing to recognize the importance of “state of good repair”

− We saw this in Lesson #3. Those infrastructure systems in a “state of good repair” suffered less collateral effects when a portion of the system was stressed to failure. Our capital assets must be driven by a life cycle focus.

− There will be a tendency to compensate for maintenance and operational vulnerabilities by adding on top of the existing base system. In complex systems, in particular, this can act to create new risks. The “foundation” must be strong.

• Inadequate renewal of emergency training

− The systems of our “built environment” are not static, nor are the threats they face. Emergency training must be undertaken recognizing the dynamic environment within which our “built environment” exists as well as its own inherently dynamic nature.

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• Inadequate operating provisions to limit disturbances

− Failure must be contained or “localized” to prohibit “tight coupling” effects from taking hold. In New York, on September 11, we saw operating action take preventive steps against further failure of the PATH and NYC Transit lines as a result of flooding in damaged sections. In more routine circumstances we find good examples in power-grid inter-ties.

2.6.3 Attitude Vulnerabilities

In contrast with system and maintenance vulnerabilities that focus on whether the right system is in place and whether it’s sustained properly, attitude vulnerabilities address our willingness to accept an unexpected or undesired “truth.” Specific “attitude” risks include: • Cognitive Lock

− In life, particularly when we are under stress, we expect certain situations to evolve in certain ways. Sometimes they don’t. Cognitive lock occurs when we hold onto a course of action against all contradictory evidence. This can be particularly disastrous when combined with a complex system and often requires a fresh pair of eyes to see the new “truth” in front of us. I include haste as an attitude vulnerability given the risks often incurred, unknowingly, when blindly charging ahead.

• Over-commitment to bureaucratic goals

− The goal has been set and any deviation from the goal is not acceptable. Problems that arise are ignored if they put the goal at risk. The “unmovable” goals set for aviation security ignored the realities of having a comprehensive approach in favor of meeting a fixed end date. Does mere achievement of the bureaucratic goal ensure we have accomplished our true aim?

− Was failure to use available government owned housing that was larger than the FEMA spec, an acceptable decision in the early days after Katrina?

• Prisoner to Heuristics

− Past experience or what we’ve heard prevents us from taking a broader look. We adopt a perspective of “it never happened, so it’s not credible.” When the command center was established at the World Trade Center on September 11, it was set up in the shadow of the unstruck south tower. The possibility of a deliberate attack on

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two (or more) buildings at the same time, in a way designed to cripple first responder capability, was not considered credible.

− Being a prisoner to heuristics also involves a failure to consider what we see or learn from analogous systems or settings. Are multiple, simultaneous attacks or attackers on first responder teams the new norm? Or do we run the risk of the next attitude vulnerability? Experiences since 9/11 have highlighted our awareness of multiple or subsequent attacks designed to neutralize first responder capabilities.

• Denial

− Conventional threat analysis has us consider a range of “likely” scenarios and design our systems to resist, respond and recover from such scenarios. But the “unlikely” is also possible and it, too, must be considered. How do you address these “unlikely” scenarios in your system design and operation? At one level you can’t because one can always postulate another “unlikely” scenario that will defeat any specific system measures you undertake. So what is one to do?

In many ways this brings us full circle to the need to have inherently flexible, redundant and reliable systems. “Core capacity” provides the trained system operator with the tools to address a broad range of “unlikely” scenarios.

Contingency planning for our critical infrastructure must include training in the capabilities and limits of various system elements. The “unlikely” must be part of our planning processes.

• Failure to learn “Lessons Learned”

− I’ve tried to distill down the events of September 11 into a set of factors for us to consider in the future design and operation of our critical infrastructure. These lessons are not unique to the events of September 11. Rather, from an engineering standpoint, we have seen many of these lessons learned in prior events of scale in heavily engineered systems.

− The interest in establishing proactive mechanisms in APEC, for dealing with a broader type of events of scale, was limited until the tsunami drove home the point that there was an important commonality between all events of scale.

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2.6.4 Risk-taking Vulnerabilities

None of us wants to be wrong. But the way we perceive risks and handle mistakes affects the range of actions we are willing to consider when faced with extreme situations. Two particular risk-taking vulnerabilities are worth calling out. • Litigation constrains risk-taking in the “Respond” and “Recover” phases

− All evidence points to the engineer and constructor increasingly being part of tomorrow’s first responder team in our heavily “built environment.” This was one of the lessons learned on September 11 and repeatedly since. But while the engineering profession responded, voluntarily and overwhelmingly, it did so at its own peril. As licensed professionals undertaking their profession, it was not clear whether they were covered by Good Samaritan legislation. This influenced some response decisions after Hurricane Sandy as prior lawsuits were not suddenly forgotten.

− To what extent was litigation or the fear of public opinion a constraint in communicating early infections in the various APEC health crises?

• Fear of “satisficing”

− We are often called to make decisions or take actions in the absence of complete information. Our willingness to take action and move forward with an apparently workable solution is often a function of how mistakes are perceived and handled.

− Running heavy cranes out across the “debris field,” following the collapse of the World Trade Center, was an example of willingness to “satisfice.” No as-builts existed and a high degree of judgment and risk-taking was required. How might we have handled a mistake that sent a crane toppling or crashing through the sub-basement structure?

2.6.5 Transitional Vulnerabilities

“Change” is the watchword of life. We seek to improve what we do; add new levels of safety, change protocols, etc. But in the process we must recognize that complex infrastructure systems, and for that matter, systems in general, are often most vulnerable immediately before, during and immediately after this change process. What are some of these transitional vulnerabilities and what must we be cognizant of as we move through these transition stages? They include:

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• Inadequate use of currently deployed resources

− There is a tendency to look for the “silver bullet” as opposed to better deploying and applying the resources at hand.

• Change processes further stress existing systems

− These risks were issues after 9/11 as we modified our air travel regimes, handling of “just-in-time” commerce and revamped first responder efforts. Change for change’s sake is not necessarily the answer and if approached narrowly, may increase the overall risks we face.

• New system failure rates not planned

− True operating characteristics and failure rates of new systems can only be understood after an extended period of operating under both good and bad conditions. The old adage that you “don’t know what you don’t know” is particularly relevant during a transitional period.

• Technology put ahead of people

− September 11 and other subsequent events have taught us that people cannot, and should not, be taken out of the loop. It was individual actions that led to the shutdown of transit lines, not technology. It was individual action that dispatched ferries, busses, generators, cranes and engineers…not technology. Technology is a powerful enabler of people, but it needs to fit them, not the other way around.

2.7 Concluding Thoughts

I’ve looked back at some of the lessons we should have learned from September 11 and other events of scale from my DRN and APEC perspectives. as well as I’ve also looked around at what experiences from other “systems” failures have taught us so we may better understand the full range of vulnerabilities our critical infrastructure faces. But what are the

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challenges ahead? That is the real question and why we must truly understand the programmatic challenges that planning and responding to events of scale requires.

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Table 2-2. Resist Phase Lessons Learned

• Requirements for resistance/reduction of impacts from events of scale

− Long term, strategic view − Recognized interdependencies − Proactive action/planning − Improved communication across bureaucratic “silos” − Recognition that an event of scale exists that will overwhelm

all measures

• Establish Non-Government Organizations (NGO) linkages/protocols

− UN Disaster Relief, International Red Cross

• Identify supporting business resources and put outreach mechanisms in place

• Provide pool of expertise to assist in response phase planning

− Identify protocols required − Facilitate mitigation of barriers

• Understand those systemic needs best met by business

• Understand special needs unique to the each potential event of scale

− Know what may be quickly mobilized and sources

• Create a common definition of “Critical Infrastructure”

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• Critical Infrastructure Must Be Defined

− Not Everything is Critical − Critical Infrastructure Must Be Designed to Resist

Attack Catastrophic Failure Open Role of Infrastructure Limits Ability to Resist Deliberate

Attack

− Link Between Infrastructure and Development Highlighted

• Recognize “Core Capacity” of infrastructure systems essential

− Core Capacity

Degree of interconnectivity of various elements of a system Number of alternative paths available

− Flexibility and redundancy

Traditional project evaluation models have rewarded new connections vs. responsiveness and reliability

− Deferred maintenance = real cost, real risk

• Operational/emergency response training essential

− Need to reconfigure “First-Responder” team

• Complex systems require a new model

− Dislocations can be profound

− Improved reliability, availability and performance pay hidden dividends

− “Quality” of the system counts

Critical to sustain ability to respond

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− Backlog of deferred maintenance should be viewed as element of systems’ risk

Systems in “state of good repair” fared better in both response and recovery phases

Key to integrity of “new” security and “safety” systems

• Operational training integral to engineering of critical infrastructure

− Establish evacuation routes and off-property staging areas

• Scenario training must be evolutionary as new threats emerge

− Review existing emergency response plan − Revamp unusual incident reporting

AFT Bomb Threat Training

• Emergency Operation Centers must be safe, redundant and integrated with other relevant EOCs

− Quick response essential

Interoperability of First Responders

• Role of the Engineer and Constructor is redefined

− The New First Responder

• Engineer for recovery

− Provide for accessibility to the sites of “Critical Infrastructure”

− Ensure availability of specialized construction equipment, contracts and materials

− Develop a well-documented system with clear interface points

− Pre-planning and rehearsing response and recovery scenarios for high probability events (earthquake, hurricane, flood in prone areas)

• Failure to recognize the “built environment” as a growing and ever more complex system

• Inadequate “system” understanding

− What may go wrong, how to detect and remedy − Positive feedback loop risks

“Progressive” failures

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− Centralized control weaknesses in complex systems

Need for “interoperability” Need to “see” the situation

− Partial decentralization of systems required − “Tight coupling” of systems

An event in one system leads to an event in another in short order

− Failing to KISS

KISS – Keep It Simple Stupid Some classes of systems/technology are inherently open to

chains of failure

• Adding safety systems only raises level of complexity

− Inadequate “Core Capacity”

“Reach” emphasized over “responsiveness”

• Failing to recognize importance of “state of good repair”

− Tendency will be to “add” on top of existing base “system” − The “foundation” must be strong

• Inadequate renewal of emergency training

• Inadequate operating provisions to limit disturbances

− Good example – power-grid inter-ties − “Cognitive lock”

Holding on to a course of action against all contradictory evidence

• Disastrous when combined with a complex system (Fermi accident is example)

• Requires a fresh pair of eyes

− Haste

• Poor quality control on slag inclusions did more to sink the Titanic than the iceberg

• Over commitment to bureaucratic goals

− Growing problems ignored for sake of meeting goals

Congress and TSA on aviation security (NASA and Morton Thiokol is an example)

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• Becoming a prisoner to Heuristics

− Broader look constrained by…

Past experience (never happened so not credible) What we heard (often narrow and limited)

− Failure to consider lessons learned in analogous settings or system − Denial

Failure to consider the unlikely Absence of contingency plans for future

− Failure to learn “lessons learned”

• Inadequate use of currently deployed resources

− “Silver Bullet” syndrome

• Change processes further stress existing systems

− Air travel − Just-in-time commerce

Seaport security Border crossings

− First responders

• New system failure rates not planned

− Don’t know what you don’t know − Systems must be learned under good conditions and bad − Technology Put Ahead Of People

Technology needs to fit people – not the other way around

• Scale matters

− Both a Challenge and an Opportunity

• Our cities –development and infrastructure –must be designed for the 3Rs:

− Resist − Respond − Recover

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Table 2-3. Respond Phase Lessons Learned

• Quick response with the right resources can limit immediate and longer term impacts from events of scale but requires:

− Mobilization of all sectors of society

Government, Non-Government Organizations (NGO), Business

− Clear understanding of systemic issues and resource needs required in response phase

− Protocols in place, systems and structures for non-traditional interaction between sectors

− Clear understanding of resources available

− Exit strategy

− Recognition that an event of scale exists which will overwhelm all measures

• Recognize that fast-paced Government-Business interaction in a multi-national context will not occur

− Government will default to major NGOs − Business resources best delivered through NGOs − NGO interface with business currently limited – focus needed

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• Provide quick mobilization to meet systemic needs

− Generic drugs typically required, including understanding storage requirements and shelf life

− Air transport appropriate for disaster zone capabilities and condition

− Airport Emergency Team to manage logistics at receiving airport and provide supplemental handling equipment

− Structural and construction engineers to assess damage and assist victim rescue and recovery

− Transport and logistics specialists with special training in disaster management

• Provide network to aid mobilization of special resources from Business

− Vaccines, burn treatment supplies, water treatment, field sanitation, temporary shelter, hand tools for debris removal

− Recognize that needs evolve throughout the response phase

• Prioritize requests to Business to match resources with needs

− Avoid overwhelming the supply chain with lower priority supplies

• Establish handover plan to revert temporary management activities to Government

− Know when to leave and have planned exit strategy

− Stay close to Government immediately after handover from the Response phase to ensure no gaps develop

• Recognize need for alert mechanism as specific pharmaceutical needs changed

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• Recognize need for Airport Emergency Team

• Establish Business response networks:

− Need to establish rules of engagement (have a plan)

− Need for handover plan to build local operational capacity for logistical management of supplies

− Need to extend concept to engineering, communication and other fields

− Need to have broader pool of individuals trained in emergency operations

− Need to participate in “transition coalition with NGOs and Government to plan and prioritize economic recovery process

• Apply “Cognitive Lock” and “Heuristic” concerns in this phase as well

• Realize litigation constrains risk-taking in “Respond” and “Recover” Phases

− Inadequate Good Samaritan Legislation for Engineers and Constructors

• Avoid “Satisficing”

− Satisficing – A workable and fast-acting solution without complete information

− Driven by how we “handle mistakes”

• Plan B needed for first line responders

− Activation procedure for second line responders required

− Rapid deployment of medical care services top priority

− Accurate medical supplies procured through pre-arranged activation procedure with pharmaceutical companies

− Established relationship with locals linking to local authorities and network

− Quickly identify locations for medical centers

• Critical Supplies

− Water − Food (Culture factors) − Temporary shelters − Clothing (Culture factors) − Medicines − Equipment (Heavy)

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Table 2-4. Recover Phase Lessons Learned

• Successful recovery is possible but requires:

− Long-term vision of “success” − Transparency in implementing the recovery program − Focused effort on sustaining “reservoir” of good will − Recognition that Business plays unique role in post-disaster

economic recovery process through job creation

• Continue communication between Business and Government to ensure reservoir of goodwill not drained

• Insist on a transparent and corruption-free Recovery phase

• Help prioritize economic recovery process

• Provision of “tools” to facilitate self-recovery at earliest possible date is a best

• Set requirement for a comprehensive and integrated systems view

− Development and urban infrastructure − Consider all views: User, Operator, Regulator, Provider

• Remember the Four-Dimensional Framework

− Extends below ground

Underground transportation arteries, etc.

− Plans for changes with time

Adaptable buildings and infrastructure Understand our engineered environment

• Not only past and present;

• More importantly – future

− Understand how it will evolve − Understanding how 3Rs will be built in as system expands − Have a vision

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Infrastructure resiliency has become a major area of focus since 9/11. Much of that focus has been developed from a national defense or law enforcement perspective and consequentially has focused heavily on technological additions to existing infrastructure networks to detect adverse agents (human or other), enhance cyber protection or facilitate interoperability among first responders. While each of these vectors enhances the current state of infrastructure resiliency, they may do so in a way that masks a growing and perhaps accelerating decline in overall infrastructure system resiliency. This accelerating decline in infrastructure system resiliency is not due to failed technology additions or misplaced training efforts but rather driven by the fundamental crumbling of the underlying infrastructure systems. Like any structure, infrastructure resiliency will only be as good as its foundations. Additionally resiliency must be understood in the context of actions acting upon critical infrastructure before, during and after an “event of scale” (man-made or natural). The National Infrastructure Protection Plan’s (17) case for resiliency is founded on its overarching goal to, “Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of the Nation’s CI/KR (Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources)…” It envisions accomplishing this goal by increasing infrastructure protection, defining such protection as: “… actions to mitigate the overall risk to CI/KR assets, systems, networks, functions, or their interconnecting links resulting from exposure, injury, destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation. In the context of the NIPP, this includes actions to deter the threat, mitigate vulnerabilities, or minimize

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consequences associated with a terrorist attack or other incident. Protection can include a wide range of activities, such as hardening facilities, building resiliency and redundancy, incorporating hazard resistance into initial facility design, initiating active or passive countermeasures, installing security systems, promoting workforce surety programs, and implementing cyber security measures, among various others.” In order to achieve these objectives it is important to have a comprehensive understanding of the life cycle nature of critical infrastructure and the importance of strong and sustained foundations. Perspective must be retained so that we do not overweight national defense and law enforcement perspectives to the detriment of more “mundane” events of scale. Infrastructure systems, by their very nature, are designed to shape and respond to a set of changing needs. Under the best of conditions they will face changed operating regimes from their original design basis, adapt to inevitable changes of technology given their long design lifetimes and facilitate or hinder social progress in ways not envisioned when they were first deployed. Infrastructure systems are “living” systems which respond to dynamic operating environments continuously; are subject to diurnal, weekly and annual operating cycles; and are maintained, modified and enhanced over decade-long time frames. True resiliency can only be achieved if it recognizes the inherent operating regimes in which infrastructure accomplishes its mission and the different time constants that govern its responsiveness and adaptability. The NIPP outlines protective actions as including activities to deter, devalue, detect or defend. Protective programs to mitigate, respond and recover are appropriately defined as preparedness but until recently seemed to take a backseat to detection and hardening. In the aftermath of 9/11 the importance of these so called preparedness measures was recognized (18) and the lessons learned with respect to infrastructure performance were relearned during Hurricane Katrina. In the National Infrastructure Advisory Council’s (NIAC) Final Report and Recommendations on Critical Infrastructure Resilience (21) this more comprehensive perspective starts to take shape. Among the recommendations laid out by the NIAC resiliency study group are the: • Need to adopt a common definition for critical infrastructure resilience

especially across government. A common definition will help guide policy development.

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• Importance of working with Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CIKR) owners and operators to establish outcomes-oriented sector resilience goals.

• Need to update the framework of authorities laid out under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan to allow government to maintain the CIKR Public-Private Sector Partnership and infrastructure security gains, while incorporating resilience strategies and approaches.

• Importance of continuing to leverage the Public-Private Sector Partnership that was established for implementation of protection strategy, utilizing it as a tool to strengthen and develop infrastructure resilience.

• Importance of aiding owners and operators in strengthening infrastructure resilience by applying incentives, removing barriers, improving risk transparency, and facilitating learning.

• Understanding of the role market demand plays in defining and shaping critical infrastructure resilience and recognizing where this market demand falls short (or in the case of publicly owned and operated infrastructure, is largely absent) and does not assure necessary levels of resilience to support appropriate public needs.

The 21st century’s highly engineered environment and our increased recognition of the threats this environment faces, suggests that the traditional 3Rs of reading, ‘riting and ‘rithmatic have been replaced by resist, respond and recover at least as it relates to critical infrastructure. Together these 3R’s define true infrastructure resiliency. It is only through adequate preparedness that true infrastructure resiliency will be obtained. The NIAC study on Critical Infrastructure Resilience began to move in the right direction. In each event of scale we have seen certain core lessons learned (19), which we must not only truly learn but more importantly must act upon. These lessons have included: • Recognition that “core capacity” of infrastructure systems is essential –

Adequate capability to meet routine needs contributes to an infrastructure system’s ability to respond to events of scale. But it is not just “more” capability, but also the degree of interconnectivity of the various elements of the system…its flexibility and redundancy. After 9/11, transit systems with high core capacity first stopped the flow of additional passengers into lower Manhattan, quickly shifted to an evacuation mode and finally, on an extended basis, reconfigured as

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required as modifications to the infrastructure networks came on line. During Katrina we saw the impact of inadequate hurricane protection facilities as poorly “founded” levees were topped and failed.

• Understanding the importance of the link between infrastructure and development – In the aftermath of both 9/11 and Katrina we saw the far reaching impact that a failure of infrastructure had on local “development” as well as on regional and national economic performance. The reach of the impact from a failed piece of infrastructure goes well beyond the area of immediate impact extending fully throughout the system which the failed infrastructure is part of.

• Recognizing the real cost and real risk that deferred maintenance represents – This was seen most clearly in the aftermath of Katrina where failed levee maintenance programs contributed to progressive infrastructure failure. By contrast, after 9/11, public infrastructure systems in a good state of repair were able to adapt to a significantly changed operating regime.

Are these adequately addressed in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and subsequent documents? Are we focused on ensuring that essential core capacity is put in place with appropriate maintenance regimes? Let’s look at the state of our infrastructure today and a likely future state without implementation of significant focused efforts to build a safer, more secure and more resilient infrastructure system. 3.1 State of Infrastructure Resiliency

The nation’s infrastructure, as a resilient system, is on the verge of failure. The American Society of Civil Engineers’ most recent report card (20) gave the nation’s infrastructure an overall “Poor” grade of a “D+”. The backlog of investments that would be required to bring our nation’s infrastructure up to a state of good repair tops $3.6 trillion in investment needs by 2020. Investments made under the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) did little to dent this demand as emphasis was placed on speed of expenditure versus priority of need. Weakened foundations, widespread states of disrepair and disinvestment exist in each of our infrastructure systems. The core capacity required is not present and the relative performance of the system for routine usage is projected to continue to deteriorate for the foreseeable future. It is upon this weakened and deteriorating foundation that the NIPP originally would have us invest in deterrence, detection and defense.

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3.2 Achieving True Infrastructure Resiliency

The NIIP recognized the importance of infrastructure resiliency but through its initial emphasis on protection failed to question the effectiveness and readiness of the underlying systems. Are we a prisoner to heuristics? Is it good homeland security policy to assume decaying systems will afford us the protection and responsiveness needed when confronted with an event of scale? Eisenhower’s National Defense Highway System (today’s Interstate System) recognized the value of a high degree of core capacity, connectivity, flexibility and redundancy. It set high design standards and established a funding regime to complete it and keep it in a state of good repair. Over time the funding regime became co-opted to the point that the highway trust fund is insolvent and maintenance was given a back seat as new highways garnered more votes than repaved ones. The same is true across our infrastructure systems. The NIAC study on Critical Infrastructure Resilience began the process of restoring the systemic, life-cycle focus that infrastructure resiliency requires. True infrastructure resiliency can only be achieved when the base systems are sound and designed to meet infrastructure system requirements of the 21st century. These requirements will include features for homeland security but most importantly will include requirements essential for efficient day-to-day functioning of these systems. As in other areas of national interest, both the public and private sectors have roles to play. As in the original concept of the interstate highway system, users will have to foot the bill with government playing much more of a standard setting and research role. Infrastructure resiliency is achievable but only if we recognize that adding protection onto a poorly “founded” and decaying system won’t achieve it. 3.3 Resiliency Imperative – Public & Private Infrastructure

Every year public and private infrastructure owners spend billions of dollars to build, operate and maintain the nation’s infrastructure. In 2007 alone $372.3 billion was spent (CBO, 2010) on capital expenditures, yet the ASCE Report Card on the Nation’s Infrastructure shows a growing investment shortfall.

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Table 3-1. Infrastructure Spending in US (2007) CAPEX

Infrastructure Public Private Total Highways 87.5 0 87.5 Aviation, Mass Transit, Rail 26.6 10.2 36.8 Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment 38.9 1.3 40.2 Water Transportation and Water Resources 7.8 0 7.8 Total Transportation & Water 1 160.8 11.5 172.3 Education 85.5 16.92 102.4 Communication 0 27.52 27.5 Power 11.4 50.12 61.5 Total Infrastructure 257.7 114.4 372.3 1. Congressional Budget Office; Public Spending on Transportation and

Water Infrastructure 2. Relation of Private Fixed Investment in Structures (by type) in the

Fixed Assets Accounts to the Corresponding Items in the National Income and Product Accounts; Bureau of Economic Analysis

In addition to capital spending, Federal, State and Local expenditures for operations and maintenance related to transportation, water and education totaled $249.9 billion in that year while Energy operation and maintenance expenditures (exclusive of fuel) reached $127.5 billion. In simplest terms, public and private infrastructure investment and ongoing O&M expenditures represent equal components of the nation’s infrastructure stock, must be considered in tandem recognizing the interrelationships present especially when subject to an event of scale, and be held to common performance expectations. Table 3-2 highlights some of the similarities and differences between publicly and privately owned and operated infrastructure from a resiliency perspective. While missions are similar in scope, regulatory, market mechanism and financial frameworks differ significantly. Each suffers from sufficient access to federal resources to meet resiliency requirements that go beyond the respective infrastructure system and its ongoing resiliency requirements. In order to meet overall national infrastructure resiliency needs, each of these infrastructure sets must rise to a common standard of resiliency.

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Table 3-2. Comparison of Public & Private Infrastructure1 Feature Public Private

Critical infrastructure requiring resiliency to meet long term, ongoing needs

Yes Yes

Critical infrastructure required to support other critical infrastructure systems operated by others

Yes Yes

Critical infrastructure required to resist, respond or recover from manmade events of scale

Yes Yes

Critical infrastructure required to resist, respond or recover from natural events of scale

Yes Yes

Market based funding mechanisms for ongoing resiliency requirements

No Yes

Capital budget prioritized to meet ongoing business resiliency needs and optimize economic returns

No Yes

Risk based approach to project prioritization to meet ongoing resiliency requirements

Limited Yes

Regulatory requirements define minimum resiliency levels

No Yes

Regulatory framework causes corrective action to address shortfalls in minimum resiliency levels

No Yes

Federal resources available to meet broader regulatory resiliency requirements

Limited Limited

Financial reporting requirements would identify risks associated with ongoing resiliency requirement shortfall

No Yes

3.4 Public & Private Infrastructures Require a Common

Resiliency Standard

Public and private infrastructures are intimately interrelated and as such must be held to a common resiliency standard. This resiliency standard, applicable to all industries and organizations, both public and private, should be formulated in a manner such that it provides generic guidelines. The design and implementation of resiliency management plans and frameworks will need to take into account the varying needs of a specific organization, whether public or private, its particular objectives, context, structure, operations, processes, functions, projects, products, services, or assets and specific practices employed. It would be intended that this standard be utilized to harmonize resiliency management processes in existing and future regulations or standards and provide a common approach in support of standards dealing with specific risks and resiliency requirements but not replace those standards, which, however, should increasingly have a life cycle performance based perspective.

1 Excludes postal facilities, prisons, schools and water and other natural resources

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3.5 Resiliency Management Principles Applicable to Public and Private Infrastructures

• Resiliency is built on a comprehensive understanding of the required level of performance that an organization requires to meet both normal as well as off normal events. Assessment of organizational resiliency must be risk based. For resiliency management to be effective and support organizational resiliency, an organization should at all levels comply with the following principles: Risk management creates and protects value and promotes resiliency as one of the strategic business objectives of an organization.

• Risk management, including a specific assessment and management of risks that affect the resiliency of an organization, is an integral part of all organizational processes. Resiliency management is not a stand-alone activity that is separate from the main activities and processes of the organization.

• Resiliency management, like risk management in general, is part of decision making. It helps organizations make informed choices, prioritize actions and distinguish among alternative courses of action.

• Resiliency management explicitly addresses uncertainty in terms of initiating events; organizational and systemic response; and nature and timing of recovery.

• Resiliency management is systematic, structured and timely. It encompasses all aspects of an organization and the full life cycle of all organizational activities.

• Resiliency management is based on the best available information. Inputs are based on a broad set of information sources and include expert judgment. It should take into account, any limitations of the data or modeling used or the possibility of divergence among experts.

• Resiliency management is tailored to the organization's external and internal context and risk profile.

• Resiliency management takes human and cultural factors into account to the extent that they can facilitate or hinder achievement of the organization's objectives.

• Resiliency management is transparent and inclusive and includes involvement of stakeholders and decision makers at all levels of the organization.

• Resiliency management is dynamic, iterative and responsive to change. As external and internal events occur, context and knowledge change, monitoring and review take place, new risks emerge, some change, and

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others disappear. Therefore, resiliency management continually senses and responds to change.

• Resiliency management facilitates continual improvement of the organization.

3.6 Strategies to Foster Improved Infrastructure Resiliency

Infrastructure delivery and operation is at an inflection point. There is growing recognition that disinvestment in sustaining current system performance has reached unacceptable levels. Demographics, periods of extended budget constraint and competition with private sector opportunities have combined to hollow out government’s infrastructure delivery capabilities. Traditional federal and state government funding sources are constrained by competition with other priorities, resistance to raising taxes and absence of user fee structures that adequately value the services infrastructure provides. The path forward will require new strategies. Some candidate strategies are laid out below; others certainly exist. The key to achieving and sustaining infrastructure resiliency will be to define a new paradigm to fund, deliver and maintain the infrastructure systems the nation requires. Strategy Option 1 – Require Life Cycle Funding Frameworks

Many infrastructure investments today are driven by the political attractiveness of ribbon cuttings over the unseen investments required to maintain existing assets. Funding frameworks place great emphasis on new capacity and modern replacements, yet rarely consider the longer term costs associated with sustaining those investments. This leaves maintenance to compete with other discretionary priorities with broader and more vocal constituencies. In private infrastructure models, business requirements or actual funding evaluations undertaken at the time of financing of the emerging class of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) drive towards the establishment and budgeting of adequate funding for routine maintenance and periodic renewals. Often these infrastructure ownership and management models will require sustained asset preservation (to protect investors’ investments) and may even involve funding of sinking funds for periodic renewals. The requirements for publicly-owned infrastructure should be no less. Initial project funding should carry with it a commitment to fund routine and periodic activities at defined levels (output or performance-driven) and may appropriately include ongoing funding of specially created sinking funds for such purposes.

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Strategy Option 2 – Define a Required State of Good Repair

Private infrastructure is often subject to regulation that requires certain performance-based characteristics with respect to operating regime or safety performance. More recent infrastructure sales to PPP’s have required sustained performance against well developed and well defined operating and maintenance performance specifications that go far beyond even the current performance of the governmental sellers of these assets. This standard setting approach is not inappropriate. Rather it provides the public with the assurance that these assets will be used in a way that protects the public’s long-term interest in high quality, adequately performing infrastructure. Typically, regulatory based infrastructure systems and contract based PPP’s face a range of penalties for failing to maintain performance and safety at threshold levels on a sustained basis. The same threshold performance with respect to sustaining critical infrastructure in a state of good repair must apply to governmentally owned infrastructure assets as well. Just as the first call on financial resources for privately owned infrastructure must sustain the ability to meet regulatory and contractual requirements, so too must the public sector. We must move beyond simple reporting of degraded critical infrastructure condition to “contract” based requirements that require redress. Strategy Option 3 – Fully Mobilize Private Sector Capabilities

Private sector business models are focused on developing and achieving competitive advantage. As this advantage is lost, business models must change or management or the business itself will certainly disappear. Successful businesses have several characteristics which are essential in the delivery and management of the infrastructure systems of the 21st century. These include: • Clearly defined long term, strategic objectives

• Strong management systems and practices including a deep understanding of external drivers and comprehensive risk assessment and management

• Strong stakeholder focus

• Financial discipline and business model innovation

• Strong sense of “time” and the need for decisiveness Increasingly we have seen government outsource pieces of the infrastructure life cycle (design, construction, elements of maintenance). This provides select benefits to the public sector but does not achieve the full potential the

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private sector can bring. Through its intermediation in the life cycle process, either between life cycle stages or between multiple players in a given stage, the public sector retains its greatest risk, namely, interface risk between the various parties. This intermediation is expensive and seldom is the risk adequately assessed and provided for. We have seen governments in Canada, Europe and Australia significantly capitalize on private sector expertise through PPP structures of various forms. Initially conceived as off balance sheet financing tools, they quickly evolved into project delivery and operation vehicles that transferred many more project risks, focused on outcomes, allowed private sector creativity to flourish and took advantage of project finance structures that accessed broader capital markets and rewarded outstanding performance. Today, these opportunities still lay largely ahead for the United States. While gaining traction, design build in its many forms (design build; design build finance; design build finance operate; design build operate and maintain) is still underutilized and finance based structures are really still in their infancy. To achieve infrastructure resiliency we will need to make broader and more creative use of these tools adopting a life cycle, performance based perspective wherever possible. Strategy 4 – Fairly Value our Infrastructure

In order to fund the critical infrastructure we require, in the condition that we will require it to perform, we must first move beyond the notion that infrastructure is free. This will require a broad public education process. While this will be a good start, public education will not be enough, as political cycles are much shorter than either capital construction periods or operating time frames of infrastructure. The resistance to raising taxes, or for that matter tolls or other user fees, will remain until the political cycle and good business practices are decoupled. This decoupling is exactly what we see in PPP’s. In order to establish a fair value of our infrastructure, there are some central precepts which should be established: • Life cycle infrastructure costs are either fully self-supporting from

funding sources derived from infrastructures value or subsidized by other areas of the economy that it competes with for economic resources.

• Infrastructure value is not only a function of the type of facility (road, water treatment plant), location (urban core, wilderness), and network role (major river crossing, alternate route in a less congested area), but

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also the level of demand for that facility at any point in time (peak, shoulder period, off peak).

• Infrastructure availability carries an intrinsic value that extends beyond a current user set.

Within the framework represented by these precepts, several opportunities exist to more fairly value our infrastructure and develop the funding regime that is required to deploy and sustain our infrastructure networks and to ensure that critical infrastructure is both there and capable to perform at required levels during events of scale. Suggestions include: • Use of access or availability fees. Examples would include periodic fees

for being connected to infrastructure services (water, wastewater, telecom). It would also include fees for having the ability to access certain classes of infrastructure on demand (owning a car or truck).

• Usage fees which do not distinguish between location, network role or level of demand. These might represent base charges per mile driven or per gallon consumed for example.

• Premium value fees to address location or network role values. A mile traveled in the urban core or the use of a major river crossing are examples of this.

• Peak pricing regimes, used not only to capture the intrinsically higher value but also to manage demand, thus reducing the requirement for additional capacity.

While each of these actions would represent a major step forward, more can be done to decouple inevitable rate increases from the shorter political cycle. Two specific suggestions are offered in this regard: • Establish well defined performance standards that mandate necessary

levels of investment. Increased spending is no longer a purely political decision.

• Index certain fee structures to defined escalation regimes that are automatically triggered, while moving other fee elements fully into a market based pricing regime (peak pricing).

Private sector skill sets, greater life cycle delivery responsibility and actual ownership of assets through PPP’s have a key role to play.

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3.7 Conclusion

Infrastructure lies strategically at the intersection of the public and private sectors. It underpins and ties together the balance of human development and activity. It is largely unseen and except in failure taken for granted. The 21st century presents many challenges for the nation’s infrastructure. Key among these challenges will be the need to improve the nation’s infrastructure so that it may better resist, respond to and recover from what will likely be a growing number of “events of scale”. Many of these events will merely be the consequence of ever greater proportions of our population living in growing urban conglomerations and the attendant risks that come from concentration. Other events will be the consequence of longer term trends such as those posed by global warming, rising sea levels or growing uncertainties related to key societal inputs such as clean water. Finally, some, ever more horrific in potential will be from human actors. This set of inevitable challenges will ultimately raise our awareness of and focus on the need to enhance our infrastructure’s resiliency. Much in the same way that society is sharpening its focus on the triple bottom line (economic, social, environmental) as part of its increased awareness and emphasis on sustainability, so too will the focus on resiliency need to be increased. Perhaps resiliency will become the fourth leg of sustainability, one that looks very much at survival of and recovery from the unknown unknowns which today’s definition of sustainability stops short of comprehensively addressing.

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Resiliency Identification, Assessment and Tracking (RIAT)1 represents a comprehensive risk ontology not currently employed in the engineering and construction industry. Its application is broader than just the infrastructure which has dominated much of the focus of this book to this point. Private sector owners are the major owners of capital assets. Industrial resiliency is a key element of broader societal and economic resilience and as such it is appropriate that strategies and techniques to identify, track and ultimately sustain and enhance resilience apply broadly to infrastructure and non-infrastructure capital assets alike. Resilience identification, assessment and tracking, as discussed in this chapter, is characterized by its integration into a broader risk assessment methodology tailored to the considerations typically present in large, complex long duration engineering and construction programs and the associated facilities and their owners. RIAT integrates multiple resiliency assessment perspectives and in turn may be integrated with various risk management methodologies in a new way to provide a comprehensive identification, assessment and analysis of program risks as well as the resiliency inherent in a given project, program or existing capital asset. The methodology and techniques described in this chapter are thus applicable to both private and publicly owned industrial, infrastructure, commercial and institutional assets.

1 Disclosure: One or more of the concepts, techniques or methodologies described in this paper are protected by various patents pending. Owners and clients interested in discussing any of these concepts further should contact the author.

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Rules based prioritization and program specific knowledge incorporation are key features of the RIAT approach. The RIAT methodology goes beyond the current project and program focus, which considers risk along a certainty-uncertainty axis. RIAT introduces the concept of resilience which includes: • Assessment of risk management plans • Organizational process assessment • Strategic decision making • Resiliency management • Context assessment • Human factors • Stakeholder awareness and involvement in resiliency • Responsiveness of resiliency management plans to change, and • 3Rs assessment of individual facility resiliency considering:

− Inherent ability to resist off normal events − Inherent ability to respond to off normal events − Inherent ability to recover from off normal events

The first step in this process, resiliency assessment, can be seen schematically in Figure 4-1.

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Figure 4-1. Resiliency Assessment (Part 1) Resiliency is built on a comprehensive understanding of the required level of performance that an organization requires to meet both normal as well as off normal events. Assessment of organizational resiliency must be risk based. For resiliency management to be effective and support organizational resiliency, an organization should at all levels comply with the following principles: • Risk management creates and protects value and promotes resiliency as

one of the strategic business objectives of an organization.

• Risk management, including a specific assessment and management of risks that affect the resiliency of an organization, is an integral part of all organizational processes.

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• Resiliency management is not a stand-alone activity that is separate from the main activities and processes of the organization.

• Resiliency management, like risk management in general, is part of decision making. It helps organizations make informed choices, prioritize actions, and distinguish among alternative courses of action.

4.1 Risk Management Plan Assessment

The RIAT methodology begins with an assessment of existing risk management plans with the objective of confirming the current plan status, frequency of updates and extent of distribution or referrals to the plan to the extent determinable. Resiliency and other related or supporting plans or management documents identified as relevant to resiliency efforts, would be semantically indexed and scored against a resiliency concepts database. The strength of the inclusion of resiliency or resiliency concepts as a strategic business objective would be judged utilizing a combination of expert judgment and semantic analysis and expert input included in the overall risk management plan assessment. 4.2 Organizational Process Assessment

Organizational process assessment specifically addresses the extent to which risk management is an integral organizational process. All organizational process documentation, including procedures, forms and reports, are semantically indexed and reviewed by an appropriate expert. Risks that are specifically assessed would be tabulated and compared to a primary risk table to ensure completeness. For each risk identified a corresponding risk management plan or activity is identified, the strength of the activity or plan assessed, and implementation confirmed. 4.3 Strategic Decision Making Assessment

Assessment of strategic decision-making confirms that risk management is specifically addressed in a significantly relevant manner in all decision-making processes identified. The extent to which resiliency management is specifically addressed in decision-making processes is also assessed. Outputs from this step include a tabulation of prioritized choices and actions as well as a tabulation of alternative strategies identified. At each stage, scoring and ranking using various methodologies, including the use of fuzzy logic and expert systems, prepare inputs into the overall

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resiliency assessment incorporated as part of a broader risk assessment. Both inductive and deductive reasoning is utilized at different stages of the analysis.

Additional resiliency management principles, which must be reflected in an assessment of resiliency, include: • Resiliency management explicitly addresses uncertainty in terms of

initiating events, organizational and systemic response, and nature and timing of recovery.

• Resiliency management is systematic, structured, and timely. It encompasses all aspects of an organization and the full life cycle of all organizational activities.

• Resiliency management is based on the best available information. Inputs are based on a broad set of information sources and include expert judgment. It should take into account any limitations of the data or modeling used or the possibility of divergence among experts.

• Resiliency management is tailored to the organization’s external and internal context and risk profile.

• Resiliency management takes human and cultural factors into account to the extent that they can facilitate or hinder achievement of the organization’s objectives.

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Figure 4-2. Resiliency Assessment (Part 2) 4.4 Resiliency Management Assessment

This assessment encompasses a broad range of resiliency management activities and processes utilizing a combination of assessment techniques, including expert judgment. Specifically, any existing scenario-based resiliency analyses would be assessed to ensure that an appropriately broad spectrum of potential initiating events had been considered; that uncertainty was specifically addressed; that a range of systemic responses was considered; and that the scenarios provided good insight into the nature and timing of any recovery.

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The extent of organizational coverage of resiliency plans, as well as the adequacy of involvement of appropriate organizational elements, is undertaken and scored. Similarly an assessment will be made to assure resiliency plans encompass the entire life cycle or that limitations have been clearly communicated. Recognizing that resiliency management planning and implementation, if necessary, rely on the availability of the best possible information, an assessment of the adequacy of information is undertaken. Specifically, the extent of information sources is evaluated as well as the extent to which any limitations on the data have been captured. In the event that data centric models are used, any limitations inherent in the models are assessed as well as the degree to which any limitations have been noted. The availability of expert judgment to the resiliency management process, both in the planning and implementation stages, is also assessed and scored. Recognizing that data may come from many sources, methodologies to assess the cohesion, alignment and associated confidence in assembled information are reviewed to ensure that resiliency management activities have been well-founded. 4.5 Context Assessment

Context assessment assures that assessment of overall adequacy of resiliency efforts appropriately reflect the various risk profiles that are both inherent in the specific instance as well as the broader industry. Importantly, relative risk conditions are considered and timely awareness of contextual changes factored in. An expert systems approach guides to a composite score with respect to context. The context assessment outputs are utilized at the resiliency assessment level to guide overall weighting criteria selection. 4.6 Human Factors Assessment

Human factors assessment looks at risks to resiliency from factors such as cognitive lock, “satisficing” and fear. Relationships with employees and other individuals that comprise resiliency efforts, including their willingness to deliver bad news and consider new ideas, are assessed through a combination of crowd sourcing techniques and an assessment of known cultural and cross cultural factors. Finally, resiliency management must reflect these added principles: • Resiliency management is transparent and inclusive and includes

involvement of stakeholders and decision makers at all levels of the organization.

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• Resiliency management is dynamic, iterative, and responsive to change. As external and internal events occur, context and knowledge change, monitoring and review take place, new risks emerge, some change, and others disappear. Therefore, resiliency management continually senses and responds to change.

• Resiliency management facilitates continual improvement of the organization.

4.7 Stakeholder Awareness and Involvement in Resiliency

Assessment of resiliency planning and program requires a realistic view on the extent to which other supporting players have been identified, engaged and aware of the roles they may be asked to play. This assessment utilizes a number of surveying and interview techniques to develop an appropriately weighted score that factors into the overall resiliency assessment assembly. The following specific stakeholders are considered: • Decision makers at all levels of the organization

• Employees

• Key suppliers

• Pre-positioned response and recovery contractors

• Key clients

• Local government agencies

• Regulators, to the extent response or recovery-related actions are subject to oversight or approval

• Other major stakeholders

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This is reflected in Figure 4-3.

Figure 4-3. Resiliency Assessment (Part 3) 4.8 Responsiveness of Resiliency Management Plans

to Change

Processes for incorporating changed conditions, processes, organizational or response capabilities into the resiliency management program in a timely manner are assessed and scored utilizing expert judgment. 4.9 3Rs Assessment of Individual Facility Resiliency

This assessment is comprised of three significant parts that specifically consider conditions that may change or exist in a post-event environment. Specifically the following are addressed: • Inherent ability to resist off normal events • Inherent ability to respond to off normal events • Inherent ability to recover from off normal events

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4.10 Phases of an Event of Scale from a Relief, Response and Reconstruct Perspective

Events of scale are becoming increasingly common events in an increasingly complex and networked world. The impact of these events is amplified by growing populations in vulnerable areas and addressing these events require increased levels of engineering and logistical support. Understanding the nature of this engineering and logistical support is essential to response and reconstruction efforts. To assist in better planning for the deployment of engineering and logistical elements post-disaster, a phased event of scale framework is laid out in Figure 4-4 and was described in Chapter 1 and summarized again here. These activities are not sequential but rather define major phases delineating precursor activities and required capabilities.

Figure 4-4. Phases of an Event to Scale 4.11 Inherent Ability to Resist Off Normal Events

Returning now to the three significant parts that specifically consider conditions that may change or exist in a post-event environment, let us consider each in turn, beginning with the inherent ability to resist off normal events. This is illustrated in Figure 4-5.

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Figure 4-5. Inherent Ability to Resist Off Normal Events This assessment considers a range of pre-event factors and looks at their contribution to the inherent resiliency of the program. Before describing some of the specific assessment areas addressed it is worth looking at this resiliency phase more broadly and highlight some of the factors that will be more generally considered. Not all events of scale occur without warning and all do benefit from some degree of pre-planning and preparation. Pre-event activities include: • Emergency notification • Evacuation or sheltering • Pre-positioning of engineering first response and logistical teams

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Formally, this assessment considers both the organization’s and program’s core capacity. Elements of core capacity that will be addressed include the extent of systems and features relevant to resiliency needs. Alternate paths or said in other words the flexibility and adaptability of the organization and the systems, structures and components comprising the program. And finally the quality of the systems – will they survive design basis events intact or even with a degraded but useful capability. To the extent that a more holistic management and project execution system such as a 7DSM system have been employed, this information will be intelligently extracted and integrated. A 7DSM perspective is described in detail in Appendix 2. Other input methodologies are also available. An assessment is made as to the nature and degree of coupling of systems and the risk level associated with any tight coupling. Potential positive feedback loop risks must be assessed using information from a 7DSM program execution system or the equivalent. This effort will assess two other inherent features of the program, drawing information from a linked 7DSM system or the equivalent. These include the degree of interoperability and the degree of decentralized control. In assessing the inherent ability to resist off normal events, additional information, related to the operating and maintenance phase of the specific facilities comprising a program, will be elicited. These will include review of the operating characteristics and failure rates of systems, structures and components based on an experiential plant operating history as well as a proprietary operating and maintenance data base that will consider appropriate analogs. Deferred maintenance will be evaluated to assess both the nature and level of any such condition recognizing its contribution to degraded resiliency. 4.12 Inherent Ability to Respond to Off Normal Events

The second aspect of the 3Rs assessment is the inherent ability to respond to off normal events. Engineering and logistical activities during the event and its immediate aftermath should be focused on predictive forecasting of the nature, type, extent and pattern of damage. Areas at risk from secondary effects should be prioritized. Additional event phase activities include: • Refinement of disaster assessment checklists

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• Pre-mobilization of first response and initial relief capabilities Updated inventory of engineering, logistical and supply chain Identification of frameworks that must be activated or modified

• Activation of disaster response teams associated with engineering assessment or logistical support to first responders

Figure 4-6 describes some of the considerations that go into this assessment.

Figure 4-6. Inherent Ability to Respond to Off Normal Events

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4.13 First Response

Activities during the first response phase rely on resources already in the disaster area. Engineering and logistical activities during the first response phase include: • Prime focus on life saving Focus on minimization of additional loss of

life. Updating disaster assessment checklists to reflect the specific event.

• Identifying evolving engineering and logistical needs.

• Establishing logistical centers. The ability to accomplish these various activities is reviewed as part of assessing the inherent ability to respond to off normal events. 4.14 Mobilization of Initial Relief

The focus during this phase is the saving and preservation of life. Initial relief activities will consist of continued rescue efforts and additional engineering resources may be deployed for extended rescue operations. During this phase, emergency sheltering will include assessment of existing structures. Plans for review of transitional shelter sites for safety are also developed during the Mobilization of Initial Relief such that these assessments can be completed in a timely manner before desirable sites become committed to less than optimum usage. Planning for transitional phase activities, including identification and action on enabling activities, should be begun and completed early in the Initial Relief phase. Long lead transitional requirements should be initially established and supply chains organized to meet these needs. At each stage, focus must be on establishing the framework for “vertical launch” of the subsequent phase.

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The role of the client and program team will be narrowly focused during this stage but provisions for awareness will be assessed. 4.15 Initial Relief

The initial relief phase follows on the heels of the First Response phase and the two overlap. The Initial Relief phase is focused on preserving life and avoiding an even greater human tragedy by ensuring that the most basic human needs of shelter, food, water and basic medical care are met. During this phase the engineering and logistics effort is focused on supporting primary human relief efforts: • Ongoing assessment of existing shelter stability

• Identification of safe drinking water sources, including emergency restoration Identification and stabilization of infrastructure essential to relief operations

• Ongoing assessment of physical safety of sites associated with Initial Relief activities Operation of Initial Relief phase logistical centers

• Deployment of man camps

• Assessment of physical infrastructure and potential sites for transitional

• Identification of logistical needs for transition phase activities and initiation of enabling activities

Each of these activities will potentially impact program activities both directly and indirectly and linkages to program labor requirements warrant special attention.

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This assessment will consider and evaluate these various factors as well as those in the subsequent supporting activities. Training programs and plans will be reviewed against established criteria and scored for overall adequacy; the extent to which the training is scenario-based; the effectiveness and actual implementation of the training programs; the renewal and refreshing of emergency training (continuing competency); and the adequacy of the training as it relates to the various phases that an event of scale will involve. There is recognition of the inter-linkage between a given “development” and associated critical infrastructure and the consideration given to such infrastructure, including any planned contingencies as a result of concomitant loss will be considered. The availability of specialized construction equipment, contracts, material and labor will receive particular attention and detailed inventories; contracts in place and mobilization times and mechanisms; and labor and material sourcing and contingency strategies will be evaluated, scored and gaps identified. Accessibility to spares, especially for long lead or mission critical equipment, will be assessed and risks associated with any segregated on-site or off-site storage evaluated. The potential of multiple calls on shared inventory pools and the supply chain more generally will be evaluated. System documentation will be assessed to ensure that it is current, that interface points are clearly identified and that documentation is of sufficient quality to support resiliency efforts. Linkages to a current instance of a 7DSM system facilitate such assessments but manual assessments can augment such automated activities. Finally the assessment of the inherent ability to respond to off normal events will consider the ability of the overall organizational and system design to limit broader disturbances and have well-developed arrangements for non site-based emergency teams. 4.16 Inherent Ability to Recover From Off Normal Events

This represents the third of the 3Rs assessed as part of our 3Rs assessment. The recovery phase, as defined here, includes: • Mobilization of the transition phase • Transition phase

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• Mobilization of reconstruction • Reconstruction • Preparedness assessment (lessons learned) These activities are reflected in Figure 4-7.

Figure 4-7. Inherent Ability to Recover From Off Normal Events 4.17 Mobilization of Transition Phase

As the post-event situation stabilizes, attention turns to transitional assistance. There is an overlap from Initial Relief to Transition phase activities marked by various mobilization activities in anticipation of the Transition phase. During this mobilization for the Transition phase, engineering, construction and logistical activities grow in relative importance when compared to other relief activities. This shift in relative importance of the engineering and construction role is characteristic of post-event periods. By contrast, logistical operations, while growing throughout the post-event period, shift increasingly to more normal conditions.

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Essential engineering, construction and logistical activities include identification of: • Elements of permanent potable water system and waste disposal system

• Additional infrastructure repairs to be undertaken to support Transition and Reconstruction

• Permanent power generation repairs and replacements required

• Reconfigured power distribution networks Also included is mobilization of: • Engineering and construction resources to deploy Transition

infrastructure Construction and logistical resources to deploy transition phase shelters

• Labor related training and employment Long lead contracts to support engineering, construction and logistical activities

The mechanisms for awareness of these activities together with an assessment of how they may impact a program’s recovery are important and will be assessed in this overall resiliency assessment. 4.18 Transition Phase

During the transition phase the focus is on returning some semblance of normalcy in meeting population and local economy needs completing permanent reconstruction. Engineering, construction and logistics activities during this phase include: • Elements of permanent potable water Elements of permanent waste

disposal system Additional infrastructure repairs to support Transition and initial Reconstruction

• Permanent power generation repairs Construction of reconfigured power distribution networks to support Transition and early Reconstruction efforts

• Transition infrastructure including transition shelter site infrastructure

• Transition phase logistical operations Importantly, initial lessons learned assessments from an engineering, construction and logistics standpoint are prepared.

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Again, awareness and possible interfaces and impacts of the program’s resiliency management perspective are assessed. 4.19 Mobilization of Reconstruction

Specific engineering, construction and logistics activities include: • Reconstruction planning

• Code modification to build on lessons learned at the earliest stages of reconstruction

• Permitting and approvals

• Estimates and budget development

• Funding and program management, engineering and construction contracting activities

• Construction labor agreements

• Definition of requisite safety, quality and inspection programs These activities will occur regionally as well as for the owner’s specific program. This subassembly will consider both the awareness and impacts of regional activities on program resiliency plans as well as the programs own frameworks in place or the methodologies and timing to put in place. Specifically, this assessment element will evaluate rehearsals, including tabletop exercises, for recovery from high probability events as well as from catastrophic events. Many of the factors previously described will be evaluated as part of these rehearsals. Finally a detailed assessment of preparedness for the post-disaster reconstruction environment will be undertaken recognizing that the disaster changes each of the elements that comprise a more typical construction model. This assessment will specifically consider: • Project inputs • Business frameworks • Project and environmental setting framework • Stakeholder framework • Project and construction activity special challenges • Changed project outputs

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Disasters change each element of the standard construction model and activities normally undertaken are modified by post-disaster logistics constraints as well as modify post-disaster logistics themselves. 4.20 Conclusion

Resiliency is a dynamic condition. “Building it in” or assessing its presence and strength are merely snapshots in a long playing movie where the script and its ending are yet to be written. A focus on resiliency helps guide us to an operating project and organization with a life cycle focus and sensitive to a much more holistic set of demands, challenges, constraints and opportunities than we might otherwise be aware of. It is this notion of “sustainable resiliency” which is the result of good resiliency identification, assessment and importantly, tracking. In this Chapter, many considerations related to resiliency are laid out in the form of a structured approach and each of the many aspects to be considered developed. Each area lend itself to deeper and more expansive development but hopefully this methodology and framework provide a basis for more complete development and implementation by major capital asset owners.

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Much has been written on Black Swan type risks, sometimes treated as the risks from Unknown Unknowns. Do Black Swans inhabit the world of capital assets and are they truly Unknown Unknowns? In 17th century Europe all observable swans were white and by extension all swans were therefore assumed to be white. No non-white swan had ever been observed. In the 18th century, however, black swans were discovered in Western Australia and that discovery undermined the statistics of swans to that date. Previously, the “risk” of a Black Swan was essentially nil but upon recognition that the improbable was not the same as the impossible, the possibility of Black Swans became more likely.

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What had changed that made Black Swans more probable? Simply put, our perceptions were broadened. In this article we will look at large programs; what creates the possibility of Black Swans; and what are some of the new risks of which we must pay attention. 5.1 Possibility of Black Swans

Achieving resilience in our capital assets is very much about meeting the challenges of scale and complexity. These challenges largely focus on the management of known knowns and known unknowns. But large long-lived capital assets, by their very nature, move into a new neighborhood where previously rare unknown unknowns are more prevalent. In effect, large capital asset program risks grow in new non-linear ways. What causes this growth? Simply put: • Scale and complexity move you into a new neighborhood where black

swans may be more common.

• Scaling drives non-linear and noncorrelated growth in risks.

• Complexity masks existing risks.

• Complexity creates new risks.

So what are Black Swans? First they are outliers, beyond the set of expectations we have about allowable “value.” They are outliers since we believe we have no past experience to suggest the possibility. I emphasize the word “believe” here since I will later suggest that there is a reasonable expectation that large capital asset programs are “neighborhoods” that Black Swans visit. Second, Black Swans have a significant impact not only on the capital asset program but on the psychology and behavior of those implementing the program. They often cause a new paradigm to develop that may not fundamentally reduce risks. This is one of the greatest challenges today’s resilience efforts face. Third, we rationalize, after the fact, that it was in effect predictable. While in some instances this may be true, often it defies rationality and thus a focus on resisting, responding and recovering from these unknown unknowns through resiliency is a more appropriate focus.

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In Michael Lewis’s book, The Big Short, there is an illustration of a business model that masked what otherwise should have been a reasonable expectation. He describes some of the models used by ratings agencies to rate mortgage-backed securities, reporting that at least one agency used a model for home price increases that could not accept negative numbers. As an engineering and construction example, many estimating and business modeling programs provide for inflation of costs over time and even model the variance of such costs over time. Do they allow for deflation? In my view, the main point is to build resilience against outlier risks that can occur and capitalize on outlier opportunities. This concept of building resiliency into the capital asset program structure and strategies is an important one. 5.2 New Risks in Large Capital Asset Programs

Complexity and scale create an attractive environment for Black Swans. They create a hidden, interlocking fragility while at the same time giving a perception of stability in this complex system. Vulnerabilities enter large programs, project organizations and other human-designed systems as they grow more complex. Increasingly, these systems and their myriad of relationships, including hidden relationships, are so complex that they defy a thorough understanding. As complexity grows, insufficient attention is often paid to the introduction and proliferation of new links with new risks. (See Figure 5-1) As a result, many programs continually implement workarounds and “fixes,” which ultimately add to the total life cycle cost and often sow the seeds of new risks and new failures.

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Figure 5-1. Complexity The Rise of Complexity

To exacerbate matters, the possibility of random failure rises as the number of combinations of things that can impact the program grows. This is the non-linear effect previously described. The enormous complexity of large programs means that even tiny risks and attendant failures can cascade to become catastrophic in proportion.

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Severe impacts from Black Swans are almost guaranteed to occur in some complex programs, especially those with strong externalities or of a long duration. The statistics of events in manmade systems are starting to resemble that of natural phenomena like earthquakes, which means they are bound to happen.

The inherent weaknesses of a complex system reveal themselves in the face of turbulence or stress or more significantly events of scale. As the complexity of systems increases, the exposure to Black Swan risks grows, but these risks do not need to be unmitigated. In each Black Swan event we have seen certain core lessons learned, which must be acted upon by the Program Manager. These lessons include: • Recognition that “core capacity” of complex programs and systems is

essential.

− Adequate capability to meet routine needs contributes to the program’s ability to respond to Black Swan events. But it is not just “more” capability, but also the degree of interconnectivity of the various elements of the system, its flexibility and redundancy. Or in other words its resiliency, sensitive to the fact that this interconnectivity may also create new vulnerabilities.

• Understanding the link between process and non-process infrastructure.

• Recognizing the real cost and real risk that come from failing to keep the program performance and capability at high level.

− I often wonder how capital asset program performance would improve if as much attention was focused on program organizational performance as often is focused on the approval of the addition of the next staff member!

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Resiliency is built on a comprehensive understanding of the required level of performance that an organization requires to meet both normal as well as off normal events. Assessment of organizational resiliency must be risk-based. For resiliency management to be effective and support organizational resiliency, an organization should, at all levels, comply with the following principles: • Risk management creates and protects value and promotes resiliency as

one of the strategic business objectives of an organization.

• Risk management, including a specific assessment and management of risks that affect the resiliency of an organization, is an integral part of all organizational processes.

• Resiliency management is not a stand-alone activity that is separate from the main activities and processes of the organization.

• Resiliency management, like risk management in general, is part of decision making. It helps organizations make informed choices, prioritize actions and distinguish among alternative courses of action.

• Resiliency management explicitly addresses uncertainty in terms of initiating events; organizational and systemic response; and nature and timing of recovery.

• Resiliency management is systematic, structured and timely. It encompasses all aspects of an organization and the full life cycle of all organizational activities.

• Resiliency management is based on the best available information. Inputs are based on a broad set of information sources and include expert judgment. It should take into account, any limitations of the data or modeling used or the possibility of divergence among experts.

• Resiliency management is tailored to the organization's external and internal context and risk profile.

• Resiliency management takes human and cultural factors into account to the extent that they can facilitate or hinder achievement of the organization's objectives.

• Resiliency management is transparent and inclusive and includes involvement of stakeholders and decision makers at all levels of the organization.

• Resiliency management is dynamic, iterative and responsive to change. As external and internal events occur, context and knowledge change, monitoring and review take place, new risks emerge, some change and

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others disappear. Therefore, resiliency management continually senses and responds to change.

• Resiliency management facilitates continual improvement of the organization.

As we saw in Section 2.6, we need to be SMART about the types of Black Swan risks that large programs may face: • System Risks • Maintenance & Operation Risks • Attitude Vulnerabilities • Risk-taking Vulnerabilities • Transitional Risks

Some examples of these various risks are included in this section to highlight their occurrence and importance. System Risks

System risks include: • Failure to recognize the program as a growing and ever more complex

system

• Inadequate “system” understanding

• Positive feedback loop risks

• Centralized control weaknesses in complex systems

• There is a need for “interoperability” and an ability to “see” the situation. Partial decentralization of systems is required

• “Tight Coupling” of systems

− Simply put, an event in one system or project leads to an event in another in short order

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• Failing to KISS • Inadequate “core capacity”

− All too often we emphasize “reach” over “responsiveness” when making key decisions regarding program and organizational investments.

Consideration of these risks will enhance the resiliency of large, complex programs. Maintenance & Operation Risks

If “system” risks focus on ensuring that the right system is put in place, then “maintenance” risks are focused on keeping it that way. • Failing to recognize the importance of “state of good repair.” • Inadequate renewal of contingency planning. • Inadequate operating provisions to limit disturbances. Attitude Vulnerabilities

In contrast with system and maintenance risk, that focus on whether the right management systems and frameworks are in place and whether they are sustained properly, attitude vulnerabilities address our willingness to accept an unexpected or undesired “truth.” • Cognitive lock • Over-commitment to bureaucratic goals

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• Prisoner to Heuristics • Denial • Failure to learn “lessons learned”

Risk-taking Vulnerabilities

None of us likes to be wrong. But the way we perceive risks and handle mistakes affects the range of actions we are willing to consider when faced with extreme situations. Risk aversion replaces risk management. • Litigation constrains risk-taking in the early phases after an event

of scale

• Fear of “satisficing”

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Transitional Risks

“We must recognize that complex capital asset programs and their management systems are most vulnerable immediately before, during and immediately after a change process.

• Inadequate use of currently deployed resources • Change processes further stress existing systems • New system failure rates not planned • Technology put ahead of people

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When this book was originally conceived it was intended to address what I refer to as the 3R’s of events of scale. These are associated with a simple three phase model of Resist, Respond and Recover. This model was laid out in a paper prepared shortly after 9/11 for the National Academy of Engineering1 and in many ways remains my reductionist view of disasters. As the writing of this book evolved I felt it was more important to focus more heavily on the pre-event phase where we can make a difference in how events might unfold and limit its consequences and the post event phase which has its own special challenges but also the opportunity to serve as the next pre-event phase with lessons learned all around us. While this book will not focus heavily on the immediate response phase it is not intended to diminish its life saving importance. To the body of work that is out there, hopefully this chapter will make some contributions at least at the margin. Transitional activities have been touched upon elsewhere in the book and will not be repeated here. Figure 6-1, Resiliency Model, provides an overview of the linkage between pre- and post-event phases.

1 “A 911 Call to the Engineering Profession,” published in The Bridge: Linking Engineering and Society, National Academy of Engineering, Spring 2002

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Figure 6-1. Resiliency Model If there is one special point this book seeks to make it is this: Engineers and constructors are new, first responders in today’s increasingly built environment This point cannot be overstated and its importance must not be diminished lest we be destined to learn the same lessons over and over – a price we cannot afford to pay on either a human or financial dimension. The key to effective response to an event of scale begins with planning and preparedness before such an event occurs as discussed in earlier chapters. Tables 6-1 and 6-2 provide an overview of some of the items to be addressed in this pre-event stage. Table 6-3 is a checklist of disaster response supplies that contingency operations teams should consider in their advanced planning and be prepared to mobilize with. The balance of this book focuses on the post disaster recovery period where less attention has been paid. It is not business as usual as we will highlight in the following chapters.

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Table 6-1. Emergency Planning Checklist

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Table 6-2. Emergency Preparedness Checklist

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Table 6-3. Contingency Operations Teams Supply Checklist

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Post-disaster reconstruction changes each element of the standard construction model. Activities normally undertaken in more conventional periods are modified not only by post-disaster logistics constraints, but in turn, modify post-disaster logistics themselves. In a pre-disaster environment we can simplistically describe construction as occurring within a simple model that includes a set of project inputs, transformed at a project site within a well-defined framework, to deliver the desired project outputs. Post-disaster, each of these elements is significantly modified. This chapter examines how the traditional construction model is changed post-disaster and provides a framework for not only considering construction in a post-disaster environment but also a guide for improving the resiliency of our various frameworks to deal with such eventualities. 7.1 Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Post-disaster reconstruction is an inevitable human activity. Well-meaning people come together with deep passion and commitment to face a situation of destruction and suffering with a set of social and physical frameworks that, at a minimum, have been significantly modified and at a maximum, shattered beyond recognition. Post-disaster reconstruction brings out the best in people but can also bring out at times the worst. It is in this condition where constraints, change and uncertainty are the norm that the engineering and construction industry is challenged to restore and rebuild. If done well, they will be better prepared to meet tomorrow’s challenges. Disasters change each element of the standard construction model. Activities normally undertaken, in more conventional periods, are modified not only by post-

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disaster logistics constraints but in turn modify post-disaster logistics themselves. Chapter 4 looked at resiliency, its identification, assessment and tracking. In that assessment it was important to understand how well-prepared we are when all other planning and protection has been overwhelmed. That understanding is aided by recognizing that the post-disaster construction setting can differ significantly to the pre-disaster condition and frameworks. 7.2 A Simplified Construction Model

In a pre-disaster environment we can simplistically describe construction as occurring within a simple model (Figure 7-1) that includes a set of project inputs. Those inputs are transformed at a project site within a well-defined framework to deliver the desired project outputs. Framework elements include: • Business framework

• Project environment and setting

• Social and stakeholder framework

• Economic and political frameworks

Figure 7-1. Simplified Construction Model Post-disaster, each of these elements is significantly modified. Let’s look at Figure 7-1 and each element to see how it is modified Post-disaster starting with project inputs themselves.

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7.3 Project Inputs

Each of the basic inputs from a simplified construction model (labor, materials, equipment) is modified post-disaster and several new input considerations become significant. These modified and new input factors are reflected in Figure 7-2 and include: • Labor

− New management skills

− Skilled labor requirements changed/expanded

− Large unskilled labor pool mobilization

− Labor sourcing (Global or select nationals)

• Materials

− Material requirements and sequencing changed

− Quantities disrupted supply chains

− Challenging logistics

• Equipment

− Sourcing

− Maintenance during construction

− Trained operators

• Knowledge of Post-Disaster Construction

• Subcontractor Finance

• Non-Process Infrastructure

− Traditional housing, provision, and utility services disrupted or inadequate

− Logistic facilities disrupted or inadequate

• Modified Safety Practices for Post-Disaster Environment

− Unknown conditions

− Specialized craft training

− Changed work sequences

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• Stronger Management Systems Role

− Commercial transactions

− Labor documentation and payroll

− Augmented work face planning and management

Figure 7-2. Project Inputs Similarly, the various framework elements are subject to modified or added components, which act to shape Post-disaster project management in ways not encountered in non-disaster scenarios. Let’s look at each of the framework elements in turn and how the various components are modified post-disaster. 7.4 Disaster Changes Business Framework

Disaster changes the business framework, introducing new factors into basic construction contract considerations. This significantly alters risk frameworks that the program or project team may experience, creating new de facto owner groups different than those with which the engineering and construction team and broader community may be used to engaging, thus with, and creating new challenges with various labor organizations. Specific modifications to the “simplified” model are reflected in Figure 7-3 and may include: • Contract

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− Scope includes more unknowns and potentially evolving requirements

− Schedule based on potential continuing risk events, degraded labor productivity, uncertain supply chains, and evolving approval frameworks

− Budgets based on uncertain labor, equipment, and material costs accounting for competition for constrained resources

− Quality standards must consider risks and intended usage and duration

• Risk Framework

− Significantly changed risk profile must be reflected in terms and conditions

• Owners

− External funding agencies may assume de facto owner’s role

• Labor Organizations and Agreements

− Existing agreements may create barriers to recovery

− Potential for labor strife as external workforce mobilized

Figure 7-3. Business Framework

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7.5 Disaster Changes Project and Environmental Setting Framework

Disasters, in particular broader scale disasters, fundamentally alter the project and environmental setting. Site access will be constrained in new and potentially evolving ways. Basic site and regional geography may be fundamentally modified and the regional infrastructure, at whatever level, projects rely on to meet many of their basic needs, may now be non-existent. Basic assumptions under the “simplified” pre-disaster model are no longer valid. Changes to the various components of this framework element are seen in Figure 7-4 and include: • Project Site

− Constrained access

− Denied access

− Uncertain ownership or other property rights

• Geography

− Modified topography (floods, landslides, or mudslides; earthquake displacement; lava fields; aftermath of military action)

− Terrain limits rate of response or reconstruction

− Accessibility constrains available options

• Climate

− Adverse climactic conditions impact response activities (continuing hurricane season, seasonal extremes of temperature or precipitation)

− Event of scale necessitates construction in non-traditional time periods (monsoon, depth of winter, peak of summer)

• Regional Infrastructure

− Widespread destruction of regional infrastructures important to response and reconstruction (roads and rails washed away, bridges severely damaged or destroyed, airports rendered unusable, destroyed power generation and transmission capability, destroyed or degraded potable water treatment and distribution capability, degraded wastewater capability, constrained telecom services from facility damage)

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− Regional infrastructure inadequate for level and nature of response and rebuilding activities

• Social Infrastructures Disrupted or Destroyed

− Housing, medical, police, fire, sanitation

− Banking and other financial institutions

• Records and Documentation

− Lost records

− As-builts no longer meaningful

− Property rights not well-documented or inconsistent with social realities (squatter populations)

• Codes and Standards

− Evolving as a result of event of scale

− Variable – affected by donor/funder requirements

Figure 7-4. Project Environment and Setting

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7.6 Disaster Changes Social and Stakeholder Framework

Social and stakeholder frameworks undergo some of the most significant changes post-disaster, often in ways that are not readily visible. These changes impact each of the components that comprise this framework element. Traditional problem resolution mechanisms may breakdown and new sources of concern or conflict emerge. Displaced populations, transient relief and reconstruction populations and a reemergence or strengthening of cultural or tribal issues, compound the difficulty in undertaking the engineering and construction activities needed to respond and reconstruct post-disaster. Often, the debilitating and corrosive impacts of corruption are more sharply felt. Changes to specific framework components are shown in Figure 7-5 and include: • Organized Stakeholders

− Traditional stakeholder groups dysfunctional

− Stakeholder objectives evolving

− New stakeholder groups emerging

− National or international stakeholders gain roles to enable or intervene

• Demographics

− Loss and displacement of populations

− Impact of relief, response, and reconstruction populations

− Constraints on construction labor

• Cultural/Religious

− Transitional roles often played by cultural or religious groups

− Cultural and religious sensitivities often elevated

− Tribal issues and prerogatives may resurface

• Ownership Rights

− Lack of documentation and records

− Conflicting claims

− Formal versus informal rights

− Confiscation in the absence of the rule of law

− Corruption

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Figure 7-5. Social and Stakeholder Framework 7.7 Disaster Changes Economic and Political Framework

The destructive impact of a disaster on economic activity pre-disaster is easy to understand. Harder to come to grips with is the trajectory of economic activity post-disaster. This trajectory is often shaped by political functionality and the extension of politics into every aspect of life and every decision essential to post-disaster relief and recovery. Examples of changes in the various components of this final framework element are shown in Figure 7-6 and include: • Rule of Law

− Confiscation and security risks elevated due to lack of rule of law

− Emergency decrees inconsistently interpreted and applied

− Local laws of convenience

− Corruption

• Regulations

− Regulations not relevant to situation on ground or act to impede progress

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− Traditional regulations extended to situation for which they were not designed

• Financial Institutions

− Absent or disrupted

− Emergence of a cash economy

− Difficulty paying suppliers and labor

• Project Funding

− Color of money issues associated with multiple funding sources and tied requirements

− Documentation requirements evolve

− Lack of on-the-ground payment capability by donors

− Lack of timeliness of payments

• Politics

− Politics in traditionally non-political activities

− Every activity potentially someone’s political platform

− Long-range planning efforts began anew affecting critical decisions

− Economic development a core consideration

− Capacity building may be an imperative

• Sustainability and Resilience

− Life-cycle focus may emerge

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Figure 7-6. Economic and Political Framework 7.8 Post-Disaster Project and Construction Activity

Post-disaster project and construction activity must now occur at a site where traditional inputs and project frameworks have been modified and special challenges such as those shown in Figure 7-7 are present. These special challenges include debris removal and potential reuse to mitigate ever-present logistical challenges. Changed psychology, both with respect to decision-making and risk–taking, but also with respect to a labor force that itself may be displaced or suffering the loss of close relatives; and changed liability concerns as one of the first things to grow post-disaster is uncertainty which is a root cause of much liability. I have already touched upon the corrosive effects of corruption which may be controlled or compounded by governmental leadership and enablement. These are real issues as are those related to human and construction safety. The construction environment is inherently dangerous and post-disaster uncertainties only exacerbate these concerns.

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Figure 7-7. Special Challenges Finally, post-disaster construction activities face modified output requirements from more traditional non-disaster construction. 7.9 Post-Disaster Construction Outputs

Traditional construction activities are traditionally focused on creating new facilities, usually “permanent” in nature. Post-disaster, constructed projects may take on a wider range of time frames including temporary, transitional and permanent dimensions. Pressures to use disaster debris in construction may modify certain design and construction choices. Considerations related to not adding to this material problem are only heightened post-disaster. Social dimensions of the “triple bottom line” of sustainability take on increased importance as part of the overall disaster recovery process. Specific changes to post-disaster outputs are reflected in Figure 7-8 and include: • Completed Project

− Temporary

− Transitional

− Permanent

• Construction Waste

− Linkage to debris considerations (disposal and reuse in construction)

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− Recycling drivers

• Sustainability

− Capacity building

− Economic development

− New industry creation

− Enhanced resiliency

− Lessons learned and best practices

Figure 7-8. Project Outputs Post-disaster engineering and construction program and project management activities are significantly modified from non-disaster activities. Changes to the fundamental project model employed in the management of these types of programs and projects requires a fundamental rethink of skill sets, management processes, risks and constraints. In addition, these changes collectively and significantly alter the logistical characteristics of such programs while simultaneously significantly modifying the broader logistical space within which the disaster has occurred. Even the most basic project activities have the potential to significantly affect project and regional logistics and even the best intentioned relief and recovery activities have the ability to impact response and recovery in today’s highly engineered, built environment. Consideration, awareness and incorporation of the numerous changed factors above will be assessed in this subassembly. The challenges of this changed environment can be met through concerted action. Specific recommendations include:

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• Government and NGO community must plan for assisting in post-disaster recovery

• Engagement with engineering and construction community must begin pre-disaster

− Pre-placed contracts

Program management

EPC

Supply chain

− Earliest mobilization to disaster zone

− Early activation of logistics chains

• Post-disaster period requires streamlined decision frameworks

− Decision authorities at project and disaster site

− Logistical-affecting processes may act as barrier in post-disaster scenario

Examples are customs, building permits, and liability legislation

Consider a standard “modified” logistical template for local government consideration

“Go-bys”

Best practices 7.10 Preparedness Assessment – Part of Resiliency Assessment

Key to long-term learning and preparation for the inevitable “next event” is the performance of a Preparedness Assessment. This process acts to ensure that we have truly learned from and provided for the vital lessons we have learned through each stage of the post-event period. As we have moved through the post-event period, not only will our insights have become deeper, but so too will our perspective on some of the actions we undertook at the earliest stages of the post-event response. • Did decisions on ruble disposal create delays or unneeded costs during

the transition phase or reconstruction phase?

• Did temporary infrastructure decisions result in wasted efforts when permanent fixes could have been accomplished for marginally more time or money?

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• Did management frameworks established at the earliest stages of the post-disaster period represent barriers for efficient reconstruction?

The list of post-event lesson learned questions goes on. But more important may be whether what we have rebuilt will provide a better pre-event condition than what existed before the last event. Or have we merely reconstructed a built environment the sows the seeds for shortfalls in responding to the next event of scale? The inherent ability to recover from off normal events must consider prior owner or program- specific lessons learned as well as review against a database of such lessons learned. Have we created that database? At the end of the day, successful program design and program risk assessment leads to program resiliency defined as an: • Ability to avoid or resist “risks”

• Ability to respond to those “risks” which do emerge

• Ability to recover from severe impact events such as Black Swans The taxonomy of each aids in forming an ontology from a global perspective. The taxonomy or ontology can be considered a normalized view without constraints imposed by individual management or analysis tools. This chapter lays out a taxonomy for considering one key element of the recovery stage, namely reconstruction. It should be considered in the broader context of identifying, assessing and tracking resiliency.

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Today’s highly engineered environment requires a new first responder team that includes engineers and constructors. The importance of these new first responders could be seen in efforts to remove bent steel beams in the search for 9/11 survivors; seal levee breaches after Katrina; restore power and water supply after the tsunami at Fukushima; and the massive infrastructure recovery efforts following Super Storm Sandy in New York and New Jersey. These new first responders are also essential for rebuilding after the immediate response phase. Events of scale change the normal construction process. New logistical challenges emerge and evolve in the post-disaster phase. These challenges include destroyed logistical facilities; competition with other post-disaster aid flows; and disrupted supply chains. This chapter looks at these challenges and offers recommendations to better manage them. Events of scale change the normal construction process as discussed in the previous chapter. New logistical challenges emerge and evolve in the post-disaster phase. These challenges include destroyed logistical facilities; competition with other post-disaster aid flows; and disrupted supply chains.

Figure 8-1. Events of Scale Change the Landscape

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Today’s managers charged with designing, building and operating with resiliency in mind, must be cognizant of the growing role these new first responders play after events of scale. Their effectiveness and the efficiency of longer term aid and reconstruction flows are closely coupled by this weakened logistical chain.

8.1 Logistics Affecting Activities

Many of the work processes and engineering, procurement and construction activities, traditionally associated with large-scale construction programs, must be modified to deal with the realities of post-disaster construction. Some of these changes are driven by logistical constraints of the post-disaster environment, while other changes are driven by changed institutional processes. Each of these changes impact the normal logistical processes expected in large-scale programs. This chapter looks at changes based on prior experience. Recommendations are provided in the matrix incorporated in Table 8-5 at the end of this chapter.

Table 8-1. Logistics Affecting Activities

• Client capabilities and resources • Client-contractor alignment and

contract • Mobilization • Mission-critical, unique equipment

sourcing • Ocean freight • Communication • Human remains • Vehicle safety • Oversized shipments • Road and bridge transport • Sourcing integrity • Global sourcing • In-country logistical institutional

infrastructure • Transportation insurance • Site transport • Port capacity and operations • Quality of locally procured material • Expediting • Construction equipment • Traffic routing and logistics plan • Execution plans • Project Management Manual • Workshare

• Staging areas • Building permits and consents for

temporary construction and logistical facilities

• Construction fleet maintenance • Cash flow • Non-process infrastructure (NPI) • Warehousing • Design basis • Degree of design standardization • Prefabrication • Anti-corruption and transparency • Material security • Craft training • Stakeholder engagement • Logistical contract forms • Preassembly • Modularization • Degree of client-furnished materials

and equipment • Small tools • Change management • Construction waste • Less-than-full truckload shipments • Supplier relationship agreements

(SRAs)

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Client Capabilities and Resources. Client organization may be lacking resources that understand engineering, procurement and construction processes and how they change in a post-disaster environment. Impacts and importance of logistics in post-disaster situations may not be sufficiently understood or required resources not engaged. Lack of appreciation for nature or scale of logistical challenges adversely impacts overall construction effort. Client-Contractor Alignment and Contract. Private sector efforts are in support of clients with flexibility to quickly execute risk-appropriate contracts. Public sector efforts are effective where prior contract vehicles exist and alignment activities have previously occurred. Lack of prior contract impacts efficiency of logistical commitments being made. Mobilization. Certain government or aid agency contracts are task order-based with no provision for mobilization costs. This delays activities to create efficient logistics operation. Execution Plans. Funding-driven baseline shaped by donor community. Project Management Manual (PMM). PMM expanded to include procedures/approvals linked to funding source. These procedures may vary by project delivery approach, contracting strategy and project phase. Added approvals and complexity impact logistics chain.

Figure 8-2. Strong Project Management Practices Required

Workshare. Funding agencies may drive work to be performed locally. Design Basis. Nature of funding sources constrain solutions reducing opportunities to modify supply chain.

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Degree of Design Standardization. Required volumes limit standardization opportunities. Labor. OCONUS mobilization through Mobilization and Deployment Center (MDC). MDC in a Box for OCN mobilization (recruitment, training, and on-boarding process completed in 7 to 8 days).

Figure 8-3. Training of Labor is Essential

Table 8-2. Typical Stabilization and Post-Disaster Labor Requirements

Contracts/ Task Orders

Time Period

PersonnelMobilized

SubcontractPersonnel Mobilized

BP MC 252 Incident Response <70 days 8,447 0 LOGCAP IV, TO5–AOR <120 days 1,480 1,924 LOGCAP IV, TO2 <90 days 64 376 LOGCAP IV, TO4 <60 days 72 248 FEMA Individual Assistance <90 days 1,410 2,190 CETAC I <45 days 50 2,950 CETAC II <60 days 33 1,575 New Power Generation <45 days 50 540 Public Works Water <45 days 50 1,150

Prefabrication. Initially focused on response phase needs Preassembly. Typically limited by funding coupled to job creation in affected area; access route constraints Modularization. Use constrained by client awareness and procurement practices; site access may be limited to port areas and major routes

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Degree of Client. Furnished Materials and Equipment - Adequate owner provided advance financing limits use; contracting practices by government limit PMC+ approaches; multiplicity of buyers (lack of sourcing hub) reduces supply chain efficiency

Table 8-3. Cost of Labor and Building Materials in Aceh Late 2004 to Late 2006

Resource Unit (RP) End 2004

Mid-2005

Early 2006

Oct 2006

Change (%)

Labor 000/day 30 40 50 50 67 Wood million/m3 1.0 1.5 1.9 2.2 120 Cement 000/50kg 20 26 34 37 85 Sand 000/3m3 150 300 300 300 100 Brick Each 250 580 700 700 180

Resource Unit

(RMB) Labor Per day Brick Each Cement Per ton Aggregate Per m3 25 50 55 75 200 Steel Per ton 5,400 3,800 3,600 4,200 22.2

Table 8-4. Cost of Labor and Building Materials in Sichuan

Mid 2008 to Mid 2009

Mid 2008 End 2008 Early 2009

Mid 2009

Change (%)

30 60 100 80 167 0.33 0.53 0.55 0.35 6 390 460 550 480 23.1

Supplier Relationship Agreements (SRAs). Effective use limited by competitive procurement and form of contract; high demand drives use of nontraditional sourcing for which reduced supplier-buyer information exchange has occurred. Global Sourcing. Expanded sourcing effort to meet timeframes, requires augmented vendor inspection, QA/QC and expediting. Supply identification of materials of construction should be undertaken for disaster types and locations in advance of disaster. Sourcing Integrity. Supply origins for certain bulk materials (timber) and their preparation for use may be difficult and compliance with procurement norms harder at the subcontractor level.

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Mission-Critical, Unique Equipment Sourcing. Supply chain compression activities may include new sources of supply, multi-vendor awards, use of CFM as feedstock to select vendors, phased procurement and pricing, and expedited transport. Locally Procured Material Quality. May take physical possession but not title at end of inspection line to prevent material substitution further straining logistical chain. Expediting. Reflect evolving needs and on the ground conditions. Traffic Routing and Logistics Plan. Reflect evolving needs and on the ground conditions; consider evolving condition of transport routes and other logistics facilities; increased number of logistics choke points and greater competition for logistics capabilities.

Figure 8-4. Fabrication Drives Logistics

Building Permits and Consents for Temporary Construction and Logistical Facilities. Government capacity may be inadequate. Delay of facilities may result. Mechanisms for waivers may not exist.

Figure 8-5. Temporary Construction

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Warehousing. Limited CFM and shortages make this a lower priority, but inability to reliably implement a just in time supply chain can make this an even more significant activity. Warehousing may need to be located closer to site of reconstruction activities because of weakened local logistics networks. Material Security. Augmented security; perimeter patrols; larger guard force. Trafficking. Trafficking is key link in supply chain management as logistical system reconfigures post-disaster. Logistical Contract Forms. Special requirements to address changed shipper risks. Construction Waste. Expanded volumes associated with site debris; high mixed waste; potential need to classify portions as hazardous waste. Less-Than-Full Truckload Shipments. Logistically expensive especially where shipments are rationed. Staging Areas. Inefficient supply chains exacerbate staging needs. Out of zone staging process utilized to control flow into valuable routes. Road and Bridge Transport. Conditions and capacities unknown. Significant degradation may not be evident. Oversized Shipments. Logistical constraints limit shipment sizes increasing volumes shipped. Ocean Freight. Competition for vessels or harbor constraints drive undesirable load sizes and combinations. Transportation Insurance. Unavailability affects logistics choices. Port Capacity and Operations. Potentially impacted by damage at the port; cargo handling operations overwhelmed by lack of prioritization. Construction Equipment. Competition for equipment may drive ownership decisions; efficient equipment not available; shortages of operators.

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Construction Fleet Maintenance. Maintenance requirements associated with difficult site conditions necessitate larger fleet sizes; fuel supply is critical resource.

Figure 8-6. Fleet Maintenance is an Essential Logistical Activity

Non-Process Infrastructure (NPI). Constrained by site access (transport; site-based debris) and community perceptions; competition for generators and water treatment limit construction activities. Craft Training. Training expanded to include hazards of ongoing risk conditions; multiple client and contractor structures without strong program control undermines safety culture; local labor force may move between contractors more frequently diminishing training investment made by any one contractor. Small Tools. Requirement to address shortages and expanded workforce. Vehicle Safety. Difficulties encountered in driver certification and training. Human Remains. Protocols cause partial site shutdown and reconfigured logistics. Communication. Regional communication networks degraded impacting efficiency. In-Country Logistical Institutional Infrastructure. Institutional frameworks inappropriate for post-disaster response and rebuilding. Site Transport. Local transport dysfunctional.

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Cash Flow. Need to bridge cash requirements of subcontractors makes payment terms an increasingly important selection factor in sourcing decisions. Anticorruption and Transparency. Risks greatly increase and monitoring and surveillance become larger activities. Increased security in logistics chain. Stakeholder Engagement. Changed stakeholder groups, priorities and communication difficulties impact effective communication. Change Management. Impacts of change magnified in logistics chain post-disaster. 8.2 Conclusion and Recommendations

Changes to some logistics affected and logistics affecting engineering and construction activities have been described. Table 8-5 includes a comparison with non-disaster programs and suggests some areas for consideration by resiliency planners, implementers and post-disaster managers. The considerations laid out will help prepare the managers to deal with a growing dimension of post-disaster activities. Recommendations for individual considerations have been made based on experience. These specific recommendations at the activity level are complemented by the following recommendations. • Government and NGO community must plan for assisting in post-

disaster recovery

− Provide accessibility to the sites of critical infrastructure

− Maintain awareness of global logistics chain

− Ensure availability of specialized construction equipment, contracts, and materials

− Develop well-documented system with clear interface points

− Preplan and rehearse response and recovery scenarios for high-probability events

Earthquake Hurricane Flood

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• Engagement with engineering and construction community must begin pre-disaster

− Pre-placed contracts

Program management EPC Supply chain

− Earliest mobilization to disaster zone − Early activation of logistics chains

• Post-disaster period requires streamlined decision frameworks

− Decision authorities at project and disaster site − Logistical-affecting processes may act as barrier in post-disaster

scenario

Examples are customs, building permits, and liability legislation Consider a standard “modified” logistical template for local

government consideration

“Go-bys” Best practices

Table 8-5. Logistics Affecting Engineering

and Construction Activities

Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

Management Client capabilities and resources

• Client organization is appropriately resourced or program manager engaged

• Combined team brings necessary understanding of EPC activities and how they interact with necessary logistics considerations

• Client organization may be lacking resources that understand EPC processes, and how they change in a post-disaster environment

• Impacts and importance of logistics in a post-disaster situation may not be sufficiently understood in client organization, or required resources have not been engaged

• Client organizations must recognize that the linkage between end use and shipping and other logistical activities grows in importance in a post-disaster situation

• Pre-positioned contracts with experienced post-disaster construction contractors that have strong logistics capabilities provide owner organizations with the capability to efficiently respond

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Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

Management Client capabilities and resources (cont.)

• Client lack of appreciation for nature or scale of logistical challenges may adversely impact overall engineering and construction effort

and recover

Client-contractor alignment and contract

• Pre-established contractual basis reflective of overall procurement and construction strategy

• Alignment with owner organization

• Private sector efforts typically in support of major customers, with flexibility to quickly execute risk-appropriate contracts

• Public sector efforts effective where prior contract vehicles exist and alignment activities have previously occurred (FEMA and LOGCAP IV)

• Lack of a prior contract impacts efficiency of logistical commitments being made

• Lack of well-defined responsibilities and authorities in post-disaster organization may delay completion of required RACI charts, creating uncertainties in approval process for crucial logistics-affecting activities

• Pre-positioned contracts allow for pre-disaster alignment around basic work processes, allocation of responsibilities, and delegated and retained authorities and approvals

• Supply chain and logistical strategies can be discussed and the new first responder in today's built environment can participate in select tabletop exercises

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Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

ManagementMobilization • Typically

recognized and funded activity

• Certain government or aid agency contracts are task order-based with no provision for mobilization costs, delaying activities and commitments to create an efficient logistics operation

• Create a limited mobilization task in pre-positioned contracts to accelerate response timeframes

Execution plans • Scope-driven baseline

• Funding-driven baseline shaped by donor community or “color of money"

• Clearly identify any funding-source-linked requirements at earliest possible stage

• Select major donor organization requirements can be pre-identified in pre-positioned contracts (examples: FEMA Public Assistance, State Emergency Management, Red Cross)

Project Management Manual

• Standard go-by template with client-specific forms, procedures, and approvals

• Expanded to include forms, procedures, and approvals linked to funding source

• Procedures may vary by project delivery approach (direct execution or grant funded); contracting strategy (design-bid build, design build); and phase of project

• Added approvals and complexity may impact logistics chain

• Pre-positioned contracts allow for pre-disaster alignment around basic work processes and reports

• Critical logistical hubs and choke points can be pre-identified

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Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

Management Workshare • Global

Engineering Centers (GECs) workshare limits need to move many resources to project location

• Funding agencies may drive work to be performed locally

• Local engineering and construction resource surveys may be periodically conducted as part of pre-positioned contract

Design basis • Optimized against well-defined owner criteria through a formal tollgate process

• Nature of funding sources may constrain solutions to replace in kind, reducing opportunities to modify supply chain

• Existing planning documents should be inventoried and collected to accelerate reconstruction planning

• Efforts focused on achieving plans versus creating entirely new ones where possible

• Planning collection in advance of disaster also facilitates resiliency reviews by local disaster planning agencies

Degree of designstandardization

• Maximized to reduce supply chain

• Required volumes limit standardization opportunities

• Incorporate resiliency features as part of new design basis

Labor • Globally and locally sourced – standard HR systems and processes

• OCONUS mobilization through Mobilization and Deployment Center (MDC)

• MDC in a Box for other-country national (OCN) mobilization

• From first speaking to a recruiter to putting boots on the ground, the recruitment, training, and on-boarding process can be completed in 7 to 8 days

• Client organization must ensure response and reconstruction contractors have well-developed mobilization plans and capabilities

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Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

ManagementPrefabrication • Maximized to

address labor availability and cost

• Eliminates shipments of temporary equipment, materials, and construction consumables

• Reduces construction waste streams

• Initially focused on response-phase needs

• Identify staging and prefabrication sites in proximity to critical infrastructure and population centers

• Identify similar regional areas outside the evaluated zone

Pre-assembly • Maximized to address labor availability and cost

• Eliminates shipments of temporary equipment, materials, and construction consumables

• Reduces construction waste streams

• Typically limited by funding linkages to job creation in affected area

• May be constrained by access route constraints

• Identify staging and prefabrication sites in proximity to critical infrastructure and population centers

• Identify similar regional areas outside the evaluated zone

• Identify major access routes and weight and size constraints as part of disaster planning efforts

Modularization • Maximizes benefits associated with manufacturing efforts, such as those realized on a smaller scale with prefabrication and pre-assembly

• Allows parallel construction to shorten schedules

• Facilitates pre-commissioning

• Uses constrained by client awareness and constraining procurement practices

• Site access may be constrained to port areas and, at later stages, major overland logistical routes

• Identify staging and prefabrication sites in proximity to critical infrastructure and population centers

• Identify similar regional areas outside the evaluated zone

• Identify major access routes and weight and size constraints as part of disaster planning efforts.

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Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

Management Degree of client-furnished materials and equipment

• Best practice moving beyond major equipment to include select construction bulks, piping, cabling, pumps, motors, and MCC

• Targeted levels nominally 30 percent

• Necessitates strong materials management organization as part of expanded program management contractor (PMC) role (PMC+)

• Use adequate owner-provided advance financing limits

• Contracting practices by government limit PMC+ contracting approaches

• Multiplicity of buyers (lack of sourcing hub) reduces supply chain efficiency

• Prepositioned response and reconstruction contracts should provide for use of commercial practices to the maximum extent possible

• Contractors with well-developed supply chains are essential in post-disaster settings

Supplier relationship agreements (SRAs)

• Maximize use of PMC's SRAs to simplify supply chain, gain greater assurance on delivery timeframes, and consolidate shipments

• High level of pre-transaction information transferred between buyer and supplier

• Effective use limited to private sector facilities and clients due to traditional limitations on competitive procurement and form of contract for non-private buyers

• High demand drives use of non-traditional sourcing for which reduced supplier-buyer information exchange has previously occurred

• Prepositioned response and reconstruction contracts should provide for use of commercial practices to the maximum extent possible

• Contractors with well-developed supply chains are essential in post-disaster settings

Global sourcing

• Leverage of ongoing supplier analysis and assessment activities consistent with anticipated business volumes by supply category and

• Expanded sourcing effort to meet required timeframes and budgets requires augmented vendor inspection, QA/QC, and expediting efforts

• Periodic assessments should be made of basic construction material availability for a range of disasters (local, regional, multi-regional)

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Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

ManagementGlobal sourcing (cont.)

regions• Appropriate

supply sources pre-identified prior to major program activities

• Identification of supplies of materials for construction and required non-process infrastructure undertaken for limited number of disaster types and locations in advance of disaster-limiting logistics system planning activities

Sourcing integrity

• Pre-acquisition surveys confirm environmental, labor, and legal compliance by supply base

• Local supply capabilities well- defined and capacity building undertaken off a known base

• Supply origins for certain bulk materials (timber) and their preparation or treatment for use may be difficult to ascertain

• Compliance with global procurement norms harder to police at the subcontractor level

• Best-value procurement, with strong quality and inspection efforts, produces more consistent and timely outcomes and, at the end of the day, the most cost-effective outcome, all costs considered

Mission-critical, unique equipment sourcing

• Traditional long-lead items procured through early funding commitments

• Supply chain compression activities may include:

• New sources of supply

• Multi-vendor awards

• Use of CFM as feedstock to selected vendors

• Phased procurement and pricing

• Expedited transport (Aeroflot)

• Prepositioned response and reconstruction contracts should provide for use of commercial practices to the maximum extent possible

• Contractors with well-developed supply chains are essential in post-disaster settings

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Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

Management Locally procured material quality

• Standard vendor qualification and inspection programs

• Material (batch) inspections

• May take physical possession, but not title, at end of inspection line to prevent material substitution further straining overall logistical chain

• Strained logistical chains require the right shipments, at the right time, to the right place

• Poor quality and associated back-shipment and rework or workarounds strain an already over-taxed supply chain

Expediting • Focused on baseline schedule execution

• Reflect evolving needs and on-the-ground conditions

• Trafficking into disaster area should not be left to inexperienced suppliers buying shipment services on a low-cost and uncoordinated basis

Traffic routing and logistics plan

• Focused on baseline schedule execution

• Reflect evolving needs and on-the-ground conditions

• Consider evolving condition of transport routes and other logistics facilities

• Increased number of logistics choke points and greater competition for logistics capabilities

• Trafficking into the disaster area should not be left to inexperienced suppliers buying shipment services on a low-cost and uncoordinated basis

Building permits and consents for temporary construction and logistical facilities

• Routine activity • Government capacity may be inadequate given widespread damage and competing demands for permits

• Delay of logistical and temporary construction facilities may result

• Identify and put in place an expedited process for temporary or transitional facilities after a declared disaster

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Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

Management

• Mechanisms for waivers may not exist

Warehousing • Consistent with higher CFM

• More limited CFM and shortages of labor and materials may make warehousing a lower priority facility

• Inability to reliably implement a just-in-time supply chain can make warehousing an even more significant activity

• Warehousing may need to be located closer to site of reconstruction activities because of weakened local logistics networks

• Mechanisms to identify vacant, large-scale commercial facilities equipped to receive and warehouse equipment and materials should be pre-established (Examples: vacant "big box" stores, warehouses, and supermarkets)

Material security

• Warehouse and lay-down areas typically have controlled access and routine security

• Augmented security

• Perimeter patrols • Larger guard force

• Pre-establish badging requirements and requirements for security or auxiliary police

Trafficking

• Most contractors rely on supplier to ship goods

• Supplier not expert

• Materials arrive late, or worse, damaged because the supplier went with the low-cost shipper, without checking quality and safety records

• Fluor controls delivery

• Key link in supply chain management as logistical system responds to stress and reconfigures post-disaster

• Trafficking into the disaster area should not be left to inexperienced suppliers buying shipment services on a low-cost and uncoordinated basis

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Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

Management Trafficking (cont.)

• Use companies that have good tracking (GPS) and dispatching capabilities

• Can change routes or even delivery locations as the situation dictates

Logistical contract forms

• Generally industry standard

• Special requirements to address changed shipper risks:

• Demurrage • Labor strife • Excess wear and

tear • Lost productivity • Availability of fuel • Security

• Strategies for changed logistical risk management should be pre-assessed and decisions made on types of risk best retained

Construction waste

• Seek to minimize volumes generated (25 percent of construction materials are waste)

• Minimize mixed waste

• Recycle

• Expanded volumes associated with site debris

• High mixed waste • Potential need to

classify portions as hazardous waste

• Pre-identification of temporary and permanent debris storage locations and preferred logistical movements associated with debris handling for a range of total impacts

Less-than-full truckload shipments

• Limited attention beyond CFM volumes

• Logistically expensive, especially where possession times or number of shipments are effectively rationed

• Trafficking into the disaster area should not be left to inexperienced suppliers buying shipment services on a low-cost and uncoordinated basis

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Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

ManagementStaging areas • Staging area at

port or key local hub

• Staging and warehouse area at or near site

• Inefficient supply chains may exacerbate staging area needs

• Out-of-zone staging process utilized to control flow into valuable shipping space and routes

• Identify staging and prefabrication sites in proximity to critical infrastructure and population centers

• Identify similar regional areas outside the evaluated zone

• Identify major access routes and weight and size constraints as part of disaster planning efforts

Road and bridge transport

• Conditions and capacities generally well understood

• Conditions and capacities unknown

• Significant degradation may not be evident

• Preposition a structural assessment contract for critical logistical infrastructure to provide early information of logistical degradation of any form

Oversized shipments

• Limited to high-value equipment and modules

• Platooned where possible

• Logistics constraints may cause shipment sizes to be constrained, increasing volumes shipped and associated labor requirements

• Client organizations must recognize that the linkage between end use and shipping and other logistical activities grows in importance in a post-disaster situation

• Prepositioned contracts, with experienced post-disaster construction contractors who have strong logistics capabilities, provide owner organizations with the capability to efficiently respond and recover

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Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

Management Ocean freight • Heavy lift needs

identified in conjunction with long-lead and modularization planning

• Competition for vessels or harbor constraints may drive undesirable load sizes and combinations

• Client organizations must recognize that the linkage between end use and shipping and other logistical activities grows in importance in a post-disaster situation

• Prepositioned contracts, with experienced post-disaster construction contractors who have strong logistics capabilities, provide owner organizations with the capability to efficiently respond and recover

Transportation insurance

• Generally industry standard

• Unavailability and cost or coverage limitations may affect logistics choices

• Strategies for changed logistical risk management should be pre-assessed and decisions made on types of risk best retained

Port capacity and operations

• Often saturated by global-scale programs

• May necessitate separate material handling wharfs

• Traditional challenges scaled up and potentially impacted by damage at the port

• Cargo handling operations may be overwhelmed by lack of coordinated prioritization of needs

• Preposition a structural assessment contract for critical logistical infrastructure to provide early information of logistical degradation of any form

• Trafficking into the disaster area should not be left to inexperienced suppliers operating on an uncoordinated basis

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Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

ManagementConstruction equipment

• Lease-versus-buy decisions intermittently constrained by availability

• Specialized equipment identified at early stage

• Competition for equipment may drive less than desirable ownership decisions

• Most efficient equipment may not be available

• Shortages of major equipment operators

• Local construction equipment resource surveys may be periodically conducted as part of pre-positioned contract

Construction fleet maintenance

• May be delivered as part of PMC+ services

• Fueling operations may best be done as a client-furnished service

• Fuel logistics may be critical challenge

• Increased maintenance requirements associated with difficult site conditions may necessitate larger fleet sizes

• Fuel supply is critical resource during early phases

• Local construction equipment resource surveys may be periodically conducted as part of pre-positioned contract

Non-process infrastructure (NPI)

• Growing challenge

• Increased use of modular camp and ancillary facilities

• Requires early site access

• Site power and water may be met from nearby networks in many instances or temporary generators or treatment plants elsewhere

• Meeting the NPI challenge may be constrained by site access (transport or site-based debris) and community perceptions

• Competition for generators and water treatment may limit rates of certain construction activities

• Identify NPI requirements for a range of disasters (scale and type) as part of prepositioned contract activities

• Identify gaps in existing capacity

Craft training

• Skills, construction safety, and process safety training focused on labor force are

• Training expanded to include increased awareness of hazards associated with

• Develop post-disaster craft training program template for likely post-disaster conditions to be encountered

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Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

Management Craft training (cont.)

intended to serve program's needs

• Consistent safety culture across program reinforces safety

prior destruction and any ongoing risk conditions

• Multiple client and contractor structures without strong program control undermine efforts to build safety culture

• Local labor force may move between contractors more frequently, diminishing the training investment made by any one contractor (no overall program focus)

• Emergency authorities to include a mandate for safety

Small tools • Implement program-wide small tools program to control cost, reduce theft, and improve safety

• Small tools program a requirement to address shortages and expanded workforce

• Prepositioned contractor should have an in-place, small tools capability to foster response and reconstruction activities

Vehicle safety • Driver certification and safe driving program

• Reduced accidents support increased logistics availability

• Difficulties may be encountered in driver certification and training, given competition for limited supply

• Strengthened driver inspection program as part of materials receipt process

Human remains • Not typically encountered

• Protocols put in place and may cause partial site shutdown and reconfigured site or supply chain logistics

• Defined program for human remain recovery, with clearly assigned responsibilities and augmentation plan for large-scale events

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Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

ManagementCommunication • Utilize regional

communication networks and supplement with site-based communications as needed

• Regional communication networks may be unavailable or degraded, impacting efficiency of supply chain operations

• Project Management Plan should identify planned communication strategy and contractor-provided capabilities (Example: Sat-Phone)

In-country logistical institutional infrastructure

• Policies defined: • Imports and

duties • Weight limits • Packaging

requirements • Rules of origin • Required

documentation • Typical approval

timeframes • Agency roles

understood (even if inefficient)

• Institutional frameworks may be inappropriate for post-disaster response and rebuilding

• Institutional frameworks for modification may be absent, contributing to logistical chain ineffectiveness or uncertainty

• Establish institutional frameworks for engineering, construction, and logistical response activities and the specialized issues associated with reconstruction

• Clearly identify variance from normal processes and authorities

Site transport • Typically bus transport from site gate or construction camp

• Local transport, if available

• Local transport may be dysfunctional

• Travel times for critical specialty labor may necessitate increased helicopter operations

• Logistical plan should identify extraordinary transportation capabilities:

• Heavy lift • River access • Heliport or potential

landing sites in vicinity of staging areas

• Warehouse • Command centers

Cash flow • Positive cash flow or minimum working capital needs do not influence logistical decision-making

• The need to bridge cash requirements of subcontractors makes payment terms an increasingly important selection factor in sourcing decisions

• Prepositioned contracts should have necessary payment mechanisms, invoicing requirements, and approval mechanics thoroughly addressed

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Logistics- Affecting Activities

Global ScaleCAPEX Program –

Leveraged Execution and Procurement

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

Recommendations for Post-Disaster

Management Anticorruption and transparency

• Required business process

• Risks greatly increase, and monitoring and surveillance become larger activities

• May impact sources of supply, logistic routes, and ports of entry

• May necessitate increased security in logistics chain

• Strong transparency and anticorruption requirements in place and incorporated into all contracts

Stakeholder engagement

• Keep stakeholders informed in advance of logistics activities impacting local or regional transportation networks

• Changed stakeholder groups, priorities, and communication difficulties impact the effective communication of planned logistic activities that affect local and regional networks

• Stakeholder impacts may be exacerbated by difficulties in stakeholder engagement

• Communication plans, focused on both response and reconstruction activities, developed in advance

Change management

• Critical activity for efficient supply chain operations

• Impacts of change magnified in logistics chain post-disaster

• Responsibility and timely decision processes incorporated into Project Management Plan and institutional frameworks for post-disaster operations

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Life cycle risk assessment is supported by the 7DSM project execution model (See Appendix 2) by facilitating both traditional life cycle risk analysis that considers inherent system attributes captured in the expanded project model, as well as nontraditional risks associated with classes of risks that might be best characterized as Black Swans. This later consideration results in an overall resiliency assessment, which is increasingly important for critical infrastructure and mission critical facilities. Also considered in this resiliency assessment are the flexibility inherent in design and operating methodology; the agility of the selected supply chain; the state of good repair as captured throughout the facilities life cycle and benchmarked against assembly and system level specifications; and externally provided assessments related to factors such as organizational agility. Life cycle analysis supports one aspect of a more comprehensive resiliency assessment by allowing us to evaluate a capital asset’s ability to withstand the impacts of off normal events. This evaluation may occur at both the project initiation stage, when alternatives and their relative performance are being considered, as well as at later stages when a real event has occurred. Let’s look at each of these in turn. 9.1 Assessing Inherent Resiliency During the Optimization

Process

In the initial stages of a capital asset’s optimization, we conduct a life cycle analysis as described in “Application of Life Cycle Analysis in the Capital

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Assets Industry.” This analysis is undertaken initially for a Base Scenario and later as we reach final stages of optimization. A preferred alternative is stress tested by considering alternative scenarios. These alternatives can consist of both improved as well as degraded alternatives, including alternatives that may be associated with extreme failure. The results of consideration of these alternative scenarios can be seen in the following figures, which depict the behavior of a singular “bottom line” for two different cases of resiliency. In Figure 9-1, the behavior of the capital asset shows little overlap with the Base case performance model and as such, the asset model is not resilient for the stress case considered.

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Figure 9-1. Capital Asset Stress Test #1 In Figure 9-2, the Base Case and stress case show a meaningful overlap in anticipated performance, demonstrating the degree of resiliency in the capital asset strategy we are contemplating.

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Figure 9-2. Capital Asset Stress Test #2 In the comprehensive LCA described in my previous book, the singular curve associated with each scenario and reflected in Figure 9-2 would be replaced by a three dimensional Pareto optimal front. The area of overlap reflected in this figure would be replaced by an overlap in 3 dimensional spaces as described by Pareto optimal fronts for each scenario. The higher the degree of overlap, the higher the inherent degree of resiliency to the type of stress events contemplated 9.2 Resiliency Assessment Post Startup

Resiliency assessment can be expanded to consider how resiliency changes along varying operating trajectories. Specifically, we can consider how resiliency parameters change over time for non-Base case Scenarios, such as those that may be associated with: • Facility aging

• State of good repair as characterized by the level of deferred maintenance

• Relationship of insurance levels and coverage to replacement values

• Profitability with respect to level, cumulative profitability and profit trajectory

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Figure 9-3. Post Startup Resiliency Assessment Let’s look at each of these in turn. 9.2.1 Facility Age

An extreme event acting on the capital asset will result in different outcomes as the facility ages. In the first instance, an aged facility may be less able to withstand or resist the impacts associated with an extreme event. It is important to highlight that resiliency-related assessments are not limited to responding to physical damages associated with an extreme natural event. but rather, they can include a wide range of internal or external initiating events including loss of market, fraud, change of technology or competitive position as well as more traditionally thought of losses associated with earthquake, fire and wind. Facilities at a life-cycle point, where a major upgrading or refurbishment was contemplated, will have a different level of resiliency and willingness to make restorative-type investments than one that is in a strong physically and financially in a strong position. Finally, as a capital asset approaches end of life, we would expect its resiliency to drop as the financial proposition of investing in the facility falls by the wayside. 9.2.2 State of Good Repair

The inherent resiliency of a capital asset has been seen to be a function of its state of good repair. At the facility planning stage, when initial life cycle analysis is being considered, assumptions are being made on the anticipated operating and maintenance regime. Is the philosophy heavy on preventive maintenance or deferral of maintenance activities until failure? Are major

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refurbishments scheduled for every 7 years or held into abeyance until every 10 years with lower operational facility performance accepted as an economically valid trade-off? How is maintenance planned to happen over the life cycle? Will all preventive maintenance stop 10 years before end of life? These decisions, as reflected in the initial life cycle asset plan, and more importantly as subsequently materialized or modified, have a direct impact of the capital asset’s resiliency and its resiliency trajectory. 9.2.3 Insurance and Replacement Costs

Life cycle analysis is focused on the initial economics of delivering an asset and then sustaining that asset over a planned economic life cycle. Replacement cost of the asset is not traditionally considered as part of this assessment except to the extent that elements must be periodically replaced or refurbished. Similarly, insurance levels and associated cost are traditionally modeled from the perspective of providing some level of coverage for initial investors during that period when their financial risk is greatest. In assessing a capital asset’s resiliency we need to understand how replacement costs will change over time and importantly, how insurance coverage levels and form should change to protect investors in this asset. As uncovered exposure (replacement cost – insurance coverage) grows we must assess whether uncovered amounts: • Represent the potential for significant degradation of investor returns

• Economically support the restoration of the asset to complete its originally intended economic life, all other factors considered

• Create contingent liabilities, associated with breach of contract, through delayed deliveries, to the client base or in the extreme, an inability to meet remaining contractual commitments

9.2.4 Profitability

Capital asset profitability levels, cumulative returns to investors at different points in time, and forward profit trajectories all influence the willingness to repair or restore a capital asset after an extreme event. Assets performing significantly above initial expectations will have higher inherent resiliency than those only marginally profitable.

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Life cycle analysis that incorporates a degrading profit position over time may have its lifetime significantly truncated after an extreme event. Conversely, an asset with decreasing marginal costs as a percentage of revenue, would likely attract renewed investment if remaining facility lifetimes warranted. 9.3 Other System Level Characteristics

The 7DSM framework laid out in “Application of Life Cycle Analysis in the Capital Assets Industry” considers a broad range of system performance characteristics traditionally not “valued” in life cycle analysis. Resiliency is one such parameter, others include: • Flexibility inherent in plant configuration and operating regime

− Two 50% facilities, physically isolated from each other versus a singular 100% facility

− Planned base load capacity and economics at 80% of surge capability

− Degree of modularization and standardization that supports plant reconfiguration for changed future product lines with minimum plant downtime

− Fuel flexibility

• Supply chain agility and ability to source feedstocks of various kinds from multiple sources

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I sat down to write this chapter on the 12th Anniversary of the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center. As I thought about the events that day and what we have done…and not done…since that date, I decided to take a little different approach than I had first contemplated. Previously, I have written about the lessons learned or more appropriately, the lessons we must still learn, from the events of that day and the response that followed. I have talked about what I refer to as the 3R’s of resiliency – resist, respond and recover. More recently, I have written about how the engineering and construction “model” changes post disaster to better help project managers recognize the different framework in which they are operating. In this chapter, I will not provide a reprise of those points, not because I feel they have been fully communicated and embraced, but rather because it is now time to extend the thinking process. How do we know when we have achieved resiliency? What are the various elements that contribute to resiliency? And when is resilient, resilient enough? Let me step back for a minute and compare and contrast two similar but different terms. The first, “resiliency” and the second, “business continuity.” The White House sponsored National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) defined resilience as “the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure

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or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event.”1 By contrast, business continuity has been defined as the ability of the key operations of a firm to continue without stoppage, irrespective of the adverse circumstances or events. This later definition from the on-line businessdictionary.com actually represents a higher standard for the firm than NOIAC suggests for the nation’s infrastructure and does not provide for a period of disruption at the firm level while remaining silent on any individual asset. This higher standard for the firm suggests that individual assets must have high levels of resiliency and collectively the firms various assets including stockpiles, multiple similar facilities, and financial reserves and provisions such as insurance must all act in concert to achieve business continuity. In this chapter I will focus on the asset level determination of resiliency in that it is applicable to both public and private assets. 10.1 Challenges of Assessing Resiliency

There are many challenges to assessing the resiliency of a facility. By definition this assessment is not just a review of physical features to determine how “hard,” “adaptable,” or “flexible” the facility is but rather must take a more holistic, life-cycle view. This life cycle review includes consideration of the changing hazards the facility faces, its condition and the contingencies provided for, to name just a few. In addition to these challenges, a way to measure resiliency and communicated an asset’s state and the changes it has undergone, is also a challenge. In this chapter we will focus on just one challenge related to resiliency, namely what is the scope of a comprehensive resiliency assessment. In interactions with both public and private clients, we have found the first challenge encountered is in ensuring that a comprehensive view of resiliency and a corresponding scope for assessing it exists. If successful, this chapter provides the feedstock for a formal scope of work to assess a facility’s and associated owner’s resiliency.

1 National Infrastructure Advisory Council Critical Infrastructure Resilience Final Report And Recommendations; September 8, 2009

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10.2 Resiliency Model and Prerequisites to Resiliency Assessment

The development of a comprehensive scope for assessing resiliency begins with a framework or model for thinking about and assessing resiliency. The heart of the Resiliency Model is Preparedness and Planning.

Figure 10-1. Resiliency Model Resiliency Model

The model shown provides a framework for a comprehensive assessment of an owner’s and facility’s resiliency and is built upon a fundamental understanding of the potential hazards that may be faced. This initial Hazards Assessment is a prerequisite to implementation of a more comprehensive resiliency program and assessing the current or intended future state with respect to resiliency. A summary level scope of work for this assessment is reflected in the following section. 10.3 Hazards Determination and Characterization

A prerequisite of undertaking facility resiliency and programming is to determine the hazards and their characteristics that the facility must consider from a resiliency standpoint. The scope of this pre-requisite work includes: • Defining the study area including adjacencies and potentially affected

logistical chokepoints or recovery staging and sourcing areas

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• Data collection from public and private sources with supplemental bespoke data collection if required

• Determine potential hazards considering a range of manmade2, natural and so-called “Natech” hazards

• Create a geographic based database reflecting interdependencies, shared features and coupled constraints

• Characterize hazards considering frequency, duration, severity, intensity and potential mitigators

• Identify cascading event potentials driven by coupled constraints or events that are “Natech” in nature

• Developing a facility specific hazards model

• Define model scenarios to be evaluated

• Create a spectrum of map based data sources for pre-event planning and subsequent post-event utilization (Table 10-1 provides some examples)

• Document analysis assumptions, sources of inputs, scenario rationale, potential impacts on facility and the defined study area

• Provide input into a detailed Vulnerability Assessment undertaken as part of resiliency planning and mitigation

Table 10-1. Map Based Information (Typical)

Study location with governmental jurisdictions and logistical networks and nodes

Emergency response facilities, distances, capabilities, response times

Severe weather hazard risks

Population density Emergency and essential facility locations and capabilities

Historical tornado paths and intensity

Housing stock – pre 1970

Logistical inventory and exposure risks

Flood hazards

Housing stock – post 1970

Major utility inventories and exposure risks

Earthquake hazards

2 “Terrorism – Reducing Vulnerabilities and Improving Responses”; Committee on Counterterrorism Challenges for Russia and the United States; “The Three R’s: Lessons Learned from September 11, 2001”; National Research Council of the National Academies, In cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sciences; The National Academies Press; 2004

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Household income Point risk locations (dams, chemical storage tanks, prisons)

Hurricane storm tracks and damage profiles

Storm surge maps Other natural hazards Natech hazards

With a Hazards Assessment in hand we are no able to assess each aspect of resiliency as reflected in Figure 10-1. 1. Vulnerability Assessment For each major business support component a vulnerability assessment is conducted. During the initial site assessment, data is collected from key stakeholders that help identify known gaps, critical operations by priority/RTO, and pertinent site specific data. Specific elements of scope to be covered during the vulnerability assessment include: • Detailed facility vulnerability assessment

− Gather pertinent engineering data, which may include drawings, specifications, and materials of construction.

− Hands-on review of the facilities to detect vulnerabilities based on selected disaster criteria. These reviews may include structural stability, building envelope integrity, clean space/ utility integrity, protection against water intrusion, grounds, potential windblown debris, and facility-based utility concerns.

− Based on the information gathered, risks will be identified and prioritized.

• Manufacturing and equipment vulnerability assessment

− Manufacturing and equipment vulnerability assessment performed by industry experts in conjunction with operations personnel.

− Determine what actions will be taken in case of an event.

− Current business interruption procedures reviewed against the defined disaster scenarios.

− Risk analysis performed and list of current risks developed and prioritized.

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• Critical utility vulnerability assessment

− Critical utility assessment utilizing discipline engineers and meetings with facility engineers, local utility suppliers, county, and state engineers.

− Gather pertinent engineering data which may include drawings, specifications, and materials of construction.

− Review of the critical utilities performed to detect vulnerabilities based on disaster criteria. These reviews can include electrical, water, sewer, natural gas, etc. During the vulnerability assessment, each of these utilities will be evaluated for criticality, based on its role to support business operations.

− List of current risks will be developed and prioritized.

• Infrastructure vulnerability assessment

− Infrastructure assessment utilizing discipline engineers and meetings with facility engineers, local utility suppliers, county, and state engineers.

− Gather pertinent engineering data which may include drawings, specifications, and materials of construction.

− Review of infrastructure performed to detect vulnerabilities based on disaster criteria. These reviews can include highways, roads, bridges, rail, airfields, etc. During the vulnerability assessment, each of these infrastructure elements will be evaluated for criticality, based on its role to support business operations.

− List of current risks will be developed and prioritized.

• Employee vulnerability assessment

− Critical employees who might be impacted by a natural disaster are identified by first researching the vulnerability of the local community against modeling of the potential disaster scenario. Criteria assessed includes:

Demographics Housing availability Household incomes Local codes Preparedness of the local emergency management agencies Locations of the critical employees

− Site based support facilities for employees, such as day care, medical care, and fitness centers are also assessed.

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• Supply chain management and logistics vulnerability assessment

− Supply chain management and logistics vulnerability assessment focused primarily on production demands and how the disaster scenario would adversely affect the supply of parts for R&D, production, maintenance, and/or the resumption of operations, post-event.

− Criteria reviewed include warehousing operations, tracking of goods, location of parts during the event, integrity of the locations and turnaround times for resupply of parts, locations of suppliers and/or manufacturers, and identification of sole source suppliers/ manufacturers.

− List of current risks will be developed and prioritized.

• IT and Communication Systems vulnerability assessment

− IT and communications vulnerability assessment utilizes industry experts and meetings with the facility engineers, IT leaders, and the communications providers to map the cyber architecture, data, and systems to ascertain the integrity of the communication network on, and off-site.

− Review includes phone systems, data centers, and business processes. One of the major attributes that will be reviewed is whether the current system can maintain service and operability based on disaster criteria.

− Current business interruption plan and countermeasures assessed for vulnerability. This includes assessment of temporary facilities and equipment located off.

− List of current risk will be developed and prioritized. 2. Risk Management Risk management is a key aspect of any resiliency plan and as such its assessment is essential in any Resiliency Assessment. It is here that we continue to build on the Hazards and Vulnerability Assessments previously performed. The scope at this stage includes: • Based in the vulnerability assessments conducted on each major

component of business operations, an analysis of business interruption risk is performed against the selected forms of business interruption.

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• A readiness analysis is conducted to ascertain the asset owner’s readiness to respond to each risk.

• Findings are analyzed and a prioritized list of mitigation actions recommended.

• On a periodic basis a review of the Risk Register is conducted to:

− Validate progress on risk mitigation activities.

− Establish concurrence on the Business Interruption Risk Profile (in aggregate and by facility).

− Establish mitigation actions that will be taken to reduce or prevent business interruption risk and the timeframe for action.

3. Mitigation Mitigation actions include development of recommended improvements to each of the major business components. For physical assets, capital improvements may be recommended for consideration. For all components, recovery plans are prepared to address varying levels of business interruption. These actions are intended, when implemented, to reduce owner’s risk exposure. • Detailed facility preventative action plan

− Based on the recommendations of the vulnerability assessment, a list of recommended actions are compiled and issued.

− Industry subject matter experts are leveraged to develop solutions which may include modification of structures, preventative actions, securing of the building envelope, and/or reassignment of existing structures due to integrity concerns.

• Manufacturing and Equipment preventative action plan

− Based on the recommendations of the vulnerability assessment, a list of recommended actions are compiled and issued. For manufacturing facilities, GMP (good manufacturing practices) principles are incorporated into the recovery plan.

− Industry subject matter experts are leveraged to develop solutions that, when implemented, reduce the owner’s risk exposure.

− Examinations include equipment sourcing, lead time, documentation, spare parts, etc.

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• Critical Utility preventative action plan

− Based on the recommendations of the vulnerability assessment, a list of recommended actions are compiled and issued.

− Industry subject matter experts are leveraged to develop solutions which include:

Preventative actions

Safe guarding of existing facilities and establishing redundancies and/or alternative connections to enable the use of temporary utilities

• Infrastructure preventative action plan

− Based on the recommendations of the vulnerability assessment, a list of recommended actions is compiled and issued.

− Industry subject matter experts are leveraged to develop solutions which include:

Preventative actions

Safe guarding of existing infrastructure

Establishment of redundancies and/or alternatives to enable the use of infrastructure

Establishment of agreements with Federal, State, and local entities to expedite recovery

• Employee availability preventative action plan

− Based on recommendations of the vulnerability analysis of critical employees proactive measures with local, state and federal agencies to expedite temporary housing if required.

− Family support alternatives such as child care and personal health care may be established.

• Supply Chain Management (SCM) and logistics preventative action plan

− Based on the recommendations of the vulnerability assessment a list of recommended actions is compiled and issued.

− Industry subject matter experts are leveraged to develop solutions to close the gap and establish an agreed upon roadmap to improve SCM operations, thereby reducing the impact of an event on SCM and/or production.

− Development of alternate supplier and/or logistical routings.

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• IT and Communications preventative action plan

− Industry subject matter experts are leveraged to develop solutions to improve the integrity of the IT and communication network, on and off-site.

4. Preparedness & Planning The heart of the Resiliency Model is Preparedness and Planning. An overall Facilities Recovery Plan (FRP) is developed and integrated with the owner’s Business Continuity Plan. This plan is developed based on specified Recovery Time Objectives (RTOs) and disaster/hazard scenarios for each site. The FRP outlines the procedures to be executed in the event of a natural or manmade disaster impacting operations of the specified site. This plan includes all components addressed in the Resiliency Model scope. Facilities Recovery Plan (FRP) Development

Based upon information collected from the initial assessment and data collection process, an FRP is tailored to meet the needs of the site. Site specific disaster scenarios are developed or validated based upon information gathered, historical data, and through the development of a detailed All-Hazards review. These scenarios are used to define an order of magnitude response requirement coupled with established RTOs. The plan encompasses: • Initial site assessment and data collection • Site specific disaster scenario models • Facility Recovery Plan Creation • Mobilization Plans • Debris Management Plan • Disaster Housing Strategy Detailed Planning Efforts in support of the FRP are assessed as part of a comprehensive resiliency assessment and include the following components. • Establish and maintain the Rapid Deployment Team (RDT) and

Equipment

− One of the core components of the FRP is the establishment and maintenance of a Rapid Deployment Team. This team maintains the systems and equipment necessary to respond in the event of a disaster and maintains a readiness posture in accordance with the plan.

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• Coordination and maintenance of the Mobilization Plan

− As part of the FRP, pre-positioned contracts to expedite the facility recovery efforts to resume operations no later than the specified RTO of each site or function.

− Coordination and maintenance when there are specific changes identified that would affect the mobilization plan. The plan is reviewed at least.

− A recovery process is included in the FRPs.

• Project Execution Plan (PEP)

− Develop a Project Execution Plan to execute the scope of work. This ensures consistency in execution and offers a proven method to meet or exceed expectations.

− In support of the mobilization plan and the Rapid Deployment Team, ensure that all applicable procedures and training programs have been gathered in a central location, to expedite the mobilization plan.

• Public and Private Integration efforts with Federal, State, Local and NGO entities

− Agreements must be established with various government, private and NGO entities as part of the pre-event planning activities to ensure an expedited recovery process.

• Structural Engineering and Shoring Plan

− Review the structural aspect of the facilities, current shoring methodologies, offer recommendations for improvements, develop a plan to address post-event mobilization, facility surveillance, and recommended shoring methods.

• Review Insurance Recovery Module/SOP

− Perform a review of Insurance Recovery Module with the intent to expedite a post-event recovery and maximize recovery of expenditures.

• Establish Local, Regional, and National Subcontracting Plan

− As part of the Facility Recovery Plan develop a contingency subcontracting plan that will safeguard ability to execute the recovery operations, even if the local contractors are unable to respond in a timely manner. To ensure timely execution post-event, it is recommended that blanket order agreements (BOAs) be

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established with each of these subcontractors to ensure a timely response and recovery.

Subcontracted support services may include but are not limited to RDT transportation, debris management, communications, power generation, fuel supply, billeting/office quarters, food services, water supply, waste management, equipment/vehicle support, tool support, facility restoration, environmental assessment/industrial hygiene, personnel augmentation, and medical support.

• Maintenance of Subcontract Agreements

− Update contract agreements, based on a change in scope, changes in flow down requirements from the technical agreement, and/or any substantive change needed to maintain the contracts in good working order.

• Establish PO Agreements for Food Service options

− As part of the Facility Recovery Plan develop food service strategies that can be implemented and immediately deployed to support post-event recovery efforts.

• Establish PO agreements for use of RVs and/or Construction Trailers

− Temporary housing and office space may be required directly after an event. These agreements establish competitive pricing and will ensure mission ready equipment will be available post-event.

− A retainer/maintenance may be established to ensure that the desired equipment is available for mobilization post-event.

• Establish Base Camp framework

− Additional facilities and life support functions may be required post-event. Establishing these requirements and putting in place PO agreements prior to the event will expedite the recovery efforts.

− Identify the parcel of land that will be used for the large foot print a base camp requires and pre-establish the conceptual layout/design to expedite effort post-event.

− Working in conjunction with the conceptual design effort, establish land use agreement for the base camp prior to an event.

− Establish Memorandums of Understandings (MOU’s) with the local authorities for use of land in close proximity.

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• Tabletop Exercise

− Develop Tabletop Exercises based upon a predefined test criterion. Include the development of a script which would include the following: problem statement, mission and scope, goals/objectives, narrative, and evaluation.

− The execution of the Tabletop Exercise will be purely the facilitation of the script; this includes ensuring that the players and evaluators are executing their duties per the narrative.

• After Action Report Development

− The After Action Report (AAR) will be developed from the compilation of the evaluation reports and will be issued to Gulfstream. Gulfstream can then develop an improvement plan from the results.

• Periodic Review of Risk Level Annual or semi-annual review of risk level based on the implementation of recommendations from the risk mitigation plan. 5. Disaster Response Planning, provisions for and strategies related to disaster response are reviewed and assessed as part of an overall resiliency assessment. Gaps are identified and addressed as part of the resiliency assessment scope. Specific activities assessed include: • Initial damage assessment

− Upon activation of a Rapid Deployment Team, an initial damage assessment is undertaken to establish:

Safe entry into facilities Types of support resources needed to secure the facilities Types of support resources for demolition and construction

• Implement pre-scripted response plans with Surety

• Coordinate with owner’s and governmental Emergency Operation Centers

• Initiate Temporary Housing and Equipment supplies

− Activate contracts with housing and equipment suppliers

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• Set up for required surge of construction management and craft

− Implement man camp provisions if necessary based on magnitude of disaster

− Activate support contracts from all required subcontractors of services and supplies

6. Disaster Recovery Plans and provisions are put in place and assessed on the ability to perform EPCM services coordinating all disaster recovery efforts, including but not limited to: • Expediting engineering support as required

• Expediting construction material and equipment as required

• Contracting required subcontractor support

• Establishing Fast-Track construction schedule

• Establishing testing, commissioning, and validation for required facilities and processes

• Coordinating Owner’s Acceptance and Claims processing 7. After Action & Lessons Learned After an event has occurred and business operations are restored plans and capabilities should exist to: • Conduct a critical review of pre-and post-event activities, post-recovery

debriefing and capture best practice learning’s, document and update plans for improvement.

• Share best practices and lessons learned with other owner facilities for inclusion into their Business Continuity plans.

Summary

Achieving and assuring resiliency and business continuity is a growing emphasis area for public and private infrastructure and facilities. Events of scale, natural and manmade, are of sufficient frequency and impact to increase the importance of adequate attention. Growing emphasis on life cycle performance of capital assets further supports the achievement of resiliency and provides a framework for updated asset assessment.

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In this paper a “scope” of a comprehensive resiliency assessment is outlined and provides a basis for owners seeking to gain a better handle on the performance of their business and major assets under stress. Table 10-2 recaps the key scope elements that have been described.

Table 10-2. Resiliency and Business Continuity Assessment – Model Scope

Prerequisite – Hazards Analysis and Characterization Pre-Event Post-Event

Vulnerability Assessment Disaster Response Risk Management Disaster Recovery Mitigation After Action & Lessons Learned Preparedness & Planning

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In 2011, the President of the United States issued PPD-8: National Preparedness1. This directive outlined the National Planning Frameworks, which defined the intent and scope of preparedness, including stating preparedness goals, risk assessments, tools, programs, and expected results. Later that year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the Implementation Plan for Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness. The Implementation Plan clarified that PPD-8’s reference to “all-of-Nation” was the same as “whole community,” or the participation of the private and nonprofit sectors, including nongovernmental organizations, and the general public. This integrates community-based, nonprofit, and private sector preparedness programs, research and development activities, and preparedness assistance. PPD-8 relies heavily on national standards such as NFPA 1600 for implementation.

1 Presidential Policy Directive 8 : National Preparedness. http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness

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Figure 11-1. The New and Improved Preparedness Cycle under PPD-8 11.1 NFPA 1600

In 2004, following the attacks of September 11, the 9/11 Commission asked the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) to develop a consensus on a “National Standard for Preparedness” for the private sector. The result was ANSI’s recommendation of a voluntary National Preparedness Standard―NFPA 16002. The 9/11 Commission formerly recommended the adoption and use of NFPA 1600 saying: “We endorse the American National Standards Institute’s recommended standard for private preparedness. We were encouraged by Secretary Tom Ridge’s praise of the standard, and urge the Department of Homeland Security to promote its adoption. We also encourage the insurance and credit-rating industries to look closely at a company’s compliance with the ANSI standard in assessing its insurability and creditworthiness. We believe that compliance with the standard should define the standard of care owed by a company to its employees and the public for legal purposes. Private-sector preparedness is not a luxury; it is a cost of doing business in the post-9/11 world. It is ignored at a tremendous potential cost in lives, money, and national security.”

2 National Fire Protection Association 1600-Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, 2007 Edition

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This recommendation has since been restated in two federals laws, Public Law 108-458, and most recently within Title IX of Public Law 110-53, which calls for voluntary certification of private sector preparedness programs. The 2007 edition of NFPA 1600 expanded the phases of emergency management and business continuity programs to identify both prevention and mitigation--not just mitigation. The 2010 edition of NFPA 16003 was reordered and expanded. Chapter 4, Program Management, was expanded to emphasize the importance of leadership and commitment. It also includes new requirements for defining performance objectives, and includes new requirements for records management. The 2013 edition of NFPA 1600, “Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs”4 is complete and was approved by NFPA’s Standards Council in November 2012. This chapter will focus on NFPA 1600 [9] since it must closely aligns with the National Planning Framework as outlined in PPD-8. 11.2 NFPA 1600 Objectives

A complete Business Continuity and Disaster Management (BCDM) Program following NFPA 1600 includes involvement from all levels and disciplines in an organization. This chapter will discuss the need for risk assessments in general, as well as risk assessments for one illustrative class of industrial facilities, electrical installations. NFPA 1600 identifies three main tasks that should be included in a risk assessment. They are: 1. “Identify hazards and estimate their relative probabilities of

occurrence”

2. “Assess the vulnerability of people, property, business operations, the environment, and the organization itself to identified hazards”

3. “Quantify the potential detrimental impacts of each hazard” NFPA 1600, Section 5.4.1 requires entities to conduct risk assessments “in accordance with Section 5.4 to identify strategies for

3 National Fire Protection Association 1600-Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, 2010 Edition 4 National Fire Protection Association 1600-Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, 2013 Edition

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prevention and mitigation and to gather information to develop plans for response, continuity, and recovery.” 11.3 Managing Risks and Profitability

For businesses to stay competitive, risks must be managed every day. In the Natural Hazards Risk Atlas 20135 a British risk assessor ranked 197 countries according to their absolute economic exposure to earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes, landslide, flood, and wildfires. Four nations – the United States, ranked first, followed by Japan, China, and Philippines – were deemed at “extreme risk” in absolute terms determined by the overall costs from a natural disaster. It has been acknowledged that the impact to a company’s physical facilities is minor when compared to the greater cost impact measured in terms of Business Interruption. For example, on March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake hit the main island of Japan. The earthquake, tsunami, and its aftermath caused devastating human, social, environmental and economic damage. The earthquake also heavily disrupted global manufacturing supply chains. A shortage of raw material for an inexpensive component early in the supply chain made it impossible for companies to build their $45,000 car, $45 million airplane, or a computer server. The events in Japan clearly showed that it can be months before a manufacturer learns the full effect on its supply chain. When a company discovers too late that they are missing parts, they have lost critical time in securing limited inventory or sourcing alternatives. Slow response creates significant revenue risk. The principle concerns related to business interruption include: • Unrecoverable operating costs

• Employee retention

• Loss of customer satisfaction

• Loss of market share or brand erosion

• Loss of revenue

• Loss of sales

• Loss of shareholder equity and credit rating

• Increased insurance premiums 5 Natural Hazards Risk Atlas 2013, Maplecroft. Online at http://www.maplecroft.com

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• Risk and crisis management – accountability to shareholders, employees, regulators and general public

According to the insurance industry, disaster mitigation planning is highly desirable and potential premium reductions may exist based upon the reduced risk model. In essence, BCDM plans can pay for themselves. It is estimated, based on solid mitigations plans, a company could save between 20 and 25 percent on their insurance policies on both their property and business interruption insurance policies. This is a win for the insurance companies and a solid win for the corporations. Even if a corporation is self-insured, the savings in downtime and production will pay for a good BCDM plan. Investment in disaster response and recovery plans, coupled with rapid response teams, can help minimize the recovery from natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes. To be effective, the plans should include housing provisions for displaced employees, back-up communications networks, and means to immediately restore critical utilities. There are significant actions that can be taken before a disaster to mitigate the effects. A study by Oxford Metrica quantified a 22 percent positive difference in stock prices for those companies that invested in pre-planning of recovery activities versus the non-planners. An effective BCDM plan enhances corporate resilience providing a myriad of benefits: • Management peace of mind through objective reviews and protected

revenue flows

• Increased productivity and innovation

• Expanded customer base and increased customer retention

• Lower operating expenses and reduced cost of capital

• Stronger reputation, better regulatory compliance and governance

• Maximizes insurance claim recovery and minimizes settlement time

• Lower insurance premiums by leveraging market risks 11.4 Vulnerability/Risk Assessments

Industrial facilities are exposed to a range of hazards including natural hazards and human-caused. Hurricanes, power outages, tornados, terrorist

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events, and human-caused accidents can range greatly in severity and can threaten a business’s ability to keep its people and facilities safe, protect the environment, and remain operational. Disasters/hazards are evaluated in terms of the likelihood that a problem may occur and the severity of damage it would cause if such an event did occur. Some disasters/hazards are more likely than others at a given location, and some would result in greater damage than others. The likelihood, combined with the potential severity of the outcome, provides a general risk. How prepared the organization is to deal with the potential risks can be determined by conducting a Risk Assessment or Vulnerability Assessment. Risk Management is the deliberate process of understanding “risk”, the likelihood that a threat will harm an asset with some severity of consequences, and deciding on and implementing actions to reduce it. Well-managed industrial facilities perform a Risk or Vulnerability Assessment and have a written plan to deal with the hazards that could affect the facility. The assessment entails assigning probabilities, estimating impact, and assessing resources required. The detailed analysis and report includes: • Type of disaster/hazard and applicable scenario

• Property impact by structure

• Employee impact

• Business readiness impact

• Recommendations for prevention, mitigation and response to risks

• Preparation of recovery plans

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Figure 11-2. Estimated Damage ($ Billion) Caused by Reported Natural Disasters 1900-2011 11.4.1 Identification of Hazards

Hazard assessments require a comprehensive understanding of the location specific potential threats. These include earthquake, flooding, hurricane, landslide, pandemics, severe weather, terrorism, tsunamis, wildfires, and other geological, meteorological, and biological hazards. The assessment also includes evaluation of accidental and intentional human caused events, as well as technological caused events. These hazards can be identified and analyzed for a facility utilizing: • Geographic Information System (GIS)

• Business Intelligence

• Forecasting and Probability Databases

• Macro level modeling using nationally recognized disaster forecasting tool (HAZUS-MH)6

• SLOSH (Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes) Model

• Open Source Information – Readily available data via the internet

• Micro or site level hazard modeling All possible hazards should be identified, and the probability of each event estimated. For simplicity, a qualitative determination can be made as to

6 HAZUS-MH software, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security

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whether a hazard has a high, medium, or low probability of occurrence during a certain period of time, such as the life of the facility.

Figure 11-3. U.S. Hazard Maps 11.4.2 Assessment of Vulnerabilities

The next step is to assess the vulnerability of various operations to understand the probability and potential impact: • Employees • Community • Facilities • Critical utilities • Communications • Supply chain management • Site infrastructure • Manufacturing and equipment • Environment

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Figure 11-4. Hazard Modeling Hurricanes 11.4.3 Impact Analysis

Following determination of which hazards can occur and who and what is at risk at that facility, the next step is to analyze the impact of the hazards based on the mitigation measures currently in place. The severity of the impact to each affected asset can be assigned as being high, medium, or low. The analysis should include the impact on: • People working in the facility • People responding to an incident • Continuity of operations • Property, facilities and infrastructure • Supply chain • The environment • Company obligations • The economic and financial condition of the company • The reputation of the company The analysis explains how each hazard could impact the affected asset. The risk assessment and impact analysis includes not only hazards that could occur only at the facility but also hazards that could occur in the region, the nation, or the world, and could affect the facility due to cascading impacts. For example, a hazard could disrupt the supply of raw

Sustained Winds Displaced Households

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material, demand for the product produced, or disrupt the supply of electrical power to the facility. 11.4.4 Prevention, Mitigation and Response to Risks

Once impacts have been identified, the prevention, mitigation, and response to the risk are evaluated. NFPA 1600 states that companies shall “develop a strategy to prevent an incident that threatens life, property, and the environment.” The level of preventative measures depends on the level of risk. For those incidents that cannot be prevented, NFPA 1600 states that companies shall “develop and implement a mitigation strategy that includes measures to be taken to limit or control the consequences, extent, or severity of an incident that cannot be prevented.” In some instances it may not be possible to prevent or mitigate all risks for financial or other reasons. In these cases, it is essential to plan to respond to the risk event. 11.4.5 Recovery Plans

Electrical risk assessments are only one type of risk assessments that should be done at a facility and are discussed in this chapter to illustrate the approach to be taken. A complete risk assessment includes a comprehensive, multidiscipline review of the entire facility. The risk assessment findings, including any prevention, mitigation, or response plans, are included in the recovery plan for the facility. NFPA 1600 defines recovery as “Activities and programs designed to return conditions to a level that is acceptable to the entity.” In addition to preventing and mitigating risks, NFPA 1600 requires programs to include recovery plans. 11.5 Risk Assessment for an Electrical Installation in an Industrial Location

To illustrate the approach to be taken in assessing risks for an electrical installation at an industrial location we will look at a method to perform a risk assessment for such a facility. Principle steps include: • Prepare the Hazards Checklist • Prepare the Risk Assessment Checklist • Develop the Risk Assessment Matrix • Develop the Risk Mitigation/Risk Response Plan • Include results and findings in the Facility Recovery Plan 11.5.1 Hazards Checklist for Electrical Installations in Industrial Locations

Prepare the Hazards Checklist for Electrical Installations in Industrial Locations. Table 11-1 provides an example of a Hazards Checklist for

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Electrical Installations in Industrial Locations. By utilizing the Hazards Checklist, hazards are identified that could affect the electrical installation at the facility. These will be included in the Risk Assessment. This checklist should be modified as required for a Risk Assessment of a particular facility. 11.5.2 Risk Assessment Checklist for Electrical Installations in Industrial Locations

The next step is to prepare the Risk Assessment Checklist for Electrical Installations in Industrial Locations. Table 11-2 provides an example of a Risk Assessment Checklist for Electrical Installations in Industrial Locations. This checklist can be modified as required for a Risk Assessment of a particular facility.

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Table 11-1. Hazards Checklist for Electrical Installations in Industrial Locations

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Table 11-2. Risk Assessment Checklist Electrical Installations in Industrial Locations

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11.5.3 Risk Assessment Matrix for Electrical Installations in Industrial Locations

The third step in the process is to develop the Risk Assessment Matrix for Electrical Installations in Industrial Locations. A simplified Risk Assessment Matrix for Electrical Installations in Industrial Locations is shown below (Table 11-3). This matrix shows the probability of occurrence of each hazard and the severity of impact each hazard has on different assets and operations. An actual Risk Assessment Matrix for Electrical Installations in Industrial Locations would contain all hazards on one axis, all assets on the other axis, and an impact analysis for each combination.

Table 11-3. Simplified Risk Assessment Matrix

Hu

rric

ane

Flo

od

Ter

rori

sm

Pro

cess

Are

a F

ire

Probability of Occurrence during plant life

H M L M

Assets At Risk: Impact Analysis (Probability-Severity)

Incoming Utility Power H-H M-H L-H M-L

Main HV Substation or Switchyard H-H M-H L-H M-L

Standby Generator H-M M-M L-M M-L Grounding System H-L M-L L-L M-L Overhead Cable Distribution System H-L M-L L-L M-M

H= High Probability or Severity, M= Medium Probability or Severity, L= Low Probability or Severity

11.5.4 Risk Mitigation/Risk Response Plan

After the risk assessment has been prepared a Risk Mitigation/Risk Response Plan is prepared listing all of the scenarios from the Risk Assessment Matrix in the Risk Mitigation/Risk Response Plan. Each is explained in detail with respect to how the hazard can impact the facility. Use the Risk Assessment Matrix to order the scenarios from most severe and most likely to occur to least severe and least likely to occur. The scenarios in most need of prevention or mitigation should top of the list.

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Ideally, after identifying an event and affected asset, a method to prevent the event can be identified. Many times the risk will not be preventable but there may be risk mitigation techniques available to lessen the severity of the impact. In some instances, mitigation will not be possible or will be prohibitively expensive, and scenario-specific risk response plans must be developed. A simplified Risk Mitigation/Risk Response Plan is shown in Table 11-4.

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Table 11-4. Simplified Risk Mitigation/Risk Response Plan

Hazard and Scenario

Severity Rating with

Existing Mitigation

Additional Risk

Prevention or Mitigation

Risk Response Plan

Hurricane downs Utility Company power lines into facility

H-H

Determine what prevention or mitigation will be done.

Develop a response plan for unmitigated risks.

Fire damages overhead cable distribution system

M-M

Determine what prevention or mitigation will be done.

Develop a response plan for unmitigated risks.

Flood waters damage Standby Generator

M-M

Determine what prevention or mitigation will be done.

Develop a response plan for unmitigated risks.

Terrorist attacks Main HV Switchyard

L-H

Determine what prevention or mitigation will be done.

Develop a response plan for unmitigated risks.

Terrorist attacks grounding system

L-L None No

H= High Probability or Severity, M= Medium Probability or Severity, L= Low Probability or Severity

11.5.5 Facility Recovery Plan

Finally, a Facility Recovery Plan is prepared. The Facility Recovery Plan (FRP) is a site-specific plan that includes processes, procedures, mobilization plans and predefined agreements between the Owner and other stakeholders, in an effort to bring the affected facility back on-line in the shortest period possible. This plan should include all risk prevention and risk mitigation plans, and a timeline for their implementation. The plan should include execution plans, drawings, schedules, and cost estimates. The FRP can be coordinated with the Owner’s insurance provider to potentially leverage the discussion in favor of reduced premiums. Include the Risk Mitigation/Risk Response Plan along with any scenario-specific risk response plans in the FRP.

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11.6 Recovery

A well-developed recovery plan includes the development of disaster response plans and maintenance of rapid response teams to support the facility’s recovery after a natural disaster. The plans should include providing housing to displaced employees and their families, the setting up of communications networks, reestablishing utilities, rapidly repairing damaged infrastructure, and providing the construction personnel with assistance providing life support services such as food, utilities, and communications. 11.7 Post-Event Review and Actions

The post-event review process is purely a critical review of the pre-event planning process and the post-event execution to determine actions that perform well and also areas of improvement. The findings are compiled in a lessons learned or best practice document, and then fed back into the risk management system for action.

Figure 11-5. Crisis Response Impact on Shareholder Value

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This chapter looks at a few emerging topics taking on growing importance in the area of resilience. The intent is to expose these developing areas for further consideration and examination by others. 12.1 Resilience Interdependencies

Resilience interdependencies can be defined as encompassing the following types of mutual reliance: • Geography linked – the initiating event of scale creates a plurality of

adverse events within an affected geography. An example of geography linked interdependencies is represented by multiple regional bridge failures as the result of a strong regional earthquake or widespread destruction of housing stock as a result of a devastating hurricane.

• System linked – an initiating event of scale damages a critical element of an infrastructure or other system leading to failure in a linked system. Loss of power to flood pumps, as a result of a hurricane, allows flooding of critical infrastructure that otherwise had survived the initiating event of scale.

• Data linked – the initiating event debilitates either forward or backward data flows in coupling information systems resulting in degraded performance in data linked systems. Loss of data flows to critical elements of the power grid, with attendant subsequent failure of major portions of that system, is an example of data linked system interdependencies

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• Physical coupling – the initiating event causes a physical failure in one system element, which in failure, physically degrades an independent system element. This second system element may be another portion of the originally impacted system or a completely unrelated element of another system. An example might include a dam failure as a result of flood-driven over-topping with resultant failure of other capital assets downstream. The destruction of other than just the twin towers on 9/11 was the result of physical coupling.

• Framework linked – an initiating event of scale creates degradation or destruction of one or more capital asset frameworks, which then propagate causing secondary loss of resilience. Propagation of failures through the financial system is a good example of framework linkage. In some sense the NaTech type event at Fukishima had a broader framework linked effect after the immediate physical coupling.

These interdependencies may result in a multiplicity of parallel failures or a cascading series of failures which may: • Persist – reflecting different time constants associated with propagation

of the impacts initially caused by the event of scale.

• Escalate – as network scaling impacts are realized. Progressive grid failures such as that experienced in the northeast U.S. would be an example.

• Develop as a result of unseen coupling of systems or risks. This may be best termed as “constraint coupling.”

Coupling of risk and systems, especially constraint coupling, may emerge as a result of assumption migration. The susceptibility of a complex system to constraint coupling or cascading risks may be viewed as analogous to complexity measurement techniques applied in other areas. Cycloclimactic complexity analysis is one such technique that may serve as a good analog for evaluating coupling risks in complex systems and thus serve as an element of an overall resilience assessment or “score.”

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Figure 12-1. Susceptibility to Cascading Failure. 12.2 Addressing the Uncertainty of Alternate Futures

Assessing the probability of alternative futures requires making a numerical probabilistic judgment to quantify what otherwise would be a purely subjective assessment. In typical risk assessment Bayesian approaches are used to directly assess the various risk factors being considered. Quantification of these purely subjective assessments, however, is more difficult and requires consideration of non-Bayesian methodologies such as those associated with “belief functions.” Belief functions came into their own about 50 years ago and involves the assessment of probabilities for a more readily assessed related aspect and then draws conclusions about the judgment area of interest by considering these results.

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Belief functions integrate two ideas1: • Obtaining a degree of belief for one aspect from subjective probabilities

from another

• Rule for combining these degrees of belief when they are based on independent evidence

The use of belief functions has been considered in the formulation of a resilience index of urban infrastructure2 and it warrants broader consideration and application to other resilience indices. Its ability to integrate various sets of subjective, independent information as well as more structured, hierarchal data are important characteristics of assessing resilience. 12.3 Decision Framework for Establishing Targeted Resiliency Level

One approach for establishing a targeted level of resiliency to be achieved is to establish a “recovery time objective” or RTO for the facility. A facility has a baseline recovery time for any disaster event at any state of resilience. For every day that a facility is offline, productivity is stopped, and revenue is foregone. Facility management should aim to minimize their recovery time objective (RTO). Resilience measures encompass a wide range of aspects, including operational planning and physical facilities and infrastructure protection. In order to improve resilience, facilities may be required to purchase additional equipment, find alternate suppliers, or a number of other actions. Many of these actions will have a direct purchasing cost to the company, and even those that are planning aspects require employee labor, which is an additional cost. Resilience measure costs range widely based on their effectiveness and criticality. Some measures, seen as “low hanging fruit”, may require a low capital expense but may provide a significant resilience increase at a low threat level and a moderate resilience increase at higher threat levels. More costly measures may be required to improve resilience at higher threat levels. As the mitigated threat level increases, the resilience measures (and associated costs) to mitigate damages and decrease RTO will increase exponentially. It is much more difficult and costly to plan for a 7 day recovery following a Category 5 hurricane than for a 7 day recovery following a Category 1 hurricane. Figure 12-2 shows the relationship

1 A Mathematical Theory of Evidence; Glenn Shafer 2 Formulation of Resilience Index of Urban Infrastructure Using belief Functions; Attoh-Okine; Cooper; Mensah

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between RTO and cost for six hypothetical event magnitudes (C1 to C6), with C6 having the highest magnitude. As seen in the figure, as the desired RTO decreases, costs to mitigate increase exponentially, and as the magnitude of event to mitigate against increases, costs to mitigate increase.

Figure 12-2. RTO vs. Cost Relationship Between RTO and Threat

Threats of different magnitudes will have different RTOs, as high magnitude events, such as a Category 5 hurricane, will have a higher RTO than a Category 2 hurricane. As threat magnitude increases, RTO at a given level of resilience will increase. Improving facility resilience will reduce RTO, though a given mitigation technique may not reduce the RTO by the same amount for threats of different magnitudes. For example, simple facility damage mitigation measures may reduce the RTO to near zero for a Category 1 hurricane, whereas these measures alone will likely have an insignificant impact on a Category 5 hurricane event, as other recovery requirements may be critical path items and may take longer than facility repairs. Relationship Between Cost and Threat

As the magnitude of a threat increases, the cost to mitigate against that threat will increase. For example, it is more costly to mitigate damages to a 7 day RTO for a Category 5 hurricane than it would be to mitigate damages to a 7 day RTO for a Category 1 hurricane. As the RTO decreases towards zero, cost to mitigate for a low magnitude threat would be moderate, but costs to mitigate for a high magnitude threat would approach infinity, as it is not feasible, at any cost, to fully mitigate large events. As seen in Figure 12-3, for every given RTO, costs to mitigate are higher as the threat magnitude to mitigate against increases.

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Figure 12-3. Threat vs. Cost. Interaction Between Three Variables

As discussed in the preceding text, the three dimensions of the study (RTO, threat, and cost to mitigate) have an interconnected relationship. Based on the previous discussion and presented data, the relationship between the three dimensions has been plotted on a 3-dimensional graph, with threat as the x-axis, RTO as the y-axis, and cost as the z-axis. Additionally, projected losses to the company for each scenario were developed (based on direct damages from a threat + economic losses due to business interruption). As threat magnitude increases, direct damages increase, and as RTO increases, economic losses due to business interruption increase. These losses were plotted on the 3-dimensional graph with cost to mitigate, as seen in Figure 12-4. The intersection line between the two planes (cost to mitigate and economic losses) is the economic breakeven line. This line represents the RTO for each threat magnitude that provides mitigated losses equal to the cost to mitigate.

Figure 12-4. RTO vs. Threat vs. Cost.

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Upon rotating the graph such that RTO is on the x-axis, and threat is on the y-axis (as seen in Figure 12-5), we can determine the approximate breakeven points for RTO at a specific threat magnitude. For example, at a low magnitude threat (threat level 1), we see that the intersection between cost to mitigate and economic losses occurs at an approximate 13 day RTO. At a threat level 2, the intersection occurs at a 15 day RTO. These desired RTOs are close to one another because the mitigation costs and losses at these levels are low, but as the magnitude of the threat increases, the economic losses and costs to mitigate increase at different rates. At threat magnitude level 6, the breakeven RTO is approximately 66 days.

Figure 12-5. RTO vs. Threat Breakeven 12.4 Need for a Resiliency Code

Today’s built environment is marked by growing complexity, accelerated rates of change and growing exposure to an ever larger set of externalities. Each of these factors in and of themselves would present significant challenges for our built environment to address. Taken together they challenge the very foundations of resiliency which are a hallmark of a stable society. As we have shown throughout this book, we face a growing resiliency challenge. But to identify and even characterize a problem without at least suggesting one potential solution is disingenuous at best. In this section we will make the case for development of 21st century resilience codes to address the most fundamental levels of resiliency we require. As we have done throughout this book the perspective will be from an engineering and construction perspective but its extension into other frameworks requiring comparable resilience will be obvious.

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12.4.1 Recognizing the Resilience Challenge

Impacts from events of scale can be very devastating. We have seen this in the numerous examples used throughout this book. Looking at events during just these early years of the 21st century we have seen events such as: • Attacks of 9/11 • Florida hurricanes of 2004 • Hurricane Katrina 2005 • Japan 2011 earthquake and tsunami • Super Storm Sandy 2012 • Oklahoma City 2013 tornado • Drought, wildfire, flooding, severe storms, etc. The risks our built environment face are known. We may make different judgments on their causes, likelihoods and severities but they are known. Risk models have been developed to predict these risks and as a result, plans can be made to counter their negative effects. These events affect the public and private sectors and importantly, robust solutions must be comprehensive and likely lie at the intersection of these two sectors of society. Policy actions, changed codes and standards, flexible regulations able to address the changed frameworks post-disaster, must be coupled with broadened planning and pre-positioned and enabled response and recovery capabilities within the private sector. 12.4.2 Future Cities Require Resilience Codes

A growing proportion of the world’s population and its associated industrial and economic activity exist in cities and their surrounds. New resilience codes offer the potential to reduce risk exposures and consequences in the same manner as what we saw after broad scale adoption of ever more robust building codes especially in high seismic areas. Cities require a resilience code focused on strengthened risk management addressing risks to: • Prevent Storm Damage to Homes • Relocate and Protect Building Systems • Remove Barriers to Elevating Buildings and Building Systems • Add Backup Fire Safety Communication • Safeguard Toxic Materials Stored in Flood Zones • Prevent Sewage Backflow • Plant Wind and Flood Resistant Trees • Clarify Construction Requirements in Flood Zones • Prevent Wind Damage to Existing Buildings

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• Analyze Wind Risks • Capture Stormwater to Prevent Flooding • Use Cool Surfaces to Reduce Summer Heat The developed resilience code must be multi-faceted and may be best addressed by migrating our codes and standards to a true lifecycle perspective where we recognize resilience to be a system level property, subject to performance driven both by initial configuration and design and subsequent operations and maintenance and changing externalities, including institutional frameworks. Examples of some elements of a comprehensive resilience code and some typical code considerations might include: • Resilience Code: Back-up Power

− Choose Reliable Backup Power and Prioritize Needs

− Use Cogeneration and Solar During Blackouts

− Remove Barriers to Backup and Natural Gas Generators

− Remove Barriers to Cogeneration

− Remove Barriers to Solar Energy

− Add Hookups for Temporary Generators & Boilers

− Keep Residential Stairwells and Hallways Lit During Blackouts

− Keep Gas Stations Open During Blackouts

• Resilience Code: Essential Safety

− Supply Drinking Water Without Power

− Ensure Toilets and Sinks Work Without Power

− Enhance Building Water Reserves

− Ensure Operable Windows in Residential Buildings

− Maintain Habitable Temperatures Without Power

• Resilience Code: Better Community Planning

− Create Emergency Plans

− Adopt an Existing Building Code

− Don’t Discourage Buildings from Operating During Emergencies

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− Support Good Samaritan Legislation

− Pre-approve Emergency Inspectors

− Pre-negotiate Emergency Recovery Agreements This last aspect, community resilience is further explored in the next section. 12.5 Community Resilience

We are a social species. We live in communities that include a broad range of interdependencies. We are inter-reliant, more than just interdependent. We have many ways in which we might categorize our communities but for purposes of this section let us think of our communities as consisting of three broad institutional sectors with different fundamental focuses. These comprise the private, public and NGO (non-governmental organizations) sectors. As citizens we may participate in one or more of these sectors and in all likelihood touch each of the sectors in some aspect of our daily life. While we may participate in these other sectors, as individual citizens, our needs and desires may not neatly fit into any one of these sectors and collectively, the needs of the citizenry exceeds the sum of the other three. Together, these four groups may be thought of as comprising the community.

Figure 12-6. Community resilience requires partnership between public, NGO and private sectors

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12.5.1 Community Resilience – Issues We Face

The concept of community resilience, as opposed to asset or even individual resilience is a somewhat new notion and like resilience in general has just entered into the national discussion. As we explore this notion of community resilience, we are immediately faced with existing policy frameworks, which are not supportive of this broader concept of resilience. Among these the most significant include: • Critical Infrastructure resides between Government and Private Industry,

making it difficult to mitigate risk

• Stafford Act focuses on Individual and Public Assistance

− Hurricane Katrina – Nearly 7,900 businesses were shut down in southeast Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina

− Similar stories from Super Storm Sandy

• Private Industry is not addressed in current Response or Recovery planning efforts other than SBA loans

This list is by no means exhaustive but does serve to point to some initial barriers to community resilience, which must be addressed. At the end of the day private industry is the primary income source for the public sector (taxation) and our citizens (income). 12.5.2 Community Resilience – Added Challenges

The previous section outlined some major issues we face in achieving community resilience. Other challenges exist and include: • Our preference to use risk transfer as the primary method to address risk

• Failing to effectively use risk mitigation to build resilience

• Inadequate understanding of the cost/benefit to mitigating risk

• Limited insurance industry acknowledgement of the benefits of pre-event planning

− Pre-Event Planning – Cost Benefit = Premium Reduction

• Lack of engagement by public, private, NGO and citizens in methods to build community resilience

− Insurance industry has a special role to play

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12.5.3 Community Resilience – Path Forward

All is not lost. An actionable and achievable path forward exists. Some of the key steps along that path include: • Developing a common language for resilience and resilience scoring

• Moving from a Life Safety to a Resilience Code

• Collaboration, including putting into place the required robust frameworks, between public, private, NGO, citizens and the insurance industry to build Community Resilience that addresses:

− Collective recovery time objectives (RTO)

− All hazard assessments

− Vulnerability assessments, risk management and mitigation

− Collective response and recovery planning

• Improved understanding by the community of the cost benefits of mitigation

• Insurance Industry recognition and reward to policy holders for taking proactive measures towards resilience

Resilience has many dimensions and we must ensure our perspective on what constitutes resilience is not myopic. Some of the dimensions of resilience we must consider include: • Economic

− Financial

− Facilities

− Logistics

− Infrastructure

− Critical Utilities

• Social

− Security

− Employees

− Housing Stock

− Supply Chain Management

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• Political

− Governance

• Cultural

− Communications

• Technological

− Equipment

− Information Technology

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As a global organization, Fluor routinely deploys experts to work at sites on both a normal and accelerated basis. Through six decades of experience performing these activities both domestically and internationally, we have developed the capability to provide worldwide, onsite support anywhere in the world. The approach used by Fluor to quickly staff TOs and prepare our employees for deployment starts with the rapid identification of qualified personnel through efficient use of our existing human resources (HR) databases. Through internal resume searches and, for new employees, interviews and background investigations, positions are quickly filled by our HR specialists. If our internal database of current employees does not identify the right person for the job, external candidates are accessed to fill the position. Once identified, U.S. expat personnel deploying to outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) event sites are processed through our Mobilization and Deployment Center (MDC) in Greenville, South Carolina, where they complete all of the paperwork (e.g., visas, project work disclosure, letter of introduction, country clearance, controlled access card, etc.) required for their assignment. While at the MDC, they also complete the required medical steps (e.g., physical exam, dental exam, chemical screen, inoculations, etc.) and training (e.g., government compliance, security briefing, etc.) before finalizing their travel plans and deploying to the work site. Seven days are required to complete pre-deployment processing at the MDC. For OCONUS projects where large numbers of other-country nationals (OCNs) are employed, Fluor has developed the innovative MDC-in-a-Box

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program. This program streamlines the recruitment, training, and on-boarding process typically performed at the MDC in Greenville for OCNs. Rather than requiring OCNs to travel to Greenville or another CONUS location, this program brings the deployment process to the workers in other countries. In addition to the cost savings from airfare and housing expenses, the MDC-in-a-Box saves a significant amount of time, vitally important during emergency and contingency responses. From first speaking to a recruiter to a putting boots on the ground, the process can be completed in 7 to 8 days. Using the MDC-in-a-Box program, we have conducted 13 missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Georgia, and Macedonia hiring, training, and deploying more than 3,700 personnel with a total cost savings of more than $25 million to the Government. With employees in 25 offices on 6 continents, Fluor offers the global capabilities required to respond quickly to GCSC requirements. Table A1-1 summarizes the number of personnel resources mobilized by Fluor on a rapid basis in recent years.

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Table A1-1. Recruiting Capability

Fluor has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to quickly recruit employees for projects requiring rapid mobilization.

Contracts/Task Orders

Time Period Fluor

Personnel Mobilized

Subcontract Personnel Mobilized

BP MC 252 Incident Response

<70 days 8,447 0

LOGCAP IV, Afghanistan AOR

<120 days 1,480 1,924

LOGCAP IV, TO#2 <90 days 64 376 LOGCAP IV, TO#4 <60 days 72 248 FEMA IA (United States)

<90 days 1,410 2,190

CENTCOM CC I (Iraq) <45 days 50 2,950 CENTCOM CC II (Iraq) <60 days 33 1,575 New Power Generation (Iraq)

<45 days 50 540

Public Works Water (Iraq)

<45 days 50 1,150

Fluor has leveraged these global capabilities to rapidly respond to emergencies and contingencies worldwide in the past 5 years, including oil spills, wars, floods, hurricanes, typhoons. Specific emergencies and contingencies to which we have responded in the past five years include the following: BP Mississippi Canyon (MC) 252 Incident Response

In response to the recent Gulf Coast Oil Spill, Fluor, through our subsidiary P2S, was tasked by BP with implementing the Qualified Community Responder program in Alabama and Florida and restoring the beaches. In a little over 2 months, Fluor hired 8,447 previously unemployed locals, including performing background checks, drug testing, and spill response and HAZWOPER training. We oversaw 24/7 beach cleanup operations, collecting 4.9 million pounds of oil-contaminated material during the response. At peak, we managed 2,500 personnel who were divided into cleanup crews on beaches spread across 7 different counties in 2 states.

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Our approach was integral to the rapid response to this project as P2S drew on Fluor's corporate resources from all business lines to staff the project. Our global equipment supplier AMECO provided tractors, trucks, and additional equipment needed for our cleanup operations. In order to perform night operations safely, we used our staffing subsidiary, TRS, to quickly hire and deploy wildlife monitors. These monitors, overseeing night operations for all cleanup operations, ensured that work performed did not endanger the wildlife, allowing cleanup workers to continue cleanup efforts through the night. Fluor was also responsible for supply and distribution functions for the entire cleanup effort, managing four warehouses and associated delivery and logistics functions. We distributed all of the BP-purchased materials for the cleanup, ranging from booms to shovels. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Worldwide Power

Contingency Response

Supporting USACE, Fluor stands ready to respond to provide temporary power services worldwide in war time contingencies and disaster relief situations. Fluor provides electrical support services, labor, temporary power of rental generators, lease of power plants, and operations and maintenance services. This IDIQ

contract has a value of up to $490 million. Responding to military base command’s electricity needs, Fluor provided 10 Caterpillar power generation units at COB Adder in Iraq to support critical installation facilities. In addition to supplying the units, Fluor operated and maintained the units and the existing 11-kva distribution system. Eareckson Air Station Base Operations Support

We provide base operations support at the remote Eareckson Air Station (EAS) on Shemya Island, which is closer to Russia than the mainland United States. When a crew member on a fishing boat 600 nautical miles from the tip of the Aleutian Islands in the summer of 2010 needed a medical rescue, we supported the Coast Guard's rescue operation response, immediately providing critical fuel, transportation, and accommodations for

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the Coast Guard crew and aircraft to allow the rescue crew to reach the fishing vessel. We responded again in August 2010 when the crew received an in-flight emergency transmission from a Boeing 777 bound for Tokyo. A warning light had activated, indicating a fire in the cargo hold of the aircraft that was, at the time, flying over the North Pacific. Pilots contacted the tower at EAS and permission was given to divert to our landing field. Our personnel were immediately mobilized to support the potentially disastrous situation. After the aircraft landed and was marshaled to a holding area, all 211 passengers and crew were escorted to the dining facility, where our galley crew had quickly prepared 200 hot meals for the guests. After a thorough inspection of the plane and false alarm determination, the plane continued on its journey. Kuwait Oil Company Fire Rebuild

After a fire destroyed 80 percent of the facilities of an oil gathering and processing center in Kuwait, Fluor mobilized a workforce to Kuwait prior to the actual contract award, allowing our team to establish a small office in Kuwait City, set up contracts

with local companies, and prepare to start the design-build effort. As the U.S. military prepared for and invaded Iraq, obtaining cargo space to the Middle East was difficult. To avoid schedule delays, Fluor maximized local equipment suppliers and expedited the procurement. Fluor managed the basic and detailed design, procurement, construction management, precommissioning, and commissioning of the center, and our rapid mobilization and procurement strategy allowed us to complete this project under budget in 18 months, instead of 24 months. American Sugar Refining (Domino) Flood Response

After Hurricane Katrina floodwaters inundated the refinery's 15 buildings with 8 feet of water, leaving 6.5 million pounds of sugar melted on the floor, it was essential to get the plant back in operation quickly, as 19 percent of the nation's cane sugar

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passes through this refinery. Fluor implemented and oversaw the cleanup effort, replacing damaged equipment, monitoring damaged materials, and estimating repairs. Fast-tracking the response, the plant reopened in just 98 days. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Project Hanford Management Contract Wautoma Fire Response

Fluor operated the Voltenpest Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency Response (HAMMER) training facility, which specializes in hands-on, homeland security training for high-risk tasks, including hazardous waste spills, law enforcement, and emergency vehicle and fire operations. In 2007, a wildfire began that ultimately burned

75,000 acres, 8,300 of which were on the nuclear cleanup DOE site. Operating the Hanford Fire Department, Fluor was the first responder to the fire and quickly mobilized additional crews, with the HAMMER facility as the incident command center. In addition, Fluor's operators manned bulldozers and water and fuel trucks to fight the blaze, using a burn out method to destroy the fuel and stop the fire. Fluor and crews from 15 agencies contained the fire in 53 hours, with no injuries, damaged facilities, or radioactivity release. New Power Generation, Iraq

Rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, Fluor provided rapid-response construction, rehabilitation, and operations and maintenance of power generation facilities throughout Iraq through 6 task orders (TOs). Upon contract NTP, we deployed 40 personnel within 30 days. Upon NTP on three additional TOs, we deployed 50, 50, and 45 personnel, respectively, within 45 days, in addition to Iraqi subcontractor personnel.

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Iraq Public Works Water, Iraq

Through 17 TOs, Fluor provided immediate assistance in the repair of Iraq's potable water distribution system, improving the efficiency of the water delivery network by 20 percent and working in 17 cities throughout Iraq. To execute the fast-paced project, Fluor trained Iraqi craftsmen through more than 145,000 training opportunities. We deployed 50 personnel within 45

days to Iraq on 2 separate task orders. Air Force Center for Engineering and Environment Heavy Engineering Repair and Construction (HERC)

Fluor holds one of the HERC multiple-award, IDIQ contracts and stands ready to respond in support of the Air Force. Fluor's wholly owned subsidiary, Del-Jen, holds an 8(a) set-aside contract and is currently providing design-build renovation and new construction services to improve and expand the operations of the Afghan National Army. Defense Threat Reduction Agency Cooperative Threat Reduction Integration Contract

Fluor mobilized employees to various U.S. military base camps throughout Iraq to support the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disposition team. We finalized the engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) for a WMD storage site, prepared detailed drawings, and constructed the facility. Fluor packaged the radiological material

for shipment to the facility and then managed and monitored the material devising systems for handling special material by developing an entire set of

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standard operating procedures for radiological planning and dosimetry, source retrieval, radiological accounting, shipping, handling, and storage. U.S. Aid Energy Sector Technical Assistance

In a fast-paced, contingency response environment, Fluor implemented and installed an O&M program at Northwest Kabul Power Station, providing electrical service to 45 percent of the city. In addition, we repaired a Kabul turbine generator to provide electricity throughout the winter months to residents who would not have had power otherwise. Fluor also trained Afghan residents to operate the generator and power station.

U.S. Air Force Red Horse

AMECO, a Fluor equipment and vehicle subsidiary, sourced 144 pieces of heavy construction equipment and vehicles to Iraq and Afghanistan within 30 days to support Air Force road and runway construction projects in Iraq and Afghanistan in response to the wars.

FEMA PA TA

Since 1997, Fluor has provided rapid deployment program management and technical engineering assistance to support disaster recovery operations in 43 states and 6 U.S. territories. Disasters to which we have responded in 48 hours include: • 23 hurricanes • 80 floods • 33 tornados

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• 40 snow/winter storms • 9 landslides • 5 typhoons • 7 tropical storms • 6 fires • 7 earthquakes • 1 drought Air Force Contract Augmentation Program

Fluor managed the planning, field engineering, procurement, transportation, construction, and rapid setup of 2,023 housing and latrine units to support 9,500 U.S. Army personnel at Camp Cooke, Al-Taji, Iraq. Procurement and logistical issues were compounded by insurgent attacks that disrupted shipments and destroyed 45 trailers, causing us to reroute approximately 300 billet trailers from Jordan north into Turkey for import through Mosul. This rerouting doubled the transport distances and impacted the schedule. More than 60 percent of the trailers were damaged in shipment due to either poor roads or violence. The trailers were successfully repaired onsite, and 98 percent of the trailers were accepted upon initial inspection by the military. Milliken Fire Rebuild

After a manufacturing fire destroyed the carpet manufacturing plant, Fluor mobilized 150 engineers and designers within 36 hours of destruction of the facilities. We completely reconstructed the 700,000-square-foot plant, with it running again in 181 days. We bring the lessons learned and

experiences of emergency responses throughout the past decade and beyond. Additional rapid mobilization experience is shown in Table A1-2.

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Table A1-2. Lessons Learned and Experiences of Emergency Responses

Contract Emergency/ Contingency

Response

FEMA PA TAC

World Trade Center Attacks

Fluor monitored the debris removal of more than 1.5 million tons of concrete, steel, and rubble, providing technical guidance on cost estimating and cost reasonableness.

LOGCAP II

Operation Enduring Freedom

Responded within 48 hours of NTP to the Philippines, with AMECO rapidly delivering 100 vehicles within days from Japan. Scope included repairs to airport runways, billets, roads, and utility systems, including telecommunications, electrical power distribution systems, water, and wastewater. AMECO continues to provide vehicle and equipment support in the Philippines.

LOGCAP II Civil Unrest Fluor responded with 48 hours of NTP in East Timor, Indonesia. Contingency planning demanded that backup components and equipment be air shipped for all systems so equipment repairs would not halt or slow down construction. Our scope spanned airfield runway design and construction and provision of electricity and water. Necessary equipment and vehicles were relocated to the site from Jakarta and Australia.

Air Force Contract Augmentation Program

Hurricane Isabel Responded within 48 hours at Langley AFB. Fluor supported facility and utility systems cleanup, restoration, and repair from the hurricane damage. We mobilized contract and procurement support to immediately contact local subcontractors to start pumping water from inundated military houses, as well as to restore

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basic utilities. Texaco Rebuild Project

Refinery Explosion and Fire

When the hydrocracker unit at the Texaco Los Angeles Plant experienced an explosion and fire one night, Fluor arrived within 13 hours, while the fires were still burning in some parts of the damaged units, to perform a preliminary damage inspection and provide assistance in starting the rebuild effort. Providing engineering, procurement, and construction, we issued and sketched drawings to contractors where appropriate in order to avoid delays that would have been incurred for formal issue of documents, especially for critical activities.

U.S. Department of State Overseas Building Operations

U.S. State Department Needs

Converting an industrial facility and renovating the interior to a fully functioning United States consulate in Brazil, Fluor mobilized 131 U.S. craft workers, 10 full-time personnel, and 5 temporary personnel within 8 weeks after contract award. Ninety-five percent of the craft personnel lacked appropriate security clearances, but we expedited the processing and issuance of the clearances without jeopardizing the rapid mobilization timeline. In addition, we hired experienced local nationals to supplement our own personnel in facilitating the procurement, logistics, and subcontract management portion of the project.

Tyndall Air Force Base Civil Engineering Support

Tornado In 2003 at 4:10 a.m., a tornado with winds over 100 mph stuck the base without warning, causing extensive damage. Fluor personnel were among the first people to respond after the tornado struck, and crews were

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quickly on the scene to repair damaged power lines, clear the base of debris and litter, repair damaged structures and security fencing, and transfer $300,000 worth of new communications equipment from the administrative building to a dry location. Power was restored to most of the base within four hours, and, by 5:30 p.m., Fluor had fixed power lines and restored operations across the base.

NAS Whiting Field Facilities Support

Hurricane Ivan With widespread flooding and damage, we mobilized 100 staff within 24 hours and restored power within 48 hours. Crews worked around the clock to open access to the site, restore communications, remove debris, and clean facilities. The base and airfield were operational within 7 and 13 days, respectively.

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The capital asset industry is being driven to new performance regimes by growing complexities, focus on sustainability, longer asset lifetimes, uncertain futures and emerging resiliency requirements. Optimization is multi-dimensional, and more holistic, in this emerging future state. And more importantly, it must occur even earlier in the asset development process. Complex replaces simple. Dynamic replaces static. Uncertainty replaces certainty. Today’s 3, 4 and 5D BIM systems provide a glimmer of hope. But the future requires even more; a 7DSM frameworks that addresses these emerging needs and more. The 7DSM Future described is intended to challenge our industry, its practitioners and its tool makers to think deeper and more boldly about what we need and what is possible.

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Figure A2-1. Emerging Needs

Let’s start with the dimensions we are most familiar with; the first 3 dimensions. Figure A2-2 represents the common spatial dimensions that we are most familiar with: • Spatially defining; discrete; finite; static, certain • Component linked

Figure A2-2. The First Three Dimensions Today

But even in these dimensions uncertainty reigns in a 7DSM future. In a 7DSM future these dimensions are more complex. We must reflect positional uncertainty (tolerances). • If we built perfectly there would be no need for as-builts. • Do “fuzzy” locations lead us to “fuzzy analysis”?

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Figure A2-3. The First Three Dimensions Tomorrow

And does that fuzzy spatial positioning and its implications for construction tolerances, need to be captured in our next generation BIM systems and actual position later fixed via laser scanning?

Figure A2-4. Fuzzy Spatial Positioning

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In a 7DSM future these first three dimensions are even more complex. Vendor-supplied products may vary between manufacturing locations; model revisions; sub-component suppliers – details vary and details matter. Components remain important but “assemblies” rise due to growing use of fabrication and modularization. Assemblies are much more than just smart components. Assemblies have assembly level properties like center of gravity, lifting and support points, pre-commissioning properties and features. This rise of assemblies change spatial context. Relative position in the facility is still important, but so also so is relative position in the assembly. Assembly to assembly “connections” augment spatial understanding associated previously with component to component connections. Assemblies may arise from: • Bespoke design (today)

• Pattern recognition technology applied to library of prior facilities

• Standard catalogue designs (7DSM future)

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Figure A2-5. The Rise of Assemblies

Assembly level attributes must be addressed and incorporated into our management, design and capital asset systems.

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• Supply chain interface points

− Vendor shop − Logistical chain

• Sequence of construction (precursors)

− Labor, equipment, materials requirements − Training and other prerequisite activities − Preparatory works − Means and methods plan

• Physical interface points • Assembly level inspection • Pre-commissioning requirements • Transient hazards The rise of assemblies will impact all other dimensions. Interface points become multi-dimensional. The notion of assemblies is a key change, and not just physical assemblies, but knowledge assemblies.

Figure A2-6. The Notion of Assemblies is a Key Change

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Let’s turn now to time, which is the 4th dimension. Today’s 4th dimension is primarily associated with the initial delivery of a capital asset. We show design progress; construction progress; commissioning progress (more possibility than reality). We link “physical” progress to project progress as management systems and BIM systems are increasingly being linked.

Figure A2-7. 4th Dimension Today

Tomorrow, the 4th dimension in a 7DSM future is a cradle to grave (or longer) timeline. This influences our optimization points (first instance vs. life cycle).

Figure A2-8. A Life Cycle Perspective

It opens the door to: • Dynamic, changeable futures • Designing, building, operating for renewal and replacement • Scenario-based futures

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Figure A2-9. Scenario-Based Futures

The 5th dimension today is focused on “first delivery” attributes. Today’s 5D BIM is really 4½ D BIM! It is essentially a set of attributes associated with first delivery of an asset. • Component level properties such as materials of construction; pressure

rating; temperature rating; direct cost and so forth

• Most systems influenced by intended use and as such only address “½” of this dimension as currently conceived

5th dimension in a 7DSM future is significantly different. It is a “complete” dimension based on today’s frameworks, including safety, training, tools, indirect costs, and risks. Like the first three dimensions, it includes uncertainty and assembly level attributes are incorporated. Added considerations include (but are not limited to) hazard identification at component and assembly level considering anticipated erection and installation means and methods. Means and methods-related attributes significantly enhance construction planning and safe delivery of the initial asset. Safety equipment, training and certifications required are treated as both component and assembly attributes and may vary from the fabrication yard to the final site and link to means and methods attributes as well as spatial relationships at time of activity.

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Added considerations also include training and tools required by supervisors, craft labor, safety and other inspectors. Indirect costs calculation and analysis go well beyond just factoring opening the door to attack indirect costs in a more systematic way. Risks associated with the design, construction and commissioning carry forward and link to a dynamic risk register. But it is not just about cost-related factors, but rather a balanced summary of all benefits and impacts. Benefits include such considerations as: • Linkage to volume purchasing agreements, rebates

• Tax advantaged purchasing

− Purchasing and payment jurisdictions − Country of manufacture − Final site

• Available tax credits and requirements for preservation and actualization

• Favorable impacts on indirects including logistical chain; construction camps; labor market availability and premium labor costs

• Avoided costs

• Favorable cash flows/purchasing agreements

• Warranty and service features Also included are triple bottom line considerations, including the Environmental and Social bottom lines. Environmental Bottom Line impacts associated with first delivery encompass: • Embedded carbon • Water footprint • Waste fractions

Social Bottom Line impacts associated with first delivery include: • Local or targeted community sourcing (SB/WBE/DBE) • Verified labor practices (wages, work conditions) • Job creation • New industry creation • Secondary value creation

− Example – construction camp built as permanent housing for operating labor force and their families

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• Cultural considerations

The 6th dimension extends this triple bottom line focus throughout the life cycle defined as encompassing

planning → design → procurement → construction → commissioning → operations → maintenance → decommissioning → end of life

Life cycle attributes consider: • O&M and End-of-Life benefits and impacts • Triple bottom line considerations • Scenario based and time series values This holistic life cycle focus highlights common drivers, systemic risks, wild cards and constraints in new and important ways.

Figure A2-10. Holistic Life Cycle View

The 6th dimension is an enabler. The true measure of a well-managed asset is not just one configured to provide the lowest life cycle cost but rather the highest life cycle returns. 6th dimension considerations allow us to respond to and serve an evolving market by developing and implementing cost-effective strategies recognizing the long-term purpose and nature of these assets. It supports: • Monitoring, maintaining and where possible enhancing asset

performance

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• Anticipating, mitigating and managing risks associated with asset degradation and failures

This 6th dimension facilitates the transition of today’s BIM to: • Asset Management System (operations as well as maintenance) • Business Planning System (dynamic and changing futures) It acts to sharpen our Asset Management focus: • Defines the minimum level of detail for an asset (what assets to track)

• Identify the probability and consequence of failure of an asset (asset risk)

• Reduced materials/spare parts costs

• Increased productivity

• More efficient scheduling and execution of work

• Integration of Lean principles into operational and production work processes

• Accurate spare parts inventory

• Accurate equipment lists for each location The 6th dimension enables robust life cycle planning: • Up front scenario planning • Dynamic asset and business reconfiguration

− Improved Refurbishment and Replacement (R&R) planning arising from asset knowledge greatly improves the quality of capital funding strategies

It guides BIM based Asset Management to Predictive Asset management: • Assess real time conditions and implications • Asset O&M optimization strategies

− Systems level view

− Deploying the limited financial, physical and human resources of the asset owner in an efficient, effective and sustainable manner. It

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is about making informed tradeoffs as part of our decision making process

Even more so than prior dimensions the 6th dimension incorporates a number of time series which impact an assets value: • Revenue • Life Cycle Costs (O&M and End of Life) • Indirect Asset Costs • Externalities • Dynamic risks embedded in each of the above

Figure A2-11. Important 6th Dimension Time Series

Let’s look at each of these important time series in turn. Revenue

• Revenue related factors incorporated in the 6th dimension include: First Revenue Date

• Plant Availability Factor and Ramp-Up Period and Rate

• Asset Life (Duration from First Revenue during analysis period)

• Scheduled Shutdowns (Regulatory, Seasonal, Maintenance)

• Supply/Demand Balance Normalized Price (Market Size; Competitor Actions)

• Capacity or Throughput

• Byproduct Value Captured

• Tax Credits Realized

• Inflation Adjustments to Normalized Pricing (Inflation; Currency Exchange Rates)

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Multiple possible futures must be contemplated and a best strategy forward taken on the basis of uncertainties about the future.

Figure A2-12. The Efficient Frontier

Indirect Asset Costs

Indirect asset costs include: • Land use* • Tax Regime

− Taxable − Tax Credit − Tax Exempt

• Financing structures • Common factors such as:

− Financial factors – hyper inflation, deflation, uninsured portion of disasters (natural, manmade, or Natech)

− Environmental factors – climate change

− Social factors – change in user behavior, change in surrounding community behavior with respect to the facility

− Correlated risks

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Figure A2-13. Indirect Asset Costs

Let’s examine some of these indirect asset costs further so we can gain a better appreciation for the range of factors this 7DSM future must consider. Land Use

Land use impacts include: • Land use (the plant site)

− Emissions to air − Emissions to water − Emissions to soils

• Land use change

− Mineral and fossil fuel use − Land transformation − Land occupation − Soil erosion, compaction and sealing

• Often ignored in LCA but taking on increasing importance. ISO 14040 – 14043, largely developed from industrial perspective and do not mention land use as an impact category but are included in this deeper look at the 6th dimension. Land use also considers following factors: • Concurrent availability –site is available on some basis for use by other

facilities. Important when evaluating large program or asset portfolio design. May be either:

− Constrained or limited

− Unconstrained or unlimited (except with respect to limiting attributes of the site independent of the facility’s presence at the site)

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• Concurrent unavailability – the site is not available for other current use due to the facility’s presence at the site.

• Loss of optionality – site use, post facility closure, is limited because of the prior presence of the facility

• Permanent unavailability – use of the site, post closure, is not reasonably possible

Financing Structures

Financing structures considered in a life cycle analysis are influenced by many factors including: • Asset characterization • Governing financial metrics (ROE, ROI, IRR, ROA) • Asset lifetimes before refurbishment or replacement • Refinance periods • Construction and operations cash flows • Residual value of asset

Financing Structures Equity Partnership Interest Capital Contribution Return of capital;

ordinary income Stock Ownership Investment Return on equity;

capital gainDebt Senior Debt Bank Debt Principal; taxable

interest income Taxable Bond Principal; taxable

interest income Tax Exempt Bond Principal; tax exempt

income Subordinated Debt Same forms as

Senior Debt Junior credit instrument

Figure A2-14. Hierarchy of Financing Structures Externalities

The 6th dimension includes consideration of a wide range of externalities that reflect real, life cycle drivers and concerns. These externalities include: • Intangibles such as brand value

• Complexity

• Assumption migration associated with longer time frames (dynamic risks)

• Stakeholder trust

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• Susceptibility to “Black Swan” type risks

• “Strategic speed”

− Capture greater market share through quick response or first mover advantages

− “Time to market” is especially important in IP driven facility needs where patent expiration effectively defines the most valuable portion of the life-cycle.

• Regulatory taxes and subsidies Dynamic Risks

The 6th dimension recognizes that risk is increasingly dynamic as we extend our considerations over longer and longer time frames. Today, we average risk across the entire duration of a project, but in long-lived construction programs, sometimes approaching 20 or more years, this may not be appropriate. Risk parameters with defined means and variances today can change significantly over the life of a program, creating different risk hierarchies and consequentially different risk management strategies and emphasis. This is even more significant as we consider the extended operations and maintenance phase, which we must consider in lifecycle analysis. Dynamic risks also consider other risks such as: • Intra-Organizational

− Changed funding availability /cost − Changes to assumptions − Modified review/approval processes − Disruptive economic factors

• Inter-Organizational

− Emergence of new risk drivers − Increase in constraint coupling − Cumulative impact of changes

• Extra-Organizational

− Litigation − Change of law/regulation − New labor or material constraints − Political actions − Social actions

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• Phasing

− Unanticipated step changes as program moves phase to phase Finally we turn to the 7th dimension. The 7th Dimension reflects the inherent capability of our 6D system to adopt and respond in ways it was not explicitly intended to do when first conceived. We use words like these to describe these system level properties: • Flexibility • Adaptability • Responsiveness … or F-A-R ness We also refer to these system level properties with words like: • RESILIENCE In a world where we were at maximum resiliency on the day we started our plant, and operated and maintained flawlessly, we still would not know whether our resilience was improved or degraded over time unless we understood how well we had learned and gained insight and how the external risks, dynamic risks, that can act upon our asset had changed. 7DSM “states” are function of: • How designed and built • Equipment and materials choices we made • How we operated and maintained • Events we have experienced • Knowledge gained and captured • Externalities and how they have changed and are changing • Insights we have embedded into our asset decisions 7DSM future expands and “completes” the current “dimensions” used in the industry as well as while adding a couple new ones. Today’s frameworks fall short of tomorrow’s needs. They must include: • Risks, uncertainties and multiple possible futures (scenarios) • Holistic consideration of the Triple Bottom Line

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7DSM is essential for “Optioneering,” which facilitates more robust scenario analysis at the earliest stages of asset “conception.” The solution sets will be multi-dimensional Pareto optimal fronts.

Figure A2-15. Multi-Dimensional Pareto Fronts

Brings a broadened perspective to traditional life cycle methodologies: • Revenue and its timing are incorporated (Scenarios)

• Risk and uncertainty are specifically addressed in modeling and subsequent optimization (Positional and Dynamic)

• Benefits, uncertainties and impacts are considered not only from an economic bottom line perspective but similarly from an environmental and social bottom line perspective (Holistic)

Framework provides a basis for periodic reconfirmation of adopted strategies or reconfiguration guidance if changed future states so dictate. It is intended not just as an up-front option assessment or validation tool but a dynamic life cycle based management tool essential in managing today’s capital asset portfolios. Finally, the 7th Dimension will allow stress testing for Resilience.

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1. “Disaster Response in APEC – A Unique Opportunity.” APEC Business

Advisory Council Business Summit. Mexico City. 22 February 2005.

2. “Handling the Unknown.” Asia Inc. October 2003.

3. “Using the 3Rs to Deal with Crisis.” Business Asia. June 2003.

4. “A 911 Call to the Engineering Profession.” The Bridge, National Academy of Engineering. Spring 2002.

5. “The 3Rs: Lessons Learned from September 11th.” Royal Academy of Engineering. 28 October 2002.

6. “The 3Rs: Lessons Learned from September 11th.” The Russian Academy of Sciences. 17 March 2003.

7. “Urban Security: New York City as Microcosm.” Journal of Technology in Society Elsevier Journals.

8. “Terrorism: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Improving Responses.” Committee on Counterterrorism Challenges for Russia and the United States, National Research Council of the National Academies in cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sciences. 2004.

9. “Vulnerability of Public Infrastructure: A Systems Perspective.” Homeland Security Summit. 6-7 June 2002.

10. “The Effect of 911 on the Engineering and Construction Industry.” World Economic Forum Governors’ Meeting for Engineering and Construction. New York, NY. 3 February 2002.

11. National Infrastructure Protection Plan; 2006

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12. “A 911 Call to the Engineering Profession,” published in The Bridge: Linking Engineering and Society, National Academy of Engineering, Spring 2002

13. “The 3 Rs: Lessons Learned from September 11th,” presented at The Royal Academy of Engineering, London, UK, October 28, 2002.

14. Report Card for America’s Infrastructure – 2009; American Society of Civil Engineers

15. Critical Infrastructure Resilience, National Critical Infrastructure Council, September 9, 2009

16. A Mathematical Theory of Evidence; Glenn Shafer; Princeton University Press; 1976

17. Formulation of Resilience Index of Urban Infrastructure Using belief Functions; N. O. Attoh-Okine; Adrienne Cooper; Stephen Mensah; IEEE Systems Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2; June 2009

18. Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness. http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness

19. NFPA 70 - 2011 National Electrical Code, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA; NFPA

20. The titles National Electrical Code and NEC are registered trademarks of the NFPA, Quincy, MA 02169.

21. British Standards Institution 25999 (2007 Edition), Business Continuity Management

22. International Standards Organization, (ISO) ISO 22301:2012 Standard on Business Continuity Management- Requirements

23. ASIS International SPC. 1-2009-Organizational Resilience: Security Preparedness, and Continuity Management Systems--Requirements with Guidance for Use (2009 Edition), Online.

24. National Fire Protection Association 1600-Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, 2007 Edition

25. ISO 22320:2011 Standard on Emergency Management – Requirements for Incident Response

26. National Fire Protection Association 1600-Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, 2010 Edition

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27. National Fire Protection Association 1600-Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, 2013 Edition

28. [The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, July 22, 2004. Online at http://www.gpo.gov

29. Natural Hazards Risk Atlas 2013, Maplecroft. Online at http://www.maplecroft.com

30. HAZUS-MH software, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security

31. Schmidt, Donald. Implementing NFPA 1600: National Preparedness Standard. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2007. Print.

32. “A 911 Call to the Engineering Profession,” published in The Bridge: Linking Engineering and Society, National Academy of Engineering, Spring 2002

33. Phases of an Event of Scale from a Relief, Response and Reconstruct Perspective; PM World Today; September, 2010

34. Intersection of Engineering, Construction and Logistics Post-Disaster; PM World Journal, July 2013

35. “Terrorism – Reducing Vulnerabilities and Improving Responses”; Committee on Counterterrorism Challenges for Russia and the United States; “The Three R’s: Lessons Learned from September 11, 2001”; National Research Council of the National Academies, In cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sciences; The National Academies Press; 2004

36. Application of Life Cycle Analysis in the Capital Assets Industry; Construction Management Association of America (CMAA); June 2013; ISBN 978-1-938014-06-2 (eBook); ISBN 978-1-938014-07-9 (Print)

37. National Infrastructure Advisory Council Critical Infrastructure Resilience Final Report And Recommendations; September 8, 2009

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1. “Disaster Response in APEC – A Unique Opportunity.” APEC Business

Advisory Council Business Summit. Mexico City. 22 February 2005.

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6. “The 3Rs: Lessons Learned from September 11th.” The Russian Academy of Sciences. 17 March 2003.

7. “Urban Security: New York City as Microcosm.” Journal of Technology in Society, Elsevier Journals.

8. “Terrorism: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Improving Responses.” Committee on Counterterrorism Challenges for Russia and the United States, National Research Council of the National Academies in cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sciences. 2004.

9. “Vulnerability of Public Infrastructure: A Systems Perspective.” Homeland Security Summit. 6-7 June 2002.

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11. National Infrastructure Protection Plan; 2006.

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12. “A 911 Call to the Engineering Profession,” published in The Bridge: Linking Engineering and Society, National Academy of Engineering, Spring 2002.

13. “The 3 Rs: Lessons Learned from September 11th,” presented at The Royal Academy of Engineering, London, United Kingdom, October 28, 2002.

14. Report Card for America’s Infrastructure – 2009; American Society of Civil Engineers.

15. Critical Infrastructure Resilience, National Critical Infrastructure Council, September 9, 2009.

16. A Mathematical Theory of Evidence; Glenn Shafer; Princeton University Press; 1976.

17. Formulation of Resilience Index of Urban Infrastructure Using belief Functions; N. O. Attoh-Okine; Adrienne Cooper; Stephen Mensah; IEEE Systems Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2; June 2009.

18. Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness. http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness.

19. NFPA 70 - 2011 National Electrical Code, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA; NFPA.

20. The titles National Electrical Code and NEC are registered trademarks of the NFPA, Quincy, MA 02169.

21. British Standards Institution 25999 (2007 Edition), Business Continuity Management.

22. International Standards Organization, (ISO) ISO 22301:2012 Standard on Business Continuity Management – Requirements.

23. ASIS International SPC. 1-2009 – Organizational Resilience: Security Preparedness, and Continuity Management Systems – Requirements with Guidance for Use (2009 Edition), Online.

24. National Fire Protection Association 1600-Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, 2007 Edition.

25. ISO 22320:2011 Standard on Emergency Management – Requirements for Incident Response.

26. National Fire Protection Association 1600 – Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, 2010 Edition.

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27. National Fire Protection Association 1600-Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, 2013 Edition.

28. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, July 22, 2004. http://www.gpo.gov.

29. Natural Hazards Risk Atlas 2013, Maplecroft. Online at http://www.maplecroft.com.

30. HAZUS-MH software, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security.

31. Schmidt, Donald. Implementing NFPA 1600: National Preparedness Standard. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2007. Print.

32. “A 911 Call to the Engineering Profession,” published in The Bridge: Linking Engineering and Society, National Academy of Engineering, Spring 2002.

33. Phases of an Event of Scale from a Relief, Response and Reconstruct Perspective; PM World Today; September, 2010.

34. Intersection of Engineering, Construction and Logistics Post-Disaster; PM World Journal, July 2013.

35. “Terrorism – Reducing Vulnerabilities and Improving Responses”; Committee on Counterterrorism Challenges for Russia and the United States; “The Three R’s: Lessons Learned from September 11, 2001”; National Research Council of the National Academies, In cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sciences; The National Academies Press; 2004.

36. Application of Life Cycle Analysis in the Capital Assets Industry; Construction Management Association of America (CMAA); June 2013; ISBN 978-1-938014-06-2 (eBook); ISBN 978-1-938014-07-9 (Print).

37. National Infrastructure Advisory Council Critical Infrastructure Resilience Final Report and Recommendations; September 8, 2009.