researchoncollaborativegovernanceofsmartgovernment ...blockchain technology is currently involved in...

23
Research Article Research on Collaborative Governance of Smart Government Based on Blockchain Technology: An Evolutionary Approach Shaonan Shan , 1,2 Xia Duan , 1 Ying Zhang, 3 Ting Ting Zhang, 4 and Hui Li 5 1 School of Urban Economics and Public Administration, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China 2 School of Business Management, Liaoning Vocation Technical College of Modern Service, Shenyang 110164, Liaoning, China 3 School of Business Administration, Henan University of Animal Husbandry and Economy, Zhengzhou 450044, Henan, China 4 School of Public Finance and Taxation, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China 5 School of Management, Guangxi University for Nationalities, Nanning 530006, Guangxi, China Correspondence should be addressed to Xia Duan; [email protected] Received 13 November 2020; Revised 2 January 2021; Accepted 24 January 2021; Published 16 February 2021 Academic Editor: Zengqiang Chen Copyright © 2021 Shaonan Shan et al. is is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Smart government is an important means of optimizing government management, improving the government decision-making capacity, and pushing forward the public service. When the smart government process applies, the dire straits of collaborative governance among the different participants could not be ignored usually caused by maximizing their profits. Based on the current research, this paper introduces the blockchain technology into the smart government system and establishes a smart government platform architecture. Meanwhile, to analyse the evolutionary and stable strategies of the three parties under the blockchain technology, the evolutionary game model including functional departments, local governments, and end users as the main players is established on account of the bounded rationality. By examining the “blockchain + government service” in Beijing with the systemic dynamics theory, this paper changes the influencing factors simulated by changing the parameter assignment, to determine the evolutionary stable equilibrium under different external conditions. e results show that local government supervision plays a leading role in the process of collaborative governance of smart government based on blockchain technology; meanwhile, effective cost control is a key factor affecting the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS). Besides, the “decentralized” structure, “distrust” architecture, and “precision” mechanism of the blockchain are verified for the effect of the evolution process. Among them, precision service and flat management improve the possibility of collaborative governance, but the impact of the trust mechanism is not obvious. erefore, the collaborative governance model of smart government based on blockchain technology is loaded with far-reaching significance for promoting the modernization of China’s governance capacity and governance system. 1. Introduction As science and technology are leaping forward and the concept of modern governance is advancing, government departments should take the strategic measure of optimizing their decision-making ability and elevate their social service level by exploiting emerging technological means to develop smart government affairs. Since 2008, IBM proposed “smart Earth” initially [1]. e concept of using novel technological means to assist government governance decision-making and optimize public service capacity has been rapidly rec- ognized worldwide, gradually forging a global upsurge of pursuing and delving into the development of smart gov- ernment affairs. As suggested from the 2018 UN survey report [2], in 2018, there were 36 leading e-government developing nations (very high EGDI, greater than 0.75). To be specific, there were 26 European nations, taking up 72%, and 5 nations in Asia, accounting for 14%; there were two nations in the Americas and Oceania, taking up 14%, and one country in Africa, occupying 3% (see Figure 1). According to the survey results, there are three important dimensions in the e-government development index (EGDI), i.e., the online service index (OSI), the data com- munication infrastructure index (TII), and the human Hindawi Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society Volume 2021, Article ID 6634386, 23 pages https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/6634386

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Page 1: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

Research ArticleResearch on Collaborative Governance of Smart GovernmentBased on Blockchain Technology An Evolutionary Approach

Shaonan Shan 12 Xia Duan 1 Ying Zhang3 Ting Ting Zhang4 and Hui Li5

1School of Urban Economics and Public Administration Capital University of Economics and Business Beijing 100070 China2School of Business Management Liaoning Vocation Technical College of Modern Service Shenyang 110164 Liaoning China3School of Business Administration Henan University of Animal Husbandry and Economy Zhengzhou 450044 Henan China4School of Public Finance and Taxation Capital University of Economics and Business Beijing 100070 China5School of Management Guangxi University for Nationalities Nanning 530006 Guangxi China

Correspondence should be addressed to Xia Duan duanxia0517sinacom

Received 13 November 2020 Revised 2 January 2021 Accepted 24 January 2021 Published 16 February 2021

Academic Editor Zengqiang Chen

Copyright copy 2021 Shaonan Shan et alis is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution Licensewhich permits unrestricted use distribution and reproduction in any medium provided the original work is properly cited

Smart government is an important means of optimizing government management improving the government decision-makingcapacity and pushing forward the public service When the smart government process applies the dire straits of collaborativegovernance among the different participants could not be ignored usually caused bymaximizing their profits Based on the currentresearch this paper introduces the blockchain technology into the smart government system and establishes a smart governmentplatform architecture Meanwhile to analyse the evolutionary and stable strategies of the three parties under the blockchaintechnology the evolutionary gamemodel including functional departments local governments and end users as the main playersis established on account of the bounded rationality By examining the ldquoblockchain + government servicerdquo in Beijing with thesystemic dynamics theory this paper changes the influencing factors simulated by changing the parameter assignment todetermine the evolutionary stable equilibrium under different external conditions e results show that local governmentsupervision plays a leading role in the process of collaborative governance of smart government based on blockchain technologymeanwhile effective cost control is a key factor affecting the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) Besides the ldquodecentralizedrdquostructure ldquodistrustrdquo architecture and ldquoprecisionrdquo mechanism of the blockchain are verified for the effect of the evolution processAmong them precision service and flat management improve the possibility of collaborative governance but the impact of thetrust mechanism is not obvious erefore the collaborative governance model of smart government based on blockchaintechnology is loaded with far-reaching significance for promoting the modernization of Chinarsquos governance capacity andgovernance system

1 Introduction

As science and technology are leaping forward and theconcept of modern governance is advancing governmentdepartments should take the strategic measure of optimizingtheir decision-making ability and elevate their social servicelevel by exploiting emerging technological means to developsmart government affairs Since 2008 IBM proposed ldquosmartEarthrdquo initially [1] e concept of using novel technologicalmeans to assist government governance decision-makingand optimize public service capacity has been rapidly rec-ognized worldwide gradually forging a global upsurge of

pursuing and delving into the development of smart gov-ernment affairs As suggested from the 2018 UN surveyreport [2] in 2018 there were 36 leading e-governmentdeveloping nations (very high EGDI greater than 075) Tobe specific there were 26 European nations taking up 72and 5 nations in Asia accounting for 14 there were twonations in the Americas and Oceania taking up 14 andone country in Africa occupying 3 (see Figure 1)According to the survey results there are three importantdimensions in the e-government development index(EGDI) ie the online service index (OSI) the data com-munication infrastructure index (TII) and the human

HindawiDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and SocietyVolume 2021 Article ID 6634386 23 pageshttpsdoiorg10115520216634386

resources index (HCI) Nations stressed the development ofgovernment affairs information and each index was im-proved significantly in 2018 thereby boosting rapid devel-opment of smart government governance (see Figure 2)

Over the past few years the Chinese government hasrepeatedly proposed to deepen ldquoInternet + governmentservicesrdquo streamline government processes improve serviceefficiency and save peoplersquos processing time and otherpolicies as an attempt to ensure the steady implementationof the strategy of ldquopromoting the modernization of nationalgovernance systems and governance capabilitiesrdquo Smartgovernment complies with the development of the times Byimproving the scientific decision-making capacity of thegovernment reducing the red tape of business handlingarousing the initiative of diversified governance andbuilding a novel model of accurate governance and multi-party coordination the production and life of enterprisesand the public will be ensured to be optimized and con-venient However the implementing effect of smart gov-ernment is hindered by the high cost of platformconstruction [3] system security risks [4] as well as theambiguity of the rights and responsibilities of governancebodies [5] As suggested by the Internet Service CapabilityDevelopment Report of Local Governments in China (2019)[6] 217 prefecture-level administrative regions in Chinahave rolled out Internet government service projects To bespecific 14 local governments exhibited prominent Internetservice response capability However 117 prefecture-levelcities remained and Internet government services continueto progress steadily and develop urgently us under theexisting obstacles drawing on national policy calls andguidance only cannot further boost the steady progress ofsmart government affairs

Numerous factors are restricting the implementation ofsmart government affairs (eg ldquoinformation islandrdquo andldquodata chimneyrdquo [7] system loopholes and privacy disclosure[8] and risks and benefits of multiple parties and uneven

distribution of rights and obligations [9]) To address such arestriction the government employs data collection datainteroperability and incentives for business collaborationand subsequently reshapes government service processesand other public management methods to boost itself toachieve informatization [10] For implementing effects goodeffects have been achieved among which big data technologydriving [11] and cross-department information sharing [12]exert the critical effects Besides different performance as-sessment systems and reward and punishment mechanismshelp tackle down the bottleneck problem when promotingsmart government affairs For instance the construction ofthe intelligent government information ecological assess-ment system the influencing mechanism and functionalrelationship among the driving force the pressure and thestate and response factors are clarified to enhance thecomprehensive serviceability of smart government affairs[13] Given the service quality and satisfaction of smartgovernment [12] the assessment index [14] for enhancingthe administrative performance of the local government is

Figure 1 e distribution map of the worldrsquos leading e-government development nations and regions in 2018

001020304050607

EGDI HCI TIIOSI

Components of EGDI index comparing 2014 2016 and 2018

047049055

066 066

039046

057

0370370422

064

201420162018

Figure 2 Breakdown of EGDI indices comparing data from 20142016 and 2018

2 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

set to promote the steady development of smart governmente operation mechanism of ldquoAchievement safety areardquo isexploited to encourage local governments to implementcontinuous ldquoinnovative practicerdquo and then it is applied forpromoting smart government projects [15] e world isdeveloping rapidly in emerging technologies in informationtechnology whereas the technology is slightly inferior insmart government projects construction Accordinglyemerging technologies should be organically combined withthe smart government to form a novel type of wisdomcharacterized by the development of the times e gov-ernment affairs model is imperative and blockchain tech-nology presents novel insights into addressing the bottleneckproblems facing smart government affairs

e core concept and significance of blockchain tech-nology refer to data association [16] and a novel distributedinfrastructure and computing paradigm of epoch-makingsignificance [17] As highlighted by the World EconomicForum in Davos by 2023 10 of the global GDP will bestored in blockchain or blockchain-related technologies andthe blockchain technology will be extensively exploited bygovernment agencies [18] Moreover China has identifiedblockchain as one of the nationrsquos vital strategic frontierinformation technologies [19] an important support forbuilding a digital China [20] Blockchain technology iscurrently involved in numerous fields of public affairsmanagement (eg public services social security publicinformation and communication artificial intelligence andlogistics supply chain) e premise for the application ofblockchain technology in smart government affairs indicatesthat it has economic profit space and is capable of fitting theexpected returns and returns of social capital to achieve themaximum benefit us government departments andplatform users are both partners and rational groups pur-suing the maximization of their respective interests whenparticipating in the operation of smart government affairscomplying consistent with the evolutionary game theory ineconomics Subsequently it is feasible to use evolutionarygame theory to analyse the blockchain technology to enableintelligent government collaborative governance [21]

is study answers the following key questions

(1) Whether blockchain technology can promote col-laborative governance among smart governmentparticipants If so how the smart government sys-tem applies blockchain technology requires analysisSubsequently for the stability of collaborativegovernance and the possibility of the occurrence ofideal events the factors should be elucidated

(2) If blockchain technology enables collaborativegovernance of smart government affairs the fol-lowing problems will arise

(3) How does blockchain technology impact the de-velopment of collaborative governance of smartgovernment

(4) Under ldquoblockchain+ smart governmentrdquo how shouldthe participants select the optimal strategy ie activecollaboration or maintaining the status quo

(5) How to optimize the smart government collabora-tive governance model with the empowerment ofblockchain technology

e rest of this study is organized as follows In Section 2a comprehensive review of the relevant literature onblockchain technology and smart government is presentedIn Section 3 the characteristics of blockchain technologyand smart government are combined to build a revisedversion of smart government platform architecture withblockchain technology building a theoretical framework forrelevant research In Section 4 the evolutionary game modelis adopted to analyse how to achieve the game evolution andstability strategy of functional departments local govern-ments and end users as well as how to achieve a tripartitecooperation equilibrium In Section 5 the case of ldquoblock-chain + government servicesrdquo in Beijing is analysed systemdynamics theory is combined to change the assignment ofexternal variables and the influence mechanism of the threeparties is simulated actively using blockchain technology todeepen the collaborative governance of smart governmentaffairs In Section 6 the research findings are summarizedand corresponding policies are formulated

2 Literature Review

Existing studies on the application of blockchain technologyin government affairs service primarily focus on the mac-roscopic and microscopic levels At the macroscopic leveldomestic and foreign scholars analysed the technologicaladvantages of blockchain application in government servicesand studied each policy of ldquoblockchain + government ser-vicesrdquo When comparing the application of blockchain togovernment service policies in a range of nations the re-searchers indicated the advantages brought by advancedtechnology analysed the possible defects and proposed thecorresponding suggestions [22ndash24] Local governments canrefer to the mentioned studies in their decision-making toassess the possibility of applying blockchain technology togovernment services in their regions At the microscopiclevel existing studies primarily assessed security concerns ingovernmental use of blockchain technology [25] the ap-plication of blockchain to e-Residency [26] blockchain andbig data combine to elevate the level of urban governanceand social information [12 27] financial network gover-nance and freight assessment [28ndash30] and smart city gov-ernance [31 32] As a research hotspot in themultidisciplinary field such a type of research covers mostaspects of the development of ldquoblockchain + governmentservicerdquo whereas it lacks systematic and dynamic researchmethods

As demonstrated above there is little guidance con-cerning the dynamic evolution of behaviour strategies be-tween government service participants under the blockchaintechnology (ie policies and measures aimed at facilitatingcollaborative behaviours among participants) Such a typeresearch combines macro and micro levels and considersgovernment service participantsrsquo characteristics Kallstromand Mauro analysed a process of citizensrsquo and stakeholdersrsquo

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 3

engagement promoted by a local authority to codesign thecity vision with multiple actors (eg politicians publicmanagers consultants citizens and other external stake-holders) ey consider that the players in the game arecompletely rational and the policy is statically implemented[33] However behavioural psychology reveals that deci-sion-makers are short-sighted and heterogeneous and allparties are inclined to bounded rationality [34] In practiceChinarsquos e-government service development remains in theinitial stage for the immaturity in core technologies im-perfect infrastructure and cognition of participants [35] Inonline government services local governments functionaldepartments and end users interact dynamically e threeparties should share their own experiences and modify theirstrategies repeatedly by keeping abreast with external en-vironment changes Accordingly the premise of boundedrationality and dynamic evolution of the evolutionary gametheory comparatively abides by the behaviour rules anddecision-making characteristics of local governmentsfunctional departments and end users For instance Zhangand Li studied multiagent collaborative governance fortargeted poverty alleviation based on the evolutionary gameanalysis framework [36] ey built a three-agent evolu-tionary game model of local governments social organi-zations and poor groups and they investigated the impact oftheir behaviour decisions on multiagent cooperative gov-ernance of targeted poverty alleviation However the dis-cussion on the stability of the cooperative governance systemwas ignored Zhang et al [37] Xu et al [38] and Chen et al[39] initially carried out evolutionary game modelling tostudy the coordinated governance of haze by heterogeneousgovernments heavy metal pollution control in soil and therelationship among government the enterprise and thepublic in environmental governance from the perspective ofstakeholdersrsquo strategy selection Subsequently they verifiedgame models and theoretical results based on numericalexamples case studies and empirical analysis respectivelyWan and Qie [40] and Hou and Li [41] investigated thetripartite game between the government smart financialpoverty alleviation ecosystem and the collaborative inno-vation system of IoT As impacted by the different researchperspectives and points of departure the existing studiesfailed to consider the optimization effect of emergingtechnologies (eg artificial intelligence big data cloudcomputing and blockchain) on smart platform systems aswell as the interactive decision-making behaviour andevolutionary stable state of intelligent platform systemparticipants under the novel technology us the realiza-tion of interagent cooperative behaviour and the impact ofexternal factors on interagent cooperative behaviour arelargely ignored In practice the lack of theoretical researchcauses weak guidance To effectively promote the intelligentplatform system empowered by emerging technology andform the situation of multisubject collaborative participa-tion further research is required in China

As the current smart platform systems are plagued bysystem vulnerabilities privacy disclosure trust crisis andothers a modified smart government platform architectureis developed here under the blockchain technology and uses

the replicator dynamic analysis method to model the de-cision-making of the three main participants of smartgovernment is study explores how the dynamic inter-action between local governments functional departmentsand end users impacts the behaviour of participants whiledetermining the main factors of the multiagent collaborativegovernance in the complex system of ldquoblockchain + smartgovernmentrdquo which can effectively guide decision-makingof local governments functional departments and endusers

e differences between this study and the relevantliterature are presented below is study (1) attempts toexplore the architecture of a smart government platformwith blockchain technology (2) analyses the major stake-holders under this framework and considers the evolu-tionary game situation of stakeholders under the conditionof bounded rationality (3) obtains the stable state and (4)draws the key factors for the collaborative governance ofsmart government with blockchain technology

3 Collaborative Governance Model of SmartGovernment with Blockchain Technology

31 Basic Ideas e smart government refers to the resourceintegration and system integration between governmentinternal business systems and external (parallelsubordinate)functional departments It seeks to achieve the reprovi-sioning and integration of government processes and re-sources to provide convenient high-quality and low-costone-stop services to the public and enterprises to link thecross-functional departments and system integration tocomplete approval in parallel to carry out the transparentclean and efficient operation of the online administrativemanagement system and to build a through service bus thatcomprises process engine management intranet portalextranet business and thematic database and derivativecentral database [42] However the ldquoblockchain technology-based collaborative governance model for smart governmentaffairsrdquo indicates that to solve the obstacles and difficultiesfacing existing smart government affairs the original smartgovernment affairs technical framework is revised by in-troducing blockchain technology (see Figure 3) Blockchaintechnology features (eg ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure ldquodetrustrdquostructure and ldquoprecisionrdquo mechanism) can effectively tackledown various obstacles facing smart government affairsis architecture corresponds to the blockchain 6-tierstructure to the ISO7-tier structure and modifies it Givenrelational data (eg Oracle) and various algorithm tech-nologies the consensus layer and the incentive layer are thecore service layers of the blockchain overlaying end userservice business function scenarios to form an efficient safeand credible government service system e tamper-proofand asymmetric encryption technology of blockchain canensure the security and privacy of data storage As ensuredby peer-to-peer equality protocol and peer-to-peer trans-mission technology the information in the system can beexchanged recognized and transmitted in an unimpededmanner Various efficient algorithms to achieve interactionprocess fast short response time and strong fault tolerance

4 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

are conducive to value themutual recognition and behaviourconsensus Technology features (eg decentralizationtraceability editability security and reliability) ensure thatmultiple governance subjects can forge a multiple collabo-rative governance situation [43] Accordingly this modelsignificantly improves the security convenience coordi-nation and intelligence of the original system thereby in-creasing social capital and economic benefits

32 Stakeholder Analysis For all stakeholders in the col-laborative governance model of smart government withblockchain technology the collaborative governance bodiesinvolved include functional departments local govern-ments and end users e starting point of each subject isdifferent so its basic idea of participating in smart gov-ernment affairs is based on different decision-making

behaviours attributed to different positions and perspectivesof all parties in the process of platform operation Accordingto Figure 4 from the perspective of the goals of collaborativegovernance entities the goals of local government depart-ments functional gates and end users are identical eyoverall use blockchain technology to obtain better smartgovernment operations and use effects and they achievemore a considerable number of total benefits is alsocomplies with the behaviour of ldquorational peoplerdquo from theperspective of economics ie the pursuit of self-interestmaximization For each subject the model refers to a Paretoimprovement process e subjects focus is different be-cause its goal is to maximize self-interests To be specificlocal governments are concerned with whether the benefitsof social public services can be maximized functional de-partments stress whether their business service levels andperformance gains are maximized and end users are more

Block data

Hash Merkletree

SQL SQL

Physical layer

Data layer

Network layer

Blockchain node Blockchain node

P2P NETWORK

Spread Test and verify

Consensus layer

Incentive layer

Blockchain core services

PosPoW Paxos Dpos Raft Vrr Others

Verification of workloadVerification of interests

and rightsVerification of equity

authorization

Approval system Tax system Civil administrationsystem

Social securitysystem Real estate system

Incentivescheme

Allocation mechanism

Contract layer

Script code Algorithm mechanism Smart contract

Handling guideline

Work process

Work progress

Work result

Query function Business function Consulting function Management function

Personal center Smart sensor

Online service Smart swipe

Common business

Identification

Smart QampADrive

integration

Drive integration

Smart dialogue

Domain corpusUnified interface

Web Access System management

Customer management Ability

performance

Operational management

Operation monitor

Auto updateStatistical

analysis

Consumables management

Mobile monitor

Function delivery

Functional certification

Online comprehensive inquiry system

Convenience service customized terminal

system

Automatic terminal consulting service system

Automatic service terminal background management

system

Application layer

Enterprise user integrated business docking

Personal user terminal interface operation

Comprehensive supervision and management of blockchain technology

CComprehensive operation management for administrators

Cloud server Operating system Cluster Network

Asymmetric encryption

Chain structure

Digital signature

Figure 3 Modified smart government platform architecture with blockchain technology

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 5

concerned with maximizing the overall benefits (eg ease ofuse security and satisfaction) However through contin-uous adjustment and optimization under the long-termcontractual relationship of the parties the respective ad-vantages can be exploited to lastly achieve the win-wincooperation of all parties and achieve the maximization ofself-interest under the smart government coordinatedgovernance with blockchain technology

33 Profit Mechanism In the application of blockchaintechnology for constructing smart government affairsprojects only when the total revenue of system operation isgreater than the total cost of construction can the project beimplemented us to ensure the smooth operation andpromotion of blockchain-based smart government projects thefuture direct income and potential income should be balancedand coordinated after the operation to ensure the realization ofldquoPareto optimalityrdquo between the incomes of all parties par-ticipating in collaborative governance as well as mobilize theenthusiasm of all subjects maximally Combined with theadvantages of blockchain technology the present study makes

an in-depth analysis of the economic benefits in the collabo-rative governance model of smart government based onblockchain technology as shown in Figure 5

34 Collaborative Governance Organizational Structureough in the collaborative governance model of smartgovernment with blockchain technology the stakeholdersinvolved mainly include functional departments localgovernments and end users However the operation ofsmart government projects is highly technical which con-tinues to operate exhibits strong externalities and involvesnumerous participants the relationship between them isvery sophisticated as well covering third-party companies(eg system development companies operation andmaintenance outsourcing parties and blockchain technol-ogy providers) as well as nongovernmental organizations(eg chambers of commerce and social groups) Based onthe existing research results the present study analyses anddesigns the operation organization structure of the smartgovernment collaborative governance model with block-chain technology (see Figure 6)

Smart government coordinated governance

goals

Local government

Industry and commerce department

Judicial department

Tax department

Civil administration

department

Personal user

Enterprise

Other organizations

helliphellip

helliphellip

1Optimized public management structure from pyramid to flat structure2Enhance the credibility of the government establish a good image3Improve public decision-making ability and increase social benefits4Realize cross-departmental and cross-regional joint utilization of government affairs data promote diversified equal participation and win-win cooperation

1Improve business handling efficiency2Reduce the loss of information distortion in massive data collection and processing3Improve the precision level of public affairs services4Reduce system security risks

1Improve production service and life convenience2Personalization service revenue3Run once at most government service experience4Security of privacy information

Functional departments

End users

Figure 4 e goal of each stakeholder in the smart government collaborative governance model with blockchain technology

6 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

4 Assumptions and Construction of theEvolutionary Game Model

41 Basic Assumptions is study assumes that the strate-gies of functional departments are Positive Negative estrategies of local government are Strict supervision Loose

supervision while those of end users are Use Nonuse xy and z respectively denote the probability of functionaldepartmentsrsquo choice of blockchain + government servicestechnology local government supervision and end usersrsquouse smart government platform In correspondence 1-x 1-yand 1-z represent that the probability that functional

Revenue from smart government operations

Including operating platformcomprehensive revenue and user

use revenue

Direct benefits

Potential benefits

Base income

Performance gains

Rewards and punishments

earnings

Policy benefit

Including performance income from actively completing business transactions

additional income from supervisionand regulation violations

Including improve the efficiency of public affairs and enhance the

credibility of the benefits

Including precision service level flat management structure trust confirmationand reduce the loss of privacy information

disclosure etc

Figure 5 Analysis of the operational income of smart government projects based on blockchain technology

Smart government project

Local government Functional departments

Society Enterprises and other organizations

Development operation and maintenance

company

Block chain technology provider

Integrated business dockingand business handling

Smart government project development and operation and maintenance contract performance

Smart government business function demand collection

System security

Technical service contract performance

Data security

Technical feedback

Operation process supervision and management

Business handling requirements

Business handling and process management

Technical services

Consultation requestConsultation

request

Technical services

Technical support

Data information

resources

Technical support

Operation and

maintenance requirements

Improved public service

efficiency and

credibility

Accurate service

capability improvement

and trust confirmation

Figure 6 Framework diagram of the collaborative governance organization structure of smart government projects with blockchaintechnology

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 7

departments do not choose ldquoblockchain + government ser-vicesrdquo technology that the local government does loosesupervision and that end users do not use smart governmentplatform respectively

C4 refers to the cost paid by the functional departmentswhen they do not choose blockchain + government servicestechnology strategies I2 and βS2 respectively represent thebenefit increase that the functional departments can obtainby drawing upon blockchain + government services tech-nology C3 represents the cost of functional departmentswhen they comply with blockchain + government servicestechnology strategy

C2 denotes cost paid by the local government whenthey do not choose strict supervision C1 represents costpaid by the local government when they choose strictsupervision Under functional departments choosingnegative strategy A1 and αS1 respectively represent thebenefit increase of the government when the governmentfollows the ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategies Under end userschoosing use strategy P1 represent punishments paid bythe government when the government adopts the ldquoLoosesupervisionrdquo strategy

C5 represents cost paid by the end users when they donot exploit smart government platform I3 denotes the utilityincrease of the end users when they follow smart govern-ment platform When local governments select ldquoLoose su-pervisionrdquo strategies the end users can suffer P1 from a lossof privacy

Under blockchain + government services technology thecoefficient of improving the precision service level for thefunctional departments is β when they follow positivestrategies e coefficient of optimizing the flat managementefficiency of the public management structure for the localgovernment is α when they select strict supervision strate-gies e coefficient of empowering trust for the end users isc when they comply with strategies According to the actualsituation we suppose that 0 leα β c le1 e correspondingparameters are listed in Table 1

42 Model Construction Based on the mentioned modelassumptions the present study builds a three-party payoffmatrix of functional departments local government andend users e first second and third functions representthe functional departmentsrsquo payoff the payoff of localgovernment and the payoff of end users respectively especific form of the payoff matrix of each party is listed inTable 2

4219e Construction of the Expected Return Function of AllParties(1) Revenue Analysis of Functional Departments Accordingto the return matrix listed in Table 2 the benefits of positivestrategy and negative strategy employed by functional de-partments are the following equations respectively

Ex yz I2 minus C3 + βS2( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C3( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

I2 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yzβS2

(1)

E1minus x yz I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

I2 minus C4 minus yP4

(2)

Average revenue of functional department is as follows

E xEx +(1 minus x)E1minus x (3)

(2) Revenue Analysis of Local Government e fitness oflocal government that adopt strict supervision strategy andloose supervision strategy is written as follows

Uy xz I1 minus C1 + αS1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I1 minus C2( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

(4)

U1minus y xz I1 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I2 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I2 minus C2( 1113857

I1 minus C2 minus zP1

(5)

Average revenue of local government is as follows

U yUy +(1 minus y)U1minus y (6)

(3) Revenue Analysis of End Users e fitness of end usersthat adopt use strategy and nonuse strategy is expressed asfollows

Vz xy I3 minus cS3( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) I3 minus P3( 1113857 + y(1 minus x)I3

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I3 minus P3( 1113857 I3 +(y minus 1)P3 + xycS3(7)

V1minus z xy minus C5( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 + y(1 minus x) minus C5( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 minus C5(8)

Average revenue of end user is as follows

V zVz +(1 minus z)V1minus z (9)

422 9e Replication Dynamic Equation of 9ree-PartyEvolutionary Game(1) Replication Dynamic Equation of Functional Depart-ments According to equations (1)ndash(3) the replication dy-namic equation of functional departments adopting theldquoPositiverdquo strategy is defined as follows

8 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

F(x) dx

dt x Ex minus E( 1113857 x(1 minus x) Ex minus E1minus x( 1113857

x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(10)

(2) Replication Dynamic Equation of Local GovernmentAccording to equations (4)ndash(6) the replication dynamicequation of ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategy adopted by localgovernment is as follows

F(y) dy

dt y Uy minus U1113872 1113873 y(1 minus y) Uy minus U1minus y1113872 1113873

y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(11)

(3) Replication Dynamic Equation of End Users According

to equations (7)ndash(9) the replication dynamic equation ofldquoUserdquo strategy adopted by end user is expressed as follows

F(z) dz

dt z Vz minus V1minus z( 1113857

z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

(12)

43 Model Analysis

431 Evolution Path and Stability Analysis of 9ree-PartyAgent Strategy In accordance with the stability theorem ofdifferential equation the stable point of the replicationdynamic equation should be located at the zero point wherethe first derivative is less than zero ie it should be writtenas follows

d(F(x))

dxlt 0 | F(x) 0 x isin [0 1] (13)

Table 1 Main parameters and their meaning

Game player Sign Variable

Functionaldepartment

I2 Performance benefits of smart government platform business processingC3 Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing

C4Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processing

expenditureP4 When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortionΒ Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departmentsS2 Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departmentsP2 Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses

Local government

I1 Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operationC1 e cost of strict supervisionC2 e cost of loose supervision

P1When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages the

governmentrsquos credibility

A1When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments are

foundA Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public management structureS1 Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public management structure

End user

I3 e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platformC5 Still choose the total cost of business hall processingP3 When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use the platformΓ e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology

S3Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determine the

benefits of rights

Table 2 Payment matrix of functional departments local governments and end users

Functional departmentPositive (x) Negative (1-x)

End userUse (z) Nonuse (1-z) Use (z) Nonuse (1-z)

Local government

Strict supervision (y)I1 minus C1 + αS1 I1 minus C1 I1 minus C1 +A1 I1 minus C1 +A1I2 minus C3 + βS2 I2 minus C3 I2 minus C4 minus P4 I2 minus C4 minus P4I3 + cS3 minus C5 I3 minus C5

Loose supervision (1-y)I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2 I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C4 I2 minus C2I3 minus P3 minus C5 I3 minus P3 minus C5

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 9

Subsequently the evolution and stability strategies of thethree main agents of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users can be discussed

(1) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Functional Depart-mentse first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with positive strategy for x can be determined byequation (10)

zF(x)

zx (1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(14)

If we set

Πx C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (15)

and from Πx 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P2 + C3 minus C4

P2 + P4 + zβS2 (16)

en we have Conclusion 1 enun_Conclusion_1

Conclusion 1 When Πx gt 0 the positive strategy of func-tional departments is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πx lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Furthermorethe probability of x increases while the probability of y and zis elevated

Theorem 1 Πx 0 is the dividing line of the stable state offunctional departments (see Figure 7(a)) According to thestability theorem of the differential equation whenΠx gt 0 hasF(x)prime gt 0 F(x)

prime lt 0 it indicates the stable state of positivestrategy of functional departments while the negative strategyis unstable (see Figure 7(b)) Likewise when Πx lt 0 hasF(x)prime(0)lt 0 F(x)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the negative strategyof the functional departments is in a stable state while thepositive strategy is unstable (see Figure 7(c))

When ygt λy (F(x)dx)|x1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 1In other words functional departments are inclined to followa positive strategy under the probability of y higher than λy

When ylt λy (F(x)dx)|x0lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 0In other words functional departments tend to select anegative strategy when the probability of y is lower than λyLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and x

As revealed from the results the decision-makingbehaviour of functional departments is affected by nu-merous factors According to the formula the positivedecision (x) of functional departments increases with theincrease in local governmentsrsquo strict supervision strategy(y) and end user use strategy (z) Besides the smaller thedifference between the cost expenditure of optimizingsmart government business by positively using blockchaintechnology and the cost expenditure of negatively usingblockchain technology the higher the distortion loss ofmass data collection and processing attributed to not

using blockchain technology and the higher the systemsecurity problem and the precision service incomebrought by blockchain technology when local govern-ments are lax in supervision the higher the possibility forfunctional departments will choose the positive strategy

(2) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Local Governmente first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with strict supervision strategy for y can be ob-tained according to equation (11)

zF(y)

zy (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(17)

If

Πy C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + zxαS1 (18)

and from Πy 0 the following equation is yielded

λx C1 minus C2 minus A1 minus zP1

zαS1 minus A1 (19)

en we have Conclusion 2 enun_Conclusion_2

Conclusion 2 When Πy gt 0 the strict supervision strategyof local government is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πy lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Moreover theprobability of y increases while the probability of x and z iselevated

Theorem 2 Πy 0 is the boundary line of the stable state oflocal government (see Figure 8(a)) According to the stabilitytheorem of the differential equation when Πy gt 0 hasF(y)prime (0)gt 0 F(y)

prime (1)lt 0 it indicates that the local government isin a stable state when strict supervision strategy is adopted whilethe loose supervision strategy is unstable (see Figure 8(b))Likewise when Πy lt 0 has F(y)

prime(0)lt 0 F(y)prime(1)gt 0 this indi-

cates that local government is in a stable state when it choose loosesupervision strategy while strict supervision strategy is unstable(see Figure 8(c))

When xgt λx(dF(y)dy)|y1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the local government is y 1 Inother words local government tends to select a strict su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is higher than λx

When xlt λx (dF(y)dy)|y0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the local government is y 0 Inother words local government tends to select a loose su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is lower than λxLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and y

As revealed from the analysis results the decision-making behaviour of the local government is affected bymany factorse formula shows that the local governmentrsquosstrict supervision (y) and decision-making will increase withthe increase in the positive strategy (x) of the functionaldepartment and the end user strategy (z) Besides thesmaller the difference between the cost of strict supervision

10 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

by local governments and the cost of lax supervision thegreater the extra benefit from the irregularities of functionaldepartments under strict supervision e risk of data se-curity attributed to government neglect of supervision

damages the credibility of the government and the increaseof the income from the flat management of functional de-partments actively using blockchain technology to optimizethe public management structure which will directly affect

x

ζ6 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1(0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)Sx

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)ζ5 (0 1 0)

Sx

(c)

Figure 7 Functional department stability evolution phase diagram

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (011)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(c)

Figure 8 Phase diagram of local government stability evolution

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 11

the improvement of the willingness of local governments tomake final strict supervision decisions

(3) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of End Users e firstpartial derivative of the replication dynamic equation withstrict supervision strategy for y can be obtained according toequation (12)

zF(z)

zz (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (20)

If we set

Πz I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (21)

and from Πz 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P3 minus C5 minus I3

P3 + xcS3 (22)

en we have Conclusion 3enun_Conclusion_3

Conclusion 3 When Πz gt 0 the use strategy of end users isthe evolutionary stability strategy when Πz lt 0 the nonusestrategy of end users is an evolutionary stability strategyMoreover the probability of z increases while the probabilityof x and y increases

Theorem 3 Πz 0 is the dividing line of end usersrsquo stable state(see Figure 9(a)) Under the stability theorem of the differentialequation when Πz gt 0 has F(z)

prime(0)gt 0 F(z)prime(1)lt 0 it indicates

that end users use the smart government platform in a stable state(see Figure 9(b)) Likewise when Πz lt 0 hasF(z)prime(0)lt 0 F(z)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the end user does notuse the strategy in a stable state but the use strategy is unstable(see Figure 9(c))

When ygt λy (dF(z)dz)|z1lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 1 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a use strategy whenthe probability of y is higher than λy

When ylt λy (dF(z)dz)|z0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 0 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a nonuse strategywhen the probability of y is lower than λy Likewise we canprove the relationship between x and z

As suggested from the analysis results for the end usersit can be seen from the formula that the use of decision (z)increases with the increase in positive strategy (x) offunctional departments and strict supervision strategy (y) oflocal government e greater the comprehensive incomeand the total cost when not in use the greater the creditconfirmation income and privacy risk loss obtained by theuser when using the blockchain technology and the higherthe possibility of end users choosing the use strategy

432 Stability Analysis of Evolution Strategy under theAction of 9ree Parties Set P(x y z) (dxdt)G(x y z) (dydt) and Q(x y z) (dzdt) then equa-tions (10)ndash(12) express the group dynamics of the evolution

system of functional departments local government and endusers as written in the following equation

P(x y z) dx

dt x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

G(x y z) dy

dt y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

Q(x y z) dz

dt z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(23)

Set

H(E)

P(x y z)

G(x y z)

Q(x y z)

⎧⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎩ 0 (24)

and there are 12 equilibrium points for the system repli-cation dynamic equation However complying with theliterature [44] only 8 special equilibrium points should bediscussed for the replication dynamic system as follows

ξ1

00

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ2

10

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ3

11

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ4

11

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ5

01

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ6

01

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ7

00

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ8

10

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

(25)

e evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) for replicatingthe dynamic equation system is formulated based on thelocal stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix of the systemwith the method proposed by Friedman Moreover the

12 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Jacobian matrix of the system is obtained from equation (23)as follows

J

(1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)x P4 + P2 + zβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)xyβS2

y(1 minus y) zαS1 minus A1( 1113857 (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857 y(1 minus y) P1 + xαS1( 1113857

z(z minus 1)ycS3 z(z minus 1) P3 + xcS3( 1113857 (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

(26)

According to the replication dynamic equation system(13) the local equilibrium point is yielded as followsξ1(0 0 0) ξ2(1 0 0) ξ3(1 1 0) ξ4(1 1 1) ξ5(0 1 0)ξ6(0 1 1) ξ7(0 0 1) ξ8(1 0 1) By complying with Lya-punov stability theorem when all eigenvalues (λ) of theJacobian matrix satisfy λlt 0 the equilibrium point is theasymptotically stable at is the confluence When all ei-genvalues of the Jacobian matrix satisfy λgt 0 the equilib-rium point is unstable which is the source Furthermore forthe Jacobian matrix the eigenvalues (λ) mixed states Inother words some are positive while others are negativeen the equilibrium point also termed as the saddle pointis unstable First for the case where the equilibrium point isξ1(0 0 0) the Jacobian matrix is as follows

J1

C4 minus C3 minus P2 0 0

0 C2 minus C1 + A1 0

0 0 I3 + C5 minus P3

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (27)

It is therefore indicated that the eigenvalues of the Ja-cobian matrix are λ1 C4 minus C3 minus P2 λ2 C2 minus C1 + A1 andλ3 I3 + C5 minus P3 With the identical analogy the 8 equi-librium points are substituted into the Jacobian matrix (26)respectively and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

corresponding to the equilibrium points can be determinedrespectively (Table 3)

According to the mentioned analysis the evolutionarygame system has stability under certain conditions How-ever many parameters are accordingly involved and thecharacteristic value (λ) symbol is determined by the size ofthe mentioned parameter values Under the existing knownmathematical derivation method the stability of each of theNash equilibrium is determined and the evolutionary gamemodel cannot effectively lead to the reach steady stateequilibrium Accordingly this article further employs sys-tem dynamics to analyse the impact of various uncertainfactors on the evolution of the game and lays a basis forformulating relevant policies

5 System Dynamics Simulation Analysis

e above paragraphs analyzed the interaction of the threesubjects in the strategic choice and the influence of externalvariables on the stability of the evolutionary game oughsome conclusions have been drawn they are all analysesconducted from the perspective of a single subject lackingsystematic and comprehensive analysis from the perspectiveof three subjects In the 1950s Fletcher of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology initially adopted the theory of

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(b)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(c)

Figure 9 End user stability evolution phase diagram

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 13

management science and systems science and incorporatedcomputerized simulation technology into quantitative an-alyses to develop a system dynamics theory method It isprimarily adopted to study system problems with highnonlinearity as characterized by multivariate causal feed-back and complex time-varying

us to systematically and deeply analyse the strategicinteraction between different agents the present study usesthe system dynamics theory to build a dynamic model of anintelligent government collaborative governance systembased on blockchain technology and the simulation ofsystem dynamics with VENSIM PLE simulation software isemployed to analyse the evolution of the strategicinteraction

51 Based on the SD Model of ldquoBlockchain +GovernmentAffairs Servicerdquo in Beijing Since November 2019 BeijingMunicipal Government Service Bureau Beijing MunicipalScience and Technology Commission and BeijingMunicipalBureau of Economy and Information Technology have ledthe implementation of the Action Plan on the application ofblockchain in the field of Government Services e BeijingMunicipal Bureau of Commerce and other departments asthe responsible units have vigorously propelled the appli-cation construction of blockchain in government services inthe four pilot areas of the city By August 2020 140 gov-ernment affairs services have been connected in Beijing 253business affairs and 65 human affairs have been settledonline and 100000 pieces of administrative materials can besimplified throughout the year ere have been 121 en-terprises having used the blockchain system to query andverify various functions for nearly 7800 times e reporteddata have been down-regulated by 80 and the averagematerial has decreased by 40

is study combines the specific application scenarios ofblockchain pilots in Haidian Xicheng Chaoyang Shunyiand other blockchain pilots in the ldquoBlue Book on the Ap-plication of Blockchain in Municipal Services in Beijing(First Edition)rdquo issued by the Beijing Municipal Adminis-tration in July 2020 Vensim PLE software is employed tobuild the system dynamics model of the evolutionary gamebetween functional departments local governments andend users (see Figure 10)

52 Initial SimulationAnalysis According to the applicationpractice of the blockchain in the government service field of

Beijing the initial value of the model is assumed as followsINITIAL TIME 0 FINAL TIME 20 TIME-STEP 00625 and Units for Time Month and the 16external variables are assigned as shown in Table 4

Since the three participating agents of functionaldepartments local governments and end users have twokinds of strategy choices 0 and 1 this constitutes 8strategy combinations namely (0 0 0) (0 0 1) (0 1 0)(1 0 0) (1 1 0) (1 0 1) (0 1 1) and (1 1 1) When theinitial states of the three parties are pure strategies thesystem is in equilibrium At this time no one party iswilling to actively change the existing strategies and thementioned eight strategy combinations will become theequilibrium state of the system However this state is notstable as long as there is a small change in one or moresubjects in the system and the system will lose theequilibrium state We take the combination of (0 0 1)strategy as an example to illustrate and its evolutionresults are shown in Figure 11(a) is figure indicates thatthe initial probabilities of the functional departmentschoosing the positive strategy and the local governmentchoosing the strict supervision strategy are very low (both001) in the game process when the participants find thatthere are more profitable strategy choices in the system itwill adjust the original strategy and through the con-tinuous learning and imitating between the subjects thesystem can lastly reach a novel equilibrium state

e simulation of 8 pure strategy combinations issummarized as follows①No matter the positive strategy ofthe functional departments starts from 0 to 001 or from 1 to099 and its strategy choice will eventually reach an equi-librium state at 1 It is therefore revealed that in smartgovernment projects functional departments actively drawupon the smart government platform under the blockchaintechnology to complete the business which is the optimalchoice Only the active use of blockchain technology tooptimize the existing platform workflow can ensure itsmaximum revenue ② Under functional departmentsadopting positive strategies if the local government adopts astrategy of loose supervision no matter whether the endusers change from 0 or 1 the final strategy is 1 ie (1 0 0)and (1 0 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations refers to (1 0 1) (see Figure 11(b)) If the localgovernment carries out strict regulation the end users willmutate from 0 or 1 and the final strategy will be 1 namely(1 1 0) and (1 1 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations is (1 1 1) (see Figure 11(c))

Table 3 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

Equilibrium point λ1 λ2 λ3ζ1 (0 0 0) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ2 (1 0 0) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ3 (1 1 0) minus (C4minus C3 + P4) minus (C2minus C1) I3 +C5 + cS3ζ4 (1 1 1) minus (C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2) minus (C2minus C1 +P1 + αS1) minus (I3 +C5 + cS3)ζ5 (0 1 0) C4minus C3 +P4 minus (C2minus C1 +A1) I3 +C5ζ6 (0 1 1) C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2 minus (C2minus C1 +A1 +P1) minus (I3 +C5)ζ7 (0 0 1) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 +P1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)ζ8 (1 0 1) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 + P1 + αS1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)

14 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Moreover it is revealed that the end users have a positiveattitude towards the use of smart government affairs andthey are willing to use the platform to complete businesstransactions As suggested from the analysis through theevolutionary game process of ldquomutation-adjustment-equi-libriumrdquo of the three agents of the game the system willeventually reach the equilibrium state of (1 1 1)

53 SimulationAnalysis of the Impact of ExternalVariables onStrategy Based on the above discussion the value of eachparameter determines whether each strategy combination isthe equilibrium point to make the system stable state andthe impact of external variables on the strategy selection ofthe game subject is analysede following continues to take(0 0 1) strategy combination as an example to discuss

531 Factors of Functional Departmentsrsquo Strategy ChoiceIn the policy combination of (0 0 1) the initial state offunctional departments refers to a negative strategy It isassumed that the functional departments start from theprobability of 001 As indicated from the simulation amongthe 16 external variables the cost of a positive strategy C3the cost of a negative strategy C4 revenue from precisionservices S2 loss of system security risk P2 loss of informationdistortion attributed to mass data collection and processingP4 and the mentioned five external variables will impact thestrategic choice of functional departments In particular

accurate service degree coefficient β should be stressedwhich is the use of blockchain technology to enhance theserviceability of functional departments By regulating thevalue of β the precision income will be affected Under otherinitial values unchanged the evolution result of strategychoice probability of functional departments is analysed (seeFigure 12)

As revealed from the comparison of Figures 12(b) 12(c)and 12(e) C4 P2 and P4 similarly impact the evolution trendof positive strategy choice in functional departments ehigher the cost for functional departments to negativelyexploit blockchain technology the smaller the loss of systemsecurity risk when using blockchain technology and thegreater the loss of information distortion attributed to massdata collection and processing when not using blockchaintechnology the more functional departments will be in-clined to comply with the strategy of positively usingblockchain technology In addition according to thesimulation analysis C3 complexly impacts the strategyselection of functional departments Under the extremelylarge C3 value functional departments are inclined to useblockchain technology negatively in particular when thevalue is smaller the faster the functional departments willreach the stable state of positive strategy It is also revealedthat when functional departments positively exploitblockchain technology to complete smart governmentbusiness the cost acts as a critical factor when the cost istoo high it will impact the choice of their strategies

Positive strategy probabilityof functional departments xChanging rate of

functionaldepartments R(x)t

Positive and negativestrategy expected income

difference Ex-Expected benefits of

functional departmentspositive strategy Ex

Expected benefits offunctional departmentsnegative strategy E(1-x)

Loss of systemsecurity risk P2

The cost of a positivestrategy C3

Revenue fromprecision services S2

Smart government onenet to run performance

gains I2

The cost of anegative strategy C4

Loss of information distortioncaused by mass data collection

and processing P4

Use strategyprobability of end

users z

End users use strategyand nonuse strategy of

expected incomedifference Vz-

The expected revenueof users using the

platform VzThe expected revenueof uesrs nonusing the

platform V(1-z)

The cost of nonusestrategy C5

Privacy securityrisk loss P3

Revenue frompersonalized

customizationservices I3

Strict supervisionprobability of local

government y Changing rate of localgovernment R(y)t

Strict regulation and loosesupervision of expectedincome difference Uy-

Expected benefits of localgovernmentrsquos loosesupervision U(1-y)

Expected benefits oflocal governments strict

sypervision Uy

Find out the illegal operationand get extra income A1

The cost of the strictsupervision C1

Flating managementearnings S1

Operating income of the smartgovernmentrsquos One net to run

platform I1

The cost of the loosesupervision C2

Data security riskscause the loss of

governmentcredibility P1

β

α

γ

The user gets thebenefit of the trust

confirmation S3

Changing rate of endusers R(z)t

Figure 10 System dynamics (SD) model of functional department local government and end user evolutionary game system

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 15

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 2: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

resources index (HCI) Nations stressed the development ofgovernment affairs information and each index was im-proved significantly in 2018 thereby boosting rapid devel-opment of smart government governance (see Figure 2)

Over the past few years the Chinese government hasrepeatedly proposed to deepen ldquoInternet + governmentservicesrdquo streamline government processes improve serviceefficiency and save peoplersquos processing time and otherpolicies as an attempt to ensure the steady implementationof the strategy of ldquopromoting the modernization of nationalgovernance systems and governance capabilitiesrdquo Smartgovernment complies with the development of the times Byimproving the scientific decision-making capacity of thegovernment reducing the red tape of business handlingarousing the initiative of diversified governance andbuilding a novel model of accurate governance and multi-party coordination the production and life of enterprisesand the public will be ensured to be optimized and con-venient However the implementing effect of smart gov-ernment is hindered by the high cost of platformconstruction [3] system security risks [4] as well as theambiguity of the rights and responsibilities of governancebodies [5] As suggested by the Internet Service CapabilityDevelopment Report of Local Governments in China (2019)[6] 217 prefecture-level administrative regions in Chinahave rolled out Internet government service projects To bespecific 14 local governments exhibited prominent Internetservice response capability However 117 prefecture-levelcities remained and Internet government services continueto progress steadily and develop urgently us under theexisting obstacles drawing on national policy calls andguidance only cannot further boost the steady progress ofsmart government affairs

Numerous factors are restricting the implementation ofsmart government affairs (eg ldquoinformation islandrdquo andldquodata chimneyrdquo [7] system loopholes and privacy disclosure[8] and risks and benefits of multiple parties and uneven

distribution of rights and obligations [9]) To address such arestriction the government employs data collection datainteroperability and incentives for business collaborationand subsequently reshapes government service processesand other public management methods to boost itself toachieve informatization [10] For implementing effects goodeffects have been achieved among which big data technologydriving [11] and cross-department information sharing [12]exert the critical effects Besides different performance as-sessment systems and reward and punishment mechanismshelp tackle down the bottleneck problem when promotingsmart government affairs For instance the construction ofthe intelligent government information ecological assess-ment system the influencing mechanism and functionalrelationship among the driving force the pressure and thestate and response factors are clarified to enhance thecomprehensive serviceability of smart government affairs[13] Given the service quality and satisfaction of smartgovernment [12] the assessment index [14] for enhancingthe administrative performance of the local government is

Figure 1 e distribution map of the worldrsquos leading e-government development nations and regions in 2018

001020304050607

EGDI HCI TIIOSI

Components of EGDI index comparing 2014 2016 and 2018

047049055

066 066

039046

057

0370370422

064

201420162018

Figure 2 Breakdown of EGDI indices comparing data from 20142016 and 2018

2 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

set to promote the steady development of smart governmente operation mechanism of ldquoAchievement safety areardquo isexploited to encourage local governments to implementcontinuous ldquoinnovative practicerdquo and then it is applied forpromoting smart government projects [15] e world isdeveloping rapidly in emerging technologies in informationtechnology whereas the technology is slightly inferior insmart government projects construction Accordinglyemerging technologies should be organically combined withthe smart government to form a novel type of wisdomcharacterized by the development of the times e gov-ernment affairs model is imperative and blockchain tech-nology presents novel insights into addressing the bottleneckproblems facing smart government affairs

e core concept and significance of blockchain tech-nology refer to data association [16] and a novel distributedinfrastructure and computing paradigm of epoch-makingsignificance [17] As highlighted by the World EconomicForum in Davos by 2023 10 of the global GDP will bestored in blockchain or blockchain-related technologies andthe blockchain technology will be extensively exploited bygovernment agencies [18] Moreover China has identifiedblockchain as one of the nationrsquos vital strategic frontierinformation technologies [19] an important support forbuilding a digital China [20] Blockchain technology iscurrently involved in numerous fields of public affairsmanagement (eg public services social security publicinformation and communication artificial intelligence andlogistics supply chain) e premise for the application ofblockchain technology in smart government affairs indicatesthat it has economic profit space and is capable of fitting theexpected returns and returns of social capital to achieve themaximum benefit us government departments andplatform users are both partners and rational groups pur-suing the maximization of their respective interests whenparticipating in the operation of smart government affairscomplying consistent with the evolutionary game theory ineconomics Subsequently it is feasible to use evolutionarygame theory to analyse the blockchain technology to enableintelligent government collaborative governance [21]

is study answers the following key questions

(1) Whether blockchain technology can promote col-laborative governance among smart governmentparticipants If so how the smart government sys-tem applies blockchain technology requires analysisSubsequently for the stability of collaborativegovernance and the possibility of the occurrence ofideal events the factors should be elucidated

(2) If blockchain technology enables collaborativegovernance of smart government affairs the fol-lowing problems will arise

(3) How does blockchain technology impact the de-velopment of collaborative governance of smartgovernment

(4) Under ldquoblockchain+ smart governmentrdquo how shouldthe participants select the optimal strategy ie activecollaboration or maintaining the status quo

(5) How to optimize the smart government collabora-tive governance model with the empowerment ofblockchain technology

e rest of this study is organized as follows In Section 2a comprehensive review of the relevant literature onblockchain technology and smart government is presentedIn Section 3 the characteristics of blockchain technologyand smart government are combined to build a revisedversion of smart government platform architecture withblockchain technology building a theoretical framework forrelevant research In Section 4 the evolutionary game modelis adopted to analyse how to achieve the game evolution andstability strategy of functional departments local govern-ments and end users as well as how to achieve a tripartitecooperation equilibrium In Section 5 the case of ldquoblock-chain + government servicesrdquo in Beijing is analysed systemdynamics theory is combined to change the assignment ofexternal variables and the influence mechanism of the threeparties is simulated actively using blockchain technology todeepen the collaborative governance of smart governmentaffairs In Section 6 the research findings are summarizedand corresponding policies are formulated

2 Literature Review

Existing studies on the application of blockchain technologyin government affairs service primarily focus on the mac-roscopic and microscopic levels At the macroscopic leveldomestic and foreign scholars analysed the technologicaladvantages of blockchain application in government servicesand studied each policy of ldquoblockchain + government ser-vicesrdquo When comparing the application of blockchain togovernment service policies in a range of nations the re-searchers indicated the advantages brought by advancedtechnology analysed the possible defects and proposed thecorresponding suggestions [22ndash24] Local governments canrefer to the mentioned studies in their decision-making toassess the possibility of applying blockchain technology togovernment services in their regions At the microscopiclevel existing studies primarily assessed security concerns ingovernmental use of blockchain technology [25] the ap-plication of blockchain to e-Residency [26] blockchain andbig data combine to elevate the level of urban governanceand social information [12 27] financial network gover-nance and freight assessment [28ndash30] and smart city gov-ernance [31 32] As a research hotspot in themultidisciplinary field such a type of research covers mostaspects of the development of ldquoblockchain + governmentservicerdquo whereas it lacks systematic and dynamic researchmethods

As demonstrated above there is little guidance con-cerning the dynamic evolution of behaviour strategies be-tween government service participants under the blockchaintechnology (ie policies and measures aimed at facilitatingcollaborative behaviours among participants) Such a typeresearch combines macro and micro levels and considersgovernment service participantsrsquo characteristics Kallstromand Mauro analysed a process of citizensrsquo and stakeholdersrsquo

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 3

engagement promoted by a local authority to codesign thecity vision with multiple actors (eg politicians publicmanagers consultants citizens and other external stake-holders) ey consider that the players in the game arecompletely rational and the policy is statically implemented[33] However behavioural psychology reveals that deci-sion-makers are short-sighted and heterogeneous and allparties are inclined to bounded rationality [34] In practiceChinarsquos e-government service development remains in theinitial stage for the immaturity in core technologies im-perfect infrastructure and cognition of participants [35] Inonline government services local governments functionaldepartments and end users interact dynamically e threeparties should share their own experiences and modify theirstrategies repeatedly by keeping abreast with external en-vironment changes Accordingly the premise of boundedrationality and dynamic evolution of the evolutionary gametheory comparatively abides by the behaviour rules anddecision-making characteristics of local governmentsfunctional departments and end users For instance Zhangand Li studied multiagent collaborative governance fortargeted poverty alleviation based on the evolutionary gameanalysis framework [36] ey built a three-agent evolu-tionary game model of local governments social organi-zations and poor groups and they investigated the impact oftheir behaviour decisions on multiagent cooperative gov-ernance of targeted poverty alleviation However the dis-cussion on the stability of the cooperative governance systemwas ignored Zhang et al [37] Xu et al [38] and Chen et al[39] initially carried out evolutionary game modelling tostudy the coordinated governance of haze by heterogeneousgovernments heavy metal pollution control in soil and therelationship among government the enterprise and thepublic in environmental governance from the perspective ofstakeholdersrsquo strategy selection Subsequently they verifiedgame models and theoretical results based on numericalexamples case studies and empirical analysis respectivelyWan and Qie [40] and Hou and Li [41] investigated thetripartite game between the government smart financialpoverty alleviation ecosystem and the collaborative inno-vation system of IoT As impacted by the different researchperspectives and points of departure the existing studiesfailed to consider the optimization effect of emergingtechnologies (eg artificial intelligence big data cloudcomputing and blockchain) on smart platform systems aswell as the interactive decision-making behaviour andevolutionary stable state of intelligent platform systemparticipants under the novel technology us the realiza-tion of interagent cooperative behaviour and the impact ofexternal factors on interagent cooperative behaviour arelargely ignored In practice the lack of theoretical researchcauses weak guidance To effectively promote the intelligentplatform system empowered by emerging technology andform the situation of multisubject collaborative participa-tion further research is required in China

As the current smart platform systems are plagued bysystem vulnerabilities privacy disclosure trust crisis andothers a modified smart government platform architectureis developed here under the blockchain technology and uses

the replicator dynamic analysis method to model the de-cision-making of the three main participants of smartgovernment is study explores how the dynamic inter-action between local governments functional departmentsand end users impacts the behaviour of participants whiledetermining the main factors of the multiagent collaborativegovernance in the complex system of ldquoblockchain + smartgovernmentrdquo which can effectively guide decision-makingof local governments functional departments and endusers

e differences between this study and the relevantliterature are presented below is study (1) attempts toexplore the architecture of a smart government platformwith blockchain technology (2) analyses the major stake-holders under this framework and considers the evolu-tionary game situation of stakeholders under the conditionof bounded rationality (3) obtains the stable state and (4)draws the key factors for the collaborative governance ofsmart government with blockchain technology

3 Collaborative Governance Model of SmartGovernment with Blockchain Technology

31 Basic Ideas e smart government refers to the resourceintegration and system integration between governmentinternal business systems and external (parallelsubordinate)functional departments It seeks to achieve the reprovi-sioning and integration of government processes and re-sources to provide convenient high-quality and low-costone-stop services to the public and enterprises to link thecross-functional departments and system integration tocomplete approval in parallel to carry out the transparentclean and efficient operation of the online administrativemanagement system and to build a through service bus thatcomprises process engine management intranet portalextranet business and thematic database and derivativecentral database [42] However the ldquoblockchain technology-based collaborative governance model for smart governmentaffairsrdquo indicates that to solve the obstacles and difficultiesfacing existing smart government affairs the original smartgovernment affairs technical framework is revised by in-troducing blockchain technology (see Figure 3) Blockchaintechnology features (eg ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure ldquodetrustrdquostructure and ldquoprecisionrdquo mechanism) can effectively tackledown various obstacles facing smart government affairsis architecture corresponds to the blockchain 6-tierstructure to the ISO7-tier structure and modifies it Givenrelational data (eg Oracle) and various algorithm tech-nologies the consensus layer and the incentive layer are thecore service layers of the blockchain overlaying end userservice business function scenarios to form an efficient safeand credible government service system e tamper-proofand asymmetric encryption technology of blockchain canensure the security and privacy of data storage As ensuredby peer-to-peer equality protocol and peer-to-peer trans-mission technology the information in the system can beexchanged recognized and transmitted in an unimpededmanner Various efficient algorithms to achieve interactionprocess fast short response time and strong fault tolerance

4 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

are conducive to value themutual recognition and behaviourconsensus Technology features (eg decentralizationtraceability editability security and reliability) ensure thatmultiple governance subjects can forge a multiple collabo-rative governance situation [43] Accordingly this modelsignificantly improves the security convenience coordi-nation and intelligence of the original system thereby in-creasing social capital and economic benefits

32 Stakeholder Analysis For all stakeholders in the col-laborative governance model of smart government withblockchain technology the collaborative governance bodiesinvolved include functional departments local govern-ments and end users e starting point of each subject isdifferent so its basic idea of participating in smart gov-ernment affairs is based on different decision-making

behaviours attributed to different positions and perspectivesof all parties in the process of platform operation Accordingto Figure 4 from the perspective of the goals of collaborativegovernance entities the goals of local government depart-ments functional gates and end users are identical eyoverall use blockchain technology to obtain better smartgovernment operations and use effects and they achievemore a considerable number of total benefits is alsocomplies with the behaviour of ldquorational peoplerdquo from theperspective of economics ie the pursuit of self-interestmaximization For each subject the model refers to a Paretoimprovement process e subjects focus is different be-cause its goal is to maximize self-interests To be specificlocal governments are concerned with whether the benefitsof social public services can be maximized functional de-partments stress whether their business service levels andperformance gains are maximized and end users are more

Block data

Hash Merkletree

SQL SQL

Physical layer

Data layer

Network layer

Blockchain node Blockchain node

P2P NETWORK

Spread Test and verify

Consensus layer

Incentive layer

Blockchain core services

PosPoW Paxos Dpos Raft Vrr Others

Verification of workloadVerification of interests

and rightsVerification of equity

authorization

Approval system Tax system Civil administrationsystem

Social securitysystem Real estate system

Incentivescheme

Allocation mechanism

Contract layer

Script code Algorithm mechanism Smart contract

Handling guideline

Work process

Work progress

Work result

Query function Business function Consulting function Management function

Personal center Smart sensor

Online service Smart swipe

Common business

Identification

Smart QampADrive

integration

Drive integration

Smart dialogue

Domain corpusUnified interface

Web Access System management

Customer management Ability

performance

Operational management

Operation monitor

Auto updateStatistical

analysis

Consumables management

Mobile monitor

Function delivery

Functional certification

Online comprehensive inquiry system

Convenience service customized terminal

system

Automatic terminal consulting service system

Automatic service terminal background management

system

Application layer

Enterprise user integrated business docking

Personal user terminal interface operation

Comprehensive supervision and management of blockchain technology

CComprehensive operation management for administrators

Cloud server Operating system Cluster Network

Asymmetric encryption

Chain structure

Digital signature

Figure 3 Modified smart government platform architecture with blockchain technology

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 5

concerned with maximizing the overall benefits (eg ease ofuse security and satisfaction) However through contin-uous adjustment and optimization under the long-termcontractual relationship of the parties the respective ad-vantages can be exploited to lastly achieve the win-wincooperation of all parties and achieve the maximization ofself-interest under the smart government coordinatedgovernance with blockchain technology

33 Profit Mechanism In the application of blockchaintechnology for constructing smart government affairsprojects only when the total revenue of system operation isgreater than the total cost of construction can the project beimplemented us to ensure the smooth operation andpromotion of blockchain-based smart government projects thefuture direct income and potential income should be balancedand coordinated after the operation to ensure the realization ofldquoPareto optimalityrdquo between the incomes of all parties par-ticipating in collaborative governance as well as mobilize theenthusiasm of all subjects maximally Combined with theadvantages of blockchain technology the present study makes

an in-depth analysis of the economic benefits in the collabo-rative governance model of smart government based onblockchain technology as shown in Figure 5

34 Collaborative Governance Organizational Structureough in the collaborative governance model of smartgovernment with blockchain technology the stakeholdersinvolved mainly include functional departments localgovernments and end users However the operation ofsmart government projects is highly technical which con-tinues to operate exhibits strong externalities and involvesnumerous participants the relationship between them isvery sophisticated as well covering third-party companies(eg system development companies operation andmaintenance outsourcing parties and blockchain technol-ogy providers) as well as nongovernmental organizations(eg chambers of commerce and social groups) Based onthe existing research results the present study analyses anddesigns the operation organization structure of the smartgovernment collaborative governance model with block-chain technology (see Figure 6)

Smart government coordinated governance

goals

Local government

Industry and commerce department

Judicial department

Tax department

Civil administration

department

Personal user

Enterprise

Other organizations

helliphellip

helliphellip

1Optimized public management structure from pyramid to flat structure2Enhance the credibility of the government establish a good image3Improve public decision-making ability and increase social benefits4Realize cross-departmental and cross-regional joint utilization of government affairs data promote diversified equal participation and win-win cooperation

1Improve business handling efficiency2Reduce the loss of information distortion in massive data collection and processing3Improve the precision level of public affairs services4Reduce system security risks

1Improve production service and life convenience2Personalization service revenue3Run once at most government service experience4Security of privacy information

Functional departments

End users

Figure 4 e goal of each stakeholder in the smart government collaborative governance model with blockchain technology

6 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

4 Assumptions and Construction of theEvolutionary Game Model

41 Basic Assumptions is study assumes that the strate-gies of functional departments are Positive Negative estrategies of local government are Strict supervision Loose

supervision while those of end users are Use Nonuse xy and z respectively denote the probability of functionaldepartmentsrsquo choice of blockchain + government servicestechnology local government supervision and end usersrsquouse smart government platform In correspondence 1-x 1-yand 1-z represent that the probability that functional

Revenue from smart government operations

Including operating platformcomprehensive revenue and user

use revenue

Direct benefits

Potential benefits

Base income

Performance gains

Rewards and punishments

earnings

Policy benefit

Including performance income from actively completing business transactions

additional income from supervisionand regulation violations

Including improve the efficiency of public affairs and enhance the

credibility of the benefits

Including precision service level flat management structure trust confirmationand reduce the loss of privacy information

disclosure etc

Figure 5 Analysis of the operational income of smart government projects based on blockchain technology

Smart government project

Local government Functional departments

Society Enterprises and other organizations

Development operation and maintenance

company

Block chain technology provider

Integrated business dockingand business handling

Smart government project development and operation and maintenance contract performance

Smart government business function demand collection

System security

Technical service contract performance

Data security

Technical feedback

Operation process supervision and management

Business handling requirements

Business handling and process management

Technical services

Consultation requestConsultation

request

Technical services

Technical support

Data information

resources

Technical support

Operation and

maintenance requirements

Improved public service

efficiency and

credibility

Accurate service

capability improvement

and trust confirmation

Figure 6 Framework diagram of the collaborative governance organization structure of smart government projects with blockchaintechnology

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 7

departments do not choose ldquoblockchain + government ser-vicesrdquo technology that the local government does loosesupervision and that end users do not use smart governmentplatform respectively

C4 refers to the cost paid by the functional departmentswhen they do not choose blockchain + government servicestechnology strategies I2 and βS2 respectively represent thebenefit increase that the functional departments can obtainby drawing upon blockchain + government services tech-nology C3 represents the cost of functional departmentswhen they comply with blockchain + government servicestechnology strategy

C2 denotes cost paid by the local government whenthey do not choose strict supervision C1 represents costpaid by the local government when they choose strictsupervision Under functional departments choosingnegative strategy A1 and αS1 respectively represent thebenefit increase of the government when the governmentfollows the ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategies Under end userschoosing use strategy P1 represent punishments paid bythe government when the government adopts the ldquoLoosesupervisionrdquo strategy

C5 represents cost paid by the end users when they donot exploit smart government platform I3 denotes the utilityincrease of the end users when they follow smart govern-ment platform When local governments select ldquoLoose su-pervisionrdquo strategies the end users can suffer P1 from a lossof privacy

Under blockchain + government services technology thecoefficient of improving the precision service level for thefunctional departments is β when they follow positivestrategies e coefficient of optimizing the flat managementefficiency of the public management structure for the localgovernment is α when they select strict supervision strate-gies e coefficient of empowering trust for the end users isc when they comply with strategies According to the actualsituation we suppose that 0 leα β c le1 e correspondingparameters are listed in Table 1

42 Model Construction Based on the mentioned modelassumptions the present study builds a three-party payoffmatrix of functional departments local government andend users e first second and third functions representthe functional departmentsrsquo payoff the payoff of localgovernment and the payoff of end users respectively especific form of the payoff matrix of each party is listed inTable 2

4219e Construction of the Expected Return Function of AllParties(1) Revenue Analysis of Functional Departments Accordingto the return matrix listed in Table 2 the benefits of positivestrategy and negative strategy employed by functional de-partments are the following equations respectively

Ex yz I2 minus C3 + βS2( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C3( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

I2 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yzβS2

(1)

E1minus x yz I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

I2 minus C4 minus yP4

(2)

Average revenue of functional department is as follows

E xEx +(1 minus x)E1minus x (3)

(2) Revenue Analysis of Local Government e fitness oflocal government that adopt strict supervision strategy andloose supervision strategy is written as follows

Uy xz I1 minus C1 + αS1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I1 minus C2( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

(4)

U1minus y xz I1 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I2 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I2 minus C2( 1113857

I1 minus C2 minus zP1

(5)

Average revenue of local government is as follows

U yUy +(1 minus y)U1minus y (6)

(3) Revenue Analysis of End Users e fitness of end usersthat adopt use strategy and nonuse strategy is expressed asfollows

Vz xy I3 minus cS3( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) I3 minus P3( 1113857 + y(1 minus x)I3

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I3 minus P3( 1113857 I3 +(y minus 1)P3 + xycS3(7)

V1minus z xy minus C5( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 + y(1 minus x) minus C5( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 minus C5(8)

Average revenue of end user is as follows

V zVz +(1 minus z)V1minus z (9)

422 9e Replication Dynamic Equation of 9ree-PartyEvolutionary Game(1) Replication Dynamic Equation of Functional Depart-ments According to equations (1)ndash(3) the replication dy-namic equation of functional departments adopting theldquoPositiverdquo strategy is defined as follows

8 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

F(x) dx

dt x Ex minus E( 1113857 x(1 minus x) Ex minus E1minus x( 1113857

x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(10)

(2) Replication Dynamic Equation of Local GovernmentAccording to equations (4)ndash(6) the replication dynamicequation of ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategy adopted by localgovernment is as follows

F(y) dy

dt y Uy minus U1113872 1113873 y(1 minus y) Uy minus U1minus y1113872 1113873

y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(11)

(3) Replication Dynamic Equation of End Users According

to equations (7)ndash(9) the replication dynamic equation ofldquoUserdquo strategy adopted by end user is expressed as follows

F(z) dz

dt z Vz minus V1minus z( 1113857

z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

(12)

43 Model Analysis

431 Evolution Path and Stability Analysis of 9ree-PartyAgent Strategy In accordance with the stability theorem ofdifferential equation the stable point of the replicationdynamic equation should be located at the zero point wherethe first derivative is less than zero ie it should be writtenas follows

d(F(x))

dxlt 0 | F(x) 0 x isin [0 1] (13)

Table 1 Main parameters and their meaning

Game player Sign Variable

Functionaldepartment

I2 Performance benefits of smart government platform business processingC3 Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing

C4Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processing

expenditureP4 When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortionΒ Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departmentsS2 Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departmentsP2 Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses

Local government

I1 Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operationC1 e cost of strict supervisionC2 e cost of loose supervision

P1When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages the

governmentrsquos credibility

A1When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments are

foundA Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public management structureS1 Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public management structure

End user

I3 e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platformC5 Still choose the total cost of business hall processingP3 When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use the platformΓ e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology

S3Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determine the

benefits of rights

Table 2 Payment matrix of functional departments local governments and end users

Functional departmentPositive (x) Negative (1-x)

End userUse (z) Nonuse (1-z) Use (z) Nonuse (1-z)

Local government

Strict supervision (y)I1 minus C1 + αS1 I1 minus C1 I1 minus C1 +A1 I1 minus C1 +A1I2 minus C3 + βS2 I2 minus C3 I2 minus C4 minus P4 I2 minus C4 minus P4I3 + cS3 minus C5 I3 minus C5

Loose supervision (1-y)I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2 I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C4 I2 minus C2I3 minus P3 minus C5 I3 minus P3 minus C5

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 9

Subsequently the evolution and stability strategies of thethree main agents of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users can be discussed

(1) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Functional Depart-mentse first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with positive strategy for x can be determined byequation (10)

zF(x)

zx (1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(14)

If we set

Πx C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (15)

and from Πx 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P2 + C3 minus C4

P2 + P4 + zβS2 (16)

en we have Conclusion 1 enun_Conclusion_1

Conclusion 1 When Πx gt 0 the positive strategy of func-tional departments is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πx lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Furthermorethe probability of x increases while the probability of y and zis elevated

Theorem 1 Πx 0 is the dividing line of the stable state offunctional departments (see Figure 7(a)) According to thestability theorem of the differential equation whenΠx gt 0 hasF(x)prime gt 0 F(x)

prime lt 0 it indicates the stable state of positivestrategy of functional departments while the negative strategyis unstable (see Figure 7(b)) Likewise when Πx lt 0 hasF(x)prime(0)lt 0 F(x)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the negative strategyof the functional departments is in a stable state while thepositive strategy is unstable (see Figure 7(c))

When ygt λy (F(x)dx)|x1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 1In other words functional departments are inclined to followa positive strategy under the probability of y higher than λy

When ylt λy (F(x)dx)|x0lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 0In other words functional departments tend to select anegative strategy when the probability of y is lower than λyLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and x

As revealed from the results the decision-makingbehaviour of functional departments is affected by nu-merous factors According to the formula the positivedecision (x) of functional departments increases with theincrease in local governmentsrsquo strict supervision strategy(y) and end user use strategy (z) Besides the smaller thedifference between the cost expenditure of optimizingsmart government business by positively using blockchaintechnology and the cost expenditure of negatively usingblockchain technology the higher the distortion loss ofmass data collection and processing attributed to not

using blockchain technology and the higher the systemsecurity problem and the precision service incomebrought by blockchain technology when local govern-ments are lax in supervision the higher the possibility forfunctional departments will choose the positive strategy

(2) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Local Governmente first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with strict supervision strategy for y can be ob-tained according to equation (11)

zF(y)

zy (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(17)

If

Πy C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + zxαS1 (18)

and from Πy 0 the following equation is yielded

λx C1 minus C2 minus A1 minus zP1

zαS1 minus A1 (19)

en we have Conclusion 2 enun_Conclusion_2

Conclusion 2 When Πy gt 0 the strict supervision strategyof local government is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πy lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Moreover theprobability of y increases while the probability of x and z iselevated

Theorem 2 Πy 0 is the boundary line of the stable state oflocal government (see Figure 8(a)) According to the stabilitytheorem of the differential equation when Πy gt 0 hasF(y)prime (0)gt 0 F(y)

prime (1)lt 0 it indicates that the local government isin a stable state when strict supervision strategy is adopted whilethe loose supervision strategy is unstable (see Figure 8(b))Likewise when Πy lt 0 has F(y)

prime(0)lt 0 F(y)prime(1)gt 0 this indi-

cates that local government is in a stable state when it choose loosesupervision strategy while strict supervision strategy is unstable(see Figure 8(c))

When xgt λx(dF(y)dy)|y1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the local government is y 1 Inother words local government tends to select a strict su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is higher than λx

When xlt λx (dF(y)dy)|y0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the local government is y 0 Inother words local government tends to select a loose su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is lower than λxLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and y

As revealed from the analysis results the decision-making behaviour of the local government is affected bymany factorse formula shows that the local governmentrsquosstrict supervision (y) and decision-making will increase withthe increase in the positive strategy (x) of the functionaldepartment and the end user strategy (z) Besides thesmaller the difference between the cost of strict supervision

10 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

by local governments and the cost of lax supervision thegreater the extra benefit from the irregularities of functionaldepartments under strict supervision e risk of data se-curity attributed to government neglect of supervision

damages the credibility of the government and the increaseof the income from the flat management of functional de-partments actively using blockchain technology to optimizethe public management structure which will directly affect

x

ζ6 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1(0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)Sx

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)ζ5 (0 1 0)

Sx

(c)

Figure 7 Functional department stability evolution phase diagram

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (011)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(c)

Figure 8 Phase diagram of local government stability evolution

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 11

the improvement of the willingness of local governments tomake final strict supervision decisions

(3) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of End Users e firstpartial derivative of the replication dynamic equation withstrict supervision strategy for y can be obtained according toequation (12)

zF(z)

zz (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (20)

If we set

Πz I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (21)

and from Πz 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P3 minus C5 minus I3

P3 + xcS3 (22)

en we have Conclusion 3enun_Conclusion_3

Conclusion 3 When Πz gt 0 the use strategy of end users isthe evolutionary stability strategy when Πz lt 0 the nonusestrategy of end users is an evolutionary stability strategyMoreover the probability of z increases while the probabilityof x and y increases

Theorem 3 Πz 0 is the dividing line of end usersrsquo stable state(see Figure 9(a)) Under the stability theorem of the differentialequation when Πz gt 0 has F(z)

prime(0)gt 0 F(z)prime(1)lt 0 it indicates

that end users use the smart government platform in a stable state(see Figure 9(b)) Likewise when Πz lt 0 hasF(z)prime(0)lt 0 F(z)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the end user does notuse the strategy in a stable state but the use strategy is unstable(see Figure 9(c))

When ygt λy (dF(z)dz)|z1lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 1 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a use strategy whenthe probability of y is higher than λy

When ylt λy (dF(z)dz)|z0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 0 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a nonuse strategywhen the probability of y is lower than λy Likewise we canprove the relationship between x and z

As suggested from the analysis results for the end usersit can be seen from the formula that the use of decision (z)increases with the increase in positive strategy (x) offunctional departments and strict supervision strategy (y) oflocal government e greater the comprehensive incomeand the total cost when not in use the greater the creditconfirmation income and privacy risk loss obtained by theuser when using the blockchain technology and the higherthe possibility of end users choosing the use strategy

432 Stability Analysis of Evolution Strategy under theAction of 9ree Parties Set P(x y z) (dxdt)G(x y z) (dydt) and Q(x y z) (dzdt) then equa-tions (10)ndash(12) express the group dynamics of the evolution

system of functional departments local government and endusers as written in the following equation

P(x y z) dx

dt x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

G(x y z) dy

dt y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

Q(x y z) dz

dt z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(23)

Set

H(E)

P(x y z)

G(x y z)

Q(x y z)

⎧⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎩ 0 (24)

and there are 12 equilibrium points for the system repli-cation dynamic equation However complying with theliterature [44] only 8 special equilibrium points should bediscussed for the replication dynamic system as follows

ξ1

00

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ2

10

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ3

11

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ4

11

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ5

01

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ6

01

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ7

00

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ8

10

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

(25)

e evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) for replicatingthe dynamic equation system is formulated based on thelocal stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix of the systemwith the method proposed by Friedman Moreover the

12 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Jacobian matrix of the system is obtained from equation (23)as follows

J

(1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)x P4 + P2 + zβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)xyβS2

y(1 minus y) zαS1 minus A1( 1113857 (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857 y(1 minus y) P1 + xαS1( 1113857

z(z minus 1)ycS3 z(z minus 1) P3 + xcS3( 1113857 (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

(26)

According to the replication dynamic equation system(13) the local equilibrium point is yielded as followsξ1(0 0 0) ξ2(1 0 0) ξ3(1 1 0) ξ4(1 1 1) ξ5(0 1 0)ξ6(0 1 1) ξ7(0 0 1) ξ8(1 0 1) By complying with Lya-punov stability theorem when all eigenvalues (λ) of theJacobian matrix satisfy λlt 0 the equilibrium point is theasymptotically stable at is the confluence When all ei-genvalues of the Jacobian matrix satisfy λgt 0 the equilib-rium point is unstable which is the source Furthermore forthe Jacobian matrix the eigenvalues (λ) mixed states Inother words some are positive while others are negativeen the equilibrium point also termed as the saddle pointis unstable First for the case where the equilibrium point isξ1(0 0 0) the Jacobian matrix is as follows

J1

C4 minus C3 minus P2 0 0

0 C2 minus C1 + A1 0

0 0 I3 + C5 minus P3

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (27)

It is therefore indicated that the eigenvalues of the Ja-cobian matrix are λ1 C4 minus C3 minus P2 λ2 C2 minus C1 + A1 andλ3 I3 + C5 minus P3 With the identical analogy the 8 equi-librium points are substituted into the Jacobian matrix (26)respectively and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

corresponding to the equilibrium points can be determinedrespectively (Table 3)

According to the mentioned analysis the evolutionarygame system has stability under certain conditions How-ever many parameters are accordingly involved and thecharacteristic value (λ) symbol is determined by the size ofthe mentioned parameter values Under the existing knownmathematical derivation method the stability of each of theNash equilibrium is determined and the evolutionary gamemodel cannot effectively lead to the reach steady stateequilibrium Accordingly this article further employs sys-tem dynamics to analyse the impact of various uncertainfactors on the evolution of the game and lays a basis forformulating relevant policies

5 System Dynamics Simulation Analysis

e above paragraphs analyzed the interaction of the threesubjects in the strategic choice and the influence of externalvariables on the stability of the evolutionary game oughsome conclusions have been drawn they are all analysesconducted from the perspective of a single subject lackingsystematic and comprehensive analysis from the perspectiveof three subjects In the 1950s Fletcher of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology initially adopted the theory of

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(b)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(c)

Figure 9 End user stability evolution phase diagram

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 13

management science and systems science and incorporatedcomputerized simulation technology into quantitative an-alyses to develop a system dynamics theory method It isprimarily adopted to study system problems with highnonlinearity as characterized by multivariate causal feed-back and complex time-varying

us to systematically and deeply analyse the strategicinteraction between different agents the present study usesthe system dynamics theory to build a dynamic model of anintelligent government collaborative governance systembased on blockchain technology and the simulation ofsystem dynamics with VENSIM PLE simulation software isemployed to analyse the evolution of the strategicinteraction

51 Based on the SD Model of ldquoBlockchain +GovernmentAffairs Servicerdquo in Beijing Since November 2019 BeijingMunicipal Government Service Bureau Beijing MunicipalScience and Technology Commission and BeijingMunicipalBureau of Economy and Information Technology have ledthe implementation of the Action Plan on the application ofblockchain in the field of Government Services e BeijingMunicipal Bureau of Commerce and other departments asthe responsible units have vigorously propelled the appli-cation construction of blockchain in government services inthe four pilot areas of the city By August 2020 140 gov-ernment affairs services have been connected in Beijing 253business affairs and 65 human affairs have been settledonline and 100000 pieces of administrative materials can besimplified throughout the year ere have been 121 en-terprises having used the blockchain system to query andverify various functions for nearly 7800 times e reporteddata have been down-regulated by 80 and the averagematerial has decreased by 40

is study combines the specific application scenarios ofblockchain pilots in Haidian Xicheng Chaoyang Shunyiand other blockchain pilots in the ldquoBlue Book on the Ap-plication of Blockchain in Municipal Services in Beijing(First Edition)rdquo issued by the Beijing Municipal Adminis-tration in July 2020 Vensim PLE software is employed tobuild the system dynamics model of the evolutionary gamebetween functional departments local governments andend users (see Figure 10)

52 Initial SimulationAnalysis According to the applicationpractice of the blockchain in the government service field of

Beijing the initial value of the model is assumed as followsINITIAL TIME 0 FINAL TIME 20 TIME-STEP 00625 and Units for Time Month and the 16external variables are assigned as shown in Table 4

Since the three participating agents of functionaldepartments local governments and end users have twokinds of strategy choices 0 and 1 this constitutes 8strategy combinations namely (0 0 0) (0 0 1) (0 1 0)(1 0 0) (1 1 0) (1 0 1) (0 1 1) and (1 1 1) When theinitial states of the three parties are pure strategies thesystem is in equilibrium At this time no one party iswilling to actively change the existing strategies and thementioned eight strategy combinations will become theequilibrium state of the system However this state is notstable as long as there is a small change in one or moresubjects in the system and the system will lose theequilibrium state We take the combination of (0 0 1)strategy as an example to illustrate and its evolutionresults are shown in Figure 11(a) is figure indicates thatthe initial probabilities of the functional departmentschoosing the positive strategy and the local governmentchoosing the strict supervision strategy are very low (both001) in the game process when the participants find thatthere are more profitable strategy choices in the system itwill adjust the original strategy and through the con-tinuous learning and imitating between the subjects thesystem can lastly reach a novel equilibrium state

e simulation of 8 pure strategy combinations issummarized as follows①No matter the positive strategy ofthe functional departments starts from 0 to 001 or from 1 to099 and its strategy choice will eventually reach an equi-librium state at 1 It is therefore revealed that in smartgovernment projects functional departments actively drawupon the smart government platform under the blockchaintechnology to complete the business which is the optimalchoice Only the active use of blockchain technology tooptimize the existing platform workflow can ensure itsmaximum revenue ② Under functional departmentsadopting positive strategies if the local government adopts astrategy of loose supervision no matter whether the endusers change from 0 or 1 the final strategy is 1 ie (1 0 0)and (1 0 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations refers to (1 0 1) (see Figure 11(b)) If the localgovernment carries out strict regulation the end users willmutate from 0 or 1 and the final strategy will be 1 namely(1 1 0) and (1 1 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations is (1 1 1) (see Figure 11(c))

Table 3 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

Equilibrium point λ1 λ2 λ3ζ1 (0 0 0) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ2 (1 0 0) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ3 (1 1 0) minus (C4minus C3 + P4) minus (C2minus C1) I3 +C5 + cS3ζ4 (1 1 1) minus (C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2) minus (C2minus C1 +P1 + αS1) minus (I3 +C5 + cS3)ζ5 (0 1 0) C4minus C3 +P4 minus (C2minus C1 +A1) I3 +C5ζ6 (0 1 1) C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2 minus (C2minus C1 +A1 +P1) minus (I3 +C5)ζ7 (0 0 1) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 +P1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)ζ8 (1 0 1) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 + P1 + αS1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)

14 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Moreover it is revealed that the end users have a positiveattitude towards the use of smart government affairs andthey are willing to use the platform to complete businesstransactions As suggested from the analysis through theevolutionary game process of ldquomutation-adjustment-equi-libriumrdquo of the three agents of the game the system willeventually reach the equilibrium state of (1 1 1)

53 SimulationAnalysis of the Impact of ExternalVariables onStrategy Based on the above discussion the value of eachparameter determines whether each strategy combination isthe equilibrium point to make the system stable state andthe impact of external variables on the strategy selection ofthe game subject is analysede following continues to take(0 0 1) strategy combination as an example to discuss

531 Factors of Functional Departmentsrsquo Strategy ChoiceIn the policy combination of (0 0 1) the initial state offunctional departments refers to a negative strategy It isassumed that the functional departments start from theprobability of 001 As indicated from the simulation amongthe 16 external variables the cost of a positive strategy C3the cost of a negative strategy C4 revenue from precisionservices S2 loss of system security risk P2 loss of informationdistortion attributed to mass data collection and processingP4 and the mentioned five external variables will impact thestrategic choice of functional departments In particular

accurate service degree coefficient β should be stressedwhich is the use of blockchain technology to enhance theserviceability of functional departments By regulating thevalue of β the precision income will be affected Under otherinitial values unchanged the evolution result of strategychoice probability of functional departments is analysed (seeFigure 12)

As revealed from the comparison of Figures 12(b) 12(c)and 12(e) C4 P2 and P4 similarly impact the evolution trendof positive strategy choice in functional departments ehigher the cost for functional departments to negativelyexploit blockchain technology the smaller the loss of systemsecurity risk when using blockchain technology and thegreater the loss of information distortion attributed to massdata collection and processing when not using blockchaintechnology the more functional departments will be in-clined to comply with the strategy of positively usingblockchain technology In addition according to thesimulation analysis C3 complexly impacts the strategyselection of functional departments Under the extremelylarge C3 value functional departments are inclined to useblockchain technology negatively in particular when thevalue is smaller the faster the functional departments willreach the stable state of positive strategy It is also revealedthat when functional departments positively exploitblockchain technology to complete smart governmentbusiness the cost acts as a critical factor when the cost istoo high it will impact the choice of their strategies

Positive strategy probabilityof functional departments xChanging rate of

functionaldepartments R(x)t

Positive and negativestrategy expected income

difference Ex-Expected benefits of

functional departmentspositive strategy Ex

Expected benefits offunctional departmentsnegative strategy E(1-x)

Loss of systemsecurity risk P2

The cost of a positivestrategy C3

Revenue fromprecision services S2

Smart government onenet to run performance

gains I2

The cost of anegative strategy C4

Loss of information distortioncaused by mass data collection

and processing P4

Use strategyprobability of end

users z

End users use strategyand nonuse strategy of

expected incomedifference Vz-

The expected revenueof users using the

platform VzThe expected revenueof uesrs nonusing the

platform V(1-z)

The cost of nonusestrategy C5

Privacy securityrisk loss P3

Revenue frompersonalized

customizationservices I3

Strict supervisionprobability of local

government y Changing rate of localgovernment R(y)t

Strict regulation and loosesupervision of expectedincome difference Uy-

Expected benefits of localgovernmentrsquos loosesupervision U(1-y)

Expected benefits oflocal governments strict

sypervision Uy

Find out the illegal operationand get extra income A1

The cost of the strictsupervision C1

Flating managementearnings S1

Operating income of the smartgovernmentrsquos One net to run

platform I1

The cost of the loosesupervision C2

Data security riskscause the loss of

governmentcredibility P1

β

α

γ

The user gets thebenefit of the trust

confirmation S3

Changing rate of endusers R(z)t

Figure 10 System dynamics (SD) model of functional department local government and end user evolutionary game system

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 15

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 3: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

set to promote the steady development of smart governmente operation mechanism of ldquoAchievement safety areardquo isexploited to encourage local governments to implementcontinuous ldquoinnovative practicerdquo and then it is applied forpromoting smart government projects [15] e world isdeveloping rapidly in emerging technologies in informationtechnology whereas the technology is slightly inferior insmart government projects construction Accordinglyemerging technologies should be organically combined withthe smart government to form a novel type of wisdomcharacterized by the development of the times e gov-ernment affairs model is imperative and blockchain tech-nology presents novel insights into addressing the bottleneckproblems facing smart government affairs

e core concept and significance of blockchain tech-nology refer to data association [16] and a novel distributedinfrastructure and computing paradigm of epoch-makingsignificance [17] As highlighted by the World EconomicForum in Davos by 2023 10 of the global GDP will bestored in blockchain or blockchain-related technologies andthe blockchain technology will be extensively exploited bygovernment agencies [18] Moreover China has identifiedblockchain as one of the nationrsquos vital strategic frontierinformation technologies [19] an important support forbuilding a digital China [20] Blockchain technology iscurrently involved in numerous fields of public affairsmanagement (eg public services social security publicinformation and communication artificial intelligence andlogistics supply chain) e premise for the application ofblockchain technology in smart government affairs indicatesthat it has economic profit space and is capable of fitting theexpected returns and returns of social capital to achieve themaximum benefit us government departments andplatform users are both partners and rational groups pur-suing the maximization of their respective interests whenparticipating in the operation of smart government affairscomplying consistent with the evolutionary game theory ineconomics Subsequently it is feasible to use evolutionarygame theory to analyse the blockchain technology to enableintelligent government collaborative governance [21]

is study answers the following key questions

(1) Whether blockchain technology can promote col-laborative governance among smart governmentparticipants If so how the smart government sys-tem applies blockchain technology requires analysisSubsequently for the stability of collaborativegovernance and the possibility of the occurrence ofideal events the factors should be elucidated

(2) If blockchain technology enables collaborativegovernance of smart government affairs the fol-lowing problems will arise

(3) How does blockchain technology impact the de-velopment of collaborative governance of smartgovernment

(4) Under ldquoblockchain+ smart governmentrdquo how shouldthe participants select the optimal strategy ie activecollaboration or maintaining the status quo

(5) How to optimize the smart government collabora-tive governance model with the empowerment ofblockchain technology

e rest of this study is organized as follows In Section 2a comprehensive review of the relevant literature onblockchain technology and smart government is presentedIn Section 3 the characteristics of blockchain technologyand smart government are combined to build a revisedversion of smart government platform architecture withblockchain technology building a theoretical framework forrelevant research In Section 4 the evolutionary game modelis adopted to analyse how to achieve the game evolution andstability strategy of functional departments local govern-ments and end users as well as how to achieve a tripartitecooperation equilibrium In Section 5 the case of ldquoblock-chain + government servicesrdquo in Beijing is analysed systemdynamics theory is combined to change the assignment ofexternal variables and the influence mechanism of the threeparties is simulated actively using blockchain technology todeepen the collaborative governance of smart governmentaffairs In Section 6 the research findings are summarizedand corresponding policies are formulated

2 Literature Review

Existing studies on the application of blockchain technologyin government affairs service primarily focus on the mac-roscopic and microscopic levels At the macroscopic leveldomestic and foreign scholars analysed the technologicaladvantages of blockchain application in government servicesand studied each policy of ldquoblockchain + government ser-vicesrdquo When comparing the application of blockchain togovernment service policies in a range of nations the re-searchers indicated the advantages brought by advancedtechnology analysed the possible defects and proposed thecorresponding suggestions [22ndash24] Local governments canrefer to the mentioned studies in their decision-making toassess the possibility of applying blockchain technology togovernment services in their regions At the microscopiclevel existing studies primarily assessed security concerns ingovernmental use of blockchain technology [25] the ap-plication of blockchain to e-Residency [26] blockchain andbig data combine to elevate the level of urban governanceand social information [12 27] financial network gover-nance and freight assessment [28ndash30] and smart city gov-ernance [31 32] As a research hotspot in themultidisciplinary field such a type of research covers mostaspects of the development of ldquoblockchain + governmentservicerdquo whereas it lacks systematic and dynamic researchmethods

As demonstrated above there is little guidance con-cerning the dynamic evolution of behaviour strategies be-tween government service participants under the blockchaintechnology (ie policies and measures aimed at facilitatingcollaborative behaviours among participants) Such a typeresearch combines macro and micro levels and considersgovernment service participantsrsquo characteristics Kallstromand Mauro analysed a process of citizensrsquo and stakeholdersrsquo

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 3

engagement promoted by a local authority to codesign thecity vision with multiple actors (eg politicians publicmanagers consultants citizens and other external stake-holders) ey consider that the players in the game arecompletely rational and the policy is statically implemented[33] However behavioural psychology reveals that deci-sion-makers are short-sighted and heterogeneous and allparties are inclined to bounded rationality [34] In practiceChinarsquos e-government service development remains in theinitial stage for the immaturity in core technologies im-perfect infrastructure and cognition of participants [35] Inonline government services local governments functionaldepartments and end users interact dynamically e threeparties should share their own experiences and modify theirstrategies repeatedly by keeping abreast with external en-vironment changes Accordingly the premise of boundedrationality and dynamic evolution of the evolutionary gametheory comparatively abides by the behaviour rules anddecision-making characteristics of local governmentsfunctional departments and end users For instance Zhangand Li studied multiagent collaborative governance fortargeted poverty alleviation based on the evolutionary gameanalysis framework [36] ey built a three-agent evolu-tionary game model of local governments social organi-zations and poor groups and they investigated the impact oftheir behaviour decisions on multiagent cooperative gov-ernance of targeted poverty alleviation However the dis-cussion on the stability of the cooperative governance systemwas ignored Zhang et al [37] Xu et al [38] and Chen et al[39] initially carried out evolutionary game modelling tostudy the coordinated governance of haze by heterogeneousgovernments heavy metal pollution control in soil and therelationship among government the enterprise and thepublic in environmental governance from the perspective ofstakeholdersrsquo strategy selection Subsequently they verifiedgame models and theoretical results based on numericalexamples case studies and empirical analysis respectivelyWan and Qie [40] and Hou and Li [41] investigated thetripartite game between the government smart financialpoverty alleviation ecosystem and the collaborative inno-vation system of IoT As impacted by the different researchperspectives and points of departure the existing studiesfailed to consider the optimization effect of emergingtechnologies (eg artificial intelligence big data cloudcomputing and blockchain) on smart platform systems aswell as the interactive decision-making behaviour andevolutionary stable state of intelligent platform systemparticipants under the novel technology us the realiza-tion of interagent cooperative behaviour and the impact ofexternal factors on interagent cooperative behaviour arelargely ignored In practice the lack of theoretical researchcauses weak guidance To effectively promote the intelligentplatform system empowered by emerging technology andform the situation of multisubject collaborative participa-tion further research is required in China

As the current smart platform systems are plagued bysystem vulnerabilities privacy disclosure trust crisis andothers a modified smart government platform architectureis developed here under the blockchain technology and uses

the replicator dynamic analysis method to model the de-cision-making of the three main participants of smartgovernment is study explores how the dynamic inter-action between local governments functional departmentsand end users impacts the behaviour of participants whiledetermining the main factors of the multiagent collaborativegovernance in the complex system of ldquoblockchain + smartgovernmentrdquo which can effectively guide decision-makingof local governments functional departments and endusers

e differences between this study and the relevantliterature are presented below is study (1) attempts toexplore the architecture of a smart government platformwith blockchain technology (2) analyses the major stake-holders under this framework and considers the evolu-tionary game situation of stakeholders under the conditionof bounded rationality (3) obtains the stable state and (4)draws the key factors for the collaborative governance ofsmart government with blockchain technology

3 Collaborative Governance Model of SmartGovernment with Blockchain Technology

31 Basic Ideas e smart government refers to the resourceintegration and system integration between governmentinternal business systems and external (parallelsubordinate)functional departments It seeks to achieve the reprovi-sioning and integration of government processes and re-sources to provide convenient high-quality and low-costone-stop services to the public and enterprises to link thecross-functional departments and system integration tocomplete approval in parallel to carry out the transparentclean and efficient operation of the online administrativemanagement system and to build a through service bus thatcomprises process engine management intranet portalextranet business and thematic database and derivativecentral database [42] However the ldquoblockchain technology-based collaborative governance model for smart governmentaffairsrdquo indicates that to solve the obstacles and difficultiesfacing existing smart government affairs the original smartgovernment affairs technical framework is revised by in-troducing blockchain technology (see Figure 3) Blockchaintechnology features (eg ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure ldquodetrustrdquostructure and ldquoprecisionrdquo mechanism) can effectively tackledown various obstacles facing smart government affairsis architecture corresponds to the blockchain 6-tierstructure to the ISO7-tier structure and modifies it Givenrelational data (eg Oracle) and various algorithm tech-nologies the consensus layer and the incentive layer are thecore service layers of the blockchain overlaying end userservice business function scenarios to form an efficient safeand credible government service system e tamper-proofand asymmetric encryption technology of blockchain canensure the security and privacy of data storage As ensuredby peer-to-peer equality protocol and peer-to-peer trans-mission technology the information in the system can beexchanged recognized and transmitted in an unimpededmanner Various efficient algorithms to achieve interactionprocess fast short response time and strong fault tolerance

4 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

are conducive to value themutual recognition and behaviourconsensus Technology features (eg decentralizationtraceability editability security and reliability) ensure thatmultiple governance subjects can forge a multiple collabo-rative governance situation [43] Accordingly this modelsignificantly improves the security convenience coordi-nation and intelligence of the original system thereby in-creasing social capital and economic benefits

32 Stakeholder Analysis For all stakeholders in the col-laborative governance model of smart government withblockchain technology the collaborative governance bodiesinvolved include functional departments local govern-ments and end users e starting point of each subject isdifferent so its basic idea of participating in smart gov-ernment affairs is based on different decision-making

behaviours attributed to different positions and perspectivesof all parties in the process of platform operation Accordingto Figure 4 from the perspective of the goals of collaborativegovernance entities the goals of local government depart-ments functional gates and end users are identical eyoverall use blockchain technology to obtain better smartgovernment operations and use effects and they achievemore a considerable number of total benefits is alsocomplies with the behaviour of ldquorational peoplerdquo from theperspective of economics ie the pursuit of self-interestmaximization For each subject the model refers to a Paretoimprovement process e subjects focus is different be-cause its goal is to maximize self-interests To be specificlocal governments are concerned with whether the benefitsof social public services can be maximized functional de-partments stress whether their business service levels andperformance gains are maximized and end users are more

Block data

Hash Merkletree

SQL SQL

Physical layer

Data layer

Network layer

Blockchain node Blockchain node

P2P NETWORK

Spread Test and verify

Consensus layer

Incentive layer

Blockchain core services

PosPoW Paxos Dpos Raft Vrr Others

Verification of workloadVerification of interests

and rightsVerification of equity

authorization

Approval system Tax system Civil administrationsystem

Social securitysystem Real estate system

Incentivescheme

Allocation mechanism

Contract layer

Script code Algorithm mechanism Smart contract

Handling guideline

Work process

Work progress

Work result

Query function Business function Consulting function Management function

Personal center Smart sensor

Online service Smart swipe

Common business

Identification

Smart QampADrive

integration

Drive integration

Smart dialogue

Domain corpusUnified interface

Web Access System management

Customer management Ability

performance

Operational management

Operation monitor

Auto updateStatistical

analysis

Consumables management

Mobile monitor

Function delivery

Functional certification

Online comprehensive inquiry system

Convenience service customized terminal

system

Automatic terminal consulting service system

Automatic service terminal background management

system

Application layer

Enterprise user integrated business docking

Personal user terminal interface operation

Comprehensive supervision and management of blockchain technology

CComprehensive operation management for administrators

Cloud server Operating system Cluster Network

Asymmetric encryption

Chain structure

Digital signature

Figure 3 Modified smart government platform architecture with blockchain technology

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 5

concerned with maximizing the overall benefits (eg ease ofuse security and satisfaction) However through contin-uous adjustment and optimization under the long-termcontractual relationship of the parties the respective ad-vantages can be exploited to lastly achieve the win-wincooperation of all parties and achieve the maximization ofself-interest under the smart government coordinatedgovernance with blockchain technology

33 Profit Mechanism In the application of blockchaintechnology for constructing smart government affairsprojects only when the total revenue of system operation isgreater than the total cost of construction can the project beimplemented us to ensure the smooth operation andpromotion of blockchain-based smart government projects thefuture direct income and potential income should be balancedand coordinated after the operation to ensure the realization ofldquoPareto optimalityrdquo between the incomes of all parties par-ticipating in collaborative governance as well as mobilize theenthusiasm of all subjects maximally Combined with theadvantages of blockchain technology the present study makes

an in-depth analysis of the economic benefits in the collabo-rative governance model of smart government based onblockchain technology as shown in Figure 5

34 Collaborative Governance Organizational Structureough in the collaborative governance model of smartgovernment with blockchain technology the stakeholdersinvolved mainly include functional departments localgovernments and end users However the operation ofsmart government projects is highly technical which con-tinues to operate exhibits strong externalities and involvesnumerous participants the relationship between them isvery sophisticated as well covering third-party companies(eg system development companies operation andmaintenance outsourcing parties and blockchain technol-ogy providers) as well as nongovernmental organizations(eg chambers of commerce and social groups) Based onthe existing research results the present study analyses anddesigns the operation organization structure of the smartgovernment collaborative governance model with block-chain technology (see Figure 6)

Smart government coordinated governance

goals

Local government

Industry and commerce department

Judicial department

Tax department

Civil administration

department

Personal user

Enterprise

Other organizations

helliphellip

helliphellip

1Optimized public management structure from pyramid to flat structure2Enhance the credibility of the government establish a good image3Improve public decision-making ability and increase social benefits4Realize cross-departmental and cross-regional joint utilization of government affairs data promote diversified equal participation and win-win cooperation

1Improve business handling efficiency2Reduce the loss of information distortion in massive data collection and processing3Improve the precision level of public affairs services4Reduce system security risks

1Improve production service and life convenience2Personalization service revenue3Run once at most government service experience4Security of privacy information

Functional departments

End users

Figure 4 e goal of each stakeholder in the smart government collaborative governance model with blockchain technology

6 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

4 Assumptions and Construction of theEvolutionary Game Model

41 Basic Assumptions is study assumes that the strate-gies of functional departments are Positive Negative estrategies of local government are Strict supervision Loose

supervision while those of end users are Use Nonuse xy and z respectively denote the probability of functionaldepartmentsrsquo choice of blockchain + government servicestechnology local government supervision and end usersrsquouse smart government platform In correspondence 1-x 1-yand 1-z represent that the probability that functional

Revenue from smart government operations

Including operating platformcomprehensive revenue and user

use revenue

Direct benefits

Potential benefits

Base income

Performance gains

Rewards and punishments

earnings

Policy benefit

Including performance income from actively completing business transactions

additional income from supervisionand regulation violations

Including improve the efficiency of public affairs and enhance the

credibility of the benefits

Including precision service level flat management structure trust confirmationand reduce the loss of privacy information

disclosure etc

Figure 5 Analysis of the operational income of smart government projects based on blockchain technology

Smart government project

Local government Functional departments

Society Enterprises and other organizations

Development operation and maintenance

company

Block chain technology provider

Integrated business dockingand business handling

Smart government project development and operation and maintenance contract performance

Smart government business function demand collection

System security

Technical service contract performance

Data security

Technical feedback

Operation process supervision and management

Business handling requirements

Business handling and process management

Technical services

Consultation requestConsultation

request

Technical services

Technical support

Data information

resources

Technical support

Operation and

maintenance requirements

Improved public service

efficiency and

credibility

Accurate service

capability improvement

and trust confirmation

Figure 6 Framework diagram of the collaborative governance organization structure of smart government projects with blockchaintechnology

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 7

departments do not choose ldquoblockchain + government ser-vicesrdquo technology that the local government does loosesupervision and that end users do not use smart governmentplatform respectively

C4 refers to the cost paid by the functional departmentswhen they do not choose blockchain + government servicestechnology strategies I2 and βS2 respectively represent thebenefit increase that the functional departments can obtainby drawing upon blockchain + government services tech-nology C3 represents the cost of functional departmentswhen they comply with blockchain + government servicestechnology strategy

C2 denotes cost paid by the local government whenthey do not choose strict supervision C1 represents costpaid by the local government when they choose strictsupervision Under functional departments choosingnegative strategy A1 and αS1 respectively represent thebenefit increase of the government when the governmentfollows the ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategies Under end userschoosing use strategy P1 represent punishments paid bythe government when the government adopts the ldquoLoosesupervisionrdquo strategy

C5 represents cost paid by the end users when they donot exploit smart government platform I3 denotes the utilityincrease of the end users when they follow smart govern-ment platform When local governments select ldquoLoose su-pervisionrdquo strategies the end users can suffer P1 from a lossof privacy

Under blockchain + government services technology thecoefficient of improving the precision service level for thefunctional departments is β when they follow positivestrategies e coefficient of optimizing the flat managementefficiency of the public management structure for the localgovernment is α when they select strict supervision strate-gies e coefficient of empowering trust for the end users isc when they comply with strategies According to the actualsituation we suppose that 0 leα β c le1 e correspondingparameters are listed in Table 1

42 Model Construction Based on the mentioned modelassumptions the present study builds a three-party payoffmatrix of functional departments local government andend users e first second and third functions representthe functional departmentsrsquo payoff the payoff of localgovernment and the payoff of end users respectively especific form of the payoff matrix of each party is listed inTable 2

4219e Construction of the Expected Return Function of AllParties(1) Revenue Analysis of Functional Departments Accordingto the return matrix listed in Table 2 the benefits of positivestrategy and negative strategy employed by functional de-partments are the following equations respectively

Ex yz I2 minus C3 + βS2( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C3( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

I2 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yzβS2

(1)

E1minus x yz I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

I2 minus C4 minus yP4

(2)

Average revenue of functional department is as follows

E xEx +(1 minus x)E1minus x (3)

(2) Revenue Analysis of Local Government e fitness oflocal government that adopt strict supervision strategy andloose supervision strategy is written as follows

Uy xz I1 minus C1 + αS1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I1 minus C2( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

(4)

U1minus y xz I1 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I2 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I2 minus C2( 1113857

I1 minus C2 minus zP1

(5)

Average revenue of local government is as follows

U yUy +(1 minus y)U1minus y (6)

(3) Revenue Analysis of End Users e fitness of end usersthat adopt use strategy and nonuse strategy is expressed asfollows

Vz xy I3 minus cS3( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) I3 minus P3( 1113857 + y(1 minus x)I3

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I3 minus P3( 1113857 I3 +(y minus 1)P3 + xycS3(7)

V1minus z xy minus C5( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 + y(1 minus x) minus C5( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 minus C5(8)

Average revenue of end user is as follows

V zVz +(1 minus z)V1minus z (9)

422 9e Replication Dynamic Equation of 9ree-PartyEvolutionary Game(1) Replication Dynamic Equation of Functional Depart-ments According to equations (1)ndash(3) the replication dy-namic equation of functional departments adopting theldquoPositiverdquo strategy is defined as follows

8 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

F(x) dx

dt x Ex minus E( 1113857 x(1 minus x) Ex minus E1minus x( 1113857

x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(10)

(2) Replication Dynamic Equation of Local GovernmentAccording to equations (4)ndash(6) the replication dynamicequation of ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategy adopted by localgovernment is as follows

F(y) dy

dt y Uy minus U1113872 1113873 y(1 minus y) Uy minus U1minus y1113872 1113873

y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(11)

(3) Replication Dynamic Equation of End Users According

to equations (7)ndash(9) the replication dynamic equation ofldquoUserdquo strategy adopted by end user is expressed as follows

F(z) dz

dt z Vz minus V1minus z( 1113857

z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

(12)

43 Model Analysis

431 Evolution Path and Stability Analysis of 9ree-PartyAgent Strategy In accordance with the stability theorem ofdifferential equation the stable point of the replicationdynamic equation should be located at the zero point wherethe first derivative is less than zero ie it should be writtenas follows

d(F(x))

dxlt 0 | F(x) 0 x isin [0 1] (13)

Table 1 Main parameters and their meaning

Game player Sign Variable

Functionaldepartment

I2 Performance benefits of smart government platform business processingC3 Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing

C4Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processing

expenditureP4 When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortionΒ Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departmentsS2 Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departmentsP2 Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses

Local government

I1 Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operationC1 e cost of strict supervisionC2 e cost of loose supervision

P1When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages the

governmentrsquos credibility

A1When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments are

foundA Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public management structureS1 Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public management structure

End user

I3 e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platformC5 Still choose the total cost of business hall processingP3 When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use the platformΓ e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology

S3Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determine the

benefits of rights

Table 2 Payment matrix of functional departments local governments and end users

Functional departmentPositive (x) Negative (1-x)

End userUse (z) Nonuse (1-z) Use (z) Nonuse (1-z)

Local government

Strict supervision (y)I1 minus C1 + αS1 I1 minus C1 I1 minus C1 +A1 I1 minus C1 +A1I2 minus C3 + βS2 I2 minus C3 I2 minus C4 minus P4 I2 minus C4 minus P4I3 + cS3 minus C5 I3 minus C5

Loose supervision (1-y)I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2 I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C4 I2 minus C2I3 minus P3 minus C5 I3 minus P3 minus C5

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 9

Subsequently the evolution and stability strategies of thethree main agents of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users can be discussed

(1) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Functional Depart-mentse first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with positive strategy for x can be determined byequation (10)

zF(x)

zx (1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(14)

If we set

Πx C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (15)

and from Πx 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P2 + C3 minus C4

P2 + P4 + zβS2 (16)

en we have Conclusion 1 enun_Conclusion_1

Conclusion 1 When Πx gt 0 the positive strategy of func-tional departments is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πx lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Furthermorethe probability of x increases while the probability of y and zis elevated

Theorem 1 Πx 0 is the dividing line of the stable state offunctional departments (see Figure 7(a)) According to thestability theorem of the differential equation whenΠx gt 0 hasF(x)prime gt 0 F(x)

prime lt 0 it indicates the stable state of positivestrategy of functional departments while the negative strategyis unstable (see Figure 7(b)) Likewise when Πx lt 0 hasF(x)prime(0)lt 0 F(x)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the negative strategyof the functional departments is in a stable state while thepositive strategy is unstable (see Figure 7(c))

When ygt λy (F(x)dx)|x1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 1In other words functional departments are inclined to followa positive strategy under the probability of y higher than λy

When ylt λy (F(x)dx)|x0lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 0In other words functional departments tend to select anegative strategy when the probability of y is lower than λyLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and x

As revealed from the results the decision-makingbehaviour of functional departments is affected by nu-merous factors According to the formula the positivedecision (x) of functional departments increases with theincrease in local governmentsrsquo strict supervision strategy(y) and end user use strategy (z) Besides the smaller thedifference between the cost expenditure of optimizingsmart government business by positively using blockchaintechnology and the cost expenditure of negatively usingblockchain technology the higher the distortion loss ofmass data collection and processing attributed to not

using blockchain technology and the higher the systemsecurity problem and the precision service incomebrought by blockchain technology when local govern-ments are lax in supervision the higher the possibility forfunctional departments will choose the positive strategy

(2) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Local Governmente first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with strict supervision strategy for y can be ob-tained according to equation (11)

zF(y)

zy (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(17)

If

Πy C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + zxαS1 (18)

and from Πy 0 the following equation is yielded

λx C1 minus C2 minus A1 minus zP1

zαS1 minus A1 (19)

en we have Conclusion 2 enun_Conclusion_2

Conclusion 2 When Πy gt 0 the strict supervision strategyof local government is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πy lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Moreover theprobability of y increases while the probability of x and z iselevated

Theorem 2 Πy 0 is the boundary line of the stable state oflocal government (see Figure 8(a)) According to the stabilitytheorem of the differential equation when Πy gt 0 hasF(y)prime (0)gt 0 F(y)

prime (1)lt 0 it indicates that the local government isin a stable state when strict supervision strategy is adopted whilethe loose supervision strategy is unstable (see Figure 8(b))Likewise when Πy lt 0 has F(y)

prime(0)lt 0 F(y)prime(1)gt 0 this indi-

cates that local government is in a stable state when it choose loosesupervision strategy while strict supervision strategy is unstable(see Figure 8(c))

When xgt λx(dF(y)dy)|y1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the local government is y 1 Inother words local government tends to select a strict su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is higher than λx

When xlt λx (dF(y)dy)|y0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the local government is y 0 Inother words local government tends to select a loose su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is lower than λxLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and y

As revealed from the analysis results the decision-making behaviour of the local government is affected bymany factorse formula shows that the local governmentrsquosstrict supervision (y) and decision-making will increase withthe increase in the positive strategy (x) of the functionaldepartment and the end user strategy (z) Besides thesmaller the difference between the cost of strict supervision

10 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

by local governments and the cost of lax supervision thegreater the extra benefit from the irregularities of functionaldepartments under strict supervision e risk of data se-curity attributed to government neglect of supervision

damages the credibility of the government and the increaseof the income from the flat management of functional de-partments actively using blockchain technology to optimizethe public management structure which will directly affect

x

ζ6 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1(0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)Sx

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)ζ5 (0 1 0)

Sx

(c)

Figure 7 Functional department stability evolution phase diagram

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (011)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(c)

Figure 8 Phase diagram of local government stability evolution

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 11

the improvement of the willingness of local governments tomake final strict supervision decisions

(3) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of End Users e firstpartial derivative of the replication dynamic equation withstrict supervision strategy for y can be obtained according toequation (12)

zF(z)

zz (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (20)

If we set

Πz I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (21)

and from Πz 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P3 minus C5 minus I3

P3 + xcS3 (22)

en we have Conclusion 3enun_Conclusion_3

Conclusion 3 When Πz gt 0 the use strategy of end users isthe evolutionary stability strategy when Πz lt 0 the nonusestrategy of end users is an evolutionary stability strategyMoreover the probability of z increases while the probabilityof x and y increases

Theorem 3 Πz 0 is the dividing line of end usersrsquo stable state(see Figure 9(a)) Under the stability theorem of the differentialequation when Πz gt 0 has F(z)

prime(0)gt 0 F(z)prime(1)lt 0 it indicates

that end users use the smart government platform in a stable state(see Figure 9(b)) Likewise when Πz lt 0 hasF(z)prime(0)lt 0 F(z)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the end user does notuse the strategy in a stable state but the use strategy is unstable(see Figure 9(c))

When ygt λy (dF(z)dz)|z1lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 1 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a use strategy whenthe probability of y is higher than λy

When ylt λy (dF(z)dz)|z0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 0 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a nonuse strategywhen the probability of y is lower than λy Likewise we canprove the relationship between x and z

As suggested from the analysis results for the end usersit can be seen from the formula that the use of decision (z)increases with the increase in positive strategy (x) offunctional departments and strict supervision strategy (y) oflocal government e greater the comprehensive incomeand the total cost when not in use the greater the creditconfirmation income and privacy risk loss obtained by theuser when using the blockchain technology and the higherthe possibility of end users choosing the use strategy

432 Stability Analysis of Evolution Strategy under theAction of 9ree Parties Set P(x y z) (dxdt)G(x y z) (dydt) and Q(x y z) (dzdt) then equa-tions (10)ndash(12) express the group dynamics of the evolution

system of functional departments local government and endusers as written in the following equation

P(x y z) dx

dt x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

G(x y z) dy

dt y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

Q(x y z) dz

dt z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(23)

Set

H(E)

P(x y z)

G(x y z)

Q(x y z)

⎧⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎩ 0 (24)

and there are 12 equilibrium points for the system repli-cation dynamic equation However complying with theliterature [44] only 8 special equilibrium points should bediscussed for the replication dynamic system as follows

ξ1

00

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ2

10

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ3

11

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ4

11

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ5

01

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ6

01

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ7

00

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ8

10

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

(25)

e evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) for replicatingthe dynamic equation system is formulated based on thelocal stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix of the systemwith the method proposed by Friedman Moreover the

12 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Jacobian matrix of the system is obtained from equation (23)as follows

J

(1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)x P4 + P2 + zβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)xyβS2

y(1 minus y) zαS1 minus A1( 1113857 (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857 y(1 minus y) P1 + xαS1( 1113857

z(z minus 1)ycS3 z(z minus 1) P3 + xcS3( 1113857 (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

(26)

According to the replication dynamic equation system(13) the local equilibrium point is yielded as followsξ1(0 0 0) ξ2(1 0 0) ξ3(1 1 0) ξ4(1 1 1) ξ5(0 1 0)ξ6(0 1 1) ξ7(0 0 1) ξ8(1 0 1) By complying with Lya-punov stability theorem when all eigenvalues (λ) of theJacobian matrix satisfy λlt 0 the equilibrium point is theasymptotically stable at is the confluence When all ei-genvalues of the Jacobian matrix satisfy λgt 0 the equilib-rium point is unstable which is the source Furthermore forthe Jacobian matrix the eigenvalues (λ) mixed states Inother words some are positive while others are negativeen the equilibrium point also termed as the saddle pointis unstable First for the case where the equilibrium point isξ1(0 0 0) the Jacobian matrix is as follows

J1

C4 minus C3 minus P2 0 0

0 C2 minus C1 + A1 0

0 0 I3 + C5 minus P3

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (27)

It is therefore indicated that the eigenvalues of the Ja-cobian matrix are λ1 C4 minus C3 minus P2 λ2 C2 minus C1 + A1 andλ3 I3 + C5 minus P3 With the identical analogy the 8 equi-librium points are substituted into the Jacobian matrix (26)respectively and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

corresponding to the equilibrium points can be determinedrespectively (Table 3)

According to the mentioned analysis the evolutionarygame system has stability under certain conditions How-ever many parameters are accordingly involved and thecharacteristic value (λ) symbol is determined by the size ofthe mentioned parameter values Under the existing knownmathematical derivation method the stability of each of theNash equilibrium is determined and the evolutionary gamemodel cannot effectively lead to the reach steady stateequilibrium Accordingly this article further employs sys-tem dynamics to analyse the impact of various uncertainfactors on the evolution of the game and lays a basis forformulating relevant policies

5 System Dynamics Simulation Analysis

e above paragraphs analyzed the interaction of the threesubjects in the strategic choice and the influence of externalvariables on the stability of the evolutionary game oughsome conclusions have been drawn they are all analysesconducted from the perspective of a single subject lackingsystematic and comprehensive analysis from the perspectiveof three subjects In the 1950s Fletcher of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology initially adopted the theory of

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(b)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(c)

Figure 9 End user stability evolution phase diagram

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 13

management science and systems science and incorporatedcomputerized simulation technology into quantitative an-alyses to develop a system dynamics theory method It isprimarily adopted to study system problems with highnonlinearity as characterized by multivariate causal feed-back and complex time-varying

us to systematically and deeply analyse the strategicinteraction between different agents the present study usesthe system dynamics theory to build a dynamic model of anintelligent government collaborative governance systembased on blockchain technology and the simulation ofsystem dynamics with VENSIM PLE simulation software isemployed to analyse the evolution of the strategicinteraction

51 Based on the SD Model of ldquoBlockchain +GovernmentAffairs Servicerdquo in Beijing Since November 2019 BeijingMunicipal Government Service Bureau Beijing MunicipalScience and Technology Commission and BeijingMunicipalBureau of Economy and Information Technology have ledthe implementation of the Action Plan on the application ofblockchain in the field of Government Services e BeijingMunicipal Bureau of Commerce and other departments asthe responsible units have vigorously propelled the appli-cation construction of blockchain in government services inthe four pilot areas of the city By August 2020 140 gov-ernment affairs services have been connected in Beijing 253business affairs and 65 human affairs have been settledonline and 100000 pieces of administrative materials can besimplified throughout the year ere have been 121 en-terprises having used the blockchain system to query andverify various functions for nearly 7800 times e reporteddata have been down-regulated by 80 and the averagematerial has decreased by 40

is study combines the specific application scenarios ofblockchain pilots in Haidian Xicheng Chaoyang Shunyiand other blockchain pilots in the ldquoBlue Book on the Ap-plication of Blockchain in Municipal Services in Beijing(First Edition)rdquo issued by the Beijing Municipal Adminis-tration in July 2020 Vensim PLE software is employed tobuild the system dynamics model of the evolutionary gamebetween functional departments local governments andend users (see Figure 10)

52 Initial SimulationAnalysis According to the applicationpractice of the blockchain in the government service field of

Beijing the initial value of the model is assumed as followsINITIAL TIME 0 FINAL TIME 20 TIME-STEP 00625 and Units for Time Month and the 16external variables are assigned as shown in Table 4

Since the three participating agents of functionaldepartments local governments and end users have twokinds of strategy choices 0 and 1 this constitutes 8strategy combinations namely (0 0 0) (0 0 1) (0 1 0)(1 0 0) (1 1 0) (1 0 1) (0 1 1) and (1 1 1) When theinitial states of the three parties are pure strategies thesystem is in equilibrium At this time no one party iswilling to actively change the existing strategies and thementioned eight strategy combinations will become theequilibrium state of the system However this state is notstable as long as there is a small change in one or moresubjects in the system and the system will lose theequilibrium state We take the combination of (0 0 1)strategy as an example to illustrate and its evolutionresults are shown in Figure 11(a) is figure indicates thatthe initial probabilities of the functional departmentschoosing the positive strategy and the local governmentchoosing the strict supervision strategy are very low (both001) in the game process when the participants find thatthere are more profitable strategy choices in the system itwill adjust the original strategy and through the con-tinuous learning and imitating between the subjects thesystem can lastly reach a novel equilibrium state

e simulation of 8 pure strategy combinations issummarized as follows①No matter the positive strategy ofthe functional departments starts from 0 to 001 or from 1 to099 and its strategy choice will eventually reach an equi-librium state at 1 It is therefore revealed that in smartgovernment projects functional departments actively drawupon the smart government platform under the blockchaintechnology to complete the business which is the optimalchoice Only the active use of blockchain technology tooptimize the existing platform workflow can ensure itsmaximum revenue ② Under functional departmentsadopting positive strategies if the local government adopts astrategy of loose supervision no matter whether the endusers change from 0 or 1 the final strategy is 1 ie (1 0 0)and (1 0 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations refers to (1 0 1) (see Figure 11(b)) If the localgovernment carries out strict regulation the end users willmutate from 0 or 1 and the final strategy will be 1 namely(1 1 0) and (1 1 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations is (1 1 1) (see Figure 11(c))

Table 3 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

Equilibrium point λ1 λ2 λ3ζ1 (0 0 0) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ2 (1 0 0) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ3 (1 1 0) minus (C4minus C3 + P4) minus (C2minus C1) I3 +C5 + cS3ζ4 (1 1 1) minus (C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2) minus (C2minus C1 +P1 + αS1) minus (I3 +C5 + cS3)ζ5 (0 1 0) C4minus C3 +P4 minus (C2minus C1 +A1) I3 +C5ζ6 (0 1 1) C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2 minus (C2minus C1 +A1 +P1) minus (I3 +C5)ζ7 (0 0 1) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 +P1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)ζ8 (1 0 1) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 + P1 + αS1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)

14 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Moreover it is revealed that the end users have a positiveattitude towards the use of smart government affairs andthey are willing to use the platform to complete businesstransactions As suggested from the analysis through theevolutionary game process of ldquomutation-adjustment-equi-libriumrdquo of the three agents of the game the system willeventually reach the equilibrium state of (1 1 1)

53 SimulationAnalysis of the Impact of ExternalVariables onStrategy Based on the above discussion the value of eachparameter determines whether each strategy combination isthe equilibrium point to make the system stable state andthe impact of external variables on the strategy selection ofthe game subject is analysede following continues to take(0 0 1) strategy combination as an example to discuss

531 Factors of Functional Departmentsrsquo Strategy ChoiceIn the policy combination of (0 0 1) the initial state offunctional departments refers to a negative strategy It isassumed that the functional departments start from theprobability of 001 As indicated from the simulation amongthe 16 external variables the cost of a positive strategy C3the cost of a negative strategy C4 revenue from precisionservices S2 loss of system security risk P2 loss of informationdistortion attributed to mass data collection and processingP4 and the mentioned five external variables will impact thestrategic choice of functional departments In particular

accurate service degree coefficient β should be stressedwhich is the use of blockchain technology to enhance theserviceability of functional departments By regulating thevalue of β the precision income will be affected Under otherinitial values unchanged the evolution result of strategychoice probability of functional departments is analysed (seeFigure 12)

As revealed from the comparison of Figures 12(b) 12(c)and 12(e) C4 P2 and P4 similarly impact the evolution trendof positive strategy choice in functional departments ehigher the cost for functional departments to negativelyexploit blockchain technology the smaller the loss of systemsecurity risk when using blockchain technology and thegreater the loss of information distortion attributed to massdata collection and processing when not using blockchaintechnology the more functional departments will be in-clined to comply with the strategy of positively usingblockchain technology In addition according to thesimulation analysis C3 complexly impacts the strategyselection of functional departments Under the extremelylarge C3 value functional departments are inclined to useblockchain technology negatively in particular when thevalue is smaller the faster the functional departments willreach the stable state of positive strategy It is also revealedthat when functional departments positively exploitblockchain technology to complete smart governmentbusiness the cost acts as a critical factor when the cost istoo high it will impact the choice of their strategies

Positive strategy probabilityof functional departments xChanging rate of

functionaldepartments R(x)t

Positive and negativestrategy expected income

difference Ex-Expected benefits of

functional departmentspositive strategy Ex

Expected benefits offunctional departmentsnegative strategy E(1-x)

Loss of systemsecurity risk P2

The cost of a positivestrategy C3

Revenue fromprecision services S2

Smart government onenet to run performance

gains I2

The cost of anegative strategy C4

Loss of information distortioncaused by mass data collection

and processing P4

Use strategyprobability of end

users z

End users use strategyand nonuse strategy of

expected incomedifference Vz-

The expected revenueof users using the

platform VzThe expected revenueof uesrs nonusing the

platform V(1-z)

The cost of nonusestrategy C5

Privacy securityrisk loss P3

Revenue frompersonalized

customizationservices I3

Strict supervisionprobability of local

government y Changing rate of localgovernment R(y)t

Strict regulation and loosesupervision of expectedincome difference Uy-

Expected benefits of localgovernmentrsquos loosesupervision U(1-y)

Expected benefits oflocal governments strict

sypervision Uy

Find out the illegal operationand get extra income A1

The cost of the strictsupervision C1

Flating managementearnings S1

Operating income of the smartgovernmentrsquos One net to run

platform I1

The cost of the loosesupervision C2

Data security riskscause the loss of

governmentcredibility P1

β

α

γ

The user gets thebenefit of the trust

confirmation S3

Changing rate of endusers R(z)t

Figure 10 System dynamics (SD) model of functional department local government and end user evolutionary game system

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 15

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

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[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 4: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

engagement promoted by a local authority to codesign thecity vision with multiple actors (eg politicians publicmanagers consultants citizens and other external stake-holders) ey consider that the players in the game arecompletely rational and the policy is statically implemented[33] However behavioural psychology reveals that deci-sion-makers are short-sighted and heterogeneous and allparties are inclined to bounded rationality [34] In practiceChinarsquos e-government service development remains in theinitial stage for the immaturity in core technologies im-perfect infrastructure and cognition of participants [35] Inonline government services local governments functionaldepartments and end users interact dynamically e threeparties should share their own experiences and modify theirstrategies repeatedly by keeping abreast with external en-vironment changes Accordingly the premise of boundedrationality and dynamic evolution of the evolutionary gametheory comparatively abides by the behaviour rules anddecision-making characteristics of local governmentsfunctional departments and end users For instance Zhangand Li studied multiagent collaborative governance fortargeted poverty alleviation based on the evolutionary gameanalysis framework [36] ey built a three-agent evolu-tionary game model of local governments social organi-zations and poor groups and they investigated the impact oftheir behaviour decisions on multiagent cooperative gov-ernance of targeted poverty alleviation However the dis-cussion on the stability of the cooperative governance systemwas ignored Zhang et al [37] Xu et al [38] and Chen et al[39] initially carried out evolutionary game modelling tostudy the coordinated governance of haze by heterogeneousgovernments heavy metal pollution control in soil and therelationship among government the enterprise and thepublic in environmental governance from the perspective ofstakeholdersrsquo strategy selection Subsequently they verifiedgame models and theoretical results based on numericalexamples case studies and empirical analysis respectivelyWan and Qie [40] and Hou and Li [41] investigated thetripartite game between the government smart financialpoverty alleviation ecosystem and the collaborative inno-vation system of IoT As impacted by the different researchperspectives and points of departure the existing studiesfailed to consider the optimization effect of emergingtechnologies (eg artificial intelligence big data cloudcomputing and blockchain) on smart platform systems aswell as the interactive decision-making behaviour andevolutionary stable state of intelligent platform systemparticipants under the novel technology us the realiza-tion of interagent cooperative behaviour and the impact ofexternal factors on interagent cooperative behaviour arelargely ignored In practice the lack of theoretical researchcauses weak guidance To effectively promote the intelligentplatform system empowered by emerging technology andform the situation of multisubject collaborative participa-tion further research is required in China

As the current smart platform systems are plagued bysystem vulnerabilities privacy disclosure trust crisis andothers a modified smart government platform architectureis developed here under the blockchain technology and uses

the replicator dynamic analysis method to model the de-cision-making of the three main participants of smartgovernment is study explores how the dynamic inter-action between local governments functional departmentsand end users impacts the behaviour of participants whiledetermining the main factors of the multiagent collaborativegovernance in the complex system of ldquoblockchain + smartgovernmentrdquo which can effectively guide decision-makingof local governments functional departments and endusers

e differences between this study and the relevantliterature are presented below is study (1) attempts toexplore the architecture of a smart government platformwith blockchain technology (2) analyses the major stake-holders under this framework and considers the evolu-tionary game situation of stakeholders under the conditionof bounded rationality (3) obtains the stable state and (4)draws the key factors for the collaborative governance ofsmart government with blockchain technology

3 Collaborative Governance Model of SmartGovernment with Blockchain Technology

31 Basic Ideas e smart government refers to the resourceintegration and system integration between governmentinternal business systems and external (parallelsubordinate)functional departments It seeks to achieve the reprovi-sioning and integration of government processes and re-sources to provide convenient high-quality and low-costone-stop services to the public and enterprises to link thecross-functional departments and system integration tocomplete approval in parallel to carry out the transparentclean and efficient operation of the online administrativemanagement system and to build a through service bus thatcomprises process engine management intranet portalextranet business and thematic database and derivativecentral database [42] However the ldquoblockchain technology-based collaborative governance model for smart governmentaffairsrdquo indicates that to solve the obstacles and difficultiesfacing existing smart government affairs the original smartgovernment affairs technical framework is revised by in-troducing blockchain technology (see Figure 3) Blockchaintechnology features (eg ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure ldquodetrustrdquostructure and ldquoprecisionrdquo mechanism) can effectively tackledown various obstacles facing smart government affairsis architecture corresponds to the blockchain 6-tierstructure to the ISO7-tier structure and modifies it Givenrelational data (eg Oracle) and various algorithm tech-nologies the consensus layer and the incentive layer are thecore service layers of the blockchain overlaying end userservice business function scenarios to form an efficient safeand credible government service system e tamper-proofand asymmetric encryption technology of blockchain canensure the security and privacy of data storage As ensuredby peer-to-peer equality protocol and peer-to-peer trans-mission technology the information in the system can beexchanged recognized and transmitted in an unimpededmanner Various efficient algorithms to achieve interactionprocess fast short response time and strong fault tolerance

4 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

are conducive to value themutual recognition and behaviourconsensus Technology features (eg decentralizationtraceability editability security and reliability) ensure thatmultiple governance subjects can forge a multiple collabo-rative governance situation [43] Accordingly this modelsignificantly improves the security convenience coordi-nation and intelligence of the original system thereby in-creasing social capital and economic benefits

32 Stakeholder Analysis For all stakeholders in the col-laborative governance model of smart government withblockchain technology the collaborative governance bodiesinvolved include functional departments local govern-ments and end users e starting point of each subject isdifferent so its basic idea of participating in smart gov-ernment affairs is based on different decision-making

behaviours attributed to different positions and perspectivesof all parties in the process of platform operation Accordingto Figure 4 from the perspective of the goals of collaborativegovernance entities the goals of local government depart-ments functional gates and end users are identical eyoverall use blockchain technology to obtain better smartgovernment operations and use effects and they achievemore a considerable number of total benefits is alsocomplies with the behaviour of ldquorational peoplerdquo from theperspective of economics ie the pursuit of self-interestmaximization For each subject the model refers to a Paretoimprovement process e subjects focus is different be-cause its goal is to maximize self-interests To be specificlocal governments are concerned with whether the benefitsof social public services can be maximized functional de-partments stress whether their business service levels andperformance gains are maximized and end users are more

Block data

Hash Merkletree

SQL SQL

Physical layer

Data layer

Network layer

Blockchain node Blockchain node

P2P NETWORK

Spread Test and verify

Consensus layer

Incentive layer

Blockchain core services

PosPoW Paxos Dpos Raft Vrr Others

Verification of workloadVerification of interests

and rightsVerification of equity

authorization

Approval system Tax system Civil administrationsystem

Social securitysystem Real estate system

Incentivescheme

Allocation mechanism

Contract layer

Script code Algorithm mechanism Smart contract

Handling guideline

Work process

Work progress

Work result

Query function Business function Consulting function Management function

Personal center Smart sensor

Online service Smart swipe

Common business

Identification

Smart QampADrive

integration

Drive integration

Smart dialogue

Domain corpusUnified interface

Web Access System management

Customer management Ability

performance

Operational management

Operation monitor

Auto updateStatistical

analysis

Consumables management

Mobile monitor

Function delivery

Functional certification

Online comprehensive inquiry system

Convenience service customized terminal

system

Automatic terminal consulting service system

Automatic service terminal background management

system

Application layer

Enterprise user integrated business docking

Personal user terminal interface operation

Comprehensive supervision and management of blockchain technology

CComprehensive operation management for administrators

Cloud server Operating system Cluster Network

Asymmetric encryption

Chain structure

Digital signature

Figure 3 Modified smart government platform architecture with blockchain technology

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 5

concerned with maximizing the overall benefits (eg ease ofuse security and satisfaction) However through contin-uous adjustment and optimization under the long-termcontractual relationship of the parties the respective ad-vantages can be exploited to lastly achieve the win-wincooperation of all parties and achieve the maximization ofself-interest under the smart government coordinatedgovernance with blockchain technology

33 Profit Mechanism In the application of blockchaintechnology for constructing smart government affairsprojects only when the total revenue of system operation isgreater than the total cost of construction can the project beimplemented us to ensure the smooth operation andpromotion of blockchain-based smart government projects thefuture direct income and potential income should be balancedand coordinated after the operation to ensure the realization ofldquoPareto optimalityrdquo between the incomes of all parties par-ticipating in collaborative governance as well as mobilize theenthusiasm of all subjects maximally Combined with theadvantages of blockchain technology the present study makes

an in-depth analysis of the economic benefits in the collabo-rative governance model of smart government based onblockchain technology as shown in Figure 5

34 Collaborative Governance Organizational Structureough in the collaborative governance model of smartgovernment with blockchain technology the stakeholdersinvolved mainly include functional departments localgovernments and end users However the operation ofsmart government projects is highly technical which con-tinues to operate exhibits strong externalities and involvesnumerous participants the relationship between them isvery sophisticated as well covering third-party companies(eg system development companies operation andmaintenance outsourcing parties and blockchain technol-ogy providers) as well as nongovernmental organizations(eg chambers of commerce and social groups) Based onthe existing research results the present study analyses anddesigns the operation organization structure of the smartgovernment collaborative governance model with block-chain technology (see Figure 6)

Smart government coordinated governance

goals

Local government

Industry and commerce department

Judicial department

Tax department

Civil administration

department

Personal user

Enterprise

Other organizations

helliphellip

helliphellip

1Optimized public management structure from pyramid to flat structure2Enhance the credibility of the government establish a good image3Improve public decision-making ability and increase social benefits4Realize cross-departmental and cross-regional joint utilization of government affairs data promote diversified equal participation and win-win cooperation

1Improve business handling efficiency2Reduce the loss of information distortion in massive data collection and processing3Improve the precision level of public affairs services4Reduce system security risks

1Improve production service and life convenience2Personalization service revenue3Run once at most government service experience4Security of privacy information

Functional departments

End users

Figure 4 e goal of each stakeholder in the smart government collaborative governance model with blockchain technology

6 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

4 Assumptions and Construction of theEvolutionary Game Model

41 Basic Assumptions is study assumes that the strate-gies of functional departments are Positive Negative estrategies of local government are Strict supervision Loose

supervision while those of end users are Use Nonuse xy and z respectively denote the probability of functionaldepartmentsrsquo choice of blockchain + government servicestechnology local government supervision and end usersrsquouse smart government platform In correspondence 1-x 1-yand 1-z represent that the probability that functional

Revenue from smart government operations

Including operating platformcomprehensive revenue and user

use revenue

Direct benefits

Potential benefits

Base income

Performance gains

Rewards and punishments

earnings

Policy benefit

Including performance income from actively completing business transactions

additional income from supervisionand regulation violations

Including improve the efficiency of public affairs and enhance the

credibility of the benefits

Including precision service level flat management structure trust confirmationand reduce the loss of privacy information

disclosure etc

Figure 5 Analysis of the operational income of smart government projects based on blockchain technology

Smart government project

Local government Functional departments

Society Enterprises and other organizations

Development operation and maintenance

company

Block chain technology provider

Integrated business dockingand business handling

Smart government project development and operation and maintenance contract performance

Smart government business function demand collection

System security

Technical service contract performance

Data security

Technical feedback

Operation process supervision and management

Business handling requirements

Business handling and process management

Technical services

Consultation requestConsultation

request

Technical services

Technical support

Data information

resources

Technical support

Operation and

maintenance requirements

Improved public service

efficiency and

credibility

Accurate service

capability improvement

and trust confirmation

Figure 6 Framework diagram of the collaborative governance organization structure of smart government projects with blockchaintechnology

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 7

departments do not choose ldquoblockchain + government ser-vicesrdquo technology that the local government does loosesupervision and that end users do not use smart governmentplatform respectively

C4 refers to the cost paid by the functional departmentswhen they do not choose blockchain + government servicestechnology strategies I2 and βS2 respectively represent thebenefit increase that the functional departments can obtainby drawing upon blockchain + government services tech-nology C3 represents the cost of functional departmentswhen they comply with blockchain + government servicestechnology strategy

C2 denotes cost paid by the local government whenthey do not choose strict supervision C1 represents costpaid by the local government when they choose strictsupervision Under functional departments choosingnegative strategy A1 and αS1 respectively represent thebenefit increase of the government when the governmentfollows the ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategies Under end userschoosing use strategy P1 represent punishments paid bythe government when the government adopts the ldquoLoosesupervisionrdquo strategy

C5 represents cost paid by the end users when they donot exploit smart government platform I3 denotes the utilityincrease of the end users when they follow smart govern-ment platform When local governments select ldquoLoose su-pervisionrdquo strategies the end users can suffer P1 from a lossof privacy

Under blockchain + government services technology thecoefficient of improving the precision service level for thefunctional departments is β when they follow positivestrategies e coefficient of optimizing the flat managementefficiency of the public management structure for the localgovernment is α when they select strict supervision strate-gies e coefficient of empowering trust for the end users isc when they comply with strategies According to the actualsituation we suppose that 0 leα β c le1 e correspondingparameters are listed in Table 1

42 Model Construction Based on the mentioned modelassumptions the present study builds a three-party payoffmatrix of functional departments local government andend users e first second and third functions representthe functional departmentsrsquo payoff the payoff of localgovernment and the payoff of end users respectively especific form of the payoff matrix of each party is listed inTable 2

4219e Construction of the Expected Return Function of AllParties(1) Revenue Analysis of Functional Departments Accordingto the return matrix listed in Table 2 the benefits of positivestrategy and negative strategy employed by functional de-partments are the following equations respectively

Ex yz I2 minus C3 + βS2( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C3( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

I2 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yzβS2

(1)

E1minus x yz I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

I2 minus C4 minus yP4

(2)

Average revenue of functional department is as follows

E xEx +(1 minus x)E1minus x (3)

(2) Revenue Analysis of Local Government e fitness oflocal government that adopt strict supervision strategy andloose supervision strategy is written as follows

Uy xz I1 minus C1 + αS1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I1 minus C2( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

(4)

U1minus y xz I1 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I2 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I2 minus C2( 1113857

I1 minus C2 minus zP1

(5)

Average revenue of local government is as follows

U yUy +(1 minus y)U1minus y (6)

(3) Revenue Analysis of End Users e fitness of end usersthat adopt use strategy and nonuse strategy is expressed asfollows

Vz xy I3 minus cS3( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) I3 minus P3( 1113857 + y(1 minus x)I3

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I3 minus P3( 1113857 I3 +(y minus 1)P3 + xycS3(7)

V1minus z xy minus C5( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 + y(1 minus x) minus C5( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 minus C5(8)

Average revenue of end user is as follows

V zVz +(1 minus z)V1minus z (9)

422 9e Replication Dynamic Equation of 9ree-PartyEvolutionary Game(1) Replication Dynamic Equation of Functional Depart-ments According to equations (1)ndash(3) the replication dy-namic equation of functional departments adopting theldquoPositiverdquo strategy is defined as follows

8 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

F(x) dx

dt x Ex minus E( 1113857 x(1 minus x) Ex minus E1minus x( 1113857

x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(10)

(2) Replication Dynamic Equation of Local GovernmentAccording to equations (4)ndash(6) the replication dynamicequation of ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategy adopted by localgovernment is as follows

F(y) dy

dt y Uy minus U1113872 1113873 y(1 minus y) Uy minus U1minus y1113872 1113873

y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(11)

(3) Replication Dynamic Equation of End Users According

to equations (7)ndash(9) the replication dynamic equation ofldquoUserdquo strategy adopted by end user is expressed as follows

F(z) dz

dt z Vz minus V1minus z( 1113857

z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

(12)

43 Model Analysis

431 Evolution Path and Stability Analysis of 9ree-PartyAgent Strategy In accordance with the stability theorem ofdifferential equation the stable point of the replicationdynamic equation should be located at the zero point wherethe first derivative is less than zero ie it should be writtenas follows

d(F(x))

dxlt 0 | F(x) 0 x isin [0 1] (13)

Table 1 Main parameters and their meaning

Game player Sign Variable

Functionaldepartment

I2 Performance benefits of smart government platform business processingC3 Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing

C4Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processing

expenditureP4 When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortionΒ Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departmentsS2 Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departmentsP2 Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses

Local government

I1 Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operationC1 e cost of strict supervisionC2 e cost of loose supervision

P1When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages the

governmentrsquos credibility

A1When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments are

foundA Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public management structureS1 Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public management structure

End user

I3 e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platformC5 Still choose the total cost of business hall processingP3 When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use the platformΓ e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology

S3Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determine the

benefits of rights

Table 2 Payment matrix of functional departments local governments and end users

Functional departmentPositive (x) Negative (1-x)

End userUse (z) Nonuse (1-z) Use (z) Nonuse (1-z)

Local government

Strict supervision (y)I1 minus C1 + αS1 I1 minus C1 I1 minus C1 +A1 I1 minus C1 +A1I2 minus C3 + βS2 I2 minus C3 I2 minus C4 minus P4 I2 minus C4 minus P4I3 + cS3 minus C5 I3 minus C5

Loose supervision (1-y)I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2 I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C4 I2 minus C2I3 minus P3 minus C5 I3 minus P3 minus C5

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 9

Subsequently the evolution and stability strategies of thethree main agents of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users can be discussed

(1) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Functional Depart-mentse first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with positive strategy for x can be determined byequation (10)

zF(x)

zx (1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(14)

If we set

Πx C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (15)

and from Πx 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P2 + C3 minus C4

P2 + P4 + zβS2 (16)

en we have Conclusion 1 enun_Conclusion_1

Conclusion 1 When Πx gt 0 the positive strategy of func-tional departments is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πx lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Furthermorethe probability of x increases while the probability of y and zis elevated

Theorem 1 Πx 0 is the dividing line of the stable state offunctional departments (see Figure 7(a)) According to thestability theorem of the differential equation whenΠx gt 0 hasF(x)prime gt 0 F(x)

prime lt 0 it indicates the stable state of positivestrategy of functional departments while the negative strategyis unstable (see Figure 7(b)) Likewise when Πx lt 0 hasF(x)prime(0)lt 0 F(x)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the negative strategyof the functional departments is in a stable state while thepositive strategy is unstable (see Figure 7(c))

When ygt λy (F(x)dx)|x1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 1In other words functional departments are inclined to followa positive strategy under the probability of y higher than λy

When ylt λy (F(x)dx)|x0lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 0In other words functional departments tend to select anegative strategy when the probability of y is lower than λyLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and x

As revealed from the results the decision-makingbehaviour of functional departments is affected by nu-merous factors According to the formula the positivedecision (x) of functional departments increases with theincrease in local governmentsrsquo strict supervision strategy(y) and end user use strategy (z) Besides the smaller thedifference between the cost expenditure of optimizingsmart government business by positively using blockchaintechnology and the cost expenditure of negatively usingblockchain technology the higher the distortion loss ofmass data collection and processing attributed to not

using blockchain technology and the higher the systemsecurity problem and the precision service incomebrought by blockchain technology when local govern-ments are lax in supervision the higher the possibility forfunctional departments will choose the positive strategy

(2) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Local Governmente first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with strict supervision strategy for y can be ob-tained according to equation (11)

zF(y)

zy (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(17)

If

Πy C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + zxαS1 (18)

and from Πy 0 the following equation is yielded

λx C1 minus C2 minus A1 minus zP1

zαS1 minus A1 (19)

en we have Conclusion 2 enun_Conclusion_2

Conclusion 2 When Πy gt 0 the strict supervision strategyof local government is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πy lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Moreover theprobability of y increases while the probability of x and z iselevated

Theorem 2 Πy 0 is the boundary line of the stable state oflocal government (see Figure 8(a)) According to the stabilitytheorem of the differential equation when Πy gt 0 hasF(y)prime (0)gt 0 F(y)

prime (1)lt 0 it indicates that the local government isin a stable state when strict supervision strategy is adopted whilethe loose supervision strategy is unstable (see Figure 8(b))Likewise when Πy lt 0 has F(y)

prime(0)lt 0 F(y)prime(1)gt 0 this indi-

cates that local government is in a stable state when it choose loosesupervision strategy while strict supervision strategy is unstable(see Figure 8(c))

When xgt λx(dF(y)dy)|y1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the local government is y 1 Inother words local government tends to select a strict su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is higher than λx

When xlt λx (dF(y)dy)|y0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the local government is y 0 Inother words local government tends to select a loose su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is lower than λxLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and y

As revealed from the analysis results the decision-making behaviour of the local government is affected bymany factorse formula shows that the local governmentrsquosstrict supervision (y) and decision-making will increase withthe increase in the positive strategy (x) of the functionaldepartment and the end user strategy (z) Besides thesmaller the difference between the cost of strict supervision

10 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

by local governments and the cost of lax supervision thegreater the extra benefit from the irregularities of functionaldepartments under strict supervision e risk of data se-curity attributed to government neglect of supervision

damages the credibility of the government and the increaseof the income from the flat management of functional de-partments actively using blockchain technology to optimizethe public management structure which will directly affect

x

ζ6 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1(0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)Sx

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)ζ5 (0 1 0)

Sx

(c)

Figure 7 Functional department stability evolution phase diagram

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (011)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(c)

Figure 8 Phase diagram of local government stability evolution

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 11

the improvement of the willingness of local governments tomake final strict supervision decisions

(3) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of End Users e firstpartial derivative of the replication dynamic equation withstrict supervision strategy for y can be obtained according toequation (12)

zF(z)

zz (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (20)

If we set

Πz I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (21)

and from Πz 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P3 minus C5 minus I3

P3 + xcS3 (22)

en we have Conclusion 3enun_Conclusion_3

Conclusion 3 When Πz gt 0 the use strategy of end users isthe evolutionary stability strategy when Πz lt 0 the nonusestrategy of end users is an evolutionary stability strategyMoreover the probability of z increases while the probabilityof x and y increases

Theorem 3 Πz 0 is the dividing line of end usersrsquo stable state(see Figure 9(a)) Under the stability theorem of the differentialequation when Πz gt 0 has F(z)

prime(0)gt 0 F(z)prime(1)lt 0 it indicates

that end users use the smart government platform in a stable state(see Figure 9(b)) Likewise when Πz lt 0 hasF(z)prime(0)lt 0 F(z)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the end user does notuse the strategy in a stable state but the use strategy is unstable(see Figure 9(c))

When ygt λy (dF(z)dz)|z1lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 1 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a use strategy whenthe probability of y is higher than λy

When ylt λy (dF(z)dz)|z0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 0 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a nonuse strategywhen the probability of y is lower than λy Likewise we canprove the relationship between x and z

As suggested from the analysis results for the end usersit can be seen from the formula that the use of decision (z)increases with the increase in positive strategy (x) offunctional departments and strict supervision strategy (y) oflocal government e greater the comprehensive incomeand the total cost when not in use the greater the creditconfirmation income and privacy risk loss obtained by theuser when using the blockchain technology and the higherthe possibility of end users choosing the use strategy

432 Stability Analysis of Evolution Strategy under theAction of 9ree Parties Set P(x y z) (dxdt)G(x y z) (dydt) and Q(x y z) (dzdt) then equa-tions (10)ndash(12) express the group dynamics of the evolution

system of functional departments local government and endusers as written in the following equation

P(x y z) dx

dt x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

G(x y z) dy

dt y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

Q(x y z) dz

dt z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(23)

Set

H(E)

P(x y z)

G(x y z)

Q(x y z)

⎧⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎩ 0 (24)

and there are 12 equilibrium points for the system repli-cation dynamic equation However complying with theliterature [44] only 8 special equilibrium points should bediscussed for the replication dynamic system as follows

ξ1

00

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ2

10

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ3

11

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ4

11

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ5

01

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ6

01

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ7

00

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ8

10

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

(25)

e evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) for replicatingthe dynamic equation system is formulated based on thelocal stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix of the systemwith the method proposed by Friedman Moreover the

12 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Jacobian matrix of the system is obtained from equation (23)as follows

J

(1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)x P4 + P2 + zβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)xyβS2

y(1 minus y) zαS1 minus A1( 1113857 (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857 y(1 minus y) P1 + xαS1( 1113857

z(z minus 1)ycS3 z(z minus 1) P3 + xcS3( 1113857 (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

(26)

According to the replication dynamic equation system(13) the local equilibrium point is yielded as followsξ1(0 0 0) ξ2(1 0 0) ξ3(1 1 0) ξ4(1 1 1) ξ5(0 1 0)ξ6(0 1 1) ξ7(0 0 1) ξ8(1 0 1) By complying with Lya-punov stability theorem when all eigenvalues (λ) of theJacobian matrix satisfy λlt 0 the equilibrium point is theasymptotically stable at is the confluence When all ei-genvalues of the Jacobian matrix satisfy λgt 0 the equilib-rium point is unstable which is the source Furthermore forthe Jacobian matrix the eigenvalues (λ) mixed states Inother words some are positive while others are negativeen the equilibrium point also termed as the saddle pointis unstable First for the case where the equilibrium point isξ1(0 0 0) the Jacobian matrix is as follows

J1

C4 minus C3 minus P2 0 0

0 C2 minus C1 + A1 0

0 0 I3 + C5 minus P3

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (27)

It is therefore indicated that the eigenvalues of the Ja-cobian matrix are λ1 C4 minus C3 minus P2 λ2 C2 minus C1 + A1 andλ3 I3 + C5 minus P3 With the identical analogy the 8 equi-librium points are substituted into the Jacobian matrix (26)respectively and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

corresponding to the equilibrium points can be determinedrespectively (Table 3)

According to the mentioned analysis the evolutionarygame system has stability under certain conditions How-ever many parameters are accordingly involved and thecharacteristic value (λ) symbol is determined by the size ofthe mentioned parameter values Under the existing knownmathematical derivation method the stability of each of theNash equilibrium is determined and the evolutionary gamemodel cannot effectively lead to the reach steady stateequilibrium Accordingly this article further employs sys-tem dynamics to analyse the impact of various uncertainfactors on the evolution of the game and lays a basis forformulating relevant policies

5 System Dynamics Simulation Analysis

e above paragraphs analyzed the interaction of the threesubjects in the strategic choice and the influence of externalvariables on the stability of the evolutionary game oughsome conclusions have been drawn they are all analysesconducted from the perspective of a single subject lackingsystematic and comprehensive analysis from the perspectiveof three subjects In the 1950s Fletcher of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology initially adopted the theory of

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(b)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(c)

Figure 9 End user stability evolution phase diagram

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 13

management science and systems science and incorporatedcomputerized simulation technology into quantitative an-alyses to develop a system dynamics theory method It isprimarily adopted to study system problems with highnonlinearity as characterized by multivariate causal feed-back and complex time-varying

us to systematically and deeply analyse the strategicinteraction between different agents the present study usesthe system dynamics theory to build a dynamic model of anintelligent government collaborative governance systembased on blockchain technology and the simulation ofsystem dynamics with VENSIM PLE simulation software isemployed to analyse the evolution of the strategicinteraction

51 Based on the SD Model of ldquoBlockchain +GovernmentAffairs Servicerdquo in Beijing Since November 2019 BeijingMunicipal Government Service Bureau Beijing MunicipalScience and Technology Commission and BeijingMunicipalBureau of Economy and Information Technology have ledthe implementation of the Action Plan on the application ofblockchain in the field of Government Services e BeijingMunicipal Bureau of Commerce and other departments asthe responsible units have vigorously propelled the appli-cation construction of blockchain in government services inthe four pilot areas of the city By August 2020 140 gov-ernment affairs services have been connected in Beijing 253business affairs and 65 human affairs have been settledonline and 100000 pieces of administrative materials can besimplified throughout the year ere have been 121 en-terprises having used the blockchain system to query andverify various functions for nearly 7800 times e reporteddata have been down-regulated by 80 and the averagematerial has decreased by 40

is study combines the specific application scenarios ofblockchain pilots in Haidian Xicheng Chaoyang Shunyiand other blockchain pilots in the ldquoBlue Book on the Ap-plication of Blockchain in Municipal Services in Beijing(First Edition)rdquo issued by the Beijing Municipal Adminis-tration in July 2020 Vensim PLE software is employed tobuild the system dynamics model of the evolutionary gamebetween functional departments local governments andend users (see Figure 10)

52 Initial SimulationAnalysis According to the applicationpractice of the blockchain in the government service field of

Beijing the initial value of the model is assumed as followsINITIAL TIME 0 FINAL TIME 20 TIME-STEP 00625 and Units for Time Month and the 16external variables are assigned as shown in Table 4

Since the three participating agents of functionaldepartments local governments and end users have twokinds of strategy choices 0 and 1 this constitutes 8strategy combinations namely (0 0 0) (0 0 1) (0 1 0)(1 0 0) (1 1 0) (1 0 1) (0 1 1) and (1 1 1) When theinitial states of the three parties are pure strategies thesystem is in equilibrium At this time no one party iswilling to actively change the existing strategies and thementioned eight strategy combinations will become theequilibrium state of the system However this state is notstable as long as there is a small change in one or moresubjects in the system and the system will lose theequilibrium state We take the combination of (0 0 1)strategy as an example to illustrate and its evolutionresults are shown in Figure 11(a) is figure indicates thatthe initial probabilities of the functional departmentschoosing the positive strategy and the local governmentchoosing the strict supervision strategy are very low (both001) in the game process when the participants find thatthere are more profitable strategy choices in the system itwill adjust the original strategy and through the con-tinuous learning and imitating between the subjects thesystem can lastly reach a novel equilibrium state

e simulation of 8 pure strategy combinations issummarized as follows①No matter the positive strategy ofthe functional departments starts from 0 to 001 or from 1 to099 and its strategy choice will eventually reach an equi-librium state at 1 It is therefore revealed that in smartgovernment projects functional departments actively drawupon the smart government platform under the blockchaintechnology to complete the business which is the optimalchoice Only the active use of blockchain technology tooptimize the existing platform workflow can ensure itsmaximum revenue ② Under functional departmentsadopting positive strategies if the local government adopts astrategy of loose supervision no matter whether the endusers change from 0 or 1 the final strategy is 1 ie (1 0 0)and (1 0 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations refers to (1 0 1) (see Figure 11(b)) If the localgovernment carries out strict regulation the end users willmutate from 0 or 1 and the final strategy will be 1 namely(1 1 0) and (1 1 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations is (1 1 1) (see Figure 11(c))

Table 3 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

Equilibrium point λ1 λ2 λ3ζ1 (0 0 0) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ2 (1 0 0) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ3 (1 1 0) minus (C4minus C3 + P4) minus (C2minus C1) I3 +C5 + cS3ζ4 (1 1 1) minus (C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2) minus (C2minus C1 +P1 + αS1) minus (I3 +C5 + cS3)ζ5 (0 1 0) C4minus C3 +P4 minus (C2minus C1 +A1) I3 +C5ζ6 (0 1 1) C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2 minus (C2minus C1 +A1 +P1) minus (I3 +C5)ζ7 (0 0 1) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 +P1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)ζ8 (1 0 1) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 + P1 + αS1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)

14 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Moreover it is revealed that the end users have a positiveattitude towards the use of smart government affairs andthey are willing to use the platform to complete businesstransactions As suggested from the analysis through theevolutionary game process of ldquomutation-adjustment-equi-libriumrdquo of the three agents of the game the system willeventually reach the equilibrium state of (1 1 1)

53 SimulationAnalysis of the Impact of ExternalVariables onStrategy Based on the above discussion the value of eachparameter determines whether each strategy combination isthe equilibrium point to make the system stable state andthe impact of external variables on the strategy selection ofthe game subject is analysede following continues to take(0 0 1) strategy combination as an example to discuss

531 Factors of Functional Departmentsrsquo Strategy ChoiceIn the policy combination of (0 0 1) the initial state offunctional departments refers to a negative strategy It isassumed that the functional departments start from theprobability of 001 As indicated from the simulation amongthe 16 external variables the cost of a positive strategy C3the cost of a negative strategy C4 revenue from precisionservices S2 loss of system security risk P2 loss of informationdistortion attributed to mass data collection and processingP4 and the mentioned five external variables will impact thestrategic choice of functional departments In particular

accurate service degree coefficient β should be stressedwhich is the use of blockchain technology to enhance theserviceability of functional departments By regulating thevalue of β the precision income will be affected Under otherinitial values unchanged the evolution result of strategychoice probability of functional departments is analysed (seeFigure 12)

As revealed from the comparison of Figures 12(b) 12(c)and 12(e) C4 P2 and P4 similarly impact the evolution trendof positive strategy choice in functional departments ehigher the cost for functional departments to negativelyexploit blockchain technology the smaller the loss of systemsecurity risk when using blockchain technology and thegreater the loss of information distortion attributed to massdata collection and processing when not using blockchaintechnology the more functional departments will be in-clined to comply with the strategy of positively usingblockchain technology In addition according to thesimulation analysis C3 complexly impacts the strategyselection of functional departments Under the extremelylarge C3 value functional departments are inclined to useblockchain technology negatively in particular when thevalue is smaller the faster the functional departments willreach the stable state of positive strategy It is also revealedthat when functional departments positively exploitblockchain technology to complete smart governmentbusiness the cost acts as a critical factor when the cost istoo high it will impact the choice of their strategies

Positive strategy probabilityof functional departments xChanging rate of

functionaldepartments R(x)t

Positive and negativestrategy expected income

difference Ex-Expected benefits of

functional departmentspositive strategy Ex

Expected benefits offunctional departmentsnegative strategy E(1-x)

Loss of systemsecurity risk P2

The cost of a positivestrategy C3

Revenue fromprecision services S2

Smart government onenet to run performance

gains I2

The cost of anegative strategy C4

Loss of information distortioncaused by mass data collection

and processing P4

Use strategyprobability of end

users z

End users use strategyand nonuse strategy of

expected incomedifference Vz-

The expected revenueof users using the

platform VzThe expected revenueof uesrs nonusing the

platform V(1-z)

The cost of nonusestrategy C5

Privacy securityrisk loss P3

Revenue frompersonalized

customizationservices I3

Strict supervisionprobability of local

government y Changing rate of localgovernment R(y)t

Strict regulation and loosesupervision of expectedincome difference Uy-

Expected benefits of localgovernmentrsquos loosesupervision U(1-y)

Expected benefits oflocal governments strict

sypervision Uy

Find out the illegal operationand get extra income A1

The cost of the strictsupervision C1

Flating managementearnings S1

Operating income of the smartgovernmentrsquos One net to run

platform I1

The cost of the loosesupervision C2

Data security riskscause the loss of

governmentcredibility P1

β

α

γ

The user gets thebenefit of the trust

confirmation S3

Changing rate of endusers R(z)t

Figure 10 System dynamics (SD) model of functional department local government and end user evolutionary game system

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 15

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 5: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

are conducive to value themutual recognition and behaviourconsensus Technology features (eg decentralizationtraceability editability security and reliability) ensure thatmultiple governance subjects can forge a multiple collabo-rative governance situation [43] Accordingly this modelsignificantly improves the security convenience coordi-nation and intelligence of the original system thereby in-creasing social capital and economic benefits

32 Stakeholder Analysis For all stakeholders in the col-laborative governance model of smart government withblockchain technology the collaborative governance bodiesinvolved include functional departments local govern-ments and end users e starting point of each subject isdifferent so its basic idea of participating in smart gov-ernment affairs is based on different decision-making

behaviours attributed to different positions and perspectivesof all parties in the process of platform operation Accordingto Figure 4 from the perspective of the goals of collaborativegovernance entities the goals of local government depart-ments functional gates and end users are identical eyoverall use blockchain technology to obtain better smartgovernment operations and use effects and they achievemore a considerable number of total benefits is alsocomplies with the behaviour of ldquorational peoplerdquo from theperspective of economics ie the pursuit of self-interestmaximization For each subject the model refers to a Paretoimprovement process e subjects focus is different be-cause its goal is to maximize self-interests To be specificlocal governments are concerned with whether the benefitsof social public services can be maximized functional de-partments stress whether their business service levels andperformance gains are maximized and end users are more

Block data

Hash Merkletree

SQL SQL

Physical layer

Data layer

Network layer

Blockchain node Blockchain node

P2P NETWORK

Spread Test and verify

Consensus layer

Incentive layer

Blockchain core services

PosPoW Paxos Dpos Raft Vrr Others

Verification of workloadVerification of interests

and rightsVerification of equity

authorization

Approval system Tax system Civil administrationsystem

Social securitysystem Real estate system

Incentivescheme

Allocation mechanism

Contract layer

Script code Algorithm mechanism Smart contract

Handling guideline

Work process

Work progress

Work result

Query function Business function Consulting function Management function

Personal center Smart sensor

Online service Smart swipe

Common business

Identification

Smart QampADrive

integration

Drive integration

Smart dialogue

Domain corpusUnified interface

Web Access System management

Customer management Ability

performance

Operational management

Operation monitor

Auto updateStatistical

analysis

Consumables management

Mobile monitor

Function delivery

Functional certification

Online comprehensive inquiry system

Convenience service customized terminal

system

Automatic terminal consulting service system

Automatic service terminal background management

system

Application layer

Enterprise user integrated business docking

Personal user terminal interface operation

Comprehensive supervision and management of blockchain technology

CComprehensive operation management for administrators

Cloud server Operating system Cluster Network

Asymmetric encryption

Chain structure

Digital signature

Figure 3 Modified smart government platform architecture with blockchain technology

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 5

concerned with maximizing the overall benefits (eg ease ofuse security and satisfaction) However through contin-uous adjustment and optimization under the long-termcontractual relationship of the parties the respective ad-vantages can be exploited to lastly achieve the win-wincooperation of all parties and achieve the maximization ofself-interest under the smart government coordinatedgovernance with blockchain technology

33 Profit Mechanism In the application of blockchaintechnology for constructing smart government affairsprojects only when the total revenue of system operation isgreater than the total cost of construction can the project beimplemented us to ensure the smooth operation andpromotion of blockchain-based smart government projects thefuture direct income and potential income should be balancedand coordinated after the operation to ensure the realization ofldquoPareto optimalityrdquo between the incomes of all parties par-ticipating in collaborative governance as well as mobilize theenthusiasm of all subjects maximally Combined with theadvantages of blockchain technology the present study makes

an in-depth analysis of the economic benefits in the collabo-rative governance model of smart government based onblockchain technology as shown in Figure 5

34 Collaborative Governance Organizational Structureough in the collaborative governance model of smartgovernment with blockchain technology the stakeholdersinvolved mainly include functional departments localgovernments and end users However the operation ofsmart government projects is highly technical which con-tinues to operate exhibits strong externalities and involvesnumerous participants the relationship between them isvery sophisticated as well covering third-party companies(eg system development companies operation andmaintenance outsourcing parties and blockchain technol-ogy providers) as well as nongovernmental organizations(eg chambers of commerce and social groups) Based onthe existing research results the present study analyses anddesigns the operation organization structure of the smartgovernment collaborative governance model with block-chain technology (see Figure 6)

Smart government coordinated governance

goals

Local government

Industry and commerce department

Judicial department

Tax department

Civil administration

department

Personal user

Enterprise

Other organizations

helliphellip

helliphellip

1Optimized public management structure from pyramid to flat structure2Enhance the credibility of the government establish a good image3Improve public decision-making ability and increase social benefits4Realize cross-departmental and cross-regional joint utilization of government affairs data promote diversified equal participation and win-win cooperation

1Improve business handling efficiency2Reduce the loss of information distortion in massive data collection and processing3Improve the precision level of public affairs services4Reduce system security risks

1Improve production service and life convenience2Personalization service revenue3Run once at most government service experience4Security of privacy information

Functional departments

End users

Figure 4 e goal of each stakeholder in the smart government collaborative governance model with blockchain technology

6 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

4 Assumptions and Construction of theEvolutionary Game Model

41 Basic Assumptions is study assumes that the strate-gies of functional departments are Positive Negative estrategies of local government are Strict supervision Loose

supervision while those of end users are Use Nonuse xy and z respectively denote the probability of functionaldepartmentsrsquo choice of blockchain + government servicestechnology local government supervision and end usersrsquouse smart government platform In correspondence 1-x 1-yand 1-z represent that the probability that functional

Revenue from smart government operations

Including operating platformcomprehensive revenue and user

use revenue

Direct benefits

Potential benefits

Base income

Performance gains

Rewards and punishments

earnings

Policy benefit

Including performance income from actively completing business transactions

additional income from supervisionand regulation violations

Including improve the efficiency of public affairs and enhance the

credibility of the benefits

Including precision service level flat management structure trust confirmationand reduce the loss of privacy information

disclosure etc

Figure 5 Analysis of the operational income of smart government projects based on blockchain technology

Smart government project

Local government Functional departments

Society Enterprises and other organizations

Development operation and maintenance

company

Block chain technology provider

Integrated business dockingand business handling

Smart government project development and operation and maintenance contract performance

Smart government business function demand collection

System security

Technical service contract performance

Data security

Technical feedback

Operation process supervision and management

Business handling requirements

Business handling and process management

Technical services

Consultation requestConsultation

request

Technical services

Technical support

Data information

resources

Technical support

Operation and

maintenance requirements

Improved public service

efficiency and

credibility

Accurate service

capability improvement

and trust confirmation

Figure 6 Framework diagram of the collaborative governance organization structure of smart government projects with blockchaintechnology

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 7

departments do not choose ldquoblockchain + government ser-vicesrdquo technology that the local government does loosesupervision and that end users do not use smart governmentplatform respectively

C4 refers to the cost paid by the functional departmentswhen they do not choose blockchain + government servicestechnology strategies I2 and βS2 respectively represent thebenefit increase that the functional departments can obtainby drawing upon blockchain + government services tech-nology C3 represents the cost of functional departmentswhen they comply with blockchain + government servicestechnology strategy

C2 denotes cost paid by the local government whenthey do not choose strict supervision C1 represents costpaid by the local government when they choose strictsupervision Under functional departments choosingnegative strategy A1 and αS1 respectively represent thebenefit increase of the government when the governmentfollows the ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategies Under end userschoosing use strategy P1 represent punishments paid bythe government when the government adopts the ldquoLoosesupervisionrdquo strategy

C5 represents cost paid by the end users when they donot exploit smart government platform I3 denotes the utilityincrease of the end users when they follow smart govern-ment platform When local governments select ldquoLoose su-pervisionrdquo strategies the end users can suffer P1 from a lossof privacy

Under blockchain + government services technology thecoefficient of improving the precision service level for thefunctional departments is β when they follow positivestrategies e coefficient of optimizing the flat managementefficiency of the public management structure for the localgovernment is α when they select strict supervision strate-gies e coefficient of empowering trust for the end users isc when they comply with strategies According to the actualsituation we suppose that 0 leα β c le1 e correspondingparameters are listed in Table 1

42 Model Construction Based on the mentioned modelassumptions the present study builds a three-party payoffmatrix of functional departments local government andend users e first second and third functions representthe functional departmentsrsquo payoff the payoff of localgovernment and the payoff of end users respectively especific form of the payoff matrix of each party is listed inTable 2

4219e Construction of the Expected Return Function of AllParties(1) Revenue Analysis of Functional Departments Accordingto the return matrix listed in Table 2 the benefits of positivestrategy and negative strategy employed by functional de-partments are the following equations respectively

Ex yz I2 minus C3 + βS2( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C3( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

I2 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yzβS2

(1)

E1minus x yz I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

I2 minus C4 minus yP4

(2)

Average revenue of functional department is as follows

E xEx +(1 minus x)E1minus x (3)

(2) Revenue Analysis of Local Government e fitness oflocal government that adopt strict supervision strategy andloose supervision strategy is written as follows

Uy xz I1 minus C1 + αS1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I1 minus C2( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

(4)

U1minus y xz I1 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I2 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I2 minus C2( 1113857

I1 minus C2 minus zP1

(5)

Average revenue of local government is as follows

U yUy +(1 minus y)U1minus y (6)

(3) Revenue Analysis of End Users e fitness of end usersthat adopt use strategy and nonuse strategy is expressed asfollows

Vz xy I3 minus cS3( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) I3 minus P3( 1113857 + y(1 minus x)I3

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I3 minus P3( 1113857 I3 +(y minus 1)P3 + xycS3(7)

V1minus z xy minus C5( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 + y(1 minus x) minus C5( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 minus C5(8)

Average revenue of end user is as follows

V zVz +(1 minus z)V1minus z (9)

422 9e Replication Dynamic Equation of 9ree-PartyEvolutionary Game(1) Replication Dynamic Equation of Functional Depart-ments According to equations (1)ndash(3) the replication dy-namic equation of functional departments adopting theldquoPositiverdquo strategy is defined as follows

8 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

F(x) dx

dt x Ex minus E( 1113857 x(1 minus x) Ex minus E1minus x( 1113857

x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(10)

(2) Replication Dynamic Equation of Local GovernmentAccording to equations (4)ndash(6) the replication dynamicequation of ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategy adopted by localgovernment is as follows

F(y) dy

dt y Uy minus U1113872 1113873 y(1 minus y) Uy minus U1minus y1113872 1113873

y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(11)

(3) Replication Dynamic Equation of End Users According

to equations (7)ndash(9) the replication dynamic equation ofldquoUserdquo strategy adopted by end user is expressed as follows

F(z) dz

dt z Vz minus V1minus z( 1113857

z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

(12)

43 Model Analysis

431 Evolution Path and Stability Analysis of 9ree-PartyAgent Strategy In accordance with the stability theorem ofdifferential equation the stable point of the replicationdynamic equation should be located at the zero point wherethe first derivative is less than zero ie it should be writtenas follows

d(F(x))

dxlt 0 | F(x) 0 x isin [0 1] (13)

Table 1 Main parameters and their meaning

Game player Sign Variable

Functionaldepartment

I2 Performance benefits of smart government platform business processingC3 Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing

C4Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processing

expenditureP4 When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortionΒ Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departmentsS2 Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departmentsP2 Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses

Local government

I1 Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operationC1 e cost of strict supervisionC2 e cost of loose supervision

P1When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages the

governmentrsquos credibility

A1When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments are

foundA Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public management structureS1 Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public management structure

End user

I3 e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platformC5 Still choose the total cost of business hall processingP3 When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use the platformΓ e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology

S3Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determine the

benefits of rights

Table 2 Payment matrix of functional departments local governments and end users

Functional departmentPositive (x) Negative (1-x)

End userUse (z) Nonuse (1-z) Use (z) Nonuse (1-z)

Local government

Strict supervision (y)I1 minus C1 + αS1 I1 minus C1 I1 minus C1 +A1 I1 minus C1 +A1I2 minus C3 + βS2 I2 minus C3 I2 minus C4 minus P4 I2 minus C4 minus P4I3 + cS3 minus C5 I3 minus C5

Loose supervision (1-y)I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2 I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C4 I2 minus C2I3 minus P3 minus C5 I3 minus P3 minus C5

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 9

Subsequently the evolution and stability strategies of thethree main agents of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users can be discussed

(1) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Functional Depart-mentse first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with positive strategy for x can be determined byequation (10)

zF(x)

zx (1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(14)

If we set

Πx C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (15)

and from Πx 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P2 + C3 minus C4

P2 + P4 + zβS2 (16)

en we have Conclusion 1 enun_Conclusion_1

Conclusion 1 When Πx gt 0 the positive strategy of func-tional departments is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πx lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Furthermorethe probability of x increases while the probability of y and zis elevated

Theorem 1 Πx 0 is the dividing line of the stable state offunctional departments (see Figure 7(a)) According to thestability theorem of the differential equation whenΠx gt 0 hasF(x)prime gt 0 F(x)

prime lt 0 it indicates the stable state of positivestrategy of functional departments while the negative strategyis unstable (see Figure 7(b)) Likewise when Πx lt 0 hasF(x)prime(0)lt 0 F(x)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the negative strategyof the functional departments is in a stable state while thepositive strategy is unstable (see Figure 7(c))

When ygt λy (F(x)dx)|x1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 1In other words functional departments are inclined to followa positive strategy under the probability of y higher than λy

When ylt λy (F(x)dx)|x0lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 0In other words functional departments tend to select anegative strategy when the probability of y is lower than λyLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and x

As revealed from the results the decision-makingbehaviour of functional departments is affected by nu-merous factors According to the formula the positivedecision (x) of functional departments increases with theincrease in local governmentsrsquo strict supervision strategy(y) and end user use strategy (z) Besides the smaller thedifference between the cost expenditure of optimizingsmart government business by positively using blockchaintechnology and the cost expenditure of negatively usingblockchain technology the higher the distortion loss ofmass data collection and processing attributed to not

using blockchain technology and the higher the systemsecurity problem and the precision service incomebrought by blockchain technology when local govern-ments are lax in supervision the higher the possibility forfunctional departments will choose the positive strategy

(2) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Local Governmente first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with strict supervision strategy for y can be ob-tained according to equation (11)

zF(y)

zy (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(17)

If

Πy C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + zxαS1 (18)

and from Πy 0 the following equation is yielded

λx C1 minus C2 minus A1 minus zP1

zαS1 minus A1 (19)

en we have Conclusion 2 enun_Conclusion_2

Conclusion 2 When Πy gt 0 the strict supervision strategyof local government is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πy lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Moreover theprobability of y increases while the probability of x and z iselevated

Theorem 2 Πy 0 is the boundary line of the stable state oflocal government (see Figure 8(a)) According to the stabilitytheorem of the differential equation when Πy gt 0 hasF(y)prime (0)gt 0 F(y)

prime (1)lt 0 it indicates that the local government isin a stable state when strict supervision strategy is adopted whilethe loose supervision strategy is unstable (see Figure 8(b))Likewise when Πy lt 0 has F(y)

prime(0)lt 0 F(y)prime(1)gt 0 this indi-

cates that local government is in a stable state when it choose loosesupervision strategy while strict supervision strategy is unstable(see Figure 8(c))

When xgt λx(dF(y)dy)|y1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the local government is y 1 Inother words local government tends to select a strict su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is higher than λx

When xlt λx (dF(y)dy)|y0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the local government is y 0 Inother words local government tends to select a loose su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is lower than λxLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and y

As revealed from the analysis results the decision-making behaviour of the local government is affected bymany factorse formula shows that the local governmentrsquosstrict supervision (y) and decision-making will increase withthe increase in the positive strategy (x) of the functionaldepartment and the end user strategy (z) Besides thesmaller the difference between the cost of strict supervision

10 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

by local governments and the cost of lax supervision thegreater the extra benefit from the irregularities of functionaldepartments under strict supervision e risk of data se-curity attributed to government neglect of supervision

damages the credibility of the government and the increaseof the income from the flat management of functional de-partments actively using blockchain technology to optimizethe public management structure which will directly affect

x

ζ6 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1(0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)Sx

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)ζ5 (0 1 0)

Sx

(c)

Figure 7 Functional department stability evolution phase diagram

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (011)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(c)

Figure 8 Phase diagram of local government stability evolution

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 11

the improvement of the willingness of local governments tomake final strict supervision decisions

(3) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of End Users e firstpartial derivative of the replication dynamic equation withstrict supervision strategy for y can be obtained according toequation (12)

zF(z)

zz (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (20)

If we set

Πz I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (21)

and from Πz 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P3 minus C5 minus I3

P3 + xcS3 (22)

en we have Conclusion 3enun_Conclusion_3

Conclusion 3 When Πz gt 0 the use strategy of end users isthe evolutionary stability strategy when Πz lt 0 the nonusestrategy of end users is an evolutionary stability strategyMoreover the probability of z increases while the probabilityof x and y increases

Theorem 3 Πz 0 is the dividing line of end usersrsquo stable state(see Figure 9(a)) Under the stability theorem of the differentialequation when Πz gt 0 has F(z)

prime(0)gt 0 F(z)prime(1)lt 0 it indicates

that end users use the smart government platform in a stable state(see Figure 9(b)) Likewise when Πz lt 0 hasF(z)prime(0)lt 0 F(z)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the end user does notuse the strategy in a stable state but the use strategy is unstable(see Figure 9(c))

When ygt λy (dF(z)dz)|z1lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 1 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a use strategy whenthe probability of y is higher than λy

When ylt λy (dF(z)dz)|z0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 0 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a nonuse strategywhen the probability of y is lower than λy Likewise we canprove the relationship between x and z

As suggested from the analysis results for the end usersit can be seen from the formula that the use of decision (z)increases with the increase in positive strategy (x) offunctional departments and strict supervision strategy (y) oflocal government e greater the comprehensive incomeand the total cost when not in use the greater the creditconfirmation income and privacy risk loss obtained by theuser when using the blockchain technology and the higherthe possibility of end users choosing the use strategy

432 Stability Analysis of Evolution Strategy under theAction of 9ree Parties Set P(x y z) (dxdt)G(x y z) (dydt) and Q(x y z) (dzdt) then equa-tions (10)ndash(12) express the group dynamics of the evolution

system of functional departments local government and endusers as written in the following equation

P(x y z) dx

dt x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

G(x y z) dy

dt y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

Q(x y z) dz

dt z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(23)

Set

H(E)

P(x y z)

G(x y z)

Q(x y z)

⎧⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎩ 0 (24)

and there are 12 equilibrium points for the system repli-cation dynamic equation However complying with theliterature [44] only 8 special equilibrium points should bediscussed for the replication dynamic system as follows

ξ1

00

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ2

10

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ3

11

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ4

11

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ5

01

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ6

01

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ7

00

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ8

10

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

(25)

e evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) for replicatingthe dynamic equation system is formulated based on thelocal stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix of the systemwith the method proposed by Friedman Moreover the

12 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Jacobian matrix of the system is obtained from equation (23)as follows

J

(1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)x P4 + P2 + zβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)xyβS2

y(1 minus y) zαS1 minus A1( 1113857 (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857 y(1 minus y) P1 + xαS1( 1113857

z(z minus 1)ycS3 z(z minus 1) P3 + xcS3( 1113857 (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

(26)

According to the replication dynamic equation system(13) the local equilibrium point is yielded as followsξ1(0 0 0) ξ2(1 0 0) ξ3(1 1 0) ξ4(1 1 1) ξ5(0 1 0)ξ6(0 1 1) ξ7(0 0 1) ξ8(1 0 1) By complying with Lya-punov stability theorem when all eigenvalues (λ) of theJacobian matrix satisfy λlt 0 the equilibrium point is theasymptotically stable at is the confluence When all ei-genvalues of the Jacobian matrix satisfy λgt 0 the equilib-rium point is unstable which is the source Furthermore forthe Jacobian matrix the eigenvalues (λ) mixed states Inother words some are positive while others are negativeen the equilibrium point also termed as the saddle pointis unstable First for the case where the equilibrium point isξ1(0 0 0) the Jacobian matrix is as follows

J1

C4 minus C3 minus P2 0 0

0 C2 minus C1 + A1 0

0 0 I3 + C5 minus P3

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (27)

It is therefore indicated that the eigenvalues of the Ja-cobian matrix are λ1 C4 minus C3 minus P2 λ2 C2 minus C1 + A1 andλ3 I3 + C5 minus P3 With the identical analogy the 8 equi-librium points are substituted into the Jacobian matrix (26)respectively and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

corresponding to the equilibrium points can be determinedrespectively (Table 3)

According to the mentioned analysis the evolutionarygame system has stability under certain conditions How-ever many parameters are accordingly involved and thecharacteristic value (λ) symbol is determined by the size ofthe mentioned parameter values Under the existing knownmathematical derivation method the stability of each of theNash equilibrium is determined and the evolutionary gamemodel cannot effectively lead to the reach steady stateequilibrium Accordingly this article further employs sys-tem dynamics to analyse the impact of various uncertainfactors on the evolution of the game and lays a basis forformulating relevant policies

5 System Dynamics Simulation Analysis

e above paragraphs analyzed the interaction of the threesubjects in the strategic choice and the influence of externalvariables on the stability of the evolutionary game oughsome conclusions have been drawn they are all analysesconducted from the perspective of a single subject lackingsystematic and comprehensive analysis from the perspectiveof three subjects In the 1950s Fletcher of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology initially adopted the theory of

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(b)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(c)

Figure 9 End user stability evolution phase diagram

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 13

management science and systems science and incorporatedcomputerized simulation technology into quantitative an-alyses to develop a system dynamics theory method It isprimarily adopted to study system problems with highnonlinearity as characterized by multivariate causal feed-back and complex time-varying

us to systematically and deeply analyse the strategicinteraction between different agents the present study usesthe system dynamics theory to build a dynamic model of anintelligent government collaborative governance systembased on blockchain technology and the simulation ofsystem dynamics with VENSIM PLE simulation software isemployed to analyse the evolution of the strategicinteraction

51 Based on the SD Model of ldquoBlockchain +GovernmentAffairs Servicerdquo in Beijing Since November 2019 BeijingMunicipal Government Service Bureau Beijing MunicipalScience and Technology Commission and BeijingMunicipalBureau of Economy and Information Technology have ledthe implementation of the Action Plan on the application ofblockchain in the field of Government Services e BeijingMunicipal Bureau of Commerce and other departments asthe responsible units have vigorously propelled the appli-cation construction of blockchain in government services inthe four pilot areas of the city By August 2020 140 gov-ernment affairs services have been connected in Beijing 253business affairs and 65 human affairs have been settledonline and 100000 pieces of administrative materials can besimplified throughout the year ere have been 121 en-terprises having used the blockchain system to query andverify various functions for nearly 7800 times e reporteddata have been down-regulated by 80 and the averagematerial has decreased by 40

is study combines the specific application scenarios ofblockchain pilots in Haidian Xicheng Chaoyang Shunyiand other blockchain pilots in the ldquoBlue Book on the Ap-plication of Blockchain in Municipal Services in Beijing(First Edition)rdquo issued by the Beijing Municipal Adminis-tration in July 2020 Vensim PLE software is employed tobuild the system dynamics model of the evolutionary gamebetween functional departments local governments andend users (see Figure 10)

52 Initial SimulationAnalysis According to the applicationpractice of the blockchain in the government service field of

Beijing the initial value of the model is assumed as followsINITIAL TIME 0 FINAL TIME 20 TIME-STEP 00625 and Units for Time Month and the 16external variables are assigned as shown in Table 4

Since the three participating agents of functionaldepartments local governments and end users have twokinds of strategy choices 0 and 1 this constitutes 8strategy combinations namely (0 0 0) (0 0 1) (0 1 0)(1 0 0) (1 1 0) (1 0 1) (0 1 1) and (1 1 1) When theinitial states of the three parties are pure strategies thesystem is in equilibrium At this time no one party iswilling to actively change the existing strategies and thementioned eight strategy combinations will become theequilibrium state of the system However this state is notstable as long as there is a small change in one or moresubjects in the system and the system will lose theequilibrium state We take the combination of (0 0 1)strategy as an example to illustrate and its evolutionresults are shown in Figure 11(a) is figure indicates thatthe initial probabilities of the functional departmentschoosing the positive strategy and the local governmentchoosing the strict supervision strategy are very low (both001) in the game process when the participants find thatthere are more profitable strategy choices in the system itwill adjust the original strategy and through the con-tinuous learning and imitating between the subjects thesystem can lastly reach a novel equilibrium state

e simulation of 8 pure strategy combinations issummarized as follows①No matter the positive strategy ofthe functional departments starts from 0 to 001 or from 1 to099 and its strategy choice will eventually reach an equi-librium state at 1 It is therefore revealed that in smartgovernment projects functional departments actively drawupon the smart government platform under the blockchaintechnology to complete the business which is the optimalchoice Only the active use of blockchain technology tooptimize the existing platform workflow can ensure itsmaximum revenue ② Under functional departmentsadopting positive strategies if the local government adopts astrategy of loose supervision no matter whether the endusers change from 0 or 1 the final strategy is 1 ie (1 0 0)and (1 0 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations refers to (1 0 1) (see Figure 11(b)) If the localgovernment carries out strict regulation the end users willmutate from 0 or 1 and the final strategy will be 1 namely(1 1 0) and (1 1 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations is (1 1 1) (see Figure 11(c))

Table 3 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

Equilibrium point λ1 λ2 λ3ζ1 (0 0 0) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ2 (1 0 0) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ3 (1 1 0) minus (C4minus C3 + P4) minus (C2minus C1) I3 +C5 + cS3ζ4 (1 1 1) minus (C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2) minus (C2minus C1 +P1 + αS1) minus (I3 +C5 + cS3)ζ5 (0 1 0) C4minus C3 +P4 minus (C2minus C1 +A1) I3 +C5ζ6 (0 1 1) C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2 minus (C2minus C1 +A1 +P1) minus (I3 +C5)ζ7 (0 0 1) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 +P1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)ζ8 (1 0 1) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 + P1 + αS1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)

14 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Moreover it is revealed that the end users have a positiveattitude towards the use of smart government affairs andthey are willing to use the platform to complete businesstransactions As suggested from the analysis through theevolutionary game process of ldquomutation-adjustment-equi-libriumrdquo of the three agents of the game the system willeventually reach the equilibrium state of (1 1 1)

53 SimulationAnalysis of the Impact of ExternalVariables onStrategy Based on the above discussion the value of eachparameter determines whether each strategy combination isthe equilibrium point to make the system stable state andthe impact of external variables on the strategy selection ofthe game subject is analysede following continues to take(0 0 1) strategy combination as an example to discuss

531 Factors of Functional Departmentsrsquo Strategy ChoiceIn the policy combination of (0 0 1) the initial state offunctional departments refers to a negative strategy It isassumed that the functional departments start from theprobability of 001 As indicated from the simulation amongthe 16 external variables the cost of a positive strategy C3the cost of a negative strategy C4 revenue from precisionservices S2 loss of system security risk P2 loss of informationdistortion attributed to mass data collection and processingP4 and the mentioned five external variables will impact thestrategic choice of functional departments In particular

accurate service degree coefficient β should be stressedwhich is the use of blockchain technology to enhance theserviceability of functional departments By regulating thevalue of β the precision income will be affected Under otherinitial values unchanged the evolution result of strategychoice probability of functional departments is analysed (seeFigure 12)

As revealed from the comparison of Figures 12(b) 12(c)and 12(e) C4 P2 and P4 similarly impact the evolution trendof positive strategy choice in functional departments ehigher the cost for functional departments to negativelyexploit blockchain technology the smaller the loss of systemsecurity risk when using blockchain technology and thegreater the loss of information distortion attributed to massdata collection and processing when not using blockchaintechnology the more functional departments will be in-clined to comply with the strategy of positively usingblockchain technology In addition according to thesimulation analysis C3 complexly impacts the strategyselection of functional departments Under the extremelylarge C3 value functional departments are inclined to useblockchain technology negatively in particular when thevalue is smaller the faster the functional departments willreach the stable state of positive strategy It is also revealedthat when functional departments positively exploitblockchain technology to complete smart governmentbusiness the cost acts as a critical factor when the cost istoo high it will impact the choice of their strategies

Positive strategy probabilityof functional departments xChanging rate of

functionaldepartments R(x)t

Positive and negativestrategy expected income

difference Ex-Expected benefits of

functional departmentspositive strategy Ex

Expected benefits offunctional departmentsnegative strategy E(1-x)

Loss of systemsecurity risk P2

The cost of a positivestrategy C3

Revenue fromprecision services S2

Smart government onenet to run performance

gains I2

The cost of anegative strategy C4

Loss of information distortioncaused by mass data collection

and processing P4

Use strategyprobability of end

users z

End users use strategyand nonuse strategy of

expected incomedifference Vz-

The expected revenueof users using the

platform VzThe expected revenueof uesrs nonusing the

platform V(1-z)

The cost of nonusestrategy C5

Privacy securityrisk loss P3

Revenue frompersonalized

customizationservices I3

Strict supervisionprobability of local

government y Changing rate of localgovernment R(y)t

Strict regulation and loosesupervision of expectedincome difference Uy-

Expected benefits of localgovernmentrsquos loosesupervision U(1-y)

Expected benefits oflocal governments strict

sypervision Uy

Find out the illegal operationand get extra income A1

The cost of the strictsupervision C1

Flating managementearnings S1

Operating income of the smartgovernmentrsquos One net to run

platform I1

The cost of the loosesupervision C2

Data security riskscause the loss of

governmentcredibility P1

β

α

γ

The user gets thebenefit of the trust

confirmation S3

Changing rate of endusers R(z)t

Figure 10 System dynamics (SD) model of functional department local government and end user evolutionary game system

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 15

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 6: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

concerned with maximizing the overall benefits (eg ease ofuse security and satisfaction) However through contin-uous adjustment and optimization under the long-termcontractual relationship of the parties the respective ad-vantages can be exploited to lastly achieve the win-wincooperation of all parties and achieve the maximization ofself-interest under the smart government coordinatedgovernance with blockchain technology

33 Profit Mechanism In the application of blockchaintechnology for constructing smart government affairsprojects only when the total revenue of system operation isgreater than the total cost of construction can the project beimplemented us to ensure the smooth operation andpromotion of blockchain-based smart government projects thefuture direct income and potential income should be balancedand coordinated after the operation to ensure the realization ofldquoPareto optimalityrdquo between the incomes of all parties par-ticipating in collaborative governance as well as mobilize theenthusiasm of all subjects maximally Combined with theadvantages of blockchain technology the present study makes

an in-depth analysis of the economic benefits in the collabo-rative governance model of smart government based onblockchain technology as shown in Figure 5

34 Collaborative Governance Organizational Structureough in the collaborative governance model of smartgovernment with blockchain technology the stakeholdersinvolved mainly include functional departments localgovernments and end users However the operation ofsmart government projects is highly technical which con-tinues to operate exhibits strong externalities and involvesnumerous participants the relationship between them isvery sophisticated as well covering third-party companies(eg system development companies operation andmaintenance outsourcing parties and blockchain technol-ogy providers) as well as nongovernmental organizations(eg chambers of commerce and social groups) Based onthe existing research results the present study analyses anddesigns the operation organization structure of the smartgovernment collaborative governance model with block-chain technology (see Figure 6)

Smart government coordinated governance

goals

Local government

Industry and commerce department

Judicial department

Tax department

Civil administration

department

Personal user

Enterprise

Other organizations

helliphellip

helliphellip

1Optimized public management structure from pyramid to flat structure2Enhance the credibility of the government establish a good image3Improve public decision-making ability and increase social benefits4Realize cross-departmental and cross-regional joint utilization of government affairs data promote diversified equal participation and win-win cooperation

1Improve business handling efficiency2Reduce the loss of information distortion in massive data collection and processing3Improve the precision level of public affairs services4Reduce system security risks

1Improve production service and life convenience2Personalization service revenue3Run once at most government service experience4Security of privacy information

Functional departments

End users

Figure 4 e goal of each stakeholder in the smart government collaborative governance model with blockchain technology

6 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

4 Assumptions and Construction of theEvolutionary Game Model

41 Basic Assumptions is study assumes that the strate-gies of functional departments are Positive Negative estrategies of local government are Strict supervision Loose

supervision while those of end users are Use Nonuse xy and z respectively denote the probability of functionaldepartmentsrsquo choice of blockchain + government servicestechnology local government supervision and end usersrsquouse smart government platform In correspondence 1-x 1-yand 1-z represent that the probability that functional

Revenue from smart government operations

Including operating platformcomprehensive revenue and user

use revenue

Direct benefits

Potential benefits

Base income

Performance gains

Rewards and punishments

earnings

Policy benefit

Including performance income from actively completing business transactions

additional income from supervisionand regulation violations

Including improve the efficiency of public affairs and enhance the

credibility of the benefits

Including precision service level flat management structure trust confirmationand reduce the loss of privacy information

disclosure etc

Figure 5 Analysis of the operational income of smart government projects based on blockchain technology

Smart government project

Local government Functional departments

Society Enterprises and other organizations

Development operation and maintenance

company

Block chain technology provider

Integrated business dockingand business handling

Smart government project development and operation and maintenance contract performance

Smart government business function demand collection

System security

Technical service contract performance

Data security

Technical feedback

Operation process supervision and management

Business handling requirements

Business handling and process management

Technical services

Consultation requestConsultation

request

Technical services

Technical support

Data information

resources

Technical support

Operation and

maintenance requirements

Improved public service

efficiency and

credibility

Accurate service

capability improvement

and trust confirmation

Figure 6 Framework diagram of the collaborative governance organization structure of smart government projects with blockchaintechnology

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 7

departments do not choose ldquoblockchain + government ser-vicesrdquo technology that the local government does loosesupervision and that end users do not use smart governmentplatform respectively

C4 refers to the cost paid by the functional departmentswhen they do not choose blockchain + government servicestechnology strategies I2 and βS2 respectively represent thebenefit increase that the functional departments can obtainby drawing upon blockchain + government services tech-nology C3 represents the cost of functional departmentswhen they comply with blockchain + government servicestechnology strategy

C2 denotes cost paid by the local government whenthey do not choose strict supervision C1 represents costpaid by the local government when they choose strictsupervision Under functional departments choosingnegative strategy A1 and αS1 respectively represent thebenefit increase of the government when the governmentfollows the ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategies Under end userschoosing use strategy P1 represent punishments paid bythe government when the government adopts the ldquoLoosesupervisionrdquo strategy

C5 represents cost paid by the end users when they donot exploit smart government platform I3 denotes the utilityincrease of the end users when they follow smart govern-ment platform When local governments select ldquoLoose su-pervisionrdquo strategies the end users can suffer P1 from a lossof privacy

Under blockchain + government services technology thecoefficient of improving the precision service level for thefunctional departments is β when they follow positivestrategies e coefficient of optimizing the flat managementefficiency of the public management structure for the localgovernment is α when they select strict supervision strate-gies e coefficient of empowering trust for the end users isc when they comply with strategies According to the actualsituation we suppose that 0 leα β c le1 e correspondingparameters are listed in Table 1

42 Model Construction Based on the mentioned modelassumptions the present study builds a three-party payoffmatrix of functional departments local government andend users e first second and third functions representthe functional departmentsrsquo payoff the payoff of localgovernment and the payoff of end users respectively especific form of the payoff matrix of each party is listed inTable 2

4219e Construction of the Expected Return Function of AllParties(1) Revenue Analysis of Functional Departments Accordingto the return matrix listed in Table 2 the benefits of positivestrategy and negative strategy employed by functional de-partments are the following equations respectively

Ex yz I2 minus C3 + βS2( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C3( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

I2 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yzβS2

(1)

E1minus x yz I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

I2 minus C4 minus yP4

(2)

Average revenue of functional department is as follows

E xEx +(1 minus x)E1minus x (3)

(2) Revenue Analysis of Local Government e fitness oflocal government that adopt strict supervision strategy andloose supervision strategy is written as follows

Uy xz I1 minus C1 + αS1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I1 minus C2( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

(4)

U1minus y xz I1 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I2 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I2 minus C2( 1113857

I1 minus C2 minus zP1

(5)

Average revenue of local government is as follows

U yUy +(1 minus y)U1minus y (6)

(3) Revenue Analysis of End Users e fitness of end usersthat adopt use strategy and nonuse strategy is expressed asfollows

Vz xy I3 minus cS3( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) I3 minus P3( 1113857 + y(1 minus x)I3

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I3 minus P3( 1113857 I3 +(y minus 1)P3 + xycS3(7)

V1minus z xy minus C5( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 + y(1 minus x) minus C5( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 minus C5(8)

Average revenue of end user is as follows

V zVz +(1 minus z)V1minus z (9)

422 9e Replication Dynamic Equation of 9ree-PartyEvolutionary Game(1) Replication Dynamic Equation of Functional Depart-ments According to equations (1)ndash(3) the replication dy-namic equation of functional departments adopting theldquoPositiverdquo strategy is defined as follows

8 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

F(x) dx

dt x Ex minus E( 1113857 x(1 minus x) Ex minus E1minus x( 1113857

x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(10)

(2) Replication Dynamic Equation of Local GovernmentAccording to equations (4)ndash(6) the replication dynamicequation of ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategy adopted by localgovernment is as follows

F(y) dy

dt y Uy minus U1113872 1113873 y(1 minus y) Uy minus U1minus y1113872 1113873

y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(11)

(3) Replication Dynamic Equation of End Users According

to equations (7)ndash(9) the replication dynamic equation ofldquoUserdquo strategy adopted by end user is expressed as follows

F(z) dz

dt z Vz minus V1minus z( 1113857

z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

(12)

43 Model Analysis

431 Evolution Path and Stability Analysis of 9ree-PartyAgent Strategy In accordance with the stability theorem ofdifferential equation the stable point of the replicationdynamic equation should be located at the zero point wherethe first derivative is less than zero ie it should be writtenas follows

d(F(x))

dxlt 0 | F(x) 0 x isin [0 1] (13)

Table 1 Main parameters and their meaning

Game player Sign Variable

Functionaldepartment

I2 Performance benefits of smart government platform business processingC3 Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing

C4Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processing

expenditureP4 When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortionΒ Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departmentsS2 Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departmentsP2 Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses

Local government

I1 Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operationC1 e cost of strict supervisionC2 e cost of loose supervision

P1When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages the

governmentrsquos credibility

A1When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments are

foundA Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public management structureS1 Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public management structure

End user

I3 e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platformC5 Still choose the total cost of business hall processingP3 When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use the platformΓ e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology

S3Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determine the

benefits of rights

Table 2 Payment matrix of functional departments local governments and end users

Functional departmentPositive (x) Negative (1-x)

End userUse (z) Nonuse (1-z) Use (z) Nonuse (1-z)

Local government

Strict supervision (y)I1 minus C1 + αS1 I1 minus C1 I1 minus C1 +A1 I1 minus C1 +A1I2 minus C3 + βS2 I2 minus C3 I2 minus C4 minus P4 I2 minus C4 minus P4I3 + cS3 minus C5 I3 minus C5

Loose supervision (1-y)I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2 I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C4 I2 minus C2I3 minus P3 minus C5 I3 minus P3 minus C5

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 9

Subsequently the evolution and stability strategies of thethree main agents of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users can be discussed

(1) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Functional Depart-mentse first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with positive strategy for x can be determined byequation (10)

zF(x)

zx (1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(14)

If we set

Πx C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (15)

and from Πx 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P2 + C3 minus C4

P2 + P4 + zβS2 (16)

en we have Conclusion 1 enun_Conclusion_1

Conclusion 1 When Πx gt 0 the positive strategy of func-tional departments is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πx lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Furthermorethe probability of x increases while the probability of y and zis elevated

Theorem 1 Πx 0 is the dividing line of the stable state offunctional departments (see Figure 7(a)) According to thestability theorem of the differential equation whenΠx gt 0 hasF(x)prime gt 0 F(x)

prime lt 0 it indicates the stable state of positivestrategy of functional departments while the negative strategyis unstable (see Figure 7(b)) Likewise when Πx lt 0 hasF(x)prime(0)lt 0 F(x)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the negative strategyof the functional departments is in a stable state while thepositive strategy is unstable (see Figure 7(c))

When ygt λy (F(x)dx)|x1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 1In other words functional departments are inclined to followa positive strategy under the probability of y higher than λy

When ylt λy (F(x)dx)|x0lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 0In other words functional departments tend to select anegative strategy when the probability of y is lower than λyLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and x

As revealed from the results the decision-makingbehaviour of functional departments is affected by nu-merous factors According to the formula the positivedecision (x) of functional departments increases with theincrease in local governmentsrsquo strict supervision strategy(y) and end user use strategy (z) Besides the smaller thedifference between the cost expenditure of optimizingsmart government business by positively using blockchaintechnology and the cost expenditure of negatively usingblockchain technology the higher the distortion loss ofmass data collection and processing attributed to not

using blockchain technology and the higher the systemsecurity problem and the precision service incomebrought by blockchain technology when local govern-ments are lax in supervision the higher the possibility forfunctional departments will choose the positive strategy

(2) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Local Governmente first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with strict supervision strategy for y can be ob-tained according to equation (11)

zF(y)

zy (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(17)

If

Πy C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + zxαS1 (18)

and from Πy 0 the following equation is yielded

λx C1 minus C2 minus A1 minus zP1

zαS1 minus A1 (19)

en we have Conclusion 2 enun_Conclusion_2

Conclusion 2 When Πy gt 0 the strict supervision strategyof local government is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πy lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Moreover theprobability of y increases while the probability of x and z iselevated

Theorem 2 Πy 0 is the boundary line of the stable state oflocal government (see Figure 8(a)) According to the stabilitytheorem of the differential equation when Πy gt 0 hasF(y)prime (0)gt 0 F(y)

prime (1)lt 0 it indicates that the local government isin a stable state when strict supervision strategy is adopted whilethe loose supervision strategy is unstable (see Figure 8(b))Likewise when Πy lt 0 has F(y)

prime(0)lt 0 F(y)prime(1)gt 0 this indi-

cates that local government is in a stable state when it choose loosesupervision strategy while strict supervision strategy is unstable(see Figure 8(c))

When xgt λx(dF(y)dy)|y1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the local government is y 1 Inother words local government tends to select a strict su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is higher than λx

When xlt λx (dF(y)dy)|y0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the local government is y 0 Inother words local government tends to select a loose su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is lower than λxLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and y

As revealed from the analysis results the decision-making behaviour of the local government is affected bymany factorse formula shows that the local governmentrsquosstrict supervision (y) and decision-making will increase withthe increase in the positive strategy (x) of the functionaldepartment and the end user strategy (z) Besides thesmaller the difference between the cost of strict supervision

10 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

by local governments and the cost of lax supervision thegreater the extra benefit from the irregularities of functionaldepartments under strict supervision e risk of data se-curity attributed to government neglect of supervision

damages the credibility of the government and the increaseof the income from the flat management of functional de-partments actively using blockchain technology to optimizethe public management structure which will directly affect

x

ζ6 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1(0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)Sx

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)ζ5 (0 1 0)

Sx

(c)

Figure 7 Functional department stability evolution phase diagram

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (011)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(c)

Figure 8 Phase diagram of local government stability evolution

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 11

the improvement of the willingness of local governments tomake final strict supervision decisions

(3) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of End Users e firstpartial derivative of the replication dynamic equation withstrict supervision strategy for y can be obtained according toequation (12)

zF(z)

zz (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (20)

If we set

Πz I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (21)

and from Πz 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P3 minus C5 minus I3

P3 + xcS3 (22)

en we have Conclusion 3enun_Conclusion_3

Conclusion 3 When Πz gt 0 the use strategy of end users isthe evolutionary stability strategy when Πz lt 0 the nonusestrategy of end users is an evolutionary stability strategyMoreover the probability of z increases while the probabilityof x and y increases

Theorem 3 Πz 0 is the dividing line of end usersrsquo stable state(see Figure 9(a)) Under the stability theorem of the differentialequation when Πz gt 0 has F(z)

prime(0)gt 0 F(z)prime(1)lt 0 it indicates

that end users use the smart government platform in a stable state(see Figure 9(b)) Likewise when Πz lt 0 hasF(z)prime(0)lt 0 F(z)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the end user does notuse the strategy in a stable state but the use strategy is unstable(see Figure 9(c))

When ygt λy (dF(z)dz)|z1lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 1 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a use strategy whenthe probability of y is higher than λy

When ylt λy (dF(z)dz)|z0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 0 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a nonuse strategywhen the probability of y is lower than λy Likewise we canprove the relationship between x and z

As suggested from the analysis results for the end usersit can be seen from the formula that the use of decision (z)increases with the increase in positive strategy (x) offunctional departments and strict supervision strategy (y) oflocal government e greater the comprehensive incomeand the total cost when not in use the greater the creditconfirmation income and privacy risk loss obtained by theuser when using the blockchain technology and the higherthe possibility of end users choosing the use strategy

432 Stability Analysis of Evolution Strategy under theAction of 9ree Parties Set P(x y z) (dxdt)G(x y z) (dydt) and Q(x y z) (dzdt) then equa-tions (10)ndash(12) express the group dynamics of the evolution

system of functional departments local government and endusers as written in the following equation

P(x y z) dx

dt x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

G(x y z) dy

dt y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

Q(x y z) dz

dt z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(23)

Set

H(E)

P(x y z)

G(x y z)

Q(x y z)

⎧⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎩ 0 (24)

and there are 12 equilibrium points for the system repli-cation dynamic equation However complying with theliterature [44] only 8 special equilibrium points should bediscussed for the replication dynamic system as follows

ξ1

00

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ2

10

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ3

11

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ4

11

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ5

01

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ6

01

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ7

00

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ8

10

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

(25)

e evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) for replicatingthe dynamic equation system is formulated based on thelocal stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix of the systemwith the method proposed by Friedman Moreover the

12 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Jacobian matrix of the system is obtained from equation (23)as follows

J

(1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)x P4 + P2 + zβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)xyβS2

y(1 minus y) zαS1 minus A1( 1113857 (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857 y(1 minus y) P1 + xαS1( 1113857

z(z minus 1)ycS3 z(z minus 1) P3 + xcS3( 1113857 (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

(26)

According to the replication dynamic equation system(13) the local equilibrium point is yielded as followsξ1(0 0 0) ξ2(1 0 0) ξ3(1 1 0) ξ4(1 1 1) ξ5(0 1 0)ξ6(0 1 1) ξ7(0 0 1) ξ8(1 0 1) By complying with Lya-punov stability theorem when all eigenvalues (λ) of theJacobian matrix satisfy λlt 0 the equilibrium point is theasymptotically stable at is the confluence When all ei-genvalues of the Jacobian matrix satisfy λgt 0 the equilib-rium point is unstable which is the source Furthermore forthe Jacobian matrix the eigenvalues (λ) mixed states Inother words some are positive while others are negativeen the equilibrium point also termed as the saddle pointis unstable First for the case where the equilibrium point isξ1(0 0 0) the Jacobian matrix is as follows

J1

C4 minus C3 minus P2 0 0

0 C2 minus C1 + A1 0

0 0 I3 + C5 minus P3

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (27)

It is therefore indicated that the eigenvalues of the Ja-cobian matrix are λ1 C4 minus C3 minus P2 λ2 C2 minus C1 + A1 andλ3 I3 + C5 minus P3 With the identical analogy the 8 equi-librium points are substituted into the Jacobian matrix (26)respectively and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

corresponding to the equilibrium points can be determinedrespectively (Table 3)

According to the mentioned analysis the evolutionarygame system has stability under certain conditions How-ever many parameters are accordingly involved and thecharacteristic value (λ) symbol is determined by the size ofthe mentioned parameter values Under the existing knownmathematical derivation method the stability of each of theNash equilibrium is determined and the evolutionary gamemodel cannot effectively lead to the reach steady stateequilibrium Accordingly this article further employs sys-tem dynamics to analyse the impact of various uncertainfactors on the evolution of the game and lays a basis forformulating relevant policies

5 System Dynamics Simulation Analysis

e above paragraphs analyzed the interaction of the threesubjects in the strategic choice and the influence of externalvariables on the stability of the evolutionary game oughsome conclusions have been drawn they are all analysesconducted from the perspective of a single subject lackingsystematic and comprehensive analysis from the perspectiveof three subjects In the 1950s Fletcher of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology initially adopted the theory of

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(b)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(c)

Figure 9 End user stability evolution phase diagram

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 13

management science and systems science and incorporatedcomputerized simulation technology into quantitative an-alyses to develop a system dynamics theory method It isprimarily adopted to study system problems with highnonlinearity as characterized by multivariate causal feed-back and complex time-varying

us to systematically and deeply analyse the strategicinteraction between different agents the present study usesthe system dynamics theory to build a dynamic model of anintelligent government collaborative governance systembased on blockchain technology and the simulation ofsystem dynamics with VENSIM PLE simulation software isemployed to analyse the evolution of the strategicinteraction

51 Based on the SD Model of ldquoBlockchain +GovernmentAffairs Servicerdquo in Beijing Since November 2019 BeijingMunicipal Government Service Bureau Beijing MunicipalScience and Technology Commission and BeijingMunicipalBureau of Economy and Information Technology have ledthe implementation of the Action Plan on the application ofblockchain in the field of Government Services e BeijingMunicipal Bureau of Commerce and other departments asthe responsible units have vigorously propelled the appli-cation construction of blockchain in government services inthe four pilot areas of the city By August 2020 140 gov-ernment affairs services have been connected in Beijing 253business affairs and 65 human affairs have been settledonline and 100000 pieces of administrative materials can besimplified throughout the year ere have been 121 en-terprises having used the blockchain system to query andverify various functions for nearly 7800 times e reporteddata have been down-regulated by 80 and the averagematerial has decreased by 40

is study combines the specific application scenarios ofblockchain pilots in Haidian Xicheng Chaoyang Shunyiand other blockchain pilots in the ldquoBlue Book on the Ap-plication of Blockchain in Municipal Services in Beijing(First Edition)rdquo issued by the Beijing Municipal Adminis-tration in July 2020 Vensim PLE software is employed tobuild the system dynamics model of the evolutionary gamebetween functional departments local governments andend users (see Figure 10)

52 Initial SimulationAnalysis According to the applicationpractice of the blockchain in the government service field of

Beijing the initial value of the model is assumed as followsINITIAL TIME 0 FINAL TIME 20 TIME-STEP 00625 and Units for Time Month and the 16external variables are assigned as shown in Table 4

Since the three participating agents of functionaldepartments local governments and end users have twokinds of strategy choices 0 and 1 this constitutes 8strategy combinations namely (0 0 0) (0 0 1) (0 1 0)(1 0 0) (1 1 0) (1 0 1) (0 1 1) and (1 1 1) When theinitial states of the three parties are pure strategies thesystem is in equilibrium At this time no one party iswilling to actively change the existing strategies and thementioned eight strategy combinations will become theequilibrium state of the system However this state is notstable as long as there is a small change in one or moresubjects in the system and the system will lose theequilibrium state We take the combination of (0 0 1)strategy as an example to illustrate and its evolutionresults are shown in Figure 11(a) is figure indicates thatthe initial probabilities of the functional departmentschoosing the positive strategy and the local governmentchoosing the strict supervision strategy are very low (both001) in the game process when the participants find thatthere are more profitable strategy choices in the system itwill adjust the original strategy and through the con-tinuous learning and imitating between the subjects thesystem can lastly reach a novel equilibrium state

e simulation of 8 pure strategy combinations issummarized as follows①No matter the positive strategy ofthe functional departments starts from 0 to 001 or from 1 to099 and its strategy choice will eventually reach an equi-librium state at 1 It is therefore revealed that in smartgovernment projects functional departments actively drawupon the smart government platform under the blockchaintechnology to complete the business which is the optimalchoice Only the active use of blockchain technology tooptimize the existing platform workflow can ensure itsmaximum revenue ② Under functional departmentsadopting positive strategies if the local government adopts astrategy of loose supervision no matter whether the endusers change from 0 or 1 the final strategy is 1 ie (1 0 0)and (1 0 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations refers to (1 0 1) (see Figure 11(b)) If the localgovernment carries out strict regulation the end users willmutate from 0 or 1 and the final strategy will be 1 namely(1 1 0) and (1 1 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations is (1 1 1) (see Figure 11(c))

Table 3 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

Equilibrium point λ1 λ2 λ3ζ1 (0 0 0) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ2 (1 0 0) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ3 (1 1 0) minus (C4minus C3 + P4) minus (C2minus C1) I3 +C5 + cS3ζ4 (1 1 1) minus (C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2) minus (C2minus C1 +P1 + αS1) minus (I3 +C5 + cS3)ζ5 (0 1 0) C4minus C3 +P4 minus (C2minus C1 +A1) I3 +C5ζ6 (0 1 1) C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2 minus (C2minus C1 +A1 +P1) minus (I3 +C5)ζ7 (0 0 1) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 +P1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)ζ8 (1 0 1) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 + P1 + αS1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)

14 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Moreover it is revealed that the end users have a positiveattitude towards the use of smart government affairs andthey are willing to use the platform to complete businesstransactions As suggested from the analysis through theevolutionary game process of ldquomutation-adjustment-equi-libriumrdquo of the three agents of the game the system willeventually reach the equilibrium state of (1 1 1)

53 SimulationAnalysis of the Impact of ExternalVariables onStrategy Based on the above discussion the value of eachparameter determines whether each strategy combination isthe equilibrium point to make the system stable state andthe impact of external variables on the strategy selection ofthe game subject is analysede following continues to take(0 0 1) strategy combination as an example to discuss

531 Factors of Functional Departmentsrsquo Strategy ChoiceIn the policy combination of (0 0 1) the initial state offunctional departments refers to a negative strategy It isassumed that the functional departments start from theprobability of 001 As indicated from the simulation amongthe 16 external variables the cost of a positive strategy C3the cost of a negative strategy C4 revenue from precisionservices S2 loss of system security risk P2 loss of informationdistortion attributed to mass data collection and processingP4 and the mentioned five external variables will impact thestrategic choice of functional departments In particular

accurate service degree coefficient β should be stressedwhich is the use of blockchain technology to enhance theserviceability of functional departments By regulating thevalue of β the precision income will be affected Under otherinitial values unchanged the evolution result of strategychoice probability of functional departments is analysed (seeFigure 12)

As revealed from the comparison of Figures 12(b) 12(c)and 12(e) C4 P2 and P4 similarly impact the evolution trendof positive strategy choice in functional departments ehigher the cost for functional departments to negativelyexploit blockchain technology the smaller the loss of systemsecurity risk when using blockchain technology and thegreater the loss of information distortion attributed to massdata collection and processing when not using blockchaintechnology the more functional departments will be in-clined to comply with the strategy of positively usingblockchain technology In addition according to thesimulation analysis C3 complexly impacts the strategyselection of functional departments Under the extremelylarge C3 value functional departments are inclined to useblockchain technology negatively in particular when thevalue is smaller the faster the functional departments willreach the stable state of positive strategy It is also revealedthat when functional departments positively exploitblockchain technology to complete smart governmentbusiness the cost acts as a critical factor when the cost istoo high it will impact the choice of their strategies

Positive strategy probabilityof functional departments xChanging rate of

functionaldepartments R(x)t

Positive and negativestrategy expected income

difference Ex-Expected benefits of

functional departmentspositive strategy Ex

Expected benefits offunctional departmentsnegative strategy E(1-x)

Loss of systemsecurity risk P2

The cost of a positivestrategy C3

Revenue fromprecision services S2

Smart government onenet to run performance

gains I2

The cost of anegative strategy C4

Loss of information distortioncaused by mass data collection

and processing P4

Use strategyprobability of end

users z

End users use strategyand nonuse strategy of

expected incomedifference Vz-

The expected revenueof users using the

platform VzThe expected revenueof uesrs nonusing the

platform V(1-z)

The cost of nonusestrategy C5

Privacy securityrisk loss P3

Revenue frompersonalized

customizationservices I3

Strict supervisionprobability of local

government y Changing rate of localgovernment R(y)t

Strict regulation and loosesupervision of expectedincome difference Uy-

Expected benefits of localgovernmentrsquos loosesupervision U(1-y)

Expected benefits oflocal governments strict

sypervision Uy

Find out the illegal operationand get extra income A1

The cost of the strictsupervision C1

Flating managementearnings S1

Operating income of the smartgovernmentrsquos One net to run

platform I1

The cost of the loosesupervision C2

Data security riskscause the loss of

governmentcredibility P1

β

α

γ

The user gets thebenefit of the trust

confirmation S3

Changing rate of endusers R(z)t

Figure 10 System dynamics (SD) model of functional department local government and end user evolutionary game system

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 15

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 7: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

4 Assumptions and Construction of theEvolutionary Game Model

41 Basic Assumptions is study assumes that the strate-gies of functional departments are Positive Negative estrategies of local government are Strict supervision Loose

supervision while those of end users are Use Nonuse xy and z respectively denote the probability of functionaldepartmentsrsquo choice of blockchain + government servicestechnology local government supervision and end usersrsquouse smart government platform In correspondence 1-x 1-yand 1-z represent that the probability that functional

Revenue from smart government operations

Including operating platformcomprehensive revenue and user

use revenue

Direct benefits

Potential benefits

Base income

Performance gains

Rewards and punishments

earnings

Policy benefit

Including performance income from actively completing business transactions

additional income from supervisionand regulation violations

Including improve the efficiency of public affairs and enhance the

credibility of the benefits

Including precision service level flat management structure trust confirmationand reduce the loss of privacy information

disclosure etc

Figure 5 Analysis of the operational income of smart government projects based on blockchain technology

Smart government project

Local government Functional departments

Society Enterprises and other organizations

Development operation and maintenance

company

Block chain technology provider

Integrated business dockingand business handling

Smart government project development and operation and maintenance contract performance

Smart government business function demand collection

System security

Technical service contract performance

Data security

Technical feedback

Operation process supervision and management

Business handling requirements

Business handling and process management

Technical services

Consultation requestConsultation

request

Technical services

Technical support

Data information

resources

Technical support

Operation and

maintenance requirements

Improved public service

efficiency and

credibility

Accurate service

capability improvement

and trust confirmation

Figure 6 Framework diagram of the collaborative governance organization structure of smart government projects with blockchaintechnology

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 7

departments do not choose ldquoblockchain + government ser-vicesrdquo technology that the local government does loosesupervision and that end users do not use smart governmentplatform respectively

C4 refers to the cost paid by the functional departmentswhen they do not choose blockchain + government servicestechnology strategies I2 and βS2 respectively represent thebenefit increase that the functional departments can obtainby drawing upon blockchain + government services tech-nology C3 represents the cost of functional departmentswhen they comply with blockchain + government servicestechnology strategy

C2 denotes cost paid by the local government whenthey do not choose strict supervision C1 represents costpaid by the local government when they choose strictsupervision Under functional departments choosingnegative strategy A1 and αS1 respectively represent thebenefit increase of the government when the governmentfollows the ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategies Under end userschoosing use strategy P1 represent punishments paid bythe government when the government adopts the ldquoLoosesupervisionrdquo strategy

C5 represents cost paid by the end users when they donot exploit smart government platform I3 denotes the utilityincrease of the end users when they follow smart govern-ment platform When local governments select ldquoLoose su-pervisionrdquo strategies the end users can suffer P1 from a lossof privacy

Under blockchain + government services technology thecoefficient of improving the precision service level for thefunctional departments is β when they follow positivestrategies e coefficient of optimizing the flat managementefficiency of the public management structure for the localgovernment is α when they select strict supervision strate-gies e coefficient of empowering trust for the end users isc when they comply with strategies According to the actualsituation we suppose that 0 leα β c le1 e correspondingparameters are listed in Table 1

42 Model Construction Based on the mentioned modelassumptions the present study builds a three-party payoffmatrix of functional departments local government andend users e first second and third functions representthe functional departmentsrsquo payoff the payoff of localgovernment and the payoff of end users respectively especific form of the payoff matrix of each party is listed inTable 2

4219e Construction of the Expected Return Function of AllParties(1) Revenue Analysis of Functional Departments Accordingto the return matrix listed in Table 2 the benefits of positivestrategy and negative strategy employed by functional de-partments are the following equations respectively

Ex yz I2 minus C3 + βS2( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C3( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

I2 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yzβS2

(1)

E1minus x yz I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

I2 minus C4 minus yP4

(2)

Average revenue of functional department is as follows

E xEx +(1 minus x)E1minus x (3)

(2) Revenue Analysis of Local Government e fitness oflocal government that adopt strict supervision strategy andloose supervision strategy is written as follows

Uy xz I1 minus C1 + αS1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I1 minus C2( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

(4)

U1minus y xz I1 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I2 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I2 minus C2( 1113857

I1 minus C2 minus zP1

(5)

Average revenue of local government is as follows

U yUy +(1 minus y)U1minus y (6)

(3) Revenue Analysis of End Users e fitness of end usersthat adopt use strategy and nonuse strategy is expressed asfollows

Vz xy I3 minus cS3( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) I3 minus P3( 1113857 + y(1 minus x)I3

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I3 minus P3( 1113857 I3 +(y minus 1)P3 + xycS3(7)

V1minus z xy minus C5( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 + y(1 minus x) minus C5( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 minus C5(8)

Average revenue of end user is as follows

V zVz +(1 minus z)V1minus z (9)

422 9e Replication Dynamic Equation of 9ree-PartyEvolutionary Game(1) Replication Dynamic Equation of Functional Depart-ments According to equations (1)ndash(3) the replication dy-namic equation of functional departments adopting theldquoPositiverdquo strategy is defined as follows

8 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

F(x) dx

dt x Ex minus E( 1113857 x(1 minus x) Ex minus E1minus x( 1113857

x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(10)

(2) Replication Dynamic Equation of Local GovernmentAccording to equations (4)ndash(6) the replication dynamicequation of ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategy adopted by localgovernment is as follows

F(y) dy

dt y Uy minus U1113872 1113873 y(1 minus y) Uy minus U1minus y1113872 1113873

y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(11)

(3) Replication Dynamic Equation of End Users According

to equations (7)ndash(9) the replication dynamic equation ofldquoUserdquo strategy adopted by end user is expressed as follows

F(z) dz

dt z Vz minus V1minus z( 1113857

z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

(12)

43 Model Analysis

431 Evolution Path and Stability Analysis of 9ree-PartyAgent Strategy In accordance with the stability theorem ofdifferential equation the stable point of the replicationdynamic equation should be located at the zero point wherethe first derivative is less than zero ie it should be writtenas follows

d(F(x))

dxlt 0 | F(x) 0 x isin [0 1] (13)

Table 1 Main parameters and their meaning

Game player Sign Variable

Functionaldepartment

I2 Performance benefits of smart government platform business processingC3 Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing

C4Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processing

expenditureP4 When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortionΒ Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departmentsS2 Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departmentsP2 Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses

Local government

I1 Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operationC1 e cost of strict supervisionC2 e cost of loose supervision

P1When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages the

governmentrsquos credibility

A1When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments are

foundA Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public management structureS1 Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public management structure

End user

I3 e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platformC5 Still choose the total cost of business hall processingP3 When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use the platformΓ e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology

S3Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determine the

benefits of rights

Table 2 Payment matrix of functional departments local governments and end users

Functional departmentPositive (x) Negative (1-x)

End userUse (z) Nonuse (1-z) Use (z) Nonuse (1-z)

Local government

Strict supervision (y)I1 minus C1 + αS1 I1 minus C1 I1 minus C1 +A1 I1 minus C1 +A1I2 minus C3 + βS2 I2 minus C3 I2 minus C4 minus P4 I2 minus C4 minus P4I3 + cS3 minus C5 I3 minus C5

Loose supervision (1-y)I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2 I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C4 I2 minus C2I3 minus P3 minus C5 I3 minus P3 minus C5

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 9

Subsequently the evolution and stability strategies of thethree main agents of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users can be discussed

(1) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Functional Depart-mentse first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with positive strategy for x can be determined byequation (10)

zF(x)

zx (1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(14)

If we set

Πx C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (15)

and from Πx 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P2 + C3 minus C4

P2 + P4 + zβS2 (16)

en we have Conclusion 1 enun_Conclusion_1

Conclusion 1 When Πx gt 0 the positive strategy of func-tional departments is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πx lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Furthermorethe probability of x increases while the probability of y and zis elevated

Theorem 1 Πx 0 is the dividing line of the stable state offunctional departments (see Figure 7(a)) According to thestability theorem of the differential equation whenΠx gt 0 hasF(x)prime gt 0 F(x)

prime lt 0 it indicates the stable state of positivestrategy of functional departments while the negative strategyis unstable (see Figure 7(b)) Likewise when Πx lt 0 hasF(x)prime(0)lt 0 F(x)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the negative strategyof the functional departments is in a stable state while thepositive strategy is unstable (see Figure 7(c))

When ygt λy (F(x)dx)|x1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 1In other words functional departments are inclined to followa positive strategy under the probability of y higher than λy

When ylt λy (F(x)dx)|x0lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 0In other words functional departments tend to select anegative strategy when the probability of y is lower than λyLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and x

As revealed from the results the decision-makingbehaviour of functional departments is affected by nu-merous factors According to the formula the positivedecision (x) of functional departments increases with theincrease in local governmentsrsquo strict supervision strategy(y) and end user use strategy (z) Besides the smaller thedifference between the cost expenditure of optimizingsmart government business by positively using blockchaintechnology and the cost expenditure of negatively usingblockchain technology the higher the distortion loss ofmass data collection and processing attributed to not

using blockchain technology and the higher the systemsecurity problem and the precision service incomebrought by blockchain technology when local govern-ments are lax in supervision the higher the possibility forfunctional departments will choose the positive strategy

(2) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Local Governmente first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with strict supervision strategy for y can be ob-tained according to equation (11)

zF(y)

zy (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(17)

If

Πy C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + zxαS1 (18)

and from Πy 0 the following equation is yielded

λx C1 minus C2 minus A1 minus zP1

zαS1 minus A1 (19)

en we have Conclusion 2 enun_Conclusion_2

Conclusion 2 When Πy gt 0 the strict supervision strategyof local government is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πy lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Moreover theprobability of y increases while the probability of x and z iselevated

Theorem 2 Πy 0 is the boundary line of the stable state oflocal government (see Figure 8(a)) According to the stabilitytheorem of the differential equation when Πy gt 0 hasF(y)prime (0)gt 0 F(y)

prime (1)lt 0 it indicates that the local government isin a stable state when strict supervision strategy is adopted whilethe loose supervision strategy is unstable (see Figure 8(b))Likewise when Πy lt 0 has F(y)

prime(0)lt 0 F(y)prime(1)gt 0 this indi-

cates that local government is in a stable state when it choose loosesupervision strategy while strict supervision strategy is unstable(see Figure 8(c))

When xgt λx(dF(y)dy)|y1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the local government is y 1 Inother words local government tends to select a strict su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is higher than λx

When xlt λx (dF(y)dy)|y0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the local government is y 0 Inother words local government tends to select a loose su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is lower than λxLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and y

As revealed from the analysis results the decision-making behaviour of the local government is affected bymany factorse formula shows that the local governmentrsquosstrict supervision (y) and decision-making will increase withthe increase in the positive strategy (x) of the functionaldepartment and the end user strategy (z) Besides thesmaller the difference between the cost of strict supervision

10 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

by local governments and the cost of lax supervision thegreater the extra benefit from the irregularities of functionaldepartments under strict supervision e risk of data se-curity attributed to government neglect of supervision

damages the credibility of the government and the increaseof the income from the flat management of functional de-partments actively using blockchain technology to optimizethe public management structure which will directly affect

x

ζ6 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1(0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)Sx

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)ζ5 (0 1 0)

Sx

(c)

Figure 7 Functional department stability evolution phase diagram

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (011)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(c)

Figure 8 Phase diagram of local government stability evolution

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 11

the improvement of the willingness of local governments tomake final strict supervision decisions

(3) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of End Users e firstpartial derivative of the replication dynamic equation withstrict supervision strategy for y can be obtained according toequation (12)

zF(z)

zz (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (20)

If we set

Πz I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (21)

and from Πz 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P3 minus C5 minus I3

P3 + xcS3 (22)

en we have Conclusion 3enun_Conclusion_3

Conclusion 3 When Πz gt 0 the use strategy of end users isthe evolutionary stability strategy when Πz lt 0 the nonusestrategy of end users is an evolutionary stability strategyMoreover the probability of z increases while the probabilityof x and y increases

Theorem 3 Πz 0 is the dividing line of end usersrsquo stable state(see Figure 9(a)) Under the stability theorem of the differentialequation when Πz gt 0 has F(z)

prime(0)gt 0 F(z)prime(1)lt 0 it indicates

that end users use the smart government platform in a stable state(see Figure 9(b)) Likewise when Πz lt 0 hasF(z)prime(0)lt 0 F(z)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the end user does notuse the strategy in a stable state but the use strategy is unstable(see Figure 9(c))

When ygt λy (dF(z)dz)|z1lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 1 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a use strategy whenthe probability of y is higher than λy

When ylt λy (dF(z)dz)|z0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 0 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a nonuse strategywhen the probability of y is lower than λy Likewise we canprove the relationship between x and z

As suggested from the analysis results for the end usersit can be seen from the formula that the use of decision (z)increases with the increase in positive strategy (x) offunctional departments and strict supervision strategy (y) oflocal government e greater the comprehensive incomeand the total cost when not in use the greater the creditconfirmation income and privacy risk loss obtained by theuser when using the blockchain technology and the higherthe possibility of end users choosing the use strategy

432 Stability Analysis of Evolution Strategy under theAction of 9ree Parties Set P(x y z) (dxdt)G(x y z) (dydt) and Q(x y z) (dzdt) then equa-tions (10)ndash(12) express the group dynamics of the evolution

system of functional departments local government and endusers as written in the following equation

P(x y z) dx

dt x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

G(x y z) dy

dt y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

Q(x y z) dz

dt z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(23)

Set

H(E)

P(x y z)

G(x y z)

Q(x y z)

⎧⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎩ 0 (24)

and there are 12 equilibrium points for the system repli-cation dynamic equation However complying with theliterature [44] only 8 special equilibrium points should bediscussed for the replication dynamic system as follows

ξ1

00

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ2

10

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ3

11

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ4

11

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ5

01

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ6

01

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ7

00

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ8

10

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

(25)

e evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) for replicatingthe dynamic equation system is formulated based on thelocal stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix of the systemwith the method proposed by Friedman Moreover the

12 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Jacobian matrix of the system is obtained from equation (23)as follows

J

(1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)x P4 + P2 + zβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)xyβS2

y(1 minus y) zαS1 minus A1( 1113857 (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857 y(1 minus y) P1 + xαS1( 1113857

z(z minus 1)ycS3 z(z minus 1) P3 + xcS3( 1113857 (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

(26)

According to the replication dynamic equation system(13) the local equilibrium point is yielded as followsξ1(0 0 0) ξ2(1 0 0) ξ3(1 1 0) ξ4(1 1 1) ξ5(0 1 0)ξ6(0 1 1) ξ7(0 0 1) ξ8(1 0 1) By complying with Lya-punov stability theorem when all eigenvalues (λ) of theJacobian matrix satisfy λlt 0 the equilibrium point is theasymptotically stable at is the confluence When all ei-genvalues of the Jacobian matrix satisfy λgt 0 the equilib-rium point is unstable which is the source Furthermore forthe Jacobian matrix the eigenvalues (λ) mixed states Inother words some are positive while others are negativeen the equilibrium point also termed as the saddle pointis unstable First for the case where the equilibrium point isξ1(0 0 0) the Jacobian matrix is as follows

J1

C4 minus C3 minus P2 0 0

0 C2 minus C1 + A1 0

0 0 I3 + C5 minus P3

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (27)

It is therefore indicated that the eigenvalues of the Ja-cobian matrix are λ1 C4 minus C3 minus P2 λ2 C2 minus C1 + A1 andλ3 I3 + C5 minus P3 With the identical analogy the 8 equi-librium points are substituted into the Jacobian matrix (26)respectively and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

corresponding to the equilibrium points can be determinedrespectively (Table 3)

According to the mentioned analysis the evolutionarygame system has stability under certain conditions How-ever many parameters are accordingly involved and thecharacteristic value (λ) symbol is determined by the size ofthe mentioned parameter values Under the existing knownmathematical derivation method the stability of each of theNash equilibrium is determined and the evolutionary gamemodel cannot effectively lead to the reach steady stateequilibrium Accordingly this article further employs sys-tem dynamics to analyse the impact of various uncertainfactors on the evolution of the game and lays a basis forformulating relevant policies

5 System Dynamics Simulation Analysis

e above paragraphs analyzed the interaction of the threesubjects in the strategic choice and the influence of externalvariables on the stability of the evolutionary game oughsome conclusions have been drawn they are all analysesconducted from the perspective of a single subject lackingsystematic and comprehensive analysis from the perspectiveof three subjects In the 1950s Fletcher of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology initially adopted the theory of

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(b)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(c)

Figure 9 End user stability evolution phase diagram

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 13

management science and systems science and incorporatedcomputerized simulation technology into quantitative an-alyses to develop a system dynamics theory method It isprimarily adopted to study system problems with highnonlinearity as characterized by multivariate causal feed-back and complex time-varying

us to systematically and deeply analyse the strategicinteraction between different agents the present study usesthe system dynamics theory to build a dynamic model of anintelligent government collaborative governance systembased on blockchain technology and the simulation ofsystem dynamics with VENSIM PLE simulation software isemployed to analyse the evolution of the strategicinteraction

51 Based on the SD Model of ldquoBlockchain +GovernmentAffairs Servicerdquo in Beijing Since November 2019 BeijingMunicipal Government Service Bureau Beijing MunicipalScience and Technology Commission and BeijingMunicipalBureau of Economy and Information Technology have ledthe implementation of the Action Plan on the application ofblockchain in the field of Government Services e BeijingMunicipal Bureau of Commerce and other departments asthe responsible units have vigorously propelled the appli-cation construction of blockchain in government services inthe four pilot areas of the city By August 2020 140 gov-ernment affairs services have been connected in Beijing 253business affairs and 65 human affairs have been settledonline and 100000 pieces of administrative materials can besimplified throughout the year ere have been 121 en-terprises having used the blockchain system to query andverify various functions for nearly 7800 times e reporteddata have been down-regulated by 80 and the averagematerial has decreased by 40

is study combines the specific application scenarios ofblockchain pilots in Haidian Xicheng Chaoyang Shunyiand other blockchain pilots in the ldquoBlue Book on the Ap-plication of Blockchain in Municipal Services in Beijing(First Edition)rdquo issued by the Beijing Municipal Adminis-tration in July 2020 Vensim PLE software is employed tobuild the system dynamics model of the evolutionary gamebetween functional departments local governments andend users (see Figure 10)

52 Initial SimulationAnalysis According to the applicationpractice of the blockchain in the government service field of

Beijing the initial value of the model is assumed as followsINITIAL TIME 0 FINAL TIME 20 TIME-STEP 00625 and Units for Time Month and the 16external variables are assigned as shown in Table 4

Since the three participating agents of functionaldepartments local governments and end users have twokinds of strategy choices 0 and 1 this constitutes 8strategy combinations namely (0 0 0) (0 0 1) (0 1 0)(1 0 0) (1 1 0) (1 0 1) (0 1 1) and (1 1 1) When theinitial states of the three parties are pure strategies thesystem is in equilibrium At this time no one party iswilling to actively change the existing strategies and thementioned eight strategy combinations will become theequilibrium state of the system However this state is notstable as long as there is a small change in one or moresubjects in the system and the system will lose theequilibrium state We take the combination of (0 0 1)strategy as an example to illustrate and its evolutionresults are shown in Figure 11(a) is figure indicates thatthe initial probabilities of the functional departmentschoosing the positive strategy and the local governmentchoosing the strict supervision strategy are very low (both001) in the game process when the participants find thatthere are more profitable strategy choices in the system itwill adjust the original strategy and through the con-tinuous learning and imitating between the subjects thesystem can lastly reach a novel equilibrium state

e simulation of 8 pure strategy combinations issummarized as follows①No matter the positive strategy ofthe functional departments starts from 0 to 001 or from 1 to099 and its strategy choice will eventually reach an equi-librium state at 1 It is therefore revealed that in smartgovernment projects functional departments actively drawupon the smart government platform under the blockchaintechnology to complete the business which is the optimalchoice Only the active use of blockchain technology tooptimize the existing platform workflow can ensure itsmaximum revenue ② Under functional departmentsadopting positive strategies if the local government adopts astrategy of loose supervision no matter whether the endusers change from 0 or 1 the final strategy is 1 ie (1 0 0)and (1 0 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations refers to (1 0 1) (see Figure 11(b)) If the localgovernment carries out strict regulation the end users willmutate from 0 or 1 and the final strategy will be 1 namely(1 1 0) and (1 1 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations is (1 1 1) (see Figure 11(c))

Table 3 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

Equilibrium point λ1 λ2 λ3ζ1 (0 0 0) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ2 (1 0 0) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ3 (1 1 0) minus (C4minus C3 + P4) minus (C2minus C1) I3 +C5 + cS3ζ4 (1 1 1) minus (C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2) minus (C2minus C1 +P1 + αS1) minus (I3 +C5 + cS3)ζ5 (0 1 0) C4minus C3 +P4 minus (C2minus C1 +A1) I3 +C5ζ6 (0 1 1) C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2 minus (C2minus C1 +A1 +P1) minus (I3 +C5)ζ7 (0 0 1) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 +P1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)ζ8 (1 0 1) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 + P1 + αS1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)

14 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Moreover it is revealed that the end users have a positiveattitude towards the use of smart government affairs andthey are willing to use the platform to complete businesstransactions As suggested from the analysis through theevolutionary game process of ldquomutation-adjustment-equi-libriumrdquo of the three agents of the game the system willeventually reach the equilibrium state of (1 1 1)

53 SimulationAnalysis of the Impact of ExternalVariables onStrategy Based on the above discussion the value of eachparameter determines whether each strategy combination isthe equilibrium point to make the system stable state andthe impact of external variables on the strategy selection ofthe game subject is analysede following continues to take(0 0 1) strategy combination as an example to discuss

531 Factors of Functional Departmentsrsquo Strategy ChoiceIn the policy combination of (0 0 1) the initial state offunctional departments refers to a negative strategy It isassumed that the functional departments start from theprobability of 001 As indicated from the simulation amongthe 16 external variables the cost of a positive strategy C3the cost of a negative strategy C4 revenue from precisionservices S2 loss of system security risk P2 loss of informationdistortion attributed to mass data collection and processingP4 and the mentioned five external variables will impact thestrategic choice of functional departments In particular

accurate service degree coefficient β should be stressedwhich is the use of blockchain technology to enhance theserviceability of functional departments By regulating thevalue of β the precision income will be affected Under otherinitial values unchanged the evolution result of strategychoice probability of functional departments is analysed (seeFigure 12)

As revealed from the comparison of Figures 12(b) 12(c)and 12(e) C4 P2 and P4 similarly impact the evolution trendof positive strategy choice in functional departments ehigher the cost for functional departments to negativelyexploit blockchain technology the smaller the loss of systemsecurity risk when using blockchain technology and thegreater the loss of information distortion attributed to massdata collection and processing when not using blockchaintechnology the more functional departments will be in-clined to comply with the strategy of positively usingblockchain technology In addition according to thesimulation analysis C3 complexly impacts the strategyselection of functional departments Under the extremelylarge C3 value functional departments are inclined to useblockchain technology negatively in particular when thevalue is smaller the faster the functional departments willreach the stable state of positive strategy It is also revealedthat when functional departments positively exploitblockchain technology to complete smart governmentbusiness the cost acts as a critical factor when the cost istoo high it will impact the choice of their strategies

Positive strategy probabilityof functional departments xChanging rate of

functionaldepartments R(x)t

Positive and negativestrategy expected income

difference Ex-Expected benefits of

functional departmentspositive strategy Ex

Expected benefits offunctional departmentsnegative strategy E(1-x)

Loss of systemsecurity risk P2

The cost of a positivestrategy C3

Revenue fromprecision services S2

Smart government onenet to run performance

gains I2

The cost of anegative strategy C4

Loss of information distortioncaused by mass data collection

and processing P4

Use strategyprobability of end

users z

End users use strategyand nonuse strategy of

expected incomedifference Vz-

The expected revenueof users using the

platform VzThe expected revenueof uesrs nonusing the

platform V(1-z)

The cost of nonusestrategy C5

Privacy securityrisk loss P3

Revenue frompersonalized

customizationservices I3

Strict supervisionprobability of local

government y Changing rate of localgovernment R(y)t

Strict regulation and loosesupervision of expectedincome difference Uy-

Expected benefits of localgovernmentrsquos loosesupervision U(1-y)

Expected benefits oflocal governments strict

sypervision Uy

Find out the illegal operationand get extra income A1

The cost of the strictsupervision C1

Flating managementearnings S1

Operating income of the smartgovernmentrsquos One net to run

platform I1

The cost of the loosesupervision C2

Data security riskscause the loss of

governmentcredibility P1

β

α

γ

The user gets thebenefit of the trust

confirmation S3

Changing rate of endusers R(z)t

Figure 10 System dynamics (SD) model of functional department local government and end user evolutionary game system

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 15

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 8: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

departments do not choose ldquoblockchain + government ser-vicesrdquo technology that the local government does loosesupervision and that end users do not use smart governmentplatform respectively

C4 refers to the cost paid by the functional departmentswhen they do not choose blockchain + government servicestechnology strategies I2 and βS2 respectively represent thebenefit increase that the functional departments can obtainby drawing upon blockchain + government services tech-nology C3 represents the cost of functional departmentswhen they comply with blockchain + government servicestechnology strategy

C2 denotes cost paid by the local government whenthey do not choose strict supervision C1 represents costpaid by the local government when they choose strictsupervision Under functional departments choosingnegative strategy A1 and αS1 respectively represent thebenefit increase of the government when the governmentfollows the ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategies Under end userschoosing use strategy P1 represent punishments paid bythe government when the government adopts the ldquoLoosesupervisionrdquo strategy

C5 represents cost paid by the end users when they donot exploit smart government platform I3 denotes the utilityincrease of the end users when they follow smart govern-ment platform When local governments select ldquoLoose su-pervisionrdquo strategies the end users can suffer P1 from a lossof privacy

Under blockchain + government services technology thecoefficient of improving the precision service level for thefunctional departments is β when they follow positivestrategies e coefficient of optimizing the flat managementefficiency of the public management structure for the localgovernment is α when they select strict supervision strate-gies e coefficient of empowering trust for the end users isc when they comply with strategies According to the actualsituation we suppose that 0 leα β c le1 e correspondingparameters are listed in Table 1

42 Model Construction Based on the mentioned modelassumptions the present study builds a three-party payoffmatrix of functional departments local government andend users e first second and third functions representthe functional departmentsrsquo payoff the payoff of localgovernment and the payoff of end users respectively especific form of the payoff matrix of each party is listed inTable 2

4219e Construction of the Expected Return Function of AllParties(1) Revenue Analysis of Functional Departments Accordingto the return matrix listed in Table 2 the benefits of positivestrategy and negative strategy employed by functional de-partments are the following equations respectively

Ex yz I2 minus C3 + βS2( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C3( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C3 minus P2( 1113857

I2 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yzβS2

(1)

E1minus x yz I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)z I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ y(1 minus z) I2 minus C4 minus P4( 1113857 +(1 minus y)(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

I2 minus C4 minus yP4

(2)

Average revenue of functional department is as follows

E xEx +(1 minus x)E1minus x (3)

(2) Revenue Analysis of Local Government e fitness oflocal government that adopt strict supervision strategy andloose supervision strategy is written as follows

Uy xz I1 minus C1 + αS1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I1 minus C2( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I1 minus C1 + A1( 1113857

(4)

U1minus y xz I1 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857 + x(1 minus z) I2 minus C4( 1113857

+ z(1 minus x) I2 minus C2 minus P1( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I2 minus C2( 1113857

I1 minus C2 minus zP1

(5)

Average revenue of local government is as follows

U yUy +(1 minus y)U1minus y (6)

(3) Revenue Analysis of End Users e fitness of end usersthat adopt use strategy and nonuse strategy is expressed asfollows

Vz xy I3 minus cS3( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) I3 minus P3( 1113857 + y(1 minus x)I3

+(1 minus x)(1 minus z) I3 minus P3( 1113857 I3 +(y minus 1)P3 + xycS3(7)

V1minus z xy minus C5( 1113857 + x(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 + y(1 minus x) minus C5( 1113857

+(1 minus x)(1 minus y) minus C5( 1113857 minus C5(8)

Average revenue of end user is as follows

V zVz +(1 minus z)V1minus z (9)

422 9e Replication Dynamic Equation of 9ree-PartyEvolutionary Game(1) Replication Dynamic Equation of Functional Depart-ments According to equations (1)ndash(3) the replication dy-namic equation of functional departments adopting theldquoPositiverdquo strategy is defined as follows

8 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

F(x) dx

dt x Ex minus E( 1113857 x(1 minus x) Ex minus E1minus x( 1113857

x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(10)

(2) Replication Dynamic Equation of Local GovernmentAccording to equations (4)ndash(6) the replication dynamicequation of ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategy adopted by localgovernment is as follows

F(y) dy

dt y Uy minus U1113872 1113873 y(1 minus y) Uy minus U1minus y1113872 1113873

y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(11)

(3) Replication Dynamic Equation of End Users According

to equations (7)ndash(9) the replication dynamic equation ofldquoUserdquo strategy adopted by end user is expressed as follows

F(z) dz

dt z Vz minus V1minus z( 1113857

z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

(12)

43 Model Analysis

431 Evolution Path and Stability Analysis of 9ree-PartyAgent Strategy In accordance with the stability theorem ofdifferential equation the stable point of the replicationdynamic equation should be located at the zero point wherethe first derivative is less than zero ie it should be writtenas follows

d(F(x))

dxlt 0 | F(x) 0 x isin [0 1] (13)

Table 1 Main parameters and their meaning

Game player Sign Variable

Functionaldepartment

I2 Performance benefits of smart government platform business processingC3 Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing

C4Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processing

expenditureP4 When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortionΒ Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departmentsS2 Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departmentsP2 Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses

Local government

I1 Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operationC1 e cost of strict supervisionC2 e cost of loose supervision

P1When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages the

governmentrsquos credibility

A1When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments are

foundA Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public management structureS1 Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public management structure

End user

I3 e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platformC5 Still choose the total cost of business hall processingP3 When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use the platformΓ e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology

S3Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determine the

benefits of rights

Table 2 Payment matrix of functional departments local governments and end users

Functional departmentPositive (x) Negative (1-x)

End userUse (z) Nonuse (1-z) Use (z) Nonuse (1-z)

Local government

Strict supervision (y)I1 minus C1 + αS1 I1 minus C1 I1 minus C1 +A1 I1 minus C1 +A1I2 minus C3 + βS2 I2 minus C3 I2 minus C4 minus P4 I2 minus C4 minus P4I3 + cS3 minus C5 I3 minus C5

Loose supervision (1-y)I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2 I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C4 I2 minus C2I3 minus P3 minus C5 I3 minus P3 minus C5

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 9

Subsequently the evolution and stability strategies of thethree main agents of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users can be discussed

(1) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Functional Depart-mentse first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with positive strategy for x can be determined byequation (10)

zF(x)

zx (1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(14)

If we set

Πx C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (15)

and from Πx 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P2 + C3 minus C4

P2 + P4 + zβS2 (16)

en we have Conclusion 1 enun_Conclusion_1

Conclusion 1 When Πx gt 0 the positive strategy of func-tional departments is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πx lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Furthermorethe probability of x increases while the probability of y and zis elevated

Theorem 1 Πx 0 is the dividing line of the stable state offunctional departments (see Figure 7(a)) According to thestability theorem of the differential equation whenΠx gt 0 hasF(x)prime gt 0 F(x)

prime lt 0 it indicates the stable state of positivestrategy of functional departments while the negative strategyis unstable (see Figure 7(b)) Likewise when Πx lt 0 hasF(x)prime(0)lt 0 F(x)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the negative strategyof the functional departments is in a stable state while thepositive strategy is unstable (see Figure 7(c))

When ygt λy (F(x)dx)|x1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 1In other words functional departments are inclined to followa positive strategy under the probability of y higher than λy

When ylt λy (F(x)dx)|x0lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 0In other words functional departments tend to select anegative strategy when the probability of y is lower than λyLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and x

As revealed from the results the decision-makingbehaviour of functional departments is affected by nu-merous factors According to the formula the positivedecision (x) of functional departments increases with theincrease in local governmentsrsquo strict supervision strategy(y) and end user use strategy (z) Besides the smaller thedifference between the cost expenditure of optimizingsmart government business by positively using blockchaintechnology and the cost expenditure of negatively usingblockchain technology the higher the distortion loss ofmass data collection and processing attributed to not

using blockchain technology and the higher the systemsecurity problem and the precision service incomebrought by blockchain technology when local govern-ments are lax in supervision the higher the possibility forfunctional departments will choose the positive strategy

(2) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Local Governmente first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with strict supervision strategy for y can be ob-tained according to equation (11)

zF(y)

zy (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(17)

If

Πy C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + zxαS1 (18)

and from Πy 0 the following equation is yielded

λx C1 minus C2 minus A1 minus zP1

zαS1 minus A1 (19)

en we have Conclusion 2 enun_Conclusion_2

Conclusion 2 When Πy gt 0 the strict supervision strategyof local government is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πy lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Moreover theprobability of y increases while the probability of x and z iselevated

Theorem 2 Πy 0 is the boundary line of the stable state oflocal government (see Figure 8(a)) According to the stabilitytheorem of the differential equation when Πy gt 0 hasF(y)prime (0)gt 0 F(y)

prime (1)lt 0 it indicates that the local government isin a stable state when strict supervision strategy is adopted whilethe loose supervision strategy is unstable (see Figure 8(b))Likewise when Πy lt 0 has F(y)

prime(0)lt 0 F(y)prime(1)gt 0 this indi-

cates that local government is in a stable state when it choose loosesupervision strategy while strict supervision strategy is unstable(see Figure 8(c))

When xgt λx(dF(y)dy)|y1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the local government is y 1 Inother words local government tends to select a strict su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is higher than λx

When xlt λx (dF(y)dy)|y0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the local government is y 0 Inother words local government tends to select a loose su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is lower than λxLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and y

As revealed from the analysis results the decision-making behaviour of the local government is affected bymany factorse formula shows that the local governmentrsquosstrict supervision (y) and decision-making will increase withthe increase in the positive strategy (x) of the functionaldepartment and the end user strategy (z) Besides thesmaller the difference between the cost of strict supervision

10 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

by local governments and the cost of lax supervision thegreater the extra benefit from the irregularities of functionaldepartments under strict supervision e risk of data se-curity attributed to government neglect of supervision

damages the credibility of the government and the increaseof the income from the flat management of functional de-partments actively using blockchain technology to optimizethe public management structure which will directly affect

x

ζ6 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1(0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)Sx

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)ζ5 (0 1 0)

Sx

(c)

Figure 7 Functional department stability evolution phase diagram

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (011)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(c)

Figure 8 Phase diagram of local government stability evolution

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 11

the improvement of the willingness of local governments tomake final strict supervision decisions

(3) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of End Users e firstpartial derivative of the replication dynamic equation withstrict supervision strategy for y can be obtained according toequation (12)

zF(z)

zz (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (20)

If we set

Πz I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (21)

and from Πz 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P3 minus C5 minus I3

P3 + xcS3 (22)

en we have Conclusion 3enun_Conclusion_3

Conclusion 3 When Πz gt 0 the use strategy of end users isthe evolutionary stability strategy when Πz lt 0 the nonusestrategy of end users is an evolutionary stability strategyMoreover the probability of z increases while the probabilityof x and y increases

Theorem 3 Πz 0 is the dividing line of end usersrsquo stable state(see Figure 9(a)) Under the stability theorem of the differentialequation when Πz gt 0 has F(z)

prime(0)gt 0 F(z)prime(1)lt 0 it indicates

that end users use the smart government platform in a stable state(see Figure 9(b)) Likewise when Πz lt 0 hasF(z)prime(0)lt 0 F(z)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the end user does notuse the strategy in a stable state but the use strategy is unstable(see Figure 9(c))

When ygt λy (dF(z)dz)|z1lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 1 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a use strategy whenthe probability of y is higher than λy

When ylt λy (dF(z)dz)|z0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 0 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a nonuse strategywhen the probability of y is lower than λy Likewise we canprove the relationship between x and z

As suggested from the analysis results for the end usersit can be seen from the formula that the use of decision (z)increases with the increase in positive strategy (x) offunctional departments and strict supervision strategy (y) oflocal government e greater the comprehensive incomeand the total cost when not in use the greater the creditconfirmation income and privacy risk loss obtained by theuser when using the blockchain technology and the higherthe possibility of end users choosing the use strategy

432 Stability Analysis of Evolution Strategy under theAction of 9ree Parties Set P(x y z) (dxdt)G(x y z) (dydt) and Q(x y z) (dzdt) then equa-tions (10)ndash(12) express the group dynamics of the evolution

system of functional departments local government and endusers as written in the following equation

P(x y z) dx

dt x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

G(x y z) dy

dt y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

Q(x y z) dz

dt z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(23)

Set

H(E)

P(x y z)

G(x y z)

Q(x y z)

⎧⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎩ 0 (24)

and there are 12 equilibrium points for the system repli-cation dynamic equation However complying with theliterature [44] only 8 special equilibrium points should bediscussed for the replication dynamic system as follows

ξ1

00

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ2

10

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ3

11

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ4

11

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ5

01

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ6

01

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ7

00

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ8

10

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

(25)

e evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) for replicatingthe dynamic equation system is formulated based on thelocal stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix of the systemwith the method proposed by Friedman Moreover the

12 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Jacobian matrix of the system is obtained from equation (23)as follows

J

(1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)x P4 + P2 + zβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)xyβS2

y(1 minus y) zαS1 minus A1( 1113857 (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857 y(1 minus y) P1 + xαS1( 1113857

z(z minus 1)ycS3 z(z minus 1) P3 + xcS3( 1113857 (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

(26)

According to the replication dynamic equation system(13) the local equilibrium point is yielded as followsξ1(0 0 0) ξ2(1 0 0) ξ3(1 1 0) ξ4(1 1 1) ξ5(0 1 0)ξ6(0 1 1) ξ7(0 0 1) ξ8(1 0 1) By complying with Lya-punov stability theorem when all eigenvalues (λ) of theJacobian matrix satisfy λlt 0 the equilibrium point is theasymptotically stable at is the confluence When all ei-genvalues of the Jacobian matrix satisfy λgt 0 the equilib-rium point is unstable which is the source Furthermore forthe Jacobian matrix the eigenvalues (λ) mixed states Inother words some are positive while others are negativeen the equilibrium point also termed as the saddle pointis unstable First for the case where the equilibrium point isξ1(0 0 0) the Jacobian matrix is as follows

J1

C4 minus C3 minus P2 0 0

0 C2 minus C1 + A1 0

0 0 I3 + C5 minus P3

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (27)

It is therefore indicated that the eigenvalues of the Ja-cobian matrix are λ1 C4 minus C3 minus P2 λ2 C2 minus C1 + A1 andλ3 I3 + C5 minus P3 With the identical analogy the 8 equi-librium points are substituted into the Jacobian matrix (26)respectively and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

corresponding to the equilibrium points can be determinedrespectively (Table 3)

According to the mentioned analysis the evolutionarygame system has stability under certain conditions How-ever many parameters are accordingly involved and thecharacteristic value (λ) symbol is determined by the size ofthe mentioned parameter values Under the existing knownmathematical derivation method the stability of each of theNash equilibrium is determined and the evolutionary gamemodel cannot effectively lead to the reach steady stateequilibrium Accordingly this article further employs sys-tem dynamics to analyse the impact of various uncertainfactors on the evolution of the game and lays a basis forformulating relevant policies

5 System Dynamics Simulation Analysis

e above paragraphs analyzed the interaction of the threesubjects in the strategic choice and the influence of externalvariables on the stability of the evolutionary game oughsome conclusions have been drawn they are all analysesconducted from the perspective of a single subject lackingsystematic and comprehensive analysis from the perspectiveof three subjects In the 1950s Fletcher of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology initially adopted the theory of

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(b)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(c)

Figure 9 End user stability evolution phase diagram

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 13

management science and systems science and incorporatedcomputerized simulation technology into quantitative an-alyses to develop a system dynamics theory method It isprimarily adopted to study system problems with highnonlinearity as characterized by multivariate causal feed-back and complex time-varying

us to systematically and deeply analyse the strategicinteraction between different agents the present study usesthe system dynamics theory to build a dynamic model of anintelligent government collaborative governance systembased on blockchain technology and the simulation ofsystem dynamics with VENSIM PLE simulation software isemployed to analyse the evolution of the strategicinteraction

51 Based on the SD Model of ldquoBlockchain +GovernmentAffairs Servicerdquo in Beijing Since November 2019 BeijingMunicipal Government Service Bureau Beijing MunicipalScience and Technology Commission and BeijingMunicipalBureau of Economy and Information Technology have ledthe implementation of the Action Plan on the application ofblockchain in the field of Government Services e BeijingMunicipal Bureau of Commerce and other departments asthe responsible units have vigorously propelled the appli-cation construction of blockchain in government services inthe four pilot areas of the city By August 2020 140 gov-ernment affairs services have been connected in Beijing 253business affairs and 65 human affairs have been settledonline and 100000 pieces of administrative materials can besimplified throughout the year ere have been 121 en-terprises having used the blockchain system to query andverify various functions for nearly 7800 times e reporteddata have been down-regulated by 80 and the averagematerial has decreased by 40

is study combines the specific application scenarios ofblockchain pilots in Haidian Xicheng Chaoyang Shunyiand other blockchain pilots in the ldquoBlue Book on the Ap-plication of Blockchain in Municipal Services in Beijing(First Edition)rdquo issued by the Beijing Municipal Adminis-tration in July 2020 Vensim PLE software is employed tobuild the system dynamics model of the evolutionary gamebetween functional departments local governments andend users (see Figure 10)

52 Initial SimulationAnalysis According to the applicationpractice of the blockchain in the government service field of

Beijing the initial value of the model is assumed as followsINITIAL TIME 0 FINAL TIME 20 TIME-STEP 00625 and Units for Time Month and the 16external variables are assigned as shown in Table 4

Since the three participating agents of functionaldepartments local governments and end users have twokinds of strategy choices 0 and 1 this constitutes 8strategy combinations namely (0 0 0) (0 0 1) (0 1 0)(1 0 0) (1 1 0) (1 0 1) (0 1 1) and (1 1 1) When theinitial states of the three parties are pure strategies thesystem is in equilibrium At this time no one party iswilling to actively change the existing strategies and thementioned eight strategy combinations will become theequilibrium state of the system However this state is notstable as long as there is a small change in one or moresubjects in the system and the system will lose theequilibrium state We take the combination of (0 0 1)strategy as an example to illustrate and its evolutionresults are shown in Figure 11(a) is figure indicates thatthe initial probabilities of the functional departmentschoosing the positive strategy and the local governmentchoosing the strict supervision strategy are very low (both001) in the game process when the participants find thatthere are more profitable strategy choices in the system itwill adjust the original strategy and through the con-tinuous learning and imitating between the subjects thesystem can lastly reach a novel equilibrium state

e simulation of 8 pure strategy combinations issummarized as follows①No matter the positive strategy ofthe functional departments starts from 0 to 001 or from 1 to099 and its strategy choice will eventually reach an equi-librium state at 1 It is therefore revealed that in smartgovernment projects functional departments actively drawupon the smart government platform under the blockchaintechnology to complete the business which is the optimalchoice Only the active use of blockchain technology tooptimize the existing platform workflow can ensure itsmaximum revenue ② Under functional departmentsadopting positive strategies if the local government adopts astrategy of loose supervision no matter whether the endusers change from 0 or 1 the final strategy is 1 ie (1 0 0)and (1 0 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations refers to (1 0 1) (see Figure 11(b)) If the localgovernment carries out strict regulation the end users willmutate from 0 or 1 and the final strategy will be 1 namely(1 1 0) and (1 1 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations is (1 1 1) (see Figure 11(c))

Table 3 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

Equilibrium point λ1 λ2 λ3ζ1 (0 0 0) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ2 (1 0 0) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ3 (1 1 0) minus (C4minus C3 + P4) minus (C2minus C1) I3 +C5 + cS3ζ4 (1 1 1) minus (C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2) minus (C2minus C1 +P1 + αS1) minus (I3 +C5 + cS3)ζ5 (0 1 0) C4minus C3 +P4 minus (C2minus C1 +A1) I3 +C5ζ6 (0 1 1) C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2 minus (C2minus C1 +A1 +P1) minus (I3 +C5)ζ7 (0 0 1) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 +P1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)ζ8 (1 0 1) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 + P1 + αS1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)

14 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Moreover it is revealed that the end users have a positiveattitude towards the use of smart government affairs andthey are willing to use the platform to complete businesstransactions As suggested from the analysis through theevolutionary game process of ldquomutation-adjustment-equi-libriumrdquo of the three agents of the game the system willeventually reach the equilibrium state of (1 1 1)

53 SimulationAnalysis of the Impact of ExternalVariables onStrategy Based on the above discussion the value of eachparameter determines whether each strategy combination isthe equilibrium point to make the system stable state andthe impact of external variables on the strategy selection ofthe game subject is analysede following continues to take(0 0 1) strategy combination as an example to discuss

531 Factors of Functional Departmentsrsquo Strategy ChoiceIn the policy combination of (0 0 1) the initial state offunctional departments refers to a negative strategy It isassumed that the functional departments start from theprobability of 001 As indicated from the simulation amongthe 16 external variables the cost of a positive strategy C3the cost of a negative strategy C4 revenue from precisionservices S2 loss of system security risk P2 loss of informationdistortion attributed to mass data collection and processingP4 and the mentioned five external variables will impact thestrategic choice of functional departments In particular

accurate service degree coefficient β should be stressedwhich is the use of blockchain technology to enhance theserviceability of functional departments By regulating thevalue of β the precision income will be affected Under otherinitial values unchanged the evolution result of strategychoice probability of functional departments is analysed (seeFigure 12)

As revealed from the comparison of Figures 12(b) 12(c)and 12(e) C4 P2 and P4 similarly impact the evolution trendof positive strategy choice in functional departments ehigher the cost for functional departments to negativelyexploit blockchain technology the smaller the loss of systemsecurity risk when using blockchain technology and thegreater the loss of information distortion attributed to massdata collection and processing when not using blockchaintechnology the more functional departments will be in-clined to comply with the strategy of positively usingblockchain technology In addition according to thesimulation analysis C3 complexly impacts the strategyselection of functional departments Under the extremelylarge C3 value functional departments are inclined to useblockchain technology negatively in particular when thevalue is smaller the faster the functional departments willreach the stable state of positive strategy It is also revealedthat when functional departments positively exploitblockchain technology to complete smart governmentbusiness the cost acts as a critical factor when the cost istoo high it will impact the choice of their strategies

Positive strategy probabilityof functional departments xChanging rate of

functionaldepartments R(x)t

Positive and negativestrategy expected income

difference Ex-Expected benefits of

functional departmentspositive strategy Ex

Expected benefits offunctional departmentsnegative strategy E(1-x)

Loss of systemsecurity risk P2

The cost of a positivestrategy C3

Revenue fromprecision services S2

Smart government onenet to run performance

gains I2

The cost of anegative strategy C4

Loss of information distortioncaused by mass data collection

and processing P4

Use strategyprobability of end

users z

End users use strategyand nonuse strategy of

expected incomedifference Vz-

The expected revenueof users using the

platform VzThe expected revenueof uesrs nonusing the

platform V(1-z)

The cost of nonusestrategy C5

Privacy securityrisk loss P3

Revenue frompersonalized

customizationservices I3

Strict supervisionprobability of local

government y Changing rate of localgovernment R(y)t

Strict regulation and loosesupervision of expectedincome difference Uy-

Expected benefits of localgovernmentrsquos loosesupervision U(1-y)

Expected benefits oflocal governments strict

sypervision Uy

Find out the illegal operationand get extra income A1

The cost of the strictsupervision C1

Flating managementearnings S1

Operating income of the smartgovernmentrsquos One net to run

platform I1

The cost of the loosesupervision C2

Data security riskscause the loss of

governmentcredibility P1

β

α

γ

The user gets thebenefit of the trust

confirmation S3

Changing rate of endusers R(z)t

Figure 10 System dynamics (SD) model of functional department local government and end user evolutionary game system

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 15

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 9: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

F(x) dx

dt x Ex minus E( 1113857 x(1 minus x) Ex minus E1minus x( 1113857

x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(10)

(2) Replication Dynamic Equation of Local GovernmentAccording to equations (4)ndash(6) the replication dynamicequation of ldquostrict supervisionrdquo strategy adopted by localgovernment is as follows

F(y) dy

dt y Uy minus U1113872 1113873 y(1 minus y) Uy minus U1minus y1113872 1113873

y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(11)

(3) Replication Dynamic Equation of End Users According

to equations (7)ndash(9) the replication dynamic equation ofldquoUserdquo strategy adopted by end user is expressed as follows

F(z) dz

dt z Vz minus V1minus z( 1113857

z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

(12)

43 Model Analysis

431 Evolution Path and Stability Analysis of 9ree-PartyAgent Strategy In accordance with the stability theorem ofdifferential equation the stable point of the replicationdynamic equation should be located at the zero point wherethe first derivative is less than zero ie it should be writtenas follows

d(F(x))

dxlt 0 | F(x) 0 x isin [0 1] (13)

Table 1 Main parameters and their meaning

Game player Sign Variable

Functionaldepartment

I2 Performance benefits of smart government platform business processingC3 Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing

C4Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processing

expenditureP4 When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortionΒ Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departmentsS2 Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departmentsP2 Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses

Local government

I1 Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operationC1 e cost of strict supervisionC2 e cost of loose supervision

P1When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages the

governmentrsquos credibility

A1When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments are

foundA Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public management structureS1 Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public management structure

End user

I3 e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platformC5 Still choose the total cost of business hall processingP3 When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use the platformΓ e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology

S3Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determine the

benefits of rights

Table 2 Payment matrix of functional departments local governments and end users

Functional departmentPositive (x) Negative (1-x)

End userUse (z) Nonuse (1-z) Use (z) Nonuse (1-z)

Local government

Strict supervision (y)I1 minus C1 + αS1 I1 minus C1 I1 minus C1 +A1 I1 minus C1 +A1I2 minus C3 + βS2 I2 minus C3 I2 minus C4 minus P4 I2 minus C4 minus P4I3 + cS3 minus C5 I3 minus C5

Loose supervision (1-y)I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2 I1 minus C2 minus P1 I1 minus C2I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C3 minus P2 I2 minus C4 I2 minus C2I3 minus P3 minus C5 I3 minus P3 minus C5

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 9

Subsequently the evolution and stability strategies of thethree main agents of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users can be discussed

(1) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Functional Depart-mentse first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with positive strategy for x can be determined byequation (10)

zF(x)

zx (1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(14)

If we set

Πx C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (15)

and from Πx 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P2 + C3 minus C4

P2 + P4 + zβS2 (16)

en we have Conclusion 1 enun_Conclusion_1

Conclusion 1 When Πx gt 0 the positive strategy of func-tional departments is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πx lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Furthermorethe probability of x increases while the probability of y and zis elevated

Theorem 1 Πx 0 is the dividing line of the stable state offunctional departments (see Figure 7(a)) According to thestability theorem of the differential equation whenΠx gt 0 hasF(x)prime gt 0 F(x)

prime lt 0 it indicates the stable state of positivestrategy of functional departments while the negative strategyis unstable (see Figure 7(b)) Likewise when Πx lt 0 hasF(x)prime(0)lt 0 F(x)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the negative strategyof the functional departments is in a stable state while thepositive strategy is unstable (see Figure 7(c))

When ygt λy (F(x)dx)|x1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 1In other words functional departments are inclined to followa positive strategy under the probability of y higher than λy

When ylt λy (F(x)dx)|x0lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 0In other words functional departments tend to select anegative strategy when the probability of y is lower than λyLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and x

As revealed from the results the decision-makingbehaviour of functional departments is affected by nu-merous factors According to the formula the positivedecision (x) of functional departments increases with theincrease in local governmentsrsquo strict supervision strategy(y) and end user use strategy (z) Besides the smaller thedifference between the cost expenditure of optimizingsmart government business by positively using blockchaintechnology and the cost expenditure of negatively usingblockchain technology the higher the distortion loss ofmass data collection and processing attributed to not

using blockchain technology and the higher the systemsecurity problem and the precision service incomebrought by blockchain technology when local govern-ments are lax in supervision the higher the possibility forfunctional departments will choose the positive strategy

(2) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Local Governmente first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with strict supervision strategy for y can be ob-tained according to equation (11)

zF(y)

zy (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(17)

If

Πy C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + zxαS1 (18)

and from Πy 0 the following equation is yielded

λx C1 minus C2 minus A1 minus zP1

zαS1 minus A1 (19)

en we have Conclusion 2 enun_Conclusion_2

Conclusion 2 When Πy gt 0 the strict supervision strategyof local government is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πy lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Moreover theprobability of y increases while the probability of x and z iselevated

Theorem 2 Πy 0 is the boundary line of the stable state oflocal government (see Figure 8(a)) According to the stabilitytheorem of the differential equation when Πy gt 0 hasF(y)prime (0)gt 0 F(y)

prime (1)lt 0 it indicates that the local government isin a stable state when strict supervision strategy is adopted whilethe loose supervision strategy is unstable (see Figure 8(b))Likewise when Πy lt 0 has F(y)

prime(0)lt 0 F(y)prime(1)gt 0 this indi-

cates that local government is in a stable state when it choose loosesupervision strategy while strict supervision strategy is unstable(see Figure 8(c))

When xgt λx(dF(y)dy)|y1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the local government is y 1 Inother words local government tends to select a strict su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is higher than λx

When xlt λx (dF(y)dy)|y0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the local government is y 0 Inother words local government tends to select a loose su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is lower than λxLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and y

As revealed from the analysis results the decision-making behaviour of the local government is affected bymany factorse formula shows that the local governmentrsquosstrict supervision (y) and decision-making will increase withthe increase in the positive strategy (x) of the functionaldepartment and the end user strategy (z) Besides thesmaller the difference between the cost of strict supervision

10 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

by local governments and the cost of lax supervision thegreater the extra benefit from the irregularities of functionaldepartments under strict supervision e risk of data se-curity attributed to government neglect of supervision

damages the credibility of the government and the increaseof the income from the flat management of functional de-partments actively using blockchain technology to optimizethe public management structure which will directly affect

x

ζ6 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1(0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)Sx

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)ζ5 (0 1 0)

Sx

(c)

Figure 7 Functional department stability evolution phase diagram

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (011)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(c)

Figure 8 Phase diagram of local government stability evolution

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 11

the improvement of the willingness of local governments tomake final strict supervision decisions

(3) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of End Users e firstpartial derivative of the replication dynamic equation withstrict supervision strategy for y can be obtained according toequation (12)

zF(z)

zz (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (20)

If we set

Πz I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (21)

and from Πz 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P3 minus C5 minus I3

P3 + xcS3 (22)

en we have Conclusion 3enun_Conclusion_3

Conclusion 3 When Πz gt 0 the use strategy of end users isthe evolutionary stability strategy when Πz lt 0 the nonusestrategy of end users is an evolutionary stability strategyMoreover the probability of z increases while the probabilityof x and y increases

Theorem 3 Πz 0 is the dividing line of end usersrsquo stable state(see Figure 9(a)) Under the stability theorem of the differentialequation when Πz gt 0 has F(z)

prime(0)gt 0 F(z)prime(1)lt 0 it indicates

that end users use the smart government platform in a stable state(see Figure 9(b)) Likewise when Πz lt 0 hasF(z)prime(0)lt 0 F(z)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the end user does notuse the strategy in a stable state but the use strategy is unstable(see Figure 9(c))

When ygt λy (dF(z)dz)|z1lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 1 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a use strategy whenthe probability of y is higher than λy

When ylt λy (dF(z)dz)|z0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 0 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a nonuse strategywhen the probability of y is lower than λy Likewise we canprove the relationship between x and z

As suggested from the analysis results for the end usersit can be seen from the formula that the use of decision (z)increases with the increase in positive strategy (x) offunctional departments and strict supervision strategy (y) oflocal government e greater the comprehensive incomeand the total cost when not in use the greater the creditconfirmation income and privacy risk loss obtained by theuser when using the blockchain technology and the higherthe possibility of end users choosing the use strategy

432 Stability Analysis of Evolution Strategy under theAction of 9ree Parties Set P(x y z) (dxdt)G(x y z) (dydt) and Q(x y z) (dzdt) then equa-tions (10)ndash(12) express the group dynamics of the evolution

system of functional departments local government and endusers as written in the following equation

P(x y z) dx

dt x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

G(x y z) dy

dt y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

Q(x y z) dz

dt z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(23)

Set

H(E)

P(x y z)

G(x y z)

Q(x y z)

⎧⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎩ 0 (24)

and there are 12 equilibrium points for the system repli-cation dynamic equation However complying with theliterature [44] only 8 special equilibrium points should bediscussed for the replication dynamic system as follows

ξ1

00

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ2

10

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ3

11

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ4

11

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ5

01

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ6

01

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ7

00

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ8

10

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

(25)

e evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) for replicatingthe dynamic equation system is formulated based on thelocal stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix of the systemwith the method proposed by Friedman Moreover the

12 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Jacobian matrix of the system is obtained from equation (23)as follows

J

(1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)x P4 + P2 + zβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)xyβS2

y(1 minus y) zαS1 minus A1( 1113857 (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857 y(1 minus y) P1 + xαS1( 1113857

z(z minus 1)ycS3 z(z minus 1) P3 + xcS3( 1113857 (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

(26)

According to the replication dynamic equation system(13) the local equilibrium point is yielded as followsξ1(0 0 0) ξ2(1 0 0) ξ3(1 1 0) ξ4(1 1 1) ξ5(0 1 0)ξ6(0 1 1) ξ7(0 0 1) ξ8(1 0 1) By complying with Lya-punov stability theorem when all eigenvalues (λ) of theJacobian matrix satisfy λlt 0 the equilibrium point is theasymptotically stable at is the confluence When all ei-genvalues of the Jacobian matrix satisfy λgt 0 the equilib-rium point is unstable which is the source Furthermore forthe Jacobian matrix the eigenvalues (λ) mixed states Inother words some are positive while others are negativeen the equilibrium point also termed as the saddle pointis unstable First for the case where the equilibrium point isξ1(0 0 0) the Jacobian matrix is as follows

J1

C4 minus C3 minus P2 0 0

0 C2 minus C1 + A1 0

0 0 I3 + C5 minus P3

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (27)

It is therefore indicated that the eigenvalues of the Ja-cobian matrix are λ1 C4 minus C3 minus P2 λ2 C2 minus C1 + A1 andλ3 I3 + C5 minus P3 With the identical analogy the 8 equi-librium points are substituted into the Jacobian matrix (26)respectively and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

corresponding to the equilibrium points can be determinedrespectively (Table 3)

According to the mentioned analysis the evolutionarygame system has stability under certain conditions How-ever many parameters are accordingly involved and thecharacteristic value (λ) symbol is determined by the size ofthe mentioned parameter values Under the existing knownmathematical derivation method the stability of each of theNash equilibrium is determined and the evolutionary gamemodel cannot effectively lead to the reach steady stateequilibrium Accordingly this article further employs sys-tem dynamics to analyse the impact of various uncertainfactors on the evolution of the game and lays a basis forformulating relevant policies

5 System Dynamics Simulation Analysis

e above paragraphs analyzed the interaction of the threesubjects in the strategic choice and the influence of externalvariables on the stability of the evolutionary game oughsome conclusions have been drawn they are all analysesconducted from the perspective of a single subject lackingsystematic and comprehensive analysis from the perspectiveof three subjects In the 1950s Fletcher of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology initially adopted the theory of

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(b)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(c)

Figure 9 End user stability evolution phase diagram

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 13

management science and systems science and incorporatedcomputerized simulation technology into quantitative an-alyses to develop a system dynamics theory method It isprimarily adopted to study system problems with highnonlinearity as characterized by multivariate causal feed-back and complex time-varying

us to systematically and deeply analyse the strategicinteraction between different agents the present study usesthe system dynamics theory to build a dynamic model of anintelligent government collaborative governance systembased on blockchain technology and the simulation ofsystem dynamics with VENSIM PLE simulation software isemployed to analyse the evolution of the strategicinteraction

51 Based on the SD Model of ldquoBlockchain +GovernmentAffairs Servicerdquo in Beijing Since November 2019 BeijingMunicipal Government Service Bureau Beijing MunicipalScience and Technology Commission and BeijingMunicipalBureau of Economy and Information Technology have ledthe implementation of the Action Plan on the application ofblockchain in the field of Government Services e BeijingMunicipal Bureau of Commerce and other departments asthe responsible units have vigorously propelled the appli-cation construction of blockchain in government services inthe four pilot areas of the city By August 2020 140 gov-ernment affairs services have been connected in Beijing 253business affairs and 65 human affairs have been settledonline and 100000 pieces of administrative materials can besimplified throughout the year ere have been 121 en-terprises having used the blockchain system to query andverify various functions for nearly 7800 times e reporteddata have been down-regulated by 80 and the averagematerial has decreased by 40

is study combines the specific application scenarios ofblockchain pilots in Haidian Xicheng Chaoyang Shunyiand other blockchain pilots in the ldquoBlue Book on the Ap-plication of Blockchain in Municipal Services in Beijing(First Edition)rdquo issued by the Beijing Municipal Adminis-tration in July 2020 Vensim PLE software is employed tobuild the system dynamics model of the evolutionary gamebetween functional departments local governments andend users (see Figure 10)

52 Initial SimulationAnalysis According to the applicationpractice of the blockchain in the government service field of

Beijing the initial value of the model is assumed as followsINITIAL TIME 0 FINAL TIME 20 TIME-STEP 00625 and Units for Time Month and the 16external variables are assigned as shown in Table 4

Since the three participating agents of functionaldepartments local governments and end users have twokinds of strategy choices 0 and 1 this constitutes 8strategy combinations namely (0 0 0) (0 0 1) (0 1 0)(1 0 0) (1 1 0) (1 0 1) (0 1 1) and (1 1 1) When theinitial states of the three parties are pure strategies thesystem is in equilibrium At this time no one party iswilling to actively change the existing strategies and thementioned eight strategy combinations will become theequilibrium state of the system However this state is notstable as long as there is a small change in one or moresubjects in the system and the system will lose theequilibrium state We take the combination of (0 0 1)strategy as an example to illustrate and its evolutionresults are shown in Figure 11(a) is figure indicates thatthe initial probabilities of the functional departmentschoosing the positive strategy and the local governmentchoosing the strict supervision strategy are very low (both001) in the game process when the participants find thatthere are more profitable strategy choices in the system itwill adjust the original strategy and through the con-tinuous learning and imitating between the subjects thesystem can lastly reach a novel equilibrium state

e simulation of 8 pure strategy combinations issummarized as follows①No matter the positive strategy ofthe functional departments starts from 0 to 001 or from 1 to099 and its strategy choice will eventually reach an equi-librium state at 1 It is therefore revealed that in smartgovernment projects functional departments actively drawupon the smart government platform under the blockchaintechnology to complete the business which is the optimalchoice Only the active use of blockchain technology tooptimize the existing platform workflow can ensure itsmaximum revenue ② Under functional departmentsadopting positive strategies if the local government adopts astrategy of loose supervision no matter whether the endusers change from 0 or 1 the final strategy is 1 ie (1 0 0)and (1 0 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations refers to (1 0 1) (see Figure 11(b)) If the localgovernment carries out strict regulation the end users willmutate from 0 or 1 and the final strategy will be 1 namely(1 1 0) and (1 1 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations is (1 1 1) (see Figure 11(c))

Table 3 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

Equilibrium point λ1 λ2 λ3ζ1 (0 0 0) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ2 (1 0 0) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ3 (1 1 0) minus (C4minus C3 + P4) minus (C2minus C1) I3 +C5 + cS3ζ4 (1 1 1) minus (C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2) minus (C2minus C1 +P1 + αS1) minus (I3 +C5 + cS3)ζ5 (0 1 0) C4minus C3 +P4 minus (C2minus C1 +A1) I3 +C5ζ6 (0 1 1) C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2 minus (C2minus C1 +A1 +P1) minus (I3 +C5)ζ7 (0 0 1) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 +P1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)ζ8 (1 0 1) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 + P1 + αS1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)

14 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Moreover it is revealed that the end users have a positiveattitude towards the use of smart government affairs andthey are willing to use the platform to complete businesstransactions As suggested from the analysis through theevolutionary game process of ldquomutation-adjustment-equi-libriumrdquo of the three agents of the game the system willeventually reach the equilibrium state of (1 1 1)

53 SimulationAnalysis of the Impact of ExternalVariables onStrategy Based on the above discussion the value of eachparameter determines whether each strategy combination isthe equilibrium point to make the system stable state andthe impact of external variables on the strategy selection ofthe game subject is analysede following continues to take(0 0 1) strategy combination as an example to discuss

531 Factors of Functional Departmentsrsquo Strategy ChoiceIn the policy combination of (0 0 1) the initial state offunctional departments refers to a negative strategy It isassumed that the functional departments start from theprobability of 001 As indicated from the simulation amongthe 16 external variables the cost of a positive strategy C3the cost of a negative strategy C4 revenue from precisionservices S2 loss of system security risk P2 loss of informationdistortion attributed to mass data collection and processingP4 and the mentioned five external variables will impact thestrategic choice of functional departments In particular

accurate service degree coefficient β should be stressedwhich is the use of blockchain technology to enhance theserviceability of functional departments By regulating thevalue of β the precision income will be affected Under otherinitial values unchanged the evolution result of strategychoice probability of functional departments is analysed (seeFigure 12)

As revealed from the comparison of Figures 12(b) 12(c)and 12(e) C4 P2 and P4 similarly impact the evolution trendof positive strategy choice in functional departments ehigher the cost for functional departments to negativelyexploit blockchain technology the smaller the loss of systemsecurity risk when using blockchain technology and thegreater the loss of information distortion attributed to massdata collection and processing when not using blockchaintechnology the more functional departments will be in-clined to comply with the strategy of positively usingblockchain technology In addition according to thesimulation analysis C3 complexly impacts the strategyselection of functional departments Under the extremelylarge C3 value functional departments are inclined to useblockchain technology negatively in particular when thevalue is smaller the faster the functional departments willreach the stable state of positive strategy It is also revealedthat when functional departments positively exploitblockchain technology to complete smart governmentbusiness the cost acts as a critical factor when the cost istoo high it will impact the choice of their strategies

Positive strategy probabilityof functional departments xChanging rate of

functionaldepartments R(x)t

Positive and negativestrategy expected income

difference Ex-Expected benefits of

functional departmentspositive strategy Ex

Expected benefits offunctional departmentsnegative strategy E(1-x)

Loss of systemsecurity risk P2

The cost of a positivestrategy C3

Revenue fromprecision services S2

Smart government onenet to run performance

gains I2

The cost of anegative strategy C4

Loss of information distortioncaused by mass data collection

and processing P4

Use strategyprobability of end

users z

End users use strategyand nonuse strategy of

expected incomedifference Vz-

The expected revenueof users using the

platform VzThe expected revenueof uesrs nonusing the

platform V(1-z)

The cost of nonusestrategy C5

Privacy securityrisk loss P3

Revenue frompersonalized

customizationservices I3

Strict supervisionprobability of local

government y Changing rate of localgovernment R(y)t

Strict regulation and loosesupervision of expectedincome difference Uy-

Expected benefits of localgovernmentrsquos loosesupervision U(1-y)

Expected benefits oflocal governments strict

sypervision Uy

Find out the illegal operationand get extra income A1

The cost of the strictsupervision C1

Flating managementearnings S1

Operating income of the smartgovernmentrsquos One net to run

platform I1

The cost of the loosesupervision C2

Data security riskscause the loss of

governmentcredibility P1

β

α

γ

The user gets thebenefit of the trust

confirmation S3

Changing rate of endusers R(z)t

Figure 10 System dynamics (SD) model of functional department local government and end user evolutionary game system

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 15

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 10: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

Subsequently the evolution and stability strategies of thethree main agents of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users can be discussed

(1) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Functional Depart-mentse first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with positive strategy for x can be determined byequation (10)

zF(x)

zx (1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

(14)

If we set

Πx C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (15)

and from Πx 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P2 + C3 minus C4

P2 + P4 + zβS2 (16)

en we have Conclusion 1 enun_Conclusion_1

Conclusion 1 When Πx gt 0 the positive strategy of func-tional departments is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πx lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Furthermorethe probability of x increases while the probability of y and zis elevated

Theorem 1 Πx 0 is the dividing line of the stable state offunctional departments (see Figure 7(a)) According to thestability theorem of the differential equation whenΠx gt 0 hasF(x)prime gt 0 F(x)

prime lt 0 it indicates the stable state of positivestrategy of functional departments while the negative strategyis unstable (see Figure 7(b)) Likewise when Πx lt 0 hasF(x)prime(0)lt 0 F(x)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the negative strategyof the functional departments is in a stable state while thepositive strategy is unstable (see Figure 7(c))

When ygt λy (F(x)dx)|x1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 1In other words functional departments are inclined to followa positive strategy under the probability of y higher than λy

When ylt λy (F(x)dx)|x0lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the functional departments is x 0In other words functional departments tend to select anegative strategy when the probability of y is lower than λyLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and x

As revealed from the results the decision-makingbehaviour of functional departments is affected by nu-merous factors According to the formula the positivedecision (x) of functional departments increases with theincrease in local governmentsrsquo strict supervision strategy(y) and end user use strategy (z) Besides the smaller thedifference between the cost expenditure of optimizingsmart government business by positively using blockchaintechnology and the cost expenditure of negatively usingblockchain technology the higher the distortion loss ofmass data collection and processing attributed to not

using blockchain technology and the higher the systemsecurity problem and the precision service incomebrought by blockchain technology when local govern-ments are lax in supervision the higher the possibility forfunctional departments will choose the positive strategy

(2) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of Local Governmente first partial derivative of the replication dynamicequation with strict supervision strategy for y can be ob-tained according to equation (11)

zF(y)

zy (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

(17)

If

Πy C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + zxαS1 (18)

and from Πy 0 the following equation is yielded

λx C1 minus C2 minus A1 minus zP1

zαS1 minus A1 (19)

en we have Conclusion 2 enun_Conclusion_2

Conclusion 2 When Πy gt 0 the strict supervision strategyof local government is the evolutionary stability strategywhen Πy lt 0 the negative strategy of the functional de-partments is an evolutionary stability strategy Moreover theprobability of y increases while the probability of x and z iselevated

Theorem 2 Πy 0 is the boundary line of the stable state oflocal government (see Figure 8(a)) According to the stabilitytheorem of the differential equation when Πy gt 0 hasF(y)prime (0)gt 0 F(y)

prime (1)lt 0 it indicates that the local government isin a stable state when strict supervision strategy is adopted whilethe loose supervision strategy is unstable (see Figure 8(b))Likewise when Πy lt 0 has F(y)

prime(0)lt 0 F(y)prime(1)gt 0 this indi-

cates that local government is in a stable state when it choose loosesupervision strategy while strict supervision strategy is unstable(see Figure 8(c))

When xgt λx(dF(y)dy)|y1lt0 indicating that the evo-lution stable strategy of the local government is y 1 Inother words local government tends to select a strict su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is higher than λx

When xlt λx (dF(y)dy)|y0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the local government is y 0 Inother words local government tends to select a loose su-pervision strategy when the probability of y is lower than λxLikewise we can prove the relationship between z and y

As revealed from the analysis results the decision-making behaviour of the local government is affected bymany factorse formula shows that the local governmentrsquosstrict supervision (y) and decision-making will increase withthe increase in the positive strategy (x) of the functionaldepartment and the end user strategy (z) Besides thesmaller the difference between the cost of strict supervision

10 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

by local governments and the cost of lax supervision thegreater the extra benefit from the irregularities of functionaldepartments under strict supervision e risk of data se-curity attributed to government neglect of supervision

damages the credibility of the government and the increaseof the income from the flat management of functional de-partments actively using blockchain technology to optimizethe public management structure which will directly affect

x

ζ6 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1(0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)Sx

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)ζ5 (0 1 0)

Sx

(c)

Figure 7 Functional department stability evolution phase diagram

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (011)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(c)

Figure 8 Phase diagram of local government stability evolution

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 11

the improvement of the willingness of local governments tomake final strict supervision decisions

(3) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of End Users e firstpartial derivative of the replication dynamic equation withstrict supervision strategy for y can be obtained according toequation (12)

zF(z)

zz (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (20)

If we set

Πz I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (21)

and from Πz 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P3 minus C5 minus I3

P3 + xcS3 (22)

en we have Conclusion 3enun_Conclusion_3

Conclusion 3 When Πz gt 0 the use strategy of end users isthe evolutionary stability strategy when Πz lt 0 the nonusestrategy of end users is an evolutionary stability strategyMoreover the probability of z increases while the probabilityof x and y increases

Theorem 3 Πz 0 is the dividing line of end usersrsquo stable state(see Figure 9(a)) Under the stability theorem of the differentialequation when Πz gt 0 has F(z)

prime(0)gt 0 F(z)prime(1)lt 0 it indicates

that end users use the smart government platform in a stable state(see Figure 9(b)) Likewise when Πz lt 0 hasF(z)prime(0)lt 0 F(z)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the end user does notuse the strategy in a stable state but the use strategy is unstable(see Figure 9(c))

When ygt λy (dF(z)dz)|z1lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 1 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a use strategy whenthe probability of y is higher than λy

When ylt λy (dF(z)dz)|z0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 0 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a nonuse strategywhen the probability of y is lower than λy Likewise we canprove the relationship between x and z

As suggested from the analysis results for the end usersit can be seen from the formula that the use of decision (z)increases with the increase in positive strategy (x) offunctional departments and strict supervision strategy (y) oflocal government e greater the comprehensive incomeand the total cost when not in use the greater the creditconfirmation income and privacy risk loss obtained by theuser when using the blockchain technology and the higherthe possibility of end users choosing the use strategy

432 Stability Analysis of Evolution Strategy under theAction of 9ree Parties Set P(x y z) (dxdt)G(x y z) (dydt) and Q(x y z) (dzdt) then equa-tions (10)ndash(12) express the group dynamics of the evolution

system of functional departments local government and endusers as written in the following equation

P(x y z) dx

dt x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

G(x y z) dy

dt y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

Q(x y z) dz

dt z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(23)

Set

H(E)

P(x y z)

G(x y z)

Q(x y z)

⎧⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎩ 0 (24)

and there are 12 equilibrium points for the system repli-cation dynamic equation However complying with theliterature [44] only 8 special equilibrium points should bediscussed for the replication dynamic system as follows

ξ1

00

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ2

10

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ3

11

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ4

11

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ5

01

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ6

01

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ7

00

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ8

10

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

(25)

e evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) for replicatingthe dynamic equation system is formulated based on thelocal stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix of the systemwith the method proposed by Friedman Moreover the

12 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Jacobian matrix of the system is obtained from equation (23)as follows

J

(1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)x P4 + P2 + zβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)xyβS2

y(1 minus y) zαS1 minus A1( 1113857 (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857 y(1 minus y) P1 + xαS1( 1113857

z(z minus 1)ycS3 z(z minus 1) P3 + xcS3( 1113857 (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

(26)

According to the replication dynamic equation system(13) the local equilibrium point is yielded as followsξ1(0 0 0) ξ2(1 0 0) ξ3(1 1 0) ξ4(1 1 1) ξ5(0 1 0)ξ6(0 1 1) ξ7(0 0 1) ξ8(1 0 1) By complying with Lya-punov stability theorem when all eigenvalues (λ) of theJacobian matrix satisfy λlt 0 the equilibrium point is theasymptotically stable at is the confluence When all ei-genvalues of the Jacobian matrix satisfy λgt 0 the equilib-rium point is unstable which is the source Furthermore forthe Jacobian matrix the eigenvalues (λ) mixed states Inother words some are positive while others are negativeen the equilibrium point also termed as the saddle pointis unstable First for the case where the equilibrium point isξ1(0 0 0) the Jacobian matrix is as follows

J1

C4 minus C3 minus P2 0 0

0 C2 minus C1 + A1 0

0 0 I3 + C5 minus P3

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (27)

It is therefore indicated that the eigenvalues of the Ja-cobian matrix are λ1 C4 minus C3 minus P2 λ2 C2 minus C1 + A1 andλ3 I3 + C5 minus P3 With the identical analogy the 8 equi-librium points are substituted into the Jacobian matrix (26)respectively and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

corresponding to the equilibrium points can be determinedrespectively (Table 3)

According to the mentioned analysis the evolutionarygame system has stability under certain conditions How-ever many parameters are accordingly involved and thecharacteristic value (λ) symbol is determined by the size ofthe mentioned parameter values Under the existing knownmathematical derivation method the stability of each of theNash equilibrium is determined and the evolutionary gamemodel cannot effectively lead to the reach steady stateequilibrium Accordingly this article further employs sys-tem dynamics to analyse the impact of various uncertainfactors on the evolution of the game and lays a basis forformulating relevant policies

5 System Dynamics Simulation Analysis

e above paragraphs analyzed the interaction of the threesubjects in the strategic choice and the influence of externalvariables on the stability of the evolutionary game oughsome conclusions have been drawn they are all analysesconducted from the perspective of a single subject lackingsystematic and comprehensive analysis from the perspectiveof three subjects In the 1950s Fletcher of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology initially adopted the theory of

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(b)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(c)

Figure 9 End user stability evolution phase diagram

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 13

management science and systems science and incorporatedcomputerized simulation technology into quantitative an-alyses to develop a system dynamics theory method It isprimarily adopted to study system problems with highnonlinearity as characterized by multivariate causal feed-back and complex time-varying

us to systematically and deeply analyse the strategicinteraction between different agents the present study usesthe system dynamics theory to build a dynamic model of anintelligent government collaborative governance systembased on blockchain technology and the simulation ofsystem dynamics with VENSIM PLE simulation software isemployed to analyse the evolution of the strategicinteraction

51 Based on the SD Model of ldquoBlockchain +GovernmentAffairs Servicerdquo in Beijing Since November 2019 BeijingMunicipal Government Service Bureau Beijing MunicipalScience and Technology Commission and BeijingMunicipalBureau of Economy and Information Technology have ledthe implementation of the Action Plan on the application ofblockchain in the field of Government Services e BeijingMunicipal Bureau of Commerce and other departments asthe responsible units have vigorously propelled the appli-cation construction of blockchain in government services inthe four pilot areas of the city By August 2020 140 gov-ernment affairs services have been connected in Beijing 253business affairs and 65 human affairs have been settledonline and 100000 pieces of administrative materials can besimplified throughout the year ere have been 121 en-terprises having used the blockchain system to query andverify various functions for nearly 7800 times e reporteddata have been down-regulated by 80 and the averagematerial has decreased by 40

is study combines the specific application scenarios ofblockchain pilots in Haidian Xicheng Chaoyang Shunyiand other blockchain pilots in the ldquoBlue Book on the Ap-plication of Blockchain in Municipal Services in Beijing(First Edition)rdquo issued by the Beijing Municipal Adminis-tration in July 2020 Vensim PLE software is employed tobuild the system dynamics model of the evolutionary gamebetween functional departments local governments andend users (see Figure 10)

52 Initial SimulationAnalysis According to the applicationpractice of the blockchain in the government service field of

Beijing the initial value of the model is assumed as followsINITIAL TIME 0 FINAL TIME 20 TIME-STEP 00625 and Units for Time Month and the 16external variables are assigned as shown in Table 4

Since the three participating agents of functionaldepartments local governments and end users have twokinds of strategy choices 0 and 1 this constitutes 8strategy combinations namely (0 0 0) (0 0 1) (0 1 0)(1 0 0) (1 1 0) (1 0 1) (0 1 1) and (1 1 1) When theinitial states of the three parties are pure strategies thesystem is in equilibrium At this time no one party iswilling to actively change the existing strategies and thementioned eight strategy combinations will become theequilibrium state of the system However this state is notstable as long as there is a small change in one or moresubjects in the system and the system will lose theequilibrium state We take the combination of (0 0 1)strategy as an example to illustrate and its evolutionresults are shown in Figure 11(a) is figure indicates thatthe initial probabilities of the functional departmentschoosing the positive strategy and the local governmentchoosing the strict supervision strategy are very low (both001) in the game process when the participants find thatthere are more profitable strategy choices in the system itwill adjust the original strategy and through the con-tinuous learning and imitating between the subjects thesystem can lastly reach a novel equilibrium state

e simulation of 8 pure strategy combinations issummarized as follows①No matter the positive strategy ofthe functional departments starts from 0 to 001 or from 1 to099 and its strategy choice will eventually reach an equi-librium state at 1 It is therefore revealed that in smartgovernment projects functional departments actively drawupon the smart government platform under the blockchaintechnology to complete the business which is the optimalchoice Only the active use of blockchain technology tooptimize the existing platform workflow can ensure itsmaximum revenue ② Under functional departmentsadopting positive strategies if the local government adopts astrategy of loose supervision no matter whether the endusers change from 0 or 1 the final strategy is 1 ie (1 0 0)and (1 0 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations refers to (1 0 1) (see Figure 11(b)) If the localgovernment carries out strict regulation the end users willmutate from 0 or 1 and the final strategy will be 1 namely(1 1 0) and (1 1 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations is (1 1 1) (see Figure 11(c))

Table 3 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

Equilibrium point λ1 λ2 λ3ζ1 (0 0 0) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ2 (1 0 0) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ3 (1 1 0) minus (C4minus C3 + P4) minus (C2minus C1) I3 +C5 + cS3ζ4 (1 1 1) minus (C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2) minus (C2minus C1 +P1 + αS1) minus (I3 +C5 + cS3)ζ5 (0 1 0) C4minus C3 +P4 minus (C2minus C1 +A1) I3 +C5ζ6 (0 1 1) C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2 minus (C2minus C1 +A1 +P1) minus (I3 +C5)ζ7 (0 0 1) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 +P1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)ζ8 (1 0 1) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 + P1 + αS1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)

14 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Moreover it is revealed that the end users have a positiveattitude towards the use of smart government affairs andthey are willing to use the platform to complete businesstransactions As suggested from the analysis through theevolutionary game process of ldquomutation-adjustment-equi-libriumrdquo of the three agents of the game the system willeventually reach the equilibrium state of (1 1 1)

53 SimulationAnalysis of the Impact of ExternalVariables onStrategy Based on the above discussion the value of eachparameter determines whether each strategy combination isthe equilibrium point to make the system stable state andthe impact of external variables on the strategy selection ofthe game subject is analysede following continues to take(0 0 1) strategy combination as an example to discuss

531 Factors of Functional Departmentsrsquo Strategy ChoiceIn the policy combination of (0 0 1) the initial state offunctional departments refers to a negative strategy It isassumed that the functional departments start from theprobability of 001 As indicated from the simulation amongthe 16 external variables the cost of a positive strategy C3the cost of a negative strategy C4 revenue from precisionservices S2 loss of system security risk P2 loss of informationdistortion attributed to mass data collection and processingP4 and the mentioned five external variables will impact thestrategic choice of functional departments In particular

accurate service degree coefficient β should be stressedwhich is the use of blockchain technology to enhance theserviceability of functional departments By regulating thevalue of β the precision income will be affected Under otherinitial values unchanged the evolution result of strategychoice probability of functional departments is analysed (seeFigure 12)

As revealed from the comparison of Figures 12(b) 12(c)and 12(e) C4 P2 and P4 similarly impact the evolution trendof positive strategy choice in functional departments ehigher the cost for functional departments to negativelyexploit blockchain technology the smaller the loss of systemsecurity risk when using blockchain technology and thegreater the loss of information distortion attributed to massdata collection and processing when not using blockchaintechnology the more functional departments will be in-clined to comply with the strategy of positively usingblockchain technology In addition according to thesimulation analysis C3 complexly impacts the strategyselection of functional departments Under the extremelylarge C3 value functional departments are inclined to useblockchain technology negatively in particular when thevalue is smaller the faster the functional departments willreach the stable state of positive strategy It is also revealedthat when functional departments positively exploitblockchain technology to complete smart governmentbusiness the cost acts as a critical factor when the cost istoo high it will impact the choice of their strategies

Positive strategy probabilityof functional departments xChanging rate of

functionaldepartments R(x)t

Positive and negativestrategy expected income

difference Ex-Expected benefits of

functional departmentspositive strategy Ex

Expected benefits offunctional departmentsnegative strategy E(1-x)

Loss of systemsecurity risk P2

The cost of a positivestrategy C3

Revenue fromprecision services S2

Smart government onenet to run performance

gains I2

The cost of anegative strategy C4

Loss of information distortioncaused by mass data collection

and processing P4

Use strategyprobability of end

users z

End users use strategyand nonuse strategy of

expected incomedifference Vz-

The expected revenueof users using the

platform VzThe expected revenueof uesrs nonusing the

platform V(1-z)

The cost of nonusestrategy C5

Privacy securityrisk loss P3

Revenue frompersonalized

customizationservices I3

Strict supervisionprobability of local

government y Changing rate of localgovernment R(y)t

Strict regulation and loosesupervision of expectedincome difference Uy-

Expected benefits of localgovernmentrsquos loosesupervision U(1-y)

Expected benefits oflocal governments strict

sypervision Uy

Find out the illegal operationand get extra income A1

The cost of the strictsupervision C1

Flating managementearnings S1

Operating income of the smartgovernmentrsquos One net to run

platform I1

The cost of the loosesupervision C2

Data security riskscause the loss of

governmentcredibility P1

β

α

γ

The user gets thebenefit of the trust

confirmation S3

Changing rate of endusers R(z)t

Figure 10 System dynamics (SD) model of functional department local government and end user evolutionary game system

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 15

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 11: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

by local governments and the cost of lax supervision thegreater the extra benefit from the irregularities of functionaldepartments under strict supervision e risk of data se-curity attributed to government neglect of supervision

damages the credibility of the government and the increaseof the income from the flat management of functional de-partments actively using blockchain technology to optimizethe public management structure which will directly affect

x

ζ6 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1(0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)Sx

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)ζ5 (0 1 0)

Sx

(c)

Figure 7 Functional department stability evolution phase diagram

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (011)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(b)

x

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sy

(c)

Figure 8 Phase diagram of local government stability evolution

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 11

the improvement of the willingness of local governments tomake final strict supervision decisions

(3) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of End Users e firstpartial derivative of the replication dynamic equation withstrict supervision strategy for y can be obtained according toequation (12)

zF(z)

zz (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (20)

If we set

Πz I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (21)

and from Πz 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P3 minus C5 minus I3

P3 + xcS3 (22)

en we have Conclusion 3enun_Conclusion_3

Conclusion 3 When Πz gt 0 the use strategy of end users isthe evolutionary stability strategy when Πz lt 0 the nonusestrategy of end users is an evolutionary stability strategyMoreover the probability of z increases while the probabilityof x and y increases

Theorem 3 Πz 0 is the dividing line of end usersrsquo stable state(see Figure 9(a)) Under the stability theorem of the differentialequation when Πz gt 0 has F(z)

prime(0)gt 0 F(z)prime(1)lt 0 it indicates

that end users use the smart government platform in a stable state(see Figure 9(b)) Likewise when Πz lt 0 hasF(z)prime(0)lt 0 F(z)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the end user does notuse the strategy in a stable state but the use strategy is unstable(see Figure 9(c))

When ygt λy (dF(z)dz)|z1lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 1 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a use strategy whenthe probability of y is higher than λy

When ylt λy (dF(z)dz)|z0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 0 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a nonuse strategywhen the probability of y is lower than λy Likewise we canprove the relationship between x and z

As suggested from the analysis results for the end usersit can be seen from the formula that the use of decision (z)increases with the increase in positive strategy (x) offunctional departments and strict supervision strategy (y) oflocal government e greater the comprehensive incomeand the total cost when not in use the greater the creditconfirmation income and privacy risk loss obtained by theuser when using the blockchain technology and the higherthe possibility of end users choosing the use strategy

432 Stability Analysis of Evolution Strategy under theAction of 9ree Parties Set P(x y z) (dxdt)G(x y z) (dydt) and Q(x y z) (dzdt) then equa-tions (10)ndash(12) express the group dynamics of the evolution

system of functional departments local government and endusers as written in the following equation

P(x y z) dx

dt x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

G(x y z) dy

dt y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

Q(x y z) dz

dt z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(23)

Set

H(E)

P(x y z)

G(x y z)

Q(x y z)

⎧⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎩ 0 (24)

and there are 12 equilibrium points for the system repli-cation dynamic equation However complying with theliterature [44] only 8 special equilibrium points should bediscussed for the replication dynamic system as follows

ξ1

00

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ2

10

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ3

11

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ4

11

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ5

01

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ6

01

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ7

00

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ8

10

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

(25)

e evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) for replicatingthe dynamic equation system is formulated based on thelocal stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix of the systemwith the method proposed by Friedman Moreover the

12 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Jacobian matrix of the system is obtained from equation (23)as follows

J

(1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)x P4 + P2 + zβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)xyβS2

y(1 minus y) zαS1 minus A1( 1113857 (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857 y(1 minus y) P1 + xαS1( 1113857

z(z minus 1)ycS3 z(z minus 1) P3 + xcS3( 1113857 (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

(26)

According to the replication dynamic equation system(13) the local equilibrium point is yielded as followsξ1(0 0 0) ξ2(1 0 0) ξ3(1 1 0) ξ4(1 1 1) ξ5(0 1 0)ξ6(0 1 1) ξ7(0 0 1) ξ8(1 0 1) By complying with Lya-punov stability theorem when all eigenvalues (λ) of theJacobian matrix satisfy λlt 0 the equilibrium point is theasymptotically stable at is the confluence When all ei-genvalues of the Jacobian matrix satisfy λgt 0 the equilib-rium point is unstable which is the source Furthermore forthe Jacobian matrix the eigenvalues (λ) mixed states Inother words some are positive while others are negativeen the equilibrium point also termed as the saddle pointis unstable First for the case where the equilibrium point isξ1(0 0 0) the Jacobian matrix is as follows

J1

C4 minus C3 minus P2 0 0

0 C2 minus C1 + A1 0

0 0 I3 + C5 minus P3

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (27)

It is therefore indicated that the eigenvalues of the Ja-cobian matrix are λ1 C4 minus C3 minus P2 λ2 C2 minus C1 + A1 andλ3 I3 + C5 minus P3 With the identical analogy the 8 equi-librium points are substituted into the Jacobian matrix (26)respectively and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

corresponding to the equilibrium points can be determinedrespectively (Table 3)

According to the mentioned analysis the evolutionarygame system has stability under certain conditions How-ever many parameters are accordingly involved and thecharacteristic value (λ) symbol is determined by the size ofthe mentioned parameter values Under the existing knownmathematical derivation method the stability of each of theNash equilibrium is determined and the evolutionary gamemodel cannot effectively lead to the reach steady stateequilibrium Accordingly this article further employs sys-tem dynamics to analyse the impact of various uncertainfactors on the evolution of the game and lays a basis forformulating relevant policies

5 System Dynamics Simulation Analysis

e above paragraphs analyzed the interaction of the threesubjects in the strategic choice and the influence of externalvariables on the stability of the evolutionary game oughsome conclusions have been drawn they are all analysesconducted from the perspective of a single subject lackingsystematic and comprehensive analysis from the perspectiveof three subjects In the 1950s Fletcher of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology initially adopted the theory of

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(b)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(c)

Figure 9 End user stability evolution phase diagram

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 13

management science and systems science and incorporatedcomputerized simulation technology into quantitative an-alyses to develop a system dynamics theory method It isprimarily adopted to study system problems with highnonlinearity as characterized by multivariate causal feed-back and complex time-varying

us to systematically and deeply analyse the strategicinteraction between different agents the present study usesthe system dynamics theory to build a dynamic model of anintelligent government collaborative governance systembased on blockchain technology and the simulation ofsystem dynamics with VENSIM PLE simulation software isemployed to analyse the evolution of the strategicinteraction

51 Based on the SD Model of ldquoBlockchain +GovernmentAffairs Servicerdquo in Beijing Since November 2019 BeijingMunicipal Government Service Bureau Beijing MunicipalScience and Technology Commission and BeijingMunicipalBureau of Economy and Information Technology have ledthe implementation of the Action Plan on the application ofblockchain in the field of Government Services e BeijingMunicipal Bureau of Commerce and other departments asthe responsible units have vigorously propelled the appli-cation construction of blockchain in government services inthe four pilot areas of the city By August 2020 140 gov-ernment affairs services have been connected in Beijing 253business affairs and 65 human affairs have been settledonline and 100000 pieces of administrative materials can besimplified throughout the year ere have been 121 en-terprises having used the blockchain system to query andverify various functions for nearly 7800 times e reporteddata have been down-regulated by 80 and the averagematerial has decreased by 40

is study combines the specific application scenarios ofblockchain pilots in Haidian Xicheng Chaoyang Shunyiand other blockchain pilots in the ldquoBlue Book on the Ap-plication of Blockchain in Municipal Services in Beijing(First Edition)rdquo issued by the Beijing Municipal Adminis-tration in July 2020 Vensim PLE software is employed tobuild the system dynamics model of the evolutionary gamebetween functional departments local governments andend users (see Figure 10)

52 Initial SimulationAnalysis According to the applicationpractice of the blockchain in the government service field of

Beijing the initial value of the model is assumed as followsINITIAL TIME 0 FINAL TIME 20 TIME-STEP 00625 and Units for Time Month and the 16external variables are assigned as shown in Table 4

Since the three participating agents of functionaldepartments local governments and end users have twokinds of strategy choices 0 and 1 this constitutes 8strategy combinations namely (0 0 0) (0 0 1) (0 1 0)(1 0 0) (1 1 0) (1 0 1) (0 1 1) and (1 1 1) When theinitial states of the three parties are pure strategies thesystem is in equilibrium At this time no one party iswilling to actively change the existing strategies and thementioned eight strategy combinations will become theequilibrium state of the system However this state is notstable as long as there is a small change in one or moresubjects in the system and the system will lose theequilibrium state We take the combination of (0 0 1)strategy as an example to illustrate and its evolutionresults are shown in Figure 11(a) is figure indicates thatthe initial probabilities of the functional departmentschoosing the positive strategy and the local governmentchoosing the strict supervision strategy are very low (both001) in the game process when the participants find thatthere are more profitable strategy choices in the system itwill adjust the original strategy and through the con-tinuous learning and imitating between the subjects thesystem can lastly reach a novel equilibrium state

e simulation of 8 pure strategy combinations issummarized as follows①No matter the positive strategy ofthe functional departments starts from 0 to 001 or from 1 to099 and its strategy choice will eventually reach an equi-librium state at 1 It is therefore revealed that in smartgovernment projects functional departments actively drawupon the smart government platform under the blockchaintechnology to complete the business which is the optimalchoice Only the active use of blockchain technology tooptimize the existing platform workflow can ensure itsmaximum revenue ② Under functional departmentsadopting positive strategies if the local government adopts astrategy of loose supervision no matter whether the endusers change from 0 or 1 the final strategy is 1 ie (1 0 0)and (1 0 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations refers to (1 0 1) (see Figure 11(b)) If the localgovernment carries out strict regulation the end users willmutate from 0 or 1 and the final strategy will be 1 namely(1 1 0) and (1 1 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations is (1 1 1) (see Figure 11(c))

Table 3 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

Equilibrium point λ1 λ2 λ3ζ1 (0 0 0) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ2 (1 0 0) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ3 (1 1 0) minus (C4minus C3 + P4) minus (C2minus C1) I3 +C5 + cS3ζ4 (1 1 1) minus (C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2) minus (C2minus C1 +P1 + αS1) minus (I3 +C5 + cS3)ζ5 (0 1 0) C4minus C3 +P4 minus (C2minus C1 +A1) I3 +C5ζ6 (0 1 1) C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2 minus (C2minus C1 +A1 +P1) minus (I3 +C5)ζ7 (0 0 1) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 +P1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)ζ8 (1 0 1) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 + P1 + αS1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)

14 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Moreover it is revealed that the end users have a positiveattitude towards the use of smart government affairs andthey are willing to use the platform to complete businesstransactions As suggested from the analysis through theevolutionary game process of ldquomutation-adjustment-equi-libriumrdquo of the three agents of the game the system willeventually reach the equilibrium state of (1 1 1)

53 SimulationAnalysis of the Impact of ExternalVariables onStrategy Based on the above discussion the value of eachparameter determines whether each strategy combination isthe equilibrium point to make the system stable state andthe impact of external variables on the strategy selection ofthe game subject is analysede following continues to take(0 0 1) strategy combination as an example to discuss

531 Factors of Functional Departmentsrsquo Strategy ChoiceIn the policy combination of (0 0 1) the initial state offunctional departments refers to a negative strategy It isassumed that the functional departments start from theprobability of 001 As indicated from the simulation amongthe 16 external variables the cost of a positive strategy C3the cost of a negative strategy C4 revenue from precisionservices S2 loss of system security risk P2 loss of informationdistortion attributed to mass data collection and processingP4 and the mentioned five external variables will impact thestrategic choice of functional departments In particular

accurate service degree coefficient β should be stressedwhich is the use of blockchain technology to enhance theserviceability of functional departments By regulating thevalue of β the precision income will be affected Under otherinitial values unchanged the evolution result of strategychoice probability of functional departments is analysed (seeFigure 12)

As revealed from the comparison of Figures 12(b) 12(c)and 12(e) C4 P2 and P4 similarly impact the evolution trendof positive strategy choice in functional departments ehigher the cost for functional departments to negativelyexploit blockchain technology the smaller the loss of systemsecurity risk when using blockchain technology and thegreater the loss of information distortion attributed to massdata collection and processing when not using blockchaintechnology the more functional departments will be in-clined to comply with the strategy of positively usingblockchain technology In addition according to thesimulation analysis C3 complexly impacts the strategyselection of functional departments Under the extremelylarge C3 value functional departments are inclined to useblockchain technology negatively in particular when thevalue is smaller the faster the functional departments willreach the stable state of positive strategy It is also revealedthat when functional departments positively exploitblockchain technology to complete smart governmentbusiness the cost acts as a critical factor when the cost istoo high it will impact the choice of their strategies

Positive strategy probabilityof functional departments xChanging rate of

functionaldepartments R(x)t

Positive and negativestrategy expected income

difference Ex-Expected benefits of

functional departmentspositive strategy Ex

Expected benefits offunctional departmentsnegative strategy E(1-x)

Loss of systemsecurity risk P2

The cost of a positivestrategy C3

Revenue fromprecision services S2

Smart government onenet to run performance

gains I2

The cost of anegative strategy C4

Loss of information distortioncaused by mass data collection

and processing P4

Use strategyprobability of end

users z

End users use strategyand nonuse strategy of

expected incomedifference Vz-

The expected revenueof users using the

platform VzThe expected revenueof uesrs nonusing the

platform V(1-z)

The cost of nonusestrategy C5

Privacy securityrisk loss P3

Revenue frompersonalized

customizationservices I3

Strict supervisionprobability of local

government y Changing rate of localgovernment R(y)t

Strict regulation and loosesupervision of expectedincome difference Uy-

Expected benefits of localgovernmentrsquos loosesupervision U(1-y)

Expected benefits oflocal governments strict

sypervision Uy

Find out the illegal operationand get extra income A1

The cost of the strictsupervision C1

Flating managementearnings S1

Operating income of the smartgovernmentrsquos One net to run

platform I1

The cost of the loosesupervision C2

Data security riskscause the loss of

governmentcredibility P1

β

α

γ

The user gets thebenefit of the trust

confirmation S3

Changing rate of endusers R(z)t

Figure 10 System dynamics (SD) model of functional department local government and end user evolutionary game system

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 15

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

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[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 12: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

the improvement of the willingness of local governments tomake final strict supervision decisions

(3) 9e Asymptotic Stability Analysis of End Users e firstpartial derivative of the replication dynamic equation withstrict supervision strategy for y can be obtained according toequation (12)

zF(z)

zz (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (20)

If we set

Πz I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857 (21)

and from Πz 0 the following equation is yielded

λy P3 minus C5 minus I3

P3 + xcS3 (22)

en we have Conclusion 3enun_Conclusion_3

Conclusion 3 When Πz gt 0 the use strategy of end users isthe evolutionary stability strategy when Πz lt 0 the nonusestrategy of end users is an evolutionary stability strategyMoreover the probability of z increases while the probabilityof x and y increases

Theorem 3 Πz 0 is the dividing line of end usersrsquo stable state(see Figure 9(a)) Under the stability theorem of the differentialequation when Πz gt 0 has F(z)

prime(0)gt 0 F(z)prime(1)lt 0 it indicates

that end users use the smart government platform in a stable state(see Figure 9(b)) Likewise when Πz lt 0 hasF(z)prime(0)lt 0 F(z)

prime(1)gt 0 it indicates that the end user does notuse the strategy in a stable state but the use strategy is unstable(see Figure 9(c))

When ygt λy (dF(z)dz)|z1lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 1 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a use strategy whenthe probability of y is higher than λy

When ylt λy (dF(z)dz)|z0lt0 indicating that theevolution stable strategy of the end users is z 0 In otherwords end users are inclined to select a nonuse strategywhen the probability of y is lower than λy Likewise we canprove the relationship between x and z

As suggested from the analysis results for the end usersit can be seen from the formula that the use of decision (z)increases with the increase in positive strategy (x) offunctional departments and strict supervision strategy (y) oflocal government e greater the comprehensive incomeand the total cost when not in use the greater the creditconfirmation income and privacy risk loss obtained by theuser when using the blockchain technology and the higherthe possibility of end users choosing the use strategy

432 Stability Analysis of Evolution Strategy under theAction of 9ree Parties Set P(x y z) (dxdt)G(x y z) (dydt) and Q(x y z) (dzdt) then equa-tions (10)ndash(12) express the group dynamics of the evolution

system of functional departments local government and endusers as written in the following equation

P(x y z) dx

dt x(1 minus x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857

G(x y z) dy

dt y(1 minus y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857

Q(x y z) dz

dt z(1 minus z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩

(23)

Set

H(E)

P(x y z)

G(x y z)

Q(x y z)

⎧⎪⎪⎨

⎪⎪⎩ 0 (24)

and there are 12 equilibrium points for the system repli-cation dynamic equation However complying with theliterature [44] only 8 special equilibrium points should bediscussed for the replication dynamic system as follows

ξ1

00

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ2

10

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ3

11

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ4

11

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ5

01

0

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ6

01

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ7

00

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

ξ8

10

1

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

(25)

e evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) for replicatingthe dynamic equation system is formulated based on thelocal stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix of the systemwith the method proposed by Friedman Moreover the

12 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Jacobian matrix of the system is obtained from equation (23)as follows

J

(1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)x P4 + P2 + zβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)xyβS2

y(1 minus y) zαS1 minus A1( 1113857 (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857 y(1 minus y) P1 + xαS1( 1113857

z(z minus 1)ycS3 z(z minus 1) P3 + xcS3( 1113857 (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

(26)

According to the replication dynamic equation system(13) the local equilibrium point is yielded as followsξ1(0 0 0) ξ2(1 0 0) ξ3(1 1 0) ξ4(1 1 1) ξ5(0 1 0)ξ6(0 1 1) ξ7(0 0 1) ξ8(1 0 1) By complying with Lya-punov stability theorem when all eigenvalues (λ) of theJacobian matrix satisfy λlt 0 the equilibrium point is theasymptotically stable at is the confluence When all ei-genvalues of the Jacobian matrix satisfy λgt 0 the equilib-rium point is unstable which is the source Furthermore forthe Jacobian matrix the eigenvalues (λ) mixed states Inother words some are positive while others are negativeen the equilibrium point also termed as the saddle pointis unstable First for the case where the equilibrium point isξ1(0 0 0) the Jacobian matrix is as follows

J1

C4 minus C3 minus P2 0 0

0 C2 minus C1 + A1 0

0 0 I3 + C5 minus P3

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (27)

It is therefore indicated that the eigenvalues of the Ja-cobian matrix are λ1 C4 minus C3 minus P2 λ2 C2 minus C1 + A1 andλ3 I3 + C5 minus P3 With the identical analogy the 8 equi-librium points are substituted into the Jacobian matrix (26)respectively and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

corresponding to the equilibrium points can be determinedrespectively (Table 3)

According to the mentioned analysis the evolutionarygame system has stability under certain conditions How-ever many parameters are accordingly involved and thecharacteristic value (λ) symbol is determined by the size ofthe mentioned parameter values Under the existing knownmathematical derivation method the stability of each of theNash equilibrium is determined and the evolutionary gamemodel cannot effectively lead to the reach steady stateequilibrium Accordingly this article further employs sys-tem dynamics to analyse the impact of various uncertainfactors on the evolution of the game and lays a basis forformulating relevant policies

5 System Dynamics Simulation Analysis

e above paragraphs analyzed the interaction of the threesubjects in the strategic choice and the influence of externalvariables on the stability of the evolutionary game oughsome conclusions have been drawn they are all analysesconducted from the perspective of a single subject lackingsystematic and comprehensive analysis from the perspectiveof three subjects In the 1950s Fletcher of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology initially adopted the theory of

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(b)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(c)

Figure 9 End user stability evolution phase diagram

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 13

management science and systems science and incorporatedcomputerized simulation technology into quantitative an-alyses to develop a system dynamics theory method It isprimarily adopted to study system problems with highnonlinearity as characterized by multivariate causal feed-back and complex time-varying

us to systematically and deeply analyse the strategicinteraction between different agents the present study usesthe system dynamics theory to build a dynamic model of anintelligent government collaborative governance systembased on blockchain technology and the simulation ofsystem dynamics with VENSIM PLE simulation software isemployed to analyse the evolution of the strategicinteraction

51 Based on the SD Model of ldquoBlockchain +GovernmentAffairs Servicerdquo in Beijing Since November 2019 BeijingMunicipal Government Service Bureau Beijing MunicipalScience and Technology Commission and BeijingMunicipalBureau of Economy and Information Technology have ledthe implementation of the Action Plan on the application ofblockchain in the field of Government Services e BeijingMunicipal Bureau of Commerce and other departments asthe responsible units have vigorously propelled the appli-cation construction of blockchain in government services inthe four pilot areas of the city By August 2020 140 gov-ernment affairs services have been connected in Beijing 253business affairs and 65 human affairs have been settledonline and 100000 pieces of administrative materials can besimplified throughout the year ere have been 121 en-terprises having used the blockchain system to query andverify various functions for nearly 7800 times e reporteddata have been down-regulated by 80 and the averagematerial has decreased by 40

is study combines the specific application scenarios ofblockchain pilots in Haidian Xicheng Chaoyang Shunyiand other blockchain pilots in the ldquoBlue Book on the Ap-plication of Blockchain in Municipal Services in Beijing(First Edition)rdquo issued by the Beijing Municipal Adminis-tration in July 2020 Vensim PLE software is employed tobuild the system dynamics model of the evolutionary gamebetween functional departments local governments andend users (see Figure 10)

52 Initial SimulationAnalysis According to the applicationpractice of the blockchain in the government service field of

Beijing the initial value of the model is assumed as followsINITIAL TIME 0 FINAL TIME 20 TIME-STEP 00625 and Units for Time Month and the 16external variables are assigned as shown in Table 4

Since the three participating agents of functionaldepartments local governments and end users have twokinds of strategy choices 0 and 1 this constitutes 8strategy combinations namely (0 0 0) (0 0 1) (0 1 0)(1 0 0) (1 1 0) (1 0 1) (0 1 1) and (1 1 1) When theinitial states of the three parties are pure strategies thesystem is in equilibrium At this time no one party iswilling to actively change the existing strategies and thementioned eight strategy combinations will become theequilibrium state of the system However this state is notstable as long as there is a small change in one or moresubjects in the system and the system will lose theequilibrium state We take the combination of (0 0 1)strategy as an example to illustrate and its evolutionresults are shown in Figure 11(a) is figure indicates thatthe initial probabilities of the functional departmentschoosing the positive strategy and the local governmentchoosing the strict supervision strategy are very low (both001) in the game process when the participants find thatthere are more profitable strategy choices in the system itwill adjust the original strategy and through the con-tinuous learning and imitating between the subjects thesystem can lastly reach a novel equilibrium state

e simulation of 8 pure strategy combinations issummarized as follows①No matter the positive strategy ofthe functional departments starts from 0 to 001 or from 1 to099 and its strategy choice will eventually reach an equi-librium state at 1 It is therefore revealed that in smartgovernment projects functional departments actively drawupon the smart government platform under the blockchaintechnology to complete the business which is the optimalchoice Only the active use of blockchain technology tooptimize the existing platform workflow can ensure itsmaximum revenue ② Under functional departmentsadopting positive strategies if the local government adopts astrategy of loose supervision no matter whether the endusers change from 0 or 1 the final strategy is 1 ie (1 0 0)and (1 0 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations refers to (1 0 1) (see Figure 11(b)) If the localgovernment carries out strict regulation the end users willmutate from 0 or 1 and the final strategy will be 1 namely(1 1 0) and (1 1 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations is (1 1 1) (see Figure 11(c))

Table 3 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

Equilibrium point λ1 λ2 λ3ζ1 (0 0 0) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ2 (1 0 0) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ3 (1 1 0) minus (C4minus C3 + P4) minus (C2minus C1) I3 +C5 + cS3ζ4 (1 1 1) minus (C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2) minus (C2minus C1 +P1 + αS1) minus (I3 +C5 + cS3)ζ5 (0 1 0) C4minus C3 +P4 minus (C2minus C1 +A1) I3 +C5ζ6 (0 1 1) C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2 minus (C2minus C1 +A1 +P1) minus (I3 +C5)ζ7 (0 0 1) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 +P1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)ζ8 (1 0 1) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 + P1 + αS1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)

14 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Moreover it is revealed that the end users have a positiveattitude towards the use of smart government affairs andthey are willing to use the platform to complete businesstransactions As suggested from the analysis through theevolutionary game process of ldquomutation-adjustment-equi-libriumrdquo of the three agents of the game the system willeventually reach the equilibrium state of (1 1 1)

53 SimulationAnalysis of the Impact of ExternalVariables onStrategy Based on the above discussion the value of eachparameter determines whether each strategy combination isthe equilibrium point to make the system stable state andthe impact of external variables on the strategy selection ofthe game subject is analysede following continues to take(0 0 1) strategy combination as an example to discuss

531 Factors of Functional Departmentsrsquo Strategy ChoiceIn the policy combination of (0 0 1) the initial state offunctional departments refers to a negative strategy It isassumed that the functional departments start from theprobability of 001 As indicated from the simulation amongthe 16 external variables the cost of a positive strategy C3the cost of a negative strategy C4 revenue from precisionservices S2 loss of system security risk P2 loss of informationdistortion attributed to mass data collection and processingP4 and the mentioned five external variables will impact thestrategic choice of functional departments In particular

accurate service degree coefficient β should be stressedwhich is the use of blockchain technology to enhance theserviceability of functional departments By regulating thevalue of β the precision income will be affected Under otherinitial values unchanged the evolution result of strategychoice probability of functional departments is analysed (seeFigure 12)

As revealed from the comparison of Figures 12(b) 12(c)and 12(e) C4 P2 and P4 similarly impact the evolution trendof positive strategy choice in functional departments ehigher the cost for functional departments to negativelyexploit blockchain technology the smaller the loss of systemsecurity risk when using blockchain technology and thegreater the loss of information distortion attributed to massdata collection and processing when not using blockchaintechnology the more functional departments will be in-clined to comply with the strategy of positively usingblockchain technology In addition according to thesimulation analysis C3 complexly impacts the strategyselection of functional departments Under the extremelylarge C3 value functional departments are inclined to useblockchain technology negatively in particular when thevalue is smaller the faster the functional departments willreach the stable state of positive strategy It is also revealedthat when functional departments positively exploitblockchain technology to complete smart governmentbusiness the cost acts as a critical factor when the cost istoo high it will impact the choice of their strategies

Positive strategy probabilityof functional departments xChanging rate of

functionaldepartments R(x)t

Positive and negativestrategy expected income

difference Ex-Expected benefits of

functional departmentspositive strategy Ex

Expected benefits offunctional departmentsnegative strategy E(1-x)

Loss of systemsecurity risk P2

The cost of a positivestrategy C3

Revenue fromprecision services S2

Smart government onenet to run performance

gains I2

The cost of anegative strategy C4

Loss of information distortioncaused by mass data collection

and processing P4

Use strategyprobability of end

users z

End users use strategyand nonuse strategy of

expected incomedifference Vz-

The expected revenueof users using the

platform VzThe expected revenueof uesrs nonusing the

platform V(1-z)

The cost of nonusestrategy C5

Privacy securityrisk loss P3

Revenue frompersonalized

customizationservices I3

Strict supervisionprobability of local

government y Changing rate of localgovernment R(y)t

Strict regulation and loosesupervision of expectedincome difference Uy-

Expected benefits of localgovernmentrsquos loosesupervision U(1-y)

Expected benefits oflocal governments strict

sypervision Uy

Find out the illegal operationand get extra income A1

The cost of the strictsupervision C1

Flating managementearnings S1

Operating income of the smartgovernmentrsquos One net to run

platform I1

The cost of the loosesupervision C2

Data security riskscause the loss of

governmentcredibility P1

β

α

γ

The user gets thebenefit of the trust

confirmation S3

Changing rate of endusers R(z)t

Figure 10 System dynamics (SD) model of functional department local government and end user evolutionary game system

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 15

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 13: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

Jacobian matrix of the system is obtained from equation (23)as follows

J

(1 minus 2x) C4 minus C3 +(y minus 1)P2 + yP4 + yzβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)x P4 + P2 + zβS2( 1113857 (1 minus x)xyβS2

y(1 minus y) zαS1 minus A1( 1113857 (1 minus 2y) C2 minus C1 + A1 minus xA1 + zP1 + xzαS1( 1113857 y(1 minus y) P1 + xαS1( 1113857

z(z minus 1)ycS3 z(z minus 1) P3 + xcS3( 1113857 (1 minus 2z) I3 + C5 minus (1 minus y)P3 + xycS3( 1113857

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

(26)

According to the replication dynamic equation system(13) the local equilibrium point is yielded as followsξ1(0 0 0) ξ2(1 0 0) ξ3(1 1 0) ξ4(1 1 1) ξ5(0 1 0)ξ6(0 1 1) ξ7(0 0 1) ξ8(1 0 1) By complying with Lya-punov stability theorem when all eigenvalues (λ) of theJacobian matrix satisfy λlt 0 the equilibrium point is theasymptotically stable at is the confluence When all ei-genvalues of the Jacobian matrix satisfy λgt 0 the equilib-rium point is unstable which is the source Furthermore forthe Jacobian matrix the eigenvalues (λ) mixed states Inother words some are positive while others are negativeen the equilibrium point also termed as the saddle pointis unstable First for the case where the equilibrium point isξ1(0 0 0) the Jacobian matrix is as follows

J1

C4 minus C3 minus P2 0 0

0 C2 minus C1 + A1 0

0 0 I3 + C5 minus P3

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (27)

It is therefore indicated that the eigenvalues of the Ja-cobian matrix are λ1 C4 minus C3 minus P2 λ2 C2 minus C1 + A1 andλ3 I3 + C5 minus P3 With the identical analogy the 8 equi-librium points are substituted into the Jacobian matrix (26)respectively and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

corresponding to the equilibrium points can be determinedrespectively (Table 3)

According to the mentioned analysis the evolutionarygame system has stability under certain conditions How-ever many parameters are accordingly involved and thecharacteristic value (λ) symbol is determined by the size ofthe mentioned parameter values Under the existing knownmathematical derivation method the stability of each of theNash equilibrium is determined and the evolutionary gamemodel cannot effectively lead to the reach steady stateequilibrium Accordingly this article further employs sys-tem dynamics to analyse the impact of various uncertainfactors on the evolution of the game and lays a basis forformulating relevant policies

5 System Dynamics Simulation Analysis

e above paragraphs analyzed the interaction of the threesubjects in the strategic choice and the influence of externalvariables on the stability of the evolutionary game oughsome conclusions have been drawn they are all analysesconducted from the perspective of a single subject lackingsystematic and comprehensive analysis from the perspectiveof three subjects In the 1950s Fletcher of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology initially adopted the theory of

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

(a)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

z

ζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(b)

x

ζ5 (0 1 0)

y

ζ1 (0 0 0)

ζ4 (1 1 1)

ζ6 (0 1 1)

ζ8 (1 0 1)

ζ2 (1 0 0)

zζ7 (0 0 1)

ζ3 (1 1 0)

Sz

(c)

Figure 9 End user stability evolution phase diagram

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 13

management science and systems science and incorporatedcomputerized simulation technology into quantitative an-alyses to develop a system dynamics theory method It isprimarily adopted to study system problems with highnonlinearity as characterized by multivariate causal feed-back and complex time-varying

us to systematically and deeply analyse the strategicinteraction between different agents the present study usesthe system dynamics theory to build a dynamic model of anintelligent government collaborative governance systembased on blockchain technology and the simulation ofsystem dynamics with VENSIM PLE simulation software isemployed to analyse the evolution of the strategicinteraction

51 Based on the SD Model of ldquoBlockchain +GovernmentAffairs Servicerdquo in Beijing Since November 2019 BeijingMunicipal Government Service Bureau Beijing MunicipalScience and Technology Commission and BeijingMunicipalBureau of Economy and Information Technology have ledthe implementation of the Action Plan on the application ofblockchain in the field of Government Services e BeijingMunicipal Bureau of Commerce and other departments asthe responsible units have vigorously propelled the appli-cation construction of blockchain in government services inthe four pilot areas of the city By August 2020 140 gov-ernment affairs services have been connected in Beijing 253business affairs and 65 human affairs have been settledonline and 100000 pieces of administrative materials can besimplified throughout the year ere have been 121 en-terprises having used the blockchain system to query andverify various functions for nearly 7800 times e reporteddata have been down-regulated by 80 and the averagematerial has decreased by 40

is study combines the specific application scenarios ofblockchain pilots in Haidian Xicheng Chaoyang Shunyiand other blockchain pilots in the ldquoBlue Book on the Ap-plication of Blockchain in Municipal Services in Beijing(First Edition)rdquo issued by the Beijing Municipal Adminis-tration in July 2020 Vensim PLE software is employed tobuild the system dynamics model of the evolutionary gamebetween functional departments local governments andend users (see Figure 10)

52 Initial SimulationAnalysis According to the applicationpractice of the blockchain in the government service field of

Beijing the initial value of the model is assumed as followsINITIAL TIME 0 FINAL TIME 20 TIME-STEP 00625 and Units for Time Month and the 16external variables are assigned as shown in Table 4

Since the three participating agents of functionaldepartments local governments and end users have twokinds of strategy choices 0 and 1 this constitutes 8strategy combinations namely (0 0 0) (0 0 1) (0 1 0)(1 0 0) (1 1 0) (1 0 1) (0 1 1) and (1 1 1) When theinitial states of the three parties are pure strategies thesystem is in equilibrium At this time no one party iswilling to actively change the existing strategies and thementioned eight strategy combinations will become theequilibrium state of the system However this state is notstable as long as there is a small change in one or moresubjects in the system and the system will lose theequilibrium state We take the combination of (0 0 1)strategy as an example to illustrate and its evolutionresults are shown in Figure 11(a) is figure indicates thatthe initial probabilities of the functional departmentschoosing the positive strategy and the local governmentchoosing the strict supervision strategy are very low (both001) in the game process when the participants find thatthere are more profitable strategy choices in the system itwill adjust the original strategy and through the con-tinuous learning and imitating between the subjects thesystem can lastly reach a novel equilibrium state

e simulation of 8 pure strategy combinations issummarized as follows①No matter the positive strategy ofthe functional departments starts from 0 to 001 or from 1 to099 and its strategy choice will eventually reach an equi-librium state at 1 It is therefore revealed that in smartgovernment projects functional departments actively drawupon the smart government platform under the blockchaintechnology to complete the business which is the optimalchoice Only the active use of blockchain technology tooptimize the existing platform workflow can ensure itsmaximum revenue ② Under functional departmentsadopting positive strategies if the local government adopts astrategy of loose supervision no matter whether the endusers change from 0 or 1 the final strategy is 1 ie (1 0 0)and (1 0 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations refers to (1 0 1) (see Figure 11(b)) If the localgovernment carries out strict regulation the end users willmutate from 0 or 1 and the final strategy will be 1 namely(1 1 0) and (1 1 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations is (1 1 1) (see Figure 11(c))

Table 3 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

Equilibrium point λ1 λ2 λ3ζ1 (0 0 0) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ2 (1 0 0) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ3 (1 1 0) minus (C4minus C3 + P4) minus (C2minus C1) I3 +C5 + cS3ζ4 (1 1 1) minus (C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2) minus (C2minus C1 +P1 + αS1) minus (I3 +C5 + cS3)ζ5 (0 1 0) C4minus C3 +P4 minus (C2minus C1 +A1) I3 +C5ζ6 (0 1 1) C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2 minus (C2minus C1 +A1 +P1) minus (I3 +C5)ζ7 (0 0 1) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 +P1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)ζ8 (1 0 1) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 + P1 + αS1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)

14 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Moreover it is revealed that the end users have a positiveattitude towards the use of smart government affairs andthey are willing to use the platform to complete businesstransactions As suggested from the analysis through theevolutionary game process of ldquomutation-adjustment-equi-libriumrdquo of the three agents of the game the system willeventually reach the equilibrium state of (1 1 1)

53 SimulationAnalysis of the Impact of ExternalVariables onStrategy Based on the above discussion the value of eachparameter determines whether each strategy combination isthe equilibrium point to make the system stable state andthe impact of external variables on the strategy selection ofthe game subject is analysede following continues to take(0 0 1) strategy combination as an example to discuss

531 Factors of Functional Departmentsrsquo Strategy ChoiceIn the policy combination of (0 0 1) the initial state offunctional departments refers to a negative strategy It isassumed that the functional departments start from theprobability of 001 As indicated from the simulation amongthe 16 external variables the cost of a positive strategy C3the cost of a negative strategy C4 revenue from precisionservices S2 loss of system security risk P2 loss of informationdistortion attributed to mass data collection and processingP4 and the mentioned five external variables will impact thestrategic choice of functional departments In particular

accurate service degree coefficient β should be stressedwhich is the use of blockchain technology to enhance theserviceability of functional departments By regulating thevalue of β the precision income will be affected Under otherinitial values unchanged the evolution result of strategychoice probability of functional departments is analysed (seeFigure 12)

As revealed from the comparison of Figures 12(b) 12(c)and 12(e) C4 P2 and P4 similarly impact the evolution trendof positive strategy choice in functional departments ehigher the cost for functional departments to negativelyexploit blockchain technology the smaller the loss of systemsecurity risk when using blockchain technology and thegreater the loss of information distortion attributed to massdata collection and processing when not using blockchaintechnology the more functional departments will be in-clined to comply with the strategy of positively usingblockchain technology In addition according to thesimulation analysis C3 complexly impacts the strategyselection of functional departments Under the extremelylarge C3 value functional departments are inclined to useblockchain technology negatively in particular when thevalue is smaller the faster the functional departments willreach the stable state of positive strategy It is also revealedthat when functional departments positively exploitblockchain technology to complete smart governmentbusiness the cost acts as a critical factor when the cost istoo high it will impact the choice of their strategies

Positive strategy probabilityof functional departments xChanging rate of

functionaldepartments R(x)t

Positive and negativestrategy expected income

difference Ex-Expected benefits of

functional departmentspositive strategy Ex

Expected benefits offunctional departmentsnegative strategy E(1-x)

Loss of systemsecurity risk P2

The cost of a positivestrategy C3

Revenue fromprecision services S2

Smart government onenet to run performance

gains I2

The cost of anegative strategy C4

Loss of information distortioncaused by mass data collection

and processing P4

Use strategyprobability of end

users z

End users use strategyand nonuse strategy of

expected incomedifference Vz-

The expected revenueof users using the

platform VzThe expected revenueof uesrs nonusing the

platform V(1-z)

The cost of nonusestrategy C5

Privacy securityrisk loss P3

Revenue frompersonalized

customizationservices I3

Strict supervisionprobability of local

government y Changing rate of localgovernment R(y)t

Strict regulation and loosesupervision of expectedincome difference Uy-

Expected benefits of localgovernmentrsquos loosesupervision U(1-y)

Expected benefits oflocal governments strict

sypervision Uy

Find out the illegal operationand get extra income A1

The cost of the strictsupervision C1

Flating managementearnings S1

Operating income of the smartgovernmentrsquos One net to run

platform I1

The cost of the loosesupervision C2

Data security riskscause the loss of

governmentcredibility P1

β

α

γ

The user gets thebenefit of the trust

confirmation S3

Changing rate of endusers R(z)t

Figure 10 System dynamics (SD) model of functional department local government and end user evolutionary game system

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 15

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

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[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 14: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

management science and systems science and incorporatedcomputerized simulation technology into quantitative an-alyses to develop a system dynamics theory method It isprimarily adopted to study system problems with highnonlinearity as characterized by multivariate causal feed-back and complex time-varying

us to systematically and deeply analyse the strategicinteraction between different agents the present study usesthe system dynamics theory to build a dynamic model of anintelligent government collaborative governance systembased on blockchain technology and the simulation ofsystem dynamics with VENSIM PLE simulation software isemployed to analyse the evolution of the strategicinteraction

51 Based on the SD Model of ldquoBlockchain +GovernmentAffairs Servicerdquo in Beijing Since November 2019 BeijingMunicipal Government Service Bureau Beijing MunicipalScience and Technology Commission and BeijingMunicipalBureau of Economy and Information Technology have ledthe implementation of the Action Plan on the application ofblockchain in the field of Government Services e BeijingMunicipal Bureau of Commerce and other departments asthe responsible units have vigorously propelled the appli-cation construction of blockchain in government services inthe four pilot areas of the city By August 2020 140 gov-ernment affairs services have been connected in Beijing 253business affairs and 65 human affairs have been settledonline and 100000 pieces of administrative materials can besimplified throughout the year ere have been 121 en-terprises having used the blockchain system to query andverify various functions for nearly 7800 times e reporteddata have been down-regulated by 80 and the averagematerial has decreased by 40

is study combines the specific application scenarios ofblockchain pilots in Haidian Xicheng Chaoyang Shunyiand other blockchain pilots in the ldquoBlue Book on the Ap-plication of Blockchain in Municipal Services in Beijing(First Edition)rdquo issued by the Beijing Municipal Adminis-tration in July 2020 Vensim PLE software is employed tobuild the system dynamics model of the evolutionary gamebetween functional departments local governments andend users (see Figure 10)

52 Initial SimulationAnalysis According to the applicationpractice of the blockchain in the government service field of

Beijing the initial value of the model is assumed as followsINITIAL TIME 0 FINAL TIME 20 TIME-STEP 00625 and Units for Time Month and the 16external variables are assigned as shown in Table 4

Since the three participating agents of functionaldepartments local governments and end users have twokinds of strategy choices 0 and 1 this constitutes 8strategy combinations namely (0 0 0) (0 0 1) (0 1 0)(1 0 0) (1 1 0) (1 0 1) (0 1 1) and (1 1 1) When theinitial states of the three parties are pure strategies thesystem is in equilibrium At this time no one party iswilling to actively change the existing strategies and thementioned eight strategy combinations will become theequilibrium state of the system However this state is notstable as long as there is a small change in one or moresubjects in the system and the system will lose theequilibrium state We take the combination of (0 0 1)strategy as an example to illustrate and its evolutionresults are shown in Figure 11(a) is figure indicates thatthe initial probabilities of the functional departmentschoosing the positive strategy and the local governmentchoosing the strict supervision strategy are very low (both001) in the game process when the participants find thatthere are more profitable strategy choices in the system itwill adjust the original strategy and through the con-tinuous learning and imitating between the subjects thesystem can lastly reach a novel equilibrium state

e simulation of 8 pure strategy combinations issummarized as follows①No matter the positive strategy ofthe functional departments starts from 0 to 001 or from 1 to099 and its strategy choice will eventually reach an equi-librium state at 1 It is therefore revealed that in smartgovernment projects functional departments actively drawupon the smart government platform under the blockchaintechnology to complete the business which is the optimalchoice Only the active use of blockchain technology tooptimize the existing platform workflow can ensure itsmaximum revenue ② Under functional departmentsadopting positive strategies if the local government adopts astrategy of loose supervision no matter whether the endusers change from 0 or 1 the final strategy is 1 ie (1 0 0)and (1 0 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations refers to (1 0 1) (see Figure 11(b)) If the localgovernment carries out strict regulation the end users willmutate from 0 or 1 and the final strategy will be 1 namely(1 1 0) and (1 1 1) e evolution result of the two strategycombinations is (1 1 1) (see Figure 11(c))

Table 3 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix

Equilibrium point λ1 λ2 λ3ζ1 (0 0 0) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ2 (1 0 0) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 I3 +C5minus P3ζ3 (1 1 0) minus (C4minus C3 + P4) minus (C2minus C1) I3 +C5 + cS3ζ4 (1 1 1) minus (C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2) minus (C2minus C1 +P1 + αS1) minus (I3 +C5 + cS3)ζ5 (0 1 0) C4minus C3 +P4 minus (C2minus C1 +A1) I3 +C5ζ6 (0 1 1) C4minus C3 +P4 + βS2 minus (C2minus C1 +A1 +P1) minus (I3 +C5)ζ7 (0 0 1) C4minus C3minus P2 C2minus C1 +A1 +P1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)ζ8 (1 0 1) minus (C4minus C3minus P2) C2minus C1 + P1 + αS1 minus (I3 +C5minus P3)

14 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Moreover it is revealed that the end users have a positiveattitude towards the use of smart government affairs andthey are willing to use the platform to complete businesstransactions As suggested from the analysis through theevolutionary game process of ldquomutation-adjustment-equi-libriumrdquo of the three agents of the game the system willeventually reach the equilibrium state of (1 1 1)

53 SimulationAnalysis of the Impact of ExternalVariables onStrategy Based on the above discussion the value of eachparameter determines whether each strategy combination isthe equilibrium point to make the system stable state andthe impact of external variables on the strategy selection ofthe game subject is analysede following continues to take(0 0 1) strategy combination as an example to discuss

531 Factors of Functional Departmentsrsquo Strategy ChoiceIn the policy combination of (0 0 1) the initial state offunctional departments refers to a negative strategy It isassumed that the functional departments start from theprobability of 001 As indicated from the simulation amongthe 16 external variables the cost of a positive strategy C3the cost of a negative strategy C4 revenue from precisionservices S2 loss of system security risk P2 loss of informationdistortion attributed to mass data collection and processingP4 and the mentioned five external variables will impact thestrategic choice of functional departments In particular

accurate service degree coefficient β should be stressedwhich is the use of blockchain technology to enhance theserviceability of functional departments By regulating thevalue of β the precision income will be affected Under otherinitial values unchanged the evolution result of strategychoice probability of functional departments is analysed (seeFigure 12)

As revealed from the comparison of Figures 12(b) 12(c)and 12(e) C4 P2 and P4 similarly impact the evolution trendof positive strategy choice in functional departments ehigher the cost for functional departments to negativelyexploit blockchain technology the smaller the loss of systemsecurity risk when using blockchain technology and thegreater the loss of information distortion attributed to massdata collection and processing when not using blockchaintechnology the more functional departments will be in-clined to comply with the strategy of positively usingblockchain technology In addition according to thesimulation analysis C3 complexly impacts the strategyselection of functional departments Under the extremelylarge C3 value functional departments are inclined to useblockchain technology negatively in particular when thevalue is smaller the faster the functional departments willreach the stable state of positive strategy It is also revealedthat when functional departments positively exploitblockchain technology to complete smart governmentbusiness the cost acts as a critical factor when the cost istoo high it will impact the choice of their strategies

Positive strategy probabilityof functional departments xChanging rate of

functionaldepartments R(x)t

Positive and negativestrategy expected income

difference Ex-Expected benefits of

functional departmentspositive strategy Ex

Expected benefits offunctional departmentsnegative strategy E(1-x)

Loss of systemsecurity risk P2

The cost of a positivestrategy C3

Revenue fromprecision services S2

Smart government onenet to run performance

gains I2

The cost of anegative strategy C4

Loss of information distortioncaused by mass data collection

and processing P4

Use strategyprobability of end

users z

End users use strategyand nonuse strategy of

expected incomedifference Vz-

The expected revenueof users using the

platform VzThe expected revenueof uesrs nonusing the

platform V(1-z)

The cost of nonusestrategy C5

Privacy securityrisk loss P3

Revenue frompersonalized

customizationservices I3

Strict supervisionprobability of local

government y Changing rate of localgovernment R(y)t

Strict regulation and loosesupervision of expectedincome difference Uy-

Expected benefits of localgovernmentrsquos loosesupervision U(1-y)

Expected benefits oflocal governments strict

sypervision Uy

Find out the illegal operationand get extra income A1

The cost of the strictsupervision C1

Flating managementearnings S1

Operating income of the smartgovernmentrsquos One net to run

platform I1

The cost of the loosesupervision C2

Data security riskscause the loss of

governmentcredibility P1

β

α

γ

The user gets thebenefit of the trust

confirmation S3

Changing rate of endusers R(z)t

Figure 10 System dynamics (SD) model of functional department local government and end user evolutionary game system

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 15

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

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[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 15: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

Moreover it is revealed that the end users have a positiveattitude towards the use of smart government affairs andthey are willing to use the platform to complete businesstransactions As suggested from the analysis through theevolutionary game process of ldquomutation-adjustment-equi-libriumrdquo of the three agents of the game the system willeventually reach the equilibrium state of (1 1 1)

53 SimulationAnalysis of the Impact of ExternalVariables onStrategy Based on the above discussion the value of eachparameter determines whether each strategy combination isthe equilibrium point to make the system stable state andthe impact of external variables on the strategy selection ofthe game subject is analysede following continues to take(0 0 1) strategy combination as an example to discuss

531 Factors of Functional Departmentsrsquo Strategy ChoiceIn the policy combination of (0 0 1) the initial state offunctional departments refers to a negative strategy It isassumed that the functional departments start from theprobability of 001 As indicated from the simulation amongthe 16 external variables the cost of a positive strategy C3the cost of a negative strategy C4 revenue from precisionservices S2 loss of system security risk P2 loss of informationdistortion attributed to mass data collection and processingP4 and the mentioned five external variables will impact thestrategic choice of functional departments In particular

accurate service degree coefficient β should be stressedwhich is the use of blockchain technology to enhance theserviceability of functional departments By regulating thevalue of β the precision income will be affected Under otherinitial values unchanged the evolution result of strategychoice probability of functional departments is analysed (seeFigure 12)

As revealed from the comparison of Figures 12(b) 12(c)and 12(e) C4 P2 and P4 similarly impact the evolution trendof positive strategy choice in functional departments ehigher the cost for functional departments to negativelyexploit blockchain technology the smaller the loss of systemsecurity risk when using blockchain technology and thegreater the loss of information distortion attributed to massdata collection and processing when not using blockchaintechnology the more functional departments will be in-clined to comply with the strategy of positively usingblockchain technology In addition according to thesimulation analysis C3 complexly impacts the strategyselection of functional departments Under the extremelylarge C3 value functional departments are inclined to useblockchain technology negatively in particular when thevalue is smaller the faster the functional departments willreach the stable state of positive strategy It is also revealedthat when functional departments positively exploitblockchain technology to complete smart governmentbusiness the cost acts as a critical factor when the cost istoo high it will impact the choice of their strategies

Positive strategy probabilityof functional departments xChanging rate of

functionaldepartments R(x)t

Positive and negativestrategy expected income

difference Ex-Expected benefits of

functional departmentspositive strategy Ex

Expected benefits offunctional departmentsnegative strategy E(1-x)

Loss of systemsecurity risk P2

The cost of a positivestrategy C3

Revenue fromprecision services S2

Smart government onenet to run performance

gains I2

The cost of anegative strategy C4

Loss of information distortioncaused by mass data collection

and processing P4

Use strategyprobability of end

users z

End users use strategyand nonuse strategy of

expected incomedifference Vz-

The expected revenueof users using the

platform VzThe expected revenueof uesrs nonusing the

platform V(1-z)

The cost of nonusestrategy C5

Privacy securityrisk loss P3

Revenue frompersonalized

customizationservices I3

Strict supervisionprobability of local

government y Changing rate of localgovernment R(y)t

Strict regulation and loosesupervision of expectedincome difference Uy-

Expected benefits of localgovernmentrsquos loosesupervision U(1-y)

Expected benefits oflocal governments strict

sypervision Uy

Find out the illegal operationand get extra income A1

The cost of the strictsupervision C1

Flating managementearnings S1

Operating income of the smartgovernmentrsquos One net to run

platform I1

The cost of the loosesupervision C2

Data security riskscause the loss of

governmentcredibility P1

β

α

γ

The user gets thebenefit of the trust

confirmation S3

Changing rate of endusers R(z)t

Figure 10 System dynamics (SD) model of functional department local government and end user evolutionary game system

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 15

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 16: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

Likewise the precision service degree coefficient βbrought by blockchain technology to functional depart-ments also impacts the choice of their strategiesFigure 12(e) indicates that when the degree of precisionservice is improved the functional departments approachthe positive strategy faster whereas under the income ofprecision service reaching a certain degree the impact onconvergence turns out to be slight

532 9e Factors of Local Government Strategy ChoiceAs revealed from the simulation the mentioned externalvariables will affect the local governmentrsquos strategy choice(eg the cost C1 under strict supervision the cost C2 underloose supervision the incentive income A1 under illegaloperation the credibility P1 under data security risk loss aswell as the degree coefficient α of flat management) (seeFigure 13) With the decrease in the value of C1 and the

increase in the values of C2 A1 and P1 local government ismore inclined to adopt a strict supervision strategy and theirevolution path displays an S-type growth trend Besides itcan be seen from Figure 13(d) that when the value of P1 isless than a certain value the local government will eventuallychoose the strategy of loose supervision As can be seen fromFigure 13(c) the A1 value is the reward income of localgovernment for discovering illegal operations in functionaldepartments Accordingly the strategy selection of localgovernments is influenced by functional departments Localgovernments play a normative and guiding role in the be-haviour of functional departments An appropriate increasein A1 value can promote local governments to choose a strictsupervision strategy e value of P1 is the public credibilitycompromised by the data security risk When loose su-pervise undermines credibility local government isemboldened to go slowWhen the credibility of the damagedgovernment is high the local government has a sense of

Table 4 Meaning and assignment of model variables

Variable Sign Unit Initial value

Performance benefits of smart government platform business processing I2Millionyuan 10

Actively use blockchain technology to optimize the cost of smart government business processing C3Millionyuan 5

Negative treatment of blockchain technology only maintain the cost of online business processingexpenditure C4

Millionyuan 2

When not in use blockchain technology huge amounts of data collect processing information distortion P4Millionyuan 3

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service level of functional departments β Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to improve the precision service revenue of functional departments S2Millionyuan 5

Lax supervision of local government blockchain technology the system security risks of losses P2Millionyuan 4

Economic and social benefits of smart government platform operation I1Millionyuan 15

e cost of strict supervision C1Millionyuan 5

e cost of loose supervision C2Millionyuan 3

When users use it the governmentrsquos lack of supervision results in privacy leakage which damages thegovernmentrsquos credibility P1

Millionyuan 6

When strict supervision is carried out the reward gains of noncompliance in functional departments arefound A1

Millionyuan 2

Blockchain technology is used to optimize the flat management efficiency of the public managementstructure α Dmnl 1

Using blockchain technology to optimize the flat management benefits of the public managementstructure S1

Millionyuan 6

e net income of personalized and customized services obtained via the smart government platform I3Millionyuan 12

Still choose the total cost of business hall processing C5Millionyuan 8

When the local government loose supervision users will lose privacy security risks when they use theplatform P3

Millionyuan 10

e degree of trust and authority that functional departments get from users using blockchain technology c Dmnl 1Functional departments make use of the trust gained by the users of blockchain technology to determinethe benefits of rights S3

Millionyuan 4

16 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 17: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

crisis To maintain their good image they must strictlysupervise and ensure the reputation of the governmentLikewise Figure 13(e) indicates that when the value α is thelocal governmentrsquos strict supervision the higher the ratio ofthe flat public management efficiency the faster the localgovernmentrsquos strict supervision strategy will approach to 1However when the ratio of the flat public managementefficiency reaches a certain degree the impact on the con-vergence is not so obvious

533 9e Factors of the End Usersrsquo Strategy ChoiceGiven the simulation analysis results the variables (eg thebenefits of personalized service received by the end user viathe smart government platform I3 the cost of going to thehall for business C5 the loss of user privacy and security riskP3 and the coefficient of usersrsquo trust confirmation) signif-icantly impact the user strategy choice (see Figure 14)Figures 14(a) and 14(b) indicate that when users draw uponthe smart government platform for business the greater the

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

5 Dmnl

5 Dmnl1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

22

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(a)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl1

1 Dmnl5 Dmnl5

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

(b)

2 Dmnl1 Dmnl2

1 Dmnl05 Dmnl

1

0 Dmnl0 Dmnl0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Time (month)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 Dmnl1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 Dmnl2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Figure 11 Evolutionary results for different values of x y and z (a) x 001 y 001 and z 1 (b) x 1 y 001 and z 001 (c) x 1 y 1and z 099

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 17

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 18: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1D

mnl

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(a)D

mnl

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 33

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(b)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(c)

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(d)

Figure 12 Continued

18 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 19: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x

3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2

2

2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Positive strategy probability of functional departments x current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

(e)

Figure 12 e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of functional departments (a) Current 1 C3 4 Current 2 C3 6 andCurrent 3 C3 8 (b) Current 1 C4 2 Current 2 C4 3 and Current 3 C4 4 (c) Current 1 P2 2 Current 2 P2 5 and Current 3 P2 8 (d) Current 1 P4 3 Current 2 P4 5 and Current 3 P4 7 (e) Current 1 β 01 Current 2 β 04 and Current 3 β 09

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3 33

3

3

33 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(a)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(b)

Figure 13 Continued

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 19

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 20: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

revenue and the higher the cost of business without using theplatform the more likely they will be to comply with the usestrategy According to Figure 14(c) when the local gov-ernment is lax in supervision and the users cause the loss ofprivacy security risk of the smart government platform to behigher than a certain value the usersrsquo profit from using theplatform will be damaged and the users are inclined to chooseto still go to the service hall to handle business It is thereforesuggested that the strategy choice of users displays a tight

association with the supervision intensity of local governmentsFigure 14(d) suggests that the trust mechanism of blockchaintechnology mentioned in extensive studies had slight effects onthe choice of smart government platform with blockchaintechnology in this study model is may be explained as thetrust mechanism under blockchain technology is a trustcompletely based on machine and logic Users do not haveintuitive feelings when using so it slightly impacts usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

Dm

nl

0

025

05

075

1

(d)

Strict supervision probability of local government y current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Strict supervision probability of local government y current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Strict supervision probability of local government y current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Strict supervision probability of local government y

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 11

1

1

1

11 1 1 1 1 1

0

Dm

nl

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 202Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(e)

Figure 13e impact of external variables on the strategic choice of local government (a) Current 1 C1 5 Current 2 C1 7 and Current3 C1 9 (b) Current 1 C2 3 Current 2 C2 5 and Current 3 C2 7 (c) Current 1A1 2 Current 2 A1 4 and Current 3 A1 6 (d)Current 1 P1 4 Current 2 P1 7 and Current 3 P1 10 (e) Current 1 α 01 Current 2 α 04 and Current 3 α 09

20 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 21: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

6 Conclusions

Compared with the existing online government affairs opera-tion model the smart government affairs collaborative gover-nance model with blockchain technology is conducive tobuilding a data credibility mechanism and solving the problemsof trust uncertainty nontampering and traceability while ef-fectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of multiple participation ingovernance forging a novel situation of collaborative gover-nance of multiple subjects and achieving the cooperationmodeof ldquogovernment-led market operation and multiple

participationrdquo With evolutionary game theory to analyse thecooperation strategies of functional departments local gov-ernments and end users in the smart government collaborativegovernance model with blockchain technology it is found thatthe change of the general equilibrium point (saddle point)impacts the change of game evolution characteristics and thestability analysis of the evolutionary game Based on evolu-tionary game stability analysis and system dynamics simulationresults the primary conclusions and limitations are as follows

First cost control of collaborative governance is the primaryissue in a blockchain technology smart government system For

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

ndash00002

02498

04999

075

1

(a)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

05

1

15

2

(b)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z

3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

0

025

05

075

1

(c)

Use strategy probability of end users z current 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Use strategy probability of end users z current 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Use strategy probability of end users z current 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Use strategy probability of end users z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200Time (month)

08

085

09

095

1

(d)

Figure 14 e impact of external variables on the end userrsquos strategy choice (a) Current 1 I3 5 Current 2 I3 7 and Current 3 I3 10(b) Current 1 C5 8 Current 2 C5 10 and Current 3 C5 12 (c) Current 1P3 10 Current 2 P3 14 and Current 3 P318 (d)Current 1 c 01 Current 2 c 04 and Current 3 c 09

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 21

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 22: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

instance the cost of functional departments participating in thework of building trusted infrastructure and common underlyingblockchain platforms as well as the cost of local governmentbusiness regulation and technical supervision On the wholethey impact the stability of the decision-making behaviour of theparticipants in collaborative governance

Second information security is a determining factor inadvancing the widespread use of the blockchain smart gov-ernment system As indicated from the simulation when theimmaturity of blockchain technology increases the potentialthreat to the information security of the original system re-placement this functionwill reduce the comprehensive incomeof the smart government system so functional departmentswill not use blockchain technology Likewise when end usersuse a smart government system that elevates the risk of privateinformation leakage they will refuse to use the system andprefer spending more time going to the lobby to conductbusiness

Lastly the ldquodecentralizedrdquo structure and ldquoprecisionrdquomechanism of blockchain technology can indeed elevatethe level of precision service of functional departmentsand the flat management capability of local governmentsHowever according to Figures 12(e) and 13(e) of thesimulation with the coefficient rising to a certain levelthe effect on decision-making behaviour is slightHowever the impact of blockchain technologyrsquosldquodetrustrdquo architecture on the system is relatively weak asseen in simulation Figure 14(d) where the increase intrust factor for end users only changes the smoothness ofthe decision curve whereas it does not affect usersrsquo de-cision-making behaviour is indicates that in the shortterm the increase in trust level does not noticeablyimpact the collaborative governance system

ough the research in the present study has certainpractical significance and practical value there are still limi-tations and shortcomings First the selection of Beijingldquoblockchain+ government servicerdquo case has its particularity sothe expansion income is insufficient Second based on thechange of external variable assignment to determine thestrategy selection effect only using case simulation practicalapplication should be combined with the concrete situationwhich further analysis validation Lastly the development ofblockchain technology remains preliminary and the publicityand nonprofit nature of government services determine that itsrole in the governance process is subject to certain limitationsrequiring in-depth explorations us further deepening themodel in combination with the reality and more appropriatesimulation and optimization of the smart government col-laborative governance model with blockchain technology arethe direction of future research

Data Availability

e data used to support the findings of this study areavailable from the corresponding author upon request

Conflicts of Interest

e authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

Acknowledgments

is research was funded by the Scientific Research Foun-dation of the Education Department of Liaoning Provincegrant number 202001

References

[1] httpwwwibmcomsmarterplanetcnzhgovernmentnextstepsindexhtmlresphAvailable online 2011 (accessed on December2008

[2] Available online httpspublicadministrationunorgegovkbPortalsegovkbDocumentsun2018-SurveyE-Government20Survey202018_FINAL20for20webpdf (accessed on 19July 2018)

[3] M M Kamal V Weerakkody and S Jones ldquoe case of EAIin facilitating e-Government services in a Welsh authorityrdquoInternational Journal of Information Management vol 29no 2 pp 161ndash165 2009

[4] A Mishra and D Mishra ldquoE-government - exploring thedifferent dimensions of challenges implementation andsuccess factorsrdquo Data Base For Advances in InformationSystems vol 42 no 4 pp 23ndash37 2011

[5] A Groznik and P Trkman ldquoUpstream supply chain man-agement in e-government the case of Sloveniardquo GovernmentInformation Quarterly Government Information Quarterlyvol 26 no 3 pp 459ndash467 2009

[6] Available online httpsdifanggmwcngz2019-0527content_32870708htm (accessed on May 2019)

[7] S M Wu D Q Guo and Y J Wu ldquoFuture development oftaiwanrsquos smart cities from an information security perspec-tiverdquo Sustainability vol 10 no 12 4520 pages 2018

[8] D Garcia ldquoLeaking privacy and shadow profiles in onlinesocial networksrdquo Science Advances vol 3 Article IDe1701172 2017

[9] E A Miller and V Mor ldquoBalancing regulatory controls andincentives toward smarter and more transparent oversight inlong-term carerdquo Journal of Health Politics Policy and Lawvol 33 no 2 pp 249ndash279 2008

[10] X J Kong X T Liu and B Jedari ldquoMobile crowdsourcing insmart cities technologies applications and future chal-lengesrdquo IEEE Internet of 9ings Journal vol 6 no 5pp 8095ndash8113 2019

[11] H Yu Z Yang and R O Sinnott ldquoDecentralized big dataauditing for smart city environments leveraging blockchaintechnologyrdquo IEEE Access vol 7 pp 6288ndash6296 2019

[12] M Sun and J Zhang ldquoResearch on the application of blockchain big data platform in the construction of new smart cityfor low carbon emission and green environmentrdquo ComputerCommunications vol 149 pp 332ndash342 2020

[13] A Ferraris G Santoro and A C Pellicelli ldquoOpennessrsquoofpublic governments in smart cities removing the barriers forinnovation and entrepreneurshiprdquo International Entrepre-neurship and Management Journal vol 16 pp 1259ndash12802020

[14] H Yeh ldquoe effects of successful ICT-based smart city ser-vices from citizensrsquo perspectivesrdquo Government InformationQuarterly Government Information Quarterly vol 34 no 3pp 556ndash565 2017

[15] X Z Zhao and G Wenyao ldquoHow does local governmentinnovation keep sustainable an organizational approach baseon a concept of ldquosecurity zone for achievementsrdquomdasha casestudy of smart city project in H cityrdquo Journal of PublicManagement 2020

22 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23

Page 23: ResearchonCollaborativeGovernanceofSmartGovernment ...Blockchain technology is currently involved in numerous fields of public affairs management (e.g., public services, social security,

[16] N Z Sheng F Li and X F Li ldquoData capitalization methodbased on blockchain smart contract for internet of thingsrdquoJournal of Zhejiang University Engineering Science vol 11pp 2150ndash2158 2018

[17] B Otjacques P Hitzelberger and F Feltz ldquoInteroperability ofE-government information systems issues of identification anddata sharingrdquo Journal of Management Information Systemsvol 23 no 4 pp 29ndash51 2007

[18] Available online httpwwwwetorcemorgreportsdeep-shift-technology-tipping-points-and-societal-impeat (accessed onSeptember 2015)

[19] Q Wang M Su and R Li ldquoIs China the worldrsquos blockchainleader Evidence evolution and outlook of Chinarsquos blockchainresearchrdquo Journal of Cleaner Production vol 264 Article ID121742 2020

[20] X S Li and Y L Ding ldquoHolistic governance for sustainablepublic services reshaping government-enterprise relation-ships in Chinarsquos digital government contextrdquo InternationalJournal of Environmental Research and Public Health vol 17no 5 1178 pages 2020

[21] S Olnes ldquoBeyond bitcoin enabling smart government usingblockchain technologyrdquo Electronic Government vol 9820pp 253ndash264 2019

[22] J A T Casallas J M C Lovelle and J I R Molano ldquoSmartcontracts with blockchain in the public sectorrdquo InternationalJournal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligencevol 6 pp 63ndash72 2020

[23] V Y Fantis H C Leligou and K Ntalianis ldquoNew devel-opment blockchain-a revolutionary tool for the public sec-torrdquo Public Money amp Management vol 9 pp 63ndash72 2020

[24] S Myeong and Y Jung ldquoAdministrative reforms in the fourthindustrial revolution the case of blockchain userdquo Sustain-ability vol 11 p 3971 2019

[25] G Tshering and S Gao ldquoUnderstanding security in thegovernmentrsquos use of blockchain technology with value fo-cused thinking approachrdquo Journal of Enterprise InformationManagement vol 33 no 3 pp 519ndash540 2020

[26] C Sullivan and E Burger ldquoE-residency and blockchainrdquoComputer Law amp Security Review vol 33 no 4 pp 470ndash4812017

[27] Y G Fu and J M Zhu ldquoOperation mechanism for G2Bsystem based on blockchainrdquo Tehnickivjesnik-Technical Ga-zette vol 26 no 6 pp 1841ndash1852 2019

[28] P Paech ldquoe governance of blockchain financial networksrdquo9e Modern Law Review vol 80 no 6 pp 1073ndash1110 2017

[29] I J Orji S Kusi-Sarpong S F Huang and D Vazquez-BrustldquoEvaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption inthe freight logistics industryrdquo Transportation Research PartE-Logistics and Transportation Review vol 141 Article ID102025 2020

[30] H Albayati S K Kim and J J Rho ldquoAccepting financialtransactions using blockchain technology and crypto-currency a customer perspective approachrdquo Technology inSociety vol 62 2020

[31] E Pournaras ldquoProof of witness presence blockchain con-sensus for augmented democracy in smart citiesrdquo Journal ofParallel and Distributed Computing vol 145 pp 160ndash1752020

[32] E B Sifah H Xia C N A Cobblah Q Xia J Gao and X DuldquoBEMPAS a decentralized employee performance assessmentsystem based on blockchain for smart city governancerdquo IEEEAccess vol 8 pp 99528ndash99539 2020

[33] L Kallstrom S Mauro A Sancino and G Grossi ldquoegovernance games of citizens and stakeholdersrsquo engagement

longitudinal narrativesrdquo Local Government Studies vol 82020

[34] X Wang Q L He and Q Ji ldquoEvolutionary dynamics ofconsumersrsquo crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dy-namicsrdquo System Engineering 9eory and Practice vol 37pp 2812ndash2820 2017

[35] J Ju L Liu and Y Feng ldquoDesign of an O2O citizen par-ticipation ecosystem for sustainable governancerdquo InformationSystems Frontiers vol 21 no 3 pp 605ndash620 2019

[36] N Zhang X X Zhang and M Lei ldquoMultiagent collaborativegovernance for targeted poverty alleviation from the per-spective of stakeholdersrdquo Complexity vol 2020 Article ID8276392 21 pages 2020

[37] M Zhang H Li and Y Song ldquoStudy on the heterogeneousgovernment synergistic governance game of haze in ChinardquoJournal of Environmental Management vol 248 Article ID109318 2019

[38] S T Xu Z F Zhou and K Liu ldquoMulti-evolutionary gameresearch on heavy metal pollution control in soil based on athird-party perspectiverdquo Sustainability vol 12 no 13p 5306 2020

[39] Y X Chen J Zhang and P R Tadikamalla ldquoe relationshipamong government enterprise and public in environmentalgovernance from the perspective of multi-player evolutionarygamerdquo International Journal of Environmental Research andPublic Health vol 16 no 18 p 3351 2019

[40] X L Wan and X Q Qie ldquoPoverty alleviation ecosystemevolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under thegovernment financial platform incentivemechanismrdquo Journalof Computational and Applied Mathematics vol 372 ArticleID 112595 2020

[41] J Hou and B Z Li ldquoe evolutionary game for collaborativeinnovation of the IoT industry under government leadershipin China an IoT infrastructure perspectiverdquo Sustainabilityvol 12 2020

[42] Z Lv X Li W Wang B Zhang J Hu and S FengldquoGovernment affairs service platform for smart cityrdquo FutureGeneration Computer Systems vol 81 pp 443ndash451 2018

[43] G V Pereira M A Cunha and T J LampoltshammerldquoIncreasing collaboration and participation in smart citygovernance a cross-case analysis of smart city initiativesrdquoInformation Technology for Development vol 23 no SIpp 526ndash553 2017

[44] X P Li H B Wang G Hao and C Y Xia ldquoe mechanismof alliance promotes cooperation in the spatial multi-gamesrdquoPhysics Letters A vol 384 no 20 Article ID 126414 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 23