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Research Article Emergency Planning Zones Estimation for Karachi-2 and Karachi-3 Nuclear Power Plants using Gaussian Puff Model Sümer Fahin 1 and Muhammad Ali 2,3 1 Near East University, Faculty of Engineering, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Yakın Do˘ gu Bulvarı, PK:99138 Leos ¸a/KKTC, Mersin 10, Turkey 2 ATILIM University, Faculty of Engineering, Department of Mechanical Engineering, 06836 ˙ Incek, G¨ olbas ¸ı, Ankara, Turkey 3 Directorate of Nuclear Power Engineering-Reactor (DNPER), Directorate of Nuclear Safety (DNS), P.O. Box 3140, Islamabad, Pakistan Correspondence should be addressed to S¨ umer S ¸ahin; [email protected] Received 6 May 2016; Revised 25 June 2016; Accepted 5 July 2016 Academic Editor: Arkady Serikov Copyright © 2016 S. S ¸ahin and M. Ali. is is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Emergency planning zones (PAZ and UPZ) around the Karachi-2 and Karachi-3 nuclear power plants (K-2/K-3 NPPs) have been realistically determined by employing Gaussian puff model and Gaussian plume model together for atmospheric transport, diffusion, and deposition of radioactive material using onsite and regional data related to meteorology, topography, and land- use along with latest IAEA Post-Fukushima Guidelines. e analysis work has been carried out using U.S.NRC computer code RASCAL 4.2. e assumed environmental radioactive releases provide the sound theoretical and practical bases for the estimation of emergency planning zones covering most expected scenario of severe accident and most recent multiunit Fukushima Accident. Sheltering could be used as protective action for longer period of about 04 days. e area about 3 km of K-2/K-3 NPPs site should be evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agent should be taken before release up to about 14 km to prevent severe deterministic effects. Stochastic effects may be avoided or minimized by evacuating the area within about 8 km of the K-2/K-3 NPPs site. Protective actions may become more effective and cost beneficial by using current methodology as Gaussian puff model realistically represents atmospheric transport, dispersion, and disposition processes in contrast to straight-line Gaussian plume model explicitly in study area. e estimated PAZ and UPZ were found 3 km and 8 km, respectively, around K-2/K-3 NPPs which are in well agreement with IAEA Post-Fukushima Study. erefore, current study results could be used in the establishment of emergency planning zones around K-2/K-3 NPPs. 1. Introduction Emergency planning zones (EPZs) are established around nuclear power plants in order to implement prompt and effective protective actions and other response actions to protect the public during nuclear emergency situation at nuclear power plant(s). e emergency situation arises due to damage of nuclear fuel present in nuclear reactor core or in spent fuel pool of nuclear power plants. Such emer- gency situations may have severe health effects (deterministic and stochastic) which affect public in different ways, for example, prompt causalities, reducing their life quality, and causing physiological and socioeconomic problems. ese consequences can be prevented or mitigated by implementing protective actions promptly in the designated areas, that is, emergency planning zones. e designated areas include precautionary action zone (PAZ) to reduce substantially the risk of severe deterministic effects and urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ) and to reduce substantially the risk of stochastic effects. e importance of EPZs has been demonstrated in Fukushima Accident as protective actions; that is, evacuation of public within 20 km and sheltering within 20–30 km (later on advised to evacuate voluntarily) prevented radiological consequences effectively [1, 2]. Emergency planning zones are estimated considering spectrum of accidents, environmental releases of radioactive materials, meteorology, and radiological doses from differ- ent exposure pathways. e consideration of spectrum of Hindawi Publishing Corporation Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations Volume 2016, Article ID 8549498, 8 pages http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/8549498

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Page 1: Research Article Emergency Planning Zones Estimation for ...downloads.hindawi.com/journals/stni/2016/8549498.pdfEnvironment radioactive releases: 10% of nuclear reactor core volatile

Research ArticleEmergency Planning Zones Estimation for Karachi-2 andKarachi-3 Nuclear Power Plants using Gaussian Puff Model

Suumlmer Fahin1 and Muhammad Ali23

1Near East University Faculty of Engineering Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Yakın Dogu BulvarıPK99138 LefkosaKKTC Mersin 10 Turkey2ATILIM University Faculty of Engineering Department of Mechanical Engineering 06836 Incek Golbası Ankara Turkey3Directorate of Nuclear Power Engineering-Reactor (DNPER) Directorate of Nuclear Safety (DNS)PO Box 3140 Islamabad Pakistan

Correspondence should be addressed to Sumer Sahin sumersahinneuedutr

Received 6 May 2016 Revised 25 June 2016 Accepted 5 July 2016

Academic Editor Arkady Serikov

Copyright copy 2016 S Sahin and M Ali This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution Licensewhich permits unrestricted use distribution and reproduction in any medium provided the original work is properly cited

Emergency planning zones (PAZ and UPZ) around the Karachi-2 and Karachi-3 nuclear power plants (K-2K-3 NPPs) havebeen realistically determined by employing Gaussian puff model and Gaussian plume model together for atmospheric transportdiffusion and deposition of radioactive material using onsite and regional data related to meteorology topography and land-use along with latest IAEA Post-Fukushima Guidelines The analysis work has been carried out using USNRC computer codeRASCAL 42 The assumed environmental radioactive releases provide the sound theoretical and practical bases for the estimationof emergency planning zones covering most expected scenario of severe accident and most recent multiunit Fukushima AccidentSheltering could be used as protective action for longer period of about 04 days The area about 3 km of K-2K-3 NPPs site shouldbe evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agent should be taken before release up to about 14 km to prevent severe deterministiceffects Stochastic effectsmay be avoided orminimized by evacuating the areawithin about 8 kmof theK-2K-3NPPs site Protectiveactionsmay becomemore effective and cost beneficial by using currentmethodology as Gaussian puffmodel realistically representsatmospheric transport dispersion and disposition processes in contrast to straight-line Gaussian plume model explicitly in studyareaThe estimated PAZ and UPZ were found 3 km and 8 km respectively around K-2K-3 NPPs which are in well agreement withIAEA Post-Fukushima Study Therefore current study results could be used in the establishment of emergency planning zonesaround K-2K-3 NPPs

1 Introduction

Emergency planning zones (EPZs) are established aroundnuclear power plants in order to implement prompt andeffective protective actions and other response actions toprotect the public during nuclear emergency situation atnuclear power plant(s) The emergency situation arises dueto damage of nuclear fuel present in nuclear reactor coreor in spent fuel pool of nuclear power plants Such emer-gency situationsmay have severe health effects (deterministicand stochastic) which affect public in different ways forexample prompt causalities reducing their life quality andcausing physiological and socioeconomic problems Theseconsequences can be prevented ormitigated by implementing

protective actions promptly in the designated areas thatis emergency planning zones The designated areas includeprecautionary action zone (PAZ) to reduce substantially therisk of severe deterministic effects and urgent protectiveaction planning zone (UPZ) and to reduce substantially therisk of stochastic effects The importance of EPZs has beendemonstrated in Fukushima Accident as protective actionsthat is evacuation of public within 20 km and shelteringwithin 20ndash30 km (later on advised to evacuate voluntarily)prevented radiological consequences effectively [1 2]

Emergency planning zones are estimated consideringspectrum of accidents environmental releases of radioactivematerials meteorology and radiological doses from differ-ent exposure pathways The consideration of spectrum of

Hindawi Publishing CorporationScience and Technology of Nuclear InstallationsVolume 2016 Article ID 8549498 8 pageshttpdxdoiorg10115520168549498

2 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

accident is important as some accidents have high occur-rence probability with less health consequences while someaccidents have low occurrence probability with high healthconsequencesTherefore spectrumof accidents is consideredfor radioactive material environmental releases to considerboth low occurrence probability accidents and high occur-rence probability accidents and their health effects accord-ingly The radioactive materials that enter into environmentafter occurrence of accident are subsequently transporteddiffused and deposited on ground according to local andregional meteorology topography and land-use character-istics Then radiological doses are calculated for potentialexposure pathways for example cloud shine inhalationand ground shine in model domain area Finally EPZs aredetermined using dosimetry criteria set forth by the nationalandor international nuclear regulatoragency

Generally straight-line Gaussian plume model (GPM)is used for estimation of EPZs because it is simple andcomputationally inexpensive However straight-line GPMmay give unreasonable estimates of pollutant concentrationaway from the release pointwhile it gives reasonable estimatesin the vicinity of release point as these models transportpollutants ldquoimmediatelyrdquo to entire modeling area Also rou-tinely collected meteorological data at nuclear power plantsis normally used in the estimation of EPZs However mete-orological conditions may change drastically as pollutantsmove away from the release point for example topogra-phy effects and thus onsite meteorological data alone maygive unrealistic results Since radiological doses depend onradioactive material quantity in the environment thereforeonsite meteorological data in straight-line GPMs may giveunrealistic radiological doses estimates

Further data sampling techniques (eg Latin Hyper-cube) are normally used to obtain representative meteo-rological data instead of calculating radiological doses foreach meteorological condition (eg 8760 meteorologicalconditions in a typical year) while determining radiologicaldoses at different percentile [3 4] Data sampling makescalculation computationally inexpensive and also requireslow memory capacity Since nowadays high computingmachines with sufficient memory capacity are availabletherefore if all meteorological data were used typicallyrequired in EPZs calculations instead of data sampling thenbetter statistical distribution of radiological doses would beachieved

In this study EPZs (PAZ and UPZ) around the Karachi-2 and Karachi-3 nuclear power plants (K-2K-3 NPPs) havebeen determined using USNRC (United States NuclearRegulatory Commission) RASCAL 42 (Radiological Assess-ment System for Consequence Analysis) computer code [5]USNRC RASCAL 42 is the state-of-the-art computer codewhich deploys Gaussian puff model for atmospheric trans-portation diffusion and deposition of radioactive materialaway from its release point and Gaussian plume modelin the vicinity of release point using onsite and regionaldata related to meteorology topography and land-use Thedetails of models and methods included in RASCAL 42 aregiven in [5] Also IAEA Post-Fukushima Guidelines (Inter-national Atomic Energy Agency) are implemented for the

determination of EPZs in this study [5] Following the IAEAPost-Fukushima Guidelines 10 of nuclear reactor corevolatile radioactive material is assumed to be released for10-hour duration into the environment [6] The radioac-tive material was then subsequently transported diffusedand deposited on ground according to onsite and regionalmeteorology topography and land-use characteristics usingRASCAL 42 atmospheric transport and dispersion modelRadiological doses through potential exposure pathways (iecloud shine ground shine and inhalation) are calculatedusing ICRP-60 (International Commission on RadiologicalProtection) models for representative onsite and regionalmeteorological conditions Finally IAEA dosimetry criteriafor EPZs are applied for the determination of EPZs for K-2K-3 NPPs

2 Literature Review

Emergency preparedness and response (EPR) is the system-atic methodology which ensures the capability and perfor-mance of actions required to mitigate the consequences ofan emergency situation at nuclear power plants for humanhealth and safety quality of life property and the environ-ment [6] Emergency planning zones (EPZs) an integral partof EPR have always been considered in nuclear industryeven before 1979 TMI Accident (ThreeMile Island) the mostdisastrous nuclear accident in operating commercial nuclearpower plant history at that time In 1978 USNRC gave theidea of generic emergency planning zones which was basedon spectrum of accidents consequences and probability [7]Several studies addressing different aspects of radioactiv-ity releases during nuclear emergency situation have beenconducted particularly on emergency planning zones [7ndash16] radiation doses [17ndash20] and intervention distances forprotective actions [21]

Accident scenario has profound impact on the size ofemergency planning zones as each accident sequence hasdifferent probability of occurrence and corresponding healthconsequences Several studies revealed that single accidentsequence may not fulfill the EPR objectives efficiently [6ndash8]Therefore it is recommended to use spectrum of accident[6ndash8] as it results in the optimization of protective actionsavailable to potentially highly affected areas for examplenear plant [8] In this regard IAEA has suggested 10 ofnuclear reactor core volatile radioactive material is assumedto be released during 10-hour duration into the environment[6]

Also atmospheric transport diffusion and depositionof radioactive materials from an accident depend on thesurrounding meteorology topography and land-use char-acteristics and the consequences that will result Differentmathematical models are used to predict the dispersionof radioactive material in the environment for exampleGaussian plumemodel Gaussian puffmodel and Lagrangianparticle model In most of the above-mentioned studiesstraight-line Gaussian plume model (GPM) has been useddue to its simplicity ease of calculation and requiring lesscomputational time as well as lowmemory capacity Straight-line GPMs however may give unreasonable estimates of

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 3

Start

Environment radioactive releases10 of nuclear reactor core volatile

radioactive material for the durationof 10 hours

Atmospheric dispersion and transport of environment radioactive releases using

Gaussian plume model (near to release point) and Gaussian puff model (away from release

point) coupled with 2D wind field model

Most probable meteorological parameters for

simulation period

Dose calculation considering differentpotential exposure

pathways

Public behavior(sheltering ITB

agent)

Estimating EPZs (PAZ and UPZ)using IAEA dosimetric criteria

End

K-2K-3 site andKarachi South and

Karachi Airport hourly met data

Potential exposure pathways cloud

shine ground shine and inhalation

Onsite and regionaltopography and

land-use data

Figure 1 Methodology for estimation of K-2K-3 NPPs EPZs

pollutant concentration away from the pollutant release pointas meteorology beyond 10 km may not remain the same[22] due to surrounding area characteristics for exampletopography and land-use features may also significantlymodify meteorological characteristics

Recently a study was conducted to estimate emergencyplanning zones using RODOS module RIMPUFF [8] whichis based onGaussian puffmodel [23 24] In the referred studymeteorological data provided by German Weather Servicewas preferred over more accurate onsite meteorological dataas the former covers the simulation area However moreaccurate meteorological data from onsite meteorologicalstation along withmeteorological data from national weatherservicemay be better approach as it would improve the spatialand temporal representation of wind fields in the simulationarea [25]

Further in most of the above-mentioned studies datasampling techniques have been used that select input vari-ables such that the essential information could be acquiredregarding output variables which subsequently results inefficient computation [26] In other words these techniquesare used (eg Latin Hypercube) to obtain representativemeteorological data instead of calculating radiological dosesfor each meteorological condition (eg 8760 meteorologicalconditions in a typical year) [3 4] However nowadayscomputing machines speed and memory capacity has beendrastically increased and use of data sampling might notbe as much advantageous as it was when computing speedand memory capacity were limited Therefore statisticaldistribution of radiological doses may be improved if allmeteorological data typically required in EPZs calculationsis used instead of data sampling

3 Methodology and Model Description

ACP1000 (renamed as Hualong-1) nuclear power plants(NPPs) 2times 1100MWel pressurizedwater reactor (PWR) eachare being constructed near Karachi the southern onshore cityof Pakistan and expectedly put into commercial operationin 20202021 The nuclear power plants site is about 23 kmnorthwest of Karachi having coordinates 24∘511015840510158401015840 north and66∘4610158403110158401015840 east with Sulaiman Mountains in the northwestWithin 80 km radius of site two (02) national weathermeteorological stations exist Karachi South MeteorologicalStation at 18 km in east-north-east of site andKarachi AirportMeteorological Station at 40 km in east of site [27]

Hualong-1 is the third generation three-loop PWR designwith 3050MWth thermal power 18-month fuel cycle and fuelburn-up greater than 45000MWdMT of uranium It hasdouble containment 60-year design life and contains activeand passive redundant safety systems [27]

In this study EPZs (PAZ and UPZ) around K-2K-3 nuclear power plants (NPPs) have been determined inaccordance with IAEA Post-Fukushima Guidelines [6] usingUSNRC RASCAL 42 computer code RASCAL 42 is thestate-of-the-art computer code designed to be used in theindependent assessment of dose projections It was developedto allow consideration of the dominant aspects of sourceterm transport dose and consequences It evaluates releasesfrom nuclear power plants spent fuel storage pools andcasks fuel cycle facilities and radioactive material handlingfacilities

The flow chart of themethodology adopted in the currentstudy is shown in Figure 1 and details are given in subsequentsections

4 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

31 Environment Radioactive Releases It was assumed that10 of nuclear reactor core volatile radioactive material isreleased at ground level into the environment It was assumedthat releases continue for 10 hours It is the maximumexpected radioactive material release into the environmentfollowing an accident that severely damages the fuel [6] andalso covers the Fukushima Accident scenario [5 8] Theduration of 10 hours was assumed for radioactive materialrelease although it may continue many hours after initiationof severe accident Since shorter release period leads to largeremergency planning zones [8] therefore 10-hour releaseduration would result in optimization with reference todifferent accident scenario Further containment by-pass wasconsidered as the release pathway as itmaywarrant protectiveactions early [28] Finally duration of prerelease phase wasassumed to be zero hour (0 hour) while in real scenario sev-eral hours would be available to take protective actions beforestart of severe release of radioactive material for example 13-hour duration prerelease phase of Fukushima Accident [8]

32 Atmospheric Dispersion Gaussian puff model has beenemployed for atmospheric transport diffusion and depo-sition of radioactive material away from release point andGaussian plume model in the vicinity of release point Themathematical models implemented in RASCAL 42 are givenin (1) and (2) The complete description is given in [5]

The Gaussian puffmodel as implemented in RASCAL 42is given below

120594 (119909 119910 119911)119876 = 1

212058732120590119909120590119910120590119911 exp[minus12 (119909 minus 1199090120590119909 )

2]

sdot exp[minus12 (119910 minus 1199100120590119910 )2]

sdot exp[minus12 (119911 minus 1199110120590119911 )2]

(1)

The straight-line Gaussian plume model as implemented inRASCAL 42 is given below

120594 (119909 119910 119911)1198761015840 =

1198651199101198651199112120587119906120590119910120590119911 (2)

Meteorological data collected from onsite meteorologicalstation along withmeteorological data from national weathermeteorological stations has been used in the analysis as itwould improve the spatial and temporal representation ofwind fields in the simulation area For this study onsitemeteorological data for the years 2013ndash2015 along withregional meteorological historical data collected from twometeorological stations that lie about 80 km radius aroundK-2K-3 site has been used

Most probable wind direction wind speed and atmo-spheric stability class of each hour of 10-hour durationof radioactive material release have been calculated ateach meteorological station Most probable wind direction(MPWD) for the first hour of radioactive material release

has been estimated through cumulative frequency distri-bution taking into account the circular nature of winddata (details may be found in literature eg [29]) usinghourly wind direction data along with corresponding windspeed and atmospheric stability class The MPWD alongwith corresponding most probable wind speed and atmo-spheric stability class has been used as first hour meteorol-ogy for radioactive release Most probable wind directionshift (MPWDS) during 10-hour release has been calculatedthrough cumulative frequency distribution using every 10-hour absolute wind direction shift data The total winddirection shift MPWD plusmn MPWDS was assumed during 10-hour release period For subsequent hours (ie 2nd to 10thhour of radioactive release) occurrence frequency of eachwind direction in MPWD plusmnMPWS span has been calculatedand arranged in descending order The first nine (09) winddirections were assumed as wind direction of subsequenthours of radioactive release These nine (09) wind directionsalong with corresponding most probable wind speed andatmospheric stability have been used for subsequent hours ofradioactive material release

Elevation data in three (03) terrain grids with 22 pointsin 119883 and 119884 directions in each grid with grid spacing of10 25 and 50 miles have been calculated with CALMETpreprocessor TERREL [30] using Global Digital ElevationModel (GTOPO30) to account for region topography effectsSimilarly surface roughness in three (03) terrain grids with21 points in 119883 and 119884 directions in each grid with gridspacing of 10 25 and 50 miles has been calculated usingland-useland-cover data (LULC) fromESRI (EnvironmentalSystems Research Institute)

33 Radiation Doses Cloud shine inhalation and groundshine pathways were considered as potential exposure path-ways for PAZ while inhalation pathway was consideredfor UPZ The dose conversion factors (DCFs) of ICRP-60 were considered for radiation doses calculation whileacute inhalation dose to red bone marrow was calculatedusing DCF given in IAEA EPR-D-Values 2006 The IAEAdosimetric criteria for emergency planning zones (PAZ andUPZ) have been used and the same is given in Table 1 forreference The impacts of public behavior that is protectiveactions on the distance to which IAEA criteria (Table 1) maybe exceeded were examined according to IAEA guidelines[6] It should be highlighted here that house sheltering wasconsidered only for inhalation pathway assuming normalactivity that is one-third of the time outside house (in thefield) and two-thirds of the time inside house Thyroid 50-year committed dose and acute dose are very similar becauseof short half-life of the iodine isotopes that dominate thyroiddose and evident from IAEA Study [6] Therefore thyroidcommitted dose equivalent from inhalation has been used inthis study for acute dose to thyroid

4 Analysis and Results

The volatile radioactive materials of radiological significanceare krypton xenon iodine cesium and tellurium [31]There-fore 10 of these radioactive materials were released in

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 5

Table 1 IAEA dosimetric criteria for emergency planning zones [6]

Zone Actions taken based on plantconditions to prevent the following Dosimetric quantity Dose criteria Exposure pathway

Inhalation Cloud shine Ground shine

PAZ Severe deterministic effects ADredmarrow 1 Gy X X XADfetusinh 1 Gy X

UPZ Stochastic effects 119864inh 100mSv X119867fetusinh 100mSv X

Table 2 Environment radioactive releases

Group Radioactivity releases (Bq)Noble gases (Xe Kr) 213 times 1018Iodine 217 times 1018Cesium 146 times 1017Tellurium 589 times 1017

the environment within 10 hours as given in Table 2 Theseenvironmental radioactive releases are maximum expectedactivity in case of accident that severely damages the fuelThe environmental releases of noble gases and iodine groupsare nearly in the same order that is 213 times 1018 Bq and217 times 1018 Bq respectively Cesium and tellurium grouprsquosenvironmental releases are lower than noble gases and iodinegroups with 146 times 1017 Bq and 589 times 1017 Bq respectivelyThe radioactive releases of 131I and 137Cs have been givenin Table 3 along with Fukushima Accident releases and oneof the recent studies for comparison It is evident fromTable 3 that environmental releases in current study coverboth scenarios Since current study covers the FukushimaAccident scenario therefore the analysis may be consideredas multiunit studies However it may be pointed out herethat the current analysis would be refined after completionof Probabilistic Safety Assessment Level-2 studyTherefore itmay be deduced that the environmental radioactive releasesconsidered in this study provide the sound theoretical andpractical bases for the estimation of emergency planningzones as they cover the most expected scenario of severeaccident as well as multiunit Fukushima Accident

Figure 2 shows the time dependent release rate of 131Iand 137Cs two most important radionuclides in radiologicalconsequences which depicts the accident progression asreactor core passes through different phases that is claddingfailure core melt phase and post-vessel melt-through phase[5 32] It is seen that 131I and 137Cs release rate to the envi-ronment at the start of release is about 446 times 1014 Bq15minand 533 times 1013 Bq15min respectively which increases asaccident progresses and attains the maximum value of 102 times1016 Bq15min and 126 times 1016 Bq15min at about 38 hoursAfter about 38 hours both 131I and 137Cs show decreasingtrend as post-vessel melt-through phase has completed It isalso evident from Figure 2 that 131I decreases more rapidlythan 137Cs after about 38 hours because 131I has muchshorted half-life as compared to 137Cs Also the total releasedquantity of 131I is 31 times 1017 Bq which is greater than 137Cs

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Time (hour)

120E + 16

100E + 16

800E + 15

600E + 15

400E + 15

200E + 15

000E + 00

131I137Cs

Bq15min

Figure 2 Time dependent 131I and 137Cs release rate

0123456789

10

0 05 1 15 2 25 3 35

RBE

abso

rbed

dos

e to

red

mar

row

(Sv)

Distance (km)

IAEA PAZ dosimetery limit

Figure 3 RBE weighted absorbed dose to red marrow from cloudshine inhalation and ground shine

by the order of about 10 times that is 37 times 1016 It isobserved that specific activity of 131I is greater than 137Csand ingrowth of 131I is through decay of 131Te Finally at theend of simulation that is 10 hours the release rate of 131Iand 137Cs resides around 709 times 1015 Bq15min and 936 times1014 Bq15min respectively

The acute red bone marrow dose profile is shown inFigure 3 solid curve Acute red bone marrow dose rapidlydecreases along the path as plume moves away from thesource It is evident from the profile that IAEA dosimetric

6 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

Table 3 Estimates of radioactive releases of different studies

Cases 131I (Bq) 137Cs (Bq)K-2K-3 NPPs study 31 times 1017 37 times 1016Fukushima Accident [8] 11 times 1017ndash21 times 1017 11 times 1016ndash21 times 1016SSK 2014 study [8] 31 times 1017 29 times 1016

0123456789

10

0 5 10 15 20

Thyr

oid

com

mitt

ed d

ose e

quiv

alen

t (Sv

)

Distance (km)

House shelter + ITBHouse shelterIAEA PAZ dosimetery limit

Figure 4 Thyroid committed dose equivalent to fetus from inhala-tion

criterion of 1 Sv is projected to be exceeded to about adistance of 12 km which is in good agreement with IAEAStudy [6] It should be pointed out here that RASCAL 42always calculates dose from ground shine pathway for 04days Therefore sheltering could be used as protective actionfor longer period if required as radiological doses throughground shine pathway do not result in substantial increase inacute dose to red bone marrow Ground shine dose dependson deposition (dry and wet) of radionuclides In RASCAL42 dry deposition is realistically modeled as dry depositionvelocity change with changingmeteorological conditions andsurface instead of fixed velocity Radiological doses throughground shine pathway may be increased if wet deposition(rain and snow) is considered However the probability ofrain is very low while the probability of snow is extremelylow in this region [27]Therefore the effect of wet depositionmay be ignored as highly unlikely scenarios would reduce thenumber of protective measures

Thyroid committed dose equivalent from inhalation pro-file has been shown in Figure 4 It shows that if ITB agentis taken before inhalation the IAEA criterion is projected tobe exceeded to about 3 km if pregnant woman is shelteringin a house However if ITB agent is not taken then thecriterion is projected to be exceeded to about a distance of14 km if pregnant woman is sheltering in a houseThe thyroidcommitted dose equivalent to fetus from inhalation is in wellagreement with IAEA Study [6] if pregnant woman takes ITBagent before inhalation and is sheltering in a house Howeverthyroid committed dose equivalent to fetus from inhalationfalls nearly half-way with IAEA Study [6] if pregnant woman

000005010015020025030035040045050

0 10 20 30 40

Inha

latio

n co

mm

itted

effec

tive d

ose (

Sv)

Distance (km)

Without shelteringWith shelteringIAEA UPZ dosimetery limit

Figure 5 Effective dose from inhalation

does not take ITB agent before inhalation and shelteringin a house This comparison shows that the atmospherictransport diffusion and deposition characteristics of currentstudy area are better than the area considered in IAEA StudyIt should be highlighted here that RASCAL 42 gives morerealistic results in contrast to straight-line Gaussian plumemodels as itmodifies thewind field to account for topographyand hence realistic radionuclide concentration It is suggestedthat to prevent the severe deterministic effects of a severerelease the area within about 3 km of the K-2K-3 NPPsshould be evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agenttaken before a release to about a distance of 14 kmThereforeGaussian puff model not only gives more realistic resultsbut also increases protective actions effectiveness as well asmaking them more cost effective

The effective dose from inhalation profile is shown inFigure 5 IAEA dosimetric criterion of 100mSv of effectivedose is projected to be exceeded from inhalation to about8 km for an individual sheltering in a house and about 11 kmwithout sheltering The thyroid committed dose equivalentfrom inhalation profile is shown in Figure 6 with solid curveIt shows that if an ITB agent is taken before or shortly after theinhalation the criterion of 100mSv to the fetus is projected tobe exceeded to about 14 km for a pregnant woman shelteringin a house Therefore it is inferred that in order to avoidor minimize stochastic effects for a severe release the areawithin about 8 km of K-2K-3 NPPs should be evacuated

It is emphasized here that emergency planning zonesshould be based on realistic analysis because highly unlikelyscenarios would reduce the number of protective mea-sures and hence be not favorable of meeting the intended

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 7

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80Thyr

oid

com

mitt

ed d

ose e

quiv

alen

t (Sv

)

Distance (km)

IAEA UPZ dosimetery limit

Figure 6Thyroid committed dose equivalent from inhalation aftertaking ITB and sheltering

objectives Therefore current study recommends 3 km and8 km as PAZ and UPZ respectively for K-2K-3 NPPs Therecommended PAZ and UPZ are in well agreement withIAEA guidelines [6] which suggest that the size of PAZ andUPZ could be established based on site specific analysisprovided that the boundary would not be more than a factorof two less than or greater than the recommended range thatis 3ndash5 km for PAZ and 15ndash30 km for UPZ

5 Conclusion

The current study presents the application of Gaussian puffmodel using onsite and regional data related to meteo-rology topography and land-use along with latest IAEAPost-Fukushima Guidelines for the estimation of emergencyplanning zones (PAZ and UPZ) around K-2K-3 NPPs Theenvironmental radioactive releases specifically 131I (31 times1017 Bq) and 137Cs (37 times 1016 Bq) provide the sound theo-retical and practical bases for the estimation of emergencyplanning zones as they cover the most expected scenarioof severe accident that is 10 of nuclear reactor corevolatile radioactive material as well as most recent multiunitFukushima Accident Also sheltering could be used as pro-tective action for longer period of about 04 days if requiredFurther to prevent the severe deterministic effects of a severerelease the area within about 3 km of K-2K-3 NPPs shouldbe evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agent should betaken before a release to about a distance of 14 km Moreoverstochastic effects of severe release of radioactive materialmay be avoided or minimized by evacuating the area withinabout 8 km of K-2K-3 NPPs site Protective actions maybecome more effective and cost beneficial by using currentmethodology as Gaussian puff model realistically representsatmospheric transport and dispersion process in contrast tostraight-lineGaussian plumemodelTherefore it is suggestedthat 3 km and 8 km around K-2K-3 NPPs may be designatedas PAZ and UPZ respectively which are in well agreement ofIAEA Post-Fukushima Guidelines

Nomenclature

120594(119909 119910 119911) Concentration (Cim3 or gm3)119876 Amount of material released (Ci or g)120590119909 120590119910 120590119911 Dispersion parameters (m)1199090 1199100 1199110 Center of the puff1198761015840 Material release rate (Cisec or gsec)119865119910 119865119911 Lateral and vertical exponential terms119906 Wind speed (msec)ACP Advance Chinese PWRADfetusinh Absorbed dose to fetus through inhalationADredmarrow Absorbed dose to red marrowCALMET California meteorologyDCFs Dose conversion factors119864inh Effective dose through inhalationEPR Emergency preparedness and responseEPZs Emergency planning zonesESRI Environmental Systems Research InstituteGPMs Gaussian plume modelsGTOPO30 Global 30 Arc-Second Elevation dataset119867fetusinh Equivalent dose to fetus through

inhalationIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyICRP International Commission on

Radiological ProtectionITB Iodine thyroid blockingK-2 Karachi-2K-3 Karachi-3Kr KryptonLULC Land-use land-coverMPWD Most probable wind directionMPWDS Most probable wind direction shiftMWdMT Megawatt-day per tonNPPs Nuclear power plantsPAZ Precautionary action zonePWR Pressurized water reactorRASCAL Radiological Assessment System of

Consequence AnalysisRBE Relative biological effectivenessRIMPUFF Risoslash model puffRODOS Real-time online decision support systemSSK StrahlenschutzkommissionTERREL Terrain elevationTMI Three Mile IslandUSNRC United States Nuclear Regulatory

CommissionUPZ Urgent protective action planning zoneXe Xenon

Competing Interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests

References

[1] IAEA The Fukushima Daiichi Accident Report by the DirectorGeneral International Atomic Energy Commission IAEA2015

8 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

[2] ldquoSources Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiationrdquo UnitedNations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radia-tion Vol 1 Annex A 2013

[3] T J Bander ldquoPAVAN an atmospheric dispersion programfor evaluating design-basis accidental releases of radioactivematerials fromnuclear power stationsrdquo Tech RepNUREGCR-2858 Division of Systems Integration Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashingtonDC USA 1982

[4] T Haste J Birchley E Cazzoli and J Vitazkova ldquoMEL-CORMACCS simulation of the TMI-2 severe accident andinitial recovery phases off-site fission product release andconsequencesrdquoNuclear Engineering and Design vol 236 no 10pp 1099ndash1112 2006

[5] J V Ramsdell Jr G F Athey S A McGuire and L KBrandon Rascal 4 Description of Models and Methods 20555-0001 NUREG-1940 Office of Nuclear Security and IncidentResponse US Nuclear Regulatory Commission WashingtonDC USA 2012

[6] IAEAActions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to SevereConditions at a Light Water Reactor International AtomicEnergy Commission IAEA Vienna Austria 2013

[7] H E Collins B K Grimes and F Galpin ldquoPlanning basisfor the development of state and local government radiologicalemergency response plans in support of light water nuclearpower plantsrdquo Tech Rep NUREG-0396 US Nuclear Regula-tory Commission 1978

[8] Planning Areas for Emergency Response Near Nuclear PowerPlants Recommendation by the German Commission on Radi-ological Protection Strahlenschutzkommission Geschaftsstelleder Strahlenschutzkommission Bonn Germany 2014

[9] CNSC ldquoStudy of consequences of a hypothetical severe nuclearaccident and effectiveness of mitigation measuresrdquo PWGSCCatalogue CC172-1192015E-PDF Canadian Nuclear SafetyCommission (CNSC) 2015

[10] B H Ha J Y Oh and S J Oh Examination of the EmergencyPlanning Zone (EPZ) Using Level 3 Psa Approach with Maccs2Transactions of the Korean Nuclear Society Autumn MeetingGyeongju Gyeongju Korea 2013

[11] H Ting Q Jingyuan L Hong and C Jianzhu ldquoPreliminaryStudy on plume emergency planning zone for AP1000rdquo AtomicEnergy Science and Technology vol 45 no 12 pp 1472ndash14772011

[12] H-Y Luo J-H Wang W-H Li and J-R Guo ldquoEvaluationof emergency planning zone for EPR nuclear power unit inTSNPPrdquo Nuclear Power Engineering vol 31 no 6 pp 117ndash1222010

[13] J Wu Y-M Yang I-J Chen H-T Chen and K-S ChuangldquoReevaluation of the emergency planning zone for nuclearpower plants in Taiwan using MACCS2 coderdquo Applied Radia-tion and Isotopes vol 64 no 4 pp 448ndash454 2006

[14] I-Y Jeon J K Lee and J Ki ldquoEvaluation of the size ofemergency planning zone for the korean standard nuclearpower plantsrdquo Journal of the Korean Association for RadiationProtection vol 28 no 3 pp 215ndash223 2003

[15] L-C Kung C-I Jane H-Y Hao and C-Y Ching PreliminaryStudy of the Emergency Planning Zone Evaluation for the NuclearPower Plant in Taiwan by Using Maccs2 Code vol 1 JapanHealth Physics Society Tokyo Japan 2000

[16] K A Solomon and W E Kastenberg ldquoEstimating emergencyplanning zones for the Shoreham nuclear reactor a review of

four safety analysesrdquo Journal of HazardousMaterials vol 18 no3 pp 269ndash284 1988

[17] R Chang J Schaperow T Ghosh J Barr C Tinkler and MStutzke State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (Soarca)Report NUREG-1935 Office of Nuclear Regulatory ResearchUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[18] Severe Accident Risks An Assessment for Five US Nuclear PowerPlants Vol 1 NUREG-1150 Division of Systems ResearchOffice of Nuclear Regulatory Research US Nuclear RegulatoryCommission Washington DC USA 1990

[19] M L Abbott L C Cadwallader and D A Petti ldquoRadiologicaldose calculations for fusion facilitiesrdquo Tech Rep INEELEXT-03-00405 Idaho National Engineering and EnvironmentalLaboratory Idaho Falls Idaho USA 2003

[20] A S Aliyu A T Ramli and M A Saleh ldquoAssessment ofpotential human health and environmental impacts of a nuclearpower plant (NPP) based on atmospheric dispersionmodelingrdquoAtmosfera vol 28 no 1 pp 13ndash26 2015

[21] M Hussain S U-D Khan W A A Syed and S U-D KhanldquoEstimation of intervention distances for urgent protectiveactions using comparative approach of MACCS and InterRASrdquoScience and Technology of Nuclear Installations vol 2014 ArticleID 874134 5 pages 2014

[22] Ministry for the Environment ldquoGood practice guide foratmospheric dispersion modellingrdquo ME 522 Ministry for theEnvironment Wellington New Zealand 2004

[23] T Mikkelsen Description of the Risoslash Puff Diffusion ModelRisoslash National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy TechnicalUniversity of Denmark Lyngby Denmark 1982

[24] ldquoThe Rodos System Version PV60rdquo ForschungszentrumKarlsruhe GmbH Institut fur Kern-und Energietechnik(IKET) Hermann-von-Helmholtz-Platz 1 76344 Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen Germany 2005

[25] G F Athey L K Brandon and J V Ramsdell Jr Rascal 42Workbook Office of Nuclear Security and Incident ResponseUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[26] R L Iman and W J Conover Sensitivity Analysis TechniquesSelf-Teaching Curriculum Sandia National Laboratories Albu-querque NM USA 1982

[27] Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Environmental ImpactAssessment K-2K-3 Project Pakistan Atomic Energy Commis-sion Islamabad Pakistan 2015

[28] J Kubanyi R B Lavin D Serbanescu B Toth and HWilkeningRisk Informed Support of DecisionMaking inNuclearPower Plant Emergency Zoning European Commission DGJoint Research Centre Institute for Energy 2008

[29] K V Mardia and P E Jupp Directional Statistics JohnWiley ampSons 2000

[30] Calpuff Modeling System Version 6 User Instructions ExponentEngineering and Scientific Consulting California Calif USA2011

[31] ldquoBackground and Derivation of ans-54 standard fission prod-uct release modelrdquo Division of Systems Integration Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation NUREGCR-2507 US NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington DC USA 1982

[32] L Soffer S B Burson C M Ferrell R Y Lee and J N RidgelyldquoAccident source terms for light-water nuclear power plantsrdquoDivision of Systems Technology Office of Nuclear RegulatoryResearch NUREG-1465 US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington DC USA 1995

TribologyAdvances in

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Renewable Energy

Submit your manuscripts athttpwwwhindawicom

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Page 2: Research Article Emergency Planning Zones Estimation for ...downloads.hindawi.com/journals/stni/2016/8549498.pdfEnvironment radioactive releases: 10% of nuclear reactor core volatile

2 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

accident is important as some accidents have high occur-rence probability with less health consequences while someaccidents have low occurrence probability with high healthconsequencesTherefore spectrumof accidents is consideredfor radioactive material environmental releases to considerboth low occurrence probability accidents and high occur-rence probability accidents and their health effects accord-ingly The radioactive materials that enter into environmentafter occurrence of accident are subsequently transporteddiffused and deposited on ground according to local andregional meteorology topography and land-use character-istics Then radiological doses are calculated for potentialexposure pathways for example cloud shine inhalationand ground shine in model domain area Finally EPZs aredetermined using dosimetry criteria set forth by the nationalandor international nuclear regulatoragency

Generally straight-line Gaussian plume model (GPM)is used for estimation of EPZs because it is simple andcomputationally inexpensive However straight-line GPMmay give unreasonable estimates of pollutant concentrationaway from the release pointwhile it gives reasonable estimatesin the vicinity of release point as these models transportpollutants ldquoimmediatelyrdquo to entire modeling area Also rou-tinely collected meteorological data at nuclear power plantsis normally used in the estimation of EPZs However mete-orological conditions may change drastically as pollutantsmove away from the release point for example topogra-phy effects and thus onsite meteorological data alone maygive unrealistic results Since radiological doses depend onradioactive material quantity in the environment thereforeonsite meteorological data in straight-line GPMs may giveunrealistic radiological doses estimates

Further data sampling techniques (eg Latin Hyper-cube) are normally used to obtain representative meteo-rological data instead of calculating radiological doses foreach meteorological condition (eg 8760 meteorologicalconditions in a typical year) while determining radiologicaldoses at different percentile [3 4] Data sampling makescalculation computationally inexpensive and also requireslow memory capacity Since nowadays high computingmachines with sufficient memory capacity are availabletherefore if all meteorological data were used typicallyrequired in EPZs calculations instead of data sampling thenbetter statistical distribution of radiological doses would beachieved

In this study EPZs (PAZ and UPZ) around the Karachi-2 and Karachi-3 nuclear power plants (K-2K-3 NPPs) havebeen determined using USNRC (United States NuclearRegulatory Commission) RASCAL 42 (Radiological Assess-ment System for Consequence Analysis) computer code [5]USNRC RASCAL 42 is the state-of-the-art computer codewhich deploys Gaussian puff model for atmospheric trans-portation diffusion and deposition of radioactive materialaway from its release point and Gaussian plume modelin the vicinity of release point using onsite and regionaldata related to meteorology topography and land-use Thedetails of models and methods included in RASCAL 42 aregiven in [5] Also IAEA Post-Fukushima Guidelines (Inter-national Atomic Energy Agency) are implemented for the

determination of EPZs in this study [5] Following the IAEAPost-Fukushima Guidelines 10 of nuclear reactor corevolatile radioactive material is assumed to be released for10-hour duration into the environment [6] The radioac-tive material was then subsequently transported diffusedand deposited on ground according to onsite and regionalmeteorology topography and land-use characteristics usingRASCAL 42 atmospheric transport and dispersion modelRadiological doses through potential exposure pathways (iecloud shine ground shine and inhalation) are calculatedusing ICRP-60 (International Commission on RadiologicalProtection) models for representative onsite and regionalmeteorological conditions Finally IAEA dosimetry criteriafor EPZs are applied for the determination of EPZs for K-2K-3 NPPs

2 Literature Review

Emergency preparedness and response (EPR) is the system-atic methodology which ensures the capability and perfor-mance of actions required to mitigate the consequences ofan emergency situation at nuclear power plants for humanhealth and safety quality of life property and the environ-ment [6] Emergency planning zones (EPZs) an integral partof EPR have always been considered in nuclear industryeven before 1979 TMI Accident (ThreeMile Island) the mostdisastrous nuclear accident in operating commercial nuclearpower plant history at that time In 1978 USNRC gave theidea of generic emergency planning zones which was basedon spectrum of accidents consequences and probability [7]Several studies addressing different aspects of radioactiv-ity releases during nuclear emergency situation have beenconducted particularly on emergency planning zones [7ndash16] radiation doses [17ndash20] and intervention distances forprotective actions [21]

Accident scenario has profound impact on the size ofemergency planning zones as each accident sequence hasdifferent probability of occurrence and corresponding healthconsequences Several studies revealed that single accidentsequence may not fulfill the EPR objectives efficiently [6ndash8]Therefore it is recommended to use spectrum of accident[6ndash8] as it results in the optimization of protective actionsavailable to potentially highly affected areas for examplenear plant [8] In this regard IAEA has suggested 10 ofnuclear reactor core volatile radioactive material is assumedto be released during 10-hour duration into the environment[6]

Also atmospheric transport diffusion and depositionof radioactive materials from an accident depend on thesurrounding meteorology topography and land-use char-acteristics and the consequences that will result Differentmathematical models are used to predict the dispersionof radioactive material in the environment for exampleGaussian plumemodel Gaussian puffmodel and Lagrangianparticle model In most of the above-mentioned studiesstraight-line Gaussian plume model (GPM) has been useddue to its simplicity ease of calculation and requiring lesscomputational time as well as lowmemory capacity Straight-line GPMs however may give unreasonable estimates of

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 3

Start

Environment radioactive releases10 of nuclear reactor core volatile

radioactive material for the durationof 10 hours

Atmospheric dispersion and transport of environment radioactive releases using

Gaussian plume model (near to release point) and Gaussian puff model (away from release

point) coupled with 2D wind field model

Most probable meteorological parameters for

simulation period

Dose calculation considering differentpotential exposure

pathways

Public behavior(sheltering ITB

agent)

Estimating EPZs (PAZ and UPZ)using IAEA dosimetric criteria

End

K-2K-3 site andKarachi South and

Karachi Airport hourly met data

Potential exposure pathways cloud

shine ground shine and inhalation

Onsite and regionaltopography and

land-use data

Figure 1 Methodology for estimation of K-2K-3 NPPs EPZs

pollutant concentration away from the pollutant release pointas meteorology beyond 10 km may not remain the same[22] due to surrounding area characteristics for exampletopography and land-use features may also significantlymodify meteorological characteristics

Recently a study was conducted to estimate emergencyplanning zones using RODOS module RIMPUFF [8] whichis based onGaussian puffmodel [23 24] In the referred studymeteorological data provided by German Weather Servicewas preferred over more accurate onsite meteorological dataas the former covers the simulation area However moreaccurate meteorological data from onsite meteorologicalstation along withmeteorological data from national weatherservicemay be better approach as it would improve the spatialand temporal representation of wind fields in the simulationarea [25]

Further in most of the above-mentioned studies datasampling techniques have been used that select input vari-ables such that the essential information could be acquiredregarding output variables which subsequently results inefficient computation [26] In other words these techniquesare used (eg Latin Hypercube) to obtain representativemeteorological data instead of calculating radiological dosesfor each meteorological condition (eg 8760 meteorologicalconditions in a typical year) [3 4] However nowadayscomputing machines speed and memory capacity has beendrastically increased and use of data sampling might notbe as much advantageous as it was when computing speedand memory capacity were limited Therefore statisticaldistribution of radiological doses may be improved if allmeteorological data typically required in EPZs calculationsis used instead of data sampling

3 Methodology and Model Description

ACP1000 (renamed as Hualong-1) nuclear power plants(NPPs) 2times 1100MWel pressurizedwater reactor (PWR) eachare being constructed near Karachi the southern onshore cityof Pakistan and expectedly put into commercial operationin 20202021 The nuclear power plants site is about 23 kmnorthwest of Karachi having coordinates 24∘511015840510158401015840 north and66∘4610158403110158401015840 east with Sulaiman Mountains in the northwestWithin 80 km radius of site two (02) national weathermeteorological stations exist Karachi South MeteorologicalStation at 18 km in east-north-east of site andKarachi AirportMeteorological Station at 40 km in east of site [27]

Hualong-1 is the third generation three-loop PWR designwith 3050MWth thermal power 18-month fuel cycle and fuelburn-up greater than 45000MWdMT of uranium It hasdouble containment 60-year design life and contains activeand passive redundant safety systems [27]

In this study EPZs (PAZ and UPZ) around K-2K-3 nuclear power plants (NPPs) have been determined inaccordance with IAEA Post-Fukushima Guidelines [6] usingUSNRC RASCAL 42 computer code RASCAL 42 is thestate-of-the-art computer code designed to be used in theindependent assessment of dose projections It was developedto allow consideration of the dominant aspects of sourceterm transport dose and consequences It evaluates releasesfrom nuclear power plants spent fuel storage pools andcasks fuel cycle facilities and radioactive material handlingfacilities

The flow chart of themethodology adopted in the currentstudy is shown in Figure 1 and details are given in subsequentsections

4 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

31 Environment Radioactive Releases It was assumed that10 of nuclear reactor core volatile radioactive material isreleased at ground level into the environment It was assumedthat releases continue for 10 hours It is the maximumexpected radioactive material release into the environmentfollowing an accident that severely damages the fuel [6] andalso covers the Fukushima Accident scenario [5 8] Theduration of 10 hours was assumed for radioactive materialrelease although it may continue many hours after initiationof severe accident Since shorter release period leads to largeremergency planning zones [8] therefore 10-hour releaseduration would result in optimization with reference todifferent accident scenario Further containment by-pass wasconsidered as the release pathway as itmaywarrant protectiveactions early [28] Finally duration of prerelease phase wasassumed to be zero hour (0 hour) while in real scenario sev-eral hours would be available to take protective actions beforestart of severe release of radioactive material for example 13-hour duration prerelease phase of Fukushima Accident [8]

32 Atmospheric Dispersion Gaussian puff model has beenemployed for atmospheric transport diffusion and depo-sition of radioactive material away from release point andGaussian plume model in the vicinity of release point Themathematical models implemented in RASCAL 42 are givenin (1) and (2) The complete description is given in [5]

The Gaussian puffmodel as implemented in RASCAL 42is given below

120594 (119909 119910 119911)119876 = 1

212058732120590119909120590119910120590119911 exp[minus12 (119909 minus 1199090120590119909 )

2]

sdot exp[minus12 (119910 minus 1199100120590119910 )2]

sdot exp[minus12 (119911 minus 1199110120590119911 )2]

(1)

The straight-line Gaussian plume model as implemented inRASCAL 42 is given below

120594 (119909 119910 119911)1198761015840 =

1198651199101198651199112120587119906120590119910120590119911 (2)

Meteorological data collected from onsite meteorologicalstation along withmeteorological data from national weathermeteorological stations has been used in the analysis as itwould improve the spatial and temporal representation ofwind fields in the simulation area For this study onsitemeteorological data for the years 2013ndash2015 along withregional meteorological historical data collected from twometeorological stations that lie about 80 km radius aroundK-2K-3 site has been used

Most probable wind direction wind speed and atmo-spheric stability class of each hour of 10-hour durationof radioactive material release have been calculated ateach meteorological station Most probable wind direction(MPWD) for the first hour of radioactive material release

has been estimated through cumulative frequency distri-bution taking into account the circular nature of winddata (details may be found in literature eg [29]) usinghourly wind direction data along with corresponding windspeed and atmospheric stability class The MPWD alongwith corresponding most probable wind speed and atmo-spheric stability class has been used as first hour meteorol-ogy for radioactive release Most probable wind directionshift (MPWDS) during 10-hour release has been calculatedthrough cumulative frequency distribution using every 10-hour absolute wind direction shift data The total winddirection shift MPWD plusmn MPWDS was assumed during 10-hour release period For subsequent hours (ie 2nd to 10thhour of radioactive release) occurrence frequency of eachwind direction in MPWD plusmnMPWS span has been calculatedand arranged in descending order The first nine (09) winddirections were assumed as wind direction of subsequenthours of radioactive release These nine (09) wind directionsalong with corresponding most probable wind speed andatmospheric stability have been used for subsequent hours ofradioactive material release

Elevation data in three (03) terrain grids with 22 pointsin 119883 and 119884 directions in each grid with grid spacing of10 25 and 50 miles have been calculated with CALMETpreprocessor TERREL [30] using Global Digital ElevationModel (GTOPO30) to account for region topography effectsSimilarly surface roughness in three (03) terrain grids with21 points in 119883 and 119884 directions in each grid with gridspacing of 10 25 and 50 miles has been calculated usingland-useland-cover data (LULC) fromESRI (EnvironmentalSystems Research Institute)

33 Radiation Doses Cloud shine inhalation and groundshine pathways were considered as potential exposure path-ways for PAZ while inhalation pathway was consideredfor UPZ The dose conversion factors (DCFs) of ICRP-60 were considered for radiation doses calculation whileacute inhalation dose to red bone marrow was calculatedusing DCF given in IAEA EPR-D-Values 2006 The IAEAdosimetric criteria for emergency planning zones (PAZ andUPZ) have been used and the same is given in Table 1 forreference The impacts of public behavior that is protectiveactions on the distance to which IAEA criteria (Table 1) maybe exceeded were examined according to IAEA guidelines[6] It should be highlighted here that house sheltering wasconsidered only for inhalation pathway assuming normalactivity that is one-third of the time outside house (in thefield) and two-thirds of the time inside house Thyroid 50-year committed dose and acute dose are very similar becauseof short half-life of the iodine isotopes that dominate thyroiddose and evident from IAEA Study [6] Therefore thyroidcommitted dose equivalent from inhalation has been used inthis study for acute dose to thyroid

4 Analysis and Results

The volatile radioactive materials of radiological significanceare krypton xenon iodine cesium and tellurium [31]There-fore 10 of these radioactive materials were released in

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 5

Table 1 IAEA dosimetric criteria for emergency planning zones [6]

Zone Actions taken based on plantconditions to prevent the following Dosimetric quantity Dose criteria Exposure pathway

Inhalation Cloud shine Ground shine

PAZ Severe deterministic effects ADredmarrow 1 Gy X X XADfetusinh 1 Gy X

UPZ Stochastic effects 119864inh 100mSv X119867fetusinh 100mSv X

Table 2 Environment radioactive releases

Group Radioactivity releases (Bq)Noble gases (Xe Kr) 213 times 1018Iodine 217 times 1018Cesium 146 times 1017Tellurium 589 times 1017

the environment within 10 hours as given in Table 2 Theseenvironmental radioactive releases are maximum expectedactivity in case of accident that severely damages the fuelThe environmental releases of noble gases and iodine groupsare nearly in the same order that is 213 times 1018 Bq and217 times 1018 Bq respectively Cesium and tellurium grouprsquosenvironmental releases are lower than noble gases and iodinegroups with 146 times 1017 Bq and 589 times 1017 Bq respectivelyThe radioactive releases of 131I and 137Cs have been givenin Table 3 along with Fukushima Accident releases and oneof the recent studies for comparison It is evident fromTable 3 that environmental releases in current study coverboth scenarios Since current study covers the FukushimaAccident scenario therefore the analysis may be consideredas multiunit studies However it may be pointed out herethat the current analysis would be refined after completionof Probabilistic Safety Assessment Level-2 studyTherefore itmay be deduced that the environmental radioactive releasesconsidered in this study provide the sound theoretical andpractical bases for the estimation of emergency planningzones as they cover the most expected scenario of severeaccident as well as multiunit Fukushima Accident

Figure 2 shows the time dependent release rate of 131Iand 137Cs two most important radionuclides in radiologicalconsequences which depicts the accident progression asreactor core passes through different phases that is claddingfailure core melt phase and post-vessel melt-through phase[5 32] It is seen that 131I and 137Cs release rate to the envi-ronment at the start of release is about 446 times 1014 Bq15minand 533 times 1013 Bq15min respectively which increases asaccident progresses and attains the maximum value of 102 times1016 Bq15min and 126 times 1016 Bq15min at about 38 hoursAfter about 38 hours both 131I and 137Cs show decreasingtrend as post-vessel melt-through phase has completed It isalso evident from Figure 2 that 131I decreases more rapidlythan 137Cs after about 38 hours because 131I has muchshorted half-life as compared to 137Cs Also the total releasedquantity of 131I is 31 times 1017 Bq which is greater than 137Cs

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Time (hour)

120E + 16

100E + 16

800E + 15

600E + 15

400E + 15

200E + 15

000E + 00

131I137Cs

Bq15min

Figure 2 Time dependent 131I and 137Cs release rate

0123456789

10

0 05 1 15 2 25 3 35

RBE

abso

rbed

dos

e to

red

mar

row

(Sv)

Distance (km)

IAEA PAZ dosimetery limit

Figure 3 RBE weighted absorbed dose to red marrow from cloudshine inhalation and ground shine

by the order of about 10 times that is 37 times 1016 It isobserved that specific activity of 131I is greater than 137Csand ingrowth of 131I is through decay of 131Te Finally at theend of simulation that is 10 hours the release rate of 131Iand 137Cs resides around 709 times 1015 Bq15min and 936 times1014 Bq15min respectively

The acute red bone marrow dose profile is shown inFigure 3 solid curve Acute red bone marrow dose rapidlydecreases along the path as plume moves away from thesource It is evident from the profile that IAEA dosimetric

6 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

Table 3 Estimates of radioactive releases of different studies

Cases 131I (Bq) 137Cs (Bq)K-2K-3 NPPs study 31 times 1017 37 times 1016Fukushima Accident [8] 11 times 1017ndash21 times 1017 11 times 1016ndash21 times 1016SSK 2014 study [8] 31 times 1017 29 times 1016

0123456789

10

0 5 10 15 20

Thyr

oid

com

mitt

ed d

ose e

quiv

alen

t (Sv

)

Distance (km)

House shelter + ITBHouse shelterIAEA PAZ dosimetery limit

Figure 4 Thyroid committed dose equivalent to fetus from inhala-tion

criterion of 1 Sv is projected to be exceeded to about adistance of 12 km which is in good agreement with IAEAStudy [6] It should be pointed out here that RASCAL 42always calculates dose from ground shine pathway for 04days Therefore sheltering could be used as protective actionfor longer period if required as radiological doses throughground shine pathway do not result in substantial increase inacute dose to red bone marrow Ground shine dose dependson deposition (dry and wet) of radionuclides In RASCAL42 dry deposition is realistically modeled as dry depositionvelocity change with changingmeteorological conditions andsurface instead of fixed velocity Radiological doses throughground shine pathway may be increased if wet deposition(rain and snow) is considered However the probability ofrain is very low while the probability of snow is extremelylow in this region [27]Therefore the effect of wet depositionmay be ignored as highly unlikely scenarios would reduce thenumber of protective measures

Thyroid committed dose equivalent from inhalation pro-file has been shown in Figure 4 It shows that if ITB agentis taken before inhalation the IAEA criterion is projected tobe exceeded to about 3 km if pregnant woman is shelteringin a house However if ITB agent is not taken then thecriterion is projected to be exceeded to about a distance of14 km if pregnant woman is sheltering in a houseThe thyroidcommitted dose equivalent to fetus from inhalation is in wellagreement with IAEA Study [6] if pregnant woman takes ITBagent before inhalation and is sheltering in a house Howeverthyroid committed dose equivalent to fetus from inhalationfalls nearly half-way with IAEA Study [6] if pregnant woman

000005010015020025030035040045050

0 10 20 30 40

Inha

latio

n co

mm

itted

effec

tive d

ose (

Sv)

Distance (km)

Without shelteringWith shelteringIAEA UPZ dosimetery limit

Figure 5 Effective dose from inhalation

does not take ITB agent before inhalation and shelteringin a house This comparison shows that the atmospherictransport diffusion and deposition characteristics of currentstudy area are better than the area considered in IAEA StudyIt should be highlighted here that RASCAL 42 gives morerealistic results in contrast to straight-line Gaussian plumemodels as itmodifies thewind field to account for topographyand hence realistic radionuclide concentration It is suggestedthat to prevent the severe deterministic effects of a severerelease the area within about 3 km of the K-2K-3 NPPsshould be evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agenttaken before a release to about a distance of 14 kmThereforeGaussian puff model not only gives more realistic resultsbut also increases protective actions effectiveness as well asmaking them more cost effective

The effective dose from inhalation profile is shown inFigure 5 IAEA dosimetric criterion of 100mSv of effectivedose is projected to be exceeded from inhalation to about8 km for an individual sheltering in a house and about 11 kmwithout sheltering The thyroid committed dose equivalentfrom inhalation profile is shown in Figure 6 with solid curveIt shows that if an ITB agent is taken before or shortly after theinhalation the criterion of 100mSv to the fetus is projected tobe exceeded to about 14 km for a pregnant woman shelteringin a house Therefore it is inferred that in order to avoidor minimize stochastic effects for a severe release the areawithin about 8 km of K-2K-3 NPPs should be evacuated

It is emphasized here that emergency planning zonesshould be based on realistic analysis because highly unlikelyscenarios would reduce the number of protective mea-sures and hence be not favorable of meeting the intended

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 7

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80Thyr

oid

com

mitt

ed d

ose e

quiv

alen

t (Sv

)

Distance (km)

IAEA UPZ dosimetery limit

Figure 6Thyroid committed dose equivalent from inhalation aftertaking ITB and sheltering

objectives Therefore current study recommends 3 km and8 km as PAZ and UPZ respectively for K-2K-3 NPPs Therecommended PAZ and UPZ are in well agreement withIAEA guidelines [6] which suggest that the size of PAZ andUPZ could be established based on site specific analysisprovided that the boundary would not be more than a factorof two less than or greater than the recommended range thatis 3ndash5 km for PAZ and 15ndash30 km for UPZ

5 Conclusion

The current study presents the application of Gaussian puffmodel using onsite and regional data related to meteo-rology topography and land-use along with latest IAEAPost-Fukushima Guidelines for the estimation of emergencyplanning zones (PAZ and UPZ) around K-2K-3 NPPs Theenvironmental radioactive releases specifically 131I (31 times1017 Bq) and 137Cs (37 times 1016 Bq) provide the sound theo-retical and practical bases for the estimation of emergencyplanning zones as they cover the most expected scenarioof severe accident that is 10 of nuclear reactor corevolatile radioactive material as well as most recent multiunitFukushima Accident Also sheltering could be used as pro-tective action for longer period of about 04 days if requiredFurther to prevent the severe deterministic effects of a severerelease the area within about 3 km of K-2K-3 NPPs shouldbe evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agent should betaken before a release to about a distance of 14 km Moreoverstochastic effects of severe release of radioactive materialmay be avoided or minimized by evacuating the area withinabout 8 km of K-2K-3 NPPs site Protective actions maybecome more effective and cost beneficial by using currentmethodology as Gaussian puff model realistically representsatmospheric transport and dispersion process in contrast tostraight-lineGaussian plumemodelTherefore it is suggestedthat 3 km and 8 km around K-2K-3 NPPs may be designatedas PAZ and UPZ respectively which are in well agreement ofIAEA Post-Fukushima Guidelines

Nomenclature

120594(119909 119910 119911) Concentration (Cim3 or gm3)119876 Amount of material released (Ci or g)120590119909 120590119910 120590119911 Dispersion parameters (m)1199090 1199100 1199110 Center of the puff1198761015840 Material release rate (Cisec or gsec)119865119910 119865119911 Lateral and vertical exponential terms119906 Wind speed (msec)ACP Advance Chinese PWRADfetusinh Absorbed dose to fetus through inhalationADredmarrow Absorbed dose to red marrowCALMET California meteorologyDCFs Dose conversion factors119864inh Effective dose through inhalationEPR Emergency preparedness and responseEPZs Emergency planning zonesESRI Environmental Systems Research InstituteGPMs Gaussian plume modelsGTOPO30 Global 30 Arc-Second Elevation dataset119867fetusinh Equivalent dose to fetus through

inhalationIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyICRP International Commission on

Radiological ProtectionITB Iodine thyroid blockingK-2 Karachi-2K-3 Karachi-3Kr KryptonLULC Land-use land-coverMPWD Most probable wind directionMPWDS Most probable wind direction shiftMWdMT Megawatt-day per tonNPPs Nuclear power plantsPAZ Precautionary action zonePWR Pressurized water reactorRASCAL Radiological Assessment System of

Consequence AnalysisRBE Relative biological effectivenessRIMPUFF Risoslash model puffRODOS Real-time online decision support systemSSK StrahlenschutzkommissionTERREL Terrain elevationTMI Three Mile IslandUSNRC United States Nuclear Regulatory

CommissionUPZ Urgent protective action planning zoneXe Xenon

Competing Interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests

References

[1] IAEA The Fukushima Daiichi Accident Report by the DirectorGeneral International Atomic Energy Commission IAEA2015

8 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

[2] ldquoSources Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiationrdquo UnitedNations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radia-tion Vol 1 Annex A 2013

[3] T J Bander ldquoPAVAN an atmospheric dispersion programfor evaluating design-basis accidental releases of radioactivematerials fromnuclear power stationsrdquo Tech RepNUREGCR-2858 Division of Systems Integration Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashingtonDC USA 1982

[4] T Haste J Birchley E Cazzoli and J Vitazkova ldquoMEL-CORMACCS simulation of the TMI-2 severe accident andinitial recovery phases off-site fission product release andconsequencesrdquoNuclear Engineering and Design vol 236 no 10pp 1099ndash1112 2006

[5] J V Ramsdell Jr G F Athey S A McGuire and L KBrandon Rascal 4 Description of Models and Methods 20555-0001 NUREG-1940 Office of Nuclear Security and IncidentResponse US Nuclear Regulatory Commission WashingtonDC USA 2012

[6] IAEAActions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to SevereConditions at a Light Water Reactor International AtomicEnergy Commission IAEA Vienna Austria 2013

[7] H E Collins B K Grimes and F Galpin ldquoPlanning basisfor the development of state and local government radiologicalemergency response plans in support of light water nuclearpower plantsrdquo Tech Rep NUREG-0396 US Nuclear Regula-tory Commission 1978

[8] Planning Areas for Emergency Response Near Nuclear PowerPlants Recommendation by the German Commission on Radi-ological Protection Strahlenschutzkommission Geschaftsstelleder Strahlenschutzkommission Bonn Germany 2014

[9] CNSC ldquoStudy of consequences of a hypothetical severe nuclearaccident and effectiveness of mitigation measuresrdquo PWGSCCatalogue CC172-1192015E-PDF Canadian Nuclear SafetyCommission (CNSC) 2015

[10] B H Ha J Y Oh and S J Oh Examination of the EmergencyPlanning Zone (EPZ) Using Level 3 Psa Approach with Maccs2Transactions of the Korean Nuclear Society Autumn MeetingGyeongju Gyeongju Korea 2013

[11] H Ting Q Jingyuan L Hong and C Jianzhu ldquoPreliminaryStudy on plume emergency planning zone for AP1000rdquo AtomicEnergy Science and Technology vol 45 no 12 pp 1472ndash14772011

[12] H-Y Luo J-H Wang W-H Li and J-R Guo ldquoEvaluationof emergency planning zone for EPR nuclear power unit inTSNPPrdquo Nuclear Power Engineering vol 31 no 6 pp 117ndash1222010

[13] J Wu Y-M Yang I-J Chen H-T Chen and K-S ChuangldquoReevaluation of the emergency planning zone for nuclearpower plants in Taiwan using MACCS2 coderdquo Applied Radia-tion and Isotopes vol 64 no 4 pp 448ndash454 2006

[14] I-Y Jeon J K Lee and J Ki ldquoEvaluation of the size ofemergency planning zone for the korean standard nuclearpower plantsrdquo Journal of the Korean Association for RadiationProtection vol 28 no 3 pp 215ndash223 2003

[15] L-C Kung C-I Jane H-Y Hao and C-Y Ching PreliminaryStudy of the Emergency Planning Zone Evaluation for the NuclearPower Plant in Taiwan by Using Maccs2 Code vol 1 JapanHealth Physics Society Tokyo Japan 2000

[16] K A Solomon and W E Kastenberg ldquoEstimating emergencyplanning zones for the Shoreham nuclear reactor a review of

four safety analysesrdquo Journal of HazardousMaterials vol 18 no3 pp 269ndash284 1988

[17] R Chang J Schaperow T Ghosh J Barr C Tinkler and MStutzke State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (Soarca)Report NUREG-1935 Office of Nuclear Regulatory ResearchUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[18] Severe Accident Risks An Assessment for Five US Nuclear PowerPlants Vol 1 NUREG-1150 Division of Systems ResearchOffice of Nuclear Regulatory Research US Nuclear RegulatoryCommission Washington DC USA 1990

[19] M L Abbott L C Cadwallader and D A Petti ldquoRadiologicaldose calculations for fusion facilitiesrdquo Tech Rep INEELEXT-03-00405 Idaho National Engineering and EnvironmentalLaboratory Idaho Falls Idaho USA 2003

[20] A S Aliyu A T Ramli and M A Saleh ldquoAssessment ofpotential human health and environmental impacts of a nuclearpower plant (NPP) based on atmospheric dispersionmodelingrdquoAtmosfera vol 28 no 1 pp 13ndash26 2015

[21] M Hussain S U-D Khan W A A Syed and S U-D KhanldquoEstimation of intervention distances for urgent protectiveactions using comparative approach of MACCS and InterRASrdquoScience and Technology of Nuclear Installations vol 2014 ArticleID 874134 5 pages 2014

[22] Ministry for the Environment ldquoGood practice guide foratmospheric dispersion modellingrdquo ME 522 Ministry for theEnvironment Wellington New Zealand 2004

[23] T Mikkelsen Description of the Risoslash Puff Diffusion ModelRisoslash National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy TechnicalUniversity of Denmark Lyngby Denmark 1982

[24] ldquoThe Rodos System Version PV60rdquo ForschungszentrumKarlsruhe GmbH Institut fur Kern-und Energietechnik(IKET) Hermann-von-Helmholtz-Platz 1 76344 Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen Germany 2005

[25] G F Athey L K Brandon and J V Ramsdell Jr Rascal 42Workbook Office of Nuclear Security and Incident ResponseUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[26] R L Iman and W J Conover Sensitivity Analysis TechniquesSelf-Teaching Curriculum Sandia National Laboratories Albu-querque NM USA 1982

[27] Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Environmental ImpactAssessment K-2K-3 Project Pakistan Atomic Energy Commis-sion Islamabad Pakistan 2015

[28] J Kubanyi R B Lavin D Serbanescu B Toth and HWilkeningRisk Informed Support of DecisionMaking inNuclearPower Plant Emergency Zoning European Commission DGJoint Research Centre Institute for Energy 2008

[29] K V Mardia and P E Jupp Directional Statistics JohnWiley ampSons 2000

[30] Calpuff Modeling System Version 6 User Instructions ExponentEngineering and Scientific Consulting California Calif USA2011

[31] ldquoBackground and Derivation of ans-54 standard fission prod-uct release modelrdquo Division of Systems Integration Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation NUREGCR-2507 US NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington DC USA 1982

[32] L Soffer S B Burson C M Ferrell R Y Lee and J N RidgelyldquoAccident source terms for light-water nuclear power plantsrdquoDivision of Systems Technology Office of Nuclear RegulatoryResearch NUREG-1465 US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington DC USA 1995

TribologyAdvances in

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Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

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Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Renewable Energy

Submit your manuscripts athttpwwwhindawicom

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RotatingMachinery

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EnergyJournal of

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The Scientific World JournalHindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Page 3: Research Article Emergency Planning Zones Estimation for ...downloads.hindawi.com/journals/stni/2016/8549498.pdfEnvironment radioactive releases: 10% of nuclear reactor core volatile

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 3

Start

Environment radioactive releases10 of nuclear reactor core volatile

radioactive material for the durationof 10 hours

Atmospheric dispersion and transport of environment radioactive releases using

Gaussian plume model (near to release point) and Gaussian puff model (away from release

point) coupled with 2D wind field model

Most probable meteorological parameters for

simulation period

Dose calculation considering differentpotential exposure

pathways

Public behavior(sheltering ITB

agent)

Estimating EPZs (PAZ and UPZ)using IAEA dosimetric criteria

End

K-2K-3 site andKarachi South and

Karachi Airport hourly met data

Potential exposure pathways cloud

shine ground shine and inhalation

Onsite and regionaltopography and

land-use data

Figure 1 Methodology for estimation of K-2K-3 NPPs EPZs

pollutant concentration away from the pollutant release pointas meteorology beyond 10 km may not remain the same[22] due to surrounding area characteristics for exampletopography and land-use features may also significantlymodify meteorological characteristics

Recently a study was conducted to estimate emergencyplanning zones using RODOS module RIMPUFF [8] whichis based onGaussian puffmodel [23 24] In the referred studymeteorological data provided by German Weather Servicewas preferred over more accurate onsite meteorological dataas the former covers the simulation area However moreaccurate meteorological data from onsite meteorologicalstation along withmeteorological data from national weatherservicemay be better approach as it would improve the spatialand temporal representation of wind fields in the simulationarea [25]

Further in most of the above-mentioned studies datasampling techniques have been used that select input vari-ables such that the essential information could be acquiredregarding output variables which subsequently results inefficient computation [26] In other words these techniquesare used (eg Latin Hypercube) to obtain representativemeteorological data instead of calculating radiological dosesfor each meteorological condition (eg 8760 meteorologicalconditions in a typical year) [3 4] However nowadayscomputing machines speed and memory capacity has beendrastically increased and use of data sampling might notbe as much advantageous as it was when computing speedand memory capacity were limited Therefore statisticaldistribution of radiological doses may be improved if allmeteorological data typically required in EPZs calculationsis used instead of data sampling

3 Methodology and Model Description

ACP1000 (renamed as Hualong-1) nuclear power plants(NPPs) 2times 1100MWel pressurizedwater reactor (PWR) eachare being constructed near Karachi the southern onshore cityof Pakistan and expectedly put into commercial operationin 20202021 The nuclear power plants site is about 23 kmnorthwest of Karachi having coordinates 24∘511015840510158401015840 north and66∘4610158403110158401015840 east with Sulaiman Mountains in the northwestWithin 80 km radius of site two (02) national weathermeteorological stations exist Karachi South MeteorologicalStation at 18 km in east-north-east of site andKarachi AirportMeteorological Station at 40 km in east of site [27]

Hualong-1 is the third generation three-loop PWR designwith 3050MWth thermal power 18-month fuel cycle and fuelburn-up greater than 45000MWdMT of uranium It hasdouble containment 60-year design life and contains activeand passive redundant safety systems [27]

In this study EPZs (PAZ and UPZ) around K-2K-3 nuclear power plants (NPPs) have been determined inaccordance with IAEA Post-Fukushima Guidelines [6] usingUSNRC RASCAL 42 computer code RASCAL 42 is thestate-of-the-art computer code designed to be used in theindependent assessment of dose projections It was developedto allow consideration of the dominant aspects of sourceterm transport dose and consequences It evaluates releasesfrom nuclear power plants spent fuel storage pools andcasks fuel cycle facilities and radioactive material handlingfacilities

The flow chart of themethodology adopted in the currentstudy is shown in Figure 1 and details are given in subsequentsections

4 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

31 Environment Radioactive Releases It was assumed that10 of nuclear reactor core volatile radioactive material isreleased at ground level into the environment It was assumedthat releases continue for 10 hours It is the maximumexpected radioactive material release into the environmentfollowing an accident that severely damages the fuel [6] andalso covers the Fukushima Accident scenario [5 8] Theduration of 10 hours was assumed for radioactive materialrelease although it may continue many hours after initiationof severe accident Since shorter release period leads to largeremergency planning zones [8] therefore 10-hour releaseduration would result in optimization with reference todifferent accident scenario Further containment by-pass wasconsidered as the release pathway as itmaywarrant protectiveactions early [28] Finally duration of prerelease phase wasassumed to be zero hour (0 hour) while in real scenario sev-eral hours would be available to take protective actions beforestart of severe release of radioactive material for example 13-hour duration prerelease phase of Fukushima Accident [8]

32 Atmospheric Dispersion Gaussian puff model has beenemployed for atmospheric transport diffusion and depo-sition of radioactive material away from release point andGaussian plume model in the vicinity of release point Themathematical models implemented in RASCAL 42 are givenin (1) and (2) The complete description is given in [5]

The Gaussian puffmodel as implemented in RASCAL 42is given below

120594 (119909 119910 119911)119876 = 1

212058732120590119909120590119910120590119911 exp[minus12 (119909 minus 1199090120590119909 )

2]

sdot exp[minus12 (119910 minus 1199100120590119910 )2]

sdot exp[minus12 (119911 minus 1199110120590119911 )2]

(1)

The straight-line Gaussian plume model as implemented inRASCAL 42 is given below

120594 (119909 119910 119911)1198761015840 =

1198651199101198651199112120587119906120590119910120590119911 (2)

Meteorological data collected from onsite meteorologicalstation along withmeteorological data from national weathermeteorological stations has been used in the analysis as itwould improve the spatial and temporal representation ofwind fields in the simulation area For this study onsitemeteorological data for the years 2013ndash2015 along withregional meteorological historical data collected from twometeorological stations that lie about 80 km radius aroundK-2K-3 site has been used

Most probable wind direction wind speed and atmo-spheric stability class of each hour of 10-hour durationof radioactive material release have been calculated ateach meteorological station Most probable wind direction(MPWD) for the first hour of radioactive material release

has been estimated through cumulative frequency distri-bution taking into account the circular nature of winddata (details may be found in literature eg [29]) usinghourly wind direction data along with corresponding windspeed and atmospheric stability class The MPWD alongwith corresponding most probable wind speed and atmo-spheric stability class has been used as first hour meteorol-ogy for radioactive release Most probable wind directionshift (MPWDS) during 10-hour release has been calculatedthrough cumulative frequency distribution using every 10-hour absolute wind direction shift data The total winddirection shift MPWD plusmn MPWDS was assumed during 10-hour release period For subsequent hours (ie 2nd to 10thhour of radioactive release) occurrence frequency of eachwind direction in MPWD plusmnMPWS span has been calculatedand arranged in descending order The first nine (09) winddirections were assumed as wind direction of subsequenthours of radioactive release These nine (09) wind directionsalong with corresponding most probable wind speed andatmospheric stability have been used for subsequent hours ofradioactive material release

Elevation data in three (03) terrain grids with 22 pointsin 119883 and 119884 directions in each grid with grid spacing of10 25 and 50 miles have been calculated with CALMETpreprocessor TERREL [30] using Global Digital ElevationModel (GTOPO30) to account for region topography effectsSimilarly surface roughness in three (03) terrain grids with21 points in 119883 and 119884 directions in each grid with gridspacing of 10 25 and 50 miles has been calculated usingland-useland-cover data (LULC) fromESRI (EnvironmentalSystems Research Institute)

33 Radiation Doses Cloud shine inhalation and groundshine pathways were considered as potential exposure path-ways for PAZ while inhalation pathway was consideredfor UPZ The dose conversion factors (DCFs) of ICRP-60 were considered for radiation doses calculation whileacute inhalation dose to red bone marrow was calculatedusing DCF given in IAEA EPR-D-Values 2006 The IAEAdosimetric criteria for emergency planning zones (PAZ andUPZ) have been used and the same is given in Table 1 forreference The impacts of public behavior that is protectiveactions on the distance to which IAEA criteria (Table 1) maybe exceeded were examined according to IAEA guidelines[6] It should be highlighted here that house sheltering wasconsidered only for inhalation pathway assuming normalactivity that is one-third of the time outside house (in thefield) and two-thirds of the time inside house Thyroid 50-year committed dose and acute dose are very similar becauseof short half-life of the iodine isotopes that dominate thyroiddose and evident from IAEA Study [6] Therefore thyroidcommitted dose equivalent from inhalation has been used inthis study for acute dose to thyroid

4 Analysis and Results

The volatile radioactive materials of radiological significanceare krypton xenon iodine cesium and tellurium [31]There-fore 10 of these radioactive materials were released in

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 5

Table 1 IAEA dosimetric criteria for emergency planning zones [6]

Zone Actions taken based on plantconditions to prevent the following Dosimetric quantity Dose criteria Exposure pathway

Inhalation Cloud shine Ground shine

PAZ Severe deterministic effects ADredmarrow 1 Gy X X XADfetusinh 1 Gy X

UPZ Stochastic effects 119864inh 100mSv X119867fetusinh 100mSv X

Table 2 Environment radioactive releases

Group Radioactivity releases (Bq)Noble gases (Xe Kr) 213 times 1018Iodine 217 times 1018Cesium 146 times 1017Tellurium 589 times 1017

the environment within 10 hours as given in Table 2 Theseenvironmental radioactive releases are maximum expectedactivity in case of accident that severely damages the fuelThe environmental releases of noble gases and iodine groupsare nearly in the same order that is 213 times 1018 Bq and217 times 1018 Bq respectively Cesium and tellurium grouprsquosenvironmental releases are lower than noble gases and iodinegroups with 146 times 1017 Bq and 589 times 1017 Bq respectivelyThe radioactive releases of 131I and 137Cs have been givenin Table 3 along with Fukushima Accident releases and oneof the recent studies for comparison It is evident fromTable 3 that environmental releases in current study coverboth scenarios Since current study covers the FukushimaAccident scenario therefore the analysis may be consideredas multiunit studies However it may be pointed out herethat the current analysis would be refined after completionof Probabilistic Safety Assessment Level-2 studyTherefore itmay be deduced that the environmental radioactive releasesconsidered in this study provide the sound theoretical andpractical bases for the estimation of emergency planningzones as they cover the most expected scenario of severeaccident as well as multiunit Fukushima Accident

Figure 2 shows the time dependent release rate of 131Iand 137Cs two most important radionuclides in radiologicalconsequences which depicts the accident progression asreactor core passes through different phases that is claddingfailure core melt phase and post-vessel melt-through phase[5 32] It is seen that 131I and 137Cs release rate to the envi-ronment at the start of release is about 446 times 1014 Bq15minand 533 times 1013 Bq15min respectively which increases asaccident progresses and attains the maximum value of 102 times1016 Bq15min and 126 times 1016 Bq15min at about 38 hoursAfter about 38 hours both 131I and 137Cs show decreasingtrend as post-vessel melt-through phase has completed It isalso evident from Figure 2 that 131I decreases more rapidlythan 137Cs after about 38 hours because 131I has muchshorted half-life as compared to 137Cs Also the total releasedquantity of 131I is 31 times 1017 Bq which is greater than 137Cs

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Time (hour)

120E + 16

100E + 16

800E + 15

600E + 15

400E + 15

200E + 15

000E + 00

131I137Cs

Bq15min

Figure 2 Time dependent 131I and 137Cs release rate

0123456789

10

0 05 1 15 2 25 3 35

RBE

abso

rbed

dos

e to

red

mar

row

(Sv)

Distance (km)

IAEA PAZ dosimetery limit

Figure 3 RBE weighted absorbed dose to red marrow from cloudshine inhalation and ground shine

by the order of about 10 times that is 37 times 1016 It isobserved that specific activity of 131I is greater than 137Csand ingrowth of 131I is through decay of 131Te Finally at theend of simulation that is 10 hours the release rate of 131Iand 137Cs resides around 709 times 1015 Bq15min and 936 times1014 Bq15min respectively

The acute red bone marrow dose profile is shown inFigure 3 solid curve Acute red bone marrow dose rapidlydecreases along the path as plume moves away from thesource It is evident from the profile that IAEA dosimetric

6 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

Table 3 Estimates of radioactive releases of different studies

Cases 131I (Bq) 137Cs (Bq)K-2K-3 NPPs study 31 times 1017 37 times 1016Fukushima Accident [8] 11 times 1017ndash21 times 1017 11 times 1016ndash21 times 1016SSK 2014 study [8] 31 times 1017 29 times 1016

0123456789

10

0 5 10 15 20

Thyr

oid

com

mitt

ed d

ose e

quiv

alen

t (Sv

)

Distance (km)

House shelter + ITBHouse shelterIAEA PAZ dosimetery limit

Figure 4 Thyroid committed dose equivalent to fetus from inhala-tion

criterion of 1 Sv is projected to be exceeded to about adistance of 12 km which is in good agreement with IAEAStudy [6] It should be pointed out here that RASCAL 42always calculates dose from ground shine pathway for 04days Therefore sheltering could be used as protective actionfor longer period if required as radiological doses throughground shine pathway do not result in substantial increase inacute dose to red bone marrow Ground shine dose dependson deposition (dry and wet) of radionuclides In RASCAL42 dry deposition is realistically modeled as dry depositionvelocity change with changingmeteorological conditions andsurface instead of fixed velocity Radiological doses throughground shine pathway may be increased if wet deposition(rain and snow) is considered However the probability ofrain is very low while the probability of snow is extremelylow in this region [27]Therefore the effect of wet depositionmay be ignored as highly unlikely scenarios would reduce thenumber of protective measures

Thyroid committed dose equivalent from inhalation pro-file has been shown in Figure 4 It shows that if ITB agentis taken before inhalation the IAEA criterion is projected tobe exceeded to about 3 km if pregnant woman is shelteringin a house However if ITB agent is not taken then thecriterion is projected to be exceeded to about a distance of14 km if pregnant woman is sheltering in a houseThe thyroidcommitted dose equivalent to fetus from inhalation is in wellagreement with IAEA Study [6] if pregnant woman takes ITBagent before inhalation and is sheltering in a house Howeverthyroid committed dose equivalent to fetus from inhalationfalls nearly half-way with IAEA Study [6] if pregnant woman

000005010015020025030035040045050

0 10 20 30 40

Inha

latio

n co

mm

itted

effec

tive d

ose (

Sv)

Distance (km)

Without shelteringWith shelteringIAEA UPZ dosimetery limit

Figure 5 Effective dose from inhalation

does not take ITB agent before inhalation and shelteringin a house This comparison shows that the atmospherictransport diffusion and deposition characteristics of currentstudy area are better than the area considered in IAEA StudyIt should be highlighted here that RASCAL 42 gives morerealistic results in contrast to straight-line Gaussian plumemodels as itmodifies thewind field to account for topographyand hence realistic radionuclide concentration It is suggestedthat to prevent the severe deterministic effects of a severerelease the area within about 3 km of the K-2K-3 NPPsshould be evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agenttaken before a release to about a distance of 14 kmThereforeGaussian puff model not only gives more realistic resultsbut also increases protective actions effectiveness as well asmaking them more cost effective

The effective dose from inhalation profile is shown inFigure 5 IAEA dosimetric criterion of 100mSv of effectivedose is projected to be exceeded from inhalation to about8 km for an individual sheltering in a house and about 11 kmwithout sheltering The thyroid committed dose equivalentfrom inhalation profile is shown in Figure 6 with solid curveIt shows that if an ITB agent is taken before or shortly after theinhalation the criterion of 100mSv to the fetus is projected tobe exceeded to about 14 km for a pregnant woman shelteringin a house Therefore it is inferred that in order to avoidor minimize stochastic effects for a severe release the areawithin about 8 km of K-2K-3 NPPs should be evacuated

It is emphasized here that emergency planning zonesshould be based on realistic analysis because highly unlikelyscenarios would reduce the number of protective mea-sures and hence be not favorable of meeting the intended

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 7

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80Thyr

oid

com

mitt

ed d

ose e

quiv

alen

t (Sv

)

Distance (km)

IAEA UPZ dosimetery limit

Figure 6Thyroid committed dose equivalent from inhalation aftertaking ITB and sheltering

objectives Therefore current study recommends 3 km and8 km as PAZ and UPZ respectively for K-2K-3 NPPs Therecommended PAZ and UPZ are in well agreement withIAEA guidelines [6] which suggest that the size of PAZ andUPZ could be established based on site specific analysisprovided that the boundary would not be more than a factorof two less than or greater than the recommended range thatis 3ndash5 km for PAZ and 15ndash30 km for UPZ

5 Conclusion

The current study presents the application of Gaussian puffmodel using onsite and regional data related to meteo-rology topography and land-use along with latest IAEAPost-Fukushima Guidelines for the estimation of emergencyplanning zones (PAZ and UPZ) around K-2K-3 NPPs Theenvironmental radioactive releases specifically 131I (31 times1017 Bq) and 137Cs (37 times 1016 Bq) provide the sound theo-retical and practical bases for the estimation of emergencyplanning zones as they cover the most expected scenarioof severe accident that is 10 of nuclear reactor corevolatile radioactive material as well as most recent multiunitFukushima Accident Also sheltering could be used as pro-tective action for longer period of about 04 days if requiredFurther to prevent the severe deterministic effects of a severerelease the area within about 3 km of K-2K-3 NPPs shouldbe evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agent should betaken before a release to about a distance of 14 km Moreoverstochastic effects of severe release of radioactive materialmay be avoided or minimized by evacuating the area withinabout 8 km of K-2K-3 NPPs site Protective actions maybecome more effective and cost beneficial by using currentmethodology as Gaussian puff model realistically representsatmospheric transport and dispersion process in contrast tostraight-lineGaussian plumemodelTherefore it is suggestedthat 3 km and 8 km around K-2K-3 NPPs may be designatedas PAZ and UPZ respectively which are in well agreement ofIAEA Post-Fukushima Guidelines

Nomenclature

120594(119909 119910 119911) Concentration (Cim3 or gm3)119876 Amount of material released (Ci or g)120590119909 120590119910 120590119911 Dispersion parameters (m)1199090 1199100 1199110 Center of the puff1198761015840 Material release rate (Cisec or gsec)119865119910 119865119911 Lateral and vertical exponential terms119906 Wind speed (msec)ACP Advance Chinese PWRADfetusinh Absorbed dose to fetus through inhalationADredmarrow Absorbed dose to red marrowCALMET California meteorologyDCFs Dose conversion factors119864inh Effective dose through inhalationEPR Emergency preparedness and responseEPZs Emergency planning zonesESRI Environmental Systems Research InstituteGPMs Gaussian plume modelsGTOPO30 Global 30 Arc-Second Elevation dataset119867fetusinh Equivalent dose to fetus through

inhalationIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyICRP International Commission on

Radiological ProtectionITB Iodine thyroid blockingK-2 Karachi-2K-3 Karachi-3Kr KryptonLULC Land-use land-coverMPWD Most probable wind directionMPWDS Most probable wind direction shiftMWdMT Megawatt-day per tonNPPs Nuclear power plantsPAZ Precautionary action zonePWR Pressurized water reactorRASCAL Radiological Assessment System of

Consequence AnalysisRBE Relative biological effectivenessRIMPUFF Risoslash model puffRODOS Real-time online decision support systemSSK StrahlenschutzkommissionTERREL Terrain elevationTMI Three Mile IslandUSNRC United States Nuclear Regulatory

CommissionUPZ Urgent protective action planning zoneXe Xenon

Competing Interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests

References

[1] IAEA The Fukushima Daiichi Accident Report by the DirectorGeneral International Atomic Energy Commission IAEA2015

8 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

[2] ldquoSources Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiationrdquo UnitedNations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radia-tion Vol 1 Annex A 2013

[3] T J Bander ldquoPAVAN an atmospheric dispersion programfor evaluating design-basis accidental releases of radioactivematerials fromnuclear power stationsrdquo Tech RepNUREGCR-2858 Division of Systems Integration Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashingtonDC USA 1982

[4] T Haste J Birchley E Cazzoli and J Vitazkova ldquoMEL-CORMACCS simulation of the TMI-2 severe accident andinitial recovery phases off-site fission product release andconsequencesrdquoNuclear Engineering and Design vol 236 no 10pp 1099ndash1112 2006

[5] J V Ramsdell Jr G F Athey S A McGuire and L KBrandon Rascal 4 Description of Models and Methods 20555-0001 NUREG-1940 Office of Nuclear Security and IncidentResponse US Nuclear Regulatory Commission WashingtonDC USA 2012

[6] IAEAActions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to SevereConditions at a Light Water Reactor International AtomicEnergy Commission IAEA Vienna Austria 2013

[7] H E Collins B K Grimes and F Galpin ldquoPlanning basisfor the development of state and local government radiologicalemergency response plans in support of light water nuclearpower plantsrdquo Tech Rep NUREG-0396 US Nuclear Regula-tory Commission 1978

[8] Planning Areas for Emergency Response Near Nuclear PowerPlants Recommendation by the German Commission on Radi-ological Protection Strahlenschutzkommission Geschaftsstelleder Strahlenschutzkommission Bonn Germany 2014

[9] CNSC ldquoStudy of consequences of a hypothetical severe nuclearaccident and effectiveness of mitigation measuresrdquo PWGSCCatalogue CC172-1192015E-PDF Canadian Nuclear SafetyCommission (CNSC) 2015

[10] B H Ha J Y Oh and S J Oh Examination of the EmergencyPlanning Zone (EPZ) Using Level 3 Psa Approach with Maccs2Transactions of the Korean Nuclear Society Autumn MeetingGyeongju Gyeongju Korea 2013

[11] H Ting Q Jingyuan L Hong and C Jianzhu ldquoPreliminaryStudy on plume emergency planning zone for AP1000rdquo AtomicEnergy Science and Technology vol 45 no 12 pp 1472ndash14772011

[12] H-Y Luo J-H Wang W-H Li and J-R Guo ldquoEvaluationof emergency planning zone for EPR nuclear power unit inTSNPPrdquo Nuclear Power Engineering vol 31 no 6 pp 117ndash1222010

[13] J Wu Y-M Yang I-J Chen H-T Chen and K-S ChuangldquoReevaluation of the emergency planning zone for nuclearpower plants in Taiwan using MACCS2 coderdquo Applied Radia-tion and Isotopes vol 64 no 4 pp 448ndash454 2006

[14] I-Y Jeon J K Lee and J Ki ldquoEvaluation of the size ofemergency planning zone for the korean standard nuclearpower plantsrdquo Journal of the Korean Association for RadiationProtection vol 28 no 3 pp 215ndash223 2003

[15] L-C Kung C-I Jane H-Y Hao and C-Y Ching PreliminaryStudy of the Emergency Planning Zone Evaluation for the NuclearPower Plant in Taiwan by Using Maccs2 Code vol 1 JapanHealth Physics Society Tokyo Japan 2000

[16] K A Solomon and W E Kastenberg ldquoEstimating emergencyplanning zones for the Shoreham nuclear reactor a review of

four safety analysesrdquo Journal of HazardousMaterials vol 18 no3 pp 269ndash284 1988

[17] R Chang J Schaperow T Ghosh J Barr C Tinkler and MStutzke State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (Soarca)Report NUREG-1935 Office of Nuclear Regulatory ResearchUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[18] Severe Accident Risks An Assessment for Five US Nuclear PowerPlants Vol 1 NUREG-1150 Division of Systems ResearchOffice of Nuclear Regulatory Research US Nuclear RegulatoryCommission Washington DC USA 1990

[19] M L Abbott L C Cadwallader and D A Petti ldquoRadiologicaldose calculations for fusion facilitiesrdquo Tech Rep INEELEXT-03-00405 Idaho National Engineering and EnvironmentalLaboratory Idaho Falls Idaho USA 2003

[20] A S Aliyu A T Ramli and M A Saleh ldquoAssessment ofpotential human health and environmental impacts of a nuclearpower plant (NPP) based on atmospheric dispersionmodelingrdquoAtmosfera vol 28 no 1 pp 13ndash26 2015

[21] M Hussain S U-D Khan W A A Syed and S U-D KhanldquoEstimation of intervention distances for urgent protectiveactions using comparative approach of MACCS and InterRASrdquoScience and Technology of Nuclear Installations vol 2014 ArticleID 874134 5 pages 2014

[22] Ministry for the Environment ldquoGood practice guide foratmospheric dispersion modellingrdquo ME 522 Ministry for theEnvironment Wellington New Zealand 2004

[23] T Mikkelsen Description of the Risoslash Puff Diffusion ModelRisoslash National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy TechnicalUniversity of Denmark Lyngby Denmark 1982

[24] ldquoThe Rodos System Version PV60rdquo ForschungszentrumKarlsruhe GmbH Institut fur Kern-und Energietechnik(IKET) Hermann-von-Helmholtz-Platz 1 76344 Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen Germany 2005

[25] G F Athey L K Brandon and J V Ramsdell Jr Rascal 42Workbook Office of Nuclear Security and Incident ResponseUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[26] R L Iman and W J Conover Sensitivity Analysis TechniquesSelf-Teaching Curriculum Sandia National Laboratories Albu-querque NM USA 1982

[27] Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Environmental ImpactAssessment K-2K-3 Project Pakistan Atomic Energy Commis-sion Islamabad Pakistan 2015

[28] J Kubanyi R B Lavin D Serbanescu B Toth and HWilkeningRisk Informed Support of DecisionMaking inNuclearPower Plant Emergency Zoning European Commission DGJoint Research Centre Institute for Energy 2008

[29] K V Mardia and P E Jupp Directional Statistics JohnWiley ampSons 2000

[30] Calpuff Modeling System Version 6 User Instructions ExponentEngineering and Scientific Consulting California Calif USA2011

[31] ldquoBackground and Derivation of ans-54 standard fission prod-uct release modelrdquo Division of Systems Integration Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation NUREGCR-2507 US NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington DC USA 1982

[32] L Soffer S B Burson C M Ferrell R Y Lee and J N RidgelyldquoAccident source terms for light-water nuclear power plantsrdquoDivision of Systems Technology Office of Nuclear RegulatoryResearch NUREG-1465 US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington DC USA 1995

TribologyAdvances in

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

International Journal of

AerospaceEngineeringHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

FuelsJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal ofPetroleum Engineering

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Industrial EngineeringJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Power ElectronicsHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Advances in

CombustionJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Renewable Energy

Submit your manuscripts athttpwwwhindawicom

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

StructuresJournal of

International Journal of

RotatingMachinery

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Hindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom

Journal ofEngineeringVolume 2014

Hindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

International Journal ofPhotoenergy

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Nuclear InstallationsScience and Technology of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Solar EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Wind EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Nuclear EnergyInternational Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

High Energy PhysicsAdvances in

The Scientific World JournalHindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Page 4: Research Article Emergency Planning Zones Estimation for ...downloads.hindawi.com/journals/stni/2016/8549498.pdfEnvironment radioactive releases: 10% of nuclear reactor core volatile

4 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

31 Environment Radioactive Releases It was assumed that10 of nuclear reactor core volatile radioactive material isreleased at ground level into the environment It was assumedthat releases continue for 10 hours It is the maximumexpected radioactive material release into the environmentfollowing an accident that severely damages the fuel [6] andalso covers the Fukushima Accident scenario [5 8] Theduration of 10 hours was assumed for radioactive materialrelease although it may continue many hours after initiationof severe accident Since shorter release period leads to largeremergency planning zones [8] therefore 10-hour releaseduration would result in optimization with reference todifferent accident scenario Further containment by-pass wasconsidered as the release pathway as itmaywarrant protectiveactions early [28] Finally duration of prerelease phase wasassumed to be zero hour (0 hour) while in real scenario sev-eral hours would be available to take protective actions beforestart of severe release of radioactive material for example 13-hour duration prerelease phase of Fukushima Accident [8]

32 Atmospheric Dispersion Gaussian puff model has beenemployed for atmospheric transport diffusion and depo-sition of radioactive material away from release point andGaussian plume model in the vicinity of release point Themathematical models implemented in RASCAL 42 are givenin (1) and (2) The complete description is given in [5]

The Gaussian puffmodel as implemented in RASCAL 42is given below

120594 (119909 119910 119911)119876 = 1

212058732120590119909120590119910120590119911 exp[minus12 (119909 minus 1199090120590119909 )

2]

sdot exp[minus12 (119910 minus 1199100120590119910 )2]

sdot exp[minus12 (119911 minus 1199110120590119911 )2]

(1)

The straight-line Gaussian plume model as implemented inRASCAL 42 is given below

120594 (119909 119910 119911)1198761015840 =

1198651199101198651199112120587119906120590119910120590119911 (2)

Meteorological data collected from onsite meteorologicalstation along withmeteorological data from national weathermeteorological stations has been used in the analysis as itwould improve the spatial and temporal representation ofwind fields in the simulation area For this study onsitemeteorological data for the years 2013ndash2015 along withregional meteorological historical data collected from twometeorological stations that lie about 80 km radius aroundK-2K-3 site has been used

Most probable wind direction wind speed and atmo-spheric stability class of each hour of 10-hour durationof radioactive material release have been calculated ateach meteorological station Most probable wind direction(MPWD) for the first hour of radioactive material release

has been estimated through cumulative frequency distri-bution taking into account the circular nature of winddata (details may be found in literature eg [29]) usinghourly wind direction data along with corresponding windspeed and atmospheric stability class The MPWD alongwith corresponding most probable wind speed and atmo-spheric stability class has been used as first hour meteorol-ogy for radioactive release Most probable wind directionshift (MPWDS) during 10-hour release has been calculatedthrough cumulative frequency distribution using every 10-hour absolute wind direction shift data The total winddirection shift MPWD plusmn MPWDS was assumed during 10-hour release period For subsequent hours (ie 2nd to 10thhour of radioactive release) occurrence frequency of eachwind direction in MPWD plusmnMPWS span has been calculatedand arranged in descending order The first nine (09) winddirections were assumed as wind direction of subsequenthours of radioactive release These nine (09) wind directionsalong with corresponding most probable wind speed andatmospheric stability have been used for subsequent hours ofradioactive material release

Elevation data in three (03) terrain grids with 22 pointsin 119883 and 119884 directions in each grid with grid spacing of10 25 and 50 miles have been calculated with CALMETpreprocessor TERREL [30] using Global Digital ElevationModel (GTOPO30) to account for region topography effectsSimilarly surface roughness in three (03) terrain grids with21 points in 119883 and 119884 directions in each grid with gridspacing of 10 25 and 50 miles has been calculated usingland-useland-cover data (LULC) fromESRI (EnvironmentalSystems Research Institute)

33 Radiation Doses Cloud shine inhalation and groundshine pathways were considered as potential exposure path-ways for PAZ while inhalation pathway was consideredfor UPZ The dose conversion factors (DCFs) of ICRP-60 were considered for radiation doses calculation whileacute inhalation dose to red bone marrow was calculatedusing DCF given in IAEA EPR-D-Values 2006 The IAEAdosimetric criteria for emergency planning zones (PAZ andUPZ) have been used and the same is given in Table 1 forreference The impacts of public behavior that is protectiveactions on the distance to which IAEA criteria (Table 1) maybe exceeded were examined according to IAEA guidelines[6] It should be highlighted here that house sheltering wasconsidered only for inhalation pathway assuming normalactivity that is one-third of the time outside house (in thefield) and two-thirds of the time inside house Thyroid 50-year committed dose and acute dose are very similar becauseof short half-life of the iodine isotopes that dominate thyroiddose and evident from IAEA Study [6] Therefore thyroidcommitted dose equivalent from inhalation has been used inthis study for acute dose to thyroid

4 Analysis and Results

The volatile radioactive materials of radiological significanceare krypton xenon iodine cesium and tellurium [31]There-fore 10 of these radioactive materials were released in

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 5

Table 1 IAEA dosimetric criteria for emergency planning zones [6]

Zone Actions taken based on plantconditions to prevent the following Dosimetric quantity Dose criteria Exposure pathway

Inhalation Cloud shine Ground shine

PAZ Severe deterministic effects ADredmarrow 1 Gy X X XADfetusinh 1 Gy X

UPZ Stochastic effects 119864inh 100mSv X119867fetusinh 100mSv X

Table 2 Environment radioactive releases

Group Radioactivity releases (Bq)Noble gases (Xe Kr) 213 times 1018Iodine 217 times 1018Cesium 146 times 1017Tellurium 589 times 1017

the environment within 10 hours as given in Table 2 Theseenvironmental radioactive releases are maximum expectedactivity in case of accident that severely damages the fuelThe environmental releases of noble gases and iodine groupsare nearly in the same order that is 213 times 1018 Bq and217 times 1018 Bq respectively Cesium and tellurium grouprsquosenvironmental releases are lower than noble gases and iodinegroups with 146 times 1017 Bq and 589 times 1017 Bq respectivelyThe radioactive releases of 131I and 137Cs have been givenin Table 3 along with Fukushima Accident releases and oneof the recent studies for comparison It is evident fromTable 3 that environmental releases in current study coverboth scenarios Since current study covers the FukushimaAccident scenario therefore the analysis may be consideredas multiunit studies However it may be pointed out herethat the current analysis would be refined after completionof Probabilistic Safety Assessment Level-2 studyTherefore itmay be deduced that the environmental radioactive releasesconsidered in this study provide the sound theoretical andpractical bases for the estimation of emergency planningzones as they cover the most expected scenario of severeaccident as well as multiunit Fukushima Accident

Figure 2 shows the time dependent release rate of 131Iand 137Cs two most important radionuclides in radiologicalconsequences which depicts the accident progression asreactor core passes through different phases that is claddingfailure core melt phase and post-vessel melt-through phase[5 32] It is seen that 131I and 137Cs release rate to the envi-ronment at the start of release is about 446 times 1014 Bq15minand 533 times 1013 Bq15min respectively which increases asaccident progresses and attains the maximum value of 102 times1016 Bq15min and 126 times 1016 Bq15min at about 38 hoursAfter about 38 hours both 131I and 137Cs show decreasingtrend as post-vessel melt-through phase has completed It isalso evident from Figure 2 that 131I decreases more rapidlythan 137Cs after about 38 hours because 131I has muchshorted half-life as compared to 137Cs Also the total releasedquantity of 131I is 31 times 1017 Bq which is greater than 137Cs

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Time (hour)

120E + 16

100E + 16

800E + 15

600E + 15

400E + 15

200E + 15

000E + 00

131I137Cs

Bq15min

Figure 2 Time dependent 131I and 137Cs release rate

0123456789

10

0 05 1 15 2 25 3 35

RBE

abso

rbed

dos

e to

red

mar

row

(Sv)

Distance (km)

IAEA PAZ dosimetery limit

Figure 3 RBE weighted absorbed dose to red marrow from cloudshine inhalation and ground shine

by the order of about 10 times that is 37 times 1016 It isobserved that specific activity of 131I is greater than 137Csand ingrowth of 131I is through decay of 131Te Finally at theend of simulation that is 10 hours the release rate of 131Iand 137Cs resides around 709 times 1015 Bq15min and 936 times1014 Bq15min respectively

The acute red bone marrow dose profile is shown inFigure 3 solid curve Acute red bone marrow dose rapidlydecreases along the path as plume moves away from thesource It is evident from the profile that IAEA dosimetric

6 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

Table 3 Estimates of radioactive releases of different studies

Cases 131I (Bq) 137Cs (Bq)K-2K-3 NPPs study 31 times 1017 37 times 1016Fukushima Accident [8] 11 times 1017ndash21 times 1017 11 times 1016ndash21 times 1016SSK 2014 study [8] 31 times 1017 29 times 1016

0123456789

10

0 5 10 15 20

Thyr

oid

com

mitt

ed d

ose e

quiv

alen

t (Sv

)

Distance (km)

House shelter + ITBHouse shelterIAEA PAZ dosimetery limit

Figure 4 Thyroid committed dose equivalent to fetus from inhala-tion

criterion of 1 Sv is projected to be exceeded to about adistance of 12 km which is in good agreement with IAEAStudy [6] It should be pointed out here that RASCAL 42always calculates dose from ground shine pathway for 04days Therefore sheltering could be used as protective actionfor longer period if required as radiological doses throughground shine pathway do not result in substantial increase inacute dose to red bone marrow Ground shine dose dependson deposition (dry and wet) of radionuclides In RASCAL42 dry deposition is realistically modeled as dry depositionvelocity change with changingmeteorological conditions andsurface instead of fixed velocity Radiological doses throughground shine pathway may be increased if wet deposition(rain and snow) is considered However the probability ofrain is very low while the probability of snow is extremelylow in this region [27]Therefore the effect of wet depositionmay be ignored as highly unlikely scenarios would reduce thenumber of protective measures

Thyroid committed dose equivalent from inhalation pro-file has been shown in Figure 4 It shows that if ITB agentis taken before inhalation the IAEA criterion is projected tobe exceeded to about 3 km if pregnant woman is shelteringin a house However if ITB agent is not taken then thecriterion is projected to be exceeded to about a distance of14 km if pregnant woman is sheltering in a houseThe thyroidcommitted dose equivalent to fetus from inhalation is in wellagreement with IAEA Study [6] if pregnant woman takes ITBagent before inhalation and is sheltering in a house Howeverthyroid committed dose equivalent to fetus from inhalationfalls nearly half-way with IAEA Study [6] if pregnant woman

000005010015020025030035040045050

0 10 20 30 40

Inha

latio

n co

mm

itted

effec

tive d

ose (

Sv)

Distance (km)

Without shelteringWith shelteringIAEA UPZ dosimetery limit

Figure 5 Effective dose from inhalation

does not take ITB agent before inhalation and shelteringin a house This comparison shows that the atmospherictransport diffusion and deposition characteristics of currentstudy area are better than the area considered in IAEA StudyIt should be highlighted here that RASCAL 42 gives morerealistic results in contrast to straight-line Gaussian plumemodels as itmodifies thewind field to account for topographyand hence realistic radionuclide concentration It is suggestedthat to prevent the severe deterministic effects of a severerelease the area within about 3 km of the K-2K-3 NPPsshould be evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agenttaken before a release to about a distance of 14 kmThereforeGaussian puff model not only gives more realistic resultsbut also increases protective actions effectiveness as well asmaking them more cost effective

The effective dose from inhalation profile is shown inFigure 5 IAEA dosimetric criterion of 100mSv of effectivedose is projected to be exceeded from inhalation to about8 km for an individual sheltering in a house and about 11 kmwithout sheltering The thyroid committed dose equivalentfrom inhalation profile is shown in Figure 6 with solid curveIt shows that if an ITB agent is taken before or shortly after theinhalation the criterion of 100mSv to the fetus is projected tobe exceeded to about 14 km for a pregnant woman shelteringin a house Therefore it is inferred that in order to avoidor minimize stochastic effects for a severe release the areawithin about 8 km of K-2K-3 NPPs should be evacuated

It is emphasized here that emergency planning zonesshould be based on realistic analysis because highly unlikelyscenarios would reduce the number of protective mea-sures and hence be not favorable of meeting the intended

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 7

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80Thyr

oid

com

mitt

ed d

ose e

quiv

alen

t (Sv

)

Distance (km)

IAEA UPZ dosimetery limit

Figure 6Thyroid committed dose equivalent from inhalation aftertaking ITB and sheltering

objectives Therefore current study recommends 3 km and8 km as PAZ and UPZ respectively for K-2K-3 NPPs Therecommended PAZ and UPZ are in well agreement withIAEA guidelines [6] which suggest that the size of PAZ andUPZ could be established based on site specific analysisprovided that the boundary would not be more than a factorof two less than or greater than the recommended range thatis 3ndash5 km for PAZ and 15ndash30 km for UPZ

5 Conclusion

The current study presents the application of Gaussian puffmodel using onsite and regional data related to meteo-rology topography and land-use along with latest IAEAPost-Fukushima Guidelines for the estimation of emergencyplanning zones (PAZ and UPZ) around K-2K-3 NPPs Theenvironmental radioactive releases specifically 131I (31 times1017 Bq) and 137Cs (37 times 1016 Bq) provide the sound theo-retical and practical bases for the estimation of emergencyplanning zones as they cover the most expected scenarioof severe accident that is 10 of nuclear reactor corevolatile radioactive material as well as most recent multiunitFukushima Accident Also sheltering could be used as pro-tective action for longer period of about 04 days if requiredFurther to prevent the severe deterministic effects of a severerelease the area within about 3 km of K-2K-3 NPPs shouldbe evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agent should betaken before a release to about a distance of 14 km Moreoverstochastic effects of severe release of radioactive materialmay be avoided or minimized by evacuating the area withinabout 8 km of K-2K-3 NPPs site Protective actions maybecome more effective and cost beneficial by using currentmethodology as Gaussian puff model realistically representsatmospheric transport and dispersion process in contrast tostraight-lineGaussian plumemodelTherefore it is suggestedthat 3 km and 8 km around K-2K-3 NPPs may be designatedas PAZ and UPZ respectively which are in well agreement ofIAEA Post-Fukushima Guidelines

Nomenclature

120594(119909 119910 119911) Concentration (Cim3 or gm3)119876 Amount of material released (Ci or g)120590119909 120590119910 120590119911 Dispersion parameters (m)1199090 1199100 1199110 Center of the puff1198761015840 Material release rate (Cisec or gsec)119865119910 119865119911 Lateral and vertical exponential terms119906 Wind speed (msec)ACP Advance Chinese PWRADfetusinh Absorbed dose to fetus through inhalationADredmarrow Absorbed dose to red marrowCALMET California meteorologyDCFs Dose conversion factors119864inh Effective dose through inhalationEPR Emergency preparedness and responseEPZs Emergency planning zonesESRI Environmental Systems Research InstituteGPMs Gaussian plume modelsGTOPO30 Global 30 Arc-Second Elevation dataset119867fetusinh Equivalent dose to fetus through

inhalationIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyICRP International Commission on

Radiological ProtectionITB Iodine thyroid blockingK-2 Karachi-2K-3 Karachi-3Kr KryptonLULC Land-use land-coverMPWD Most probable wind directionMPWDS Most probable wind direction shiftMWdMT Megawatt-day per tonNPPs Nuclear power plantsPAZ Precautionary action zonePWR Pressurized water reactorRASCAL Radiological Assessment System of

Consequence AnalysisRBE Relative biological effectivenessRIMPUFF Risoslash model puffRODOS Real-time online decision support systemSSK StrahlenschutzkommissionTERREL Terrain elevationTMI Three Mile IslandUSNRC United States Nuclear Regulatory

CommissionUPZ Urgent protective action planning zoneXe Xenon

Competing Interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests

References

[1] IAEA The Fukushima Daiichi Accident Report by the DirectorGeneral International Atomic Energy Commission IAEA2015

8 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

[2] ldquoSources Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiationrdquo UnitedNations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radia-tion Vol 1 Annex A 2013

[3] T J Bander ldquoPAVAN an atmospheric dispersion programfor evaluating design-basis accidental releases of radioactivematerials fromnuclear power stationsrdquo Tech RepNUREGCR-2858 Division of Systems Integration Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashingtonDC USA 1982

[4] T Haste J Birchley E Cazzoli and J Vitazkova ldquoMEL-CORMACCS simulation of the TMI-2 severe accident andinitial recovery phases off-site fission product release andconsequencesrdquoNuclear Engineering and Design vol 236 no 10pp 1099ndash1112 2006

[5] J V Ramsdell Jr G F Athey S A McGuire and L KBrandon Rascal 4 Description of Models and Methods 20555-0001 NUREG-1940 Office of Nuclear Security and IncidentResponse US Nuclear Regulatory Commission WashingtonDC USA 2012

[6] IAEAActions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to SevereConditions at a Light Water Reactor International AtomicEnergy Commission IAEA Vienna Austria 2013

[7] H E Collins B K Grimes and F Galpin ldquoPlanning basisfor the development of state and local government radiologicalemergency response plans in support of light water nuclearpower plantsrdquo Tech Rep NUREG-0396 US Nuclear Regula-tory Commission 1978

[8] Planning Areas for Emergency Response Near Nuclear PowerPlants Recommendation by the German Commission on Radi-ological Protection Strahlenschutzkommission Geschaftsstelleder Strahlenschutzkommission Bonn Germany 2014

[9] CNSC ldquoStudy of consequences of a hypothetical severe nuclearaccident and effectiveness of mitigation measuresrdquo PWGSCCatalogue CC172-1192015E-PDF Canadian Nuclear SafetyCommission (CNSC) 2015

[10] B H Ha J Y Oh and S J Oh Examination of the EmergencyPlanning Zone (EPZ) Using Level 3 Psa Approach with Maccs2Transactions of the Korean Nuclear Society Autumn MeetingGyeongju Gyeongju Korea 2013

[11] H Ting Q Jingyuan L Hong and C Jianzhu ldquoPreliminaryStudy on plume emergency planning zone for AP1000rdquo AtomicEnergy Science and Technology vol 45 no 12 pp 1472ndash14772011

[12] H-Y Luo J-H Wang W-H Li and J-R Guo ldquoEvaluationof emergency planning zone for EPR nuclear power unit inTSNPPrdquo Nuclear Power Engineering vol 31 no 6 pp 117ndash1222010

[13] J Wu Y-M Yang I-J Chen H-T Chen and K-S ChuangldquoReevaluation of the emergency planning zone for nuclearpower plants in Taiwan using MACCS2 coderdquo Applied Radia-tion and Isotopes vol 64 no 4 pp 448ndash454 2006

[14] I-Y Jeon J K Lee and J Ki ldquoEvaluation of the size ofemergency planning zone for the korean standard nuclearpower plantsrdquo Journal of the Korean Association for RadiationProtection vol 28 no 3 pp 215ndash223 2003

[15] L-C Kung C-I Jane H-Y Hao and C-Y Ching PreliminaryStudy of the Emergency Planning Zone Evaluation for the NuclearPower Plant in Taiwan by Using Maccs2 Code vol 1 JapanHealth Physics Society Tokyo Japan 2000

[16] K A Solomon and W E Kastenberg ldquoEstimating emergencyplanning zones for the Shoreham nuclear reactor a review of

four safety analysesrdquo Journal of HazardousMaterials vol 18 no3 pp 269ndash284 1988

[17] R Chang J Schaperow T Ghosh J Barr C Tinkler and MStutzke State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (Soarca)Report NUREG-1935 Office of Nuclear Regulatory ResearchUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[18] Severe Accident Risks An Assessment for Five US Nuclear PowerPlants Vol 1 NUREG-1150 Division of Systems ResearchOffice of Nuclear Regulatory Research US Nuclear RegulatoryCommission Washington DC USA 1990

[19] M L Abbott L C Cadwallader and D A Petti ldquoRadiologicaldose calculations for fusion facilitiesrdquo Tech Rep INEELEXT-03-00405 Idaho National Engineering and EnvironmentalLaboratory Idaho Falls Idaho USA 2003

[20] A S Aliyu A T Ramli and M A Saleh ldquoAssessment ofpotential human health and environmental impacts of a nuclearpower plant (NPP) based on atmospheric dispersionmodelingrdquoAtmosfera vol 28 no 1 pp 13ndash26 2015

[21] M Hussain S U-D Khan W A A Syed and S U-D KhanldquoEstimation of intervention distances for urgent protectiveactions using comparative approach of MACCS and InterRASrdquoScience and Technology of Nuclear Installations vol 2014 ArticleID 874134 5 pages 2014

[22] Ministry for the Environment ldquoGood practice guide foratmospheric dispersion modellingrdquo ME 522 Ministry for theEnvironment Wellington New Zealand 2004

[23] T Mikkelsen Description of the Risoslash Puff Diffusion ModelRisoslash National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy TechnicalUniversity of Denmark Lyngby Denmark 1982

[24] ldquoThe Rodos System Version PV60rdquo ForschungszentrumKarlsruhe GmbH Institut fur Kern-und Energietechnik(IKET) Hermann-von-Helmholtz-Platz 1 76344 Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen Germany 2005

[25] G F Athey L K Brandon and J V Ramsdell Jr Rascal 42Workbook Office of Nuclear Security and Incident ResponseUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[26] R L Iman and W J Conover Sensitivity Analysis TechniquesSelf-Teaching Curriculum Sandia National Laboratories Albu-querque NM USA 1982

[27] Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Environmental ImpactAssessment K-2K-3 Project Pakistan Atomic Energy Commis-sion Islamabad Pakistan 2015

[28] J Kubanyi R B Lavin D Serbanescu B Toth and HWilkeningRisk Informed Support of DecisionMaking inNuclearPower Plant Emergency Zoning European Commission DGJoint Research Centre Institute for Energy 2008

[29] K V Mardia and P E Jupp Directional Statistics JohnWiley ampSons 2000

[30] Calpuff Modeling System Version 6 User Instructions ExponentEngineering and Scientific Consulting California Calif USA2011

[31] ldquoBackground and Derivation of ans-54 standard fission prod-uct release modelrdquo Division of Systems Integration Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation NUREGCR-2507 US NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington DC USA 1982

[32] L Soffer S B Burson C M Ferrell R Y Lee and J N RidgelyldquoAccident source terms for light-water nuclear power plantsrdquoDivision of Systems Technology Office of Nuclear RegulatoryResearch NUREG-1465 US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington DC USA 1995

TribologyAdvances in

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

International Journal of

AerospaceEngineeringHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

FuelsJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal ofPetroleum Engineering

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Industrial EngineeringJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Power ElectronicsHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Advances in

CombustionJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Renewable Energy

Submit your manuscripts athttpwwwhindawicom

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

StructuresJournal of

International Journal of

RotatingMachinery

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Hindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom

Journal ofEngineeringVolume 2014

Hindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

International Journal ofPhotoenergy

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Nuclear InstallationsScience and Technology of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Solar EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Wind EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Nuclear EnergyInternational Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

High Energy PhysicsAdvances in

The Scientific World JournalHindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Page 5: Research Article Emergency Planning Zones Estimation for ...downloads.hindawi.com/journals/stni/2016/8549498.pdfEnvironment radioactive releases: 10% of nuclear reactor core volatile

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 5

Table 1 IAEA dosimetric criteria for emergency planning zones [6]

Zone Actions taken based on plantconditions to prevent the following Dosimetric quantity Dose criteria Exposure pathway

Inhalation Cloud shine Ground shine

PAZ Severe deterministic effects ADredmarrow 1 Gy X X XADfetusinh 1 Gy X

UPZ Stochastic effects 119864inh 100mSv X119867fetusinh 100mSv X

Table 2 Environment radioactive releases

Group Radioactivity releases (Bq)Noble gases (Xe Kr) 213 times 1018Iodine 217 times 1018Cesium 146 times 1017Tellurium 589 times 1017

the environment within 10 hours as given in Table 2 Theseenvironmental radioactive releases are maximum expectedactivity in case of accident that severely damages the fuelThe environmental releases of noble gases and iodine groupsare nearly in the same order that is 213 times 1018 Bq and217 times 1018 Bq respectively Cesium and tellurium grouprsquosenvironmental releases are lower than noble gases and iodinegroups with 146 times 1017 Bq and 589 times 1017 Bq respectivelyThe radioactive releases of 131I and 137Cs have been givenin Table 3 along with Fukushima Accident releases and oneof the recent studies for comparison It is evident fromTable 3 that environmental releases in current study coverboth scenarios Since current study covers the FukushimaAccident scenario therefore the analysis may be consideredas multiunit studies However it may be pointed out herethat the current analysis would be refined after completionof Probabilistic Safety Assessment Level-2 studyTherefore itmay be deduced that the environmental radioactive releasesconsidered in this study provide the sound theoretical andpractical bases for the estimation of emergency planningzones as they cover the most expected scenario of severeaccident as well as multiunit Fukushima Accident

Figure 2 shows the time dependent release rate of 131Iand 137Cs two most important radionuclides in radiologicalconsequences which depicts the accident progression asreactor core passes through different phases that is claddingfailure core melt phase and post-vessel melt-through phase[5 32] It is seen that 131I and 137Cs release rate to the envi-ronment at the start of release is about 446 times 1014 Bq15minand 533 times 1013 Bq15min respectively which increases asaccident progresses and attains the maximum value of 102 times1016 Bq15min and 126 times 1016 Bq15min at about 38 hoursAfter about 38 hours both 131I and 137Cs show decreasingtrend as post-vessel melt-through phase has completed It isalso evident from Figure 2 that 131I decreases more rapidlythan 137Cs after about 38 hours because 131I has muchshorted half-life as compared to 137Cs Also the total releasedquantity of 131I is 31 times 1017 Bq which is greater than 137Cs

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Time (hour)

120E + 16

100E + 16

800E + 15

600E + 15

400E + 15

200E + 15

000E + 00

131I137Cs

Bq15min

Figure 2 Time dependent 131I and 137Cs release rate

0123456789

10

0 05 1 15 2 25 3 35

RBE

abso

rbed

dos

e to

red

mar

row

(Sv)

Distance (km)

IAEA PAZ dosimetery limit

Figure 3 RBE weighted absorbed dose to red marrow from cloudshine inhalation and ground shine

by the order of about 10 times that is 37 times 1016 It isobserved that specific activity of 131I is greater than 137Csand ingrowth of 131I is through decay of 131Te Finally at theend of simulation that is 10 hours the release rate of 131Iand 137Cs resides around 709 times 1015 Bq15min and 936 times1014 Bq15min respectively

The acute red bone marrow dose profile is shown inFigure 3 solid curve Acute red bone marrow dose rapidlydecreases along the path as plume moves away from thesource It is evident from the profile that IAEA dosimetric

6 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

Table 3 Estimates of radioactive releases of different studies

Cases 131I (Bq) 137Cs (Bq)K-2K-3 NPPs study 31 times 1017 37 times 1016Fukushima Accident [8] 11 times 1017ndash21 times 1017 11 times 1016ndash21 times 1016SSK 2014 study [8] 31 times 1017 29 times 1016

0123456789

10

0 5 10 15 20

Thyr

oid

com

mitt

ed d

ose e

quiv

alen

t (Sv

)

Distance (km)

House shelter + ITBHouse shelterIAEA PAZ dosimetery limit

Figure 4 Thyroid committed dose equivalent to fetus from inhala-tion

criterion of 1 Sv is projected to be exceeded to about adistance of 12 km which is in good agreement with IAEAStudy [6] It should be pointed out here that RASCAL 42always calculates dose from ground shine pathway for 04days Therefore sheltering could be used as protective actionfor longer period if required as radiological doses throughground shine pathway do not result in substantial increase inacute dose to red bone marrow Ground shine dose dependson deposition (dry and wet) of radionuclides In RASCAL42 dry deposition is realistically modeled as dry depositionvelocity change with changingmeteorological conditions andsurface instead of fixed velocity Radiological doses throughground shine pathway may be increased if wet deposition(rain and snow) is considered However the probability ofrain is very low while the probability of snow is extremelylow in this region [27]Therefore the effect of wet depositionmay be ignored as highly unlikely scenarios would reduce thenumber of protective measures

Thyroid committed dose equivalent from inhalation pro-file has been shown in Figure 4 It shows that if ITB agentis taken before inhalation the IAEA criterion is projected tobe exceeded to about 3 km if pregnant woman is shelteringin a house However if ITB agent is not taken then thecriterion is projected to be exceeded to about a distance of14 km if pregnant woman is sheltering in a houseThe thyroidcommitted dose equivalent to fetus from inhalation is in wellagreement with IAEA Study [6] if pregnant woman takes ITBagent before inhalation and is sheltering in a house Howeverthyroid committed dose equivalent to fetus from inhalationfalls nearly half-way with IAEA Study [6] if pregnant woman

000005010015020025030035040045050

0 10 20 30 40

Inha

latio

n co

mm

itted

effec

tive d

ose (

Sv)

Distance (km)

Without shelteringWith shelteringIAEA UPZ dosimetery limit

Figure 5 Effective dose from inhalation

does not take ITB agent before inhalation and shelteringin a house This comparison shows that the atmospherictransport diffusion and deposition characteristics of currentstudy area are better than the area considered in IAEA StudyIt should be highlighted here that RASCAL 42 gives morerealistic results in contrast to straight-line Gaussian plumemodels as itmodifies thewind field to account for topographyand hence realistic radionuclide concentration It is suggestedthat to prevent the severe deterministic effects of a severerelease the area within about 3 km of the K-2K-3 NPPsshould be evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agenttaken before a release to about a distance of 14 kmThereforeGaussian puff model not only gives more realistic resultsbut also increases protective actions effectiveness as well asmaking them more cost effective

The effective dose from inhalation profile is shown inFigure 5 IAEA dosimetric criterion of 100mSv of effectivedose is projected to be exceeded from inhalation to about8 km for an individual sheltering in a house and about 11 kmwithout sheltering The thyroid committed dose equivalentfrom inhalation profile is shown in Figure 6 with solid curveIt shows that if an ITB agent is taken before or shortly after theinhalation the criterion of 100mSv to the fetus is projected tobe exceeded to about 14 km for a pregnant woman shelteringin a house Therefore it is inferred that in order to avoidor minimize stochastic effects for a severe release the areawithin about 8 km of K-2K-3 NPPs should be evacuated

It is emphasized here that emergency planning zonesshould be based on realistic analysis because highly unlikelyscenarios would reduce the number of protective mea-sures and hence be not favorable of meeting the intended

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 7

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80Thyr

oid

com

mitt

ed d

ose e

quiv

alen

t (Sv

)

Distance (km)

IAEA UPZ dosimetery limit

Figure 6Thyroid committed dose equivalent from inhalation aftertaking ITB and sheltering

objectives Therefore current study recommends 3 km and8 km as PAZ and UPZ respectively for K-2K-3 NPPs Therecommended PAZ and UPZ are in well agreement withIAEA guidelines [6] which suggest that the size of PAZ andUPZ could be established based on site specific analysisprovided that the boundary would not be more than a factorof two less than or greater than the recommended range thatis 3ndash5 km for PAZ and 15ndash30 km for UPZ

5 Conclusion

The current study presents the application of Gaussian puffmodel using onsite and regional data related to meteo-rology topography and land-use along with latest IAEAPost-Fukushima Guidelines for the estimation of emergencyplanning zones (PAZ and UPZ) around K-2K-3 NPPs Theenvironmental radioactive releases specifically 131I (31 times1017 Bq) and 137Cs (37 times 1016 Bq) provide the sound theo-retical and practical bases for the estimation of emergencyplanning zones as they cover the most expected scenarioof severe accident that is 10 of nuclear reactor corevolatile radioactive material as well as most recent multiunitFukushima Accident Also sheltering could be used as pro-tective action for longer period of about 04 days if requiredFurther to prevent the severe deterministic effects of a severerelease the area within about 3 km of K-2K-3 NPPs shouldbe evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agent should betaken before a release to about a distance of 14 km Moreoverstochastic effects of severe release of radioactive materialmay be avoided or minimized by evacuating the area withinabout 8 km of K-2K-3 NPPs site Protective actions maybecome more effective and cost beneficial by using currentmethodology as Gaussian puff model realistically representsatmospheric transport and dispersion process in contrast tostraight-lineGaussian plumemodelTherefore it is suggestedthat 3 km and 8 km around K-2K-3 NPPs may be designatedas PAZ and UPZ respectively which are in well agreement ofIAEA Post-Fukushima Guidelines

Nomenclature

120594(119909 119910 119911) Concentration (Cim3 or gm3)119876 Amount of material released (Ci or g)120590119909 120590119910 120590119911 Dispersion parameters (m)1199090 1199100 1199110 Center of the puff1198761015840 Material release rate (Cisec or gsec)119865119910 119865119911 Lateral and vertical exponential terms119906 Wind speed (msec)ACP Advance Chinese PWRADfetusinh Absorbed dose to fetus through inhalationADredmarrow Absorbed dose to red marrowCALMET California meteorologyDCFs Dose conversion factors119864inh Effective dose through inhalationEPR Emergency preparedness and responseEPZs Emergency planning zonesESRI Environmental Systems Research InstituteGPMs Gaussian plume modelsGTOPO30 Global 30 Arc-Second Elevation dataset119867fetusinh Equivalent dose to fetus through

inhalationIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyICRP International Commission on

Radiological ProtectionITB Iodine thyroid blockingK-2 Karachi-2K-3 Karachi-3Kr KryptonLULC Land-use land-coverMPWD Most probable wind directionMPWDS Most probable wind direction shiftMWdMT Megawatt-day per tonNPPs Nuclear power plantsPAZ Precautionary action zonePWR Pressurized water reactorRASCAL Radiological Assessment System of

Consequence AnalysisRBE Relative biological effectivenessRIMPUFF Risoslash model puffRODOS Real-time online decision support systemSSK StrahlenschutzkommissionTERREL Terrain elevationTMI Three Mile IslandUSNRC United States Nuclear Regulatory

CommissionUPZ Urgent protective action planning zoneXe Xenon

Competing Interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests

References

[1] IAEA The Fukushima Daiichi Accident Report by the DirectorGeneral International Atomic Energy Commission IAEA2015

8 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

[2] ldquoSources Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiationrdquo UnitedNations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radia-tion Vol 1 Annex A 2013

[3] T J Bander ldquoPAVAN an atmospheric dispersion programfor evaluating design-basis accidental releases of radioactivematerials fromnuclear power stationsrdquo Tech RepNUREGCR-2858 Division of Systems Integration Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashingtonDC USA 1982

[4] T Haste J Birchley E Cazzoli and J Vitazkova ldquoMEL-CORMACCS simulation of the TMI-2 severe accident andinitial recovery phases off-site fission product release andconsequencesrdquoNuclear Engineering and Design vol 236 no 10pp 1099ndash1112 2006

[5] J V Ramsdell Jr G F Athey S A McGuire and L KBrandon Rascal 4 Description of Models and Methods 20555-0001 NUREG-1940 Office of Nuclear Security and IncidentResponse US Nuclear Regulatory Commission WashingtonDC USA 2012

[6] IAEAActions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to SevereConditions at a Light Water Reactor International AtomicEnergy Commission IAEA Vienna Austria 2013

[7] H E Collins B K Grimes and F Galpin ldquoPlanning basisfor the development of state and local government radiologicalemergency response plans in support of light water nuclearpower plantsrdquo Tech Rep NUREG-0396 US Nuclear Regula-tory Commission 1978

[8] Planning Areas for Emergency Response Near Nuclear PowerPlants Recommendation by the German Commission on Radi-ological Protection Strahlenschutzkommission Geschaftsstelleder Strahlenschutzkommission Bonn Germany 2014

[9] CNSC ldquoStudy of consequences of a hypothetical severe nuclearaccident and effectiveness of mitigation measuresrdquo PWGSCCatalogue CC172-1192015E-PDF Canadian Nuclear SafetyCommission (CNSC) 2015

[10] B H Ha J Y Oh and S J Oh Examination of the EmergencyPlanning Zone (EPZ) Using Level 3 Psa Approach with Maccs2Transactions of the Korean Nuclear Society Autumn MeetingGyeongju Gyeongju Korea 2013

[11] H Ting Q Jingyuan L Hong and C Jianzhu ldquoPreliminaryStudy on plume emergency planning zone for AP1000rdquo AtomicEnergy Science and Technology vol 45 no 12 pp 1472ndash14772011

[12] H-Y Luo J-H Wang W-H Li and J-R Guo ldquoEvaluationof emergency planning zone for EPR nuclear power unit inTSNPPrdquo Nuclear Power Engineering vol 31 no 6 pp 117ndash1222010

[13] J Wu Y-M Yang I-J Chen H-T Chen and K-S ChuangldquoReevaluation of the emergency planning zone for nuclearpower plants in Taiwan using MACCS2 coderdquo Applied Radia-tion and Isotopes vol 64 no 4 pp 448ndash454 2006

[14] I-Y Jeon J K Lee and J Ki ldquoEvaluation of the size ofemergency planning zone for the korean standard nuclearpower plantsrdquo Journal of the Korean Association for RadiationProtection vol 28 no 3 pp 215ndash223 2003

[15] L-C Kung C-I Jane H-Y Hao and C-Y Ching PreliminaryStudy of the Emergency Planning Zone Evaluation for the NuclearPower Plant in Taiwan by Using Maccs2 Code vol 1 JapanHealth Physics Society Tokyo Japan 2000

[16] K A Solomon and W E Kastenberg ldquoEstimating emergencyplanning zones for the Shoreham nuclear reactor a review of

four safety analysesrdquo Journal of HazardousMaterials vol 18 no3 pp 269ndash284 1988

[17] R Chang J Schaperow T Ghosh J Barr C Tinkler and MStutzke State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (Soarca)Report NUREG-1935 Office of Nuclear Regulatory ResearchUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[18] Severe Accident Risks An Assessment for Five US Nuclear PowerPlants Vol 1 NUREG-1150 Division of Systems ResearchOffice of Nuclear Regulatory Research US Nuclear RegulatoryCommission Washington DC USA 1990

[19] M L Abbott L C Cadwallader and D A Petti ldquoRadiologicaldose calculations for fusion facilitiesrdquo Tech Rep INEELEXT-03-00405 Idaho National Engineering and EnvironmentalLaboratory Idaho Falls Idaho USA 2003

[20] A S Aliyu A T Ramli and M A Saleh ldquoAssessment ofpotential human health and environmental impacts of a nuclearpower plant (NPP) based on atmospheric dispersionmodelingrdquoAtmosfera vol 28 no 1 pp 13ndash26 2015

[21] M Hussain S U-D Khan W A A Syed and S U-D KhanldquoEstimation of intervention distances for urgent protectiveactions using comparative approach of MACCS and InterRASrdquoScience and Technology of Nuclear Installations vol 2014 ArticleID 874134 5 pages 2014

[22] Ministry for the Environment ldquoGood practice guide foratmospheric dispersion modellingrdquo ME 522 Ministry for theEnvironment Wellington New Zealand 2004

[23] T Mikkelsen Description of the Risoslash Puff Diffusion ModelRisoslash National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy TechnicalUniversity of Denmark Lyngby Denmark 1982

[24] ldquoThe Rodos System Version PV60rdquo ForschungszentrumKarlsruhe GmbH Institut fur Kern-und Energietechnik(IKET) Hermann-von-Helmholtz-Platz 1 76344 Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen Germany 2005

[25] G F Athey L K Brandon and J V Ramsdell Jr Rascal 42Workbook Office of Nuclear Security and Incident ResponseUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[26] R L Iman and W J Conover Sensitivity Analysis TechniquesSelf-Teaching Curriculum Sandia National Laboratories Albu-querque NM USA 1982

[27] Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Environmental ImpactAssessment K-2K-3 Project Pakistan Atomic Energy Commis-sion Islamabad Pakistan 2015

[28] J Kubanyi R B Lavin D Serbanescu B Toth and HWilkeningRisk Informed Support of DecisionMaking inNuclearPower Plant Emergency Zoning European Commission DGJoint Research Centre Institute for Energy 2008

[29] K V Mardia and P E Jupp Directional Statistics JohnWiley ampSons 2000

[30] Calpuff Modeling System Version 6 User Instructions ExponentEngineering and Scientific Consulting California Calif USA2011

[31] ldquoBackground and Derivation of ans-54 standard fission prod-uct release modelrdquo Division of Systems Integration Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation NUREGCR-2507 US NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington DC USA 1982

[32] L Soffer S B Burson C M Ferrell R Y Lee and J N RidgelyldquoAccident source terms for light-water nuclear power plantsrdquoDivision of Systems Technology Office of Nuclear RegulatoryResearch NUREG-1465 US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington DC USA 1995

TribologyAdvances in

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

International Journal of

AerospaceEngineeringHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

FuelsJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal ofPetroleum Engineering

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Industrial EngineeringJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Power ElectronicsHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Advances in

CombustionJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Renewable Energy

Submit your manuscripts athttpwwwhindawicom

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

StructuresJournal of

International Journal of

RotatingMachinery

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Hindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom

Journal ofEngineeringVolume 2014

Hindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

International Journal ofPhotoenergy

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Nuclear InstallationsScience and Technology of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Solar EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Wind EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Nuclear EnergyInternational Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

High Energy PhysicsAdvances in

The Scientific World JournalHindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Page 6: Research Article Emergency Planning Zones Estimation for ...downloads.hindawi.com/journals/stni/2016/8549498.pdfEnvironment radioactive releases: 10% of nuclear reactor core volatile

6 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

Table 3 Estimates of radioactive releases of different studies

Cases 131I (Bq) 137Cs (Bq)K-2K-3 NPPs study 31 times 1017 37 times 1016Fukushima Accident [8] 11 times 1017ndash21 times 1017 11 times 1016ndash21 times 1016SSK 2014 study [8] 31 times 1017 29 times 1016

0123456789

10

0 5 10 15 20

Thyr

oid

com

mitt

ed d

ose e

quiv

alen

t (Sv

)

Distance (km)

House shelter + ITBHouse shelterIAEA PAZ dosimetery limit

Figure 4 Thyroid committed dose equivalent to fetus from inhala-tion

criterion of 1 Sv is projected to be exceeded to about adistance of 12 km which is in good agreement with IAEAStudy [6] It should be pointed out here that RASCAL 42always calculates dose from ground shine pathway for 04days Therefore sheltering could be used as protective actionfor longer period if required as radiological doses throughground shine pathway do not result in substantial increase inacute dose to red bone marrow Ground shine dose dependson deposition (dry and wet) of radionuclides In RASCAL42 dry deposition is realistically modeled as dry depositionvelocity change with changingmeteorological conditions andsurface instead of fixed velocity Radiological doses throughground shine pathway may be increased if wet deposition(rain and snow) is considered However the probability ofrain is very low while the probability of snow is extremelylow in this region [27]Therefore the effect of wet depositionmay be ignored as highly unlikely scenarios would reduce thenumber of protective measures

Thyroid committed dose equivalent from inhalation pro-file has been shown in Figure 4 It shows that if ITB agentis taken before inhalation the IAEA criterion is projected tobe exceeded to about 3 km if pregnant woman is shelteringin a house However if ITB agent is not taken then thecriterion is projected to be exceeded to about a distance of14 km if pregnant woman is sheltering in a houseThe thyroidcommitted dose equivalent to fetus from inhalation is in wellagreement with IAEA Study [6] if pregnant woman takes ITBagent before inhalation and is sheltering in a house Howeverthyroid committed dose equivalent to fetus from inhalationfalls nearly half-way with IAEA Study [6] if pregnant woman

000005010015020025030035040045050

0 10 20 30 40

Inha

latio

n co

mm

itted

effec

tive d

ose (

Sv)

Distance (km)

Without shelteringWith shelteringIAEA UPZ dosimetery limit

Figure 5 Effective dose from inhalation

does not take ITB agent before inhalation and shelteringin a house This comparison shows that the atmospherictransport diffusion and deposition characteristics of currentstudy area are better than the area considered in IAEA StudyIt should be highlighted here that RASCAL 42 gives morerealistic results in contrast to straight-line Gaussian plumemodels as itmodifies thewind field to account for topographyand hence realistic radionuclide concentration It is suggestedthat to prevent the severe deterministic effects of a severerelease the area within about 3 km of the K-2K-3 NPPsshould be evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agenttaken before a release to about a distance of 14 kmThereforeGaussian puff model not only gives more realistic resultsbut also increases protective actions effectiveness as well asmaking them more cost effective

The effective dose from inhalation profile is shown inFigure 5 IAEA dosimetric criterion of 100mSv of effectivedose is projected to be exceeded from inhalation to about8 km for an individual sheltering in a house and about 11 kmwithout sheltering The thyroid committed dose equivalentfrom inhalation profile is shown in Figure 6 with solid curveIt shows that if an ITB agent is taken before or shortly after theinhalation the criterion of 100mSv to the fetus is projected tobe exceeded to about 14 km for a pregnant woman shelteringin a house Therefore it is inferred that in order to avoidor minimize stochastic effects for a severe release the areawithin about 8 km of K-2K-3 NPPs should be evacuated

It is emphasized here that emergency planning zonesshould be based on realistic analysis because highly unlikelyscenarios would reduce the number of protective mea-sures and hence be not favorable of meeting the intended

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 7

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80Thyr

oid

com

mitt

ed d

ose e

quiv

alen

t (Sv

)

Distance (km)

IAEA UPZ dosimetery limit

Figure 6Thyroid committed dose equivalent from inhalation aftertaking ITB and sheltering

objectives Therefore current study recommends 3 km and8 km as PAZ and UPZ respectively for K-2K-3 NPPs Therecommended PAZ and UPZ are in well agreement withIAEA guidelines [6] which suggest that the size of PAZ andUPZ could be established based on site specific analysisprovided that the boundary would not be more than a factorof two less than or greater than the recommended range thatis 3ndash5 km for PAZ and 15ndash30 km for UPZ

5 Conclusion

The current study presents the application of Gaussian puffmodel using onsite and regional data related to meteo-rology topography and land-use along with latest IAEAPost-Fukushima Guidelines for the estimation of emergencyplanning zones (PAZ and UPZ) around K-2K-3 NPPs Theenvironmental radioactive releases specifically 131I (31 times1017 Bq) and 137Cs (37 times 1016 Bq) provide the sound theo-retical and practical bases for the estimation of emergencyplanning zones as they cover the most expected scenarioof severe accident that is 10 of nuclear reactor corevolatile radioactive material as well as most recent multiunitFukushima Accident Also sheltering could be used as pro-tective action for longer period of about 04 days if requiredFurther to prevent the severe deterministic effects of a severerelease the area within about 3 km of K-2K-3 NPPs shouldbe evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agent should betaken before a release to about a distance of 14 km Moreoverstochastic effects of severe release of radioactive materialmay be avoided or minimized by evacuating the area withinabout 8 km of K-2K-3 NPPs site Protective actions maybecome more effective and cost beneficial by using currentmethodology as Gaussian puff model realistically representsatmospheric transport and dispersion process in contrast tostraight-lineGaussian plumemodelTherefore it is suggestedthat 3 km and 8 km around K-2K-3 NPPs may be designatedas PAZ and UPZ respectively which are in well agreement ofIAEA Post-Fukushima Guidelines

Nomenclature

120594(119909 119910 119911) Concentration (Cim3 or gm3)119876 Amount of material released (Ci or g)120590119909 120590119910 120590119911 Dispersion parameters (m)1199090 1199100 1199110 Center of the puff1198761015840 Material release rate (Cisec or gsec)119865119910 119865119911 Lateral and vertical exponential terms119906 Wind speed (msec)ACP Advance Chinese PWRADfetusinh Absorbed dose to fetus through inhalationADredmarrow Absorbed dose to red marrowCALMET California meteorologyDCFs Dose conversion factors119864inh Effective dose through inhalationEPR Emergency preparedness and responseEPZs Emergency planning zonesESRI Environmental Systems Research InstituteGPMs Gaussian plume modelsGTOPO30 Global 30 Arc-Second Elevation dataset119867fetusinh Equivalent dose to fetus through

inhalationIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyICRP International Commission on

Radiological ProtectionITB Iodine thyroid blockingK-2 Karachi-2K-3 Karachi-3Kr KryptonLULC Land-use land-coverMPWD Most probable wind directionMPWDS Most probable wind direction shiftMWdMT Megawatt-day per tonNPPs Nuclear power plantsPAZ Precautionary action zonePWR Pressurized water reactorRASCAL Radiological Assessment System of

Consequence AnalysisRBE Relative biological effectivenessRIMPUFF Risoslash model puffRODOS Real-time online decision support systemSSK StrahlenschutzkommissionTERREL Terrain elevationTMI Three Mile IslandUSNRC United States Nuclear Regulatory

CommissionUPZ Urgent protective action planning zoneXe Xenon

Competing Interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests

References

[1] IAEA The Fukushima Daiichi Accident Report by the DirectorGeneral International Atomic Energy Commission IAEA2015

8 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

[2] ldquoSources Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiationrdquo UnitedNations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radia-tion Vol 1 Annex A 2013

[3] T J Bander ldquoPAVAN an atmospheric dispersion programfor evaluating design-basis accidental releases of radioactivematerials fromnuclear power stationsrdquo Tech RepNUREGCR-2858 Division of Systems Integration Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashingtonDC USA 1982

[4] T Haste J Birchley E Cazzoli and J Vitazkova ldquoMEL-CORMACCS simulation of the TMI-2 severe accident andinitial recovery phases off-site fission product release andconsequencesrdquoNuclear Engineering and Design vol 236 no 10pp 1099ndash1112 2006

[5] J V Ramsdell Jr G F Athey S A McGuire and L KBrandon Rascal 4 Description of Models and Methods 20555-0001 NUREG-1940 Office of Nuclear Security and IncidentResponse US Nuclear Regulatory Commission WashingtonDC USA 2012

[6] IAEAActions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to SevereConditions at a Light Water Reactor International AtomicEnergy Commission IAEA Vienna Austria 2013

[7] H E Collins B K Grimes and F Galpin ldquoPlanning basisfor the development of state and local government radiologicalemergency response plans in support of light water nuclearpower plantsrdquo Tech Rep NUREG-0396 US Nuclear Regula-tory Commission 1978

[8] Planning Areas for Emergency Response Near Nuclear PowerPlants Recommendation by the German Commission on Radi-ological Protection Strahlenschutzkommission Geschaftsstelleder Strahlenschutzkommission Bonn Germany 2014

[9] CNSC ldquoStudy of consequences of a hypothetical severe nuclearaccident and effectiveness of mitigation measuresrdquo PWGSCCatalogue CC172-1192015E-PDF Canadian Nuclear SafetyCommission (CNSC) 2015

[10] B H Ha J Y Oh and S J Oh Examination of the EmergencyPlanning Zone (EPZ) Using Level 3 Psa Approach with Maccs2Transactions of the Korean Nuclear Society Autumn MeetingGyeongju Gyeongju Korea 2013

[11] H Ting Q Jingyuan L Hong and C Jianzhu ldquoPreliminaryStudy on plume emergency planning zone for AP1000rdquo AtomicEnergy Science and Technology vol 45 no 12 pp 1472ndash14772011

[12] H-Y Luo J-H Wang W-H Li and J-R Guo ldquoEvaluationof emergency planning zone for EPR nuclear power unit inTSNPPrdquo Nuclear Power Engineering vol 31 no 6 pp 117ndash1222010

[13] J Wu Y-M Yang I-J Chen H-T Chen and K-S ChuangldquoReevaluation of the emergency planning zone for nuclearpower plants in Taiwan using MACCS2 coderdquo Applied Radia-tion and Isotopes vol 64 no 4 pp 448ndash454 2006

[14] I-Y Jeon J K Lee and J Ki ldquoEvaluation of the size ofemergency planning zone for the korean standard nuclearpower plantsrdquo Journal of the Korean Association for RadiationProtection vol 28 no 3 pp 215ndash223 2003

[15] L-C Kung C-I Jane H-Y Hao and C-Y Ching PreliminaryStudy of the Emergency Planning Zone Evaluation for the NuclearPower Plant in Taiwan by Using Maccs2 Code vol 1 JapanHealth Physics Society Tokyo Japan 2000

[16] K A Solomon and W E Kastenberg ldquoEstimating emergencyplanning zones for the Shoreham nuclear reactor a review of

four safety analysesrdquo Journal of HazardousMaterials vol 18 no3 pp 269ndash284 1988

[17] R Chang J Schaperow T Ghosh J Barr C Tinkler and MStutzke State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (Soarca)Report NUREG-1935 Office of Nuclear Regulatory ResearchUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[18] Severe Accident Risks An Assessment for Five US Nuclear PowerPlants Vol 1 NUREG-1150 Division of Systems ResearchOffice of Nuclear Regulatory Research US Nuclear RegulatoryCommission Washington DC USA 1990

[19] M L Abbott L C Cadwallader and D A Petti ldquoRadiologicaldose calculations for fusion facilitiesrdquo Tech Rep INEELEXT-03-00405 Idaho National Engineering and EnvironmentalLaboratory Idaho Falls Idaho USA 2003

[20] A S Aliyu A T Ramli and M A Saleh ldquoAssessment ofpotential human health and environmental impacts of a nuclearpower plant (NPP) based on atmospheric dispersionmodelingrdquoAtmosfera vol 28 no 1 pp 13ndash26 2015

[21] M Hussain S U-D Khan W A A Syed and S U-D KhanldquoEstimation of intervention distances for urgent protectiveactions using comparative approach of MACCS and InterRASrdquoScience and Technology of Nuclear Installations vol 2014 ArticleID 874134 5 pages 2014

[22] Ministry for the Environment ldquoGood practice guide foratmospheric dispersion modellingrdquo ME 522 Ministry for theEnvironment Wellington New Zealand 2004

[23] T Mikkelsen Description of the Risoslash Puff Diffusion ModelRisoslash National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy TechnicalUniversity of Denmark Lyngby Denmark 1982

[24] ldquoThe Rodos System Version PV60rdquo ForschungszentrumKarlsruhe GmbH Institut fur Kern-und Energietechnik(IKET) Hermann-von-Helmholtz-Platz 1 76344 Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen Germany 2005

[25] G F Athey L K Brandon and J V Ramsdell Jr Rascal 42Workbook Office of Nuclear Security and Incident ResponseUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[26] R L Iman and W J Conover Sensitivity Analysis TechniquesSelf-Teaching Curriculum Sandia National Laboratories Albu-querque NM USA 1982

[27] Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Environmental ImpactAssessment K-2K-3 Project Pakistan Atomic Energy Commis-sion Islamabad Pakistan 2015

[28] J Kubanyi R B Lavin D Serbanescu B Toth and HWilkeningRisk Informed Support of DecisionMaking inNuclearPower Plant Emergency Zoning European Commission DGJoint Research Centre Institute for Energy 2008

[29] K V Mardia and P E Jupp Directional Statistics JohnWiley ampSons 2000

[30] Calpuff Modeling System Version 6 User Instructions ExponentEngineering and Scientific Consulting California Calif USA2011

[31] ldquoBackground and Derivation of ans-54 standard fission prod-uct release modelrdquo Division of Systems Integration Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation NUREGCR-2507 US NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington DC USA 1982

[32] L Soffer S B Burson C M Ferrell R Y Lee and J N RidgelyldquoAccident source terms for light-water nuclear power plantsrdquoDivision of Systems Technology Office of Nuclear RegulatoryResearch NUREG-1465 US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington DC USA 1995

TribologyAdvances in

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

International Journal of

AerospaceEngineeringHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

FuelsJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal ofPetroleum Engineering

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Industrial EngineeringJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Power ElectronicsHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Advances in

CombustionJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Renewable Energy

Submit your manuscripts athttpwwwhindawicom

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

StructuresJournal of

International Journal of

RotatingMachinery

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Hindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom

Journal ofEngineeringVolume 2014

Hindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

International Journal ofPhotoenergy

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Nuclear InstallationsScience and Technology of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Solar EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Wind EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Nuclear EnergyInternational Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

High Energy PhysicsAdvances in

The Scientific World JournalHindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Page 7: Research Article Emergency Planning Zones Estimation for ...downloads.hindawi.com/journals/stni/2016/8549498.pdfEnvironment radioactive releases: 10% of nuclear reactor core volatile

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 7

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80Thyr

oid

com

mitt

ed d

ose e

quiv

alen

t (Sv

)

Distance (km)

IAEA UPZ dosimetery limit

Figure 6Thyroid committed dose equivalent from inhalation aftertaking ITB and sheltering

objectives Therefore current study recommends 3 km and8 km as PAZ and UPZ respectively for K-2K-3 NPPs Therecommended PAZ and UPZ are in well agreement withIAEA guidelines [6] which suggest that the size of PAZ andUPZ could be established based on site specific analysisprovided that the boundary would not be more than a factorof two less than or greater than the recommended range thatis 3ndash5 km for PAZ and 15ndash30 km for UPZ

5 Conclusion

The current study presents the application of Gaussian puffmodel using onsite and regional data related to meteo-rology topography and land-use along with latest IAEAPost-Fukushima Guidelines for the estimation of emergencyplanning zones (PAZ and UPZ) around K-2K-3 NPPs Theenvironmental radioactive releases specifically 131I (31 times1017 Bq) and 137Cs (37 times 1016 Bq) provide the sound theo-retical and practical bases for the estimation of emergencyplanning zones as they cover the most expected scenarioof severe accident that is 10 of nuclear reactor corevolatile radioactive material as well as most recent multiunitFukushima Accident Also sheltering could be used as pro-tective action for longer period of about 04 days if requiredFurther to prevent the severe deterministic effects of a severerelease the area within about 3 km of K-2K-3 NPPs shouldbe evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agent should betaken before a release to about a distance of 14 km Moreoverstochastic effects of severe release of radioactive materialmay be avoided or minimized by evacuating the area withinabout 8 km of K-2K-3 NPPs site Protective actions maybecome more effective and cost beneficial by using currentmethodology as Gaussian puff model realistically representsatmospheric transport and dispersion process in contrast tostraight-lineGaussian plumemodelTherefore it is suggestedthat 3 km and 8 km around K-2K-3 NPPs may be designatedas PAZ and UPZ respectively which are in well agreement ofIAEA Post-Fukushima Guidelines

Nomenclature

120594(119909 119910 119911) Concentration (Cim3 or gm3)119876 Amount of material released (Ci or g)120590119909 120590119910 120590119911 Dispersion parameters (m)1199090 1199100 1199110 Center of the puff1198761015840 Material release rate (Cisec or gsec)119865119910 119865119911 Lateral and vertical exponential terms119906 Wind speed (msec)ACP Advance Chinese PWRADfetusinh Absorbed dose to fetus through inhalationADredmarrow Absorbed dose to red marrowCALMET California meteorologyDCFs Dose conversion factors119864inh Effective dose through inhalationEPR Emergency preparedness and responseEPZs Emergency planning zonesESRI Environmental Systems Research InstituteGPMs Gaussian plume modelsGTOPO30 Global 30 Arc-Second Elevation dataset119867fetusinh Equivalent dose to fetus through

inhalationIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyICRP International Commission on

Radiological ProtectionITB Iodine thyroid blockingK-2 Karachi-2K-3 Karachi-3Kr KryptonLULC Land-use land-coverMPWD Most probable wind directionMPWDS Most probable wind direction shiftMWdMT Megawatt-day per tonNPPs Nuclear power plantsPAZ Precautionary action zonePWR Pressurized water reactorRASCAL Radiological Assessment System of

Consequence AnalysisRBE Relative biological effectivenessRIMPUFF Risoslash model puffRODOS Real-time online decision support systemSSK StrahlenschutzkommissionTERREL Terrain elevationTMI Three Mile IslandUSNRC United States Nuclear Regulatory

CommissionUPZ Urgent protective action planning zoneXe Xenon

Competing Interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests

References

[1] IAEA The Fukushima Daiichi Accident Report by the DirectorGeneral International Atomic Energy Commission IAEA2015

8 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

[2] ldquoSources Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiationrdquo UnitedNations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radia-tion Vol 1 Annex A 2013

[3] T J Bander ldquoPAVAN an atmospheric dispersion programfor evaluating design-basis accidental releases of radioactivematerials fromnuclear power stationsrdquo Tech RepNUREGCR-2858 Division of Systems Integration Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashingtonDC USA 1982

[4] T Haste J Birchley E Cazzoli and J Vitazkova ldquoMEL-CORMACCS simulation of the TMI-2 severe accident andinitial recovery phases off-site fission product release andconsequencesrdquoNuclear Engineering and Design vol 236 no 10pp 1099ndash1112 2006

[5] J V Ramsdell Jr G F Athey S A McGuire and L KBrandon Rascal 4 Description of Models and Methods 20555-0001 NUREG-1940 Office of Nuclear Security and IncidentResponse US Nuclear Regulatory Commission WashingtonDC USA 2012

[6] IAEAActions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to SevereConditions at a Light Water Reactor International AtomicEnergy Commission IAEA Vienna Austria 2013

[7] H E Collins B K Grimes and F Galpin ldquoPlanning basisfor the development of state and local government radiologicalemergency response plans in support of light water nuclearpower plantsrdquo Tech Rep NUREG-0396 US Nuclear Regula-tory Commission 1978

[8] Planning Areas for Emergency Response Near Nuclear PowerPlants Recommendation by the German Commission on Radi-ological Protection Strahlenschutzkommission Geschaftsstelleder Strahlenschutzkommission Bonn Germany 2014

[9] CNSC ldquoStudy of consequences of a hypothetical severe nuclearaccident and effectiveness of mitigation measuresrdquo PWGSCCatalogue CC172-1192015E-PDF Canadian Nuclear SafetyCommission (CNSC) 2015

[10] B H Ha J Y Oh and S J Oh Examination of the EmergencyPlanning Zone (EPZ) Using Level 3 Psa Approach with Maccs2Transactions of the Korean Nuclear Society Autumn MeetingGyeongju Gyeongju Korea 2013

[11] H Ting Q Jingyuan L Hong and C Jianzhu ldquoPreliminaryStudy on plume emergency planning zone for AP1000rdquo AtomicEnergy Science and Technology vol 45 no 12 pp 1472ndash14772011

[12] H-Y Luo J-H Wang W-H Li and J-R Guo ldquoEvaluationof emergency planning zone for EPR nuclear power unit inTSNPPrdquo Nuclear Power Engineering vol 31 no 6 pp 117ndash1222010

[13] J Wu Y-M Yang I-J Chen H-T Chen and K-S ChuangldquoReevaluation of the emergency planning zone for nuclearpower plants in Taiwan using MACCS2 coderdquo Applied Radia-tion and Isotopes vol 64 no 4 pp 448ndash454 2006

[14] I-Y Jeon J K Lee and J Ki ldquoEvaluation of the size ofemergency planning zone for the korean standard nuclearpower plantsrdquo Journal of the Korean Association for RadiationProtection vol 28 no 3 pp 215ndash223 2003

[15] L-C Kung C-I Jane H-Y Hao and C-Y Ching PreliminaryStudy of the Emergency Planning Zone Evaluation for the NuclearPower Plant in Taiwan by Using Maccs2 Code vol 1 JapanHealth Physics Society Tokyo Japan 2000

[16] K A Solomon and W E Kastenberg ldquoEstimating emergencyplanning zones for the Shoreham nuclear reactor a review of

four safety analysesrdquo Journal of HazardousMaterials vol 18 no3 pp 269ndash284 1988

[17] R Chang J Schaperow T Ghosh J Barr C Tinkler and MStutzke State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (Soarca)Report NUREG-1935 Office of Nuclear Regulatory ResearchUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[18] Severe Accident Risks An Assessment for Five US Nuclear PowerPlants Vol 1 NUREG-1150 Division of Systems ResearchOffice of Nuclear Regulatory Research US Nuclear RegulatoryCommission Washington DC USA 1990

[19] M L Abbott L C Cadwallader and D A Petti ldquoRadiologicaldose calculations for fusion facilitiesrdquo Tech Rep INEELEXT-03-00405 Idaho National Engineering and EnvironmentalLaboratory Idaho Falls Idaho USA 2003

[20] A S Aliyu A T Ramli and M A Saleh ldquoAssessment ofpotential human health and environmental impacts of a nuclearpower plant (NPP) based on atmospheric dispersionmodelingrdquoAtmosfera vol 28 no 1 pp 13ndash26 2015

[21] M Hussain S U-D Khan W A A Syed and S U-D KhanldquoEstimation of intervention distances for urgent protectiveactions using comparative approach of MACCS and InterRASrdquoScience and Technology of Nuclear Installations vol 2014 ArticleID 874134 5 pages 2014

[22] Ministry for the Environment ldquoGood practice guide foratmospheric dispersion modellingrdquo ME 522 Ministry for theEnvironment Wellington New Zealand 2004

[23] T Mikkelsen Description of the Risoslash Puff Diffusion ModelRisoslash National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy TechnicalUniversity of Denmark Lyngby Denmark 1982

[24] ldquoThe Rodos System Version PV60rdquo ForschungszentrumKarlsruhe GmbH Institut fur Kern-und Energietechnik(IKET) Hermann-von-Helmholtz-Platz 1 76344 Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen Germany 2005

[25] G F Athey L K Brandon and J V Ramsdell Jr Rascal 42Workbook Office of Nuclear Security and Incident ResponseUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[26] R L Iman and W J Conover Sensitivity Analysis TechniquesSelf-Teaching Curriculum Sandia National Laboratories Albu-querque NM USA 1982

[27] Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Environmental ImpactAssessment K-2K-3 Project Pakistan Atomic Energy Commis-sion Islamabad Pakistan 2015

[28] J Kubanyi R B Lavin D Serbanescu B Toth and HWilkeningRisk Informed Support of DecisionMaking inNuclearPower Plant Emergency Zoning European Commission DGJoint Research Centre Institute for Energy 2008

[29] K V Mardia and P E Jupp Directional Statistics JohnWiley ampSons 2000

[30] Calpuff Modeling System Version 6 User Instructions ExponentEngineering and Scientific Consulting California Calif USA2011

[31] ldquoBackground and Derivation of ans-54 standard fission prod-uct release modelrdquo Division of Systems Integration Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation NUREGCR-2507 US NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington DC USA 1982

[32] L Soffer S B Burson C M Ferrell R Y Lee and J N RidgelyldquoAccident source terms for light-water nuclear power plantsrdquoDivision of Systems Technology Office of Nuclear RegulatoryResearch NUREG-1465 US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington DC USA 1995

TribologyAdvances in

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

International Journal of

AerospaceEngineeringHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

FuelsJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal ofPetroleum Engineering

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Industrial EngineeringJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Power ElectronicsHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Advances in

CombustionJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Renewable Energy

Submit your manuscripts athttpwwwhindawicom

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

StructuresJournal of

International Journal of

RotatingMachinery

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Hindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom

Journal ofEngineeringVolume 2014

Hindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

International Journal ofPhotoenergy

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Nuclear InstallationsScience and Technology of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Solar EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Wind EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Nuclear EnergyInternational Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

High Energy PhysicsAdvances in

The Scientific World JournalHindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Page 8: Research Article Emergency Planning Zones Estimation for ...downloads.hindawi.com/journals/stni/2016/8549498.pdfEnvironment radioactive releases: 10% of nuclear reactor core volatile

8 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

[2] ldquoSources Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiationrdquo UnitedNations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radia-tion Vol 1 Annex A 2013

[3] T J Bander ldquoPAVAN an atmospheric dispersion programfor evaluating design-basis accidental releases of radioactivematerials fromnuclear power stationsrdquo Tech RepNUREGCR-2858 Division of Systems Integration Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashingtonDC USA 1982

[4] T Haste J Birchley E Cazzoli and J Vitazkova ldquoMEL-CORMACCS simulation of the TMI-2 severe accident andinitial recovery phases off-site fission product release andconsequencesrdquoNuclear Engineering and Design vol 236 no 10pp 1099ndash1112 2006

[5] J V Ramsdell Jr G F Athey S A McGuire and L KBrandon Rascal 4 Description of Models and Methods 20555-0001 NUREG-1940 Office of Nuclear Security and IncidentResponse US Nuclear Regulatory Commission WashingtonDC USA 2012

[6] IAEAActions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to SevereConditions at a Light Water Reactor International AtomicEnergy Commission IAEA Vienna Austria 2013

[7] H E Collins B K Grimes and F Galpin ldquoPlanning basisfor the development of state and local government radiologicalemergency response plans in support of light water nuclearpower plantsrdquo Tech Rep NUREG-0396 US Nuclear Regula-tory Commission 1978

[8] Planning Areas for Emergency Response Near Nuclear PowerPlants Recommendation by the German Commission on Radi-ological Protection Strahlenschutzkommission Geschaftsstelleder Strahlenschutzkommission Bonn Germany 2014

[9] CNSC ldquoStudy of consequences of a hypothetical severe nuclearaccident and effectiveness of mitigation measuresrdquo PWGSCCatalogue CC172-1192015E-PDF Canadian Nuclear SafetyCommission (CNSC) 2015

[10] B H Ha J Y Oh and S J Oh Examination of the EmergencyPlanning Zone (EPZ) Using Level 3 Psa Approach with Maccs2Transactions of the Korean Nuclear Society Autumn MeetingGyeongju Gyeongju Korea 2013

[11] H Ting Q Jingyuan L Hong and C Jianzhu ldquoPreliminaryStudy on plume emergency planning zone for AP1000rdquo AtomicEnergy Science and Technology vol 45 no 12 pp 1472ndash14772011

[12] H-Y Luo J-H Wang W-H Li and J-R Guo ldquoEvaluationof emergency planning zone for EPR nuclear power unit inTSNPPrdquo Nuclear Power Engineering vol 31 no 6 pp 117ndash1222010

[13] J Wu Y-M Yang I-J Chen H-T Chen and K-S ChuangldquoReevaluation of the emergency planning zone for nuclearpower plants in Taiwan using MACCS2 coderdquo Applied Radia-tion and Isotopes vol 64 no 4 pp 448ndash454 2006

[14] I-Y Jeon J K Lee and J Ki ldquoEvaluation of the size ofemergency planning zone for the korean standard nuclearpower plantsrdquo Journal of the Korean Association for RadiationProtection vol 28 no 3 pp 215ndash223 2003

[15] L-C Kung C-I Jane H-Y Hao and C-Y Ching PreliminaryStudy of the Emergency Planning Zone Evaluation for the NuclearPower Plant in Taiwan by Using Maccs2 Code vol 1 JapanHealth Physics Society Tokyo Japan 2000

[16] K A Solomon and W E Kastenberg ldquoEstimating emergencyplanning zones for the Shoreham nuclear reactor a review of

four safety analysesrdquo Journal of HazardousMaterials vol 18 no3 pp 269ndash284 1988

[17] R Chang J Schaperow T Ghosh J Barr C Tinkler and MStutzke State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (Soarca)Report NUREG-1935 Office of Nuclear Regulatory ResearchUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[18] Severe Accident Risks An Assessment for Five US Nuclear PowerPlants Vol 1 NUREG-1150 Division of Systems ResearchOffice of Nuclear Regulatory Research US Nuclear RegulatoryCommission Washington DC USA 1990

[19] M L Abbott L C Cadwallader and D A Petti ldquoRadiologicaldose calculations for fusion facilitiesrdquo Tech Rep INEELEXT-03-00405 Idaho National Engineering and EnvironmentalLaboratory Idaho Falls Idaho USA 2003

[20] A S Aliyu A T Ramli and M A Saleh ldquoAssessment ofpotential human health and environmental impacts of a nuclearpower plant (NPP) based on atmospheric dispersionmodelingrdquoAtmosfera vol 28 no 1 pp 13ndash26 2015

[21] M Hussain S U-D Khan W A A Syed and S U-D KhanldquoEstimation of intervention distances for urgent protectiveactions using comparative approach of MACCS and InterRASrdquoScience and Technology of Nuclear Installations vol 2014 ArticleID 874134 5 pages 2014

[22] Ministry for the Environment ldquoGood practice guide foratmospheric dispersion modellingrdquo ME 522 Ministry for theEnvironment Wellington New Zealand 2004

[23] T Mikkelsen Description of the Risoslash Puff Diffusion ModelRisoslash National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy TechnicalUniversity of Denmark Lyngby Denmark 1982

[24] ldquoThe Rodos System Version PV60rdquo ForschungszentrumKarlsruhe GmbH Institut fur Kern-und Energietechnik(IKET) Hermann-von-Helmholtz-Platz 1 76344 Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen Germany 2005

[25] G F Athey L K Brandon and J V Ramsdell Jr Rascal 42Workbook Office of Nuclear Security and Incident ResponseUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC USA2012

[26] R L Iman and W J Conover Sensitivity Analysis TechniquesSelf-Teaching Curriculum Sandia National Laboratories Albu-querque NM USA 1982

[27] Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Environmental ImpactAssessment K-2K-3 Project Pakistan Atomic Energy Commis-sion Islamabad Pakistan 2015

[28] J Kubanyi R B Lavin D Serbanescu B Toth and HWilkeningRisk Informed Support of DecisionMaking inNuclearPower Plant Emergency Zoning European Commission DGJoint Research Centre Institute for Energy 2008

[29] K V Mardia and P E Jupp Directional Statistics JohnWiley ampSons 2000

[30] Calpuff Modeling System Version 6 User Instructions ExponentEngineering and Scientific Consulting California Calif USA2011

[31] ldquoBackground and Derivation of ans-54 standard fission prod-uct release modelrdquo Division of Systems Integration Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation NUREGCR-2507 US NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington DC USA 1982

[32] L Soffer S B Burson C M Ferrell R Y Lee and J N RidgelyldquoAccident source terms for light-water nuclear power plantsrdquoDivision of Systems Technology Office of Nuclear RegulatoryResearch NUREG-1465 US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington DC USA 1995

TribologyAdvances in

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

International Journal of

AerospaceEngineeringHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

FuelsJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal ofPetroleum Engineering

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Industrial EngineeringJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Power ElectronicsHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Advances in

CombustionJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Renewable Energy

Submit your manuscripts athttpwwwhindawicom

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

StructuresJournal of

International Journal of

RotatingMachinery

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Hindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom

Journal ofEngineeringVolume 2014

Hindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

International Journal ofPhotoenergy

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Nuclear InstallationsScience and Technology of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Solar EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Wind EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Nuclear EnergyInternational Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

High Energy PhysicsAdvances in

The Scientific World JournalHindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Page 9: Research Article Emergency Planning Zones Estimation for ...downloads.hindawi.com/journals/stni/2016/8549498.pdfEnvironment radioactive releases: 10% of nuclear reactor core volatile

TribologyAdvances in

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

International Journal of

AerospaceEngineeringHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

FuelsJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal ofPetroleum Engineering

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Industrial EngineeringJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Power ElectronicsHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Advances in

CombustionJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Renewable Energy

Submit your manuscripts athttpwwwhindawicom

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

StructuresJournal of

International Journal of

RotatingMachinery

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Hindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom

Journal ofEngineeringVolume 2014

Hindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

International Journal ofPhotoenergy

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Nuclear InstallationsScience and Technology of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Solar EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Wind EnergyJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Nuclear EnergyInternational Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

High Energy PhysicsAdvances in

The Scientific World JournalHindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014