rescher, nicholas. unpopular essays on techonological progress

5/26/2018 RESCHER, Nicholas. Unpopular Essays on Techonological Progress

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npopular ss yson echnological rogressicholas Rescherln these essays, Nicholas Rescher examines anumber of controversial social issues using theintellectual tools of the philosopher. Hisanalysis clarifies such complex and troublingquestions as whether technological progressleads to greater happiness, whether we cansolve our environmental problems, whether weshould proceed with costly scientific researchon the frontiers of knowledge. At a t ime whenthere is much muddled thinking about the di-rections our technological society is taking, aclear dissection of each issue into its compo-nent parts is especially valuable. ProfessorRescher is not afraid to face the hard questionsnor to advocate an unpopular point of view.

CONTENTSTechnological Progress and Human

HappinessThe Environmental Crisis and the Quality ofLifeThe Allocation of Exotic Medical LifesavingTherapyEthical Issues Regarding the Delivery ofHealth Care

Ideals, Justice, and CrimeEconomies Versus Moral Philosophy: ThePareto Principle as a Case Study

Why Save Endangered Species?Scientific Progress and the Limits of Growth

(Continued on back f ap


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UNPOPUL R SS YSon echnological rogress


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UNPOPUL R SSon echnological rogressNI HOL S RES HER

niv rsity of ittsburgh ress


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Published by the University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260Copyright 1980, University of Pittsburgh PressAli rights reservedFeffer and Simons, Inc., LondonManufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataRescher, Nicholas.Unpopular essays on technological progress.

Includes index.1. Technology Philosophy. 2. Science-Philosophy. Title.T14.R42 601 .9 79-21648ISBN 0-8229-3411-6

The Environmental Crisisand the Ouality of Life 1974 by the University ofGeorgia Press, is reprinted from Philosophy n Environmental risis ed.William T. Blackstone, by permission of the University of Georgia Press. TheAllocation of Exotic Medical Life Saving Therapy, 1969 bythe University ofChicago, is reprinted from Ethics 29 1969). Ethicallssues Regarding theDelivery of Health Care first appeared in onnecticut Medicine41 1977).EconomiesVersus Moral Philosophy: The Pareto Principle as aCaseStudyfirst appeared in Theory n Decision 10 1979), 169-79, 1979 by D.Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland; reprinted by permission ofD. Reidel Company.


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Preface IX1 Technological Progress and Human Happiness 32 The Environmental Crisis and the Quality of Life 233 The Allocation Exotic MedicalLifesaving Therapy 304 Ethical Issues Regarding the Deliveryof Health Care 455 Ideals Justice and Crime 576 Economies Versus Moral Philosophy:The Pareto Principle as a Case Study 697 Why Save Endangered Species? 798 Scientific Progress and the Limits of Growth 93

Notes 107Name Index 119Subject Index


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ref ce

Notwithstanding their tapical diversity, the essays braught tagetherin this volume share a ommon theme: the impact for humanconcerns of the complexity and scope of modern technologicalprogress and its economic and social ramifications. Most of theseessays 9rew out of invitations to contribute a paper to some sort ofconference or symposium. Despite the professional s predilectionfor shoptalk with colleagues, a philosopher even nowadays findshimself impelled by various pulls and pressures to enter into thenontechnical discussion of timely issues of the day.Some of these essays have appeared before, though in eachcase they have been revised for publication. Chapter 2 is a revisedversion of a paper presented in a symposium, Philosophy andEnvironmental Crisis, at the University of Georgia in Athens in Feb-ruary 1971 and initially published in William T Blackstone, ed., Phi-losophy nd Environmental Crisis Athens, Georgia, 1974 Chap-ter 3 is a revised version of an essay first published in Ethics 9 1969). Chapter 4 has been revised trom a paper read at a confer-ence on Ethical Issues in the Distribution of Health Care at BrownUniversity in April 1975 and subsequently published in ConnecticutMedicine4 1977). Chapter6 isa revised version of paper publishedin heory nd Decision 10 1979). f wish toth nktheeditorsofthesepublications for their kind permission to include this material in thepresent volume.Chapter 1 was prepared as a Phi Beta Kappa Lecture delivered atthe University of Pittsburgh, December 6 1977. Chapter 5 is basedon a paper read in a series of lectures on Justice in America at theUniversity of Vermont in March 1977. Chapter 8 grew out of alecture delivered at the Sixteenth World Congress of Philosophyheld at Dsseldorf in 1978.


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x ref cewant ta thank Virginia Chestek for her able assistance preparingthis material for publication and helping m ta see it throu h thepress


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UNPOPUL R SS YSon echnological rogress


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Technological Progressn Human Happiness 1Ooes increased knowledge of nature, and t ~ h n o l o g i l masteryover it enhance man s happiness and satisfaction, or is what wehonorifically, nay almost reverently, characterize as progress reallyirrelevant to this central issue regarding the human condition? Thisquestion lies at the dead center of any examination of the relationship between technology and humanistic concerns. It goes to thevery heart of the matter: the linkage between man s knowledge andmastery over nature on the one side, and his humane life-world ofthought and feeling on the other. It is a question that theoreticians ofscience and technology generally ignore. But humanists have oftentouched on it- it may be viewed as a key issue in Goethe s aust forexample.

Writing in 1920, the able British historian of progress J. B Burypainted the following picture: The very increase of material easeseemed unavoidably to involve conditions inconsistent with universalhappiness; and the communications which linked the peoples of theworld together modified the methods of warfare instead of bringingpeace [The modern triumphs of the advance of man s aims]hardly seemed to endanger the conclusion that, while knowledge isindefinitely progressive, there is nogoo reason for sanguine hopesthat man is perfectible or that universal happiness is attainable. 1This quote provides an appropriate setting for deliberating aboutthe implications of the impressive mo rn growth in our technological competence for human happiness and the tenor of the condition of man.The istorical imension

Let us look briefly at the historical dimension of this issue. Thequestion of the reality and significance of progress has been de-


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4 UNPOPUL R ESS YSbated since the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns regarding the relative importance of the wisdom of classical antiquityas compared with modern learning was launched the late Renaissance. At the dawn of modern science the seventeenth centurythe leading figures from Bacon to Leibniz ail took a highly optimisticview. Man s knowlege was about to enter a new era and hiscircumstances and conditions of life would become transformed consequence. Consider a typical passage from Leibniz:1believe that one of the biggest reasons for this negligence [ofscience and its applications] is the despair of improving mattersand the very bad opinion entertained of human nature ut would it not be f itting at least to make a trial of our power beforedespairing of success? Do we not see every day new discoveriesnot only in the arts but also in science and in medicine? Whyshould it not be possible to secure some considerable relief fromour troubles? 1shall be tol d t ha t so many ce ntu ri es had workedfruitlessly. 8 ut considering themattermoreclosely wesee thatthemajority of those who dealt with the sciences have simply copiedfrom one another or amused themselves. It is almost a disgrace tonature that so few have trulyworked to make discoveries; we owenearly everything we know to a handful of persons 1dobel ieve that ifagreatMonarch wouId make some powerfu1effort orif a considerable number of individuals of ability were freed fromother concerns to take up the required labor that we could makegreat progress in ashort time and even enjoythe fruitsofour laborsourselves. 2Such a perspective typifies the seventeenth-century view of thepotential of scientific and technical progress for making rapid andsubstantial improvements on the human condition.By the nineteenth century the bloom of ameliorative hopefulnesswas definitely beginning to fade. The lines of thought worked byMalthus and Darwin introduced a new element of competitionstruggle and the pressure of man against man in rivalry for thebounties of nature. The idea that scientific and technological progresswould result inenhanced human satisfaction/contentment/happinesscame to be seriously questioned. Writing about 1860 the shrewd


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Technological Progress n Human HappinessGerman philosopher Hermann Lotze said: The innumerable individual steps of progress in knowledge and capability which haveunquestionably been made as regards this production and management of external goods, have as yet by no means becomecombined so as to form a general advance in the happiness oflife Each step of progress with the increase of strength it brings,brings also a corresponding increase of pressure. 3 Thus alreadyover a century ago, thoughtful minds were beginning to doubt thatman s technical progress offers him a royal route to happiness.Sorne istinctions

Before turning to a closer exploration of this issue, let one or twoimportant preliminary points be settled. For one thing, it is necessary to approach the issue of the human advantageousness oftechnical progress via the important distinction between negativeand positive benefits. A negative benefit is the removal or diminutionof something bad. (It is illustrated in caricature by the story of theman who liked to knock his head against the wall because it felt sogood when he stopped.) A positive benefit, on the other hand, is onewhich involves something that is good in its own right rather than byway of contrast with an unfortunate predecessor.Now there is no doubt that the state of human well-being hasbeen, or can be enormously improved by science and technologyas regards negative benefits. There can be no question but thattechnical progress has enormously reduced human misery andsuffering. Consider a few instances: medicine (the prevention ofchildhood diseases through innoculation, anesthetics, plastic andrestorative surgery, hygiene, dentistry, etc.); waste disposai andsanitation; temperature control (heating and air conditioning). twould be easy to multiply examples of this sort many times over.But the key fact remains that such diminutions of the bad do notadd up to agood; the lessening of suffering and discomfort does notproduce a positive condition like pleasure or joy or happiness.Pleasure is not the mere absence of pain, nor joy the absence ofsorrow. The removal of the negative does not create a positiv -though, to be sure, it abolishes an obstacle in the way of positivity.


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UNPOPUL R SS YSAnd so the immense potential of modern science and technologyfor the alleviation of suffering does not automatically qualify it as afountain of happiness.Moreover, in various ways science and technology have created asetting for life which is counterproductive for the achievement ofhappiness. One instance is modern military technology and lifeunder the shadow of the atomic sword; another is the overcrowdingof human populations, the product largely of modern medical, hy-gienic, and agricultural technology. There is organizational central-ization that has put ail of us at risk as victims of disgruntled em-ployees, irate consumers, disaffected citizens, political terrorists,and other devotees of direct action against innocent bystanders as ameans to the realization of their own objectives. This list is easilyprolonged, but here 1want to make a larger and perhaps foolhardyassumption. For 1am going to adopt the somewhat optimistic stancethat ail the problems that science and technology have created, sci-ence and technology can also resolve. And accordingly 1am goingto leave this negative aspect of the situation wholly out of accountand look at the situation if best comes to best, so to speak.The question to be considered is Even if we view the conse-quences of science and technology for the human condition in themost rosy light and look on them in their most favorable setting notin Ethiopia, say India, but in the United States and WesternEurope where the most advantageous and least problematic condi-tions have prevailed , is it really clear that science and technologyhave wrought benign effects upon the condition of human happi-ness, viewed in its positive aspect?Transition The Sociological Perspective

Let us now move off in a different direction. The issue today has anewdimension. n the past discussion has proceeded on a speculativebasis, and the participants were principally philosophers and philo-sophically inclined historians students of social affairs. But nowthe sociologists and social psychologists have taken over. t thusbecomes possible to bring statistical data to bear and to look at the


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Technological Progress and Human Happinessempirical situation. We need no longer speculate about the relationbetween progress and happiness. We can go out into the field andfind out how things o in what tough-minded social scientists like torefer to as the real world. That is we can proceed by means ofquestionnaires and the whole paraphernalia of empirical social science.When we o this, ail but the most cynical among us are in for somesurprises.he NegativeCorrelation etween rogress and PerceivedHappiness

If the thesis that increased physical well-being brings increasedhappiness were correct, one would certainly expect Americans toregard themselves as substantially happier today than ever before.This expectation is not realized.A substantial body of questionnaire data makes possible a surveyof trends in the self-evaluated happiness of Americans. Operatingwith increasing sophistication, various polling organizations havequeried massive numbers of representative Americans as to theirdegree of happiness: whether very happy, fairly happy, not happy,or the usual don t know. Some relevant findings are set out inschematic form in table 1 1 and in figure 1.1. There is doubtlesssome looseness in the comparison of these data collected bysomewhat different procedures by different organizations,4 but arelatively clear and meaningful picture emerges ail the same: Therehas been no marked and significant increase in the self-perceivedhappiness of Americans to accompany the very substantial rise inthe standard of living that has been achieved in the postwar period.Moreover, for about a generation now sociologists and socialpsychologists have gone about asking people for their judgmentsregarding the changing condition of human happiness Ccontentment, satisfaction) in the face of a steadily rising standard of living.Consider some illustrations:Science has made many changes in the way people live today ascompared with the way they lived fifty years ago. On the whole, o


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8 UNPOPULAR ESSAYSvou think people are happier than they were fifty years ago becauseof those changes, or not as happy? (Roper/Minnesota, 1955)

Not as No No Opinion/Happier Happy Difference Other36 47 15 3

Thinking of life today compared to back when your parents wereabout your age-do you think people today generally have more taworry about, or that there s notmuch difference? (Roper/Minnesota,1963)MoreToday68

LessToday8

NoDifference20

Don t Know/No Answer4

Figure 1 1: Happiness ot Arnericans by Incorne Category r r ~ _ . . . _ _ . . _ .

5ccmI

Q)>c:ot 30oco

20

Upper Income Middle Income Lower Income e _e __e e_

e_ . _ . ~ . . _ . _ . _ . _ . _ . . 10 --- - ----- ------1--

1957 1963 1971 1972Source: A. Campbell, P E Converse, and W L Rodgers, TheQualityofAmerican Lite Perceptions Evaluations and Satisfactions (NewYork, 1975).


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Technological Progress and Human Happiness 9The same sort of result comes from a 1971 study by the Institute of

Social Research:Are things getting better in this country (USA)?

Setter Worse About the Same17 36 47

This, of course, stems from 1971 - before Watergate, before thespate of shortages (gasoline, heating fuel, sugar, toilet paper, etc.),and before the period of major inflation and the whole complex ofour latter-day discontents.Such data indicate a clear result on the question, Ooes progress

Table :Self


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UNPOPUL R SS YSenhance happiness? When we approach the issue in this way, nterms of people s perceptions, the answer s emphatically negative.Half the people or more apparently think that the current hedonicquality of people s lives bears ill comparison with earlier stagesof themarch of progress.It s of interest to view such findings in the lightof more detailedquestionnaire studies, such as the following:Do you think the human race s getting better or worse from thestandpoint of health? knowlege? inner happiness? peace of mind?(AIPO, 1949

No NoSetter Worse Difference OpinionHealth 73 8 6 3Knowledge 82 7 7 4Inner happiness 2 5 8 Peace of mind 7 62 Peace of mind by educationCollege 6 74 6 4High school 8 63 8

Grade school 7 57 3 13 ote For comparable and supporting data see Hadley Cantril andMildred Strunk, Public Opinion 1935 1946 (Princeton, N.J., 1951), p280.The contrast s a striking one here. Substantial majorities envisagea course of substantial improvement in terms of material and intel

lectual attainments. N-evertheless sizable pluralities take the viewthat our situation s deteriorating as regards inner happiness orpeace of mind, and, interestingly enough, the more highly educated the group being sampled, the more emphatic this sentimentbecomes. The results of such surveys indicate that n fact a substantialmajor ity of people believe there is a negative correlation betweenprogress and happiness.5Such evidence, to be sure, relates to the subjective impression of


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Technological Progress and Human Happiness 11the people interviewed. But there are also relevant data of a moreobjective kind that indicate a failure of Americans to achieve a higherplateau of personal happiness in the wake of substantial progress inthe area of social welfare. For one thing, the suicide rate per 100,000population per annum has hovered with remarkable stability atabout eleven, plus or minus one-half, ever since World War IIMoreover, since 1945 a steadily increasing number of Americansare being admitted to mental hospitals, and, on the average, arespending an increasingly long time there. Statistical indicators of thissort are readily matched by a vast body of psychiatrie data. Evenpolitical observers, who certainly have their hand on the nation'spulse, have be co me c on ce rn ed ov er our inabi li ty to t ranslateaugmented personal affluence into increases in happiness. RichardNixon in his first State of the Union message said: Never has anation seemed to have had more and enjoyed less. 7

The Preference for the PresentGiven such extensive-and continuing-indications that happi

ness is on the wane, it would seem clear that people would hankerafter the good old days, that many or most people would prefer tohave lived in a bygone, happier time.So, indeed, it might weil appear. But the statistics obtained in thefield indicate that this expectation is altogether wrong.Do you think you would have rather lived during the horse-andbuggy days instead of now? (Roper, 1939

Yes No No Opinion25 70 5

If you had the choice, would you have preferred to live in the goodold days rather than the present period? Roper/Minnesota, 1956Yes15

No57

Other29


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UNPOPUL R SS YSHere we have something of a paradox. On the one hand, peopleincline to believe that things are going to the dogs ; on the otherhand, people evince no real preference for the good old days. Andthese findings are altogether typical of findings obtained over thepast generation. Invariably, Americans reject the would-rather-havelived-then-than-now option by a ratio of better than two to one.Explaining the Paradox: The Role of the Subjective

How can this paradox be explained? One can only approach theissue on the basis of conjecture and guesswork. But a pretty plausibleaccount can be developed; the key lies in the consideration thatsatisfaction and happiness are subjective issues that turn on subjectivefactors.The desired account can be given in something like the followingterms: an individual s assessment of his happiness is a matter of hispersonal and idiosyncratic perception of the extent to which theconditions and circumstances of his life meet his needs and aspirations. And here we enter the area of felt sufficiency and felt insufficiency. A person can quite meaningfully say realize full weil that,by prevailing standards, 1have no good reason to be happy andsatisfied with my existing circumstances, but ail the same 1amperfectly happy and quite contented. Or, on the other hand, he mayconceivably (and perhaps more plausibly) say know full weil that 1have every reason for being happy, but ail the same 1am extremelydiscontented and disatisfied. We are dealing with strictly personalevaluations.ln this context one is carried back to the old proportion from theschool of Epicurus in antiquity.8

. . attainmentdegree of satisfaction = expectationThe man whose personal vision of happiness calls for yachts andpolo ponies will be a malcontent in circumstances many of us wouldregard as idyllic. He who asks but little may be blissful in humblecircumstances. t is ail a matter of how high one reaches in one sexpectations and aspirations.


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Technological Progress and Human Happiness 3This issue of expectations deserves a closer look. People s expec

tations tend to be geared to the record of their past experience.When improvements are subject to the limits of finitude which generally prevail in human affairs, the situation shown in figure 1.2results.igure 2:xpectations uture Improvement

u Zo ~. . .JWw>>ww - J


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UNPOPUL R SS YSrespect ta the requisites of happiness, we are in the midst of arevolution of rising expectations, a revolution illustrated by the growthof narcissism and the cult of self-advancement and self-advantage.And, as our Epicurean proportion shows, when increased expectations outstripactual attainments, even significantlygrowing attainments,the result is a net decrease in satisfaction. 1The paradox mooted above is readily resolved on the basis ofthese considerations. In the past people were happier because theirachievements lived up to or exceeded their expectations. Withus, even though our level of achievement is higher (and thereforeour demands greater), a lower degree of satisfaction is bound toresult because of a greater shortfall from expectations. But nevertheless we will notwant to exchangeour circumstances for the subjectivelyhappier (but objectively less weil off) circumstances of the past. Itwould seem that Americans have come to require more of life toachieve a given level of happiness. Their view seems to be: To besure, given what little people asked of life in those simpler days,what they had was quite sufficient to render them happy, or at anyrate happier than we are today, we who have more than they. But ofcourse we with our present expectations, would not be very happyin their shoes.The Sources of Discontent

Other people can tell a person if he is healthy or in good financialshape more reliably than that person himself. His physician mayweilbe better informed than he on the former score, his tax consultanton the latter. But no oneelse can tell more accurately whether or nota person is happy. On happiness and its ramifications every man ishis own prime authority. Such self-appraisals of happiness are veryuseful barometers, and the sociologists who design questionnaireshave often paid attention to this issue. This tends to produce ratherinteresting findings, particularly as regards the sources of our discontents, or at any rate their perceived sources. Consider, for example, the data in table 1.2. It emerges that the prime factors thatseparate the happy trom the unhappy are health, aging, and money


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Technological Progress and Human Happiness 15which correlates closely with these, given the decline of economicmobility that cornes with old age).Table 1 2: Happiness n Worriment

Topics That Respondents Worry Otten About of replies)

Grow GetSelf ing tingclassification Health Old Money Ahead Work Marriage ChildrenVery happy 16Pretty happy 22Not too happy 42

5828

394758

353437

485154

12914

383631

Source: Figures are derived trom data given in N. M Bradburn and DCaplovitz, Reports on Happiness hicago, 1965), p. 55, table 2.27.Indeed, table 1.3 shows that ag;ng ;s an espec;ally prominent con-sideration.Table 1 3: Self appraisals of HappinessHappiness Categories

of replies)AgeUnder3030 3940 4950 5960 6970 and over

Very Happy302425232118

Pretty Happy586662595452

Not Too Happy111013182430

Source: Bradburn and Caplovitz, Reports on Happiness p. 9, table 2 1Another important factor bearing on happiness has to do with com .par;sons w;th others, about keeping up with the Joneses nextd r 12The data of figure 1.3 are interesting in this connection.


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16 UNPOPULAR ESSAYSAgain, a consideration of work satisfaction is illuminating. The accompanying table shows the percentage of people in occupationalgroups who would choose similar work again. 13

Professional and Percent ofwhite-eollar Willingoccupations RepeatersUrban universityprofessors 93Mathematicians 9Physicists 89Biologists 89Chemists 86Lawyers 83Journalists Wash-ington correspondents) 82Church university

professors 77White-eollarworkers, crosssection 43

Working-elassoccupations

Skilled printersPaper workersSkilled autoworkersSkilled steelworkersTextile workersBlue-eollar workers,cross sectionUnskilled steelworkersUnskilled autoworkers

Percent ofWillingRepeaters52443

16

Only professionals in the more prestigious socioeconomic qccupa-t ions seem comparatively content with their allotted shar e of theworld s work. It is particularly noteworthy that 55 percent of ailworkers teel that they do less weil than persons in other occupa-tions. One is r emi nde d of the statistic that sorne 8 percent of ailmotorists regard themselves as better than average drivers.The empirical facts do not bolster any optimistic view that scientificand technological progress is about to usher in the mil lennium. Themain sources of unhappiness for people seem to be factors likeaging and decline in health and vigor, doing less weil than one wouldlike, problems in human relationships particularly in regard to famiIy and chi dr en), having less prestige than one would like.


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Technological Progress and Human Happiness 17Figure 1.3: Workers Growing Feeling of nequity

Ali Workers1 1 r r

~ ~ : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ~

Blacks 1 1 1 1 _11Fa 1972o

1F ; ;Fa 1973

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 ) ,~ ~ : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :

, f 1 1 1

~ ~ : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ~

1 1 1 r j

} 1 ~ : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ~ Jage 35 and over

White Collar ss than age 35age 35 and over

lueCailar ss than age 35

10 20 4 5 60 70Percent Who Feel They Get LessThan They Deserve Compared taPersans in Other Occupations

Source: University of Michigan nstitute for Soc ia l Research: ISRNews/etter 2 Summer 1974 2

It is clear that factors like these do not readily lend themselves tomanipulation by science and technology.The Influence of the Life Cycle

It is illuminating to correlate people s self-appraisal of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with their age and family status, as shown infigure 1.4. Such a tabulation brings clearly to light where the highrisk factors with regard to happiness attainment are. The advice tooffer would seemingly be be female, be young (under 29), bemarried, be childless.These considerations show that much of human contentmentl


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Figure 1.4: Life Satisfaction Women andMen at Stages the Life Cycle 1971Nver married betweenages 18 and 29

Married. betwee n ages18 and 29. no children

1 r 1 1 1 :: ::::: :: : : : :: : : : : : : ::=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:

1 1 1 1~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ E : m ~ : : S : ~ : ~ : ; : ; : ~ ; : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; : ~ ~ i l l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : ; ~ ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ q : ~ ; : ; : ; : ; : ; :1

Married youngest childless than age 6 it . . . ii - ... . . . . li............................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................... .

1:::;:;:::1enWomen

1 1 1 1 1 1 ; ~ ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; = =

1 1 1 1 1 ~ .. -. ~ ~ ~ ~ .. -

~ : : : : : : : : : : : : : ; : : : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; ~ : ; : ; ~ : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; ~ ~ ; ; : ; : ; : ; :;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:; ~

.............- ........................................................................................................ ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... . .

I ~ ~Married youngest childbetween ages 6 and 17Married. youngest childover age 17

I ~ ~ ~ ;:::::: ~ ~ :;:;:;:;:;:;:;:::;:::;:;:;:;:;:::;:::;:::;:;:;:;:;:;:::;:; ~ ~Widowed

Married. over age 29.no children

1 1 1 1: : : : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : : : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : : : ; : ; : ; : ; : : : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : : : : : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : : : ; : : : ; : ; : ; : ; : ; : : : ; : ; : ; : ; : ~

: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ~1 1 1 1 1Never marriedover age 29 ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ;: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ :;:::::;:::::;:::;:;:::;:::;:;:::::; :;:::;:;:::::::;:::::1 1 1

Divorced or separated :::::::::::::::;:;:::;:::::::::::::::::::;:;:;:;:;::::::8 x x ~1 1 1 1

10000 4 5 6 7Percent Satisfied with Life as a Whole

Source Campbell Converse and Rodgers The Quality American Lite


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Technological Progress and Human Happinesssatisfaction/happiness lies at a lever so deep that technologicalprogress can, by comparison, scratch only the surface of life. Thecapacity of technical progress to contribute to our unhappiness(pollution, overcrowding, system breakdown) is thus much greaterthan its potential for contributing to our happiness, which seems toturn in l rgedegree on factors like age and human (especiallyfamilial) relationships and social interactions that lie largely or whollyoutside the manipulative range of science and technology.Conclusion

A review of some of the main points in our deliberations is now inorder:1. Thinking about happiness and technological progress is apt tobe distorted by a deep-rooted tendency to think weil of the pas1.(Every language has a phrase for it: the good old days, les bonsvieux temps or eualquiera tiempo passado tue mejor the Romansspoke of laudatores temporis aefi glorifiers of the pas1. This issimply an amusing fact that tends to color our thinking about thisissue one that we have to learn to discount for if we are going tothink realistically.2. Contentment and satisfaction seem to depend on very basicelementsof the human condition, factors which our technical progressleaves largely untouched and which actually do not admit of readymanipulation.3. There is what might be called the Fundamental Paradox ofProgress: progress produces dissatisfaction because it inflates expectations faster than it can actually meet them. And this is virtuallyinevitable because the faster the expectations actually are met, thefaster they escalate.At this stage it becomes necessary to dwell on the dangers ofturning against reason. Science and technology cannot deliver onthe 64,000 Question of human satisfaction and happiness because,in the final analysis, they simply do not furnish the stuff of which realhappiness is made. And here lies the slippery slope of the dangerous descent from antiscientism to antiintellectualism to irrationalism.


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20 UNPOPULAR ESSAYSOnly reason and intelligence can solve our problems: if we turnagainst them, we are lost.And many people seem prepared to turn away from reason andrationality. To quote from one popular book, significantly entitledScience a Sacred w by Anthony Standen: Modern life in thiscountry is highly unnatural. Machines, telephones, radios, vitaminpills, subways, cars, trains, airplanes, elevators, injections, television il products of science, and il intended individually to help uscollectively harry us day and night and drive us to stomach ulcers orthe psychiatrie ward. ln the 1920s and 1930s thoughtful andsocially concerned people looked on science and technology sman s best hope and friend. Exactly the same sort of people wouldnow unhesitatingly dismiss this view s hopelessly naive. Indeedscience and technology are often seen s the enemy of il that isgood and humane. Even so informed a thinker as the distinguishedbacteriologist Ren Dubos, in his book eason wake draws thecontrast between the past, when man was threatened by naturalforces he could not control, and the present, when our most potentfears are engendered by the malign effects or side effects) ofscience and technology.15

Surely, great dangers loom ahead along this road. Science,technology, and education in general present the nation with anenormous bill for human and material resources. As long speoplemaintain the illusion that they afford a royal road to human content-ment, they will foot this bill willingly. But what if such disillusionmentreaches serious proportions not just with respect to science, but thewhole area of the life of the mind?Science and technology will not, cannot, produce the millennium.And yet in a crowded world of very limited resources we cannotcreate nadequate setting for human life withoutthem. To recognizethat scientific rationality is not a sufficient condition for human hap-piness is one thing and represents a true insight. However, toreject it as not being a necessary condition of human welfare wouldbe a gross mistake. makes no sense to join the cult of antireason inturning our backs on science and technology. The poor workmanalways blames his tools; but in this context the difficulties lie not in thetools but in our capacity to make intelligent use of them.


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Technological rogress and uman appiness Also, and perhaps most seriously, it is worth dwelling on the

dangers of n inflation of expectations. Throughout the history ofthis country, each generation has addressed itself to life on thepremise that the conditions and circumstances of its children wouldbe better than its own. urfaith in progress runs deep. What is lifegoing to be ike when this expectation is abandoned, or even reversed?Turning expectations around in a zero-growth world is no easymatter. twill be very difficult to get people who have been taught thatevery day in every way things are getting better and better to acceptthe idea that the millennium is not around the corner. There is noneed to elaborate upon the whole collage of grumbling, discontent,search for scapegoats, political extremism, and so on, that lies in thisdirection.Now if the recent escalation of expectations in regard to therequisites of happiness were to continue unabated, then a tragictime of reckoning will come. But man is a creature that learns byexperience, and a harsh curriculum of unpleasantly monitory experiences lies ahead.

Finally, let us look back to the initial question: Does scientific andtechnological progress promote human happiness? 1am afraid 1have to say no. 1do so not because 1am a humanistic curmudgeon,but because of the hard facts we encounter when we go into the fieldand look at the reactions we get from people themselves.Something akin to a principle of the conservation of negativityseems to be operative in human affairs. t isa cruel fact of life that theachievement of real progress need not be accompanied by anycommensurate satisfaction. And there is nothing perverse aboutthis; it is ail very natural. Man as we know him in the West) tends tobe a creature of discontents, be they divine or otherwise. The imminent goal once achieved, he simply raises his level of expectationand presses onward to the next goal under the goad of reneweddiscontent.One result of this tendency a result that may properly be viewed s unfortunate is what might be characterized s the phenomenon of hedoni dis ounting This is best explained by an analogy. tis a familiar commonplace that the stock market primarily responds


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UNPOPUL R SS YSnot to present economic facts but to anticipations .of the future.Making present allowance for foreseeable future economic improvements or declines), the market has already discounted them byanticipation when they become a reality and so underreacts to oreven ignores m jor achievements when they occur. A parallelphenomenon operates in the context of foreseeable improvementsin the conditions of human life: a similar undervaluation of realizedachievements in the light of prior expectations. Having expected asmuch or generally more), we simply refuse to value very realachievements at their own true worth. Once progress is achieved, itbecomes discounted as regards its real contribution to happiness;we have already raised our sights in anticipation of its successors.The considerations of this discussion point to the ironic conclusionthat advances have in the past, through their promotion of an escalation of expectations, been self-{jefeating from the standpoint ofpromoting happiness. The progress that has been made, real thoughit is has nevertheless tended to bring in its wake a diminution ratherthan an increase in the general happiness of people.Humanists are orshould be) lovers of reason, and one s everyrational bone cries out that, ideally speaking, people ought to behappier as their conditions of life improve. But recalcitrant circum-stances of the real world indicate that they do not in fact become soAnd seemingly for a deep-seated reason. As concerns happiness,progress sets a self-{jefeating cycle into action:Improvement ~ Aroused Expectations ~ ~ DisappointmentIt seems that we must bring ourselves to realize, more in sorrowthan anger, that it is a forlorn hope to expect technological progressto make a major contribution to human happiness, taken in itspositive aspect.


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he nvironment l risisnd the u iity ot ite 2We generally think of the environmental crisis as resulting from toomuch too much pollution, wastage, pesticide, and so forth. Butthe economist views the problem as one of scarcity too little cleanair, pure water, recreationally usable terrain, agriculturally exploitable land. The answer traditional among welfare economists toproblems of scarcity is based single-mindedly on the leading idea ofproduction. But, alas, the things that the environmental crisis leavesin short supply fresh air, clean rivers, unpolluted beaches, fertilevalleys are not things to which the standard, traditional concept ofthe production of goods and services applies. The project ofproducing another planet to live on after we have used this one up isunfortunately infeasible.

Most discussions of the environmental crisis are simply exercisesin motivation and social uplift. The lesson is driven home that if weare good and behave ourselves, everything will come out just fine.To adopt more stringent statutes of regulation, to subject graspingenterprise to social pressure, to accept better social values andattitudes, to espouse the program and ideology of planned parenthood or feminism, to hand the control of affairs over to those whoare younger and purer of heart so runs the gamut of remedieswhich their respective advocates would have us adopt and which,once adopted so we are told) will put everything to rights. Throughoutthis stance there runs the fundamentally activistic optimism of theAmerican experience: virtue will be rewarded, and at the end of thesixth reel, the good guys will ride off into the glorious sunset.The present discussion proposes to dash some cold water on ailthis t offers the deeply pessimistic suggestion that, crudely speaking,the environment has had it and that we simply cannot return to thegood old days of environmental purity. We ail know of Thomas


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UNPOPUL R SS YSMore s futile laments over the demise of the feudal order and theruralistic yearnings voiced by the romantics in the early days of theIndustrial Revolution. Historical retrospect mayweil cast the presentspate of hand-wringing over environmental deterioration as an essentially analogous right-minded but utterly futile penchant for theeasier, simpler ways of bygone days.

vento think of theproblem as an environmental r s s is tendentious.Crises are by definition transitory phenomena: they point toward amoment of decision for life or death, not toward a stable condition ofthings. The very terminology indicates an unwillingness to face theprospect of serious environmental degradation as a permanentreality, an ongoing fact of life to be contended with in an ongoingway. To take this view goes deep against the grain. It involves acircumstance that is unattractive, and unwelcome. But perhaps itcould be granted t least for the sake of discussionthatthe viewmight possibly be correct and so deserves consideration. Grantingthis hypothesis, let us explore its implications.First let us be clearer about the hypothesis itself. It is certainly notmaintained that environmental activism is futile, that man cannat bydint of energy and effort manage to clean up this or that environmental mess. Rather, what is at issue is the prospect that we may simplybe unable to solve the environmental crisis as a whole, that once thisor that form of noxiousness is expelled from one door some otherequally bad version comes in byanother. My hypothesis, in short, isthat the environmental crisis may weil be incurable. It just may besomething that we cannot solve but have ta learn to live with andmake the best of.This hypothesis is surely not altogether unrealistic and fanciful.Basically, the environmental mess is a productof the conspiration ofthree forces: high population densities, high levels of personal consumption, and a messy technology of production. Can one evenrealistically expect that any of these can really be eliminated? Not thepopulation crunch surely. As one character remarked in a Peanuts cartoon: Everybody says there are too many of us but nobody wants to leave. ordo things look rosy as regards consumption. People everywhere in the world are clamoring for affluence anda place on the high-consumption bandwagon, and pitifully few are


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The Environmental Crisis and the Quality of Life 25jumping off. Nor, save in certain limited, highly publicized areas, arewe likely to get an environmentally benign technology of productionand consumption. (Nobody is enough of a bookworm to start eatingthe evening newspaper, no matter how palatable chemical ingenuity may be able to make it). Ail in ail, it takes much doing to persuadeoneself that the day of environmental pleasantness is somehow justaround the corner.Thus the hypothesis in view is not altogether visionary.Sorne Ideological Victims

If the continued unfolding of such an environmental crisis occurs,various conceptions integral to the Americal social ideology willhave to go by the board, in particular the conceptions of material progress, of technologic l omnipotence and of millenialorientation. aterial Progress Americans naturally tend to be antipathetic tathe idea of a golden age, a time in the past when conditions of lifewere superior to those of our own day. The concept of progress isdeeply, almost irremovably, impressed on the American consciousness. And this is so not just in the remote past but very much in ourown day. Take just the most recent period since World War IIConsider the marked signs of progress: (1) the increase of lifeexpectancy (at birth) from sixty-three years in 1940 to seventy yearsin 1965; (2) the rise of per capita personal income from 1 ,810 in1950 to 2,542 in 1965 (in constant [1958] dollars); (3) the increasein education represented by a rise in school enrollments from 44percent of the f i v e t o t h i r t y f o u r y e r ~ l d group in 1950 to 60 percent in 1965; (4) the growth of social welfare expenditures from 88per capita in 1945 to 360 per capita in 1965 (in constant [1958]dollars).Taken together, such statistics bring into focus the steady andsignificant improvement in the provisions for individual comfort andsocial welfare that has taken place in the United States since WorldWar II The very concept of the good old days is anathema to uswhen the terms of reference are material rather than moral. (Americans have usually been prepared to grant that the Founding Fathers


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26 UNPOPULAR ESSAYSwere better and perhaps even happier men than their owncontemporaries, but they have never been prepared to concedethat they were better off.) We have in general had a fervent commitment to the concept of material progress, that everything is gettingbigger and better or almost everything with such occasional exceptions as trains and restaurant service).Relinquishing the concept of progress will not come easy to us tis going to take a lot of doing to accustom us to the idea that thequality of life in this nation is on balance going to get worse or at anyrate will not get better. We have had little preparatory backgroundfor accepting the realization that in some key aspects in the quality oflife the best days may be behind us It is doubtful, to say the least, thatwe are going to take kindly to the idea; there may be vast social andpolitical repercussions in terms of personal frustration and socialunrest. The British have made a pretty good show of having to hauldown the flag of empire. But one may weil be skeptical about ourability to show equally good grace when the times comes to rundown our banner emblazoned with Standard of Living.Technological mnipotence A belief in the omnipotence oftechnology runs deep in the American character. We incline to theidea that, as a people, we can do anything we set our mind to. n afrontier nation there was little need to acknowledge limits of any sort.The realization of finite resources, the recognition of opportunitycosts, the need for making choices in the allocation of effort, and theinescapable prospect of unpleasant consequences of our choicesnegative externalities) are newcomers to American thinking. Thenew economic consciousness, the recognition of the realities ofcost-benefit analysis, is so recent that it has not as yet come fullyhome to us For thecourse ofour historical experience has not reallyprepared us for these realities of finiteness and incapacity. We expect government to handle things - not only the foreign wars,economic crises, and social disorders of historical experience, butnow the environmental crises as weil. The idea that our scientifictechnology and the social technology ofour political institutions maybe utterly inadequate ta the task does not really dawn on us f andwhen it finally does, the fur will surely fly The unhappy fate of the


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The Environmental Crisis and the Quality of Life conservationist, retrenchmental sector of immy Carter s energyprogram is perhaps the first indication of this.)Millennial ankerings Americans have manifested more millennial hankerings than perhaps any other people since the dayswhen apocalyptic thinking was in fashion. The idea that a solution toour problems lies somehow just around the corner is deeplyingrained in our onsciousness. Nobody knows the themes towhich people resonate better than politicians. And from WoodrowWilson s Fourteen Points to Franklin Roosevelt s New Deal to thequality-of-Iife rhetoric of Lyndon Johnson s presidential campaign,the fundamentally millennial nature of our political rhetoric is clear.Buy our program, accept our policies, and everything in the country will be just about perfect. That is how the politicians talk, and theydo so because that is what people yearn to hear. We can acceptdeprivation now as long as we feel assured that prosperity lies justaround the corner. No political campaign is complete without substantial pandering to our millennial yearnings through assurancesthat if only we put the right set of men in office ail our troubles willvanish and we can ail live happily ever after. We as a nation have yetto learn the unpleasant lesson that such pie-in-the-sky thinking is aluxury we can no longer afford.A ew Ideology: The Need for Realism

The conception that the quality of life, currently threatened by theenvironmental crisis, represents simply another one of those conditions of scarcity for which the welfare economists classic prescription of producing oneself out of il applies is profoundly misguided.There is good reason to think thatthe environmental crisis is not realIy a crisis at ail, but the unavoidable inauguration of a permanentnew condition of things. This new condition will engendera reversaiof the ongoing escalation of expectations regarding the materialconditions of life that is and long has been typical of Americans. Invarious crucial respects regarding the quality of life we may have tosettle for less. This development will unquestionably require considerable ideological revisionism. In particular, itwill demand as victims


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28 UNPOPUL R ESS YSour inclination to progressivism, our Promethean faith in man stechnological omnipotence, and our penchant for millennial think-ing. What is needed in the face of the environmental crisis at thispoint, as 1see it may weil be not a magisterial confidence that thingscan be put right, but a large doseof cool realism tempered with stoicresignation. We had better get used to the idea that we may have toscale down our expectations and learn to settle for a lowered stan-dard of living and a diminished quality of lifeThe ideological consequences of such a reorientation will clearlybe profound. The result cannot but be a radically altered ideology, awholly new American outlook. What will this be? Ail too temptingly itmay be a leap to the opposite extreme: to hopelessness, despon-dency, discouragement, and escapism; the sense of impotence and prs nous dluge Such an era of negativism may weil be thenatural consequence of the presently popular rhetoric of the envi-ronmental crisis. And the American people do not have a particu-larly good record for sensible action in a time of disappointed expec-tations. Our basic weakness is a rather nonstandard problem ofmorale: a failure not so much of nerve as of patience.Yet such a result despair and disillusionment is surely un-warranted. It is realism and not hopelessness that provides theproper remedy for overconfidence. Let us by ail means carry on thestruggle to save the environment by ail feasible steps. But let us notentertain misguided expectations about the prospects of success,expectations whose probable disappointment cannot but result indespondency, recrimination, and the tempting resort ta the direpolitical measures that are natural to gravely disillusioned people.The proper stance is surely not one of fatalistic resignation but ofcarrying on the good fight ta save the environment, doing so in fullyrealistic awareness that we are carrying on a limited war in which anactual victory may weil lie beyond our grasp. It has taken an ex-traordinarily difficult struggle for us to arrive at a limited war perspec-tive in international relations under the inexorable pressure of thepolitical and technological facts of our times. And we have not evenbegun to move toward the corresponding mentality in the sphere ofsocial problems and domestic difficulties. Yet just this is clearly oneof the crucial sociotechnological imperatives of our day.


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The Environmental Crisis and the Quality of Life 29This conclusion will very likely strike many as a repulsive instance

of gloom and doom thinking. This would be quite wrong. Themoral rather is at worst one of gloom without doom. Man is a beingof enormous adaptability resiliency and power. e has learned tosurvive under some extremely difficult and unpleasant conditions.By ail means let us do everything we can to save the environment.But if we do not do a very good job of it and it is doubtful to say theleast that we will this is not necessarily the end of the world. ehave been in tight corners and unpleasant circumstances beforeand have managed to cope.


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h llocation of xoticedic l ifesaving herapy 3Technological progress has in recent years transformed the limits ofthe possible in medical therapy. However, the very sophistication ofmodern medical technology has brought the economists classicproblem of scarcity in its wake as an unfortunate side product. Theenormously complex equipment and the highly trained teams ofexperts needed to operate it are scarce resources in relation topotential demand. The administrators of the great medical institutions that preside over these scarce resources thus come to befaced increasingly with the awesome choice: Whose life to save?A (somewhat hypothetical) paradigm of this problem may besketched within the following set of definitive assumptions. We supposethat people in some particular medically morbid condition are mortallyafflicted in that in the absence of treatment it is effectively certainthat they will die within a short time. It is assumed, furthermore, thatsome very complex course of treatment (e.g., a heart transplant)represents a substantial probability of life prolongation for people inthis condition. We assume that the availability of human resources,mechanical instrumentalities, and requisite materials (e.g., hearts inthe case of a heart transplant) make it possible to give a certaintreatment an exotic medicallifesaving therapy to a number ofpeople that is small relative to those in the mortally afflicted conditionat issue. The problem then may be formulated as follows: How isone to select within the pool of afflicted patients the ones to be giventhe lifesaving treatment in question? Faced with many candidateswhere effective treatment can be made available to only a few, oneconfronts the decision of who is to be given a chance at survival andwho is in effect, to be condemned to die.

As has already been implied, the heroic variety of spare-part


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The Allocation of Lifesaving Therapy surgery can pretty weil be assimilated to this paradigm. One canforesee the time when heart transplantation for example will havebecome a routine medical procedure albeit on a very limited basissince a cardiac surgeon with the technical competence to transplanthearts can operate at most only a few times each week and theelaborate facilities for such operations are bound to exist on amodest scale. Moreover in spare-part surgery there is always aproblem of the availability of the spare parts themselves.Another example is afforded by long-term hemodialysis a processby which nartificial kidney machine is used periodically in cases ofchronic renal failure to substitute for a nonfunctional kidney in cleaningpotential poisons from the blood. There is only a Iimited number ofchronic hemodialysis units whose complex operation is nexpensive proposition. For the present and the nearfuture the numberofplaces available for chronic hemodialysis is hopelessly inadequate. 16The traditional medical ethos has insulated the physician againstfacing the very existence of this problem. When swearing theHippocratic oath he commits himself to work for the benefit of thesick in whatsoever house enter renouncing the explicit choice ofsaving certain lives rather than others. Of course doctors havealways had to face such choices on the battlefield or in times ofdisaster but there the issue had to be resolved hurriedly underpressure and in circumstances which effectively precluded calmdeliberation by the decision maker sweil scriticism by others. nsharp contrast however cases of the type we have postulated in thepresent discussion arise predictably and represent choices to bemade deliberately and in cold blood.

t should be remarked to begin with that this problem is notfundamentallya medical problem. For when there are sufficientlymany afflicted c ndid tes so we may ssume therewill als0 bemore than enough for whom the purely medical grounds for lifesavingintervention are decisively strong in any individual case and justabout equally strong throughout the group. But in this circumstancea selection of some afflicted patients rather than others cannot exhypothesi be made on the basis of purely medical considerations.Selection is thus a problem which must somehow be solved by


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UNPOPUL R SS YSphysicians, but that does not make it a medical issue any more thanthe problem of hospital building is a medical issue. Structurally, itbears a substantial kinship with those issues that revolve about thenotorious whom-to-save-on-the-lifeboat and whom-to-throw-to-thewolves-pursuing-the-sled questions. But whereas those questionsare artificial, hypothetical, and farfetched, the issue of lifesavingtherapy poses a genuine policy question for the responsible administrators in medical institutions, indeed a question that threatens tobecome commonplace in the foreseeable future.A body of rational guidelines for making choices in these literallylife-or-{jeath situations is an obvious desideratum. This is an issue inwhich many interested parties have a substantial stake, includingthe responsible decision maker who wants to satisfy his conscienceand his potential critics that he is acting in a reasonable way.Moreover, the family and associates of the patients who are turned w y tosay nothing of the patients themselves have the right toan acceptable explanation. And indeed even the general publicwants to know that what is being done is fitting and proper. Ail theseinterested parties are entitled to insist that a reasonable code ofoperating principles provides a defensible rationale for making thelife-and-{jeath choices.1. The Two Types of Criteria

Two distinguishable types of criteria are bound up in the issue ofmaking such lifesaving choices: criteri inclusion and critericomp rison This distinction requires explanation. We can think ofthe selection as being made by a two-stage process: 1 the selectionfrom among ail possible candidates by a suitable screening processof a group to be taken under serious consideration as candidates fortherapy; and then 2 the actual singling out, within this group, of theparticular individuals to whom therapy is to be given. Thus the firstprocess narrows down the range of comparative choice by eliminating en bloc whole categories of potential candidates. The secondprocess calls for a more refined, case-by-ease comparison of thosecandidates that remain. By means of the first set of criteria one formsa selection group; by means of the second set an actual selection ismade within this group.


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The llocation of Lifesaving Therapy2. Essential Features of an Acceptable Selection System

A selection process for the choice of patients to receive lifesavingtherapy will be acceptable only when the reasonableness of itscomponent criteria can be established.To qualify as reasonable, the selection procedure must meet twoimportant structural requirements: it must be simple enough to bereadily intelligible, and it must be plausible, that is patently reasonablein a way that can be apprehended easily and without involvingramified subtleties. Those responsible for lifesaving choices mustfollow a modus operandi that virtually ail the people involved canreadily understand to be acceptable at a reasonable level of generality, at any rate). Appearances are critically important here. It is notenough that the choice be made in a justifiable way; it must bepossible for people plain people to see i.e., understand withoutelaborate teaching or indoctrination) that it is indeed justified, insofaras any mode of procedure can be justified in cases of this sort.One further requirement is obviously an essential feature of areasonable selection system: ail its component criteria, those ofinclusion and those of comparison alike, must be reasonable in thesense of being rationally defensible. Above ail, it must be fair - itmust treat relevantly like cases alike, leaving no room for influenceor favoritism. 83. The Basic Screening Stage: Criteria of Inclusion andExclusion

Three sorts of considerations are prominent among the plausiblecriteria of inclusion/exclusion at the basic screening stage: the constituency factor, the progress f science factor, and the prospect f-success factor.The onstituency actor

Sophisticated therapy is usually available only at a hospital ormedical institute or the like. Such institutions generally have clienteleboundaries. A veterans hospital will not concern itself primarily withtreating nonveterans; a children s hospital cannot be expected toaccommodate the senior citizen; an army hospital can regard col-


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34 UNPOPUL R ESS YSlege professors as outside its sphere. A medical institution is justifiedin considering for treatment only persons within its own constituency, provided this constituency is constituted upon a defensiblebasis. Thus the hemodialysis selection committee in Seattle agreedto consider only those applicants who were residents of the state ofWashington They justified this stand on the grounds that sincethe basic research had been done at a state-supportedinstitution - the people whose taxes had paid for the research shouldbe its first beneficiaries. 9h Progress of Science actor

The needs of medical research itself can provide a second validprinciple of inclusion. The research interests of the medical staff inrelation to the specifie nature of the cases at issue is a significantconsideration. t may be important for the progress of medicalscience and thus of potential benefit to many patients in the future)to determine how effective the therapy at issue is with diabetics orpersons over sixty or with a negative h factor. Considerations ofthis sort represent another type of legitimate factor in selection forlifesaving therapy. A borderline case under this head might be apatient who was willing to pay, not in monetary terms, but in offeringhimself as an experimental subject, say by contracting to return atdesignated times for a series of tests substantially unrelated to hisown health, but yielding data of importance to medical knowledge ingeneral.)h Prospect of Success actor

tmay be that while the therapy at issue is not without someeffectiveness in general, it has been established to be highly effectiveonly with patients in certain specifie categories e.g., females underforty of a specifie blood type). This difference in effectiveness - in theabsolute or in the probability of success is we assume) so markedas to constitute virtually a difference in kind rather than in degree. nthis case, it would be perfectly legitimate ta adopt the practice ofmaking the therapy at issue available only or primarily ta persans inthis substantial-promise-of-success category. It is on such grounds


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The Allocation of Lifesaving Therapy 35that young children and persons over fifty are sometimes ruled outas candidates for hemodialysis.)

Ta this point, we have held that the three factors of constituency,progress of science, and prospect of success represent legitimatecriteria of inclusion for selection for exotic lifesaving therapy. But itremains to examine the considerations which legitimate them. Thelegitimating factors are in the final analysis practical or pragmatic innature. From the practical angle it is advantageous, indeed to someextent necessary, that the arrangements governing medical institutions should embody certain constituency principles. It also makesgood pragmatic and utilitarian sense that progress-of-science considerations should be operative. And, finally, the practical aspect isreinforced by a whole host of other considerations, including moralones that countervail against violating the prospect-of-success criterion. Throughout this basic screening stage, then, a legitimatingrationale of fundamentally pragmatic considerations is forthcoming.The appropriateness of each of these three factors is of courseconditioned by the ever present element of limited availability. Eachis operative only in this context; specifically, prospect of success isa legitimate consideration only because we are dealing with a situation of scarcity.4. The Final Selection Stage: Criteria o Selection

iveelements must, as we see it figure prominently among theplausible criteria of selection that will be used in further screeningthe roupconstituted after application of the criteria of inclusion:the relative-likelihood-of-success factor, the life-expectancy factor,the family-role factor, the p o t e n t i l ~ o n t r i u t i o n s factor, and theservices-rendered factor. The first has already been discussed. Letus consider the remaining four.The Life xpectancy Factor

Even if the therapy at issue is successful in a patient s case hemay, considering his age or other aspects of his general medical


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UNPOPUL R SS YScondition, expect to live only a short time. This matter of the expected duration of future life (and of its quality s weil) is obviously afactor that can appropriately be taken into account.h Family Role Factor

A person s life is a thing of importance not only to himself but taothers-friends associates, neighbors, colleagues. But his or her)relationship to his immediate family is a thing of unique intimacy andsignificance. The nature of his relationship ta his wife, children, andparents, and the issue of their financial and psychical dependenceupon him, are obviously matters that deserve to be given weight in alifesaving selection process. Other things being anything like equal,the mother of young children must take priority over the middleaged bachelor.h Potential-Contributions Factor Prospective Service

ln choosing to save one life rather than another, the society,through the mediation of the particular medical institution inquestion - which should certainly look upon itself sa trustee for thesocial interest- is clearly warranted in considering the likely patternof future services to be rendered by the patient (adequate recoveryassumed), considering his age, talent, training, and past record ofperformance. n its allocations of complex and expensive therapeuticprocedures, society invests a scarce resource in one person sagainst another and is thus entitled to safeguard its own interests bylooking to the probable prospective return on its investment. It may weil be that a thoroughly egalitarian society is reluctant taput someone s social contribution into the scale in situations of thesort tissue. One popular article states that the mostdifficult standardwould be the candidate s value to society, and goes on ta quotesomeone who said: You can t just pick a brilliant painter over alaborer. The average citizen would be quickly eliminated. 21 Butwhat if it were not a brilliant painter but a brilliant surgeon or medicalresearcher that was at issue? One wonders if the author of the obiterdictum that one can t just pick would still feel equally sure of hisground, particularly seeing that it is (ex hypothesi) not a matter ofu tpicking, but picking for clear and cogent reasons. nany case,


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The Allocation of Lifesaving Therapy 37the fact that the standard is difficult to apply is certain no reason fornot attempting to apply il The problem of lifesaving selection isinevitably burdened with difficult standards.The Services-Rendered Factor Retrospective Service)

One person s services to another person or group have alwaysbeen taken to constitute a valid basis for a claim upon this person orgroup, of course a moral and not necessarily a legal claim. Society sobligation to recognize and reward services rendered, an obligationwhose discharge is also very possibly conducive to self-interest inthe long run, is thus another factor to be taken into accounl. Thisshould be viewed as a morally necessary correlative of the previouslyconsidered factor of prospective service. It would be morally indefensible of society in effect to say Never mind about services vourendered yesterd y it is only the services to be rendered tomorrowthat will count with us today, We live in very future-oriented times,constantly preoccupied in a distinctly utilitarian way with futuresatisfactions. And this disinclines us to give much recognition topast services. But parity considerations of the sort just adducedindicate that such recognition should be given on grounds of equity.Moreover a justification for giving weig ht to services rendered canalso be attempted along utilitarian lines. ( The reward of past servicesrendered spurs people on to greater future efforts and is thus sociallyadvantageous in the long-run future pouren our ger les autres. )22

These four factors fall into three groups: a biomedical factor, afamilial factor, and two social factors. With the first, the need for adetailed analysis of medical considerations comes to the fore. Theage of the patient, his medical condition, his specific disease, and soforth, will ail need to be taken into exact account. These biomedicalfactors represent technical issues; they cali for the physicians expertjudgment and the medical statisticians hard data. And they areethically uncontroversial factors. Their legitimacy and appropriatenessare evident from the very nature of the case.Greater problems arise with the familial and social factors. Theyinvolve intangibles that are difficult to assess. How is one to developsubcriteria for weighing the relative social contributions of (say) an


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8 UNPOPUL R SS YSarchitect or a librarian or a federal judge? And they involve highlyproblematic issues. For example, should good moral character berated a plus and bad a minus in judging services rendered?) Issuesof this sort are strikingly unpleasant for people brought up in timesgreatly inclined toward maxims of the type Judge Not and Live andLet Live Ali the same, in the situation that concerns us here suchdistasteful problems must be faced. Unpleasant choices are intrin-sic to the problem of lifesaving selection; they are of the very essenceof the matter. 3

But is reference to ail these factors indeed inevitable? The justifica-tion for taking account of the medical factors is obvious and that ofthe familial factor is relatively straightforward. But why should thesocial aspect of services rendered and to be rendered be consid-ered at ail? The answer is that they must be taken into account notfrom the medical but from the ethical point of view.Despite disagreement on many fundamental issues, moral phi-losophers of the present day are pretty weil agreed that the justifica-tion of human actions is to be sought largely if not exclusively) inthe principles of utility and justice. But utility requires reference ofservices to be rendered and justice calls for a recognition by parity toservices that have been rendered. Moral considerations would thusseem to demand recognition of these two factors. 25 To be sure,someone might say that moral considerations ought to play no rolein such a context of social politYbecause they are inherently contro-versial philosophers continue to dispute about themasabout ailelse). But this should not worry us For one thing, the exclusion ofmoral considerations is itself a doctrinal stance that is itself no lesscontroversial and disputable. There is no shirking the ethical dimen-sion. emust in this domain, as elsewhere, simply do the best wecan in the circumstances at hand.5 More Than Medical Issues Are Involved

ln recent years, an active controversy has sprung up in medicalcircles over the question of whether nonphysician laymen should begiven a role in lifesaving selection in the specifie context of chronic


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The Allocation of Lifesaving Therapy 39hemodialysis). One physician writes: think that the assessment ofthe candidates should be made by a senior doctor on the [dialysis]unit, but 1am sure that it would be helpful to him both in sharingresponsibility and in avoiding personal pressure if a small unnamedgroup of people [presumably including laymen] officially made thefinal decision. 1visualize the doctor bringing the data to the group,explaining the points in relation to each case, and obtaining theirapproval of his order or priority. 6Essentially this procedure of a selection committee of laymen hasfor some years been in use in one of the most publicized chronicdialysis units, that of the Swedish Hospital of Seattle, Washington. 7Many physicians are apparently reluctant to see the allocation ofmedical therapy pass out of strictly medical hands. Thus Dr. RalphShakman writes: Who is to implement the selection? ln my opinionit must ultimately be the responsibility of the consultants in charge ofthe renal units 1can see no reason fordelegating this responsibilityto lay persons. Surely the latter would be better employed if theycould be persuaded ta devote their time and energy to raise moreand more money for us to spend on our patients. 28 Other physicians strike much the same note. Dr. F M Parsons writes: In anattempt to overcome difficulties in selection some have advocated introducing certain specified lay people into the discussions. Is itwise? 1doubt whether a committee of this type can adjudicate assatisfactorily as two medical colleagues, particularly as successfultherapy involves close cooperation between doctor and patient. 9And according to Dr. M A Wilson: The suggestion has been madethat lay panels should select individuals for dialysis from among agroup who are medically suitable. Though this would relieve thedoctor-in-eharge of a heavy load of responsibility, it would place theburden on those who have no personal knowledge and have tobase their judgments on medical or social reports. 1do not believethis would result in better decisions for the group or improve thedoctor-patient relationship in individual cases 3QBut no amount of flag-waving about the doctor s facing up to hisresponsibility or prostrations before the idol of the doctor-patientrelationship and reluctance toadmit laymen into the sacred precinctsof the conference chambers of medical consultations) can obscure


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UNPOPUL R SS YSthe essential fact that Iifesaving selection is not a strictly medicalproblem. When there are more than enough places in a facility forlifesaving therapy to ccommod te ail who need it then it will clearlybe a medical question to decidewho does have the need and whichmong these would successfully respond. But when 9ross insufficiency of places exists, when there are ten or fifty or one hundredcandidates for each place in the program, then it is simply unrealisticto take the view that purely medical criteria can furnish a sufficientbasis for selection. The question of selection becomes serious as aphenomenon of scale; as more candidates present themselves,strictly medical factors are increasingly less adequate as a selectioncriterion precisely because by numerical category-crowding therewill be more and more cases whose status is much the same so faras purely medical considerations go.The problem clearly poses issues that transcend the medicalsphere because, in the nature of the case, many residual issuesremain to be dealt with once ail the medical questions have beenfaced. Because of this there is good reason why laymen as weil asphysicians should be involved in the selection process. Once themedical issues have been considered, extramedical and specificallysocial issues remain to be resolved. The instrumentalities of therapyhave been created through the socialinvestment of scarce resources,and the interests of the society deserve to play a role in their utilization.As representatives of their social interests, lay opinions should functionto complement and supplement medical views once the properarena of medical considerations is left behind. 3One physician has argued against lay representation on selectionpanels for hemodialysis as follows: If the doctor advises dialysis andthe lay panel refuses, the patient will regard this as a death sentencepassed by an nonymous court from which he has no right ofappeal. 3 But this dr w ck is not specific to the use of a lay panel.Rather, it is a feature inherent in every selection procedure, regardlessof whether the selection is done by the head doctor of the unit, ypanel of physicians, or some other person or group. No matter whodoes the selecting mong patients recommended for dialysis, thefeelings of the patient who has been rejected and knows it) can beexpected to be much the same, provided that he recognizes the


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The Allocation of Lifesaving Therapy 4actual nature of the choice and is not deceived by the possiblyconvenient but ultimately poisonous fiction that because the selectionwas made by physicians it was made entirely on strictly medicalgrounds).ln summary, then, the question of selection in the allocation ofscarce lifesaving therapy would appear ta be one that is in its verynature heavily laden with issues of medical research, practice, andadministration. But it is not a question that can be resolved on solelymedical grounds. Strictly social issues of justice and utility will invari-ably arise, questions going outside the medical area in whose reso-lution medical laymen can and should play a substantial raie.6 The nherent mperfection Nonoptimality)ofAny Selection rocess

The preceding discussion has argued that four factors must betaken into substantial and explicit account in the operation of asystem of selection for scarce Iifesaving therapy:A Expectancy future lite Is the chance of the treatment sbeing successful ta be rated as high, good, average, or what? And

assuming success, how much longer does the patient stand a goodchance of living, considering his age and general condition?B ami y raIe To what extent does the patient have responsibilitiesta others in his immediate family?C Social contributions rendered Are the patient s past servicesto his society outstanding, substantial, or average?D Social contributions ta be expected Considering his age,talents, training, and past record of performance, is there a substantialprobability that the patient will adequate recovery being ssumed-

render in the future services to his society that can be characterizedas outstanding, substantial, or average?This list has a serious deficiency. It is clearly insufficient for theactual construction of a reasonable selection system, since thatwould require not only that these factors be taken into account somehow or other), but, going beyond this, would specify a set ofprocedures for taking account of them. The specifie criteria thatwould constitute such a system would have to take account of


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42 UNPOPUL R SS YSthe interrelationship of these factors e.g., C and 0 , and to set outexact guidelines as ta the weight that s ta be given ta each of them.This s something our discussion has not s yet considered.

No doubt, there is no such thing as a single rationally superiorselection system. The position of affairs n this regard stands somewhatas follows: 1) It s necessary for reasons already canvassed) tohave a system; and 2) to be rationally defensible, this system shouldtake the factors A-O into substantial and explicit account. But 3 theexact manner in which a rationally defensible system takes accountof these factors cannat be fixed in any one specifie way on the basisof general considerations. Any of the variety of ways that give A-Otheir due will be acceptable and viable. One cannot hope to findwithin this range of workable systems some one that s optimal nrelation to the alternatives. There is no one system that s theuniquely) besf; there are a variety of systems that manage, in oneway or another, to accommodate ail the various factors.The situation is structurally very much akin to that of the rules fordividing an estate among the relations of a decedent who leaves nowill. It is important that there be such rules. And it s reasonable thatspouse, children, parents, siblings, and others be taken account ofn these rules. But the question of the exact method of division forinstance that when the decedent has neither living spouse nor livingchildren then 6 percent of his estate s to be divided betweenparents and 4 percent between sibl ings rather than dividing 9percent between parents and 10 percent between siblings) cannatbe settled on the basis of any general abstract considerations ofreasonableness. Within broad Iimits, a variety of resolutions are ailperfectly acceptable; no one procedure can justifiably be regardedas the Cuniquely) best because it is superior ta ail others on thebasis of considerations of general principle. 34 Such considerationscan only indicate that these factors be taken into account, but theydo not determine exactly how this should be done.7 Possible asis for a Reasonable Selection System

Having said that there is no such thing as the optimal selectionsystem, no uniquely correct system of rules for the allocation of


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The Allocation Lifesaving Therapylivesaving therapy in situations of scarcity, let us now sketch out thebroad features of what might plausibly qualify as an acceptablesystem.The basis for the system would be a point rating. The scoringwould give roughly equal weight to the medical consideration A incomparison with the extramedical considerations B C and D alsogiving roughly equal weight to these three items. The result of such ascoring procedure would provide the essential starting point of theselection mechanism.The detailed procedure 1would propose not of course as opti-mal for reasons we have seen), but as eminently acceptable-would combine the scoring procedure just discussed with an ele-ment of chance. The resulting selection system would function asfollows:

First the criteria of inclusion described in section 3 would beapplied to constitute a first phase selection group which, we shallsuppose, is substantially larger than the number n of persons whocan actually be accommodated with the therapeutic resources atissue.2. Next the criteria of selection of section 4 are brought to bear viaa scoring procedure of the type described in section 6. On this basisa second phase selection group is constituted which is only slightlylarger, say by a third or a half, than the critical number 3. If this second phase selection group is relatively homogeneous

as regards rating by the scoring procedure, that is if there are noreally major disparities within this group as would be likely if theinitial group was significantly larger than n then the final selection ismade by random

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