republican presentment combined

8/3/2019 Republican Presentment Combined

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28TH STATEWIDE INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY PRESENTMENT No.2.We, the members of the 28 th Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, having received and

reviewed evidence regarding allegations of violations of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code andrelated laws, occurring in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, pursuant to notice of submission ofInvestigation No.4, do hereby make the following findings of fact, conclusions, andrecommendation of charges.

FINDINGS OF FACT

This investigation was commenced as. the result of public allegations of potential publiccorruption and criminal misconduct within the Pennsylvania Legislature. This Grand JuryInvestigation was initially commenced before the 25 th Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, inA u g u ~ t of 2007, and, upon the 'expiration of that Grand Jury, this matter was transferred to theattention of the 28 th Statewide Investigating Grand Jury in March of 2008. The 28 th Statewide

Investigating Grand Jury issues this Presentment in furtherance of its ongoing investigation ofthe Pennsylvania Le'gislature.

I. INTRODUCTION

This Grand Jury has again uncovered, and by this Presentment charges, elected officialsand employees within the Pennsylvania legislature for the misuse and theft ofmillions of dollars.This time the offenses occurred within the leadership of the House Republican Caucus of thePennsylvania legislature. This presentment will disclose that a vast array of public expenditures,exceeding twenty million dollars, were spent between 2000 and 2007 by the House Republican

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Caucus on: programs that started with a legitimate legislative use, but ended in a campaign use;programs that were specifically designed to serve both legislative and political campaign

purposes; and, programs that had the singular purpose of employing public resources on behalfof political campaigns.

The Office of Attorney General and this Grand Jury experienced a series of acts bymembers and employees of the Caucus to obstruct and hinder this investigation. As a result,significant amounts of time and resources had to be invested in: (a) investigating the absence ofcertain evidence and (b) testing the accuracy of information provided in response to Grand Juryprocess. These efforts to obstruct the investigation and hinder the application of justice resultedin significant delays in this Grand Jury's efforts to define potential crimes, identify thoseappropriately CUlpable for criminal misconduct, and protect those who were innocent of criminalwrongdoing. The advent of such obstacles is the source of some charges contained in thisPresentment. Other potential acts of obstruction and hindering justice remain the subject ofongoing investigations by this Grand Jury.

The House. Republican Caucus is one of four caucuses that comprIse the primarymembership and employees of the Pennsylvania legislature. Each political party has a caucus ineach chamber of the Pennsylvania legislature. (At all times hereinafter, references to "Caucus"in this Presentment shall be for the House Republican Caucus unless otherwise specificallystated).

Inquiries into allegations ofmisconduct within the Pennsylvania legislature were initiallysparked by a series of newspaper revelations, commencing at the end of January, 2007, about asignificant sum of taxpayer funds secretly paid, in the form of bonuses, to employees of thePennsylvania legislature. Since 2007, the Office of Attorney General has been investigating the

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potential misuse of public monies within the four caucuses (House Democratic Caucus, HouseRepublican Caucus, Senate Republican Caucus and Senate Democratic Caucus) of the

Pennsylvania legislature. In its ensuing investigation of the House Republican Caucus, thisGrand Jury has uncovered a concerted plan to use taxpayer funds, employees and resources forpolitical campaign purposes.

In furtherance of this investigation, the 28 th Statewide Investigating Grand Jury hasreviewed extensive documentary evidence as well as testimony from numerous current andformer House Republican Caucus employees, special agents from the Office of AttorneyGeneral, and other pertinent witnesses. The scope of this Grand Jury's inquiry into the HouseRepublican Caucus has, by necessity, been extensive. Thousands of pages of t e s t i m o n ~ havebeen presented to this Grand Jury regarding the House Republican Caucus. This Grand Jury andinvestigators from the Office of Attorney General have acquired millions of emails, faxes,contracts, l e t t ~ r s , memos and other documents in the course of this investigation. 1 The reviewand analysis of this quantity ofmaterial has been necessary but time consuming.

All emails and documents placed in evidence before this Grand Jury were either obtainedthough a Grand Jury subpoena or provided voluntarily by individuals or entities. All emailsutilized in this Presentment have been authenticated by either an individual who sent, or anindividual who received, the communication. Additionally, all emails cited herein were sent onthe taxpayer funded legislative email system, unless otherwise specifically noted.

I Evidence was recovered from various locations in the United States. Agents and attorneystraveled to New Orleans and Washington, D.C. as part of the efforts required reconstructing the extensiveamounts of pertinent evidence that was reportedly missing from the Caucus.

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In this investigation, the Grand Jury has continued to be guided by the words of thePennsylvania Superior Court when it stated that an elected representative is "not allowed to

direct state-paid employees under his authority to conduct campaign/or fundraising related work,during state paid time, for his personal benefit." Such actions secure "a private monetaryadvantage" for an elected representative because, having state employees work for him on hiscampaign and/or fundraising tasks while they were being paid by the state, he obtained thebenefit of free campaign work funded by the taxpayers."

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II. THE HOUSE REPUBLICAN CAUCUSLEADERS AND STAFF PERTINENT TO THIS PRESENTMENTA. Representative PerzelNumerous people testified before the Grand Jury about Representative John Perzel's rise

to power in the House Republican Caucus. Perzel first sought a fonnal leadership positionwithin the Caucus in 1990 when he asked the Caucus members (the elected representatives of theHouse Republican Caucus) to elect him chairman of the House Republican Caucus PolicyCommittee. As part of this effort to become chairman of this committee, Perzel workedaggressively in favor of Republican members in the redistricting efforts that were underway atthat time. The Caucus elected him as policy chair and this commenced his climb of theleadership ladder.

In 1994, the Republicans became the majority party in the Pennsylvania House ofRepresentatives and Perzel was credited, through his redistricting and fundraising efforts, withassisting in this effort. As such, he sought and was elected to be the majority leader of the HouseRepublican Caucus in 1994. Perzel served as Majority Leader until 2003, when the Speaker of

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the House, Matthew Ryan, died. Perzel was then elected Speaker of the Pennsylvania House ofRepresentatives and served in that position until the Democratic Caucus regained majority statusin the House of Representatives in the legislative elections of 2006.

By all accounts, Perzel was aggressive in the acquisition and retention of power. Hedemanded obedience and loyalty and punished or eliminated those, whether elected officials oremployees, who challenged that power. These qualities were exemplified during his tenure asSpeaker of the House. As Speaker, Perzel retained a virtually unprecedented degree of powerover the resources of the House Republican Caucus. TraditionaHy, the Ivlajority Leader directiycontrols the Caucus funding and various Caucus departments (such as, research, districtoperations, printing, information and technologies, etc.). However, Perzel as Speaker, retainedabsolute control over the funds of the Caucus as well as virtually all of the Caucus departmentsother than a few (communications and printing) that he allowed the Majority Leader. tQsupervise.

Member.s and employees who were favored by Perzel, such as former RepresentativeBrett Feese, were rewarded with prominent positions in the Republican Caucus. Brian Preski,who served as Perzel's Chief of Staff from 2000 to 2007, became arguably the most powerfulperson in the Caucus short ofPerzel himself.

B. Representative SmithSmith was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1986 and has represented the

66th Legislative District since that time. He served as Majority Whip from 2000 to 2003 andMajority Leader from 2003 to 2006. He has been Minority Leader of the Caucus since 2007.

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c. Representative FeeseFeese was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1994. He rose rapidly into'

leadership under Majority Leader Perzel. In 2002, Feese became Majority Caucus Chair and in2003 he became Majority Whip. He took over, in 2004, one of the most powerful leadershippositions, as Majority Chairman of the Appropriations Committee. This position, during histenure, gave Feese oversight of all public funds approved for expenditure by the Legislature. Heremained in that position until the end of 2006. Feese was Chairman of the House RepublicanCampaign COIUInittee from 2003 to 2006. He did not run for reeiection in 2006 and becameChief Counsel of the Caucus in January of2007.

D. Brian PreskiPreski served as a Counsel to several legislative committees from 1995 to 2000. In

2000, he became Chief of Staff to the Majority Leader (Perzel). He remained in that p o s i t ~ o D until Perzel became Speaker of the House whereupon Preski remained as his Chief of Staff until2007.

E. Anthony PainterAnthony Painter had been an employee of the House Republican Caucus for 28 years.

From 1994 to July of 2007, he served as the Executive Director of the Republican Informationand Technology Office ("RIT"). Painter had worked closely with Perzel on the redistrictingefforts after the 1990 census and was subsequently made the Director of RIT when Perzelbecame Majority Leader. Painter cooperated with this investigation and testified pursuant to agrant of immunity.

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F. William TomaselliWilliam Tomaselli, worked closely with Perzel as a self-described ~ ~ t r o u b l e shooter." He

worked for Perzel from 1998 to 2007 as a Special Projects Coordinator. In 2007, he startedworking for Minority Leader Smith with the same title. Tomaselli cooperated with thisinvestigation and testified pursuant to a grant of immunity.

G. John HanleyHanley has worked for the Caucus since 1998. Most of his time in the Caucus has been

Director and Director. Hanley cooperated with this investigation and testified pursuant to agrant of immunity.

III. THE 2000 ELECTION IN THE 172ND DISTRICTIn the election of 2000, Perzel would experience what, by many accounts, would be the

defining moment for subsequent events. On the eve of Election Day in 2000, after the initialvote count, Perzel w:as losing his re-election effort in the 172 nd Legislative District. He was onlyable to achieve a very small margin of victory, the next day, after a count of the absentee ballots.Perzel vowed to never experience another close electoral challenge and instilled that manifesto inhis staff and employees of the Republican Caucus. Tomaselli testified that "panic struck" afterPerzel's close call in the 2000 election. Perzel put everyone on notice that everything possiblewould be done to prevent another occurrence of a close election in his district. Tomasellitestified that Perzel created a series of goals to ensure that he would never have another close calland the Republican Caucus would maintain their majority. One of his first acts was to open a

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pennanent campaign office. He staffed this office with Samuel "Buzz" Stokes, his brother-inlaw, as his initial Campaign Manager.

Tomaselli explained that Perzel had always been interested in the use of technology incampaigns but it now became "a priority" that was forcefully related to his campaign staff, hislegislative staff and other key employees of the Caucus. Perzel would travel to many differenttechnology conventions and shows around the country as part of his quest for ideas andequipment to realize his ambition. He would also attend campaign seminars and return to theCaucus with his ideas.

Painter also testified before the Grand Jury about the "pandemonium" that ensued as aresult of Perzel' s near defeat in the 2000 election. He testified from that day forward, "Therewas such an intense focus on making sure that this never happens again." Perzel, according toPainter, was "[v]ery focused on using technology to gain a competitive advantage" in campaigns.Painter elaborated that Perzel was in no way averse to using the Caucus and RIT resources in thepolitical and campaign aspects of the business. Painter testified that as time went by campaignwork became "so pervasive" that it became "institutionalized." He explained that it got to thepoint that the conduct of campaign work through RIT and public resources became so commonplace that such efforts were largely treated"as nonnal assignments by the staff.

Numerous witnesses before the Grand Jury echoed the testimony of Tomaselli andPainter regarding PerzeI's reaction to the election in 2000. Perzel's intense interest in usingtechnologies for campaign success and employing the resources necessary to make that anactuality also became widely known among Perzel' s s taf f and many Caucus employees.Virtually every employee of RIT became well aware of Perzel' s interest and direct involvementin the acquisition, development and use of technology for campaign purposes.

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IV. THE USE OF THE REPUBLICAN INFORMATION & TECHNOLOGY STAFFAND RESOURCES FOR CAMPAIGN PURPOSES

A. The BlueCard ProgramPerzel's travels in pursuit of better ideas for winning elections, led him to review a

program used in parts of Louisiana for the collection of detailed information about voters. Theprogram in Louisiana involved door to door questioning of voters and the. noting of voteranswers on blue colored pit:ces of paper, known as HBiueCards." On each BiueCard i h ~ r e wereareas to record specific information such as name, address, birthdays, phone numbers, emailaddresses, who they plan on voting for, whether they would like a yard sign for the c ~ d i d a t e , etc. Perzel adopted this idea for his legislative district and sought to overlay technology to theprocess. This endeavor became known as "the BlueCard Program." .

Painter testified that Perzel ' s vision was to create a program that would keep track of allthe households in Perzel' s district by maintaining accurate data about the individuals in eachhousehold. He stated that the BlueCard system was based upon a BlueCard that would be filledout for every individual in a household and would contain important information about eachindividual. He testified that the point of the whole process was to determine whether the peoplein that household were for Perzel, against Perzel, undecided or refused to talk. This keycomponent became known by the acronym FAVR.

Tomaselli defined the BlueCard program as a two piece system. He called the first piecea "manual piece" which involved sending campaign employees to every door in Perzel's districtto fill out the information on the BlueCard. Tomaselli stated that the second piece was an"electronic piece" that defined what happened to the data on the BlueCard upon its return to the

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campaign office. He testified that it was Perzel' s idea to create a computer program that wouldcapture the infonnation from the physical blue cards. Painter, Tomaselli, and every RIT

employee, or vendor, who worked on the BlueCard program, testified that it was solely forcampaign purposes.

John Perzel did not want to simply keep the BlueCards in file drawers for manualreference during campaigns. He wanted to align all the infonnation on these cards withtechnology to make it more easily accessible and deployable for campaign purposes. WhilePerze! gave the" BlueCard program life by ordering its creation anu ueuicaiing resources to ii, itwas Samuel "Buzz" Stokes who gave it definition. Stokes was a mainstay in Perzel's campaignefforts from 2000 to 2006. By the account of dozens of people who testified before this GrandJury, Stokes was the prime architect and keeper of the BlueCard program throughout its life.Despite BlueCard's control by a campaign, little to no campaign funds or resources ended" upbeing utilized in the creation and furtherance of the BlueCard program. As testified. to byPainter, T o m a s e ~ l i and numerous other RIT employees, significant amounts of employee hours,technical knowledge, resources, and equipment were put into the BlueCard program by the RITstaff. All of this effort was done at the expense of Pennsylvania's taxpayers.

Tomaselli testified that the initial BlueCard assignment was given to an RIT employeenamed Robert Haines. Haines testified that the creation of the BlueCard program was assignedto him by Painter and Tomaselli sometime in early 2001. He was directed to take all of hisguidance, on the creation of this program, from Buzz Stokes in Perzel's campaign office.However, Haines testified that direction would also come from an individual named DonaldMcClintock who was the Campaign Office Manager for Perzel' s campaign. According to

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Haines, Stokes and McClintock were his primary contacts throughout his years of work on theBlueCard program.

Initially, Haines was told to replicate the B l u e C a r d ~ s contents on a computer screen shot.Haines began working on a system that would allow the electronic tracking of the identifyinginformation from the BlueCards about voters in Perzel' s district. He chose a format, MicrosoftAccess, and tried to integrate the ever growing list of features demanded by Stokes. Hainestestified" that it took him three to four months to get the first version ofBlueCard in operation.

T umasdii and Painter both testified that Perzei' s impatience at this time was profound.Tomaselli described how, as early as April 2001, he was summoned into Perzel's office and toldto get down into the RIT office to get the BlueCard program moving. The pressure from Perzelincreased throughout 2001. Tomaselli explained that it was a difficult situation. As dozens ofwitnesses would testify, Stokes was extremely "meticulous" and was intent on perfecting ,theinformation in the BlueCard program. Perzel, while less focused on details, was very aggressivein demanding t ~ e program be promptly made operational and satisfactory to Stokes. Thistension between the increasing demands of the users and the techriicians attempting to make theprogram operational would be an ongoing theme throughout BlueCard's history."

As a direct result of Perzel' s pressure, RIT began to dedicate more and more resources tothe BlueCard program. By August of 2001, an additional programmer, Keith Paukovits and atleast three others were assigned to assist Haines on the program. Paukovits testified that whenhe started working on the BlueCard program, the people at Perzel' s campaign office claimed theprogram did not meet their standards and were angry and frustrated. He and the others were toldto fix the problems and make the program fully operational.

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Tomaselli testified that during the summer of 2001 he attended a meeting with Perzel ata Philadelphia hotel. In attendance at this meeting were many of Perzel' s campaign advisors and

political vendors. In addition, Perzel' s wife and his chief of staff, Brian Preski, were inattendance. Tomaselli stated that the meeting only pertained to Perze l's re-election efforts. Hedescribed it as a planning meeting where specific assignments were given for Perzel' s 2002 ree l ~ c t i o n campaign. Tomaselli was assigned responsibility for quite a few of these re-electionprojects including the BlueCard program, and Pre ski felt Tomaselli needed some help. Preskitold TOlnaselli that they wen: going to find him somebody to heip him with these projects (aH ofwhich were campaign related). About a month later, Perzel told Tomaselli that they were hiringEric Ruth to help him and he would be placed into RIT as Painter' s deputy director. Painter, andnumerous other RIT staff, testified that Ruth was placed in RIT for the primary purpose ofshepparding through Perzel's numerous campaign projects. He would spend most of his time atRIT insuring that this work took priority over everything else.

In December of 2001, the BlueCard program was still viewed as incomplete and thepressure had b e c o m ~ intense. Tomaselli testified that over the Christmas period of2001, he wasbeing repeatedly harangued by Perzel and Stokes over what they viewed to be a lack of progress.As a result, Tomaselli and Ruth put a deadline on the RIT staff on January 3, 2002: Emails andtestimony describe how the RIT staff worked through that holiday season in an attempt toappease the demands of Perzel's campaign. Paukovits testified for the Grand Jury that it wasclear the push to get the BlueCard program done by January 2002 was because that was the startof the campaign season for Perzel. Nominating petitions would start to be circulated InFebruary, for filing in March, and the primary election was scheduled for May of2002.

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In January of 2002, despite the efforts of the RIT staff, responsibility for the BlueCardprogram was shifted to a private vendor, GCR & Associates, Inc. ("GCR") This change was

neither sudden nor inadvertent. It was one of the first examples of what the Grand Jury wouldlearn was a common pattern of conduct by Perzel. Perzel abhorred chance and uncertainty and,as a result, aggressively sought to build redundancy and safety nets into those projects he viewedas essential to his success. As such, the potential involvement with BlueCard by GCR had beenin the works for some time. The full details of the Caucus' lengthy and costly relationship withGCR will be fully explored elsewhere in this Presenimeni bui, for the "purpose of this section, itwill just be noted that GCR was operating at this time under a two million dollar contract thathad just been signed on January 1, 2002 by Preski on behalf of Perzel and the Caucus. 2

Tomaselli testified that Perzel and Preski were well aware that part of GCR's work,under the taxpayer funded caucus contract, would be on the BlueCard program. Not only wasTomaselli part of the discussions with them on this matter, but documents acquired by the GrandJury corroborate this knowledge. In a memo from GCR dated February 1, 2002, to John Perzeland Brian Preski, it is clearly stated that, in addition to other work - both legislative andcampaign - GCR would be working on the BlueCard program. Tomaselli explained that bothPerzel and Preski had personally negotiated with GCR on the work to be performed" and that theFebruary 1,2002 memo was simply affirming what had already been agreed upon.

2 It should also be noted that in addition to the contract executed between the Caucus and GCR onJanuary I, 2002, there was another publically funded contract already in place between the Caucus andGCR. That contract had been executed in May of2001 and paid GCR in excess of $426,000. That earliercontract had also been executed by Preski on behalf of Perzel and the House Republican Caucus.

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Haines testified about the power and authority that Perzel s campaign staff wieldedwithin the capitol. He testified that they had absolute authority and their requests took priority

over all other work, even those of the Republican Representatives and their staff. Hainesdescribed how he had made a relatively minor error on the BlueCard program that resulted in afaulty printing of some of the cards in the campaign office. He stated that this occurred aroundthe time that GCR was brought on to work on the BlueCard program. As a result of this mistake,an angry McClintock called Haines from the campaign office and told him, among other things,that he should be "fin:d" fur his incompetence. Stokes and IvicCliniock also comph;tined toTomaselli and Painter and their power was such that they were able to have Haines removedfrom the BlueCard project. Haines testified that he was then assigned to minor data ent')' workfor some months before he eventually returned to the BlueCard project.

GCR's arrival to work on the BlueCard program did not result in the elimination of RITfrom the project. Emails from the period, as well as testimony about those events, reveal thatRIT continued to assist GCR in the work on the BlueCard program. GCR did, through 2002,make a series of refinements in the BlueCard program. However, in what would becomecommon place, Perzel' s campaign people then became angry and frustrated with GCR over amistake in the BlueCard program and they eventually reverted back to the RIT staff for theirprimary technical assistance.

One of the people heavily involved in the BlueCard program during this period was anindividual named Kevin Curtin. Curtin had been hired as a contract employee of RIT in 2001primarily due to his expertise in Microsoft Access type programs and databases. (The same typeof system utilized in the BlueCard program). Curtin testified that it was common place in 2002for RIT staff to be on the phone with GCR staff and Perzel' s campaign office about the BlueCard

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program. Curtin testified that from his first involvement with the BlueCard program in 2001until 2007 the RIT staff had extensive contacts with Perzel' s campaign office through meetings

at the campaign office, meetings at the Capitol, emails, faxes and phone calls. He stated, "Thatis pretty much normal to talk to them almost every day about something or another that theywanted or needed or thought of." However, Curtin testified that they were advised by Painter,Tomaselli and Stokes to keep their work for the campaign office a secret. He said that he and hiscoworkers talked openly about it and that they felt they did not have an alternative if they wantedto keep their jobs. Curtin's testinl0ny in this ft!ganl was corroborated by the testimony of anumber of other RIT staffmembers.

The BlueCard program was operational during the 2002 re-election of Perzel and wasdeemed a success. Nonetheless the quest to improve the BlueCard program, as with almost allthe technological campaign applications pursued by Perzel, never ended. In 2002, a new I,UTemployee was added to the BlueCard program team. Amanda Kaplan was hired as a data analystin RIT during April of 2002. Through her employment with RIT she became one of the primaryworkers focused on the BlueCard program. She testified that RlT staff focused on the BlueCardprogram. She testified that it was clear from the beginning that any work requested by BuzzStokes was a priority. She worked closely with him in doing data updates and other initiatives toimprove the BlueCard program.

After the election in 2002, the next big improvement in the BlueCard program was itstransfonnation into an internet web based program. One of the significant limitations of theoriginal BlueCard program was that it had been constructed in a manner that required it to beinstalled separately on each computer using the program. As such, if five computers had theBlueCard program, and all its accompanying voter data installed on them, they could not interact

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or share information. Every change, improvement or update of infonnation had to be made onevery computer operating the BlueCard program. By converting BlueCard to a web based'

program, Stokes could have multiple users employing BlueCard through the internet. Curtintestified that the web based program allowed for many more records and data to be stored andprovided '"more processing power" for the BlueCard program. It also allowed for a single updateor improvement to be made that would be instantly accessible to every user.

This conversion was done entirely by RIT staff. Curtin, who was one of the primary RITemployees involved, testified that the conversion of tht: B i u ~ C a r d prugram frum a computerbased program to a web based program '"was a significant project" that took approximately eightto ten months to perfonn. Most of this work waS perfonned by RITS staffers: Kevin Curtin;Keith Paukovits; Robert Haines; Amanda Kaplan; and Kris Hacker. The web based systemneeded, to be installed on a server accessible via the internet. Curtin, with the agreement.ofStokes, rented a server solely dedicated to the BlueCard endeavor. The server was located out ofstate and was a c ~ e s s i b l e and identified as kevincurtinI.com. The cost of renting the server wasapproximately $400:00 a month. Curtin testified that this bill came to him every month and hewas reimbursed for the exact amount by the Friends of John Perzel (Perzel's 'campaign fund).He testified that he also received some additional payments from the Friends of JOM' Perzel("FOJP") for his work on the BlueCard program in 2002. However, he was discouragedthereafter from billing everything to the FOJP and testified that the vast majority of his campaignwork was paid by the Caucus. The kevincurtin I.com server remained in the employ of theBlueCard program until it was shut off in March of 2008.

Paukovits testified that the conversion of the BlueCard program into a web based systemwas conducted in two phases - the first was the simple adoption of the historical features of the

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BlueCard program into the new web based system and the second was direction aboutimprovements from Buzz Stokes. Paukovits further outlined that part of Stokes' ambition for the

web based program involved his desire to expand its usefulness and accessibility to politicalward and committee people in the City of Philadelphia. Stokes went to great pains to explain tothe RIT staff how political wards, divisions, committees and election boards functioned in theCity of Philadelphia. This was essential in order for them to effectively create a wardmanagement portion of the BlueCard program. Over time, a very large amount of effort wasinvested in a


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be assigned to complete the task. If they proved unsatisfactory or incapable, a publically fundedvendor would simply be utilized to perfonn the work.

In 2003, another vendor was introduced into the work effort on the BlueCard program.A vendor named Aristotle International, Inc. (,"Aristotle") had been retained by contract with theCaucus in May of 2003.3 By July of 2003, Aristotle was heavily engaged in improving andmodifying the BlueCard program. Aristotle's first project manager for their House RepublicanCaucus work was named Stephanie Minnaugh. She was assigned a desk to work from in the RITdepartment within the Capitol. She testified that her original understanding was that AristoHc:would be perfonning work on a constituent services database. While ~ h e did eventually do workon the constituent services database, a great deal of her work ended up focused on Perzel' scampaign office and the BlueCard program.

Minnaugh testified that a number of RIT employees maintained the BlueCard programand database for Perzel' s campaign office. She identified five RIT staffers who workedspecifically on campaign projects for the Speaker of the House. They were Paukovits, Curtin,Haines, Kaplan, and Hacker. She testified that these employees updated the BlueCard database'"every election cycle." She explained that this involved updating the BlueCard data, followingevery election, to note which voters in the 172 nd legislative district voted and which did not.They would also be constantly updating the infonnation about voters who had moved in or out ofthe district or who had passed away. She testified that she observed that these efforts took agreat deal of time. Minnaugh said that the campaign work appeared to be common place and

3 Again, as with the previously referenced vendor GCR, the full extent of Aristotle's utilization incampaign efforts will be detailed elsewhere in this Presentment. The references here will be limited toAristotle's work on the BlueCard program.

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that nobody hid the fact that they were doing campaign and political work rather than legislativework.

Minnaugh testified that almost immediately after her arrival, she was directed to Perzel' scampaign office. In her first four months as the project manager on the House RepublicanCaucus contract she stated that she worked in Perzel' s campaign office "fourteen days out ofeach month, sometimes more", she testified that she worked directly with Buzz Stokes and DonMcClintock in Perzel' s campaign office. They directed her work, without hesitation, despite thefact that she was employed under the CauCus contract. She stated that IvlcCliniock jpked onseveral occasions about it being illegal and wondering if his daughter would ever turn on thenews and see him being put into a police car. She confirmed that the RIT staff also too,k theirBlueCard program directions from these individuals in Perzel' s campaign office.

Stokes made great efforts to . instruct Minnaugh about the political environment InPhiladelphia. She explained that he gave her a copy of a "ward leader's book" because hewanted her to understand the mission of the campaign office and how Philadelphia politicsoperated. She stated that the book detailed campaigning in Philadelphia and Perzel'sElectionDay operations. She further stated that Kevin Curtin showed her a program he created and wascontinuing to work on that allowed Philadelphia ward leaders to manage elections and ElectionDay activities at the ward level. Perzel ' s campaign staff, along with the RIT staff, educatedMinnaugh on the BlueCard program to assist her in helping direct improvements.

Minnaugh testified that the improvements to the BlueCard program sought fromAristotle ranged from very minor repairs to significant endeavors. Minnaugh detailed oneoccasion when Stokes had become agitated over the way the BlueCards were printing. Heinsisted that they were not printing correctly. Minnaugh testified that after the RIT staff was

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unable to satisfy Stokes, he turned to Aristotle to fix the problem. She described to the GrandJury that something like every third card had perhaps a "two millimeter" discrepancy in one of

the margins. She said it had no effect upon the legibility or the usefulness of the card but it wasstill "unacceptable to the campaign office." As a result, Aristotle employees spent "about twoweeks trying to break into the code of the reporting system" to repair this small discrepancy inthe margin.

Stokes also sought far more significant assistance from Aristotle. He sought many newfeatures and improvements in the BlueCard progranL ivlinnaugh i ~ s i i f i ~ J thal by the end of theprocess, Aristotle had significantly rewritten the software for the BlueCard program whileestablishing the same parameters in terms of data captured in the original BlueCard system. Shestated that the Aristotle work left the system more modernized, faster and user friendly .

. Both Painter and Minnaugh testified about one particular special feature sought by P e r ~ e l . and Stokes. Painter testified that he was frequently directed to explore new ideas and teclmologyfor incorporation, into the BlueCard program. In one case, he was directed by Perzel and Pre skito meet with a company called Cubistix. Cubistix had developed software for campaigns thatallowed candidates to knock on the greatest amount of doors in the shortest period of time and tohit target audiences in a very efficient manner. He met with them, not in 'the hope of purchasingtheir software, but to "highjack their best ideas" - as directed by Perzel. The intent was to taketheir ideas and have Aristotle write that same "functionality in the BlueCard" program. Thiswould allow street lists and street walking routes for Perzel ' s district that would allow him to hitthe "greatest number of doors in the shortest amount of time." Painter testified that there was agreat deal of enthusiasm for this project and Aristotle did subsequently endeavor to make it areality.

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Minnaugh and other Aristotle employees described the significant amount of work thatwent into the efforts to create satisfactory methods to align each address with each voter and the'voters identifying information. Additionally, an attempt was made to integrate a mappingfeature into the program so that perfectly accurate maps identifying each address and each votercould be printed for door to door campaign operations. Despite significant efforts, and expense,this program was ultimately rejected by Stokes. The Grand Jury reviewed numerous emails andother documents that corroborate these efforts.

Painter described in his Grand j uy l ~ s l i m o n y , how, u n d ~ r i h ~ A r i s i o U ~ contracts, it hadbeen built into these contracts for Aristotle to do the extra work at set rates. For example,additional installation days were billed at $1,500 per day and additional programming hours werebilled at $200 per hour. Painter also identified provisions in the contracts that pertained tocampaign work on the BlueCard program. For example, he specifically identified the t e ~ s "street name look up" in one of the contracts and stated that this was direct reference toattempting to i ~ t e g r a t e the Cubistix concept into the BlueCard program. Painter furtheridentified in excess .of $80,000 in Aristotle expenses that were directly attributable to Aristotlework just on the BlueCard effort.

Painter testified that he had discussions with Brian Preski about the Aristotle expensesfor the work they were performing on the BlueCard program. Initially, Painter stated that Preskitold him that this work would be paid for by the Friends of John Perzel. However, when the billcame due, Preski directed Painter to just pay the money out of the legislative RIT budget.

Painter, Minnaugh and a number of RIT staff testified about a significant joint effortbetween Aristotle and RIT to address Perzel's desire to integrate the BlueCard data with datafrom other sources. There was always great interest in obtaining as much information as

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possible about voters and integrating it into the BlueCard system. However , Stokes was alwaysadamant that his core data in the BlueCard program was highly accurate and he did not want italtered or amended without being assured that the new data was an improvement. As such, thispresented great difficulties in creating a computer system that would automatically integrate newdata into the BlueCard program. Painter testified that this ""data sharing scheme" was an ongoingproblem and became '"'"very time intensive." Numerous RIT staff and Aristotle employeesworked on this effort over the years. Again, the Grand Jury reviewed large amounts of writtendocumentation that corroborates the significant effort invested by both RIT and Aristotle in . t h i ~ attempt to improve the information contained in the BlueCard program. In one particularlytelling email, Kaplan - who had recently left the employ of the Caucus - wrote to Hacker thatshe still had dreams about doing data updates for Buzz Stokes. She wrote that one such dreamwoke her up and '"'"Then I remembered, wait a minute - I don't have to do that."

Minnaugh testified that John Perzel knew well that Aristotle was performing work forhis campaign in his campaign office. She testified that she personally saw Perzel in thecampaign office o b ~ e r v i n g their work on the BlueCard system. Iri addition, she testified that onanother occasion she did a presentation for Perzel, in his campaign office, about the work thatAristotle was doing to improve the BlueCard program. She testified that there was no questionthat he knew she was an employee ofAristotle.

The improvements in the BlueCard system provided by Aristotle, coupled with RIT'swork at making the BlueCard program web based, allowed the program to be used in districtsand campaigns outside of Perzel' s 172nd District. Painter testified that Perzel wanted toreplicate the BlueCard program on a regional and eventually statewide basis. Painter testifiedthat Perzel was pushing this as a part of his idea for running for governor of Pennsylvania in

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2010. Numerous additional witnesses talked about the expansion of the BlueCard program intomany other races. Paukovits confirmed the use of the BlueCard program in various races around

the state and the desire to eventually use statewide campaigns. Paukovits explained to the GrandJury that the BlueCard program was fairly easily adapted - in terms of the programmingfunctions- to new districts and campaigns. He said that the real work was on the data sidebecause all new data (voter information) needed to be input into the BlueCard program for eachnew regIon.

Paukuvits testified abuui ihe work entailed in establishing each new BlueCardapplication. A RIT employee would be assigned to set up a web environment for Paukovits toinput the empty shell of the BlueCard program. Paukovits would then change some of theimages and codes of the BlueCard program to fit each new legislative district or campaignregIon. Placing the new voter data. into the system required additional significant labor.Paukovits explained that voter data for each region could come from door to door efforts, countyvoter data, and/or purchased voter data from a vendor. Paukovits testified that cleaning andpreparing the data could be an expensive and time consuming process.

Paukovits, Haines and other RIT employees testified about the numerous BlueCardapplications that were utilized in the 2004 elections. The RIT staff created BlueCard programsfor house districts 152, 170, 172, 174 and 177 during that year. In addition, the BlueCardprogram was created for State Senate District 5 and even for a congressional district(Congressional District 13). Even after the general election of 2004, the expansion of theBlueCard program into more districts continued to be pushed as a priority. In an email datedNovember 9, 2004, only a week after the general election, Painter pushed his staff to create

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BlueCard websites for the 18 th , 61 S\ 70th, 146 th , 151 st, 152 nd and 164 th districts. Painter testifiedthat this was part ofPerzel's effort to expand his campaign influence across the state.

As previously referenced, the greatest obstacle to the expansion of the BlueCard programwas having adequate and accurate voter data for the area of proposed use of the program. Thequest for the best voter data possible to fuel BlueCard, as well as other campaign endeavors,became a massive effort that will be detailed elsewhere in this Presentment. For the purposes ofthis section, suffice it to say that the vast majority of the voter information input into the manyexpansions of the BlueCard prugram came from the purchases of such" information, at t ~ x p a y e r expense, from vendors that specialize in the accumulation and sale of such information. Again,the Grand Jury reviewed hundreds of documents and emails, as well as direct t e s t i ~ o n y , evidencing these arrangements.

While 2005 was not a general election year for legislative seats that did not prevent theexpansion of the BlueCard system. Haines and Paukovits detailed the significant efforts thatwere made to establish the BlueCard program on behalfof a special election held in July of 2005in the 131 st Legislative District. Haines testified that the RIT staff had to rush to get theBlueCard program operating in that election on behalf of Republican candidate Karen Beyerbecause there was a short tum around time, as a result of the election being held in JUly. Hainesstated that an individual named Paul Towhey was the leader of the effort to establish theBlueCard program in that election. Towhey was a legislative staffer in one of Perzel's districtoffices. Haines testified that this was one of numerous times that Towhey directed RIT staff tosetup BlueCard programs throughout the state. Haines described Towhey as only known to himby campaign work and further stated that Towhey was well aware that Haines and the other RITstaff were conducting all of this campaign work on legislative time.

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In the 131 st District, Haines testified that Towhey sought to acquire as much voterinformation through door to door efforts as was possible. To address Towhey's demands and in

an attempt to streamline the process, Haines and Paukovits put together special street listings onlaptop computers so that their voter information/data could be entered as the campaign workerswent door to door. In theory, this would eliminate the need for data input from written entries onthe BlueCards. However, this system was not very successful and the campaign workers largelyreverted to use of the paper BlueCards. Haines also testified that he and other RIT staffers, hadto travel to BCYCi'S campaign office and install the equipinent nel:t:ssary tu uperate the BiueCardprogram.

A number ofRIT staff members also testified in detail about the 2005 establishment of aPhiladelphia city wide BlueCard program. This effort was primarily orchestrated by Stokes, butwas clearly conducted at the ultimate direction of Perzel and Preski. The testimony Cl!ld,documents reveal that the establishment of the Philadelphia citywide BlueCard program ,was asignificant and expensive project. The RIT staff was driven to complete this effort in adequatetime for it to be used in the general election of 2005. The staff was directed to assist thePhiladelphia campaign of Hillel Levinson who was running for City Controller in that election.

. Paukovits testified that in 2005 they realized that RIT was operating so many copies ofthe BlueCard website program that it was becoming a technologically risky practice. Heexplained that if a repair needed to be done on any of the standard functions of the BlueCard

. program, the repair would have to be made in each and every copy of the BlueCard application.The solution, reached by the RIT staff, was to eliminate this risk by collecting all of theBlueCard web based applications into a single web site. Paukovits testified that this was a rather

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complicated effort and took many weeks of work. This work was conducted primarily byPaukovits, Curtin and Haines.

BlueCard continued to expand in both scope and sophistication through the 2006elections. Testimony from Painter, Tomaselli, Haines, Paukovits, Curtin, and others detailedhow the program continued to spread and receive significant resources through the end of 2006. .Tomaselli, who managed Perzel's 2006 re-election campaign, testified how he was impressedwith the'capabilities of the program in that election and how it had blossomed into a really niceprogram.

B. Telstar and the Election Day Complete ProgramIn the course of its various investigations into the mIsuse of public resources for

campaigns, this Grand Jury has learned that campaigns invest a great deal of effort in "get out thevote" ('.'GOTV") efforts. These are not altruistic efforts to encourage all voters to go to the p o ~ l s , rather these involve efforts to get those voters who will vote for the campaign's candidate to goto the polls. P ~ r z e l and his campaign were always focused on ways to insure that Perzel'ssupporters went to the polls on Election Day. The difficulty with GOTV Election Day efforts isaccurately determining who, throughout Election Day, has and has not yet voted: It is obviouslyvery inefficient and costly to keep contacting voters throughout Election Day who may havealready voted first thing in the morning.

Painter testified that among Perzel' s first focused ventures into applying technology tocampaign initiatives was an idea to use handheld computers to track voters at polling places.Historically, the only way to track voters at polling places was to have a person at each pollingplace who attempts to write down the name of every voter who votes. Painter explained thatPerzel had a vision to take handheld computers and to "load each device with the registered

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voters in a precinct or division in Philadelphia." Campaign workers at the polling places wouldthen just click a name on these handheld devices and have that information electronicallytransmitted to a common database. He further explained that, throughout Election Day, a systemwould be extracting those who had already voted from a list of voters who were favorable toPerzel. If a voter had not voted and was favorable to Perzel, campaign workers would go to thevoter's door and try to get the voter to go to the polls. Painter stated "it is what is known asknock and drag." He further stated that Perzel believed that this was a way he "could maximizehis limited resources." Tomaselli also mirrored this testimony and stated that this w-as Olle ofPerzel's ideas. Painter testified that he was approached by Perzel and told to make this idea areality. This effort was done entirely by using the resources and staff of the RIT and was fully -funded and paid for by the taxpayers of Pennsylvania.

Tomaselli testified that originally this handheld computer idea was labeled "TELSTAR."Over time, as the program became much bigger, more complicated and interconnected to manyof the other technological endeavors, it became known as "Election Day Complete." Paintertestified that in the. early years of TELST AR there would be frequent meetings with Perzel,Pre ski and Stokes about how the system should be designed and how it was working. Tomasellitestified that he and Ruth were also involved in many of these meetings as were whatever RITstaff was necessary to provide technical updates.

One of the earliest issues challenging the success of this idea was obtaining the righthandheld computers for accomplishing the task. Numerous members of the RIT staff testifiedthat they were consulted and/or asked to research which handheld computers would best servePerzel's Election Day needs. The initial handheld computers purchased were called "Ninos".Douglas Swenson, who was a hardware technician with RIT back in 2000, was involved with

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testing to detennine whether the Ninos could adequately track the voters on Election Day. Heand a number of other caucus employees were directed to go to Philadelphia on Election Day in

2000 and drive around to various polling places and attempt to transmit the data to a centrallocation. The initial test was limited to a number of polling places in the 64 th Ward in Perzel' sdistrict. The Ninos proved to be ineffective and the RIT staff continued their search for adequatetechnology.

Perzel actively participated in the search and study of available technology that wouldbest give his idea life. A fOIUler RIT contract e l n p l o y ~ ~ , Gregury Harbuld, t e s t i f i ~ d that. aruundthe middle of 2001 he was told to assist RIT in the purchase and use of handheld computers onelection days. He stated, "The idea was to try to put a list on a handheld device and watch as thepeople came in and check off who actually came into vote and who didn't." He understood thatthe idea for this came from Perzel. As part of this effort, Harbold took a trip to Las Vegas toattend a technology show with Perzel, Painter, Tomaselli, and others. Harbold went on this tripfor the specific purpose, as requested, to judge the technology and to detennine which itemscould do what Perzel wanted achieved on election days. He testified that it was never suggestedor stated that the handheld computers would have any purpose other than tracking voters onElection Day.

Harbold described that he was physically present with Perzel as they reviewed differenthandheld devices. He stated that Perzel asked pointed questions about the capabilities andspecifications of the handhelds they inspected. Harbold explained that the primary focus was onhow data could be downloaded onto the devices and uploaded back to a central database.Harbold further testified that it was his clear understanding that the object was to keep track ofthe voters so as to allow the campaign to encourage favorable voters to get to the polls before


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they closed. The renewed technology search eventually settled on handheld Cassiopeia PC's. At-least forty seven of these were purchased by the Caucus for use in the TELSTAR operation.

Doug Swenson, who began with RIT as a hardware technician and eventually becamethe hardware supervisor, testified that Cassiopeia stopped making these handheld computers andthe Caucus began purchasing Compaq IPAQ handheld computers. Eventually, the Caucus alsopurchased a number of Treo handheld computers. In addition to handheld computers, the Caucuspurchased dozens of handheld scanners. Swenson testified that eventually RIT was able to havesixty to seventy haf.ldheid computers operating in the fidd on Ejection Day at one time.

The first full scale employment of the TELSTAR system took place in the April 2002special election held in the 176th legislative district (a Monroe County legislative d i ~ t r i c t ) . Painter testified that approximately thirty of the Cassiopeia handheld computers were purchasedin anticipation of this election. Stokes, who had been heavily involved in the creation anddirection of the TELSTAR system, acted as the field coordinator for its use and also assisted intraining the participants. The goal was to not only assist the Republican candidate in theirspecial election but to demonstrate that these handhelds could successfully operate from the fieldand transmit the right data directly to a central location where it could be employed to determinewhich favorable voters had not yet voted.. Many RIT staff and other Caucus employees testifiedbefore the Grand Jury that they assisted, or observed the TELSTAR system in this specialelection. TELSTAR was viewed as largely successful in this election. Painter testified thatevery use of this system was ultimately designed to improve it for use in Perzel' s district on his _re-election campaigns.

After further refinements and improvements, learned from the experience in the Aprilspecial election, TELST AR was utilized again in the November 2002 general election in Perzel' s

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district and in the 148th and 153 rd legislative districts. Painter explained that Perzel viewed the148th and 153 rd districts as "at risk" districts and so he had extra resources dedicated to those

election efforts. Every piece of equipment utilized in this effort was purchased by the Caucusand was public property. Again, the TELSTAR operation was viewed as a great success.Numerous witnesses testified before the Grand Jury, including employees of Perzel's districtoffices, that they witnessed the use of the TELSTAR operation on Election Day in Perzel ' s -district. .

After the 2002 election successes of the Republican C a u ~ u s , Pt:rzd tuld Painter that hereally believed it was through the use of technology that the Republicans were able to winadditional House seats. At this point, the basic concept of the TELSTAR operation was firmly inplace. Workers would be trained to use the handheld computers and dispersed to polling placesfrom which they would transmit, at various preordained times on Election Day, the identities.o(voters who had already voted. This information would be transmitted to a central location ~ h e r e a previously established computer program would extract those who had voted from a master listof voters likely to be favorable to the Republican candidate. The identities of the remainingvoters would be provided to other campaign workers who would contact these individuals byphone or in person to encourage them to get to the polls. In practice, this operation took a greatdeal of programming, data processing, technical skill and sophisticated equipment. In 2002, allof this effort and expertise had been provided by the RIT staff, at the expense of taxpayers.

One of the attempts to improve the TELSTAR operation involved the addition of GCR"II

into the equation. At the request of Perzel and Preski, GCR created an Election Day programthat was designed to gather all the transmissions from the poll ing places and then quickly send tothe campaign headquarters a report of the favorable voters who had not yet gone to the polls.

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These reports would be generated at numerous set times throughout Election Day. The voter -update and transmittal times were usually 9:00 a.m., 11 :00 a.m., 2:00 p.m., 4:00 p.m. and 6:00p.m. As with GCR's involvement with the BlueCard program, all ofGCR's efforts were paid bythe taxpayer's pursuant to GCR contracts with the Caucus. This fact was well known to Perzeland Preski. Indeed, in furtherance of these efforts, and other caucus programs to be discussedlater, the Caucus purchased and provided two very high quality servers for use as a websiteserver and a database server. Both these servers were used on the Election Day efforts and they\vere stationed in Louisiana vvhcrc OCR has their business operations.

Other improvements were continuously being integrated into the system. One of theprimary ways they sought to make the Election' Day effort more efficient was to integrateTELSTAR results with the voter information contained in the BlueCard system. This proved tobe particularly effective in Perzel's district where the BlueCard voter data was considered to ~ e . up to date and highly accurate. The more accurately a candidate tracked his or her favorablevoters, the more effective the Election Day operation would perform. Another significant pieceintegrated into the operation was a computer program called SKYPE that allowed telephone callsto be made in a quick and inexpensive manner. The end result of these and many otherimprovements to the TELSTAR operation was its transformation into what became known as theElection Day Complete application.

The Election Day Complete application could track not only which voters were votingthroughout Election Day, but could track with a fair degree of accuracy, the percentage offavorable voters turning out on behalf of Perzel or the Republican candidate. This informationwould inform a campaign throughout the day, as to the amount of get out the vote effort theyneeded to invest in each voting area of the district. The Election Day Complete application

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could also print out a list of favorable voters on "street walking lists" so volunteers could go andknock on those doors. The SK YPE component of the operation allowed campaign workers tosimply push a button and the favorable voter's number would be dialed through the computer sothat the worker, talking through a headset, could encourage the voter to get to the polls on behalfof the candidate. The creation and implementation of the Election Day Complete applicationinvolved large amounts of personnel, hours and equipment.

Each deployment of the application was enabled by essentially three different groups ofpeople. The first \vere the programmers .and data analysts who cieated the computer functjonsand integrated them all into a single system. This was a s o p h i s t i c a ~ e d effort which involved,over the years, Painter, Curtin, Paukovits, Haines, Kaplan, Hacker, Harbold and other RIT staff.The second group was the RIT staff responsible for maintenance and installation of theequipment necessary to operate the Election Day Complete application. In addition to thehandheld computers and scanners, the system required large amounts of other equipment, such asmodems, laptop computers, stand alone computers, printers and servers. The third group was thecampaign workers who collected the voter data at the polling places, did the door to door get outthe vote efforts, and made the phone calls throughout the election day.

Numerous witnesses described the process required in anticipation of preparing theequipment for an Election Day Complete operation. Weeks before the election day, all theequipment would be removed from storage in RIT and assembled for the approaching Electionday operation. The first thing done was the removal of all property tags identifying the

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equipment as the property of the Caucus.4 Each handheld computer/scanner would be assignedto the ward, polling place or precinct to which that piece of equipment was assigned. Text files

containing lists of the voters for the voting precincts/wards where the equipment would be usedhad to be loaded onto the handheld computers. Each handheld would then be tested with the allthe other accompanying equipment to make sure that it was fully operationally before theelection day. Laptop computers and/or desktop computers would also be fully programmed andequipped with necessary voter data for installation at the location chosen to be the Election DayComplete headquarters. Often, printers would also a c ~ u I I l p a n y these computers _ o - theheadquarters for use and printing of "knocking lists, street lists, call. lists or something of thatnature." Many witnesses described this process as an "assembly line" procedure that proceededvirtually every election day from 2002 until 2006. The RIT staff would also perform training for _those who would be utilizing any part of the equipment during the Election Day Completeoperation.

Two of the most experienced RIT equipment handlers for the Election Day Completewere Doug Swenson and Andrew Mummert. Each of these individuals detailed for the GrandJury the work they performed in Perzel's district during elections. Numerous planning meetingswould take place with Painter, Ruth, Tomaselli, Stokes, McClintock or others about how andwhere the Election Day Complete equipment would be utilized and dispersed in Perzel' s District.The day before the election, Mummert and Swenson would load all the equipment up and travelwith it to Philadelphia. They would deliver equipment to various preordained locations. The

4 The removal of these tags was very important. Numerous RIT staff testified that this wasrequired by Painter and closely inspected by Swenson. New tags would be placed on the equipment whenit would return from its election use.

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equipment all came from RIT and was the property of the public. Often, even supplies such aspaper, were provided for the operation. Equipment would be dropped off at Perzel's legislativedistrict offices, Perzel's home and to the campaign office at 7050 Frankford Avenue. Thehandheld computers and scanners would be further checked and prepared upon delivery at eachlocation, as were the computers. All of the computers could directly link with GCR on electionday. All of the equipment was to be put in place and made operational the day before electionday. The handheld computers/scanners delivered to each location were marked. with identifying

On election day, Swenson and Mummert would be at the campaign office by 8:00 a.m.All of the Election Day Complete workers had phone numbers for Swenson in case anyequipment problems came up. Swenson and Mummert would then actively participate throughelection day on the collection of the voting updates from the polling places. Painter, Ruth,Paukovits, Curtin and Haines would also be present in Perzel' s district to assist and attend to anypotential problems that might arise with the programming or the BlueCard program. Theseindividuals would also be involved in the training efforts that preceded the Election DayComplete operation.

Curtin testified that John Perzel would appear in the campaign office on election day andwould ask them how the system was operating and complement them on the good work theywere doing. Curtin specifically recollected an occasion where there was a problem with theElection Day Complete operation in a remote location and Curtin was going to fix the problemover the phone. Perzel was present and insisted that someone physically go to the location to fixthe problem. Curtin stated that it was always absolutely clear that Perzel knew about the

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existence of these campaign programs and that RIT staff that was responsible for their existenceand operation.

A number of individuals testified about an incident that occurred on Election Day in2004 in Perzel' s district. Perzel and Preski were both present acting as managers of thecampaign effort. At some point during election day, the OCR website that updated the turnout offavorable voters apparently failed. Perzel and Preski became agitated and upset and directed anumber ofRIT staff to contact OCR to get the problem fixed. Eventually, both Preski and Perzelcalled the owner of GCR, G r ~ g u r y Rigamer, and directed him to get the probiem immediateiyfixed. It was well known to both Perzel and Preski that OCR was a part of the Election DayComplete operation. Eventually the GCR website was reestablished but Perzel and Preskibelieved that a significant amount of valuable election time had been wasted

. As a result of GCR failure on Election Day in 2004, Painter testified that he thought, .Perzel might "finally fire GCR" because of the election day error. However, GCR continued todemonstrate n e ~ ideas and technology they were developing or had developed in support ofcampaign efforts. While Perzel did not remove GCR from the Election Day Complete operation,he once again hedged his bets. Painter testified that Preski and Perzel directed him to haveAristotle create a duplicate back-up system to track favorable voters on election day. Eventually,by Election Day in 2006, through the efforts of Aristotle and the RIT staff, a duplicate programwas in operation as part of Election Day Complete. Aristotle's work on this was entirely underthe Caucus contracts. Tomaselli also testified that he participated in the effort to insure that thedata transmitted from the polling places on election day was not traveling to GCR all the way toLouisiana and back. He wanted a system built so that the data would also be collected directly inPerzel's campaign office and therefore be more instantaneous. He testified that Paukovits,

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Painter, Haines, Ruth and Stokes were also involved in this effort. It was completed andoperational by Election Day in 2006.

In September of 2006, in anticipation of the upcoming general election, Pre ski received abriefing and demonstration of the updated Election Day Complete program. The presentationwas made by Painter, Haines and Du Doung (a new member of the RIT staff who also worked onthe Election Day Complete program). Preski had a very positive reaction to the updated ElectionDay Complete program and expressed that the program would do "what was needed".

The use of the Election Day Complete Program was not iimited to Perzel' select ions.This technology was shared and became a regular part of the HRCC election day operationsbetween 2002 and 2006. John Hanley, the Executive Director of the HRCC, testified that thetechnology had been shared with the HRCC by Perzel. He stated that Perzel was very protectiveof the system but also wanted the credit for helping candidates by letting them use Election D ~ y . Complete. Perzel staff would often be involved in the use of the system in different campaigns,in part, to e m p h a ~ i z e Perzel' s "ownership" of the idea.

The Grand J.ury heard testimony and reviewed documentary evidence that showed theTELSTARiElection Day Complete program was employed: in the 2002 special election in the176 th 'Legislative District; 2003 special elections in the 3rd and 44th Legislative Districts; 2004special elections in 109th and 152nd Legislative Districts; 2005 special elections in the 189 th and131st Legislative Districts; and the 2006 special election in the 30th Legislative District. Theprogram was also utilized in a number of general election campaigns, in addition to Perzel' s,including but not limited too: Gannon (2004 and 2006), Weber (2002 and 2004), Wright (2006),Fox (2004), Murt (2006), Petri (2002), O'Neil (2002) and Brooks (2002).

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The same routine, as described above in Perzel' s District, would be employed in eachdeployment of the Election Day Complete operation. RIT staff provided much of the expertise

and all the equipment for these elections. In addition, Perzel staff and District Operations staffwere also often involved. Hanley testified that the decision where to deploy was made either byPerzel or at HRCC meetings, which included Feese and Bowman. When the HRCC wanted todeploy the system on a race, Hanley would inform Eric Ruth - who would begin the equipmentpreparation process. Tomaselli testified that this system was one of the responsibilities assignedto Ruth when he beCful1e Deputy Director of ruT. Twu uf tht: must pruminent iegisiative staffersinvolved in the '"shared" Election Day Complete operations were Al Bowman and Paul Towhey.Both were closely involved in the implementation and use of the operation in virtually all of thespecial elections and in many of the General elections. RIT staff, District Operations staff, andothers, have testified about the leadership roles these two. individuals played in the use of thesystem in these elections. They worked with RIT staff on determining the specific equipmentrequirements in each election and directed the election day assignments.

Of all the e ~ t e n s i v e testimony from legislative staff about the use of Election DayComplete on various campaigns, a particularly poignant moment was described by Tim Halula.Halula was an employee of RIT who had been sent to assist the deployment of the Election DayComplete equipment in the April 2006 special election held in the 30th Legislative District. Thiswas the election to replace former Representative Habay, who had been arrested and convictedfor the criminal use of public resources for ~ a m p a i g n purposes. The night before the specialelection, Halula was in his hotel room talking with Marcus Woodring, another RIT co-workerwho was there for the same purpose. In the comer of the room was a pile of the publicequipment to be used the next day to assist the Republican candidate, Mike Dolan. Halula and

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Woodring discussed how truly ""weird" it was to be about to use all these public resources to fillthe seat of a guy who just went to jail for ""illegal campaign activities."

The Grand Jury reviewed hundreds of documents and emails reflecting the work andequipment required for the use of the TELSTARiElection Day Complete programs. From 2002through 2006, many uses of this technology were made in regularly scheduled and specialelections. The program was developed and implemented at the specific direction of John Perzeland Brian Preski. Repairs and improvements, all knowingly made through public resources,WCie diiected by Perzel, Preski, Stokes, tv1cClintock, Towhey, Ruth and Buwman. Thedeployment and .use of this program, through the knowing use of public employees andresources, was directed in whole or in part, by Perzel, Preski, Feese, Stokes, Towhey,McClintock, Ruth and Bowman.

Neither funds from Perzel' s campaign, nor any PAC or campaign entity associated withPerzel, paid or reimbursed the Caucus, GCR or Aristotle for the work and resources provided tocreate and operate the Election Day Complete program. The Grand Jury specifically finds thatall of the expenses associated with this program were the burden of the public. This fact waswell known to Perzel, Preski, Feese, Stokes, McClintock, Towhey, Ruth and Bowman.

Extensive investigative effort was' made to ascertain the public's expenditures on theequipment utilized over the years in the TELSTARiElection Day Complete Operations.Unfortunately, as with too many parts of this Grand Jury's investigation, significant amounts ofthese records are missing. Only a portion of the equipment records pertaining toTELSTARiElection Day Complete have been able to be reassembled. However, this modestportion reflects in excess of $98,000 in public funds expended for the TELSTARiElection DayComplete equipment. Additional funds, determined to date to be approximately $7,527, were

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expended on phone service costs for the operation. It is particularly noteworthy that this amountreflects only a small fraction of the handheld computers and scanners utilized solely for theTELSTARIElection Day Complete operations. For example, the handheld computers purchasedby the public range from approximately $500 to $1,000 a piece in cost. Of the sixty-eighthandheld computers recovered from the RIT offices by agents of the Office of Attorney General,invoices for only nine of them have been obtained by the Grand Jury. Even a modest projectionof the costs for only the handheld computers would place the total cost, in just equipment, to thepublic at well ovei.$100,OOO.

C. Other Uses of RIT Staff and Resources for Campaign PurposesThe culture established by Perzel in the Republican Caucus resulted in a constant and

ongoing use of RIT office for campaign purposes. As testified to by numerous RIT staff, itbecame "institutionalized." Painter explained that 'the culture of the institution" was to pretendthat public resources were not being employed on campaign work while public resources wereemployed on a regular basis. He described the coded phrase "working over lunch" whicheveryone knew meant the person was doing campaign work. He stated that this type of codedlanguage to cover the truth was virtually "indoctrinated with each individual" when they cameinto the Caucus. Indicative of the amount of campaign work performed by the RIT office was ameeting described by Painter which occurred on August 26, 27, and 28, 2002. A copy of thismeeting agenda was also acquired by the Grand Jury.

Painter testified that, as confirmed by the documentation, this entire meeting was aboutthe array of technical resources being used by the Caucus to further the goals of the Caucus'campaign activities. Painter noted that all or most of these technical resources were being paid

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for by the taxpayers. Throughout the meetings that occurred over three days, RIT staffers suchas Paukovits, Haines, Kaplan, Steve Eaton, and others were present to make demonstrations of

technological applications to campaigns. It constitutes evidence of the extent to which RIT andtechnology were being employed in caucus campaigns. In attendance at these meetings, in wholeor in part, were: John Perzel, Brett Feese, Brian Preski, John Hanley, Al Bowman, Eric Ruth, JillSeaman, Bill Tomaselli, and Anthony Painter. Over the years, this was one of dozens of similarmeetings regarding the application of technology to campaigns held at the HRCC, Perzel ' scmnpaign office Oi within the Capitol.

The Grand Jury has reviewed thousands of pages of emails and documents reflecting theuse of RIT staff and resources for campaign purposes. It is unrealistic, within the confines ofthis Presentment, to detail each of these uses. As such, this portion of the Presentment willsimply.be an attempt to generally address the types of campaign work perfonned and specifica.1lyaddress those instances of particular note.

Perhaps t ~ e most frequently requested fonn of campaign work from the RIT involved theacquisition and manipulation of voter data. The RIT office was continuously at work on theacquisition and preparation of infonnation about voters. These requests could vary in specificsin virtually every imaginable way. They ranged from fairly simple requests for updated lists ofall voters in the legislative district to requests for a list of a specific type of professional within aspecific geographic area. RIT staff was also frequently "cleaning" and "processing" voter datafor a variety of purposes. Essentially, this involved fixing problems containing voter data (suchas: misspellings, bad addresses, bad phone numbers, duplicate entries, etc.) and putting it into afonnat appropriate for its requested use. All the aforementioned efforts were made for thepurpose of providing data to individual campaigns or vendors providing campaign services.

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Significant amounts of this work were done to feed voter data to GCR and Aristotle for thevarious campaign systems they were operating. Likewise, much of this data would go to polling

companies or robo call businesses for political purposes. Some of the work was also done toassist in the targeting of certain groups and professionals for fundraising purposes.

One of the vendors who frequently received this type of data was an individual namedCheryl Corsa. Corsa was a vendor, paid by the House Republican Campaign Committee, whooperated a campaign program called the Corsa Program. This was essentially a program in

1 1 1 - -I _.. 1 1 11 1 . 1 r- r , . . .1 r -t 1WIlICIl CanUIUalt=S WUUIU personauy go ooor to ooor In an enon to Increase tneIr proIlle anofavorability with voters. After a candidate would visit a household, a mailing would be promptlysent by Corsa as a follow-up gesture. Corsa also did other types of campaign outreach andmailing initiatives. Accurate names and addresses are vital to the effort she provides forcampaIgns. The RIT staff assisted her on numerous occasions in acquiring or repairing v o ~ e r . data.

C a m p a i g ~ assistance by the RIT was not limited to House Republican candidates. On anumber of occasions., the staff was directed to assist in races for positions outside of the House ofRepresentatives. Large amounts of voter data, as well as information about individuals servingon Philadelphia's election board, were provided to assist in the Philadelphia mayoral campaignof Sam Katz. Some of these directives came from Sam Stokes and some came from Preski' swife, Kelly Preski. She and Perzel' s wife, Sheryl Perzel, were employees of the Katz campaignin 2003. Later in time, Kelly Preski would become interested in running for Philadelphia citycouncil at large seat and again assistance was sought from RIT.

Stokes directed the RIT to assist a county commissioner's campaign in 2006 in BlairCounty. RIT set up a BlueCard program website for the county candidate, acquired the

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necessary voter data and placed it into the program. All of this was done under the direction andsupervision of Stokes.

RIT staff was also called upon to prepare training manuals in support of campaignefforts. Deborah Hannon was employed by RIT from March of 2000 to December of 2006 as atechnical trainer. Under the direction and supervision of Stokes, she and Paukovits spentsignificant amounts of time preparing a series of training manuals. The first project was called a"District Management Handbook." Copies of these documents, as well as numerous drafts, wererecovered' as part of the Grand Jury's investigation. Ahhough ihese manuals reference"constituents", both Hannon and Paukovits explained that this was, entirely a campaign toolinstructing people on how to operate the BlueCard' program. Hannon specifically testified thatStokes was very clear with her that this manual was to operate the BlueCard program located inPerzel's campaign office for campaign purposes. She started the District ManagementHandbook project in November of 2004 and worked directly with Stokes and other members ofthe campaign office. The District Management Handbook was never used for training of caucusemployees on the c ~ n s t i t u e n t services databases. Hannon had prepared a separate constituentservice manual for training employees on the legitimate constituent's services program-known asCS-4 program.

The Ward Management Manual was an evolving process and Hannon worked on it from2004 until 2006. She stated that the Ward Management Manual was somewhat similar to theDistrict Management Manual but it was more focused upon providing direct assistance to thepolitical ward leaders in Perzel' s district. The manual was designed to accompany the WardManagement features that the RIT staff had been building into the BlueCard program. Themanual instructed ward leaders on how to use the Ward Management computer program to

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manage political committee p e r s o n s ~ election board m e m b e r s ~ volunteers and other efforts duringcampaigns. Both Hannon and Paukovits explained that one of the challenges they faced was a

need to repeatedly update the manuals, every time Stokes made changes in the BlueCard andWard Management programs.

Hannon also worked on a door to door campaigning manual with Stokes. She explainedthat this manual was designed to track p e o p l e ~ by asking them all types of campaign questionswhile canvassing voters door to door, to determine whether or not they would assist thecandidate's campaign. She left her enlploy with RIT before this last IHanual w a ~ cunlp1eit? .

Hannon testified that S t o k e s ~ who she knew to be a relative of Perzel, "always" trumpedany other work. She stated that her efforts on these manuals were all do_ne on legislative timeand took over a hundred hours of work. This work on the campaign manuals for Stokes,"absolutely" interfered with H a n n o n ~ s other work obligations. She stated that whenever she hadother events that conflicted with Stokes needs, she had to cancel them. A number of the RITtechnical staff testified about traveling to set up computer networks and equipment at Republicancampaign offices across Pennsylvania. These efforts were confirmed by Painter. Testimony andemails evidence that some of the campaign offices receiving support from RIT were those forcandidates: Adolph in Delaware County; Beyer in Lehigh County; Millard in Columbia County;Dolan in Allegheny County; and Weber in Montgomery County. The RIT staffs werespecifically requested and their work was directed by Paul Towhey in the Beyer and Webercampaign offices. Al Bowman requested the services and directed the work in the case of theMillard and Dolan campaign offices. RIT staff also commonly provided computer assistance tothe HRCC office.

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Another area of frequent work by RIT staff was in furtherance of campaign robo calls.Between 2001 and 2007, the RIT staff attempted to perfect a series of computer applications that

would efficiently make campaign robo calls. The Grand Jury heard testimony from a number ofpeople about systems such as "the Croco-dialing system" and the ""Octopus" system. The objectof all these systems was to efficiently cycle though phone numbers and "blast out" telephonecalls on behalf of campaigns. RIT staff created and installed robo call capabilities into Perzel ' scampaign office. They also frequently recorded Perzel for the purposes of his campaign robocalls. They would travel to and make these recorliing!S at t h ~ l:ampaign office or even at ferzel' shome. They would then load the recording into the robo call system and program it to make thedesired calls.

RIT staff was also utilized as part of the effort to send out large scale ("blast") campaignemails.Painter testified that Caucus employees Ed McKenna and Tim Halula were directlyinvolved in the blast email function. Painter described how McKenna and Halula had beenworking for the communications department but Preski had them transferred to the RIT staffbecause it made it easier and "more conducive to doing campaign work without anybody raisingany stink". Halula testified that while he and McKenna were working the communicationsdepartment their supervisor, Steve Miskin, became upset because he did not want them doingcampaign work on legislative time. Halula testified that Eric Ruth was one of the people heavilyinvolved, at that time, in directing their "non legislative" work. Halula testified that after Miskinbecame upset, they were transferred in 2002 to the RIT staff. He stated that the only person thatcould have made that transfer would have been Perzel or Preski. After the transfer to RIT,Halula testified that Ruth was the direct supervisor of him and McKenna. Halula testified that hewas asked by Ruth to set up the votejohnperzel.com website. He explained how he did that and

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how over time he would modify and update this website. He understood this was clearly acampaign website.

Not everyone of RIT's campaign projects resulted in success. There were a number ofdifferent attempts to apply technology to campaign problems that failed or were ultimatelyrejected. Nonetheless, all of these efforts were at the expense of the public. Paukovits testifiedabout one such project on which ""he spent upwards of three to six months" as part ofhis job withRIT. It 'was called "'Victory" at one point, which changed to ""Event Contributions", and at yetanother point it was called ""Victory 2006." Paukovits was directed in this work priluarily byEric Ruth. Paukovits explained that ""it was an attempt to create an umbrella solution,contribution and event tracking system." Simply stated, it was an attempt to create a complexyet effective fundraising and campaign contribution tool. Despite spending a great deal of timeon this. effort and having a series of meetings with Ruth and others on its specifications, it ~ a ~ never fully completed.

One of t ~ e largest failed projects of RIT was called the "ID Verification System." Thiswas another of the ideas of Perzel and Preski, who directed the creation of this system. Painterexplained that Perzel and Preski came up with the idea after observing a NASCAR Event at theCapitol. There was a significant turnout at the event - around twenty thousand people - andPerzel and Preski wanted to come up with a way to identify such crowds of people in order totarget such constit

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