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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT

MANILA

EN BANC

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA,

Petitioner,

– versus –

CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO,

Respondent.

Senators LEILA M. DE LIMA and ANTONIO “SONNY” F. TRILLANES IV,

Movant-Intervenors.

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 237428 For: Quo Warranto

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Movant-intervenors, Senators LEILA M. DE LIMA and ANTONIO

“SONNY” F. TRILLANES IV, through undersigned counsel, respectfully state that:

1. On 29 May 2018, Movant-intervenors, in such capacity, requested

and obtained a copy of the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 11 May 2018, by which eight members of the Court voted to grant the Petition for Quo Warranto, resulting in the ouster of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno.

2. The Supreme Court’s majority decision, penned by Justice Tijam,

ruled that: 2.1. There are no grounds to grant the motion for inhibition filed

by respondent Chief Justice Sereno; 2.2. Impeachment is not an exclusive means for the removal of

an impeachable public official;

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno G.R. No. 237428 of 25

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2.3. The instant Petition for Quo Warranto could proceed independently and simultaneously with an impeachment;

2.4. The Supreme Court’s taking cognizance of the Petition for

Quo Warranto is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers;

2.5. The Petition is not dismissable on the Ground of Prescription, as “[p]rescription does not lie against the State”; and

2.6. The Petitioner sufficiently proved that Respondent violated the SALN Law, and such failure amounts to proof of lack of integrity of the Respondent to be considered, much less nominated appointed, as Chief Justice by the Judicial and Bar Council and the President of Republic, respectively.

3. Movant-intervenors, respectfully disagreeing with the findings and conclusions of the Supreme Court, hereby file the instant Motion for Reconsideration.

4. The majority decision likewise denied the Motion for Intervention

filed by herein Movant-Intervenors, stating that their claimed interest as Senator-judges in impeachment proceedings is merely contingent or expectant, as it “is still contingent on the filing of the articles of impeachment before the Senate”.

5. Movant-Intervenors likewise seek reconsideration of this ruling, on the grounds that, as will be further discussed below, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the present Petition clearly show that the interest they invoke and seek to protect through their Motion for Intervention is actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, such that an adverse ruling by the Supreme Court will result in an actual injury to the constitutional rights, duties and prerogatives of herein Movant-Intervenors and their fellow members of Congress, particularly in the Senate. In fact, this view is supported by Proposed Senate Resolution No. 738, which was signed by fourteen (14) members of the Senate, including eight (8) majority members, namely, then Senate President Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III, Senate President Pro Tempore Ralph Recto, Senators Joel Villanueva, Loren Legarda, Sherwin Gatchalian, Francis Escudero, Sonny Angara, and Grace Poe, and all six (6) members of the Senate minority, namely, Minority Leader Franklin Drilon, Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan, Bam Aquino, Risa, Hontiveros, and herein Movant-Intervenors, Antonio Trillanes IV and Leila de Lima.

A. IMPEACHMENT IS AN

EXCLUSIVE MEANS FOR THE REMOVAL OF AN


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IMPEACHABLE PUBLIC OFFICIAL

6. The subject of the said proceeding, the Chief Justice of the

Supreme Court, is, by express provision of the Constitution, removal from office exclusively by impeachment, as is every other member of the Supreme Court, the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.1

7. Under the same Article of the Constitution, the exclusive power

to try and decide all cases of impeachment is vested upon the Senate,2 whose judgment in such cases “shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.”3

8. In other words, under the Constitution, it is the exclusive domain of the Philippine Senate, acting on a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment, or Articles of Impeachment, filed by at least one-third of all Members of the House of Representatives, to remove the Chief Justice (or any other impeachable officer for that matter) from office.

9. Thus, the filing of the quo warranto petition seeking the removal of Chief Justice Sereno violates the legal interest and duty vested by the Constitution on the Senate, of which movant-intervenors are members, and is, thus, repugnant to the Constitution and destructive of the system of checks and balances established therein.

10. Hence, this opposition-in-intervention, seeking the outright dismissal of the quo warranto petition, it being without basis and, in fact, contrary to the Constitution.

Chief Justice is an impeachable officer

11. The constitutional qualifications under Art.8, Sec. 7(1) for

appointment to the Supreme Court are limited to: (1) natural born citizenship, (2) age, (3) and experience, i.e., at least fifteen years of practice of law. These are legally enforceable objective qualifications in the sense that the Supreme Court can nullify the appointment of someone who does not possess any of these three qualifications. The President, for example, cannot appoint someone who is a foreigner, or 30 years of age, or is not even a lawyer. These

1 Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution. 2 Section 3(6), Article XI. 3 Section 3(7), Article XI.


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are qualifications for which there are judicially discoverable and manageable standards, and can thus be passed upon by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its power of judicial review.

12. On the other hand, Art. 8, Sec.7(3) states that “[a] Member of the

Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.” These are not objective constitutional qualifications, but subjective characteristics of a judge.

13. These subjective characteristics are addressed for consideration of the Judicial and Bar Council and the President. Questions of competence, integrity, probity, and independence are not susceptible to analysis with the tools of legal doctrine; instead, they require political discernment on the part of the JBC and the President. They are “soft variables” for which there are no judicially manageable standards.

14. Thus, a person possessing such objective qualifications, who is also

determined as possessing the subjective qualifications by the fact that he or she has been nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council and appointed by the President, and who then takes the oath of office, as in the case of Chief Justice Sereno, is already an impeachable public officer and can no longer be removed, except through the process of impeachment.

The Removal from Office of Members of

the Class of “Impeachable Officials” Can

Only Be Obtained Exclusively Through

Impeachment

15. The quo warranto petition filed by the OSG seeks the removal or

ouster of the Chief Justice via a means other than impeachment.

16. This is contrary to the language, spirit and design of the Constitution.

The language of the Constitution provides

for the manner by which “impeachable

officers”, including members of the

Supreme Court, may be removed from

office.

17. Article XI of the Constitution, on “Accountability of Public Officers”, Section 2 states that the Chief Justice, as a member of the Supreme Court, “may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.”


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18. That the said constitutional provision uses the word “may” does not take away from the exclusive character of removing impeachable officials solely by impeachment.

18.1. First of all, the word “may” applies to the phrase “be

removed from office”. It is meant to emphasize that these officials – who are among those who hold the highest positions in their respective spheres and who are, thus, the most powerful officials in the land – nonetheless remain accountable to the public because there remains a mechanism that “may” be resorted to in order to remove them from office.

18.2. In other words, the word “may” indicates that, though the

sensitivity of their positions necessitate that they be free from the threat of being charged and removed from office by less stringent means that could affect the effective discharge of their powers and responsibilities, they are nevertheless still subject to public scrutiny and “may” still penalized for their actions, albeit through the mechanism outlined in Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

18.3. In fact, it is precisely the use of the word “may” in this

provision, in this particular Article of the Constitution, and in the context of the special character of this class of officials that emphasizes both the possibility of removal of these officials from office, as well as the intent to make the process of removal be exclusive.

18.4. Secondly, it is deceptively simplistic to argue that the word

“may” means that resort to impeachment is directory, in the sense that other means of removing this class of officials from office is still available. As far back as 1913 (and reiterated thereafter4), the Honorable Court has unequivocally rejected such simplistic interpretation, holding that:

…[I]t is well settled that in statutory interpretation the word "may" should be read "shall" where such construction is necessary to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator. In Rock Island County Supervisors vs. United States (71 U.S., 435, 446), Mr. Justice Swayne says:

The conclusion to be deduced from the authorities is that where power is given to public officers, in the language of the Act before us, or in equivalent language, whenever the public interest or individual rights call for its exercise, the language used, though permissive in form, is in fact peremptory. What they are empowered to do for a third person the law requires shall be done. The power is given, not for their benefit, but for his. It is placed with the depository to meet the demands of right, and to prevent a failure of justice. It is given as a remedy to those entitled to invoke its aid, who would otherwise be remediless. In all such cases it is held that the intent of the Legislature,

4 De Mesa v. Mencias, G.R. No. L-24583, 21 March 2018.


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which is the test, was not to devolve a mere discretion, but to impose a positive and absolute duty.

Whether the word "may" in a statute is to be construed as mandatory and imposing a duty, or merely as permissive and conferring discretion, is to be determined in each case from the apparent intention of the statute as gathered from the context, as well as from the language of the particular provision. The question in each case is whether, taken as a whole and viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances, it can be said that a purpose existed on the part of the legislator to enact a law mandatory in its character. If it can, then it should be given a mandatory effect. (Colby University vs. Village of Canandaigua (U.S.), 69 Fed., 671, 673; Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. vs. Reynolds, 8 Kan., 623, 628; Kemble vs. McPhaill, 60 Pac., 1092, 1093, 128 Cal., 444; Inhabitants of Worcester County vs.Schlesinger, 82 Mass. (16 Gray), 166, 168; People vs. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 56 N.E., 953, 956, 184 Ill., 597; State vs. Withrow (Mo.), 24 S.W., 638, 641; Leavenworth & D. M.R. Co. vs. Platte County Court, 42 Mo., 171, 174.)5

18.5. Applied in this case, and in the words of the Supreme Court,

the constitutional provision “is, in fact, peremptory” one, given that it is one:

i. “where power is given to public officers” (i.e., the power to

remove this class of officials from office);

ii. both “the public interest” (i.e., the interest to ensure that a balance is struck between giving these high-ranking officials, who are holding sensitive posts, the security needed to discharge their duties without fear or favour, and the need to nonetheless preserve a means, albeit a stringent one, of holding them accountable to the public) and “individual rights” (i.e., the right of these officials to invoke the protection,6 limited as it may be, afforded to them by the stringent requirements of impeachment proceedings), call for its exercise in the manner set forth therein; and

18.6. Furthermore, as will be further discussed below, the intent to make impeachment the exclusive mode of removing impeachable officials from office is clear, not just in the language of the provision, but also implicitly in the context of what it intends to accomplish as a feature of the system of checks and balances that underpin our structure of

5 In re application of MARIO GUARIÑA for admission to the bar, G.R. No. L 1179, January 8, 1913. Emphasis

supplied. 6 The intent to make the impeachment process as much as measure to exact accountability and to protect

this class of public officials is explicit in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, as will be discussed further below.


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government, and explicitly based on the deliberations of the Framers of the Constitution.

The system of checks and balances set forth

in the Constitution requires that the

method of removal of impeachable officers

be exclusive

19. The landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission7 explains the implicit, yet undeniable, fundamental principles upon which our system if government is founded:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. xxx.8

20. Indeed, the Constitution has “in the main, blocked out in deft

strokes and in bold lines” the powers wielded by each branch of government. 7 63 Phil. 139 (1936). 8 Emphasis supplied.


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The power to remove impeachable officers from office is explicitly vested in the Senate, acting on the Articles of Impeachment duly filed by the House of Representatives.

The Deliberations of the Constitutional

Commission leaves no doubt as to the intent

behind Section 2, Article XI of the

Constitution

21. The exclusivity of the impeachment process, as a means by which Members of the Supreme Court may be removed from office, is explicitly apparent in the deliberations of 1986 Constitutional Commission:

MR. REGALADO: I propose to add in Section 2 as a last sentence thereof as already amended the following: ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES MAY BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE AS PROVIDED BY LAW BUT NOT BY IMPEACHMENT. The reason for the amendment is this: While Section 2 enumerates the impeachable officers, there is nothing that will prevent the legislature as it stands now from providing also that other officers not enumerated therein shall also be removable only by impeachment, and that has already happened.

Under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan Decree, justices of the Sandiganbayan may be removed only by impeachment, unlike their counterparts in the then Court of Appeals. They are, therefore, a privileged class on the level of the Supreme Court. In the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies, there are many commissions which are sought to be constitutionalized — if I may use the phrase — and the end result would be that if they are constitutional commissions, the commissioners there could also be removed only by impeachment. What is there to prevent the Congress later — because of the lack of this sentence that I am seeking to add — from providing that officials of certain offices, although nonconstitutional, cannot also be removed except by impeachment?9

22. The repeated use of the phrase “also… only by impeachment”

leaves nothing to doubt: the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is that this “privileged class” of public officials may only be removed by impeachment.

23. The foregoing was merely a repetition of deliberations previously

had, which also reflected the intent to make the impeachment process the only means by which to remove this class of officials. In fact, just two days prior, the rationale thereof was also put on record:

MR. DAVIDE. xxx On lines 13 and 14, I move for the deletion of the words “and the Ombudsman.” The Ombudsman should not be placed on the level

9 R.C.C. No. 41 Monday, July 28, 1986. Emphasis supplied.


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of the President and the Vice-President, the members of the judiciary and the members of the Constitutional Commissions in the matter of removal from office.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MONSOD: We regret we cannot accept the amendment because we feel that the Ombudsman is at least on the same level as the Constitutional Commissioners and this is one way of insulating it from politics.

MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, to make the members of the Ombudsman removable only by impeachment would be to enshrine and install an officer whose functions are not as delicate as the others whom we wanted to protect from immediate removal by way of an impeachment.

MR. MONSOD: We feel that an officer in the Ombudsman, if he does his work well, could be stepping on a lot of toes. We would really prefer to keep him there but we would like the body to vote on it, although I would like to ask if we still have a quorum, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT: Do we have a quorum? There are Members who are in the lounge.

The Secretary-General and the pages conduct an actual count of the Commissioners present.

THE PRESIDENT: We have a quorum.

MR. MONSOD: May we restate the proposed amendment for the benefit of those who were not here a few minutes ago.

MR. DE LOS REYES: Madam President, parliamentary inquiry. I thought that amendment was already covered in the amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo. One of those amendments proposed by Commissioner Rodrigo was to delete the word “Ombudsman” and, therefore, we have already voted on it.

MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, may I comment on that.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Gentleman may proceed.

MR. DAVIDE: The proposed amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo was the total deletion of the office of the Ombudsman and all sections relating to it. It was rejected by the body and, therefore, we can have individual amendments now on the particular sections.

THE PRESIDENT: The purpose of the amendment of Commissioner Davide is not just to include the Ombudsman among those officials who have to be removed from office only on impeachment. Is that right?

MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President.


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MR. RODRIGO: Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question?

THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

MR. RODRIGO: The Ombudsman, is this only one man?

MR. DAVIDE: Only one man.

MR. RODRIGO: Not including his deputies.

MR. MONSOD: No.

VOTING

THE PRESIDENT: We will now vote on the amendment.

As many as are in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Davide, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised their hand.)

As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)

The results show 10 votes in favor and 14 against; the amendment is lost.10

24. The imperative character of the exclusivity of the impeachment proceedings as a means to remove this class of public officials is, once again, explicit and invites no doubt. In the words of the President of the 1986

Constitutional Commission, these officials “have to be removed from office

only on impeachment.”

25. The rationale is also clear, it is as much a means of exacting the accountability of such officials, as a means of “insulating them from politics” and of protecting them from retaliatory acts arising from the discharge of their delicate functions that entail “stepping on a lot of toes.” The idea behind the protection is to clothe them with some form of immunity so that they may act independently without fear of being removed from office through ordinary means.

26. In fact, the protection is deemed so critical that, before a vote on

the proposed amendment that would have excluded the Ombudsman from the list was taken, a member of the ConCom made a point of ensuring that there was still a quorum.

27. Impeachment is, therefore, an exclusive removal mechanism for a

select group of public officials. Any procedure that undermines this mechanism should be construed in the strictest possible sense to maintain the design of the Constitution.

10 R.C.C. NO. 40 Saturday, July 26, 1986. Emphasis supplied.


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The Supreme Court has repeatedly

recognized the exclusive character of the

impeachment process as a means of

removing impeachable officers from office

28. The Honorable Court has consistently held that this provision

“proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method,”11 and, in one particular case, had occasion to repeat this in connection with an attempt to remove a Supreme Court Justice through disbarment proceedings.12

29. The case of In re: Gonzales13is especially instructive:

The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case No. 3135 in the following terms:

There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter. In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court said:

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law.

xxx xxx xxx

The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:

11 Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 56384, 22 March 1984. 12 Cuenco v. Fernan, A.C. No. 3135, 17 February 1988. 13 A.M. No. 88-4-5433, 15 April 1988.


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xxx xxx xxx

It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that its Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.

The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.

It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.14

B. THE SUPREME COURT’S ACT OF TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTSANT PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO IS A VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS;

The Constitution Vests In The Senate The

Sole Power To Try And Decide All Cases

Of Impeachment And, Thus, Cause The

Removal Of The Chief Justice Of The

Supreme Court

30. From the foregoing, it is beyond cavil that there is only one way by which Members of the Supreme Court may be ousted or removed from office, i.e., by impeachment; and the same is intended to be both a means of exacting their accountability, and of protecting them from politics and

14 Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.


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retaliatory acts from those who may be aggrieved by their discharge of their duties.

31. Section 3 of Article XI further states, in part, that:

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

xxx xxx xxx

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.15

32. It is quite apparent from the foregoing that the Senate is the only body that has the power to remove an impeachable officer from office.

33. Had it been the intent of the Constitution to give members of the

Supreme Court the power to remove one of their own, it would have provided for a mechanism similar to the existence of Electoral Tribunals in the Senate and the House of Representatives, which are mandated to “be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members”;16 or explicitly empowered “[e]ach House … [to] punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member”.17

34. In fact, a proposal was submitted during the drafting of the pertinent constitutional provision, which would have transferred to the Supreme Court the power to adjudicate impeachment cases, as is the pratice in several jurisdictions. However, the Constitutional Commission ultimately decided against it (even the proposed compromise amendment that would

15 Emphasis supplied. 16 Article VI, Section 17, Constitution. 17 Article VI, Section 16(3).


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make it applicable only to the President), and deliberately decided to adopt the United States version (i.e., with the Senate having the sole power to try and decide impeachment cases), to wit:

MR. NOLLEDO: The Commissioner need not overhaul the procedure. But it seems to me that she is suggesting some sort of judicial review; am I right?

MS. AQUINO: No, what I am suggesting is to transfer the impeachment power after the impeachment articles have been initiated and formulated by the joint action of the legislative chambers to the judicial courts.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. OPLE: Commissioner Aquino must be aware that the main provision on impeachment in the draft article under discussion was lifted virtually from the two previous Constitutions, actually almost a verbatim copy of Article VII of the United States Constitution that was framed and ratified in 1787. xxx

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): The Chair would like to understand the present parliamentary situation. Is Commissioner Aquino proposing a specific amendment?

MS. AQUINO: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): On what section and what is the nature of the amendment?

MS. AQUINO: It will overhaul massively Section 3 in the sense that I am contemplating the possibility of amending Section 3 to vest in the judicial courts the power of impeachment trials after the impeachment articles have been formulated and initiated by the joint action of the legislative chambers. But the Committee has expressed reluctance to this position.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): Precisely, the Chair would like to know the reaction of the Committee on the proposed amendment.

MR. MONSOD: Mr. Presiding Officer, the Committee explained its position that we believe the present provision serves a very useful purpose, and we want to see it retained. Furthermore, if I get the drift of the arguments of Commissioner Aquino, the overhaul would involve the introduction of the judicial branch of the government into the process in the case of the President.

Our position is that the President has been directly elected by the people. Since this is a political act, the more appropriate judge of the President in this matter should probably be the direct representatives of the people as well, which are the Senate and the House.


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MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, I am presently inclined to respect the position of the Committee.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. GUINGONA.: Last question. Mr. Presiding Officer.

Mention was made here about the impeachment proceeding we are adopting as being copied from the United States. Is the honorable Commissioner aware that in other countries the legislature is given the power to initiate and the courts are vested with the power to adjudicate an impeachment proceeding? I would like to cite, among others, the following countries: United Arab Republic, Zambia, the Republic of France, Burundi, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Cyprus, Gabon, Somalia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, and others.

MS. AQUINO: I am not aware of that, Mr. Presiding Officer. But I am thankful for that citation because it reinforces my position.

xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, the proposed amendment on Section 3 (5) would seek to transfer the jurisdiction of the impeachment trial pertaining only to the President from the Senate to the Supreme Court, such that I would seek co-sponsorship with Commissioner Guingona to propose an amendment by substitution on Section 3 (5), page 2, beginning on line 15. The proposed amendment reads: “The Senate shall have the sole power to try impeachment CASES AFFECTING THE VICE-PRESIDENT, MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS. When the President is on trial, the Supreme Court shall BE CONVENED AS THE COURT OF IMPEACHMENT. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate IN THE CASE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT, MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS OR OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF THE PRESIDENT.

MR. ROMULO: For reasons we have already explained, the Committee regrets that we cannot accept that amendment principally because we believe this is a political act. The President’s peers who are equally elected are a better judge of the matter; finally, we feel it would politicize the Supreme Court.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): Does Commissioner Aquino ask for a vote?

MS. AQUINO: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

VOTING

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): As many as are in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Aquino, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised their hand.)


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As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)

The results show 13 votes in favor and 25 votes against; the proposed amendment is lost.18

35. It is clear from the foregoing that the intent to vest the power to remove impeachable officers from office solely on the Senate, to the exclusion even of the Surpeme Court, is completely deliberate and, thus, unequivocal.

Quo Warranto Is Not The Proper Remedy

36. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum. What

cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.

37. If Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI were so meticulously and deliberately framed to make impeachment an exclusive means of removing impeachable officers from office, and to vest solely on the Senate the power to try and devide impeachment cases, then to attempt to oust an impeachable officer, such as the Chief Justice, through a means other than impeachment is an attempt to contravene the Constitution, which the Honorable Court cannot sanction.

38. This is especially true if the proposed mode is a quo warranto

proceeding, which relies on the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court. It is no different from an attempt to remove a member of the Supreme Court under the rules on disbarment proceedings (as in the cases of Cuenco v, Fernan,19 In re Gonzales, 20 Jarque v. Desierto, 21 and Marcoleta v. Borra, 22), or through a legislative act, such as prosecution under the Sandiganbayan law (as in the case of Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan23)

39. Asking the Supreme Court to oust one of their own, at the behest

of the Executive Department, through a means that is less stringent than the requirements and procedure set forth in the Constitution, is precisely the “politicization” that the pertinent Constitutional provisions were designed to insulate impeachable officers and the Supreme Court from.

40. In any case, the Solicitor General’s allegation of lack of “integrity” on the part of the Chief Justice for her supposed incomplete SALN when she

18 Supra, footnote #14. 19 A.C. No. 3135, 17 February 1988. 20 A.M. No. 88-4-5433, 15 April 1988. 21 A.C. No. 4509, 5 December 1995. 22 A.C. No. 7732, 30 March 2009. 23 G.R. No. 56384, 22 March 1984.


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applied for the position of Chief Justice is a question that does not go into her constitutional qualification. Submission of SALN is, in the first place, not a constitutional qualification.

41. Whether or not such incomplete SALN amounts to a lack of integrity on her part is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the JBC and the President pre-appointment, and the House of Representatives and the Senate upon her assumption into office.

42. In fact, such grounds is subsumed among those set forth in Section 2 of Article XI, i.e., betrayal of public trust, and, in the case of Chief Justice Sereno, is precisely one of the proposed articles for her impeachment.

43. To seek her ouster in such grounds is, therefore, an undue intrusion into the prerogatives vested solely on the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively.

44. In any case, whether or not such failure amounts to a lack of integrity is precisely one of those grounds that is so subjective that it is best threshed out through an impeachment trial, and not to a quo warranto proceeding before the Supreme Court.

C. THE INSTANT PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO COULD NOT PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH AN IMPEACHMENT

45. Even assuming that the impeachment is not an exclusive means to oust an impeachable officer, the fact remains that the filing of the quo warranto petition cannot proceed simultaneously with an impeachment proceedings. Especially one that is based on the same grounds, seeks the same relief of ouster (which, once granted, would render the impeachment proceedings moot), and one that was filed later in time.

45.1. In fact, it is public knowledge that, as far back as 13

September 2017, the said House Committee had found the impeachment complaint filed by Atty. Larry Gadon “sufficient in form and substance”, and that hearings thereon are being conducted ever since.24

45.2. Said proceedings, to date, have progressed to the point that

on 8 March 2018, members of the House Committee on Justice voted in

24 http://www.manilatimes.net/timeline-house-panel-finds-probable-cause-to-impeach-sereno/384823/


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favor of finding probable cause to impeach Chief Justice Lourdes Sereno,25 and, on 19 March 2018, it approved the following six (6) articles of impeachment, as stated in the speech of House justice committee

chairperson Rep. Reynaldo Umali:

i. Non-filing and non-disclosure of her sworn statement of assets and liabilities and net worth (SALN), constituting the impeachable offense of culpable violation of the Constitution and/or betrayal of public trust;

ii. Committing corruption and betrayal of public trust when she

misused a total amount of ₱18 million of public funds thereby manifesting her grandiose sense of self-importance;

iii. Committing culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and/or other high crimes when she arrogated unto herself the powers reposed upon the Supreme Court as a collegial, deliberative and consultative body;

iv. Committed culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and/or other high crimes when she deliberately and maliciously abused her position as the Chief Justice and ex officio Chairperson of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC);

v. Committed culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust when she deliberately undermined and violated the principles of separation of powers among the three branches of government; and

vi. Committed betrayal of public trust when she willfully and deliberately failed to comply with her oath of office by tyrannical abuse of discretionary power.26

45.3. Last 11 April 2018, the House of Representatives Press and Public Affairs Bureau issued an official Press Release, which quoted Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez as saying that “the House of Representatives would be able to approve the Articles of Impeachment against Supreme Court Chief Justice on-leave Ma. Lourdes Sereno within a week or two after the resumption of session of Congress on May 15.”27 Speaker Alvarez likewise recalled “that the House Committee on Justice had already found

25 http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/973675/breaking-house-justice-panel-finds-probable-cause-to-impeach-

sereno 26 http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/976360/breaking-house-panel-oks-articles-of-impeachment-vs-sereno 27 Press and Public Affairs Bureau, House of Representatives. “Sereno impeachment within 1-2 weeks from

resumption of session: Alvarez”. 11 April 2018. Accessed at: http://www.congress.gov.ph/press/details.php?pressid=10625. Emphasis supplied.

http://www.congress.gov.ph/press/details.php?pressid=10625


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probable cause to impeach Sereno and prepared the corresponding committee report and Articles of Impeachment against her.”28

45.4. The same official Press Release of the House of Representatives stated that “[b]efore Congress adjourned last March 21 the Committee on Rules referred the matter for plenary consideration.”29

45.5. Thus, it is public knowledge that the Quo Warranto Petition, alleging the same grounds for the Chief Justice’s removal, was filed long after the impeachment process has already been filed.

45.6. The fact that this is one of the grounds for impeachment charged against Chief Justice Sereno was made known to the Honorable Court as far back as August 2017 of last year, considering that on 24 August 2017, it was reported that the Supreme Court, in resolutions dated August 8 and 15, granted the requests of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC) and of Atty. Larry Gadon, respectively, for the release of documents that are to be “used in filing an impeachment complaint.” 30

45.7. On 15 and 30 August 2017, impeachment complaints were, indeed, filed before the House of Representatives against the Chief Justice by representatives of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC) and Atty. Gadon, respectively.31

45.8. Atty. Gadon’s request, in particular, which the House

Committee on Justice later found to be sufficient in form and substance and is thus the basis of the Articles of Impeachment approved by the Committee,32 sought the release of various documents, including the Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs) of Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno, explicitly citing that the same shall be used in the filing of an impeachment complaint.33

45.9. In fact, members of the Honorable Court even appeared

before the House Committee on Justice to testify during the hearings held to determine the existence of probable cause.

46. In addition, the Quo Warranto Petition was intentionally and

specifically filed in order to impede and pre-empt the impeachment

28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/925357/supreme-court-impeachment-saln-release-maria-lourdes-sereno-

request-larry-gadon 31 http://www.manilatimes.net/timeline-house-panel-finds-probable-cause-to-impeach-sereno/384823/ 32 http://www.manilatimes.net/timeline-house-panel-finds-probable-cause-to-impeach-sereno/384823/ 33 Ibid.


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proceedings, according to the Solicitor General himself, when he admitted, in a press conference held on the occasion of the filing, that the filing of the Petition for Quo Warranto was intended to prevent the impeachment trial from proceeding, claiming that it was “an act of kindness”, as “[t]he Office of the Solicitor General will not allow [the Chief Justice] to undergo the indignity that the late Chief Justice Renato Corona suffered at the hands of politicians who unjustly convicted him.”34

47. Thus, it is very misleading to state that the Quo Warranto Petition could proceed simultaneously with the impeachment proceedings, as, obviously, the Supreme Court’s act of granting the same – as it did, indeed, do in this case – would render moot and inutile the earlier initiated and ongoing impeachment proceedings.

48. Therefore, even assuming that Quo Warranto is a valid remedy and impeachment is not exclusive, following the maxim qui prior est tempore, potior est jure35 and in accordance with the respect due to the constitutional Doctrine of Separation of Powers, the Supreme Court ought to have, at the very least, held in abeyance any action that would have mooted or otherwise defeated the prior-in-time impeachment proceedings, which is well within the Constitutionally mandated powers of the House of Representatives and the Senate to take cognizance of.

49. According to the Supreme Court itself, there are two (2) exceptions to applying the prior-in-time rule. However, instead of justifying deviation from the general rule, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the Petition for Quo Warranto makes the application of the general rule even more imperative.

50. As stated by the Supreme Court:

In the 1956 case of Teodoro v. Mirasol, we deviated from the "priority-in-time rule" and applied the "more appropriate action test" and the "anticipatory test."

The "more appropriate action test" considers the real issue raised by the pleadings and the ultimate objective of the parties; the more appropriate action is the one where the real issues raised can be fully and completely settled. In Teodoro, the lessee filed an action for declaratory relief to fix the period of the lease, but the lessor moved for its dismissal because he had subsequently filed an action for ejectment against the lessee. We noted that the unlawful detainer

34 http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/972920/jose-calida-sereno-supreme-court-impeachment-solicitor-general-

chief-justice 35 VICTRONICS COMPUTERS, INC. v. RTC, et al., G.R. No. 104019 January 25, 1993, citing Black's Law

Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1125.


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suit was the more appropriate action to resolve the real issue between the parties - whether or not the lessee should be allowed to continue occupying the land under the terms of the lease contract; this was the subject matter of the second suit for unlawful detainer, and was also the main or principal purpose of the first suit for declaratory relief.

In the "anticipatory test," the bona fides or good faith of the parties is the critical element. If the first suit is filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal, then the first suit should be dismissed. In Teodoro, we noted that the first action, declaratory relief, was filed by the lessee to anticipate the filing of the second action, unlawful detainer, considering the lessor's letter informing the lessee that the lease contract had

expired. 36

51. Applying the “more appropriate test”, it is the impeachment proceedings that is the more appropriate proceedings, considering that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. This fact cannot be made more apparent than during the oral arguments, when rules of evidence, including rules of materiality and relevance, appeared to have been disregarded because what was conducted was a mere “oral arguments” and not the methodical and technical presentation of evidence that would have ensured, not only that the rights of the respondent were adequately protected, but also, in the words of the Supreme Court itself, “the one where the real issues raised can be fully and completely settled.”

52. This is especially true since, applying the “anticipatory test”, it is the

second case that was filed in order to pre-empt the first proceedings and not the other way around. According to the Supreme Court, “[a] crucial consideration is the good faith of the parties”.37 Solicitor General Calida’s public admission that the filing of the Petition for Quo Warranto was intended to make the impeachment proceedings unnecessary and, thus, to prevent it from proceeding in due course is clear evidence of lack of good faith in the filing of the Petition vis-à-vis the impeachment proceedings.

D. GRANTING THE PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO, RESULTING IN THE OUSTER OF THE SUBJECT OF THE IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS, IS A VIOLATION OF THE

36 Benavidez v. Salvador, G.R. No. 173331, December 11, 2013. 37 Benavidez v. Salvador, G.R. No. 173331, December 11, 2013.


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CONSTITUTION; HENCE, MOVANT-INTERVENORS’ INTEREST IN PREVENTING SUCH A VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION IS NEITHER MERE EXPECTANT AND INCHOATE

53. As stated earlier, the impeachment proceedings is not only ongoing,

it also preceded the Petition for Quo Warranto. So, too, the fact that the latter alleges the same grounds as one of the Articles of Impeachment is known to the Supreme Court, as some of the evidence presented during the hearings of the House Committee on Justice was provided by the Court itself.

54. Considering that it is clear that the filing of the Petition for

Quo Warranto was intentionally filed in order to undermine the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate to hear and decide impeachment cases, as well as the exclusive prerogative of all senators to try the same, it is disingenuous to conclude that the interest being protected by herein Movant-Intervenors, as Senator-judges, are mere expectant and inchoate. It is clear that their interest is actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, as to justify their intervention in this case.

55. In fact, their interest is so real and immediate that the Petition for Quo Warranto was specifically filed in order to pre-empt and thwart it.

56. Hence, for the Honorable Court to proceed with deciding the Petition – despite the pendency of an earlier instituted impeachment proceedings based on the same grounds, which Petition was filed intentionally in order to pre-empt and impede the progress thereof – is an undue and unconstitutional act of usurpation of Congress’s exclusive power to remove and impeachable officer via impeachment proceedings.

57. Thus, respect for the Doctrine of Separation of Powers dictates that the Honorable Court give due respect to a co-equal branch of government, and to help uphold and defend the powers explicitly vested upon such co-equal branch by the Constitution, by dismissing the Quo Warranto Petition or, at the very least, deferring any decision thereon until the impeachment proceedings have had the opportunity to run its due course in accordance with the Constitution.

58. In fact, other members of the Senate, including herein Movant-Intervenors, filed Senate Resolution No. 738, entitled “Resolution Expressing


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The Sense Of The Senate To Uphold The Constitution On The Matter Of Removing A Chief Justice From Office”, stating, in part:

WHEREAS, Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that members of the Supreme Court "may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution xxx";

WHEREAS, Section 3( 1) of Article XI states that "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment"; Section 3(6) of the same Article states that "The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment xxx";

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court's decision to grant the quo warranto petition sets a dangerous precedent that transgresses the exclusive powers of the legislative branch to initiate, try, and decide all cases of impeachment;

WHEREAS, a fundamental doctrine of a republican government is the separation of powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government; and while this doctrine does not guarantee absolute autonomy in the discharge of functions of each branch, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances ensures their co-equality;

WHEREAS, the Senate recognizes that the continued harmonius interdependence of these branches lies in the faithful adherence of each branch of government to the Constitution;

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED to express the sense of the Senate of the Philippines to uphold the Constitution on the matter of removing a Chief Justice from office, and respectfully urge the Supreme Court to review its decision to nullify the appointment of Maria Lourdes Sereno as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

59. Therefore, as duly-elected Senators of the Republic of the Philippines currently sitting as members of the 17th Congress of the Philippines, movant-intervenors have a specific interest in ensuring that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate to hear and decide impeachment cases, as well as the exclusive prerogative of all senators to try the same, are not undermined; and that the Honorable Court does not allow itself to become complicit with this blatant attempt to circumvent and outrightly vipolate the Constitution.

E. THERE ARE SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO SUPPORT THE MOTION FOR INHIBITION FILED BY RESPONDENT CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO


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60. In the course of the proceedings, the animosity between the parties and some of the members of the Honorable Court became quite palpable and apparent. It has become evident that the Honorable Court cannot render a judgment based purely on the merits of the case, given such hostile environment.

61. With all due respect to the Honorable Court, the proceedings last

10 April 2018 cannot honestly be considered as wholly impartial, as to satisfy the due process requirement that those who shall hear, try and decide cases ought to possess the cold neutrality of impartial judges.

62. Thus, in light of what transpired during the oral arguments, herein

movant-intervenors hereby manifest their deep concern about the propriety of the Honorable Court’s denial of the Motions for Inhibition, and thus strongly urge the Honorable Court to reflect on the wisdom of proceeding with this case notwithstanding the apparent lack of impartiality of some of its members.

63. Moreover, movant-intervenors respectfully manifest that the

hostile environment for adjudicating the present case has clouded the jurisdictional issue they raised in their Opposition-in-Intervention, i.e., the issue of the lack of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear and decide the Petition for Quo Warranto, insofar as it seeks to oust or remove an impeachable officer on the grounds of her alleged lack of “integrity”.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, herein movant-intervenors, most respectfully pray that this Honorable Court RECONSIDER its Decision dated 11 May 2018; and, instead, DISMISS the Petition for Quo Warranto dated 2 March 2018 for LACK OF JURISDICTION, or, at the very least, hold in abeyance any final action therein pending the impeachment proceedings.

Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for. Quezon City for Manila, 31 March 2018.

RIGOROSO GALINDEZ & RABINO LAW OFFICES Rm 901-902, 9th Floor, FilGarcia Tower,

140 Kalayaan Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City Office Tel. Nos. 924-2396/924-8552

Fax No. 929-1609

By:


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FLORIN T. HILBAY Counsel for Movant-Intervenors

Roll of Attorneys No. 44957 PTR No. 5642721; 01/11/18; Q.C

IBP Lifetime Membership No. 08505 MCLE Exemption No. V-000908, issued on 12/3/2015

[email protected]

TEDDY ESTEBAN F. RIGOROSO Counsel for Movant-Intervenors

Roll of Attorneys No. 42240 PTR No. 5521162; 01/03/18; Q.C. IBP No. 020461; 01/05/18; Q.C.

MCLE Compliance No. V-0005526; 01/14/15 COPY FURNISHED VIA REGISTERED MAIL: SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA Petitioner Office of the Solicitor General 134 Amorsolo Street, Legaspi Village, 1229 Makati City MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO Respondent Office of the Chief Justice Supreme Court, Padre Faura, Street Ermita, Manila City 1000, Metro Manila

EXPLANATION FOR MODE OF SERVICE

Please be informed that the undersigned counsel served a copy of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration upon the foregoing parties/office by registered mail as evidenced by the attached Affidavit of Service by Registered Mail due to the shortage of available manpower to effect the service thereof by personal delivery.

TEDDY ESTEBAN F. RIGOROSO

republic of the philippines, represented by solicitor ...€¦ · court, the president, the...

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