republic of the philippines %...

Republic of the Philippines

% ̂em&tgemlragattQuezon City

***

SEVENTH DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,

- versus -

Grim. Case No. SB-16-CRM-0841

to 0848

JORGE V. SEGOVIA, AURELIO

B. BALADAD, JOSELITO REYES,CRISTOBAL N. ZARAGOZA,MARION D. BALONGLONG,ALLAN C. NOBLEZA, JO VILYCARMEL D. F. CABADING,

Accused.

Present:

Gomez-Estoesta, J., ChairpersonTrespeses, J. andHidalgo, J.

Promulgated:

-X

RESOLUTION

TRESPESES,/.

This resolves accused Jorge Segovia, Aurelio Baladad, Joselito Reyes,Cristobal Zaragoza, Marion Balonglong, Allan Nobleza and JovilyCabading's Demurrer to Evidence, with prior leave of court, the prosecution'sComment/Opposition thereto, accused's Motion for Leave to File Reply andto Admit Reply, and the prosecution's Opposition (re: accused's Motion forLeave to File Reply).

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People V. Jorge Segovia, et alSB-16-CRM-0841 to 0848

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The prosecution charged accused Jorge Valbuena Segovia, AurelioBartolome Baladad, Joselito Marinas Reyes (a.k.a. Joey Reyes), CristobalNocillado Zaragoza, Marion Daskeo Balonglong, Allan Cruz Nobleza,Manuel Tabion (a.k.a. Major Navarro), Jovily Carmel Dela Fuente Cabading,Vicente Lopez, and other individuals known only as "Calaoagan,""Bulaklak," and "Idloy" with eight (8) counts of the crime of Violation ofSection 4(a) of Republic Act No. 7438 (RA No. 7438), otherwise known asAn Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or UnderCustodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining andInvestigating Officers, and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof,docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-16-CRM-0841 to 0848.

On 3 November 2016, a Hold-Departure Order was issued against allaccused.^ Finding the existence of probable cause, the Court, in the MinuteResolution promulgated on 10 January 2017,^ ordered for the issuance ofwarrant of arrest against herein accused. On 11 January 2017, warrant of arrestwas issued.^

On 27 January 2017, accused Segovia, assisted by his counsel, pleadedNot Guilty during arraignment."^ Accused Joselito Reyes also pleaded notguilty when arraigned on 24 March 2017.^

Thereafter, the prosecution filed a Motion with Leave of Court toAmend and to Admit Amended Informations for Violation of Sec. 4(b) of RANo. 7438,^ which was granted in the Order dated 14 July 2017."^ Consequently,the Amended Information in Criminal Case Nos. SB-16-CRM-0841 to 0848

were admitted. In Crim. Case No. SB-16-0841,^ the Amended Informationreads:

On February 7, 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, inTanay, Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, accusedMaj. Gen. JORGE V. SEGOVIA (Salary Grade 28), then DivisionCommander of the 2"*' Infantry Division, Philippine Army, Armed Forcesof the Philippines (AFP), and the following members of the AFP, namely:Col. AURELIO B. BALADAD, Col. JOSELITO (JOEY) M. RYES, LtCoi: CRISTOBAL N. ZARAGZA, Capt. JOVILY CARMEL DELAFUENTE CABADING, VICENTE LOPEZ and others known only as"CALAOAGAN", "BULAKLAK and "IDLOY", together with personnelfrom the Philippine National Police (PNP) namely: P/Supt. MARION D.BALONGLONG, P/Supt. ALLAN C. NOBLEZA, and P/C Insp.MANUEL TABION, all public officers involved in the arrest, detention

' Record, Vol. 1, pp. 299-A to 299-B.^ Record, Vol. 2, pp. 101-1123 Id. at 113-114.

Md. at 200-201.

^ Record, Vol. 3, pp. 39-40.Md. at 412-418.

' Record, Vol. 4, p. 35.8 Id. at 419-422.

€

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and/or custodial investigation of Jane Beltran Balleta, conspiring andconfederating with one another and committing the offense in relation tooffice, did then and there willfully, xmlawflilly, and criminally fail to allowthe said Balleta to confer with competent and independent counsel of herchoice in violation of Balleta's rights as a person arrested, detained orunder custodial investigation.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The seven other Informations bore the same format and allegationexcept that in each criminal case, the complainant varies as follows:

Grim. Case No. SB-16-0842^ Samson Castillo

Crim. Case No. SB-16-0843'® Mercy Castro

Crim. Case No. SB-16-0844'^ Merry Mia Clamor

Crim. Case No. SB-16-0845^^ Gary Liberal

Crim. Case No. SB-16-0846^^ Reynaldo MacabentaCrim. Case No. SB-16-0847^^ Alexis Montes

Crim. Case No. SB-16-0848^5 Ma. Teresa Quinawayan

On 17 July 2017, accused Nobleza was arraigned and pleaded notguilty and on 31 July 2017, accused Segovia, Baladad, Reyes, Zaragoza,Balonglong and Cabading, likewise pleaded not guilty.*^ On 17 January 2018,Pre-trial was terminated.^^ Thereafter, trial on the merits proceeded.

Prosecution's Evidence

1. Mercy Castro

Castro alleged that on 6 February 2010, she noticed several armedsoldiers in the surrounding area. She decided to go to a room where her co-participants were but while walking, she was seen by the soldiers and told hernot to move. The soldiers barged into the other rooms and ordered hercolleagues to come out. They were ordered to line-up and their photographswere taken. The men tied their hands with nylon cords and blindfolded them.They were not informed why they were being arrested and were not apprised

' Record, Vol. 3, pp. 423-426.® Id. at 427-430.

'Id. at 431-434.

2 Id. at 435-438

Md. at 439-442.

Md. at 443-446.

Md.at447-449-A

^ Record, Vol. 4, pp. 39-40.^ Id. at 94-95.

'Record, Vol. 5, p. 267./•

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of their rights such as the right to remain silent and to confer with a lawyer oftheir own choice. Then they were forced into a vehicle.

After an hour, they arrived at their destination and were brought into anopen room. Thereafter, the interrogation begun where she was asked about herpersonal information. The interrogators insisted that she was a member of theNew People's Army (NPA) and that she was in their Order of Battle (OB).She was also asked of her supposed involvement with the NPA in Bataan andabout her aliases. She was threatened that she would be buried alive if she will

not cooperate.

Castro alleged that from 6 until 10 of February 2010, she was subjectedto continuous questioning. During the 36 hours of interrogation, she wasblindfolded with her hands tied behind her back. She was also threatened with

bodily harm and sexual abuse.

Castro identified the Joint Complaint Affidavit she signed, which wasconsidered as part of her direct testimony. In addition, Castro testified thattheir lawyers informed them that the ones responsible for their illegal arrestand detention were the military and police officers. She did not know theofficers at the time she was talking to them. She was able to identify themthrough their name badge and because the other officers were calling them bytheir names.^®

She filed a complaint against accused because according to their lawyerGen. Segovia was the commanding officer in charge at the 2^^ InfantryDivision; Col. Joey Reyes was the Chief of Staff of the 2"^ Infantry Division;and that Gen. Baladad, P./Supt. Balonglong, S.P./Supt. Nobleza and Cabadingwere part of the team that arrested and interrogated her. She recognized saidaccused because when she was still handtied and blindfolded, she was able toidentify their voices.^^ Because she was detained for three months, she becamefamiliar with them and thus, she was able to validate that the officers whomshe identified through their voices were the same officers charged in this case.

She had a chance to talk to then Chairperson Leila De Lima of theCommission on Human Rights (CHR) fi*om whom she requested if they couldhave a lawyer.^^ From the time that they were arrested, she requested to seeher mother and if she could have a lawyer because she does not know any.^^Her requests were ignored. On 11 Februaiy 2010, she was able to talk to alawyer and on 1 May 2010, they were transferred to Camp Bagong Diwa untiltheir release on 17 December 2010.

TSN, 20 March 2018, p. 27.2® Id. at 35

Id. at 52.

22 Id. at 37.

22 Id. at 38.

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On cross examination, Castro testified that CHR Chairperson De Limavisited them on 8 February 2010 and she relayed to her their experiences. Shesigned the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 21 February 2010^"^ after she conferredwith her lawyer. She confirmed that it was prepared by her lawyer.^^ Sheadmitted that in the said Salaysay, she did not mention the names of any ofthe accused. On 7 March 2010, she prepared another written SinumpaangSalaysay^^ which also failed to mention any names of the accused except forTabion and Zaragoza. There was also no mention about any of the accusedrefusing to allow the detainees to talk to their lawyer.^^

During the first 36 hours, she did ask for a lawyer from her interrogator.The interrogator answered "Hindi kayo aabutan ng abogado nyo." Sheadmitted that she does not know any lawyer but she knows that she has theright to have a lawyer.^^

On redirect^examination, she said that when he asked for a lawyer, theofficer cursed at her and threatened her. She was so scared because she was

pregnant at that time and she could hear gun shots.

2. Merry Mia Clamor

Clamor alleged that on 6 February 2010, she was in Morong, Rizal, ina small seminar house owned by Dr. Velmonte conducting a First Responder'sTraining for Community Health Workers.^^ At around 6:00 a.m., a group ofuniformed men (wearing military uniform, police uniforms, CIDG shirts)came to their venue. They heard Dr. Velmonte shouting and so they went backto their rooms and waited for further instructions. Suddenly, someone bangedinto their room. When they opened the door, some men went in and pointedguns on their heads. Then they were ordered to lie down.^^

After a few more minutes, they were ordered to stand up and to put theirhands behind their heads. She asked them what was happening but no oneanswered.^ ̂ Then they were told to proceed to the porch to line up. AngelaDolor, one of the co-organizers, got her phone and tried to call their lawyerbut someone grabbed her phone and took it away.^^ She does not know whothat lawyer was but during that time, she said that, she personally had a lawyerin mind and it was Atty. Edre Olalia.^^

Exh. G

" TSN, 20 March 2018, pp. 65-66.26 Exh. G-1.22 TSN, 20 March 2018, p. 70.28 Id. at 75.

2'TSN, 23 April 2018, p. 31.20 Id. at 38-39.2» Id. at 39. I22 Id. at 42-44 y22 Id. at 43. '

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Thereafter, they were sent back to their rooms. They were blindfoldedand handtied. Someone was holding her while she was walking and she askedthat person if they will not tell her their rights. The man answered "walangkara-karapatan dito, sa tv langyun.

She recalled that they boarded a vehicle and brought to a place she doesnot know. When they arrived at their destination, she was asked by differentpeople about her personal information and her participation in the training.She was aware of her right to counsel and so she requested if she can talk to alawyer because she was being asked so many questions.^^ She was also askedif she was a member of the New People's Army (NPA).

She cannot identify the names of those who interrogated her becauseshe was blindfolded all the time. After their blindfolds were removed, she thenrealized that those people who visited them in their cell have the same voicesas the ones who questioned them, particularly Col. Zaraeoza and Lt.Cabading.^^

After three days, they were visited by some of the representatives of theCommission on Human Rights (CHR). In the afternoon of the same day, shewas visited by her husband for a few minutes. Her husband said that he lookedfor her upon learning that they were arrested and they were with their lawyersbut they were not allowed to talk to the detainees.^^

She saw Atty. Edre Olalia for the first time on 11 February 2010. Atty.Olalia said to her that they were already outside the camp on the day of theirarrest but they were not allowed to see the detainees. She was disappointedbecause from the very start, she was already asking if she can confer or see alawyer first as she was being asked many questions and she could beincriminated since she was accused of being a member of the NPA.^^ Atty.Olalia asked her and her companions to execute an affidavit or statementdescribing what happened during their arrest and detention.

On cross-examination. Clamor identified the handwritten statement sheexecuted.^^ She confirmed that she did not allege in her statement that she wasprevented, obstructed or denied to consult with a counsel of her choice."*®Clamor also testified that she requested her interrogators if she can call herhusband and if she can confer with a lawyer. At that time, she had Atty. Olalia

3^TSN, 23 April 2018, p. 49.35 Id. at 52-53.

36 Id. at 63-64.

3'Id. at 69.38 Id. 3t 71.

39Exh.B. 7TSN, 23 April 2018, p. 91. '

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in mind. However, she admitted that she did not mention the name of Atty.Olalia to the investigating officers."^^

Clamor said that she cannot tell who are the arresting officers to whomshe made a request to see a lawyer. The only voice she could remember wasthat of Zaragoza and Cabading. She said that every time she is beinginterrogated, she would request if she can have a lawyer first. She admittedthat she did not see or hear accused Segovia, Baladad, Reyes, Balonglong, andNobleza prohibit or prevent her from talking to her lawyer of choice."^^

On re-direct examination. Clamor added that none of the accused askedher the name of her counsel. When she requested for a lawyer, they ignoredher and told her '^walang kara-karapatan She later learned fi*om herhusband that from the time they were arrested, Atty. Cortez and some otherlawyers from the National Union of People's Lawyer (NUPL) and PublicInterest Law Center (PILC) were looking for them and were trying to talk tothem but the officers at the gate of Camp Capinpin denied that they havecustody of the health workers. ̂

3. Reynaldo Torres Macabenta'*^

Macabenta alleged that the officers who detained them at CampCapinpin did not apprise them of their right to consult with a lawyer of then-own choice. His lawyers, Atty. Oliva and Atty. Matibag, told him that theyrequested the officers at Camp Capinpin if they could see the detainees butthey were denied entry. When he learned about it, he said he felt violated,angry, and he wanted to get justice. They were told that a petition for habeascorpus should be filed on their behalf for their immediate release. They werealso advised to file a complaint if they feel that their rights were violated.

Thereafter, he and the other detainees executed statements to supportthe petition for habeas corpus filed by their relatives. After more than a yearfi*om their release, he and seven others executed a Joint Complaint Affidavitagainst the officers responsible for the baseless arrest and detention.

On cross-examination, Macabenta was asked if he remembers Segoviaprevented him from speaking with his coimsel of choice and he answered inthe negative. Macabenta also said that since it was a long time ago and he wasblindfolded, he cannot say if Reyes, Baladad, Balonglong, and Nobleza alsoprevented him from conferring with his counsel."^^

TSN, 23 April 2018, pp. 95-96.«Id. at 102-104

«Id. at 105.

Id. at 108.

Record, Vol. 6, pp. 136-141.^ TSN, 24 April 2018, pp. 25-27.

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' On questions from the court, Macabenta alleged that from the time hewas arrested until they were brought to Camp Capinpin, accused never askedif he has a lawyer.

4. Dr. Alexis SolinapMontes'*^

Montes alleged that the officers who had custody over them while inCamp Capinpin did not inform them the reason why they were arrested. Theywere also not apprised of their rights such as the ri^t to consult with a lawyerof their own choice. He remembers a certain Vicente Lopez who introducedhimself as the main interrogator and forced him to admit that he was a memberof the special operation group of the NPA.

He learned that his family and counsels have been requesting theofficers at Camp Capinpin since 6 February 2010 to allow them to confer withthe detainees but they were not allowed to do so and were denied entry. On11 February 2010, he met his counsel and they were informed that they canfile a complaint if they feel that their rights were violated. Thus, they executedstatements. Thereafter, he and seven others executed a Joint ComplaintAffidavit^*® against the officers responsible for the baseless arrest anddetention.

On cross-examination, Montes said that he engaged the lawyers fromthe Public Interest Law Centre (PILC) and National LFnion of People's Lawyer(NUPL) only on 11 February 2010."^^ But prior thereto, he has never metthem.5®

On re-direct examination, he testified that among the officers whointerrogated him, he only remembers Vicente Lopez. Since he was blindfoldedand handcuffed, he cannot really identify the other officers.

5. Ma. Teresa Quinawayan

In her Judicial Affidavit which was adopted as her direct testimony,Quinawayan identified the Joint Complaint Affidavit^^ she executed togetherwith other complainants. She likewise identified the Sinumpaang Salaysa/^

Record, Vol. 6, pp. 64-70.Exh. A.

TSN, 24 April 2018, p. 51.50 Id. 52.

5' Record, Vol. 6, pp. 316-325.52 Exh. A.

55 Exh. E.

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and Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay^"^ she executed while detained atCamp Capinpin.

Quinawayan alleged that she begged the interrogating officer to allowher to call her husband. At that time, she had no means to call one because shewas blindfolded and hogtied and her cellphone was confiscated. No lawyerwas introduced to her to represent her. She said that if given the chance tocontact a lawyer she would consult her office first because they would provideher a counsel considering that she was arrested in line of her duty as field staff.On 11 February 2010, she met Atty. Edre Olalia for the first time, the lawyercontacted by her office. Atty. Olalia told her that they have been requestingCamp Capinpin to see the detainees but they were not allowed inside.

She recognized accused Tabion and Zaragoza as the ones whointerrogated her because she remembered their voices. When her blindfoldwas removed, she recognized them through their voices and their nameplates.She included in the charge accused Jorge Segovia, because he was then theCommanding Officer of the 2"^ Infantry Division of the Philippine Army anddirectly responsible for the operation that led to their arrest; accused JoeyReyes, because he was the Chief of Staff of the 2"^ Infantry Division and wasin line of command; accused Arturo Baladad, because he was theCommanding Officer of the 202"^^ Infantry Brigade which had operationalcontrol over their arrest. Accused Balonglong and Nobleza were also includedin the charge because they were part of the team that arrested them.

On cross-examination, Quinawayan testified that she engaged theservices of Atty. Edre Olalia only on 11 February 2010.^^ While she did askfor a lawyer when she was being interrogated, she did not specifically requestthe interrogators for Atty. Olalia because she thought of calling their officefirst to consult the lawyer.^^ Finally, she said that she does not knowpersonally accused Segovia, Reyes, Baladad, Balonglong, and Nobleza.^^ Sherequested for a lawyer from her interrogator but not from any of the accused.

On re-direct examination, she said that it was their lawyers whodetermined the persons responsible for their illegal detention.

6. JaneBeltranBalleta^®

On 6 February 2010, she was at Maybangcal, Morong, Rizal attendinga health training sponsored by the Council for Health and Development(CHD). At around 6:00 a.m., a group of armed men arrived at the compound

^''Exh.E-l.

TSN, 4 June 2018, p. 20.56 Id. at 21.

5Md. at 24-25.

5®Record, Vol. 6, pp. 404-412. '

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and forcibly entered the female participants' rooms. They were asked abouttheir personal information and ordered to proceed to the driveway. They wereblindfolded and their hands were tied. While they were being questioned, sheand her companions requested the officers that they need to talk to their lawyerfirst. They also asked who the commanding officer was, but the men just gaveanswers like "SOP itd'' and "Sumusunod long kami.

Thereafter, they were brought to Camp Capinpin. The military officersgot their names and personal information, took their fingerprints and mugshots. Balleta said that they were continuously interrogated and subjected toinquest proceedings by Fiscal Senson in the absence of their lawyer. She askedif she can confer with their lawyer but they ignored her. Tired of all thequestioning, and because of the episodes of seizure she was experiencing, shewas forced to tell that she was an NPA even if she is not.

On 9 February 2010, she was able to talk to her mother and Dr. GeneveReyes. On 11 February 2010, she met the NUPL lawyers Atty. Edre Olalia,Atty. Jun Oliva, Atty. Julius Matibag and others. Atty. Olalia requested her toprepare a written statement detailing the events that transpired. In addition,she executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay^^^ a handwritten KaragdagangSinumpaang Salayso)^^ and a Joint Complaint Affidavit.^^ On 1 May 2010,they were transferred to Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City.

She does not know personally Segovia, Baladad, Reyes, Balonglong,Nobleza, Zaragoza and Cabading. She was only told by their counsel that theywere the officials responsible for their arrest and detention.

On cross-examination, Balleta testified that she did not give any namewhen she requested for a lawyer because she actually does not have a lawyerof choice then.^^

On re-direct examination, she said that although she did not have alawyer in mind, she was represented by NUPL lawyers.

On questions fi-om the court, Balleta said that she did not see theaccused officers at the time when she requested for a lawyer during theinterrogation because she was blindfolded.^"^

Record, Vol. 6, p. 406 (page 3 of the Judicial Affidavit of Jane Beltran Balleta).Exh. H.

Exh. G-1.

« Exh. A.

TSN, 6 June 2018, pp. 13-14. .Id. at 40-41. y

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7. Roneo Santos Clamor^^

Roneo is a human rights defender and a member of KARAPATAN, analliance of individuals, groups and organizations working for the promotionand protection of human rights in the Philippines.

On 6 February 2010, he received a call from Olive Bernardo, Head ofthe Services Department of KARAPATAN, who requested him to join theQuick Response Team (QRT) to respond to the reported arrest of 43 healthworkers in Morong, Rizal. His wife. Dr. Merry Mia Clamor, was one of thosearrested.

Thereafter, they fetched Atty. Ephraim Cortez in Tandang Sora,Quezon City. They proceeded to Silungan Seminar House owned by Dr.Melencia Velmonte where they met Dr. Geneve Rivera, Dr. Juliet Caguiat andDr. Edelina Dela Paz. They were informed that the health workers wereprobably brought to the Provincial Mobile Group Philippine National Police(PNP) in Baras, Rizal. When they went to Baras, Rizal, the detainees were notthere and that they might have been brought to Camp Capinpin of thePhilippine Army located at Tanay, Rizal.

When they reached Camp Capinpin at around 2:00 p.m., they wereapproached by several guards. He identified himself and told the guards thatAtty. Cortez is a lawyer and demanded to see the detained health workers.They were told to wait outside. At aroxmd 3:00 p.m., Atty. Apuhin arrived andintroduced himself as a lawyer and relative of one of the detainees. During theentire duration of their stay at the main gate of Camp Capinpin, they neverreceived any official word. They left Camp Capinpin at about 7:00 p.m.without being able to see, talk or confer with his wife and other detainees.

On 7 February 2010, they returned to Camp Capinpin. Attys. Sato andPrincipe asked the guards if they could see the detainees but their request wasdenied. Personnel from the Commission on Human Rights were likewise notallowed to enter.

His next visit to Camp Capinpin was on 8 February 2010. At around10:00 a.m.. Dr. Rivera along with paramedic Celestino Dizon, Dr. AnnieQuines, Dr. Eloisa Castillo entered the Camp together with the team from theCHR. He and 14 other relatives of the detainees were allowed to enter but theywere able to talk and see them only for five minutes. On the other hand, theNUPL lawyers were able to enter Camp Capinpin only on 11 February 2010.

On cross-examination, Roneo confirmed that he did not mention in hisjudicial affidavit that when he and Atty. Cortez went to Morong, Rizal, the

Record, Vol. 6, pp. 398-403.

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latter was engaged as counsel by any of the 43 detainees.^^ He also did notstate that Attys. Sato and Principe were engaged as counsel by any of thedetainees.

On re-direct examination, Roneo said that he brought Atty. Cortezbecause as an immediate relative, he would like to assert their ri^ts statedunder Sec. 2(f) of RA No. 7438 as well as the right to counsel.^^

On re-cross, Roneo testified that Atty. Cortez was supposed to representthe 43 detainees. He admitted that it was his choice, as a relative of one of thedetainees, that Atty. Cortez should represent them.

8. Geneve Rivera Reyes^®

Reyes alleged that she was part of the Quick Response Team (QRT)which responded to the group of 43 health workers who were arrested inMorong, Rizal on 6 February 2010. She learned about the arrest from Dr. JulieCaguiat, Officer of Community Medicine Development Foundation, Inc.(COMMED), who informed her that several military and police personnelbarged into the venue. She was with Dr. Caguiat and Dr. Dela Paz as part ofthe medical team. At about past 10:00 a.m., they met the legal team composedof Atty. Cortez and the paralegal staff of KARAPATAN at Bahay Silunganin Morong, Rizal. They were informed that the participants were already takenby the military and police personnel. Then they proceeded to PNP BarasStation but they did not see the health workers and the police denied havingcustody of them.

Thereafter, they went to the nearest military camp which is CampCapinpin. Several members of the media were waiting at the gate. They askedthe guards if they have knowledge of the health workers arrested and broughtinside the camp, but the guards said none. They requested the guards to checkwith their senior officers the names of the health workers and if they can talkto them. They waited but despite their frequent follow-ups, they did notreceive any update.

While waiting, they noticed that members of the media started to lineup to enter the camp and then somebody said ̂ ^Gusto mong sumama?''''^^ Sheimmediately boarded one of the open vans entering the camp. The membersof the media proceeded to the office of Gen. Segovia and conducted aninterview with him. She overheard Gen. Segovia confirmed to the reportersthat the health workers were inside the camp. A certain Cecil Lardizabal asked

««TSN,6June2018, p. 35.Id. at 37.

Record, Vol. 6, pp. 514-521. 'Id. at 517 (page 4 of the Judicial Affidavit of Geneve Rivera Reyes). /

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if they could interview the detainees. Segovia answered that they were stillbeing processed and undergoing interrogation. Then Mr. Datoyato, the actingspokesperson, recognized him as member of the KARAPATAN thus, she wasimmediately brought out of the camp.

. Reyes returned to Camp Capinpin on 8 February 2010, together withthen CHR Chair Leila De Lima, some other doctors, Mr. Roneo Clamor andother relatives of the detainees. However, only Mr. Clamor and the doctorswere allowed to enter. The other lawyer-members were still not allowedinside.

On cross-examination, Reyes testified that he does not have personalknowledge whether the complainants engaged the services of Atty. Cortez on6 February 2010 to act as their counsel.^® He and Atty. Cortez are members ofthe QRT whose purpose is to respond to situations where people are arrestedand there are possible human rights violations or political arrest. In such cases,they volunteer their services. In this case, the person who requested them torespond was Dr. Julie Caguiat.^'

On re-direct examination, Reyes said that the reason why it is not clearwhether or not the detainees engaged the services of Atty. Cortez is becausethey were not able to come face to face with the detainees prior to 11 February2010. On the other hand, the relatives of the detainees have agreed from thevery beginning that they are engaging the services of the NUPL and PILClawyers.^^

9. Ephraim Cortez^'

Cortez is a member of the National Union of People's Lawyers(NUPL), a national association of human rights and public interest lawyers.

On 6 February 2010, he received a call from Ms. Olive Bernardo, Headof the Services Department of KARAPATAN, requesting him to join theQuick Response Team (QRT) to respond to the reported arrest of 43 healthworkers in Morong, Rizal. The QRT, headed by Mr. Roneo Clamor husbandof Merry Mia Clamor, picked him up in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. Theyproceeded to Silungan Seminar House where the 43 health workers werearrested. They met Dr. Geneve Reyes, Dr. Julie Caguiat and Dr. Edelina DelaPaz, who said that the health workers might have been brought to theProvincial Mobile Group of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Baras,Rizal. However, when they went to the PNP office in Baras, they were told

™ TSN, 9 July 2018, pp. 38-39.Id. at 44. ^

^2 Id. at 48-49.

Record, Vol. 6, pp. 390-396. /

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that the detainees might be in Camp Capinpin of the Philippine Army locatedin Tanay, Rizal.

Thereafter, they rushed to Camp Capinpin. Several guards approachedthem. He introduced himself as a lawyer and demanded to see the detainees.They were told to just wait outside the main gate and that they will informtheir supervisors of their presence. However, they never received any officialword from the guards. They left the camp at around 7:00 p.m. without beingable to see, talk or confer with the detainees.

On 9 February 2010, he returned to Camp Capinpin together with Atty.Julius Garcia Matibag and the relatives of the detainees. The lawyersdemanded to see the detainees invoking the rights of their clients under theconstitution and under RA No. 7438 but the lawyers were still not allowed toenter.

He visited Camp Capinpin for several times to interview the detaineesand get their signatures for their affidavits for the purpose of filing complaintsbefore the CHR. After due proceedings, the CHR issued a Resolution findingthat the detainees were tortured and their rights violated. Cortez said that healso assisted the detainees in filing the complaint before the Department ofJustice.

On cross-examination, Cortez testified that when they arrived at CampCapinpin, he showed the guards his IB? ID and demanded ̂ at he be allowedto confer with the 43 detainees. He did not use the word "clients" because at

that time, his purpose was only to see them first and talk to them.^"* Whenasked by the Court, he said that his services were not yet secured by thedetainees because they were incommunicado at that time.^^ His services wereengaged by the detainees only on 11 February 2010.^^

On re-direct examination, Cortez said that it was on 11 February 2010that the detainees signed an engagement letter with the NUPL and PILC.

On re-cross, Cortez said that the engagement letter signed by thedetainees was for them to represent the detainees in the habeas corpus petitionwith the Supreme Court.

TSN, 9 July 20-18, pp. 67,69."Id. at 69.

"Id. at 72. y »

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7710. Julie Payawal Caguiat

On 6 February 2010, at around 6:15 a.m., she received a call fromAngela Doloricon, one of the arrested persons. Doloricon was telling her thatthey were being arrested, then the line was suddenly cut. She tried to call backbut her number could no longer be contacted. She tried to call Dr. Velmonteto confirm but she, also, cannot be contacted. She was alarmed so she decidedto call and alert the members of Health Alliance for Democracy and HealthAction for Human Rights as part of the Quick Response Team to respond tothe 43 health workers.

She met Dr. Edelina Dela Faz and Dr. Geneve Reyes in Ortigas ataround 9:00 a.m. and proceeded to Bahay Silungan in Morong, Rizal. Theylearned from Dr. Velmonte that the 43 health workers were taken in vans bymilitary and police personnel. They contacted people who could help anddecided to wait for the lawyers. Atty. Ephraim Cortez arrived together withhis paralegal team and members of KAJRAPATAN. After gathering all thenecessary informations. Dr. Reyes and Dr. Dela Faz, the NUFL lawyers andthe paralegal team proceeded to Baras, while she stayed with Dr. Velmonte.

On 7 February 2010, they went to Camp Capinpin with the hope thatthey could confer with the health workers. However, the guards preventedthem from entering the camp. They went back to Camp Capinpin on 9 and 10of February but it was only on 11 February 2010 that she and the lawyers wereable to see and talk to the detainees.

On cross-examination, she said that part of responding is contacting alawyer they will bring to the place where the incident happened. Atty. Cortezand the NUFL lawyers went to Camp Capinpin as part of the responding teamand during that time, they were not yet engaged.^^

On questions from the Court, Caguiat said that when they saw thedetainees, some of them had bruises. Although they do not have picturesbecause it was not allowed, they had them checked by doctors who issuedmedical certificates.

After the termination of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, theprosecution formally offered its exhibits.^^ In the Minute Resolution dated 21January 2019,^® the Court admitted prosecution's Exhs. A, B, C, E, E-1, F, F-l,G,G-lH,andH-l.

" Record, Vol. 6, pp. 522-528.^TSN, 10 July 2018, p. 16. .''Record, Vol. 7,pp.233- ,8® Id. at 326-329. J *

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After the prosecution rested its case, accused Segovia, Baladad, Reyes,Zaragoza, Balonglong, Nobleza and Cabading filed their Demurrer toEvidence with prior leave of court.

Accused's Demurrer to Eyidence®^

Accused anchor their demurrer to the prosecution's failure to provetheir guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the offense of Violation of Sec. 4(b)of Republic Act No. 7438 (RA No. 7438).82

Accused aver that the accusatory portion of the eight Informationsuniformly describes the offense committed as "willfully, unlawfully, andcriminally fail to allow the said [Private Complainant] to confer withcompetent and independent counsel of [his/her] choice in violation of [Privatecomplainant's] rights as a person arrested, detained or under custodialinvestigation." Based on the Amended Informations, the issue was limited to:

Whether the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt ofobstructing, preventing, or prohibiting Private Complainants' lawyer

of choice from conferring with Private Complainants in violation of

Sec. 4(b) of Republic Act No. 7438. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, accused allege that it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove,beyond reasonable doubt, the existence of the following elements of theoffense charged:

18.1. That the Private Complainants were arrested, detained, or wereotherwise under custodial investigation;

18.2. That at the time of their arrest, detention, and custodial investigationeach Private Complainant had a lawyer of his/her own choice.

18.3. That during their arrest, detention and custodial investigation, thePrivate Complainants had identified their lawyer of his/her choice andcommunicated this choice to the Accused;

8' Record, Vol. 7, pp. 376-428.8^ Sec. 4. Section 4. Penalty Clause.

XXX

(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediatefamily of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priestor religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel,from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or fromministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall sufferthe penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine offour thousand pesos (P4,000.00).

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18.4. That the Private Complainants asked or demanded to confer with then-lawyer of choice;

18.5. That despite: (a) the Accused's knowledge of the existence and theidentity of Private Complainants' lawyer of choice, and (b) demand fromthe Complainants, the Accused knowingly, willfiilly, and voluntarily"obstructfed], prevent[ed], or prohibit[ed] Private Complainants' lawyer ofchoice from conferring with Private Complainants.

However, the testimonies of the private complainants reveal that theynever informed accused the name of their counsel of choice. In fact, they didnot have a lawyer of choice in mind when they were arrested and detainedfrom 6 to 10 February 2010. The NUPL and PILC lawyers allegedly preventedfrom entering Camp Capinpin and conferring with private complainants from6 to 10 February 2010 were not requested for by any of the complainants.Atty. Cortez admitted that he went to Camp Capinpin on his own volition andthat his services were not engaged until 11 February 2010. He never testifiedthat from the time he v/as engaged, he was prevented from seeing the privatecomplainants.

Accused further claim that other than the general allegation ofconspiracy, the prosecution failed to prove the particular acts performed byeach of the accused in furtherance of conspiracy. The complaining witnessestestified that they impleaded accused based on the information relayed to themby their lawyers that accused were either the commanding or senior officersor part of the arresting team. Accused invoke Sec. 36 of Rule 130 of the Rulesof Court stating that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knowsof his own personal knowledge. Thus, hearsay testimonies of the prosecutionwitnesses should be disregarded.

Accused add that Camp Capinpin is a secure military facility of thePhilippine Army. During the time material to these cases, there were 43 healthworkers suspected of being a member of the New People's Army detainedtherein. The detention officers had legitimate reasons to tighten their securityto protect the personnel in the camp and to prevent the escape of suspectedinsurgents. Thus, the officers at Camp Capinpin had reason to deny civilianswho had no legitimate business access to the camp. Besides, Atty. Corteznever introduced himself as the detainees' lawyer as he never referred to themas his "clients."

Finally, accused allege that penal laws such as RA No. 7438 should bestrictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Thus,when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, therule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to theaccused.^^ Accused argue that since they are being prosecuted for violating

Lent V. Tullet Prebon (Philippines), Inc., G.R. No. 189158, 11 January 2017. ^\

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Sec. 4(b), as expressed in the Informations, the prosecution cannot go beyondthe elements of the offense as limited by the Information. To do so wouldresult in violation of their right to be informed of the charges against them.

Prosecution's Comment/Opposition®^

The prosecution counters that it has established the guilt of accusedbeyond reasonable doubt for the offense charged, as well as the degree ofparticipation of each of accused in the commission of the acts complained of.

The prosecution alleges that accused have already admitted theiridentities and positions in the Joint Stipulations of Facts and Issues. Accusedalso admitted that they were arrested at Maybangcal, Morong, Rizal and weredetained at Camp Capinpin.

It further claims that lawyers came to visit and confer with privatecomplainants in Camp Capinpin but they were obstructed, prevented orprohibited from seeing the detainees despite the former's request. These wereestablished through the testimonies of Roneo Clamor, Geneve Rivera Reyes,Ephraim Cortez and Julie Payawal Caguiat, who detailed the accounts on theefforts made by the Quick Response Team and on what transpired outsideCamp Capinpin. Their testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies ofthe private complainants who all confirmed that they met their counsel for thefirst time only on 11 February 2010 or five days after their arrest.

As to the degree of participation of each of the accused, the prosecutionmaintains that they were established through the testimonies of the privatecomplainants. Mercy Castro testified that she became familiar with the voicesof accused and were able to identify them later through their name badge. Shealso said that some of accused were the ones who arrested them. Merry MiaClamor testified that the accused who visited them in their cell have the same

voices as those who interrogated her.

Both Clamor and Castro testified that they were able to get the namesand the respective positions of accused throu^ their lawyers and throughmedia reports. Reynaldo Macabenta, Alex Solinap Montes, Ma. TeresaQuinawayan and Jane Beltran Balleta testified that the basis for chargingaccused were either because they were directly responsible for the operationthat led to their arrest or were part of the arresting team. They learnedaccused's respective positions and capacity through their lawyers and afterconducting internet research.

^ Record, Vol. 7, pp. 448-479.

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The prosecution argues that accused's criminal liability is based ontheir command responsibility being the top officials of the military and thePNP units or division. It invokes Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, etclaiming that'the Supreme Court has recognized command responsibility asbasis of criminal liability, thus:

While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the CA of the caseas against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed againstthe backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the assailed decision vis-a-vis the two generals, i.e., command responsibility. The Court assumes thelatter stance owing to the fact that command responsibility, as a conceptdefined, developed, and applied under intemationd law, has little, if at all,bearing in amparo proceedings.

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its contextin the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr.Bemas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinatemembers of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control ininternational wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, commandresponsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The HagueConventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable forthe atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his dutyof control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "anomission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is maderesponsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent orpunish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered).

The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute of theIntemational Criminal Court (ICC) to which the Philippines is signatory. Sec.28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military commandersfor crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is, however,not yet formally bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend concurrence in its ratification.While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is stillno Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine.

It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legalbasis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings,enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to thisjurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine nowconstitutes a principle of intemational law or customary intemational law inaccordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.

'The prosecution also argues that it is incorrect to interpret theInformation limiting the scope of Sec. 4(b) of RA No. 7438 to privatecomplainants' "lawyer of choice." The said law merely requires "any lawyer"and the phrase "of choice" in the Information is a mere qualifier and not a factconstituting the essential element of the offense, which is not necessary to

85 G.R. No. 183871, 18 Februaiy 2010.

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prove. Further, for complainants to be able to choose a counsel of their choice,they should have been given first the opportunity to confer with any lawyer asguaranteed by RA No. 7438. However, the NUPL and PILG lawyers whowent to Camp Capinpin were denied entry.

It adds that the reasonable measures that may be undertaken by securityofficers with custodial responsibility refers to visiting hours guidelines andnot holding the detainees incommunicado.

Finally, the prosecution avers that there is no room for interpretation ifthe law is clear. RA No. 7438 mandates that the person arrested must at alltimes be assisted by counsel. If the person cannot afford the services of alawyer, the arresting, detaining or interrogating officer must provide him withone.

Accused's Motion for Leave to

File Reply AND TO Admit Reply

Accused beg for leave for the filing and admission of their Reply torefute matters stated in the prosecution's Comment/Opposition, particularlyon the criminal liability of accused based on command responsibility.

Accused allege that the doctrine in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyoinvoked by the prosecution defeats its position as the Supreme Court heldtherein that: "(t)he country is, however, not yet formally bound by the termsand provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet toextend concurrence in its ratification. While there are several pending billson command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides forcriminal liability under that doctrine." The said case was promulgated on 13December 2011. Thus, from 6 to 10 February 2010, the time material to thesecases, there was no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability underthe doctrine of command responsibility.

They add that assuming that the doctrine of command responsibility isallowed to serve as basis of criminal liability, the same must be clearly allegedin the informations. Otherwise, accused's right to be informed of the natureof the cause and accusations against him will be violated.

Moreover, accused are charged of having acted in conspiracy with oneanother in knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully committing the allegedoffense, thereby imputing dolo or deceit on accused. However, the doctrine ofcommand responsibility raised by the prosecution is the opposite of theprinciple of conspiracy as it pertains to criminal liability of a superior whowas remiss in his duty of supervising his subordinates. The two principlespertain to different legal theories and would require different defenses.

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Prosecution's Opposition to Accused's Motion

FOR Leave to File Reply and to Admit Reply

The prosecution argues that Reply is a prohibited pleading under theRevised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases, as well as the2018 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Therefore, accused'smotion for leave should be denied and the Reply incorporated therein bestricken off the record.

Court's Ruling

1. On the Motion for Leave toFile Reply and to AdmitReply

Accused's Motion for Leave to File Reply and to Admit Reply lacksmerit.

The filing of a Reply is contrary to the 2018 Revised Internal Rules ofthe Sandiganbayan, particularly in Sec. 4 of Rule VII, which provides that incase of meritorious motions, reply and memorandum shall not be allowed.This is similar to the provision of the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trialof Criminal Cases under paragraph 2(c) on Meritorious Motions, whichprovides that reply and memorandum need not be submitted. They areconsistent with Sec. 23 of Rule 119 governing demurrer to evidence whichonly prescribes the filing of a comment or opposition to the demurrer.

Accordingly, accused's motion for leave is denied.

II. On the Demurrer to Evidence

Herein accused are charged with violation of Sec. 4(b) of Republic ActNo. 7438 (RA No. 7438), which provides that:

(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, anymember of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or undercustodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious ministerchosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel,from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining andtreating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of theday or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonmentof not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of fourthousand pesos ̂ ,000.00).

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It can be deduced from the foregoing that a violation of Sec. 4(b) maybe committed by obstructing, preventing or prohibiting at any hour of the day,or in urgent cases, of the night the following persons:

• any lawyer chosen by the person arrested, detained orunder custodial investigation',

any member of the immediate family of a person arrested,detained or under custodial investigation;

any medical doctor chosen by the person arrested, detainedor under custodial investigation or by any member of hisimmediate family or by his counsel;

• any priest chosen by the person arrested, detained or undercustodial investigation or by any member of his immediatefamily or by his counsel;

• religious minister chosen by the person arrested, detainedor under custodial investigation or any member of hisimmediate family or by his counsel.

In the formal indictment, Segovia, Baladad, Reyes, Zaragoza,Balonglong, Nobleza and Cabading are accused of having failed to allow theprivate complainants from conferring with a competent and independentcounsel of their choice in violation of die rights of a person arrested, detainedor imder custodial investigation. The issue to be resolved, as reflected in thePre-trial Order,®^ was limited to "(w)hether the accused are guilty beyondreasonable doubt of obstructing, preventing or prohibiting PrivateComplainants' lawyer of choice from conferring with the Privatecomplainants in violation ofSec. 4(b) of Republic Act No. 7438."

Thus, based on the allegations in the information^^ vis-a-vis theprovision of Sec. 4(b), it is essential for the prosecution to establish:

Record, Vol. 6, pp. 39-46.

XXX

On February 7,2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Tanay, Rizal,Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, accused Maj. Gen. JORGE V.SEGOVIA (Salary Grade 28), then Division Commander of the 2"'' Infantry Division,Philippine Army, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the following members ofthe AFP, namely: Col. AURELIO B. BALADAD, Col. JOSELITO (JOEY) M. RYES,Lt. Col. CRISTOBAL N. ZARAGZA, Capt. JOVILY CARMEL DELA FUENTECABADING, VICENTE LOPEZ and others known only as "CALAOAGAN","BULAKLAK and "IDLOY", together with personnel from the Philippine NationalPolice (PNP) namely: P/Supt. MARION D. BALONGLONG, P/Supt. ALLAN C.NOBLEZA, and P/CInsp. MANUEL TABION, all public officers involved in the arrest,detention and/or custodial investigation of [Private Complainant], conspiring and

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1. that a person is arrested, detained or under custodialinvestigation;

2. that a lawyer conies to visit to privately confer with the personarrested, detained or under custodial investigation;

3. that accused willfully, unlawfully and criminally obstructs,prevents or prohibits the said lawyer from conferring with theperson arrested, detained or under custodial investigation;

4. that the competent and independent lawyer is the privatecomplainant's counsel of choice.

Accused now pray for the dismissal of the case on the ground ofinsufficiency of evidence on the alleged obstruction, prevention andprohibition by accused of private complainants from conferring with theircounsel of choice and the precise degree of participation of accused in thecommission of the offense.

A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground ofinsufficiency of evidence. It is a remedy available to the defendant, to theeffect that the evidence produced by the plaintiff is insufficient in point of law,whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain an issue.^^ The partydemurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain averdict. The Court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in ademurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent orsufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.^^

It bears to stress that the burden lies with the prosecution to prove thataccused committed the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt, as theconstitutional presumption of innocence ordinarily stands in favor of theaccused.^®

confederating with one another and committing the offense in relation to office, did thenand there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally fail to allow the said [PrivateComplainant] to confer with competent and Independent counsel of fhls/herl choice Inviolation of [Private Complainant's] rights as a person arrested, detained or undercustodial Investigation.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 189590,23 April 2018, citing the case of Condes v. Court of Appeals,555 Phil. 311,323 (2007).8' People V. Go, G.R. No. 191015,6 August 2014.^ People V. Abdulay Mama, G.R. No. 212192,21 November 2018. ""

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Upon evaluation, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed toovercome this burden.

The lawyer being referred to isprivate complainant's counsel ofchoice as alleged in the Informationbecause what controls is the

description ofthe crime charged andthe particular facts recited therein

The prosecution argues that it is incorrect to interpret the informationin such a manner that it limiits the application of Sec. 4(b) to privatecomplainants' "lawyer of choice." It avers that Sec. 4(b) merely requires "anylawyer." The prosecution adds that the phrase "of choice" in Ae informationand Pre-trial does not take away a "lawyer of choice" jfrom the phrase "anylawyer," because a lawyer of choice will necessarily be a lawyer.

We disagree.

In People v. Rapeza^^ citmg People v. Daniegaf^ the Supreme Courtexplained that the lawyer called to be present during custodial investigationshould, as far as possible, be the choice of the individual undergoingquestioning, to wit:

Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would begrave doubts as to his competence and independence as appellant's counselfor purposes of the custodial investigation. The meaning of "competentcounsel" and the standards therefor were explained in People v. Deniegaas follows:

The lawyer called to be present during suchinvestigations should be as far as reasonably possible, thechoice of the individual undergoing questioning. If thelawyer were one furnished in the accused's behalf, it isimportant that he should be competent and independent, i.e.,that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rightsof the accused, as distinguished from one who would bemerely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaninglessrecital of the individual's constitutional rights. In People v.Basay, this Court stressed that an accused's right to beinformed of the right to remain silent and to counsel

"contemplates the transmission of meaningful informationrather than just the ceremonial and perfimctory recitation ofan abstract constitutional principle."

549 Phil. 378,404(2007).^ 321 Phil. 1028, 1041-1042 (1995).

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Ideally therefore^ a lawyer engaged for anindividual facing custodial investigation (if the latter couldnot afford one) "should be engaged by the accused(himself), or by the latter's relative or person authorized byhim to engage an attorney or by the court, upon properpetition of the accused or person authorized by the accusedto file such petition." Lawyers engaged by the police,whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity andsupposed independence, are generally suspect, as in manyareas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcementauthorities can be symbiotic.

... The competent or independent lawyer so engagedshould be present from the beginning to end, i.e., at all stagesof the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonablyat every turn of the investigation, and stopping theinterrogation once in a while either to give advice to theaccused that he may either continue, choose to remain silentor terminate the interview.

XXX (Emphasis supplied)

As mandated by the 1987 Constitution, any person under investigationfor the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of hisright to remain silent and to have competent and independent counselpreferably of his own choice.^^

Therefore, a person under custodial investigation has the preference inthe choice of counsel. Although the Constitution also provides that if theperson cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one,the Court holds that the same must still be with the conformity of the personunder investigation. This was discussed in Lumanog v. People^^ wherein theSupreme Court held that "while the choice of a lawyer in cases where theperson under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel —or where the preferred lawyer is not available — is naturally lodged in thepolice investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject thecounsel chosen for him and askfor another one.^^

Moreover, it should be recalled that the allegation in the Informationslimits the lawyer to '^private complainants * competent and independent

1987 Constitution, Art. Ill, Section 12.

1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to beinformed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counselpreferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he mustbe provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presenceof counsel.

G.R.NOS. 182555, 185123 & 187745,7 September 2010. . " ̂y

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counsel of his or her choice." The Court notes the fundamental rights ofaccused to, be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.As such, the information must aver the facts and circumstances bearing on theculpability of the accused so that he may adequately prepare for his defensepursuant to the constitutional requirement on due process.

In Lacson v. Executive Secretary, the Supreme Court held that the realnature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preambleof the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law allegedto have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recitalof facts in the Complaint or Information. In the same case, the Supreme Courtcited U.S. V. Karelsen, explaining the purpose of specific factual allegation inthe information, thus:

"The object of this written accusations was — First. To furnishthe accused with such a description of the charge against him as willenable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of hisconviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for thesame cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that itmay decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, ifone should be had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, factsmust be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certainacts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonableparticularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), andcircumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specificallegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute thecrime charged,'' (Emphasis supplied)

The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform theaccused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enablehim to prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence inhis favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independentknowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with. Thus, the factsstated in the body of the information should determine the crime of which hestands charged and for which he must be tried.^^ In short, the allegations inthe information must fully inform accused of what he had allegedly committedbecause he is presumed innocent and unaware of the illegal acts imputedagainst him.

In the instant case, the information specifically identified the manner ormode by which Sec. 4(b) was allegedly committed, that is, of having failed toallow private complainants from conferring with their counsel of choice.Regardless of the technical name of the crime charged, the prosecution mustshow that accused performed the acts alleged in the information in the manner

'5 361 Phil. 251 (1999).^ People V. Petalino, G.R. No. 213222,24 September 2018.

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set forth therein. Therefore, to declare the prosecution's evidence sufficient toestablish a prima facie case and to find accused guilty beyond reasonabledoubt for acts other than those alleged in the information would result to aviolation of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause ofthe accusation against them.

From the foregoing, the prosecution is bound to prove that accusedobstructed, prevented, or prohibited private complainants from conferringwith their counsel of choice.

The prosecution failed to prove thatprivate complainants have counsel(s)of choice at the time of arrest andduring detention, and that accusedobstructed, prevented or prohibitedsaid private complainants fromconferring with their counsel ofchoice

To prove its case, the prosecution presented private complainantsMercy Castro, Merry Mia Clamor, Dr. Alexis Montes, Ma. TeresaQuinawayan, Jane Balleta, and Reynaldo Macabenta who categoricallytestified that they were not apprised of their right to confer with their coimseland/or they were not provided with one. However, it bears to reiterate that theissue in this case is whether or not accused obstructed, prevented, orprohibited private complainants from conferring with their counsel of choice.

The veracity of the claimed obstruction by accused were put to doubtin the very testimonies of the private complainants themselves. None of theprivate complainants testified that they have a .counsel of choice when theywere arrested and detained and that they requested from accused to allow themto confer with their counsel and that they were thereafter prevented fromconferring with him.

This is evident in the testimony of complaining witness Mercy Castro.The prosecution failed to show that she has a counsel of choice at the time ofher arrest and detention. Castro even admitted diiring liie direct examinationthat she has no lawyer at that time:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JACINTO:

At that time, you talked to Commissioner De Lima, were you ableto consult a lawyer or did you have a lawyer already at that time?

WITNESS:

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During that time, personally, dahil nasa loob kami ng kulungan,wala kaming lawyer at nagsabi po kami sa kanya na kung sanamakaano kami ng lawyer.

XXX

BY PROSECUTOR CUNANAN:

Q: During the first two days of your detention, February 6 andFebruary 7, did you ask for any specific person to talk to?

ATTY. FIDO:

Leading, Your Honor.

PROSECUTOR CUNANAN:

Preliminary, Your Honors.

XXX

Q: Who is that person that you asked for?

A: My mother and then an attorney. Sir.

Q: What's the name of your mother?

A: Estelita Castro, Sir.

How about the lawyer? What's the name?Q

A I'm asking for a lawyer. Personally, because I don't know anylawyer, I was requesting them I should have a lawyer.

Witness Mercy Castro further testified that she has no lawyer nor doesshe know any at the time of her arrest, thus:

CHAIRPERSON:

So, in othei words, Ms. Castro, from February 6 to 10, you neverasked for a lawyer? Earlier, you said you knew that you had a rightto a lawyer, so you never asked for one?

WITNESS:

During the 36 hours po, nag-ask po ako sa interrogator ko nunnakaiali ako. Sinabihan po ako ng interrogator kasi hindi ko siyakilala, just the voice. Sabi niya, "Hindi kayo aabutan ng abogadoniyo." So, takot na takot ako. Papatayin kami. Yun ang point nilanoon. So, nanahimik ako after that tapos tuloy tuloy anginterrogation.

CHAIRPERSON:

TSN, 20 March 2018, pp. 36-38.

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So, you have a lawyer in mind during that time?

WITNESS:

Personally, wala akong kilalang lawyerpero n^i koyun. I shouldhave a lawyer. Kailangan ba may pangalan akong sabihin kasiwala nga pa akong kilala personally.^^

Complaining witness Merry Mia Clamor testified that she requestedfor a counsel. Although she said that she had a lawyer in mind and it was Atty.Edre Olalia,^^ she admitted that she did not mention the name of said counselto the investigating officers. She testified that:

ATTY. FIDO (cross-examination)

Q: My question now is, do you agree that you only requested thatyou be allowed to call your husband so that your husband beallowed to get a lawyer for you Ms. Witness?

Xxx

A: I asked the interrogators if I can call my husband, that's one. If Ican confer with a lawyer, that's another point.

CHAIRPERSON:

Q

A

Q

A

A:

Do you have a lawyer in mind that time?

Yes, Your Honors.

Who is that?

That would be Atty. Edre Olalia, Your Honors.

Is Atty. Olalia, a lawyer of your family for you to think of himthat time?

No, he is not a lawyer of my family. Your Honors, but I knew himpersonally and I met him several times.

CHAIRPERSON:

Alright thank you. Atty. Pido.

ATTY. PIDO

Q: Did you mention the name of your lawyer to the arresting orinvestigating officer, Ms. Witness?

A: No, sir. (Emphasis supplied)

'8 TSN, 20 March 2018, p. 75.9' TSN, 23 April 2018, p. 43, 53.'0® Id. at 96.

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Clamor also made a statement during direct-examination that when herhusband visited her two days after the arrest, she asked him to get her a lawyerand bail her out.^®^ All these show that Clamor has no counsel of choice at thetime of the arrest. Thus, there is no basis in saying that she was not allowed toconfer with her counsel of choice at the time material to these cases. In fact.Clamor confirmed that she was able to talk to Atty. Olalia only on 11 February2011. There is nothing in the records which shows that she was preventedfi*om seeing Atty. Olalia fi'om the time she engaged his services.

The testimony of private complainant Reynaldo Macabentacapitalized on the fact that the officers who detained them did not apprise themof their right to consult a lawyer. He never testified that he has a counsel ofchoice at the time of the arrest, and that he was prohibited by accused fi*omconferring with said counsel. On cross-examination, he even said that he doesnot remember accused Segoyia, Reyes, Baladad, Balonglong and Noblezaprevented them fi*om conferring with a competent and independent counsel oftheir own choice.

Similar to the testimony of Macabenta, the tenor of the testimony of Dr.Alexis Solinap Montes focused on the issue that they were not apprised oftheir right to consult with their lawyer. He never claimed that he already hasa counsel at the time of his arrest and detention. The truth is, as admitted byhim. during cross-examination, he engaged the services of the lawyers ofNUPL and PILC only on 11 February 2010. Montes testified:

ATTY. SAMSON:

Q I would like to ask, it says here that you met your lawyers for thefirst time on February 11, 2010, you said that as an answer toQuestion No. 15, is that correct?

WITNESS:

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. SAMSON:

Q Before that, they were already your lawyers. Are you saying thatyou already had a lawyer, your lawyers from the Public Law

Interest Centre and NUPL? Are you saying that before

February 11, they were already your lawyers?

WITNESS:

A No, sir,

ATTY. SAMSON:

TSN, 23 April 2018, p. 69.tSN, 24 April 2018. Pp. 25-27.

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Q SOf they became your lawyers on February 11, 2010, is thatcorrect?

WITNESS:

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. SAMSON:

Q You engaged them only on February 11,2010?

WITNESS:

A Yes, sir.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE TRESPESES:

Q Prior to that, do you know them?

WITNESS:

A No, Your Honors.

ATTY. SAMSON:

Q It's just that they were there before you even knew them?

WITNESS:

Q Yes, sir.

ATTY. SAMSON:

Q You have never met

them before?

WITNESS:

A No, sir.^®^ (Emphasis supplied)

Montes never testified that accused prevented him from speaking withthe lawyers from NUPL and PILC after engaging their services. He also failedto identify any of the accused as he only remembers a certain Vicente Lopezwho interrogated him.*®"*

Complaining witness Ma. Teresa Quinawayan merely claimed thatshe was not given a lawyer when she requested for one during theinterrogation. It can be inferred from her testimony that she has no counsel atthe time of the arrest because she said that if given the chance to contact herlawyer, she would call her office first because it is her office which willprovide for a lawyer. Her testimony was consistent on this point because oncross-examination, she said that she did not ask her interrogators to call Atty.Olalia because she thought of calling their office first to consult a lawyer.

TSN, 24 April 2018, pp. 50-53.104 Id at 57.

'®5TSN,4June2018, p. 21.

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Quinawayan also admitted that she made a request to allow her toconfer with a lawyer from the interrogators but not from any of the accused.There is no showing that she was prevented by accused from seeing hercounsel, Atty. Olalia, after she engaged his services on 11 February 2010.

Finally, complaining witness Jane Balleta said that she requested for alawyer but failed to give the interrogators the name of her counsel of choice.She thereafter admitted that she does not have a lawyer of choice at the timeof the arrest. Balleta testified on cross-examination as follows:

ATTY. SANTOS

Good morning, Miss Balleta.

Q In your judicial affidavit, specifically in your Answer to QuestionsNo, 11, 12 and 22, you alleged that you ask to confer with yourlawyer butfailed to state the name ofsuch lawyer, correct?

THE INTERPRETER

For the record, Your Honors, the witness is being shown of herJudicial Affidavit.

A Yes, Sir,

Q So, you confirm that you do not have a lawyer of choice then,correct, Ms. Witness?

A No, Sir.

Q I will repeat your answer to my first question.

In your answer to Questions 11, 12, and 22 you failed to state thename of your lawyer, correct?

A Yes, Sir.

Q So, it means that at that time, your answers to 11,12 and 22, you donot have a specific lawyer in mind, otherwise, you would have statedit in your Answer to No. 11,12 and 22, correct?

A Should I ansNver yes or no. Sir.

Q I will repeat the question. You do not have a lawyer of choice then,correct?

A Yes, Sir,^^^ (Emphasis supplied)

The allegations in the informations were rendered improbable by theprivate complainants' ovm admission that they do not have counsel of choice

TSN, 4 June 2018, pp. 25-26.'0^ TSN, 6 June 2018, pp. 13-14. ^

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at the time of the arrest and detention. They are unfounded and devoid ofsupport from any other evidence on record.

The Court notes that in the Joint Complaint Affidavit^®^ dated 3 May2012 executed by the private complainants, they narrated the alleged tortureand violation of their rights during their arrest and detention. It was expliciteven on the small details but it failed to assert that they were prevented orprohibited from conferring with their counsel of choice. Even theKaragdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay^^^ executed by the private complainants,as well as the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Quinawayan,^^®Macabenta,*^^ and Balleta^^^ were silent on the issue.

The discrepancies between the allegation in the informations and theirtestimonies/affidavits relate to significant facts that could not be disregardedby the Court.

Even the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Roneo Clamor, GeneveReyes, and Julie Payawal Caguiat did not help the cause of the prosecution.They testified that they went to Camp Capinpin with the lawyers from NUPLand PILC to see the detainees but they were not allowed to enter the camp.Through their testimonies, the prosecution attempted to prove that accusedprevented the lawyers from seeing the detainees. However, considering that itwas never established that the lawyers from NUPL and the PILC were privatecomplainants' counsel of choice or that their services were already engaged,their testimonies become irrelevant to the issue.

In fact, when asked who chose Atty. Cortez as the lawyer of the 43detainees, Roneo Clamor admitted that he was the one who chose him.*^^ Thiscontradicts the allegation in the information that the lawyer was privatecomplainants' lawyer of choice. On the other hand, Caguiat testified that whenthe NUPL lawyers and Atty. Ephraim Cortez went to Camp Capinpin on 6February 2010, she categorically said that they were not yet engaged by anyof the 43 detainees. Prosecution witness Reyes revealed that the healthworkers arrested were not members of KARAPATAN. When she was asked

if anyone of the detainees requested the assistance of KARAPATAN, sheanswered that it was Dr. Julie Caguiat who requested for their service.^

Exh. A.

Exh. B (Clamor); Exh. C (Montes); Exh. E-1 (Quinawayan); F-1 (Macabenta); G-1 (Castro); H-1(Balleta)."®Exh. E.

Exh. F.

"2 Exh. H."2 tSN, 6 June 2018, p. 38."^TSN, 10 July 2018, p. 16."5 tSN, 9 July 2018, p. 50.

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When Atty. Cortez took the witness stand, he testified that he was calledto join the Quick Response Team by Olive Bernardo of KARAPATAN. Headmitted that his purpose in responding was not to offer his services but tomerely talk to the detainees.^ He admitted that private complainants engagedhis services only on 11 February 2010. He testified that:

CHAIRPERSON

Q Did I hear you correct, Atty. Cortez, that you merely representedyourself as a lawyer wanting to see the detainees?

WITNESS

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q And you did not mention the words "wanting to see clients?"

A Yes, your Honor, because at that time the immediate purpose wasjust to see them first and talk to them.

Q Which means that your services were not yet secured by thesedetainees?

A By the detainees themselves, your Honor because they wereincommunicado at that time. ̂

On re-direct examination, Atty. Cortez added that:

PROS. CUNANAN

We submit, your Honor.

Q Did you have any agreement with the detainees after February 10,2010?

WITNESS

A I think it was February 11 that they signed an engagement letterwith our office.

PROS. CUNANAN

Okay. That would be all, your Honors.

CHAIRPERSON

Q Signed engagement letter with whom?

WITNESS

A With the National Union of People's Lawyer...

Q And?

TSN, 9 July 2018, p. 70.Id. at 69.

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A And the Public Interest Law Center, your Honor.

Q To represent the detainees?

To represent them as counsel, your Honor, because that was thefirst time that they were able to see a lawyer.'^* (Emphasissupplied)

The testimony of Atty. Cortez and the version of the privatecomplainants contradict each other. The inconsistencies do not refer to minoror trivial matters but pertain to the main issue in this case. Thus, in view ofthe absence of a clear, satisfactory, and convincing testimony in support of thecharges in the Information, it can be said that the prosecution failed to meetthe quantum of proof required to support a finding of guilt.

The prosecution failed to establishconspiracy among the accused inthe commission of the offensecharged

Accused were alleged to have conspired in committing the offensecharged. It is settled that to be held guilty as co-principal by reason ofconspiracy, accused must be shown to have performed an overt act inpursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy. The overt act or acts of theaccused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of thecrime itself, or of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them toexecute or implement the criminal plan. ̂ ̂ ̂

In this case, accused's participation in the commission of the crimewere not sufficiently proven with moral certainty.

Although private complainant Mercy Castro claimed that sherecognized accused's voices, she was unable to pinpoint any accused to whomthe alleged request was made. As for private complainant Merry Mia Clamor,she admitted that she did not see or hear accused Segovia, Baladad, Reyes,Balonglong and Nobleza prohibit or prevent her fi-om conferring with hercounsel of choice.^^^ While Clamor claimed she identified the voices ofaccused Zaragoza and Cabading, she admitted that she cannot tell the arrestingofficer to whom she allegedly made the request to have a counsel.

Private complainant Reynaldo Macabenta also did not categoricallystate that he was prevented by any of accused fi-om conferring with his

"8 TSN, 9 July 2018, p. 75.People V. Saiga, G.R. No. 33334, July 23,2018.

'20 TSN, 23 April 2018, pp. 102-104.'2' Id. at 96.

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counsel. On the other hand, private complainant Alexis Montes testified thathe only remembers accused Vicente Lopez, who remains at large and failedto identify the rest of accused.

As for private complainant Ma. Teresa Quinawayan, she said that shedoes not know personally accused Segovia, Reyes, Baladad, Balonglong andNobleza.^^^ While she testified that she recognized Tabion and Zaragozabecause she remembered their voices, she claimed that she requested for alawyer only from her interrogators and not from any of the accused. Privatecomplainant Jane Balleta also said that she does not know personally accusedSegovia, Baladad, Reyes, Balonglong, Nobleza, Zaragoza and Cabading.Balleta added that she did not see any of accused when she requested for alawyer.

The testimonies of the complaining witnesses failed to show accused'sparticipation in an alleged conspiracy. Conspiracy must, like the crime itself,be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Suppositions based on merepresumptions and not on solid facts do not constitute proof beyond reasonabledoubt.

As borne by the records, accused were impleaded based on theinformation supplied by the lawyer of private complainants for the followingreasons: for accused Segovia, because he was then the Commanding Officerof the 2"^ Infantry Division of the Philippine Army, directly responsible forthe operation that led to the arrest and detention; accused Reyes, because hewas ihen the Chief of Staff of the 2"^ Infantry Division and was in-line ofcommand; accused Baladad, because he was then the Commanding Officer ofthe 202 Infantry Brigade, which had operational control over the place of thearrest in Morong, Rizal; accused Balonglong, as he was part of the arrestingteam; accused Nobleza, because he was part of the arresting team and as theChief of the Intelligence Branch of the PNP of Rizal Province, he hadcommand responsibility over the illegal acts of the PNP personnel who madethe arrest; accused Cabading, because she was the Spokeswoman of CampCapinpin under the 2"^ Infantry Division, and; accused Zaragoza since he wasthe Intelligence Officer of the 2"^ Infantry Division of the Philippine Army.

In its Comment to the Demurrer, the prosecution shifts from itsconspiracy theory and now claims that accused's criminal liability is based oncommand responsibility. It invokes Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, et alJ^^wherein the Supreme Court recognized the responsibility of commanders for

'22 TSN, 4 June 2018, pp. 24-25.'23 Id. at 26 ,'24 TSN, 6 June 2018, pp. 40-41. J'23 Zapanta v. People, G.R. Nos. 192698-99,22 April 2015. ' k'26 G.R. No. 183871, 18 February 2010.

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crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or otherpersons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.

It should be stressed however that to hold someone liable under the

doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationshipbetween the accused as superior and the perpetrator of thecrime as his subordinate;

b. the superior kiiew or had reason to know that the crime wasabout to be or had been committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonablemeasures to prevent the criminal acts or punish theperpetrators thereof.

However, the prosecution failed to prove the foregoing requirements.

Moreover, it should be noted that the allegations in the informationspertains to accused's failure to allow private complainants from conferringwith their counsel of choice which, in the first place, was unsubstantiated. Theprosecution having failed to establish that accused committed the acts in themanner described in the information, conspiracy theory and even commandresponsibility would have no leg to stand on.

At this point it is apt to reiterate and emphasize that a demurrer toevidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Itis a remedy available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence producedby the plaintiff is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make outa case or sustain an issue. The question in a demurrer to evidence is whetherthe plaintiff, by his evidence in chief, had been able to establish a prima faciecase.*^^

Hence, the Court finds the evidence adduced by the prosecutioninsufficient to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt thus,warranting the dismissal of the herein cases.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to Evidencefiled by accused Jorge Segovia y Valbuena, Aurelio Baladad y Bartolome,Joselito Reyes y Marinas (a.k.a. Joey Reyes), Cristobal Zaragoza y

iSflez V. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183533,25 September 2012 citing Noriel Rodriguez v. GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo, et al, G.R. No. 191805, 15 November 2011.

Republic v. De Borja, G.R. No. 187448,9 January 2017.

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Nocillado, Marion Balonglong y Daskeo, Allan Nobleza y Cruz and JovilyCarmel Cabading y Dela Fuente is GRANTED and the cases (CriminalCase Nos. SB-16-CRM-0841 to 1848) as against said accused are accordinglyordered DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

The bond posted by accused for their provisional liberty during thependency of these cases are ordered cancelled and returned to said accused,subject to any liability of bond.

The Hold Departure Order (HDQ) issued against accused in these casesis hereby recalled.

As against accused Manuel Tabion (a.k.a. Major Navarro), VicenteLopez, "Calaoagan," ̂^Bulaklak" and "Idloy," over whom the Court has notyet acquired jurisdiction as they remain at large, let these cases against thembe ARCHIVED, until such time that they are apprehended and the Courtacquires jurisdiction over their persons.

Meanwhile, let alias warrant of arrest be issued for the arrest of accusedManuel Tabion (a.k.a. Major Navarro), Vicente Lopez, "Calaoagan,""Bulaklak" and "Idloy."

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines.

>Y V^^JRESFESESAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. THERESA DOMRES C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTA

Associate Justice

Chairperson

GEORGINAL

Associate

. HIDALGO

Justice

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ATTEST A TION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of theCourt's Division.

MA. THERESA DOLCfflUES C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTA

Chairperson, Seventh Division

CERTIFICA TION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and theDivision Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions inthe above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assignedto the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

'AMPARO M^g^SqTAJE-^Presiding Justice

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