republic of philippines v. pimentel, 553 u.s. 851 (2008)

8/18/2019 Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851 (2008)

1/32

1(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES ET AL. v. PIMENTEL,

TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR OF ESTATE OF

PIMENTEL, DECEASED, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 06–1204. Argued March 17, 2008—Decided June 12, 2008

A class action by and for human rights victims (Pimentel class) of Fer-

dinand Marcos, while he was President of the Republic of the Philip-

pines (Republic), led to a nearly $2 billion judgment in a United

States District Court. The Pimentel class then sought to attach the

assets of Arelma, S. A. (Arelma), a company incorporated by Marcos,

held by a New York broker (Merrill Lynch). The Republic and a Phil-

ippine commission (Commission) established to recover property

wrongfully taken by Marcos are also attempting to recover this and

other Marcos property. The Philippine National Banc (PNB) holds

some of the disputed assets in escrow, awaiting the outcome of pend-ing litigation in the Sandiganbayan, a Philippine court determining

whether Marcos’ property should be forfeited to the Republic. Facing

claims from various Marcos creditors, including the Pimentel class,

Merrill Lynch filed this interpleader action under 28 U. S. C. §1335,

naming, among the defendants, the Republic, the Commission,

Arelma, PNB (all petitioners here), and the Pimentel class (respon-

dents here). The Republic and the Commission asserted sovereign

immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, and

moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b),

arguing that the action could not proceed without them. Arelma and

PNB also sought a Rule 19(b) dismissal. The District Court refused,

but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Republic and the

Commission are entitled to sovereign immunity and are required par-

ties under Rule 19(a), and it entered a stay pending the Sandiganba-yan litigation’s outcome. Finding that that litigation could not de-

termine entitlement to Arelma’s assets, the District Court vacated


2/32

2 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL

Syllabus

the stay and ultimately awarded the assets to the Pimentel class.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that dismissal was not war-

ranted under Rule 19(b) because, though the Republic and the Com-

mission were required parties, their claim had so little likelihood of

success on the merits that the action could proceed without them.

The court found it unnecessary to consider whether prejudice to those

entities might be lessened by a judgment or interim decree in the in-

terpleader action, found the entities’ failure to obtain a judgment in

the Sandiganbayan an equitable consideration counseling against

dismissing the interpleader suit, and found that allowing the inter-

pleader case to proceed would serve the Pimentel class’ interests.

Held:

1. Because Arelma and PNB also seek review of the Ninth Circuit’s

decision, this Court need not rule on the question whether the Repub-lic and the Commission, having been dismissed from the suit, had the

right to seek review of the decision that the suit could proceed in

their absence. As a general matter any party may move to dismiss

an action under Rule 19(b). Arelma and PNB have not lost standing

to have the judgment vacated in its entirety on procedural grounds

simply because they did not appeal, or petition for certiorari on, the

underlying merits ruling denying them the interpleaded assets.

Pp. 7–9.

2. Rule 19 requires dismissal of the interpleader action. Pp. 9–20.

(a) Under Rule 19(a), nonjoinder even of a required person does

not always result in dismissal. When joinder is not feasible, the

question whether an action should proceed turns on nonexclusive

considerations in Rule 19(b), which asks whether “in equity and good

conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties orshould be dismissed.” The joinder issue can be complex, and the

case-specific determinations involve multiple factors, some “substan-

tive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some sub-

ject to balancing against opposing interests,” Provident Tradesmens

Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U. S. 102, 119. Pp. 9–10.

(b) Here, Rule 19(a)’s application is not contested: The Republic

and the Commission are required entities. And this Court need not

decide the proper standard of review for Rule 19(b) decisions, because

the Ninth Circuit’s errors of law require reversal. Pp. 10–19.

(1) The first factor directs the court to consider, in determining

whether the action may proceed, the prejudice to absent entities and

present parties in the event judgment is rendered without joinder.

Rule 19(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit gave insufficient weight to the sov-

ereign status of the Republic and the Commission in consideringwhether they would be prejudiced if the case proceeded. Giving full

effect to sovereign immunity promotes the comity and dignity inter-


3/32

3Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)

Syllabus

ests that contributed to the development of the immunity doctrine.

See, e.g., Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480,

486. These interests are concrete here. The entities’ claims arise

from historically and politically significant events for the Republic

and its people, and the entities have a unique interest in resolving

matters related to Arelma’s assets. A foreign state has a comity in-

terest in using its courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so. Its

dignity is not enhanced if other nations bypass its courts without

right or good cause. A more specific affront could result if property

the Republic and the Commission claim is seized by a foreign court

decree. This Court has not considered the precise question pre-

sented, but authorities involving the intersection of joinder and the

United States’ governmental immunity, see, e.g., Mine Safety Appli-

ances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371, 373–375, instruct that wheresovereign immunity is asserted, and the sovereign’s claims are not

frivolous, dismissal must be ordered where there is a potential for in-

jury to the absent sovereign’s interests. The claims of the Republic

and the Commission were not frivolous, and the Ninth Circuit thus

erred in ruling on their merits. The privilege of sovereign immunity

from suit is much diminished if an important and consequential rul-

ing affecting the sovereign’s substantial interest is determined, or at

least assumed, by a federal court in its absence and over its objection.

The Pimentel class’ interest in recovering its damages is not dis-

counted, but important comity concerns are implicated by assertion of

foreign sovereign immunity. The error is not that the courts below

gave too much weight to the Pimentel class’ interests, but that they

did not accord proper weight to the compelling sovereign immunity

claim. Pp. 11–16.(2) The second factor is the extent to which any prejudice could

be lessened or avoided by relief or measures alternative to dismissal,

Rule 19(b)(2), but no alternative remedies or forms of relief have been

proposed or appear to be available. As to the third factor—whether a

judgment rendered without the absent party would be adequate, Rule

19(b)(3)—“adequacy” refers not to satisfaction of the Pimentel class’

claims, but to the “public stake in settling disputes by wholes, when-

ever possible,” Provident Bank, supra, at 111. Going forward with

the action in the absence of the Republic and the Commission would

not further this public interest because they could not be bound by a

judgment to which they were not parties. As to the fourth factor—

whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action

were dismissed for nonjoinder, Rule 19(b)(4)—the Ninth Circuit made

much of the tort victims’ lack of an alternative forum. But Merrill

Lynch, not the Pimentel class, is the plaintiff as the stakeholder in

the interpleader action. See 28 U. S. C. §1335(a). The Pimentel


4/32


Syllabus

class’ interests are not irrelevant to Rule 19(b)’s equitable balance,

but the Rule’s other provisions are the relevant ones to consult. A

dismissal on the ground of nonjoinder will not provide Merrill Lynch

with a judgment determining entitlement to the assets so it could be

done with the matter, but it likely would give Merrill Lynch an effec-

tive defense against piecemeal litigation by various claimants and in-

consistent, conflicting judgments. Any prejudice to Merrill Lynch is

outweighed by prejudice to the absent entities invoking sovereign

immunity. In the usual course, the Ninth Circuit’s failure to give suf-

ficient weight to the likely prejudice to the Republic and the Commis-

sion would warrant reversal and remand for further determinations,

but here, that error plus this Court’s analysis under Rule 19(b)’s ad-

ditional provisions require the action’s dismissal. Pp. 17–20.

464 F. 3d 885, reversed and remanded.

K ENNEDY , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and SCALIA , THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, and A LITO, JJ., joined, in

which SOUTER, J., joined as to all but Parts IV–B and V, and in which

STEVENS, J., joined as to Part II. STEVENS, J., and SOUTER, J., filed opin-

ions concurring in part and dissenting in part.


5/32

_________________

_________________

1Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in thepreliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested tonotify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in orderthat corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.


No. 06–1204

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., PETI-

TIONERS v. JERRY S. PIMENTEL, TEMPORARY

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF MARIANO J.


ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 12, 2008]

JUSTICE K ENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case turns on the interpretation and proper appli-

cation of Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and requires us to address the Rule’s operation in the

context of foreign sovereign immunity.

This interpleader action was commenced to determine

the ownership of property allegedly stolen by FerdinandMarcos when he was the President of the Republic of the

Philippines. Two entities named in the suit invoked sov-

ereign immunity. They are the Republic of the Philippines

and the Philippine Presidential Commission on Good

Governance, referred to in turn as the Republic and the

Commission. They were dismissed, but the interpleader

action proceeded to judgment over their objection. To-

gether with two parties who remained in the suit, the

Republic and the Commission now insist it was error to

allow the litigation to proceed. Under Rule 19, they con-

tend, the action should have been dismissed once it be-

came clear they could not be joined as parties without


6/32



their consent.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-

cuit, agreeing with the District Court, held the action

could proceed without the Republic and the Commission

as parties. Among the reasons the Court of Appeals gave

was that the absent, sovereign entities would not prevail

on their claims. We conclude the Court of Appeals gave

insufficient weight to the foreign sovereign status of the

Republic and the Commission, and that the court further

erred in reaching and discounting the merits of their

claims.

I

A

When the opinion of the Court of Appeals is consulted,

the reader will find its quotations from Rule 19 do not

accord with its text as set out here; for after the case was

in the Court of Appeals and before it came here, the text of

the Rule changed. The Rules Committee advised the

changes were stylistic only, see Advisory Committee’s

Notes on 2007 Amendment to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19, 28

U. S. C. A., p. 168 (2008); and we agree. These are the

three relevant stylistic changes. First, the word “required”

replaced the word “necessary” in subparagraph (a). Sec-

ond, the 1966 Rule set out factors in longer clauses and

the 2007 Rule sets out the factors affecting joinder in

separate lettered headings. Third, the word “indispensa-

ble,” which had remained as a remnant of the pre-1966

Rule, is altogether deleted from the current text. Though

the word “indispensable” had a lesser place in the 1966

Rule, it still had the latent potential to mislead.

As the substance and operation of the Rule both pre-

and post-2007 are unchanged, we will refer to the present,

revised version. The pre-2007 version is printed in the

Appendix of this opinion. The current Rule states, inrelevant part, as follows:


7/32

3Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)


“Rule 19. Required Joinder of Parties.

“(a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible.

“(1) Required Party. A person who is subject to

service of process and whose joinder will not deprive

the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined

as a party if:

“(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord

complete relief among existing parties; or

“(B) that person claims an interest relating to the

subject of the action and is so situated that disposing

of the action in the person’s absence may:“(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the per-

son’s ability to protect the interest; or

“(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial

risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise incon-

sistent obligations because of the interest.

“(2) Joinder by Court Order. If a person has not

been joined as required, the court must order that the

person be made a party. A person who refuses to join

as a plaintiff may be made either a defendant or, in a

proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.

“(3) Venue. If a joined party objects to venue and the joinder would make venue improper, the court must

dismiss that party.

“(b) When Joinder Is Not Feasible. If a person

who is required to be joined if feasible cannot be

joined, the court must determine whether, in equity

and good conscience, the action should proceed among

the existing parties or should be dismissed. The fac-

tors for the court to consider include:

“(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the

person’s absence might prejudice that person or the

existing parties;

“(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be less-ened or avoided by:


8/32



“(A) protective provisions in the judgment;

“(B) shaping the relief; or

“(C) other measures;

“(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s ab-

sence would be adequate; and

“(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate

remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.”

Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 19(a)–(b).

See also Rule 19(c) (imposing pleading requirements);

Rule 19(d) (creating exception for class actions).

B

In 1972, Ferdinand Marcos, then President of the Re-

public, incorporated Arelma, S. A. (Arelma), under Pana-

manian law. Around the same time, Arelma opened a

brokerage account with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

Smith Inc. (Merrill Lynch) in New York, in which it depos-

ited $2 million. As of the year 2000, the account had

grown to approximately $35 million.

Alleged crimes and misfeasance by Marcos during his

presidency became the subject of worldwide attention and

protest. A class action by and on behalf of some 9,539 of

his human rights victims was filed against Marcos and hisestate, among others. The class action was tried in the

United States District Court for the District of Hawaii and

resulted in a nearly $2 billion judgment for the class. See

Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F. 3d 767 (CA9 1996). We

refer to that litigation as the Pimentel case and to its class

members as the Pimentel class. In a related action, the

Estate of Roger Roxas and Golden Budha [sic] Corporation

(the Roxas claimants) claim a right to execute against the

assets to satisfy their own judgment against Marcos’

widow, Imelda Marcos. See Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Haw. 91,

113–115, 969 P. 2d 1209, 1231–1233 (1998).

The Pimentel class claims a right to enforce its judg-ment by attaching the Arelma assets held by Merrill


9/32

5Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)


Lynch. The Republic and the Commission claim a right to

the assets under a 1955 Philippine law providing that

property derived from the misuse of public office is for-

feited to the Republic from the moment of misappropria-

tion. See An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the

State Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully

Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing

for the Proceedings Therefor, Rep. Act No. 1379, 51:9 O. G.

4457 (June 18, 1955).

After Marcos fled the Philippines in 1986, the Commis-

sion was created to recover any property he wrongfully

took. Almost immediately the Commission asked theSwiss Government for assistance in recovering assets—

including shares in Arelma—that Marcos had moved to

Switzerland. In compliance the Swiss Government froze

certain assets and, in 1990, that freeze was upheld by the

Swiss Federal Supreme Court. In 1991, the Commission

asked the Sandiganbayan, a Philippine court of special

jurisdiction over corruption cases, to declare forfeited to

the Republic any property Marcos had obtained through

misuse of his office. That litigation is still pending in the

Sandiganbayan.

The Swiss assets were transferred to an escrow accountset up by the Commission at the Philippine National Banc

(PNB), pending the Sandiganbayan’s decision as to their

rightful owner. The Republic and the Commission re-

quested that Merrill Lynch follow the same course and

transfer the Arelma assets to an escrow account at PNB.

Merrill Lynch did not do so. Facing claims from various

Marcos creditors, including the Pimentel class, Merrill

Lynch instead filed an interpleader action under 28

U. S. C. §1335. The named defendants in the interpleader

action were, among others, the Republic and the Commis-

sion, Arelma, PNB, and the Pimentel class (the respon-

dents here).The Pimentel case had been tried as a class action be-


10/32



fore Judge Manuel Real of the United States District

Court for the Central District of California, who was sit-

ting by designation in the District of Hawaii after the

Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the

various human rights complaints against Marcos in that

court. See Hilao, supra, at 771. Judge Real directed

Merrill Lynch to file the interpleader action in the District

of Hawaii, and he presided over the matter.

After being named as defendants in the interpleader

action, the Republic and the Commission asserted sover-

eign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities

Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §1604. They moved todismiss pursuant to Rule 19(b), based on the premise that

the action could not proceed without them. Arelma and

PNB also moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 19(b). With-

out addressing whether they were entitled to sovereign

immunity, Judge Real initially rejected the request by the

Republic and the Commission to dismiss the interpleader

action. They appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed.

It held the Republic and the Commission are entitled to

sovereign immunity and that under Rule 19(a) they are

required parties (or “necessary” parties under the old

terminology). See In re Republic of the Philippines, 309F. 3d 1143, 1149–1152 (CA9 2002). The Court of Appeals

entered a stay pending the outcome of the litigation in the

Sandiganbayan over the Marcos assets. See id., at 1152–

1153.

After concluding that the pending litigation in the

Sandiganbayan could not determine entitlement to the

Arelma assets, Judge Real vacated the stay, allowed the

action to proceed, and awarded the assets to the Pimentel

class. A week later, in the case initiated before the Sandi-

ganbayan in 1991, the Republic asked that court to de-

clare the Arelma assets forfeited, arguing the matter was

ripe for decision. The Sandiganbayan has not yet ruled.In the interpleader case the Republic, the Commission,


11/32

7Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)


Arelma, and PNB appealed the District Court’s judgment

in favor of the Pimentel claimants. This time the Court of

Appeals affirmed. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

Smith v. ENC Corp., 464 F. 3d 885 (CA9 2006). Dismissal

of the interpleader suit, it held, was not warranted under

Rule 19(b) because, though the Republic and the Commis-

sion were required (“necessary”) parties under Rule 19(a),

their claim had so little likelihood of success on the merits

that the interpleader action could proceed without them.

One of the reasons the court gave was that any action

commenced by the Republic and the Commission to re-

cover the assets would be barred by New York’s 6-yearstatute of limitations for claims involving the misappro-

priation of public property. See N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann.

§213 (West Supp. 2008). The court thus found it unneces-

sary to consider whether any prejudice to the Republic and

the Commission might be lessened by some form of judg-

ment or interim decree in the interpleader action. The

court also considered the failure of the Republic and the

Commission to obtain a judgment in the Sandiganbayan—

despite the Arelma share certificates having been located

and held in escrow at the PNB since 1997–1998—to be an

equitable consideration counseling against dismissal of theinterpleader suit. The court further found it relevant that

allowing the interpleader case to proceed would serve the

interests of the Pimentel class, which, at this point, likely

has no other available forum in which to enforce its judg-

ment against property belonging to Marcos.

This Court granted certiorari. See 552 U. S. ___ (2007).

II

We begin with the question we asked the parties to

address when we granted certiorari: Whether the Republic

and the Commission, having been dismissed from the

interpleader action based on their successful assertion ofsovereign immunity, had the right to appeal the District


12/32



Court’s determination under Rule 19 that the action could

proceed in their absence; and whether they have the right

to seek this Court’s review of the Court of Appeals’ judg-

ment affirming the District Court. See ibid.

Respondents contend that the Republic and the Com-

mission were not proper parties in the Court of Appeals

when it reviewed the District Court’s judgment allowing

the action to proceed without them; and, respondents

continue, the Republic and the Commission are not proper

parties in the instant proceeding before us. See Brief for

Respondent Pimentel 21.

Without implying that respondents are correct in sayingthe Republic and the Commission could neither appeal nor

become parties here, we conclude we need not rule on this

point. Other parties before us, Arelma and PNB, also seek

review of the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the

District Court. They, too, moved to dismiss the action

under Rule 19(b), appealed from the denial of their mo-

tion, and are petitioners before this Court. As a general

matter any party may move to dismiss an action under

Rule 19(b). A court with proper jurisdiction may also

consider sua sponte the absence of a required person and

dismiss for failure to join. See, e.g ., Minnesota v. NorthernSecurities Co., 184 U. S. 199, 235 (1902); see also Provi-

dent Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U. S.

102, 111 (1968).

Respondents argue, however, that Arelma and PNB

have no standing to raise before this Court the question

whether the action may proceed in the absence of the

Republic and the Commission. Arelma and PNB lost on

the merits of their underlying claims to the interpleaded

assets in both the District Court and the Court of Appeals.

By failing to petition for certiorari on that merits ruling,

respondents contend, Arelma and PNB abandoned any

entitlement to the interpleaded assets and therefore lack aconcrete stake in the outcome of further proceedings. We


13/32

9Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)


disagree. Dismissal of the action under Rule 19(b) would

benefit Arelma and PNB by vacating the judgment deny-

ing them the interpleaded assets. A party that seeks to

have a judgment vacated in its entirety on procedural

grounds does not lose standing simply because the party

does not petition for certiorari on the substance of the

order.

III

We turn to the question whether the interpleader action

could proceed in the District Court without the Republic

and the Commission as parties.Subdivision (a) of Rule 19 states the principles that

determine when persons or entities must be joined in a

suit. The Rule instructs that nonjoinder even of a re-

quired person does not always result in dismissal. Subdi-

vision (a) opens by noting that it addresses joinder “if

Feasible.” Where joinder is not feasible, the question

whether the action should proceed turns on the factors

outlined in subdivision (b). The considerations set forth in

subdivision (b) are nonexclusive, as made clear by the

introductory statement that “[t]he factors for the court to

consider include.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b). The general

direction is whether “in equity and good conscience, the

action should proceed among the existing parties or should

be dismissed.” Ibid. The design of the Rule, then, indi-

cates that the determination whether to proceed will turn

upon factors that are case specific, which is consistent

with a Rule based on equitable considerations. This is

also consistent with the fact that the determination of who

may, or must, be parties to a suit has consequences for the

persons and entities affected by the judgment; for the

judicial system and its interest in the integrity of its proc-

esses and the respect accorded to its decrees; and for

society and its concern for the fair and prompt resolutionof disputes. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431


14/32



U. S. 720, 737–739 (1977). For these reasons, the issue of

joinder can be complex, and determinations are case spe-

cific. See, e.g., Provident Bank, supra, at 118–119.

Under the earlier Rules the term “indispensable party”

might have implied a certain rigidity that would be in

tension with this case-specific approach. The word “indis-

pensable” had an unforgiving connotation that did not fit

easily with a system that permits actions to proceed even

when some persons who otherwise should be parties to the

action cannot be joined. As the Court noted in Provident

Bank, the use of “indispensable” in Rule 19 created the

“verbal anomaly” of an “indispensable person who turnsout to be dispensable after all.” 390 U. S., at 117, n. 12.

Though the text has changed, the new Rule 19 has the

same design and, to some extent, the same tension. Re-

quired persons may turn out not to be required for the

action to proceed after all.

In all events it is clear that multiple factors must bear

on the decision whether to proceed without a required

person. This decision “must be based on factors varying

with the different cases, some such factors being substan-

tive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and

some subject to balancing against opposing interests.” Id.,at 119.

IV

We turn to Rule 19 as it relates to this case. The appli-

cation of subdivision (a) of Rule 19 is not contested. The

Republic and the Commission are required entities be-

cause “[w]ithout [them] as parties in this interpleader

action, their interests in the subject matter are not pro-

tected.” In re Republic of Philippines, 309 F. 3d, at 1152;

see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(a)(1)(B)(i). All parties appear

to concede this. The disagreement instead centers around

the application of subdivision (b), which addresseswhether the action may proceed without the Republic and


15/32

11Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)


the Commission, given that the Rule requires them to be

parties.

We have not addressed the standard of review for Rule

19(b) decisions. The case-specific inquiry that must be

followed in applying the standards set forth in subdivision

(b), including the direction to consider whether “in equity

and good conscience” the case should proceed, implies

some degree of deference to the district court. In this case,

however, we find implicit in the District Court’s rulings,

and explicit in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, errors

of law that require reversal. Whatever the appropriate

standard of review, a point we need not decide, the judg-ment could not stand. Cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U. S.

81, 99–100 (1996) (a court “by definition abuses its discre-

tion when it makes an error of law”).

The Court of Appeals erred in not giving the necessary

weight to the absent entities’ assertion of sovereign im-

munity. The court in effect decided the merits of the

Republic and the Commission’s claims to the Arelma

assets. Once it was recognized that those claims were not

frivolous, it was error for the Court of Appeals to address

them on their merits when the required entities had been

granted sovereign immunity. The court’s consideration ofthe merits was itself an infringement on foreign sovereign

immunity; and, in any event, its analysis was flawed. We

discuss these errors first in the context of how they af-

fected the Court of Appeals’ analysis under the first factor

of Rule 19(b). We then explain that the outcome suggested

by the first factor is confirmed by our analysis under the

other provisions of Rule 19(b). The action may not

proceed.

A

As to the first Rule 19(b) factor—the extent to which a

judgment rendered in the person’s absence might preju-dice that person or the existing parties, Fed. Rule Civ.


16/32



Proc. 19(b)(1)—the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

incorrect.

In considering whether the Republic and the Commis-

sion would be prejudiced if the action were to proceed in

their absence, the Court of Appeals gave insufficient

weight to their sovereign status. The doctrine of foreign

sovereign immunity has been recognized since early in the

history of our Nation. It is premised upon the “perfect

equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and

th[e] common interest impelling them to mutual inter-

course.” Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116,

137 (1812). The Court has observed that the doctrine isdesigned to “give foreign states and their instrumentali-

ties some protection from the inconvenience of suit,” Dole

Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U. S. 468, 479 (2003).

The privilege is codified by federal statute. FSIA, 28

U. S. C. §§1330, 1602–1611, provides that “a foreign state

shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the

United States and of the States except as provided in

sections 1605 to 1607,” absent existing international

agreements to the contrary. §1604; see Verlinden B. V. v.

Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 486–489 (1983)

(explaining the history of the doctrine’s codification).Exceptions to the general principle of foreign sovereign

immunity are contained in §§1605–1607 of the statute.

They are inapplicable here, or at least the parties do not

invoke them. Immunity in this case, then, is uncontested;

and pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ earlier ruling on the

issue, the District Court dismissed the Republic and the

Commission from the action on this ground.

The District Court and the Court of Appeals failed to

give full effect to sovereign immunity when they held the

action could proceed without the Republic and the Com-

mission. Giving full effect to sovereign immunity pro-

motes the comity interests that have contributed to thedevelopment of the immunity doctrine. See, e.g., id., at


17/32

13Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)


486 (“[F]oreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace

and comity”); National City Bank of N. Y. v. Republic of

China, 348 U. S. 356, 362, and n. 7 (1955) (foreign sover-

eign immunity derives from “standards of public morality,

fair dealing, reciprocal self-interest, and respect for the

‘power and dignity’ of the foreign sovereign” (quoting

Schooner Exchange, supra, at 136–137, 143–144)).

Comity and dignity interests take concrete form in this

case. The claims of the Republic and the Commission

arise from events of historical and political significance for

the Republic and its people. The Republic and the Com-

mission have a unique interest in resolving the ownershipof or claims to the Arelma assets and in determining if,

and how, the assets should be used to compensate those

persons who suffered grievous injury under Marcos.

There is a comity interest in allowing a foreign state to use

its own courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so. The

dignity of a foreign state is not enhanced if other nations

bypass its courts without right or good cause. Then, too,

there is the more specific affront that could result to the

Republic and the Commission if property they claim is

seized by the decree of a foreign court. Cf. Republic of

Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S. 30, 35–36 (1945) (pre-FSIA,common-law doctrine dictated that courts defer to execu-

tive determination of immunity because “[t]he judicial

seizure” of the property of a friendly state may be re-

garded as “an affront to its dignity and may . . . affect our

relations with it”).

Though this Court has not considered a case posing the

precise question presented here, there are some authori-

ties involving the intersection of joinder and the govern-

mental immunity of the United States. See, e.g., Mine

Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371, 373–375

(1945) (dismissing an action where the Under Secretary of

the Navy was sued in his official capacity, because theGovernment was a required entity that could not be joined


18/32



when it withheld consent to be sued); Minnesota v. United

States, 305 U. S. 382, 386–388 (1939) (dismissing the

action for nonjoinder of a required entity where the United

States was the owner of the land in question but had not

consented to suit). The analysis of the joinder issue in

those cases was somewhat perfunctory, but the holdings

were clear: A case may not proceed when a required-entity

sovereign is not amenable to suit. These cases instruct us

that where sovereign immunity is asserted, and the claims

of the sovereign are not frivolous, dismissal of the action

must be ordered where there is a potential for injury to

the interests of the absent sovereign.The Court of Appeals accordingly erred in undertaking

to rule on the merits of the Republic and the Commission’s

claims. There may be cases where the person who is not

joined asserts a claim that is frivolous. In that instance a

court may have leeway under both Rule 19(a)(1), defining

required parties, and Rule 19(b), addressing when a suit

may go forward nonetheless, to disregard the frivolous

claim. Here, the claims of the absent entities are not

frivolous; and the Court of Appeals should not have

proceeded on the premise that those claims would be

determined against the sovereign entities that assertedimmunity.

The Court of Appeals determined that the claims of the

Republic and the Commission as to the assets would not

succeed because a suit would be time barred in New York.

This is not necessarily so. If the Sandiganbayan rules that

the Republic owns the assets or stock of Arelma because

Marcos did not own them and the property was forfeited to

the Republic under Philippine law, then New York misap-

propriation rules might not be the applicable law. For

instance, the Republic and the Commission, standing in

for Arelma based upon the Sandiganbayan’s judgment,

might not pursue a misappropriation of public propertysuit, as the Court of Appeals assumed they would. They


19/32

15Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)


might instead, or in the alternative, file suit for breach of

contract against Merrill Lynch. They would argue the

statute of limitations would start to run if and when

Merrill Lynch refused to hand over the assets. See

N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. §213 (West Supp. 2008); Ely-

Cruikshank Co. v. Bank of Montreal, 81 N. Y. 2d 399, 402,

615 N. E. 2d 985, 986 (1993) (“In New York, a breach of

contract cause of action accrues at the time of the breach”).

Or the Republic and the Commission might bring an

action either in state or federal court to enforce the Sandi-

ganbayan’s judgment. See 1 Restatement (Third) of For-

eign Relations Law of the United States §482, Comment a(1986) (jurisdiction of foreign court rendering judgment is

presumed); id., at Comment d (providing exceptions not

relevant here); see also 28 U. S. C. §2467(c) (providing for

enforcement of foreign forfeiture judgments in certain

circumstances). Merrill Lynch makes arguments why

these actions would not succeed, see Brief for Merrill

Lynch as Amicus Curiae 26–27, to which the Republic, the

Commission, and the United States respond, see Reply

Brief for Petitioners 14–18; Brief for United States as

Amicus Curiae 24–28. We need not seek to predict

the outcomes. It suffices that the claims would not befrivolous.

As these comments indicate, Rule 19 cannot be applied

in a vacuum, and it may require some preliminary as-

sessment of the merits of certain claims. For example, the

Rule directs a court, in determining who is a required

person, to consider whether complete relief can be afforded

in their absence. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(a)(1)(A).

Likewise, in the Rule 19(b) inquiry, a court must examine,

to some extent, the claims presented and the interests

likely to be asserted both by the joined parties and the

absent entities or persons. Here, however, it was im-

proper to issue a definitive holding regarding a nonfrivo-lous, substantive claim made by an absent, required entity


20/32



that was entitled by its sovereign status to immunity from

suit. That privilege is much diminished if an important

and consequential ruling affecting the sovereign’s

substantial interest is determined, or at least assumed, by

a federal court in the sovereign’s absence and over its

objection.

As explained above, the decision to proceed in the ab-

sence of the Republic and the Commission ignored the

substantial prejudice those entities likely would incur.

This most directly implicates Rule 19(b)’s first factor,

which directs consideration of prejudice both to absent

persons and those who are parties. We have discussed theabsent entities. As to existing parties, we do not discount

the Pimentel class’ interest in recovering damages it was

awarded pursuant to a judgment. Furthermore, combat-

ing public corruption is a significant international policy.

The policy is manifested in treaties providing for interna-

tional cooperation in recovering forfeited assets. See, e.g.,

United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G. A.

Res. 5814, chs. IV and V, U. N. Doc. A/RES/58/4, pp. 22,

32 (Dec. 11, 2003) (reprinted in 43 I. L. M. 37 (2004));

Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters

Art. 16, Nov. 13, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104–18 (1995).This policy does support the interest of the Pimentel class

in recovering damages awarded to it. But it also under-

scores the important comity concerns implicated by the

Republic and the Commission in asserting foreign sover-

eign immunity. The error is not that the District Court

and the Court of Appeals gave too much weight to the

interest of the Pimentel class, but that it did not ac-

cord proper weight to the compelling claim of sovereign

immunity.

Based on these considerations we conclude the District

Court and the Court of Appeals gave insufficient weight to

the likely prejudice to the Republic and the Commissionshould the interpleader proceed in their absence.


21/32

17Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)


B

As to the second Rule 19(b) factor—the extent to which

any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by relief or

measures alternative to dismissal, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.

19(b)(2)—there is no substantial argument to allow the

action to proceed. No alternative remedies or forms of

relief have been proposed to us or appear to be available.

See 7 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice

and Procedure §1608, pp. 106–110 (3d ed. 2001) (collecting

cases using alternative forms of relief, including the grant-

ing of money damages rather than specific performance,

the use of declaratory judgment, and the direction that

payment be withheld pending suits against the absent

party). If the Marcos estate did not own the assets, or if

the Republic owns them now, the claim of the Pimentel

class likely fails; and in all events, if there are equally

valid but competing claims, that too would require adjudi-

cation in a case where the Republic and the Commission

are parties. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.

Tashire, 386 U. S. 523, 534, and n. 16 (1967); Russell v.

Clark’s Executors, 7 Cranch 69, 98–99 (1812) (Marshall,

C. J.); Wichita & Affiliated Tribes of Okla. v. Hodel, 788

F. 2d 765, 774 (CADC 1986) (“Conflicting claims by benefi-ciaries to a common trust present a textbook example of a

case where one party may be severely prejudiced by a

decision in his absence” (citing Williams v. Bankhead, 19

Wall. 563, 570–571 (1874))).

C

As to the third Rule 19(b) factor—whether a judgment

rendered without the absent party would be adequate,

Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b)(3)—the Court of Appeals under-

stood “adequacy” to refer to satisfaction of the Pimentel

class’ claims. But adequacy refers to the “public stake in

settling disputes by wholes, whenever possible.” Provident Bank, 390 U. S., at 111. This “social interest in the effi-


22/32



cient administration of justice and the avoidance of multi-

ple litigation” is an interest that has “traditionally been

thought to support compulsory joinder of absent and po-

tentially adverse claimants.” Illinois Brick Co., 431 U. S.,

at 737–738. Going forward with the action without the

Republic and the Commission would not further the public

interest in settling the dispute as a whole because the

Republic and the Commission would not be bound by the

judgment in an action where they were not parties.

D

As to the fourth Rule 19(b) factor—whether the plaintiffwould have an adequate remedy if the action were dis-

missed for nonjoinder, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b)(4)—the

Court of Appeals made much of what it considered the tort

victims’ lack of an alternative forum should this action be

dismissed. This seems to assume the plaintiff in this

interpleader action was the Pimentel class. It is Merrill

Lynch, however, that has the statutory status of plaintiff

as the stakeholder in the interpleader action.

It is true that, in an interpleader action, the stakeholder

is often neutral as to the outcome, while other parties

press claims in the manner of a plaintiff. That is insuffi-

cient, though, to overcome the statement in the inter-

pleader statute that the stakeholder is the plaintiff. See

28 U. S. C. §1335(a) (conditioning jurisdiction in part upon

whether “the plaintiff has deposited such money or prop-

erty” at issue with the district court or has “given bond

payable to the clerk of the court in such amount and with

such surety as the court or judge may deem proper”). We

do not ignore that, in context, the Pimentel class (and

indeed all interpleader claimants) are to some extent

comparable to the plaintiffs in noninterpleader cases.

Their interests are not irrelevant to the Rule 19(b) equita-

ble balance; but the other provisions of the Rule are therelevant ones to consult.


23/32

19Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)


Merrill Lynch, as the stakeholder, makes the point that

if the action is dismissed it loses the benefit of a judgment

allowing it to disburse the assets and be done with the

matter. Dismissal of the action, it urges, leaves it without

an adequate remedy, for it “could potentially be forced . . .

to defend lawsuits by the various claimants in different

jurisdictions, possibly leading to inconsistent judgments.”

Brief for Merrill Lynch as Amicus Curiae 14. A dismissal

of the action on the ground of nonjoinder, however, will

protect Merrill Lynch in some respects. That disposition

will not provide Merrill Lynch with a judgment determin-

ing the party entitled to the assets, but it likely wouldprovide Merrill Lynch with an effective defense against

piecemeal litigation and inconsistent, conflicting judg-

ments. As matters presently stand, in any later suit

against it Merrill Lynch may seek to join the Republic and

the Commission and have the action dismissed under Rule

19(b) should they again assert sovereign immunity. Dis-

missal for nonjoinder to some extent will serve the pur-

pose of interpleader, which is to prevent a stakeholder

from having to pay two or more parties for one claim.

Any prejudice to Merrill Lynch in this regard is out-

weighed by prejudice to the absent entities invoking sov-ereign immunity. Dismissal under Rule 19(b) will mean,

in some instances, that plaintiffs will be left without a

forum for definitive resolution of their claims. But that

result is contemplated under the doctrine of foreign sover-

eign immunity. See, e.g., Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 497 (“[I]f

a court determines that none of the exceptions to sover-

eign immunity applies, the plaintiff will be barred from

raising his claim in any court in the United States”).

V

The Court of Appeals’ failure to give sufficient weight to

the likely prejudice to the Republic and the Commissionshould the interpleader proceed in their absence would, in


24/32



the usual course, warrant reversal and remand for further

proceedings. In this case, however, that error and our

further analysis under the additional provisions of Rule

19(b) lead us to conclude the action must be dismissed.

This leaves the Pimentel class, which has waited for years

now to be compensated for grievous wrongs, with no im-

mediate way to recover on its judgment against Marcos.

And it leaves Merrill Lynch, the stakeholder, without a

judgment.

The balance of equities may change in due course. One

relevant change may occur if it appears that the Sandi-

ganbayan cannot or will not issue its ruling within areasonable period of time. Other changes could result

when and if there is a ruling. If the Sandiganbayan rules

that the Republic and the Commission have no right to the

assets, their claims in some later interpleader suit would

be less substantial than they are now. If the ruling is that

the Republic and the Commission own the assets, then

they may seek to enforce a judgment in our courts; or

consent to become parties in an interpleader suit, where

their claims could be considered; or file in some other

forum if they can obtain jurisdiction over the relevant

persons. We do note that if Merrill Lynch, or other par-ties, elect to commence further litigation in light of

changed circumstances, it would not be necessary to file

the new action in the District Court where this action

arose, provided venue and jurisdictional requirements are

satisfied elsewhere. The present action, however, may not

proceed.

* * *

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded with instruc-

tions to order the District Court to dismiss the inter-

pleader action.It is so ordered.


25/32

Opinion of the ourt

21Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)

Appendix to opinion of the Court

A PPENDIX

The Court of Appeals issued its decision before the 2007

Amendments to Rule 19(b) became effective. See Merrill

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. ENC Corp., 464 F. 3d

885, 891 (CA9 2006). The text of the Rule before those

changes were adopted is as follows:

“Rule 19. Joinder of Persons Needed for Just

Adjudication

“(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person

who is subject to service of process and whose joinder

will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the sub-

ject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in

the action if (1) in the person’s absence complete relief

cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2)

the person claims an interest relating to the subject of

the action and is so situated that the disposition of the

action in the person’s absence may (i) as a practical

matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect

that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already

parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring dou-

ble, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by

reason of the claimed interest. If the person has notbeen so joined, the court shall order that the person be

made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff

but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defen-

dant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If

the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that

party would render the venue of the action improper,

that party shall be dismissed from the action.

“(b) Determination by Court Whenever Join-

der not Feasible. If a person as described in subdi-

vision (a)(1)–(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the

court shall determine whether in equity and good con-

science the action should proceed among the parties


26/32

Opinion of the ourt


Appendix to opinion of the Court

before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person

being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to

be considered by the court include: first, to what ex-

tent a judgment rendered in the person’s absence

might be prejudicial to the person or those already

parties; second, the extent to which, by protective pro-

visions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or

other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or

avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the

person’s absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the

plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is

dismissed for nonjoinder.“(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A plead-

ing asserting a claim for relief shall state the names,

if known to the pleader, of any persons as prescribed

in subdivision (a)(1)–(2) hereof who are not joined, and

the reasons why they are not joined.

“(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is

subject to the provisions of Rule 23.”


27/32


28/32


29/32

3Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

Transfer, or Stay Submitted by the Republic of the Philip

pines and the Presidential Commission on Good Govern

ment in Civ. No. CV00–595MLR (D. Haw.), ¶6–7, 11.

These actions bespeak a level of personal involvement and

desire to control the Marcos proceedings that create at

least a colorable basis for the Republic and the Commis

sion’s concern about the District Judge’s impartiality.

Furthermore, following the Republic and the Commis

sion’s motion to dismiss the action on sovereign immunity

grounds, the District Judge decided that they were not

“real parties in interest.” See In re Republic of Philip-

pines, 309 F. 3d 1143, 1148 (CA9 2002). The Ninth Circuitreversed and directed the District Judge to enter a stay,

id., at 1153; the District Court did so, but vacated the stay

within months. While the District Court’s decision to do

so was not without some basis, it presumably increased

concern about the possibility that the District Judge would

not fairly consider the Republic’s position on the merits.

Upon reassignment, the question whether to dismiss the

case, to stay the proceedings, or to require the Republic to

choose between asserting its sovereign immunity and

defending on the merits would be open. The District

Judge might wish to hold a hearing to determine whetherthe Republic and the Commission have a substantial

argument that the Republic owned the disputed assets

when they were conveyed to Arelma in 1972. While the

Court assumes that the Republic’s interest in the Arelma

assets is “not frivolous,” ante, at 14, on this record, it is not

clear whether the Republic has a sufficient claim to those

assets to preclude their recovery by judgment creditors of

Marcos. The Republic’s claim to disputed assets may be

meritless for reasons unrelated to the potential statute of

limitations.

Further, in conducting the balancing inquiry mandated

by Rule 19, as interpreted by Justice Harlan’s opinion forthe Court in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v.


30/32



Patterson, 390 U. S. 102 (1968), I would conclude that

several facts specific to this case suggest that the Republic

and the Commission’s sovereign interests should be given

less weight than in the ordinary case. First, in all events,

the Republic and the Commission must take affirmative

steps in United States courts (or possibly invoke the assis

tance of the Attorney General to do so, see Brief for United

States as Amicus Curiae 27) at some point in order to

recover the assets held in the United States. Thus, the

sovereign interest implicated here is not of the same mag

nitude as when a sovereign faces liability; the Republic’s

interest is in choosing the most convenient venue and timefor the suit to proceed.

Second, in the past two decades, the Republic has par

ticipated in other proceedings involving Marcos’ assets in

our courts without interposing any objection. Indeed, in

1987 it filed an amicus brief with the Ninth Circuit in the

underlying consolidated class action that led to the entry

of respondents’ judgment against Marcos; in that brief the

Republic urged the Ninth Circuit to reverse the District

Judge’s dismissal of two of the cases (later consolidated)

under the act of state doctrine and “to allow the Plaintiffs

in those two cases to present their evidence of gross human rights violations against Ferdinand Marcos and to

pursue justice in U. S. District Court.” App. A to Brief for

Respondent Pimentel RA–1.

This was the Republic’s position notwithstanding the

fact that any recovery would come from a judgment

against Marcos’ assets—assets that the Republic and the

Commission now claim to have owned in full from the

moment Marcos acquired them. See, e.g., Brief for Repub

lic in Nos. 04–16401, 04–16503, and 04–16538 (CA9), p. 9

(“Under Philippine law, assets resulting from the misuse

of public office, bribery, corruption, and other such crimes

by public officials are forfeit to the Republic from themoment such assets are generated”); Pet. for Republic in


31/32

5Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)


No. 0141 (Sandiganbayon) (filed 1991) (seeking forfeiture

of a large number of Marcos assets). Even if the Republic

believed that Marcos might have some personal assets

that were not ill gotten, under the Republic’s theory that

amount could not possibly have approached the judgment

respondents received. Either the Republic was encourag

ing futile and purely symbolic litigation, or the Republic

believed that other creditors would have access to at least

a portion of Marcos’ vast assets.

In sum, I am persuaded that the Court’s judgment today

represents a more “inflexible approach” than the Rule

contemplates. Provident, 390 U. S., at 107. All partieshave an interest in the prompt resolution of the disposi

tion of the Arelma assets. A remand would allow a new

judge to handle the matter in an expeditious fashion

rather than requiring a brand new proceeding. The Court

suggests that Merrill Lynch may file in another District

Court—presumably in New York—if it seeks to commence

further litigation. See ante, at 20. While this solution

would put the matter before another District Judge, it

requires the initiation of a new proceeding that may un

necessarily delay the final resolution.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.


32/32

_________________

_________________

1Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)

Opinion of SOUTER, J.


No. 06–1204

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., PETI-

TIONERS v. JERRY S. PIMENTEL, TEMPORARY

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF MARIANO J.


ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 12, 2008]

JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring in part and dissenting in

part.

I join all but Parts IV–B and V of the Court’s opinion. I

differ as to relief because a conclusion of the matter pend-

ing before the Sandiganbayan may simplify the issues

raised in this case and render one disposition or another

more clearly correct. I would therefore vacate the judg-

ment and remand for a stay of proceedings for a reason-

able time to await a decree of the Philippine court. If it

should appear later that no such decree can be expected,

the Court of Appeals could decide on the next step in light

of the Court’s opinion. For reasons given by JUSTICE

STEVENS, I would order that any further proceedings in

the District Court be held before a judge fresh to the case.

republic of philippines v. pimentel, 553 u.s. 851 (2008)

Documents