Cities 36 (2014) 182–192

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Reprint of ‘‘The production of segregated urban landscapes: A criticalanalysis of gated communities in Sofia’’ q

0264-2751/$ - see front matter � 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2013.11.001

DOI of original article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2013.06.008q An error resulted in this article appearing in the wrong issue. The article is

reprinted here for the reader’s convenience and for the continuity of the specialissue. For citation purposes, please use the original publication details: ChristianSmigiel (2013). The production of segregated urban landscapes: A critical analysisof gated communities in Sofia. Cities 35, 125–135. doi:10.1016/j.cities.2013.06.008.⇑ Tel.: +49 177 2394010.

E-mail address: christiansmigiel@hotmail.com1 For the sake of readability we will use both the emblematic term ‘gated

community’ and ‘gated and guarded housing estates’ (which is less euphemistic andprobably more appropriate for Central and Eastern Europe) interchangeably.

2 Although having observed the development of gated communities in So007 it is rather difficult to estimate the exact number of gated and guardedstates that actually exist. This is due to an enormous growth that tospecially until 2008. Moreover, there is a dozen cases where projects hadeen presented, trendy websites had been launched, but the constructionfter a while due to investors retreating or incorrect planning. In order tverview, Sonia Hirt and me we made a first attempt to count Sofiammunities. In total we counted more than 70 gated communities in 20

012; pp. 151–154). However, during my latest research trip to Sofia in Maid an update of this list observing that at least 15 of these complexes website projects while others remain empty.

Christian Smigiel ⇑University of Leipzig, Germany

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history:Available online 20 November 2013

Keywords:Gated communitiesSegregationCritical urban geographyNeoliberal urban policyEastern Europe

Gated communities represent a rather new trend in housing in Sofia. Besides very few secluded and pri-vately governed neighbourhoods of the nomenclature they were little known in Bulgaria before 1989.This has changed profoundly over the last 15 years. Indeed, similar to other Central and Eastern Europeancities (CEE) one can speak of a boom in closed-type settlements in Sofia and its outskirts with approxi-mately 50–60 newly constructed gated and guarded housing estates which in some cases accommodateseveral hundred inhabitants. While this growth of enclosed high-income neighbourhoods has mostlybeen studied in terms of architectural design, representation, residential structure and behaviour as wellas public–private dichotomy little attention has been paid to the politico-economic processes underlyingthis radical restructuring of urban space in Central and Eastern Europe. Additionally the role of the keystakeholders (local business people, international developers, public authorities) has hardly been ques-tioned. Therefore, this article tries to uncover the interplay of different stakeholders that have shaped thisproduction of space. By applying a relational approach the article attempts to elaborate on why, by whomand by what kind of practices gated communities are produced and how they function. Beyond that thearticle also takes a closer look at the neo-liberal urban policy environment that has influenced the rise ingated communities. The article aims not only to extend the research by adding just another case study,but rather to provide a critical reading of gated communities in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermoreby discussing three examples of gated communities in Sofia, each representing a specific type with itsspecific causalities and socio-spatial outcomes, the article will also highlight what we can learn fromour post-socialist Bulgarian case regarding gated communities in general.

� 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction

Gated communities represent a rather new trend in housing inSofia (Gadecki & Smigiel, 2009).1 Besides very few secluded and pri-vately governed neighbourhoods of the nomenclature they were lit-tle known in Bulgaria before 1989 (Stoyanov & Frantz, 2006). Thishas changed profoundly over the last 15 years. Indeed, similar toother Central and Eastern European cities (CEE) one can speak of aboom in closed-type settlements in Sofia and its outskirts withapproximately 50–60 newly constructed gated and guarded housing

estates which in some cases accommodate several hundred inhabit-ants.2 While this growth of enclosed high-income neighbourhoodshas mostly been studied in terms of architectural design, representa-tion, residential structure and behaviour as well as public–privatedichotomy little attention has been paid to the politico-economicprocesses underlying this radical restructuring of urban space inCentral and Eastern Europe (Blinnikov, Shanin, Sobolev, & Volkova,2006; Brabec & Sykora, 2009; Cséfalvay, 2010; Gasior-Niemec,Glasze, & Pütz, 2009; Hirt & Petrovic, 2011; Lentz, 2006; Polanska,2010). Additionally the role of the key stakeholders (local business

fia sincehousing

ok placeofficiallystopped

o get an’s gated10 (Hirt,y 2012 Iere just

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C. Smigiel / Cities 36 (2014) 182–192 183

people, international developers, and public authorities) has hardlybeen questioned (Bodnar & Molnar, 2010). Therefore, this articletries to uncover the interplay of different stakeholders that haveshaped this production of space. By applying a relational approachthe article attempts to elaborate on why, by whom and by what kindof practices gated communities are produced and how they function.Beyond that the article also takes a closer look at the neo-liberal ur-ban policy environment that has influenced the rise in gated com-munities. The article aims not only to extend the research byadding just another case study, but rather to provide a critical read-ing of gated communities in Central and Eastern Europe. Further-more by discussing three examples of gated communities in Sofia,each representing a specific type with its specific causalities and so-cio-spatial outcomes, the article will also highlight what we canlearn from our post-socialist Bulgarian case regarding gated commu-nities in general.

Data and methods

This study began with a windshield survey in summer 2007 inthe suburbs of Sofia since at that time there was no other way toget information about gated housing complexes. Later it becameeasier and we gained permission to interview the main stakehold-ers of almost half of Sofia’s gated communities.3 In fact, we wereable to obtain access to around 30 gated and guarded housing com-plexes and to analyse 10 complexes in detail. During the research weconducted 30 semi-structured interviews with key informants suchas developers, general and property managers, architects, marketingdirectors, sales managers, residents as well as urban planners of theSofia municipality. Additionally we carried out a household survey inone gated and guarded housing estate to test our qualitative find-ings. Within this case study area of about 700–800 inhabitants livingevery 5th household of each building was surveyed. Respondentswere mostly interviewed at home. Furthermore I used participantobservation in order to identify residents’ behaviour as well as toanalyse internal relations. In total I spent several weeks (in July2007, May 2008, October 2009, April 2010 and May 2012) in these10 gated and guarded housing complexes. The interviews, field notesand documents collected from the marketing and media industrieswere coded based on themes identified in the research process thatlasted until May 2012. Subsequently, a thematic content analysiswas conducted. I also had a closer look at the main policy papersand planning documents that have framed Sofia’s urban develop-ment in general and the growth of gated communities in particular.

4 This type of theoretical setting contains several elements of Lefebvre’s tridimen-sional production of space (Lefebvre, 1991). Although I cannot discuss the linkages oLefevbre’s production of space and the applied relational approach in detail, the

Gated communities from a relational perspective: sometheoretical remarks

Although Eastern European gated communities are receivinggrowing scientific attention lately, most of these papers tend to fo-cus on socio-cultural explanations (Gasior-Niemiec et al., 2009;Hirt, 2012; Lentz, 2006). Indeed there are only a few studies thathave a different focus or apply a different theoretical setting. Oneof these exceptions is Bodnar’s and Molnar’s study on newlyplanned housing developments and gated communities in Berlinand Budapest. In order to capture the interplay between publicand private space and actors they develop a relational approachwhich they call an adoption of David Harvey’s relational connectiv-ities (Bodnar & Molnar, 2010, p. 791). But why is it useful to applysuch a relational perspective when examining gated communities?Moreover, what are the main characteristics of such a theoreticalsetting?

3 I am thankful to Svetla Marinova, Iskra Dandolova und Stanislaw Ivanov whohelped me a lot in gaining access to these complexes, and who also spent cold winterdays and hot summer evenings behind gates and curtains.

following paragraphs will briefly highlight some material, strategical and symbolicconnectivities.

5 Here I will not discuss the influences of global architecture and urban design ordebates on fear of crime.

Borrowing a statement from David Harvey one could answerbriefly that ‘the only way we can understand the qualitative andquantitative attributes of ‘‘things’’ is by understanding the pro-cesses and relations they internalize’ (Harvey, 1996, p. 52). In ourcase it means that it is important to uncover the politico-economiccausalities, power structures and internal relations of gated com-munities. Furthermore we need to analyse relations on differentspatial scales (i.e. global–local nexus), to unpack these relationsby examining logics and strategies of stakeholders that are in-volved in the production of gated communities.

A relational approach seems to be a useful approach since itdoes not only deal with relations of different actors or relations be-tween individual motives of actors and their societal background.Moreover, a relational approach contains several temporal as wellas spatial scales that help especially to highlight contradictions ofnewly produced gated communities.4

Concerning the material dimension of newly produced gatedcommunities a relational approach can help to uncover its polit-ico-economic logic by looking at the practices of financing and ur-ban design as well as by reconsidering discources and politicaldecisions that frame and legitimize gated communities. In termsof our example this means to analyse Sofia’s urban policy making,its actors and documents as well their relationalities to the currentgated community boom.

Moreover, this includes a profound discussion of ideas and con-cepts of international developers and globally operating real estatefunds as the major producers of gated communities. Besides thatlocal developers and their motives to build such a restricted urbanlandscape will be taken into account as well. By combining thesedifferent elements we will be able to get a comprehensive picturehow and what kind of glocal urban power relations has producedthese segregated urban landscapes.5

Furthermore we will also have a short look at imaginations andsymbolics of gated communities that are used and produced bydevelopers as well as by residents (tenants and owners). This refersto the symbolic of lived space in a Lefebrvian sense which is relatedto how residents are using public and private space. Beyond thatexpectations and imaginations of developers and residents in rela-tion to the concept of a gated community are going to be high-lighted. Consequently, we will be able to understand a little moreof its local performative power.

Trying to put these rather general considerations into a concisequestion that could guide our further research it seems construc-tive to ask: why and by what kind of relations are gated communi-ties constituted and how they function? However before drawingthe case study analysis we briefly need to outline the main charac-teristics of housing and urban planning in Sofia after 1989 sincethis will describe which framework the mushrooming of gatedcommunities has taken place in.

Housing and urban planning in an era of neo-liberalisation

When looking at the last two decades of housing and urbanplanning in Sofia it becomes obvious that the general conditionsare similar to other CEE cities. Besides differences in terms ofhomeownership, the principles of housing policy and urban plan-ning did not vary significantly. As in other CEE cities deregulationof the land and housing market, restitution, privatisation of hous-

f

184 C. Smigiel / Cities 36 (2014) 182–192

ing and housing construction as well as decentralisation have beenthe major features of policy-making in Sofia (Stenning, Smith,Rochovská, & Swiatek, 2010). While these practices and policieshave been intensively studied for several CEE cities – Sofia is notan exception in that case (Elbers & Tsenkova, 2003; Hoffmann &Koleva, 1993; Tsenkova, 1996; Vesselinov, 2005; Yoveva, Dimitrov,& Dimitrova, 2003) – not so much attention has been paid to thequestion of what kind of relations (i.e. politico-institutional frame-work) they have been shaped by. Furthermore the role of interna-tional institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund,European Union, USA, etc.) and their policy proposals and docu-ments in shaping urban policies in Central and Eastern Europehas not been studied in detail.

And in fact, one of the most powerful and influential relationalconnectivities brings us back to the very first days of the new era.Immediately after the changes in 1989, the World Bank publishedseveral papers which were intended to implement a new housingpolicy agenda and to serve as a guide for future urban policy-mak-ing (Renaud, 1990; World Bank, 1993). Indeed, the proposed prin-ciples quickly became the main guidelines for housing and urbanpolicy-making throughout Central and Eastern Europe (Pichler-Milanovic, 2001; Tsenkova, 2009). A number of national govern-ments of CEE countries and many CEE municipalities followedthe proposed framework described in Housing Reform in SocialistEconomies (1990) and Enabling the Markets to Work (1993) andestablished neo-liberal policy regimes at the national as well ason the urban level (Harloe, 1996).6

Within these two policy papers the authors described explicitlyhow housing markets and urban policy have to be restructured,privatised and deregulated.7 Furthermore, one can read that hous-ing reforms are ‘indispensable to the success of the overall economicreform’ (Renaud, 1990, p. 56), or ‘that governments are advised toabandon their earlier role as producers of housing’ (World Bank,1993, p. 1) or that ‘privatisation of housing production should gohand in hand with the overall privatisation of public sector enter-prises’ (World Bank, 1993; 62). Looking at these examples it is obvi-ous that the intented housing reforms can be considered as anessential part of a wider economic restructuring of Central and East-ern European societies towards a capitalist market economy on theone hand and to some extent also part of a global strategy of urbanrestructuring on the other hand (Smith, 2002). This becomes clearwhen taking a second look into the World Bank publications fromthe early 1990s. One can read that housing reforms are essential be-cause the housing sector is considered one of the most profitableeconomic sectors in the future, a major area for capital accumulationand therefore a main source for urban growth (World Bank, 1993).

However the influence of the World Bank, IMF and otherinternational institutions was not limited to policy formulationsor theoretical models. In order to support the intended politico-

6 At the macro-level the so-called ‘‘Bulgarian Economic Growth and TransitionProject’’ can be interpreted as the main neo-liberal policy draft that has been highlyinfluential in shaping Bulgaria’s transformation approach (Rahn, 2003). This policypaper was written by a team of U.S. experts. It was discussed and accepted in theGrand National Assembly in Sofia in October 1990 only six month after theCommunist Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov had commissioned a group of economicand legal experts from the Reagan administration to design this transformationstrategy (Binder, 1990). Although this 600-page draft did not function as a blueprintfor Bulgaria’s transformation, its recommendations have been highly influential asone can see e.g. in terms of the applied privatization strategy, the introduction of acurrency board, which Bulgaria accepted in 1997, as well the introduction of a flat-rate tax in 2007. The same goes for the harsh reduction of almost all kind of socialwelfare ranging from food subsidies over pay-rise freeze to the cutting ofunemployment compensation (Rahn & Utt, 1990).

7 The main instruments that have been named crucial are: property right reforms,reduction of state subsidies, decentralisation of ownership from state to localauthorities, sale of rented housing and privatisation of construction and maintenanceenterprises (Renaud, 1990; World Bank, 1993; Pichler-Milanovic, 2001).

economic change numerous projects and programmes were initi-ated in various Central and Eastern European cities. Regarding So-fia the city centre renovation initiatives, financed by the UNDP, orthe Sofia City Strategy, a strategic programme for urban develop-ment prepared in alliance with the World Bank, served as corner-stones of urban development (Dainov, Nanchev, Pancheva, &Garnizov, 2007; Sofia Municipality, 2003). Furthermore, the activ-ities and programmes of USAID have been influential as well sincethey supported suburbanisation by promoting fiscal decentralisa-tion (local taxes and fees, municipal budget and municipal debt).Moreover, different international organisations have organisedseveral seminars or workshops for Sofia’s main policy makers.Since a few years European institutions (EU, EBRD) have taken overthis role as major foreign stakeholders. Latest figures indicate thatboth institutions account for almost one third of the annual Sofiamunicipality budget (Dainov, Nanchev, & Garnizov, 2010).

Concerning housing and urban planning in Sofia, the disman-tling of the state, which had been a cornerstone of the neo-liberalpolicy models, led to a cut of almost all state subsidies for housing,an abrupt stop of public housing construction, the dissolution ofpublic construction companies, a jump in interest rates for residen-tial mortgages or loans and an uncoordinated privatisation of thehousing market – just to name a few outcomes (Strong, Reiner, &Szyrmer, 1996; Elbers & Tsenkova, 2003; Yoveva et al., 2003; Iva-nova, 2009). Furthermore, agricultural lands in the outskirts of So-fia underwent a large-scale privatisation and restitution process.Although all these changes in urban policy and legal framework,which were introduced overnight, had a devastating impact onhousing and its residents, it probably had the most severe damageon policy-making in general. As a matter of fact the neo-liberalhousing agenda resulted in a delegitimation of all kind of publicinvolvement in urban development (Dainov, Nanchev, Pancheva,& Garnizov, 2007). Looking at the facts it shows that this ideolog-ical attitude has been directing Sofia’s urban policy until today.One example is that the Bulgarian capital is still lacking a coherenthousing policy as a leading urban planner from the Sofia munici-pality confirms (Interview AA, urban planner, Sofia municipality).

Beyond that it is insightful to have a brief look at how relationsat different scales have shaped this process. Therefore, we will takethe example of the Territorial Development Plan (TDP) because itreveals how a complex institutional framework consisting of na-tional policy makers, local politicians and local business elite hasdirected urban development. The TDP has a history that reachesback until 1961. This has to be mentioned as the TDP of 1961 re-mained the legal basis for Sofia’s urban development for almost50 years. Although heavily outdated and although there had beenseveral new plans prepared before and after 1989 it lasted until2009 before Sofia adopted a new TDP (Dainov et al., 2010). Whilethe absence of such a general urban planning guideline was of min-or importance before 1989, since the state was omnipresent any-way, it became problematic with the withdrawal of stateresponsibility in the early 1990s. In fact, it led to a decentralisationthat can be described as a kind of ‘survival of the fittest’ policymeaning that one could build anything in all possible variations(Hirt, 2012). Especially private developers made use of this absenceof regulations and guidelines as one can see vividly in Sofia’ssouthern parts.8 It led to an urban sprawl that consists of a bizarremixture of new ‘Mafia baroque villas’ (Hirt, 2008, p. 803) built by anew economic elite next to old summer garden houses of elderlylow-income households on one side and dilapidating large-scalehousing estates with shrinking green spaces on the other side (Hirt,

8 In the 1990s it was local businessmen who benefitted most from the absence ofgulations. Some of them used their long-standing relations with local authorities to

cquire land almost for free while others used the weakness of public authorities tonstruct without permission.

reaco

C. Smigiel / Cities 36 (2014) 182–192 185

2007; Marinova, Poscharliev, & Vaisova, 2010; Rode & Grimm-Pretner, 2007). The Sofia municipality and the local municipalitiesof the Sofia Metropolitan area have accompanied this radical changeof spatial and social structures with an inconsistent mélange of help-lessness, gentleman’s agreements and the argument that missingpublic funding does not allow the regulation of these processes. Inaddition main urban planners and policy-makers as well localauthorities have applied the vision that public interventions belongto the past and are out-dated models of socialist urban planning(Hirt, 2007; Interview AB, local architect Sofia). Even through main-stream lenses this reveals a radical free market, capitalist ideology.This type of understanding of urban planning is even included inofficial planning documents. In fact, these documents argue for ashift towards a disperse city structure which in other words meansa political legitimation of the on-going urban sprawl.

Although the latest version of urban policy documents andplanning guidelines uses a different wording it does not intend apolicy change either. In fact, the new TDP as well as other planningdocuments such as the Municipal Development Plan (2007–2013)and the Programme for the Governance and Development of SofiaMunicipality (2008–2011) still follow the same laissez-faire ideol-ogy once set up by World Bank, IMF and other transnational policynetworks, which limits public interventions, restricts publicauthorities to only organise urban growth and over-emphasisesthe role of private developers. Moreover, these new policy guide-lines seem to be rather weak instruments in terms of strategicalinfluence as they tend to be rather uncoordinated, underfinancedand vague policy formulations that drag behind ‘urban reality’(Dainov et al., 2010).

Case studies

After having briefly highlighted the general politico-institu-tional setting in Sofia we will turn our focus to three gated commu-nities, each located in the southern districts of Sofia where almostall gated communities are situated.9 We have chosen these threecompounds because they reflect the broad spectrum of gated com-munities that has emerged over the last two decades in Sofia. Eachof the case studies portrays a specific type of gated community withits specific causalities and socio-spatial outcomes.

Mountain View Village

Mountain View Village is one of the oldest gated communities ofthe post-1990 era. It was built by a Bulgarian entrepreneurial fam-ily in the mid-1990s on an undeveloped area and is still owned andmanaged by the developer’s family. Administratively, the com-pound belongs to the suburban settlement of Pancharevo whichadjoins the Vitosha national park. However, the complex appearsas a rather isolated settlement. Only the Anglo-American schooland a few scattered detached houses are located in the vicinity.Mountain View Village consists of 23 houses (11 large-sized de-tached houses, each of them with a small front garden, 12 terracehouses), a swimming pool with a bar and a playground for chil-dren. The complex is surrounded by a solid one-and-a-half-metrehigh wall. It is controlled and guarded 24/7 by security guards.Mountain View Village houses a rather homogeneous group of res-idents who are middle-aged, high-incomers and self-employedand who have been carefully selected by the owners.

9 90% of the gated communities in Sofia are situated in the traditionally wealthysouthern neighbourhoods that formerly housed the king’s family and the state-socialist nomenclature. This also reveals that developers are keen to embed theirgated housing complexes in the historical or master narrative of Sofia to underlineexclusiveness and prestige (Gadecki & Smigiel, 2009).

Maxi Club Green City

Although having a much larger number of residents (700–800)and 18 different nationalities Maxi Club Green City also mostlyaccommodates high-incomers. Another similarity to MountainView Village is that the majority of residents are self-employed.Furthermore, about 70% of the households are young families (be-tween 26 and 45 years old) with children who moved in after thecomplex was opened in 2001. The main construction period was1998–2001. Nevertheless, the complex was constantly enlargeduntil 2007. Today it consists of 19 five-storey apartment buildings.The apartment size varies between 140 and 254 square metres. Thegated housing complex, which is surrounded by a fence, is con-nected with a hotel that is situated on the same plot. Therefore,there are a number of leisure facilities such as a spa and sports cen-tre, restaurants and tennis courts (until 2008). The whole complex,which is part of the Vitosha neighbourhood (district of Lozenec),was built by a private Bulgarian entrepreneur whose family stillowns the land and organises the marketing as well as the manage-ment of the complex.

Residential Park Sofia

Residential Park Sofia is by far the largest gated and guardedhousing development in Sofia (Hirt, 2012). It is a foreign-ownedmaster-planned development that is meant for about 2000 resi-dents. The investment has amounted to a total of 60 million Eurossince the planning started in 2005. Concerning the residents, thesales and marketing strategy targets mostly young Bulgarianhouseholds who can afford to pay at least 150,000 Euros for a100-square-metre apartment. Residential Park Sofia is situatedon an area of 200,000 square metres. The complex is located inthe neighbourhood of Simeonovo (district of Vitosha) oppositethe largest commercial and business area in Bulgaria called Busi-ness Park Sofia. Residential Park Sofia consists of a mix of detachedhouses, multi-family houses and terraced houses (see Fig. 3). Fur-thermore there is a supermarket, pharmacy, restaurants etc. anda community centre comprising a kindergarden, gym, swimmingpool and several meeting points. Therefore the Lindner Group, aGerman developer, advertises the compound as ‘a city within thecity’. Unlike other gated communities this is not only a commercialslogan as road signs show it. Indeed, Residential Park acquired anadministrative status as an independent residential district of Sofiain 2011. For the first time a privately governed residential complexhas achieved such a position which indicates the powerful positionof its management as well as of its residents.

Furthermore Residential Park Sofia has awakened some publicinterest lately, because the former general manager of the com-plex, Rosen Plevneliev, was elected as the president of Bulgaria inNovember 2011.

Arrangements, regulations and conflicts/contradictions

Earlier in this paper I asked why and by what kind of relationsare gated communities constituted and how they function? Basedon this general research question I will focus in the following onhow this has been realised in our three case studies. That meansI will try to operationalise the relational approach by emphasisingrelations of actors as well as practices in these three gated commu-nities. Considering the research data I have analysed it shows thatthe production of gated community spaces takes place along threetypes of relations which can be labelled arrangements, regulationsand conflicts/contradictions. I have chosen this terminology becauseit captures and describes the key elements and their involvementin the process of gated community production in the case of Sofia.

186 C. Smigiel / Cities 36 (2014) 182–192

Arrangements10

Arrangements have played a key role concerning the rise ingated communities in Sofia. Especially in a politico-institutionalenvironment as previously described, urban development is pre-dominantly organised and directed by a few powerful privatestakeholders imbedded in a neo-liberal state regime (with weakpublic stakeholders and missing urban policy guidelines). Withinthis environment arrangements function as the main instrumentof policy-making.

Figs. 4 and 5 provide an overview and attempt to illustrate howdifferent types of arrangements are used within the process ofgated community production. Generally speaking we can distin-guish two phases that basically differ in terms of types of arrange-ments involved. The arrangements are determined by the keystakeholders and the politico-institutional circumstances at a par-ticular time. In fact, one can differentiate between a first phase ofgated community production that started at the end of the 1990sand a second phase that started 2–3 years before Bulgaria joinedthe EU in 2007.

The first phase was predominantly shaped by Bulgarian busi-nessmen. As Fig. 4 indicates they mainly used informal arrange-ments in order to accomplish the construction of a gated andguarded housing complex.11 In most cases the procedure startedwith the purchase of land. Although located in the most presti-gious areas of Sofia the developers were able to acquire the landfor very little money by using either their local networks, politicalpower or by making use of the lack of public supervision aswell as missing knowledge of the former owners concerning theproperty value.

‘My father, who was born here, had the idea for a gated commu-nity when he was district mayor of ‘‘Pancharevo for a shortperiod’’ [the same district where the estate is situated] after1989. It was essential for him to collect as much land as possiblefor the family. [...] And somehow he was able to collect a lot ofland in a private way, because the biggest part of the territorywas agricultural land which was publicly owned. He acquired itfor a very low price. Other plots were bought for practicallynothing from the restituted owners who were mostly peasantsor the heirs of former peasants.’ (AC, manager and owner ofMountain View Village)

‘The land was private property. So we started collecting the landpiece by piece. When these owners heard that there is someonewilling to buy more land they raised the price. And I can tell youas an example that at the beginning we bought 100 square metresfor 30 US dollars and later on we paid 50 euros per square metre.[...] But in reverse we sold the first apartments for 250 US dollarsper square metre. Now we are selling at 1,600 euros per squaremetre for finished apartments.’ (AD, manager and owner of MaxiClub Green City)

These two quotations mirror the politico-institutional circum-stances as well as the main motives of the developers between1990 and the early 2000s. In fact, a typical feature of the first phaseof gated community production is the conjunction of personal andeconomic interests. In the case of the gated communities MountainView Village and Maxi Club Green City, both developed by Bulgarianbusinessmen who had lived in gated communities (see Figs. 1 and2), one can discover this conjunction of constructing a family com-

10 I am using ‘‘arrangements’’ as a category to analyze gated communities becausethey reveal the fluidity between the formal and informal side of gated communityproduction.

11 By informal arrangements I refer to non-official agreements and deals with publicauthorities concerning land use and permission for construction.

pound on the one side (family members also run the managementof the complex) and producing a profitable housing project for eco-nomic elites on the other.

Furthermore, Mountain View Village and Maxi Club Green Cityhave been produced by similar types of arrangements as Fig. 5 re-veals. The main feature of these arrangements is their informalcharacter. This becomes evident in terms of how laws, permitsand public authorities are used. As already shown the developersare well-connected with local authorities. They have establisheda network that allows them to operate without formal constraints.That means they are able to interpret building laws and planningregulations in their favour or even to lobby and acquire publicmoney for their private interests.

‘In the year 2002, it was our initiative that the Sofia municipalityinstalled a traffic light and a bus stop at the crossroads in frontof our club.’ (AD, manager and owner of Maxi Club Green City)

‘We do not care about the laws outside of the village. Of course reg-ulations are important and have to be respected. And we knowthem very well. But we think that they do not affect our village.[...] We are definitely another type of housing.’ (AC, manager andowner of Mountain View Village)

However, both cases differ in certain aspects as well. WhileMountain View Village represents a gated community which is asecluded settlement built only for family members and friends ofthe family, Maxi Club Green City is a much more heterogeneouscomplex that is not intended to function primarily as a community.As a matter of fact residents are selected only according to theirfinancial capability. Moreover, the developers of Maxi Club GreenCity applied professional advertising (by using real estate maga-zines, own website, glossy brochures) to attract residents for theirgated and guarded housing complex, whereas the residents ofMountain View Village are selected personally by the owners ofthe complex without any advertising campaign. In this regard MaxiClub Green City contains similarities with the second phase of gatedcommunity production which has been shaped by internationalreal estate developers and their standardised methods of produc-ing housing projects (see Fig. 5).

Before analysing the arrangements of the so-called secondphase of gated community production in Sofia it is worth takinga look at how public authorities perceived the growth of gatedcommunities and how they have responded.

‘We, as a district of Sofia, cannot regulate the development of gatedcomplexes. This can only be done by the Sofia municipality. [...] Butthe only regulation that the Sofia municipality has introduced isthat the owner is not allowed to cover more than 30% of his plotplus that the height of the buildings should not exceed 10 m. Allthe rest including gating, fencing or whatever is up to the owner.’(AE, main architect of the Vitosha municipality)

‘We do not know how to react as planners concerning the growth ofgated communities – I mean how to deal with it. We do not have aproper definition about it and in our laws no specification or regu-lation about gating and fencing is included. But we do not have aconsensus whether it is good or bad development either.’ (AA, SofiaMunicipality, Department for urban planning)

In 2004 we had a big celebration here in our hotel. One of ourguests was the former mayor of Sofia who was obviously a littleshocked that there are gated communities in his city. He told mepersonally that if he would have known it before he would haveinstructed the urban planning department to prohibit such a typeof residential project. I had to laugh a little, because in case ofour complex it was known to be a successful project since 2001and we even got a bus stop and traffic light installed and paid bythe municipality in 2002 (AD, manager and owner of Maxi ClubGreen City)

Fig. 1. Mountain View Village or inside an American-style gated community in the suburbs of Sofia. Source: Author’s photograph, 2007.

Fig. 2. Inside Maxi Club Green City. Source: Author’s photograph, 2008.

C. Smigiel / Cities 36 (2014) 182–192 187

Taking these statements of urban authorities as an example itbecomes obvious that the Sofia municipality has no plan or strat-egy on how to react towards the boom in gated communities. Dur-ing our interviews urban planners even mentioned off the recordthat they are in favour for this type of residential projects and theyeven support it since this is a very cost efficient way for the munic-ipality to support new housing construction. This confirms to whathas been analysed by Hirt (2007, 2012). However, these statements

also reveal that we cannot simply speak of a relation weak publicsector on one side and powerful private developer on the other.What we can see is a much more complex interplay which canbe labelled as a kind of neo-liberal state regime in which publicauthorities are important actors as they provide legal, financial aswell as infrastructural instruments and tools for the growing influ-ence of private stakeholders or in some cases tend to act like pri-vate ones. And last not least these statements underline a

Fig. 3. Inside Residential Park Sofia. Source: Author’s photograph, 2010.

188 C. Smigiel / Cities 36 (2014) 182–192

mentality of urban planning which perceives privatisation of theurban fabric as a catching-up with Western cities (Hirt, 2012, p.158).

These complex linkages illustrates the case of Residential ParkSofia in particular. This gated and guarded housing estate is anexample of the so-called second phase of gated communityproduction that has been shaped by international stakeholdersand their types of arrangements. As Fig. 5 illustrates the arrivalof international developers has led to a standardisation and inter-nationalisation of gated community production. In most casesdevelopers have adopted already existing strategies and layoutsof gated communities built in other CEE cities. This also appliesto the financing of gated and guarded housing projects which ismostly been realised by real estate branches of internationalbanks.12

After having acquired the land from 115 different owners aninternational architecture competition was arranged. The Germandeveloper of the Residential Park (Lindner Group) invited sevenarchitect offices (five international and two local offices) to presenttheir drafts for a gated and guarded housing estate. At the same

12 The boom of gated communities is part of a large inflow of foreign-owned capitalin different economic sectors. Commentators have called it a new kind of accumu-lation regime, because the Bulgarian economy is highly dependent on foreign capitalinvestments since the introduction of a new economic and fiscal policy in connectionwith currency board in 1997 (Ivanova, 2009). Therefore, investment in real estate hasbeen an important source of revenue for the Bulgarian economy. In fact, foreign directinvestment in real estate amounted for almost 30% of all foreign direct investmentduring 2006–2008 (own calculations; Ivanova, 2009).This massive inflow of foreigncapital has been predominantly provided by REITs (real estate investment trusts),open and closed real estate funds. These new types of financial instruments have beenthe major force of gated community production in Sofia since 2004–2005. They areclosely related to a general liberalization of capital movements which Bulgariaintroduced during EU accession. In fact, free movement of capital is one of the majorpolitico-economic cornerstones of the European Union. As a matter of fact Bulgariahad to implement the European council directive 88/361/EEC which imposes on all EUmember states to deregulate their financial markets and to no longer tax cross-national investments in real estate (Heeg, 2010).

time the Lindner Group started intense negotiations with the localurban planning institutions, which in contrast to the case of Moun-tain View Village and Maxi Club Sofia were done in a transparentand open manner. In fact, one could even follow them online. Lateron official relations between the developer, Sofia municipality andthe Bulgarian state even intensified and the Lindner Group re-ceived 5.5 million Euros in subsidies.

‘We got a support from the state, because it [Residential Park Sofia]was considered as a priority project and we got around 5.5 millionEuros. But we had to invest a lot! In a way it is a kind of public pri-vate partnership. But we have actually invested a lot of money inBusiness Park and Residential Park Sofia. So it is clearly a win-win situation for both sides.’ (AG, general manager of ResidentialPark Sofia)

This so-called public private partnership is an interesting casesince it is the first time that public authorities have officially sup-ported the construction of a privately governed gated and guardedhousing complex. The Lindner Group received money in order toimprove the local infrastructure by building a new bridge and toconstruct new roads around the complex which shows that privatedevelopers have also officially become major stakeholders of urbandevelopment in Sofia.13 This becomes even more apparent if oneconsiders that the Lindner Group is the developer of Bulgaria’s andeven South-eastern Europe’s largest office area called Business ParkSofia that is located in the vicinity of the Residential Park Sofia.14 Busi-ness Park Sofia is the working place for around 10,000 people. Itaccommodates all major multi-national companies which do busi-ness in Bulgaria. And like the Residential Park Sofia it is a secured

3 Another example for this type of public-private relationship is the ceremonialpening of Sofia’s second largest privately governed gated housing project Tsarigrad-i Complex by the Mayor of Sofia in relation with several subsidies for thefrastructural improvement of the complex (Hirt, 2012; p. 159).4 A large amount of residents of Residential Park has its workplace in Business Park

ofia.

1

oskin

1

S

Fig. 4. Stakeholders and their arrangements during the first phase of gatedcommunities in Sofia. Source: Own illustration.

C. Smigiel / Cities 36 (2014) 182–192 189

complex surrounded by fences and equipped with a sophisticatedCCTV system.

Returning to the issue by which kind of arrangements thesecomplexes were constituted it is revealing to have a second lookat some legal aspects. In fact, the developer of Residential Park Sofiadid not only receive millions of Euros for constructing streets andbridges, but even laws were changed in order to enable the subsi-dising. At first the Ministry for Regional Development declared theResidential Park Sofia a so-called priority project. Later on a speciallaw for the promotion of investment was passed. This opened upthe possibility to financially support this project. But all this couldonly happen due to intense lobbying from the developer’s side asthe German architect of the Residential Park Sofia, who is also partof the board of management of the Lindner Group, openly de-scribes it:

‘It was a long fight to get all permits for Residential Park. And thiscould only be achieved because of consistent lobbying. Our formergeneral manager, who is now Bulgaria’s Minister for regionaldevelopment, public infrastructure and road construction,15 wasa key figure. He did an amazing job for our project.’ (AH, architectof Residential Park Sofia)

Lobbying is a major issue in other cases as well. However, it isoften executed through different channels. The case of Orchid Hillsillustrates that even international financial institutions are in-volved. In fact, this gated and guarded housing complex was con-structed by an internationally operating investor called OrchidDevelopments Group, but the financing was done by the EuropeanBank for Reconstruction and Development, a publicly-owned bankwhose shareholders are 61 countries and two inter-governmentalorganisations (European Community and European Investment

15 As mentioned earlier, the former general manager has recently been electedPresident of Bulgaria.

Bank). Moreover, the reputation of the EBRD played a crucial rolethat the developer could acquire a large plot in a prestigious areawithin the city boundaries as interviews have shown it. Besidesthat this example shows that gated communities are not only pro-duced by anonymous REITs and other types of real estate funds,but that even international financial institutions are deeply in-volved in its spreading.

Regulations

So far having mainly analysed the kind of relations that consti-tute gated communities in Sofia, I will now turn to the questionhow gated communities function. This requires a closer look atthe relations between developers and residents of gated communi-ties. In this regard regulations play a central role concerning theconsolidation of gated communities. In fact, in all our three casestudies they are meant to sustain, to govern and to order these pri-vate gated complexes.

But what do I mean by talking about regulations? The so-calledinternal regulations are a kind of code of conduct that consists ofrules, prohibitions and sanctions. They act as a contract which isintroduced by the developers and has to be signed by the residentswhen moving into the complex.

‘We do have internal regulations. They are obligatory for every-body. They are very strict. And they regulate parking, speed limits,parties, etc. Actually they talk about everything, because we want adisciplined environment. For only a very few customers it is toostrict, but the large majority is here because of that. They appreci-ate it [. . .] because they are fed up of having scandals with theirneighbours or somebody parking on their street.’ (AG, generalmanager of Residential Park Sofia)

‘There are cases that residents do not pay the management fee for 2or 3 month. Then we impose a fine of 2.000 Euro. But there are alsoother cases where people changed the sunshade which is an ele-ment of the single-family houses. But it has to have always thesame colour. Anyway some residents changed it and we had toimpose a fine, because it is written in the regulations that you can-not change exterior elements of your house or apartment.’ (AG,general manager of Residential Park Sofia)

As one can see internal regulations are very detailed and func-tion as a kind of constitution of gated communities. Furthermorethey contain, for example, when and how to use common spaces,what are the responsibilities of owners, tenants, visitors, manage-ment and service staff and even how to behave properly (Internalregulations Residential Park Sofia, 2009). It becomes clear that reg-ulations function as a form of governance that is meant to disci-pline behaviour. Therefore, they can be interpreted as a powerfulinstrument and a technique of power to govern space in a Foucaul-tian sense (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2002). Especially international devel-opers have introduced these forms of control that are intended tocreate a disciplined landscape. Moreover, there is also a materialis-tic explanation for the existence of internal regulations. By usingstrict rules developers are able to secure the economic value ofthe complex for a longer period. Probably even more importantis that the standardisation of behaviour enables the maximisationof profit since it reduces costs and the necessity for the developerto maintain and renovate.

Most of the residents interviewed perceive these forms of con-trol rather positively. In fact, most of them mentioned that regula-tions were major reasons for moving to a gated neighbourhood.One argument we could hear often is the desire to escape out ofthe ‘chaos of the Sofia’ as several interviewees called it. This corre-sponds to the advertising of a gated community such as ResidentialPark Sofia, which uses the argument of being a different space.

Fig. 5. Stakeholders and their arrangements during the second phase of gated community production in Sofia. Source: Own illustration.

6 The household survey focused on residents’ motives to move to the gatedmplex, neighbour relations and socio-demographic parameters of the household.

190 C. Smigiel / Cities 36 (2014) 182–192

Furthermore the desire to escape from Sofia’s urban reality alsoillustrates the willingness of an elite group to separate from socie-tal issues. Residential Park Sofia is quite insightful in that sensesince it has already received the status of an independent residen-tial district which is maybe just a first step of a longer process ofbecoming an even more autonomous space.

‘We definitely are a small little town. Although we belong to theVitosha municipality we are considered administratively as anindependent unit like Mladost or other residential districts. In fact,while coming here you have maybe seen the sign (residential dis-trict) which indicates that we are an administratively independentunit. This of course does not mean that we or our residents do notpay taxes or are outside the municipality. The municipality comesand collects the waste. We use the Sofia water and energy supply.By the way, we have good relations with the mayor of Vitosha. Butit somehow describes our position. (AG, general manager of Res-idential Park Sofia)

‘Do you think that independency would be an option in the future?’(Author)

(laughs) ‘That’s hard to say and I think it’s not an option at themoment.’ (AG, general manager of Residential Park Sofia)

Similar arguments and justifications regarding regulations andcontrol were mentioned by respondents in Mountain View Villageand Maxi Club Green City. Although these complexes do not havesuch a written catalogue of regulations there exist several informalcodes of conduct that are supervised by the general assembly.These regular meetings of owners function as a kind of parliamentof the gated complex. They also elect a management board that

operates as a kind of government of the complex. In fact, the board,which usually consists of a few residents, can sanction and evenfine residents if the rules have been broken.

Conflicts/contradictions

Although this paper does not focus on residential issues of ourthree case studies in particular, it is worth taking a short look attheir socio-economic background. Unsurprisingly the majority be-longs to the upper strata of the Bulgarian population. And indeed,already housing prices indicate that these complexes are producedfor a wealthy elite since there are not many people in Sofia who areable to afford 150,000 Euros for an apartment (to start with thecheapest apartment available in Residential Park Sofia) or to payat least 1100 Euros rent per month. Results of a household surveywe conducted in Maxi Club Green City confirm this picture.16 30% ofthe respondents answered that they could afford a second or thirdcar and secondary residence in Sofia. And almost 20% of the respon-dents answered that they could afford any kind of luxury they wouldlike to have (Smigiel, 2010). Taking this socio-economic profile intoaccount it seems that these complexes are indeed communities of awealthy elite or an oasis of happiness as described in theadvertisements.

However, real life does not appear to be as simple as it is madeout to be. There are several areas of conflicts that emerge if we lookbehind the walls. In fact, conflict seems to be a major part of life in

1

co

C. Smigiel / Cities 36 (2014) 182–192 191

a gated community and a kind of relation that is an essential ele-ment of gated housing. Even when we only look at the residents,it is possible to reveal a few characteristics of these conflicts. Firstof all, the relationships between neighbours are a potential sourceof conflict. Very often neighbours quarrel because of divergentinterpretations of rules and regulations. This varies from whereand when to take a dog out to where to park the car or up to whattime social gathering is acceptable (Interview AH, resident of agated community). While these types of internal conflicts can befound in other housing estates as well it is remarkable that con-flicts in gated communities are mainly solved with the help ofsecurity officers which Setha Low has called moral minimalism(Low, 2003). Other sources of conflict are the relation betweenowners and tenants or between childless inhabitants and familieswith children. In all cases the presence of intermediaries (propertymanagement, security officers, etc.) is used to settle a dispute. Thisshows that we can speak of a juridification of relations betweenneighbours since an argument is no longer carried out directlyand openly.

Another area of conflict concerns the relation between residentsand developer or residents and property management.

‘When we decided to move here the developers told us that thiswould be a small gated housing complex with three or four apart-ment houses. But the developers kept changing their plans all thetime. Instead of three or four apartment blocks, this area hasalready nineteen now . . . Actually we have been living on anever-ending construction site for the last four years.’ (AI, residentof Maxi Club Green City)

Trying to generalise these arguments one can say that conflictsreflect the ‘contradictory nature’ of gated and guarded housing es-tates. They display a kind of contradiction which seems to be char-acteristic for this type of housing. To use David Harvey’sterminology, one could argue that contradiction is a particular typeof relation and production. It can be understood as ‘a union of twoor more internally related processes that simultaneously supportor undermine each other’ (Ollman, 1990, p. 49 in Harvey, 1996,p. 52). And in fact, gated communities are produced by severalother contradictions. There is, for example, the promise of a newurban lifestyle that unites individuality and community. Gatedcommunities are promoted to be the home for families with chil-dren as well as the home for the single businessman or business-woman. Furthermore one can read that crime and fear do notexist anymore within gated complexes, but at the same time theyare heavily controlled landscapes with dozens of rules, regulationsand surveillance that one is reminded everyday about the danger-ous world inside and outside. Moreover, advertisements and devel-opers praise the heavenly landscape, the beauty of theenvironment and the untouched nature of the complexes. How-ever, gated communities appear as standardised and fully subordi-nated, developed spaces.

Conclusion

Gated communities can be regarded as a symbol of Sofia’s urbandevelopment in the last 15 years since they mirror the powerfuland variegated interplay between public and private stakeholdersas Bodnar and Molnar have shown it for Budapest (Bodnar & Mol-nar, 2010). What we can learn from the case of Sofia is that anexplanation of these public–private linkages must go beyond aweak–strong dichotomy. Although, Sofia’s gated communities havebeen constructed by a powerful group of private stakeholders, theywere able to produce these segregated landscapes only because ofa neo-liberal policy setting whose main policy pillars are deregula-tion, decentralisation, privatisation and commodification. The

roots of this urban policy model have been promoted since theearly 1990s by programmes, projects and strategies of interna-tional institutions, such as the World Bank or the InternationalMonetary Fund or other transnational actors (consultancies, thinktanks, etc.). However, the local implementation has been done bySofia’s authorities such as urban politicians or urban planners. In-deed, out-dated master plans, missing regulations concerning gat-ing in residential areas and a general reluctance to resist financiallywell-equipped private stakeholders have fuelled Sofia’s gated com-munity boom. Besides that public authorities have recently begunto subsidise gated communities and even to classify them as inde-pendent administrative residential districts.

Moreover, the case of Sofia’s gated communities also shows Bul-garia’s post-socialist transformation path in a nutshell. At thebeginning Sofia’s gated communities had been constructed exclu-sively by Bulgarian businessmen who used informal arrangementsto acquire land in order to construct family compounds on one sideand to reinvest the revenues from the heydays of the predatorycapitalism in the 1990s on the other side. Since the mid 2000s for-eign capital has been the major driving force behind the boom ofgated communities. In fact, globally operating real estate funds incooperation with international real estate developers are repro-ducing standardised models of large-scale gated and guardedhousing estates for high-incomers. Although, several complexes re-main unfinished or empty a new socio-spatial division has alreadybeen created.

Having a last look behind the gates of Sofia’s gated communitiesit gets obvious that these complexes cannot be labelled communi-ties. Indeed, residents do not consider themselves as members of acommunity. And many residents are even not interested in havingcloser social relations with their neighbours as the large number ofconflicts and disputes among neighbours have shown it. However,all residents as well as management of the gated complexes have astrong identification with the complex. They perceive their gatedcommunity as a prestigious neighbourhood, a progressive housingconcept and a new way of social ordering that some respondentshave even called a role-model for social organisation and urbandevelopment in Sofia in general.

Acknowledgement

The paper is based on results of the author’s PhD thesis and of aresearch project which was financed by the German ScientificFoundation (DFG) (BR 1729/2-2).

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