report on the bombing of our own troops during operation â

Canadian Military History

Volume 15 | Issue 3 Article 8

4-26-2012

Report on the Bombing of Our Own Troopsduring Operation “Tractable”: 14 August 1944Arthur T. Harris

This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian MilitaryHistory by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected].

Recommended CitationHarris, Arthur T. (2006) "Report on the Bombing of Our Own Troops during Operation “Tractable”: 14 August 1944," CanadianMilitary History: Vol. 15: Iss. 3, Article 8.Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol15/iss3/8

http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh

http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol15

http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol15/iss3

http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol15/iss3/8

mailto:[email protected]

101© Canadian Military History, Volume 15, Numbers 3 & 4, Summer-Autumn 2006, pp.101-112.

Ihave studied the facts of the bombing errorswhich occurred on the 14th August 1944 in

connection with Operation “TRACTABLE” duringwhich some of a large force of Bomber Commanddropped bombs in error on our own troops. Ihave the following comments to make.

Previous operations of this type had beenoutstanding successes. The Army has paidgenerous tribute to their effect on the enemy inenabling our own troops to advance, in additionto saving our troops the much greater casualtiesthat would inevitably have occurred without thistype of support. The support attack in which

this accident occurred was otherwise anoutstanding success. Photographs subsequentlyobtained show that each of the aiming pointswas subjected to a very accurate and heavyconcentration of bombing which undoubtedlyhad the effect sought in enabling the FirstCanadian Army to advance with comparativelylight losses against enemy positions which hadpreviously proved intractable.

In order to obtain a full and clear picture ofthe circumstances leading up to and occasioningthis accident it is necessary to stress certainpoints both in regard to the actual occurrence

Report on the Bombing of OurOwn Troops during Operation“Tractable” – 14 August 1944

Arthur T. HarrisAir Chief Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command

Editor’s note: Operation “Tractable” was the second major Canadian operation in Normandydesigned to break through the German defensive perimeter to reach Falaise. Like its predecessor,Operation “Totalize,” “Tractable” was to employ heavy bombers to augment the firepower availableto the troops. The use of heavy bombers in a tactical role was a relatively new tasking for thestrategic force and required precise targetting to destroy and disrupt the enemy positions. Thestrategic bomber force, British and American, had made significant contributions to the landbattle in Normandy, but there had been mistakes, most notably during Operation “Cobra” whenthe American 8th Air Force had twice bombed their own troops on 24-25 July causing 136 deathsand an additional 621 casualties. For Operation “Tractable,” the medium bombers of 2 Group,2nd Tactical Air Force were to bomb German gun, mortar and tank positions along the startlineimmediately prior to H-Hour. This was to be followed by a large attack by Bomber Commandagainst German positions on the right flank of the Canadian attack, timed to commence twohours after the start of the advance. This bombing was intended “to destroy or neutralize enemyguns, harbours, and defended localities on the right flank and to prevent any enemy movementfrom this area to the area of the attack.” (First Canadian Army Op Instruction No.14, August1944). Though the air support was largely a success, a number of aircraft mistakenly bombedshort hitting units of First Canadian Army. In total, over 150 Allied soldiers were killed and 241wounded by the short bombing. Though it had little impact on the outcome of “Tractable,” therewere a number of investigations launched to understand why the short bombing occurred. Thereport which follows, dated 25 August 1944 and written by Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris, AirOfficer Commanding-in-Chief of Bomber Command, contains the official RAF post-mortem on thereasons for the accidental bombing of First Canadian Army.

pg101-112 11/9/06, 2:59 PM101

1

Harris: Bombing of Our Own Troops

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2006

102

itself and in regard to this type of operation as awhole.

The heavy bomber force is trained primarilyto operate in darkness. It is not trained to fly information. In darkness the aircraft operateindividually according to an overall plan,navigating by prescribed routes to theneighbourhood of their objective and bombing,under conditions in which no details of theground can generally be seen, on pyrotechnicmarkers of varying types suited to the particularoccasion and placed on or near the objective bypathfinder aircraft. Subsequent corrections aremade on the instructions of Master Bombers.

The entire force is trained to these methodsand to these only. This training and theorganisation which produces it cannot bechanged at a moment’s notice, or indeed at manymonths’ notice, to enable the force to operatewith 100% efficiency in so entirely different arole as close direct support to troops on theground in daylight.

With these facts in view, when urgentdemands began to arrive from the Army forassistance by the heavy bomber force, it wasinvariably pointed out that we would do our bestwithin the limits of our experience and trainingto meet their requirements but that grave risk

The photographs on this page and the next were taken during the heavy bombing in support of the army during Operation

“Charnwood,” 7 July 1944. This photo gives a good idea of the number of aircraft that would be in the air over the target

during the attack (467 aircraft for “Charnwood; 811 aircraft for “Tractable”).

Laurier

Centr

e for

Mili

tary

Str

ate

gic

and

Dis

arm

am

ent S

tudie

s (

LC

MS

DS

) P

hoto

gra

ph C

olle

ction

pg101-112 11/9/06, 2:59 PM102

2

Canadian Military History, Vol. 15 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 8


103

inevitably existed in these circumstances of somebombing going astray and taking effect upon ourown troops. Nevertheless previous operations onwhich this type of bombing had been employedat short notice had been so successful that theArmy authorities concerned expressed readyacceptance of the risk in exchange for the proveddecisive effects of such bombing in forwardingtheir military plans. They therefore entered thisventure, as did Bomber Command, in fullknowledge of the risks occasioned to our owntroops.

To enable those outside Bomber Commandto get a balanced view it is necessary to enlargesomewhat on the crew training and organisation

in Bomber Command. As stated above thistraining is for work entirely different from thistype of close support bombing. There is nopossibility of changing or expanding that trainingwithin a reasonable period, even if it is necessary,in order to provide this type of close support tothe troops on the ground.

The pilot in a heavy bomber has a verylimited view of the ground. Such as he has, he isunable to take advantage of in an operation ofthis description because the whole of his timeand attention is taken up in listening to hisnavigator’s and air bomber’s corrections whilecontrolling his aircraft, keeping on the correctcourse, and avoiding collisions in the high

A Halifax of Bomber Command attacks the northern suburbs of Caen during Operation “Charnwood,” 7 July 1944. The

amount of smoke and dust which obscured the target area once the bombing commenced is readily apparent.

Laurier

Centr

e for

Mili

tary

Str

ate

gic

and D

isarm

am

ent

Stu

die

s (

LC

MS

DS

) P

hoto

gra

ph C

olle

ction

pg101-112 11/9/06, 2:59 PM103

3



104

Incidents such as those which occurred onthis occasion must therefore be regarded in thelight of the above explanation of the abilities,training and functions of the various membersof the crew together with the limitations imposedupon the Captain and the navigator by thestructure of the aircraft, by the conditions inwhich they work, and by their inability to knowwhat is actually going on underneath them orprecisely what the bomb aimer is seeing or doing.

The whole of the above must be furtherconsidered in relation to the limitations ofexperience of the crews. The casualty rate amongheavy bomber crews is exceedingly high. Theirtours are therefore short. Once their training iscompleted and they commence to operate theydo not stay very long, even if they survive onoperations. The amount of actual experienceaccumulated by any individual crew is thereforenecessarily very limited. The majority of the forceis consequently, at any given moment, largelycomposed of new crews.

The circumstances of war being what theyare operations such as the one under discussionare inevitably laid on ad hoc at the shortestpossible notice, never allowing adequate time forany practice or even for extended discussion andinstruction.

On this occasion details of the operation werebrought over to this Headquarters late on the

concentration of aircraft which the methods ofbombing and considerations of enemyopposition make essential.

The navigator also has virtually no view ofthe ground. He is a machine-minder and plotterwho spends most of his time in a cabin utilisingthe data provided by the various mechanical aidsto navigation, in conjunction with deadreckoning, to determine the position of the

aircraft from minute to minute and to decideany alteration of course and speed which maybe necessary to take the aircraft through to theneighbourhood of the objective on the correctroute and bearing at the correct time.

The air bomber alone can undertakedirection of the aircraft by means of map readingwith reference to the ground beneath. Histraining in this difficult art is extremely limited,partly because there is not sufficient time duringhis training to devote much effort to thisparticular type of exercise, but mainly because,the metier of the force being night bombing,locating position by map reading from objectson the ground is normally quite impossible.

Furthermore air bombers as a whole are byno means of outstanding intelligence. They arein the main selected as such because, althoughpassing other standards for aircrew, they are theleast likely to make efficient pilots or navigators.

The details of the planned bombing during Operation “Tractable” are as follows. A total of 811 aircraft were

despatched against seven enemy concentrations, all within 2000 yards of the Canadians striking towards

Falaise:–

Quesnay (AP [Aiming Point] 21“A”) – 118 aircraft attacked with 552.8 tons HE and 8.1 tons IB.

Quesnay (AP 21“B”) – 102 aircraft attacked with 552.4 tons HE and 6.3 tons IB.

Bons Tassilly (AP 23) – 108 aircraft attacked with 427.7 tons HE and 6.3 tons IB.

Saumont St. Quentin (AP 22) – 110 aircraft attacked with 391.3 tons HE and 6.7 tons IB.

Aisy/Potigny (AP 28) – 127 aircraft attacked with 588.8 tons HE and 7.6 tons IB.

Fontaine le Pin (AP 25) – 112 aircraft attacked with 554.2 tons HE and 7.2 tons IB.

Potigny/Aisy/Ussy Road Junction (AP 24) – 105 aircraft attacked with 560.0 tons HE and 6.7 tons IB.

Total Bomb Tonnage – 3,627.2 tons HE and 48.9 tons IB.

25 sorties out of the 811 were abortive.

3 aircraft were lost. [HE = high explosive; IB = incendiary bomb]

pg101-112 11/9/06, 3:00 PM104

4



105

evening of the 13th. On studying the proposalsit became at once clear to me that the necessityto bomb the targets in succession from north tosouth in order to meet time table essentialspostulated by the Army was inviting a dangeroussituation if the wind, as predicted (and as itturned out to be) was northerly. It was obviousthat in that situation unless the windstrengthened considerably more than could beexpected there would be a tendency for smokefrom the initial targets to obscure the remainderand for smoke and smoke screens from enemyshelling and from our own troops prior to thebombing to obscure the entire area. That in factoccurred to a considerable degree. But this riskwas accepted at the particular insistence of theArmy and in my view the acceptance of this riskwas reasonable in the battle conditions prevailingand in view of the results required and knownby previous experience to be obtainable from thistype of bombing.

In the light of all the limitations mentionedabove it was at once apparent that the risk ofbombing our own troops existed in a seriousdegree. It was carefully considered whether byrouteing the aircraft over the enemy lines entirelythe risk would in any way be lessened. Thiswould however have meant subjecting ouraircraft to enemy anti-aircraft oppositionthroughout their flight over the continent in avery heavily defended area. I was not preparedto subject my crews to this additional risk inorder solely to lessen the risk of bombing ourown troops. Their casualty rate is and alwayshas been far in advance of anything sufferedanywhere by our ground troops. Furthermoresuch an approach over enemy territory wouldstill not have entirely eliminated the risk becausethe bombing was to take place within an enemysalient extending deep into our lines. Whereasthe best check against bombing our troops wasa carefully timed run from the coast line to thetarget area at a known speed this type of checkwould have been further complicated if the runin instead of being straight from the coast overour own troops had been brought in over enemyterritory at an angle with a dog leg into thesalient. Furthermore there was as much risk thataircraft might err to either side of their coursewhen coming into the salient from the east andthereby stray over our own troops as there wasthat by coming in straight over our own troopsthey might drop short or even cross the salient

altogether and hit our troops on the far side. Itherefore decided on the straight run in over ourown troops.

On a previous occasion, which in theoutcome produced a highly satisfactory seriesof attacks, I had been asked at a few hours noticeto stage close support bombing of our troops inthe dark. Knowing the limitations of the force Iwas originally horrified at this proposal. But asolution having to be found or the entire armyplan wrecked at the last moment, the problemwas solved by having our own artillery firecoloured marker shells on to the aiming points.These points were then re-marked in a clearermanner understandable to our air bombers bythe pathfinder aircraft with their specialpyrotechnics. I considered whether this wouldbe possible on this occasion. But as this attackwas to be brought off in daylight I was advisedthat the coloured artillery shells would beunlikely to show up. There was no time to testthis out. It was doubtful whether stocks ofcoloured shells were available and there was notime to find out. I therefore had to discard apossible safeguard which, however, held withinit serious possibilities of even further confusingthe issue.

The mistakes made on this occasion(although as I have remarked, apart from thesemistakes the operation was otherwise anoutstanding success) were as follows:-

Phase 1 – From 1441 to 1459 hours onePathfinder, 4 crews of No.4 Group and 9 crewsof No.6 (RCAF) Group bombed mistakenly nearSt. Aignan within our own lines. The pathfinderwas a “non-marker” aircraft and it has beenclearly established that no markers fell in thatvicinity.

I can see no valid excuse for these bombingerrors; not even for the errors of aircraft whichfollowed on behind those initiating the mistake.Attention by the navigators and Captainsconcerned to the timing of their run from thepoint where they crossed the coast inland wouldhave at once shown them that they were bombingshort by many seconds.

Phase 2 – From 1514 to 1518 hours, 12additional aircraft of No. 6 (RCAF) Group and 1Pathfinder aircraft bombed in error in the same

pg101-112 11/9/06, 3:00 PM105

5



106

pg101-112 11/9/06, 3:00 PM106

6



107

area of St. Aignan. The bombingthis time was started by a backingup aircraft of the PathfinderGroup carrying ground targetindicators. The air bomber of thisaircraft saw what he thought wereyellow target indicators alreadyburning on the ground andconsiderable smoke from theprevious bombing. He also pickedup the Master Bomber ’sinstructions to bomb the yellowtarget indicators. The MasterBomber was at that time ofcourse, watching and discussingthe indicators on the correcttarget which was simultaneouslybeing bombed.

Here again attention to thetimed run from the point ofcrossing the coast line would havemade this error impossible byany of the aircraft concerned.

Phase 3 – From 1514 to 1520hours 23 aircraft of No.6 (RCAF)Group, bombed the quarry atHaut Mesnil in error. This wasstarted by two aircraft of No.428(RCAF) Squadron who bombedalmost simultaneously. They hadbeen briefed to expect to seesmoke arising from aiming point21 which should have beenbombed by another force beforetheir arrival. They appear to havemistaken the smoke rising fromthe erroneous bombing near St.Aignan for the smoke from aimingpoint 21. The Master Bomberconcerned, who was operating onand viewing the correct target,instructed arriving aircraft to“bomb yellow target indicators.You will find them when you have passed thefirst column of smoke.” This appeared to fit thepicture as these aircraft saw it and they alsoclaimed to have seen yellow target indicatorsburning in the neighbourhood of their supposedtarget.

Here again proper attention to a lapsed timerun from the point of crossing the coast linewould have made, this mistake impossible.

Phase 4 – The quarry at Haut Mesnil was againbombed from 1532 hours onwards. This wasstarted by aircraft “J” of 460 (RAAF) Squadron.The air bomber of this aircraft claims that hesaw through the smoke of previous bombingwhat he thought were red target indicatorsburning on the ground “which he had previouslyseen cascading.” At the same time, anotheraircraft of the same squadron also bombed what

pg101-112 11/9/06, 3:00 PM107

7



108

he claimed to have been yellow markers. Thistarget was bombed by a total of 26 aircraft ofNo.1 Group.

Here again attention to the lapsed time sincecrossing the coast line would have prevented thiserror.

The analysis of aircraft in error is as follows:

In the meantime all aiming points wereotherwise being very accurately and heavilyattacked by the great majority of the force.

I have referred above to claims by manycrews that they were misled by what looked likecoloured target indicators on the ground and inthe air.

As I have remarked, I consider that in spiteof these misleading factors (which are explainedhereafter) these errors were inexcusable had theCaptains seen to it that their navigators andbomb aimers paid proper attention to the timedrun from the coast line. This timed run they toolightheartedly abandoned, some because theythought they saw target indicators – sooner thanthey could have been expected on a timed run –others because they merely followed sheeplikethe errors of their predecessors.

On hearing of these apparently misplacedtarget indicators and after investigation realisingthat they could not have been from our ownpathfinder aircraft, I sent an officer over toFrance to investigate. He reports as follows:–

On August 20th, 1944, I reported toHeadquarters No. 84 Group which Headquartersis alongside that of the 1st Canadian Army. I sawS.A.S.O. and Group Captain Ops. and explainedto them the sequence of events as they had sofar transpired, which led up to the incorrectbombing on August 14th. In particular I raisedthe matter of the alleged yellow lights which hadbeen seen on the ground both in the St. Aignanand Quarry areas. I was immediately told thatyellow smoke, flares and celanese strips were

the standard signals for troops of all alliedarmies in France to indicate their positions toour own aircraft. I was shown a copy of 1stCanadian Army Operations Standing Ordersfrom which the following is an extract.

“SECTION 8 GROUND/AIR CONVENTIONS

Para. 8. – Recognition signals displayed byforward troops will be either or both of thefollowing:

(a) Yellow and/or orange smoke and/or yellowflares

(b) Yellow celanese triangles sewn together instrips of 10".

Para 10. – Forward troops will displayrecognition signals as in para. 8 above if attackedby friendly aircraft.”

I pointed out that crews claimed to have seenyellow lights looking like target markers beforeany bombs fell in the areas occupied by our owntroops, and asked, therefore, whether theseyellow flares and smoke would only be fired bytroops after they had actually been attacked byfriendly aircraft. I was informed that owing tothere having been numerous minor incidentsinvolving the attack of friendly troops by our owntactical aircraft, it was quite common for thesesignals to be displayed if the troops imaginedthey were going to be attacked. I was also toldby Officers, both Army and Air Force, who wereamongst the troops bombed on that occasion,that the fact that the aircraft were seenapproaching with their bomb doors open, madethem feel nervous that they were going to bebombed. I could get no direct evidence thatyellow flares were alight on the ground prior tothe first bomb falling behind our own lines, butit would appear most probable that they were.

The manner in which these yellow flares, smokeand strips are laid in such circumstances is inthe form of a cluster, and thus they resemblethe pattern of target indicators on the ground.

No information had been given to thisCommand to the effect that this system ofmarking was in use and in fact my Senior AirStaff Officer, who had in the very short timeavailable hurriedly arranged this operation withthe First Canadian Army in France the previous

pg101-112 11/9/06, 3:00 PM108

8



109

Before and after photographs of

Quesnay and Quesnay Wood. The

top photo was taken on 26 July 1944

while the bottom photo was taken

shortly after the attack of 14 August

1944.

LC

MS

DS

Air P

hoto

gra

ph C

olle

ction 3

21/4

182

Canadia

n F

orc

es J

oin

t Im

agery

Centr

e (

CF

JIC

) P

MR

83-4

84

pg101-112 11/9/06, 3:00 PM109

9



110

day, had particularly sought information on thesubject of possibly confusing pyrotechnics andbeen assured that none would be used. To thatextent therefore, the First Canadian Armythemselves subscribed to the errors which weremade. Furthermore, AEAF [Allied ExpeditionaryAir Force] and/or 1st Canadian Army should haveinformed this Command of the common use ofthese pyrotechnics.

A sensational story was subsequentlypermitted to appear in the press, from warcorrespondents presumably controlled by theArmy and Air Authorities in France, to the effectthat wholesale disaster was only averted by theintervention of some Army-controlled Austeraircraft which fired red Verey lights over an areaor areas where bombing was being carried outin error and thus prevented the entire bomberforce from committing the same mistake. Mycomment on this is that in the first place therest of the bombing was under way, firmlycontrolled by the Master Bombers and achievingexcellent results on the correct aiming points.In the second place red Verey lights fired into

smoke or seen through smoke burning on theground are likely to and did in fact, give amisleading imitation of target indicators.However well intentioned, therefore, these Austeraircraft succeeded only in making confusionworse confounded. As to how the sensationalaccount of their intervention, including thenames of the Auster pilots, was allowed to getinto the press is a matter which the Air and Armyauthorities concerned will no doubt investigate.I will only comment thereon to the effect that ofthe thousands of Royal Air Force aircraft whichhave been fired on by our own defences and byour troops, and in a very large number of casesbrought down and destroyed, I do not recall oneinstance of the RAF authorities permitting suchfacts to be known outside the Service circlesnecessarily concerned in investigating suchincidents for the purpose of preventing, ifpossible, a recurrence. I regard the emanationof these sensational and untrue accounts throughofficially controlled channels as deplorable. Asthe names of the Auster pilots concerned werealso made public the responsibility is not onlythat of correspondents and censors.

Petrol dumps and ammunition set ablaze by short bombing in the 4th Canadian

Armoured Division sector near St. Aignan-de-Cramesnil, 14 August 1944.

pg101-112 11/9/06, 3:00 PM110

10



111

To sum up – These errors were caused by:

The emergency ad hoc use at short notice,of the heavy bomber force on a type of task forwhich it is not trained, in full knowledge of therisks involved, as of the gains to be secured. Inmy opinion this has been completely justifiedby the decisive successes achieved.

The inherent limitations of the structure ofthe aircraft whereby the bomb aimer, unused toand not well trained or suited to the task, is theonly individual in the crew with an uninterruptedand adequate view of the ground for pilotage bymap reading when nearing the target.

The use of coloured pyrotechnics on theground by the troops without this Commandbeing informed and indeed after this Command’srepresentative had been assured that nothing ofthe sort would be used. These pyrotechnicsfortuitously imitated yellow target marker flares.

The use of Red Verey lights by Auster aircraftin a mistaken effort to stop bombing alreadyinitiated on incorrect targets. These red lightsseen cascading and burning on the groundthrough smoke emulated red target markers andin some cases confirmed the bomber crews’ viewthat they were on the correct target.

The necessity, postulated by the ArmyAuthorities concerned, of bombing the targetsin the reverse order to that made desirable bythe wind direction.

The light wind which caused battle smokeand bomb smoke to hang about the whole areaand obscure detail.

The over ready relinquishment of the timedrun check from the coastline by the Captainsand Navigators implicated. Although this typeof operation and navigational check in daylightis not normally used by crews on the tasks forwhich they are trained and to which they areaccustomed, there is no-excuse for their laxityin that connection on this occasion.

A sheep-like following on of some crewsmisled by those preceding them.

Finally, I would add that no blame attachesto the Master Bombers. They carried out a mostdifficult and delicate task at short notice with

the greatest efficiency and success, in which theywere supported by the great majority of theBomber Force.

I am satisfied that the crews were properlybriefed and indeed, in the case of No. 6 (RCAF)Group, who were the most in error, that the AirOfficer Commanding No.6 (RCAF) Group [AirVice-Marshal C.M. McEwen] went out of his wayby special briefing and the provision of stopwatches etc. to ensure that the time check wasproperly emphasised.

But as I have said, I regard the errors of thefew who erred as being in this particular caseinexcusable solely on the grounds that no matterwhat misleading conditions and indicationsexisted any adequate effort to maintain the checkon a timed run from the coast line to the targetarea could and would have prevented thoseerrors.

In any future close support operations of thisdescription I regard the following as essentialsafeguards. The necessary instructions are beingissued accordingly:–

1. Wind direction and smoke drift must bethe over-riding consideration in the planning ofall close support operations, as this Commandhas always maintained. It must be given priorityover military or other tactical requirementsunless the Army adamantly insist otherwise andappreciate that the risk of bombing our owntroops, although fully known to them, isacceptable; as indeed it was stated to be in thiscase in view of the military advantages sought.

2. Timed run procedure is to be adheredto by all crews and the Captain is to beresponsible for this procedure being strictlyapplied.

3. A master switch is to be installedforthwith on the navigator’s panel with which hecan prevent bombs being released by the bombaimer before the expiry of the timed run, thetiming of which is the responsibility of thenavigator. This, inter alia, should preclude anyrepetition of bombing short by mistakenlyapplying the Master Bomber’s broadcastinstruction on the real target to any other areawhere conditions as in this case are fortuitouslysimulated.

Photo

by H

.G. A

ikm

an, Lib

rary

and A

rchiv

es C

anada P

A 1

31266

pg101-112 11/9/06, 3:00 PM111

11



112

4. On all such close support operations,Captains, air bombers and navigators must carrylarge scale maps or photographs to enable them,if the conditions of smoke and visibility permit,to make a final personal check as to thecorrectness of the aiming point.

5. To safeguard against faulty release ofbombs when the bomb doors are opened (whichhappens occasionally for technical reasons andwhich would be likely to mislead other crewswho see such bombs burst beneath them) bombdoors are to be opened either prior to crossingthe coast or at least 20 miles from the releasepoint over open areas.

6. The troops concerned must be givenorders to use no pyrotechnics likely to beconfused as target markers and anacknowledgment that this has been done sentto Bomber Command prior to the operation.

7. Extra Master Bombers with “cancellationpyrotechnics” must shepherd the route whereverit lies over our own troops – as soon as suitablepyrotechnics can be devised.

[signed]Arthur T. HarrisAir Chief MarshalCommanding-in-ChiefBomber Command

25 August 1944

Distribution:Deputy Supreme Commander, AEFAir C-in-C AEAFAMC, 2nd Tactical Air ForceAir Ministry (VCAS)AOC-in-C RCAF OverseasGOC-in-C 1st Canadian ArmyAOsC 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 100 Groups

From: Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command

To: Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary ForceAir Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air ForceAir Marshal Commanding, 2nd Tactical Air Force

Information copies to: Air Ministry Vice Chief of the Air StaffAOC-in-C RCAF HQ OverseasGOC-in-C 1st Canadian Army

With regards to the attached report. After consultation with the Air Officers Commanding concernedI have taken the following action.

2. The two Pathfinder Force crews have relinquished their Pathfinder badges and the acting ranksconsequent upon Pathfinder employ. They have been reposted to ordinary crew duties.

3. Squadron and Flight Commanders personally implicated have relinquished their Commandsand subsequent acting rank. They have been reposted for ordinary crew duty.

4. All crews implicated have been “starred” as not to be employed within thirty miles forward of thebomb line until reassessed by the AOsC after further experience on targets outside the operationalarea of our own troops.

5. I would ask that suitable action be taken with regard to the failure to warn this Command of theyellow flares commonly in use to mark our own troops; with regard to the mistaken action of theAuster pilots; and with regard to the deplorable and largely untrue Press stories permitted to emanatethrough RAF and Army controlled sources in France.

[signed]Arthur T. HarrisAir Chief MarshalCommanding-in-ChiefBomber Command

25 August 1944

pg101-112 11/9/06, 3:00 PM112

12



report on the bombing of our own troops during operation â

Documents