Report of investigation into a

mooring operation accident

causing death of a sailor onboard

DSL Sui Sun 105

at Euroasia Wharf, Tsing Yi

on 23 August 2009

Purpose of Investigation

This incident is investigated, and published in accordance with the IMO Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents promulgated under IMO Assembly Resolution A.849(20). The purpose of this investigation conducted by the Marine Accident Investigation and Shipping Security Policy Branch (MAISSPB) of Marine Department is to determine the circumstances and the causes of the incident with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and avoiding similar incident in future.

The conclusions drawn in this report aim to identify the different factors contributing to the incident. They are not intended to apportion blame or liability towards any particular organization or individual except so far as necessary to achieve the said purpose.

The MAISSPB has no involvement in any prosecution or disciplinary action that may be taken by the Marine Department resulting from this incident.

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Table of Contents Page

Summary 1

Description of the Vessel 2

Sources of Evidence 6

Outline of Events 7

Analysis of Evidence 9

Conclusions 14

Recommendations 15

Submission 16

1. Summary

1.2 The investigation into the accident revealed the main contributory factors as follows:­

1.1 At about 1130 on 23 August 2009, while a locally licensed dumb steel lighter Sui Sun

105 was berthing to Berth No.5 at the Euroasia Wharf in Tsing Yi Island with the assistance of a tugboat Yun Wai, a sailor of Sui Sun 105, who was at the wharf waiting to fasten the mooring ropes to bollards at the berth, was hit by the snapping of a parted mooring rope that had been tied-up to the bow of another vessel berthed at Berth No. 4 – a locally licensed dumb steel lighter Sui Sun 108. He sustained serious head injury and died in the hospital on 7 September 2009.

ò The mooring rope at the bow of Sui Sun 108 parted due to the sudden impact force applied on the rope when the vessel was bumped by Sui Sun 105, which drifted under the effect of strong current at sea; and

ò there was a lack of proper planning and poor communication existed between the Master of the tugboat and the deceased in the mooring operation of Sui

Sun 105.

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2. Description of the Vessels

2.1 Particulars of Sui Sun 105

Certificate of Ownership Number : B21617V

Certificate Issuing Authority : Hong Kong Marine Department

Type of Vessel : Class II, Dumb Steel Lighter, Cat. B

Year of Built : 1993

Built At : Qiuxin Shipyard, Shanghai

Owner : China Merchants Container Services Ltd.

Length : 49.79 metres

Breadth : 19.19 metres

Gross Tonnage : 2046.15

Net Tonnage : 1432.30

Engine Power : N.A.

Fig. 1: Dumb Steel Lighter Sui Sun 105

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Certificate of Ownership N umber : B21750V

Certificate Issuing Authority : Hong Kong Marine Department

Type of Vessel : Class II, D umb S teel Lighter, C at. B

Year of Built : 1995

Built At : Qiuxin S hipyard, S hanghai

Owner : China Merchants Container Services Ltd

Length : 48.81 m etres

Breadth : 19.21 m etres

Gross Tonnage : 2 053.40

Net Tonnage : 1 437.38

Engine Power : N.A.

2.2 Particulars of Sui Sun 108

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Fig. 2: Dumb Steel Lighter Sui Sun 108

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Certificate of Ownership N umber : B3454

Certificate Issuing Authority : Hong Kong Marine Department

Type of Vessel : Class II, T ug, C at. A

Year of Built : 1993

Built At : Guangzhou F ishing Vessel Shipyard

Owner : Yun L ee Tug Boat Company Limited

Length : 23.70 m etres

Breadth : 6.80 m etres

Depth : 3.60 m etres

Gross Tonnage : 135.57

Net Tonnage : 81.88

Engine Power : 701kW

2.3 Particulars of Yun Wai

Fig. 3: Tugboat Yun Wai

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3. Sources of Evidence

a) The person in charge of Sui Sun 108

b) A sailor of Sui Sun 105

c) The Master of Yun Wai

d) The owner of Sui Sun 108

e) The weather report provided by the Hong Kong Observatory

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4. Outline of Events

4.1 The dumb steel lighter Sui Sun 105 had been carrying out containers operations at the COSCO-HIT Terminals, Kwai Chung in the period between the evening on 22 August 2009 and the morning on 23 August 2009.

4.2 At about 1000 on 23 August 2009, Sui Sun 105 was towed by a tugboat Yun Wai to depart COSCO-HIT Terminals and moved to the Euroasia Wharf, Tsing Yi Island.

4.3 At 1130, Sui Sun 105 arrived at the Euroasia Wharf. The towing lines were then released and Yun Wai started to push Sui Sun 105 to berth with her starboard alongside Berth No. 5. At that time, a dumb steel lighter Sui Sun 108 had already berthed, with her starboard alongside, at the adjacent Berth No. 4 just round the corner (Fig. 4).

4.4 When Yun Wai pushed Sui Sun 105 close to the berth, a sailor (Sailor A) from Sui Sun

105 jumped ashore and was stand by near the stern of the vessel intended to pick up the stern mooring rope and fasten it to a bollard fitted at the berth.

4.5 However, Yun Wai pushed the bow of Sui Sun 105 first and then shifted and continue to push at the midship of Sui Sun 105.

4.6 During the berthing, another sailor (Sailor B) onboard Sui Sun 105 heard a loud banging noise and he saw Sailor A lied down on the ground at the berth whose nose and mouth were bleeding.

4.7 Sailor B noticed that the bow mooring rope of Sui Sun 108 was parted and believed that the head of Sailor A was injured by the snapping of that rope. He phoned the shipping company immediately calling for an ambulance.

4.8 At the same time, the person in charge (PIC) of Sui Sun 108 felt that his vessel was bumped by another vessel. So he went to the port side of the vessel for checking but could not find any vessel near his vessel. He then went to starboard side of the vessel and found that the bow of his ship was drifting away from the berth.

4.9 At this moment, the Master of Yun Wai also noticed that Sui Sun 108 was drifting away from the berth so he temporarily suspended the berthing of Sui Sun 105 and proceeded to push Sui Sun 108 back to Berth No. 4.

4.10 After Sui Sun 108 was secured to the Berth No. 4, the Master of Yun Wai found that the bow of Sui Sun 105 was drifting away from Berth No. 5. The Master of Yun Wai

maneuvered the tugboat to push Sui Sun 105 at the midship until the vessel moored at Berth No. 5.

4.11 Sailor A was sent to the hospital for treatment by an ambulance. He sustained serious injury and was later certified dead in the hospital on 7 September 2009.

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Fig. 4: Location of the Accident Scene

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5. Analysis of Evidence

Mooring of Sui Sun 108

Environment

Fatigue at work

Working e xperience & training

5.1 Sailor A, the deceased, was a crewmember on board Sui Sun 105. He had several years working experience on board dumb steel lighters. He had been working on board Sui Sun 105 and some other dumb steel lighters operated by the company for more than two years. He had completed the basic safety training of shipboard cargo handling and the shipboard crane operator safety training as required by Merchant Shipping (Local Vessels) (Works) Regulation. His certificates of training were valid. He was certificated to handle cargo and operate derrick crane on board Sui Sun 105.

5.2 Sui Sun 105 started container operation at COSCO-HIT Terminals in the evening on 22 August 2009. Sailor A and Sailor B onboard Sui Sun 105 worked in four-hour-on and four-hour-off shifts. At around 1000 on 23 August 2009, Sui Sun 105 was towed by Yun Wai from COSCO-HIT Terminals to Euroasia Wharf and arrived at 1130. Before the accident, Sailor A had some breaks of rest in the twelve-hour work and should not have been suffered from fatigue at work.

5.3 At the time of accident there was light breeze. Small wavelets might have been formed at the sea.

5.4 According to the information provided by the Master of Yun Wai and Sailor B, the sea current was strong and set to the southwest.

5.5 Sui Sun 108 was loaded with 18 pieces of 20-feet and 1 piece of 40-feet laden containers. As the vessel was loaded, her main deck was below the ground level of the seawall. The mooring ropes for securing the vessel by connecting the ropes between bollards at the main deck of the vessel and the bollards at Berth No. 4 would be led vertically downward at a large angle to the horizontal level. It would render chafing of the ropes against the edge of the concreted seawall (see Fig. 5). Eventually, the mooring ropes would deteriorate and yield prematurely.

5.6 Due to deadweight of the vessel, the fore and aft mooring ropes of Sui Sun 108 were subjected to high tension.

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The mooring r ope

B

Fig. 5: Mooring arrangement of Sui Sun 108

5.7 The mooring rope at bow of Sui Sun 108 that parted was a synthetic rope of 62 mm diameter, 8-strand and made of Polypropylene with a breaking load of 62.6 tonnes. The rope was type approved by major Classification Societies for use onboard vessels.

5.8 The length of the parted mooring rope was about 19 metres with an eye splice formed at one end of the rope. The rope had been used for about a month. It parted under high tension when the rope was led vertically downward at a large angle to the horizontal level when Sui Sun 108 was fully loaded.

5.9 The rope was parted at around the middle of the rope where there were signs of wear and molten yarns due to severe abrasion and frictional heat generated after the rope had been rubbed against the edge of the concreted seawall over a period of time and at the time of the accident.

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Fig. 6: Sketch of the parted mooring rope

Fig. 7: The broken mooring rope

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Communication

Possible cause of the accident

5.10 Sailor A jumped ashore and stood by at the berth near the stern of Sui Sun 105 during berthing. It was apparent that he was expecting that the vessel would be fastened at stern first.

5.11 However, the Master of Yun Wai, who maneuvered the tugboat to push the bow of Sui

Sun 105 towards the berth first, was expecting Sailor A at the berth to fasten the mooring rope at bow. Without confirming whether the mooring rope at bow had been fastened or not, he shifted the tugboat to the midship of Sui Sun 105 and pushed her against the berth. He anticipated that Sailor A had fastened the bow mooring line and would proceed to fasten the stern mooring line and complete the berthing operation.

5.12 As the mooring rope at the bow of Sui Sun 105 had not been fastened, the vessel drifted aft under the effect of strong sea current. She bumped at the bow of Sui Sun

108, which berthed at Berth No. 4.

5.13 As Sui Sui 105 was loaded with 30 pieces of 40-feet laden containers, the momentum of the vessel was high when she hit on Sui Sun 108. The consequence of the collision rendered no damage to the vessels, but it parted the bow mooring rope of Sui Sun 108.

5.14 The bow mooring rope of Sui Sun 108 was found deteriorated with signs of wear and molten yarns near the parted portion. The maximum working load of a synthetic mooring rope could have been reduced to a great extent after deterioration. In this case, when Sui Sun 105 bumped on Sui Sun 108, the shock load applied on the rope could make the rope fail immediately.

5.15 When the highly stressed mooring rope at the bow of Sui Sun 108 parted, the stored energy in the rope suddenly released resulting in a snapback. Sailor A, who was standing at the berth near the stern of Sui Sun 105 and close to the bow of Sui Sun

108, was in the snapback zone of the bow mooring line of Sui Sun 108. When the mooring rope parted, he was hit by the rope with tremendous force.

5.16. It appeared that there was communication problem and misunderstanding between the Master of Yun Wai and Sailor A during the mooring operation. After Yun Wai

pushed the bow of Sui Sun 105 for a period of time, the master of Yun Wai, by his experience, assumed that Sailor A at the berth had already secured the mooring rope at the bow. Therefore the master of Yun Wai shifted the tugboat to the midship of Sui

Sun 105 and continued to push the vessel against the wharf for berthing. He was not

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Autopsy r eport

Safety w orking p ractice

aware that Sailor A had been waiting at the berth at position near the stern part of the vessel instead of securing the mooring line at bow. With the mooring rope at bow being unfastened, Sui Sun 105 drifted aft by sea current and subsequently collided with Sui Sun 108.

5.17. Though the mooring operation of the dumb steel lighter looks simple, straight-forward and the crew on board has been operating it frequently as their routine duties, safety precautionary measures such as proper planning prior to the operation, establishment of good communication between the members of mooring team etc. must be taken to ensure safe shipboard operations.

5.18. Potential hazards exist in mooring operations. Mooring workers should use personal protective gears such as safety helmet, safety shoes and gloves when carrying out mooring operations. In this case, had Sailor A worn a safety helmet, injury sustained on his head could have been reduced.

5.19. In case of parting of a mooring rope, the rope may recoil with tremendous force, which is known as snapback effect. Mooring workers should never stay within the snapping zone of any mooring ropes on board ships and/or at the berth.

5.20. The autopsy report of the deceased was not available for this case because autopsy had been waived on the application of the next-of-kin of the deceased.

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6. Conclusions

6.3 The other safety factors contributing to t he accident are:­

6.2. The investigation into the accident revealed the main contributory factors as follows:­

6.1. At about 1130 on 23 August 2009, while a locally licensed dumb steel lighter Sui Sun

105 was berthing to Berth No.5 at the Euroasia Wharf in Tsing Yi Island with the assistance of a tugboat Yun Wai, a sailor of Sui Sun 105, who was at the wharf waiting to fasten the mooring ropes to the bollards at the berth, was hit by the snapping of a parted mooring rope that had been tied-up to the bow of another vessel berthed at Berth No. 4 – a locally licensed dumb steel lighter Sui Sun 108. He sustained serious head injury and died in the hospital on 7 September 2009.

ò The mooring rope at the bow of Sui Sun 108 parted due to the sudden impact force applied on the rope when the vessel was bumped by Sui Sun 105, which drifted under the effect of strong current at sea; and

ò there was a lack of proper planning and poor communication existed between the Master of the tugboat and the deceased in the mooring operation of Sui Sun

105.

ò the Master of Yun Wai did not check and confirm whether the mooring rope at bow of Sui Sun 105 had been fastened to the bollard at the wharf or not before shifting the tugboat to push at her midship position;

ò the deceased did not wear safety hamlet while he was engaged in the mooring operation;

ò the deceased was not aware that he was staying inside the snapback zone of the mooring rope of another vessel; and

ò The mooring rope at the bow of Sui Sun 108 had deteriorated rapidly due to chafing of the rope intermittently against the edge of the concrete seawall.

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7.3. The owners of Sui Sun 108 should e nsure the PIC of the vessel:­

7 Recommendations

7.1. A copy of this report should be sent to the owners and Master of Yun Wai, and the Person-In-Charge of Sui Sun 105 and Sui Sun 108 advising them of the findings of the accident investigation.

7.2. The respective owners of Yun Wai and Sui Sun 105 are required to ensure their masters/PIC of their vessels would take all necessary precautionary measures to ensure safe mooring operations.

ò to be aware that the condition of the mooring ropes would be deteriorated rapidly due to chafing against the seawall during berthing when the vessel is in loaded condition; and

ò to check the condition of the mooring ropes regularly and replace them when found deteriorated.

7.4. The owners of Sui Sun 105 are required to provide proper training to crewmembers onboard who would be engaged in the mooring operation, emphasizing on the personal danger when staying inside the snapback zones of any mooring ropes under all circumstances.

7.5. A Marine Department Notice should be issued to promulgate the lessons learnt from this fatal accident.

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8. Submissions

8.1 In the event that the conduct of any person or organization is criticized in an accident investigation report, it is the policy of the Marine Department that a copy of the draft report is given to that person or organization so that they can have an opportunity to rebut the criticism or offer evidence not previously available to the investigating officer.

8.2 The final draft of the report was sent to the owners and Masters of Sui Sun 105 and Sui Sun 108 and the Master of Yun Wai for comment. There was no comment received from them at the end of the consultation.

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