rent preservation - persistance of underdevelopment

8/3/2019 Rent Preservation - Persistance of Underdevelopment

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178

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2009, 1:1, 178218http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi = 10.1257/mac.1.1.178

W y e e o s i de developed co t ies so di fc lt? O e view is t ti y de developed co t ies t e elite i t i t ei e ts by o cis bopti l policies o t e est o t e pop l tio t o opp essive politic l i sti-t tio s. Yet politic l i stit tio s do c e. U o t tely, e cip tio , i depe -

de ce, d eve de oc tiz tio ve ot es lted i owt -e ci e o s.U less t ese c es i politic l i stit tio s e co plete s , d o o e wit-essi electio s i poo co t ies like I di co ld co cl de t t, t e swe stexist elsew e e.

O e possibility (see Willi R. E ste ly 2001, 2006 ) is t t eco o ists si plydo ot k ow w t it t kes to li t co t ies o t o pove ty, d t t develop e t is co seq e ce o co t ies itti po t e i t policies t o t i l d e o oeve by c ce. I o e is willi to ccept t is ve y e l possibility, t t we k owlittle, t e p zzle ets o e co plex. W y do citize s o poo co t ies, w o ve

obt i ed t e politic l powe to vote o t old elites, f d it so d to e ct t e i tpolicy e o s t t will li t t e o t o pove ty?Let e expl i y swe . Let co stit e cy be o p w e e e c e be

s t e s e cto e dow e ts (e. . ed c tio ) d t e e o e si il p e e e ces

* G d te Sc ool o B si ess, U ive sity o C ic o, 5807 S. Woodl w , C ic o IL 60637 d NBER(e- il: @c ic o sb.ed ). I t k Pete Go evic , Steve H be , Robe t I , Si o Jo so , S biL ll, Rod ey R c , A to io Spili be o, A vi d S b i , d se i p ticip ts t t e U ive sityo C li o i , Be keley, B ow U ive sity, H v d U ive sity, t e I te tio l Mo et y F d, d t eU ive sity o Pe sylv i o v l ble co e ts s well s t e N tio l Scie ce Fo d tio d t e Ce te o

t e St dy o t e St te d t e Eco o y t t e U ive sity o C ic o G d te Sc ool o B si ess o f ci ls ppo t. I especi lly te l to K l Ho , Bil e Yil z, d L i i Zi les, w ose co t ib tio s to t isve sio ve bee i v l ble. I t k Y is Tok tlidis o ese c ssist ce. A e lie ve sio o t is p pew s e titled T e Pe siste ce o U de develop e t: I stit tio s, H C pit l, o Co stit e cies?.

To co e t o t is ticle i t e o li e disc ssio o visit t e ticles p e t ttp://www. e web.o / ticles.p p?doi = 10.1257/ c.1.1.178.

Rent Preservation and the Persistenceof Underdevelopment

By Raghuram G. Rajan *

When citizens in a poor constrained society are unequally endowed,they are likely to fnd it hard to agree on re orms, even though thestatus quo hurts them collectively. Each citizen group or constituency

pre ers re orms that expand its opportunities, but in an unequal soci-ety, this will typically hurt another constituencys rents. Competitiverent preservation ensures no comprehensive re orm path may com-

mand broad support. The roots o underdevelopment may there orelie in the natural tendency toward rent preservation in a divided society. ( JEL D72, O10, O17 )
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.1.1.178http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.1.1.178http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.1.1.178http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.1.1.178


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3/41

180 AMEriCAN ECoNoMiC JourNAL: MACroECoNoMiCs JANuArY 2009

( ) .

G , - k ,

. I , , ,

, .

M , q . I

, . I zz k ,

, j , . T ,

. Y , -, k .

I , -, q , q

. M - . E

, . I ,

k , , . A ,

. I , k k , ,

k . T k

. C - .

I , I -, . . T . F , , - . S z . S ,

, z k z . T z ; z .T -

. T q -, . T . R ,


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VoL. 1 No. 1 181 rAJAN: rENT prEsErVATioN ANd uNdErdEVELopMENT

k .T , -

. P q k z , q , -

, . P , , .T q q - . O z . I , E z , , , , . I

, z ( E K L. S k 2005 ). I , -

, , - , k ( D

A , S J , J A. R 2001 ).I , E -

q , (

k , D C. N B R. W 1989 A , J , R 2005. F k ,

E L. G . 2004 ). M E , E V.M , S k 2002 q -

, , q . I -

.T . I S I, I -

. I S II, I k.I S III, I z . I S IV, I -

q . I S V, I . I S VI, I , .

I. Motivation

A I , , k -

k . T I W

V S (WVS ), - j U M .

A. W l Val e s vey an Att t e T wa C m et t n

I 2000 I . T I k ,


5/41


. T k :

H w w l y lace y v ew n th cale? 1 mean y ag ee c m- letely w th the tatement n the le t; 10 mean y ag ee c m letely w th

the tatement n the ght; an y v ew all mewhe e n between, y can ch e any n mbe n between.

T C m et t n ha m l. it b ng t the w t n e le. T C m et t n g . it t m late e le tw k ha an evel new ea . A T 1 ,

2002 7.8 2.9.T k q

( , , , , . ), ( , z / ), ( ). T . I , I

, -

. I .I . I

35, 35 55 , 55 . T ,

. I . A j

( ). I , I . I - ( ), - ( - k k k ),

, .

B. E cat n an Att t e T wa C m et t n

I T 2 ( 1 ), I -

. I , I . R

.C 1 , 25 . I 2, I ( )

, - ( ) , 5 . I 3, I .

T . A -


6/41


-. M , ,

. I , -

.F , k

( ). A q . A , -. I 4, I q

( ). E - .

Table 1Summary Statistics

VM

( )A 7.7898

(2.9391 )

M 0.5674(0.4956 )

Y 0.4131(0.4925 )

M 0.4021(0.4904 )

M 0.3591(0.4798 )

L 0.2027(0.4021 )

R 0.2652(0.4416 )

R 0.1603(0.367 )

B 0.1728(0.3782 )

E 4.4505(3.0897 )

O 2,002

N te : T 2000 W V S I . Y 35. M 35 55 . M 1

k . L 1 k , k k , - k

k , k k . R 1 50,000 , 1

5,000 . B 1 k , , - . E , 1 ( ) 9 ( ).


7/41


C. H w o t n t e M late Att t e

A , - , k -

. O , k

I , . A , .

A M (1890 ) , . T , J

J (1970 ) G (1999 ), , k k -

, . I ,

Table 2Attitudes toward Competition

(1) (2) (3) (4)

M 0.219 0.028 0.045 0.013(0.259 ) (0.183 ) (0.186 ) (0.202 )

Y 0.166 0.129 0.045 0.055(0.350 ) (0.252 ) (0.263 ) (0.262 )

M 0.077 0.186 0.097 0.101(0.308 ) (0.235 ) (0.243 ) (0.244 )

L 0.756 0.474 0.475(0.296 )** (0.295 ) (0.301 )

M 0.234 0.045(0.163 ) (0.190 )

E 0.075 0.058(0.030 )** (0.028 )**

H q 0.603(0.384 )

T q 0.191(0.334 )

S q 0.198(0.224 )

C 8.590 9.668 9.474 9.069(0.514 )*** (0.260 )*** (0.261 )*** (0.349 )***

O 810 1,288 1,283 1,283 r 2 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18

N te : T k 2000 WV S I . T G V S . I q . T q g k . T q

, q e, q c . R

*** S 1 .** S 5 .

* S 10 .


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, .W k z . I 1 T 3,

( , T 2, 3 ) ( 50,000 ) . T . T

Table 3Attitudes toward Competition: The Role o the Opportunity Set and Pr ivileges

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

M 0.056 0.044 0.039 0.017 0.050(0.179 ) (0.186 ) (0.185 ) (0.19 ) (0.178 )

Y 0.034 0.030 0.061 0.062 0.046(0.260 ) (0.260 ) (0.261 ) (0.257 ) (0.257 )

M 0.093 0.097 0.058 0.056 0.053(0.247 ) (0.243 ) (0.246 ) (0.238 ) (0.249 )

L 0.393 0.441 0.433 0.454 0.336(0.299 ) (0.304 ) (0.290 ) (0.284 ) (0.293 )

M 0.089 0.042 0.059 0.051 0.100(0.189 ) (0.191 ) (0.185 ) (0.175 ) (0.186 )

E 0.045 0.093 0.107 0.106 0.094(0.035 ) (0.035 )** (0.032 )*** (0.031 )*** (0.041 )**

R 1.155 1.026(0.425 )*** (0.405 )**

R 3 0.156 0.129(0.077 )* (0.078 )

R 0.735 0.497(0.810 ) (0.757 )

R 3 0.109 0.075(0.054 )* (0.056 )

B 0.953 1.679 0.902(0.430 )** (1.427 ) (0.425 )**

B 3 0.206 0.192(0.087 )** (0.087 )**

B 2.929(1.428 )**

B 0.1283 (0.215 )

B 0.2443 (0.096 )**

C 9.650 9.601 9.271 9.433 9.540(0.304 )*** (0.751 )*** (0.258 )*** (0.302 )*** (0.739 )***

O 1,283 1,283 1,283 1,283 1,283

r 2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19

N te : T k 2000 W VS I . R .

*** S 1 .** S 5 .

* S 10 .


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1 . T

. T

- .I 2, -

( 5,000 ) . T q ,

z . T ,

.

D. p v lege an Att t e

I I , ( k , , - ) j q . A , j

. T , . A j ,

. 3I T 3, 3, I

. A , ,

-. I , .

A , k .

O -

( ) - . W

( ), . T - 4 , , - , . B , , , . I j q k j ( , , j ). M k , j q

3 I k S D .


10/41


k . B - , .I 5, I .

T , -

.E. M t vat n M el

T I . T . F , - . O ,

, k. S , . I

, , -

. B , . T , k -

, I .T -

. T . W ,

j . T j - k ,

, , , ( ). T ,

, - k . T , I

.

II. The Framework

A. G p ct n Techn l gy an En wment

C : , k , k . T - m l , m

k , l k , . I

ASSUMPTION 1: ( ) 0 < < 1, 0 , < 1 ( ) + < 1 ( ) >

I , ( ) -, ( ) . W


11/41


12/41


. S - k , m l . U k , q j k

.

U q , . T k X- ,

, k , . T , I

< 1, , q - k .

N , - (

) - k , ,

. H , - . T q , , .

T , I . I , k , .

D. p e e ence

I ( , , ) . H , - , z . I .

E k q . I z (

), . I , z - ,

. I : , - k , , , .

III. Outcomes Under Various Strategies

L ( q ), . S s q , E - , p - k , C ( . .,

- k ).

A. stat Q

S ( ) , 1 + e + , (1 + e + ) / .


13/41


S , - ms = 1 + e (1 + e + ) / . U q , (ms )() ,

k , k

.4

B k ( ), k . E (ms ) 1() ,

(ms )() 1. F , - , , , q z , = 3 (ms ) 1

() 4 / . T , , . N

, (1 1/ )( ms) 1() ,

(ms ) 1 () (1) (ms ) () 1 .

I , , 3( + ) / 4 3 / (1 + e )4 + 1 (1) . I ,

, .B

, . I -M ,

k ( )

. A . S ,

+ ASSUMPTION 3: a b a b + 1.

1

+ e

N , .

B. pa t al re m : E cat n b t N C m et t n

W , . T . L m E k

l E . S k , . T

4 T k -, . ., (1 + e) / / . B A 2,

> A 1, .


14/41


q . T (m E ) 1 (l E ) = (m E ) (l E ) 1, m E / l E = / . A , k

q , m E + l E = (1 + e + ) (1 1/ ). F q , l E m E . W

LEMMA 1: The ne cate a e bette a te e cat n e m than n e thetat q , wh le the e cate a e w e . The l g l t may be bette w e e en ng n a amete .

PROOF:S A .

T k j ,

j . T . T k

, . T , ,

. H

1(2) (1 )m l + m 1l a1 b.

T , , (1 ), , m l . C ,

k . S - . H , f

( k ). I ( + 1) k ,

, -

. I q . N , k A 2,

, -z . S q .

E j , - k k . W .

C. pa t al re m:p -ma ket C m et t n b t n E cat n.

W - k , . B ,

. D k


15/41


k k . T (

k ) . S - , ms , ms , ,

. E , l p = / ms .T (l p ) 1, (1 )(l p ) ,

(1 )(l p ) / .

LEMMA 2: The e cate a e bette w th nly -ma ket e m than they a en e the tat q . The l g l t an the ne cate may be bette w e e en ng n a amete .

PROOF:S A .

T , , . A , . T .T , q

- k . I q ( (1 ) ,

q , ), -

- k . W , :

COROLLARY 1: ( ) The l g l t net nc me n e the tat q elat ve th net nc me n e -ma ket e m nc ea e a h ct ve e fc ency, ,nc ea e . ( ) i the e an e = e ch that the l g l t e e the tat q t

-ma ket e m , he e e the tat q t ma ket e m all e > e . i

the e an e

= e

ch that the l g l t e e -ma ket e m t the tatq , he e e -ma ket e m t the tat q all e < e . ( ) i the e a

= ch that the l g l t e e the tat q t -ma ket e m , he e- e the tat q t ma ket e m all < . i the e a = ch that the l g l t e e -ma ket e m t the tat q , he e e - ma ket e m t the tat q all > .

PROOF:S A .

W e ,C 1 ( ) ( ) q .

T , , ,


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- k .

M q - k . S = l p ms (1) ,

q (3) (l p ) 1 (lp ) . (ms )1(+) (ms )1(+)

T , . C q , k (ms )1(+) / . T . T

- 1/ . S , , k q k . I , , , - k ,

k .T . T

3(ms )1(+) / 4 3(1 ) / 4. T j , .

T , (1 ) / , 1 , ,

j . W - k ,

( ). I , ,

. W , :

COROLLARY 2: () The net nc me the ne cate n e the tat q elat vet the net nc me a te -ma ket e m nc ea e a the elat ve e fc ency

the l g l t , , nc ea e . ( ) The e a

ch that an ne cate w ke e ethe tat q t -ma ket e m all < an -ma ket e m t thetat q all > . ( ) The e an e ch that the ne cate w ke e ethe tat q t -ma ket e m all e< e an -ma ket e m t thetat q all e > e .

PROOF:S A .

A q ,

q . M , , , z . G

- k ,


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, ( ) - , , . T

. T ,

, z .I , k q . W

- k , . T . T

.

Example: L = 0.5, = 0.3, = 36, = 100. I F 1, I , - e,

q q . N , C 1.

D. C m ehen ve re m

N - k , , . S , k , -

. L mC - k k l C . T , k q z , mC = ( / ) l C . A ,

0.850.86

0.870.88

0.890.9

0.91

0.920.930.94

0.950.96

0.970.98

0.991

10.5 11 11.5 12 12.5 13

Number of educated

E f f i c i e n c y o

f o

l i g o p o

l i s

t

Uneducated preferpro market reforms

Uneducated prefer status quo

Figure 1. Preferences of UneducatedStatus Quo versus. Pro-Market Reforms

N te: T = 0.5, = 0.3, = 36, = 100.


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k , mC + l C = 1. S , 3 / ( + )4 3 / ( + )4 - . T (1/ ) 3 / ( + )4

3 / ( + )4 .LEMMA 3: ( ) The ne cate w ke alway e e c m ehen ve e m t thetat q t a t al e m (that , e the e cat n nly -ma ket e mnly); ( ) The e cate w ke e e c m ehen ve e m t nly e cat ne m b t e e -ma ket e m t c m ehen ve e m . H e e encebetween the tat q an c m ehen ve e m a amete ec fc. ( ) Thel g l t e e -ma ket e m t c m ehen ve e m . Th , he e-

e the tat q t -ma ket e m ( ee Lemma 2), he e e the tat qt c m ehen ve e m .

PROOF:O .

T k - . B ,

( -k ) (

k - k ). T - k . F

, .

COROLLARY 3: ( ) An nc ea e n the n mbe the e cate , e, a ec ea en the e fc ency the nc mbent ct n techn l gy , , nc ea e the e cat-e net nc me m c m ehen ve e m elat ve t ma nta n ng tat q . ( )The e a level e v ce ct v ty ** ch that, cete a b , the e cate

e e the tat q t c m ehen ve e m when < **, - q > **.

PROOF:S A .

I , - k (

). F , . F , , ,

q .

Example: L = 0.5, = 0.3, = 36, = 100. I F 2, I , e,


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( q ) - q ( ). I , , = 0.9

e = 12, 11.25 q , 19.75 - k , 22.75 , 64.75 .

I , - . I , I - , I .

IV. Electoral Choice and Reform Outcomes

A. V t ng an V t ng p we

I ( q )

- , . E , ( ) .

A j - - . I

( . ., ) q , - . A k

.E t , t = (w t , n t ) 0, w t

, n t t . I v t = 1, v t / w t 0, v t / n t 0. A ,

, q , , n 0 = > ne0 = e > n 0 = 1, w 0 = 0 < we0 = w < w 0 = W . L .

0.85

0.86

0.870.88

0.890.9

0.91

0.920.93

0.940.95

0.96

0.97

0.98

0.99

1

10.5 11 11.5 12 12.5 13

Number of educated


f o

l i g o p o

l i s

t

Educated prefer status quo

Educated prefer

comprehensive

reforms

Figure 2. Preferences of Educated: Comprehensive Reforms versus Status Quo

N te: T = 0.5, = 0.3, = 36, = 100.


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B. p e dem c acy

F , , v t = n t y j n jt .I , j ,

. T .

C. im e ect dem c acy

A . M , , - . O , -. T . L - j ( , q , . ., v t

= vet = v t = 1/3). I , f .W j ,

. I , -

q - k . I , ,

. I . T

, - , , , k - k .I , k -

q - . A ,

. A , . T , .

dynam c e ect .T , I z q - , k. B , , . I , . I , k -

k . B , , j , - .

I , q : , ,

k k- .

L ( 5 ) k


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k q .S

, k -

, - . P T 4.

T q - k , . G f , k - k ( , k ).I , - k .

T k q - . A , , , , j

( ). T -

, , , , j .W ( )

q , ( ) - k

Table 4Pre erences o Agents in Di erent Regions( H gh c nt act )

O E U k

A AB SQ PMR CR

PMR SQ EE CR SQ

W CR E PMR

A CB SQ PMR CR

PMR SQ EE CR PMR

W CR E SQ

A BB SQ PMR CR

PMR CR E

E E PMRW CR SQ SQ

A DB SQ PMR CR

PMR CR EE E SQ

W CR SQ PMR

N te: SQ = S q ; PMR = P - k ; E = E ; CR = C .


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q . C 2 3 e. W - , . F

, = 0.5, = 0.3, = 36, = 100, - 1, F 3 ( F

1 F 2 ). T 4 k .

T a e n the tat -q .L ( ) ( A F 3 ).

B , , q . A

, , , - k . T k - k - q ,

( ) - k .I , j (

), ( ), - k ( ) q .

H , q j - , q .

pa t al e m .I ( B F 3 ), - k -

q , q . T j - k q (

Figure 3. Reform Outcomes

N te: T = 0.5, = 0.3, = 36, = 100.

0.85

0.86

0.87

0.88

0.89

0.9

0.91

0.92

0.93

0.94

0.95

0.96

0.97

0.98

0.99

1

10.5 11 11.5 12 12.5 13

Number of educated


f o

l i g o p o

l i s t

Pro-market

reforms

No reforms

A

B

C

D

Pro-market

reforms


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) - q

( ).B -

, - k -

. T , - - k

j

q .I q - , q - , -

- k q ( C F 3 ).

A , q - k , k . P - k , , .

F ,

( D F 3 ), q - k q . N

j - , - C ( , , ).

T q , I k . T , k

. T k . I , .

A T 5 , A,

B, C, - k D ( , , q ). M , - k k

F 3. T , C 2 C 3 , , :

LEMMA 4: ( ) E cat n e m neve take lace; ( ) F any e, the e a = e, ch that -ma ket e m take lace, they w ll take lace all < e; ( )F any , the e an e = e, ch that -ma ket e m take lace, they w lltake lace all e > e.

E k . P , - k k k ( ,

) , .

Table 5Scores Based on Voting Game

S S W

A A SQ 6PMR 7 SQ

E 9CR 8

A C PMR 6SQ 7 PMRE 9

CR 8

A B PMR 6SQ 9 PMRE 8

CR 7

A D SQ 8PMR 7 PMR

E 8CR 7

N te: SQ = S q ; PMR = P k ; E = E ; CR = C .


24/41


F , q - k F 3, k

k . I , , - , , .

T -, q , - k . P , - k ,

q q .

The d fc lty C m ehen ve re m .L 4 k - q . I ,

k , . T .

I , , , , . T k

q .

T . T , . T , k

. I q ,

, . I j , . T

.S , -

k . B ( . ., ),

, . B - - -

,

. T , , , . T k

( ) - . A - -

k k , , , j . R z .

A , , . T ,

, , , . N


25/41


26/41


k - . I ,

k .W ? N , -

, k , . T ( ) .

The r e the B ge e .I

q - k . T

LEMMA 6: ( ) i ( + ) > 1 /2 an (e 1) > (1 )ms ( + 1 e) / ,whe e m s efne ea l e the n mbe e cate engage n ct n, the

tat q w ll eva l nt l the wealth the e cate excee hal the t talwealth, a te wh ch -ma ket e m w ll be enacte . ( ) The e an * chthat the c n t n n ( ) a e at fe > *. ( ) An nc ea e n lea t annc ea e n *.

PROOF:A .

T L 6 ( ) L 5 . T 6 ( ) ( , > 0.5). L 6 ( )

q , , k .T q

j , - k . T L 6 ( )

, , , . T ,

; , k , .

LEMMA 7: i + > 1 /2 an (e 1) (1 ) ms ( + 1 e) / , an 3(e 1) (e + 1)4 / 3(e + 1) (e + + 1)4 + > 1 , then the even-t al tc me w ll be a e ve n sect n iVC, el e the tat q w ll eva l .

PROOF:S A .

T L 7 L 5 L 6 . T


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, . B

j , k ,

. T S IVC.I , j

q k . W , L 7 : I + > 0.5 0.5,

S IVC.

d c n: pl t c acy ve im e ect dem c acy .R , k

. H , (L 5 ), . I , q

, ;

, q - k. N - k -

( ) . D z , , .

S , A, , q - q . H ,

(L 6 ), - k . T -

. I k k .Tk , ,

k z

k. I k , A, j - . B , , j - k . B z ( , ), .

V. Robustness, Extensions, and Related Literature

T , ( ) -( , , ),

, .M , , k ( )


28/41


, ( ) k ,

( ) j .

I , q . T

, ( ), . P

.

A. A d e ent set C n t t enc e an a d e ent set re m

C , , , k .

S ( ), q -( ), q ( ). S k

( , z ) . S

( ) .

P , q q k , , . T

. A , ,

, . T

. T . S ,, q ,

. S q .F q q j .

B , k , . H , , . N -, , .

T , , - . B - q

( , ) .


29/41


B. C m en at ng T an e

T , - . F ,

- A . T - - k z k k . O ,

- ( q z ).6

I , , .W , -

k . T , , . I - ,

, . I , , ,

. S q A, - k k k (

). M , R j L Z(2000 )

, .

A , , -

( , - - - ). H ,, . W ( T B S C 1997 ),

( A D J L(1998 ) -

C )?

T , , . T ,

. T - I . F , , ,

6 T k z - - q . E -

k - k ( ), j

k . U z - , q k . I z , , ( ), - , .


30/41


. S , , ( ) .E

. T . T ,

, . I ,

j . A q , -, .

C. Exten n

T . I k .

Alte nat ve i ent t e .I -. I , , ,

, , . C , .I ,

. I , , j ( ,

) ( ). A , , -

, , .

M e ela t c eman an e m t the n t n h t ly .I , , . M

- q -. A , , . A

, . O , , , ,

.O ,

, z . A . E

( , - ), k. G , -

, . O , q


31/41


- k , k . Tq , - k

. T ( ) . N , z

.

D. relate l te at e

re m pa aly .R q F z D R k 1991 S -JW 2000 j ( ) . E , , ,

, ( z ) . O , ,

. T F z R k (1991) , j ,

j ,

. T , q .U k F z R k (1991), ,

. I , , , . H , , q , z , , -

, . I , , ,

. M

A L A , , , q , , ( , k , , A O. K 1974

R H. B 1983, A S R W. V 1998 ).U k F B T V (2000 ),

, j , .

I , k k . H , k

- k , k , . 7

7 P ( , ). T


32/41


33/41


A , , -

k .I ,

k j . I , , -

. C ( , , A j

B j L k I 2005, E S k 2003, R j Z2003 , A P z k 2004 )?

M , , j , , . I ,

q . P , q , j

, . 9

R j R 2007 . T -

U S k ( k k , , R L. R R S 1972 R j Z 2003 ). B k , , -, k , . T k

. M , , -

, . F , -, , f

, ( E B T J. M k z 2008 ), k

. F , j . C , -

, . T k

9 T q f ( , , A R k 1994 ). T ,

. M , . O , q

, , I q , q

. A , q , q .


34/41


, .

VI. Discussion and Conclusion

W z , q k . T k -

. T k j , . S k z -

k , k z k . W ( T P G T

2002, 2005 ), . I ,

f

.T k f

. E ,

. T q .I

q q , k j k . S k, k

, - . 10 N ,

, , - -

.

A. Whe e Ha All the E cat n G ne?

M -. L P 2001 k q : W

? H , - ,

k . O k

j - . A . P

10 O , k k. I , - q , k , k ( , , E 2006 R H R k

2003 ).


35/41


, , k . N

.

A q . I , k q q . I ( ,

) . I

, P k k . 11 A

- q -, .A ,

- ( B j 2007 q ), G . (2004 )

q . P

( - f ) ( ). P

( . ., k k k ). P A . (2005 ) US

, , , . M ,

k . I ,

.

B. C ncl n

A k . T

z k . N , , ,

,

. B k , I k

11 I - S -S A , S J , J D O , A S

(2007 ) ( ), k - , . H , .


36/41


- . C

.W , k , -

, , q - . I , , -

. I , k . R

k k , q ,

.

AppendixPROOF OF LEMMA 1:

T k m E / l E = / . B A 1 ( ) A 2, / > (1 + e) / > ms / , ms , -

k q 1 + e. T , m E / l E > ms / , k , ms < m E > l E . G , q q . A , ,

, , . I k

k - . T (m)(l)

m(m) 1 (l) l(m)(l) 1 = (1 )(m) (l) . S l = k m,k ( ) k , . . . m,

, -( ) (1 ) 3 l m4(m) 1 (l) 1 > 0. B

,

q k ( z - z q ). H , q . H ,

.T ,

, = 0.5, = 0.3, = 36, = 100. L e = 6 = 0.9. T - 1.14 q

3.14 . E 0.87 0.17, . H , = 0.58, = 0.4, -

. I 0.25 0.88 , , 1.78 0.40. T

.


37/41


PROOF OF LEMMA 2:A - k , k (1 1/ )(1 )(l p ) ,

l p = / ms . U q , (1 1/ ) (ms ) 1 () . C ,

(A1) < (1 ). (ms)1(+)

W k < 1. A , 1 > A 1 ( ). F , ms > 1, . S LHS (A1) RHS. T ms > 1: ms = (1 + e)

(1 + e + ) / . S > (( / ) + 1 + e + ) / (1 + e) A 3, ms > (1 + e) 3( / ) / (1 + e + )4 / 3( / ) / (1 + e + ) + 14. U ,

A 2, 1 + e, ms > (1 + e) ( / ( + )).B / ( + ) > 1 /2 (1 + e) > 2, ms > 1.

I - .

PROOF OF COROLLARY 1:C q - k , (1 )(ms )() +

(ms ) 1() (1 1/ ) > (1 ) ( / ms ) (1 1/ ). C , - , ( ). T k

( / ms ) , q (1 )(ms )+ +

(ms )+ 1 (1 1/ ) (1 ) (1 1/ ). D . . . ms , ms ( + ) / ms (1 1/ ) > 0.

B ms . 1 ( L 2 ), q . S ms e , .

PROOF OF COROLLARY 2:C , q - k

(1 ) lp

(A2) a lp

b (lp

) 1

> a b (lp

) 1

. (ms )1(+) T - (A2) , C 2 ( ).

C (A2), , - . . . ,

1 ( + ) m s lp

a l p

b

a

b

c(1 )

d

(ms

)2(+)

(ms

)1(+)

2

l p + c(1 ) d < 0. (ms )1(+)


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S m s / > 0, l p / < 0, A 3 ( / )l p , q k ( q (A1) ), q . M , k -

: I A 3 q , - (A2)

z , - , q .I , - (A2) - / (ms )1(+) < 1. H , C 2 ( ) .

C (A2), , - . . . e, e

1 ( + ) 1 lp a l pb a b a1 b + c(1 ) d < 0. (ms )2(+) (ms )1(+) e

T l p / e, q k . B q (A1) . M , C 2 ( ), e, C 2 ( ).

PROOF OF COROLLARY 3:T

1 1(A3) (ms ) 1 ()

a1

b <

a

b

a

b

a1

b.

+ +

C , - ms, ms e, , . F , ,

z ms , . S f q - , C 3 ( ).

PROOF OF LEMMA 5:F k , ,

1(1.4) (1 )(m E )(l E ) + (m E ) 1(l E ) a1 b 1 (e + )(m E ) 1 (l E ) a1 b. C , m E = 3 / ( + )4 (1 + e + ) ( 1 1/ ), , , ( + ) 3(e + ) / ( e + + 1)4 1 / 2,

+ 1 / 2 A 2.


39/41


PROOF OF LEMMA 6:T q

e 1 1 (A5)

a

b

a1

b > (1 ) + +

a

b

a1

b

a

b.

ms

ms

ms

C ,

( + 1 e)(A6) (e 1) > (1 ) ms .

N , ms e + 1, - q z . B e 1 A 2, q > 0.5. O , -

, L 6 ( ).

PROOF OF LEMMA 7:A ,

, , q

(e 1) (e + 1)(A7) +

> 1

. ms ms

S ms = e + 1 (e + + 1) / , q.

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rent preservation - persistance of underdevelopment

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