remedial law review case digests

CASE DIGESTS REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I

Monica S. Cajucom | 1

ATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSITY

and EDWIN P. BERNAL v. JOVITA S. MANALO

G.R. No. 160455, May 9, 2005, FIRST DIVISION (Davide, Jr., J.)

FACTS:

Jovita Manalo filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against Ateneo de Naga University and Dean Edwin Bernal and President Fr. Joel Tabora, S.J. with the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. 5 of the NLRC Naga City.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision against the petitioners. It was held that respondent was constructively dismissed when she was transferred from the Accountancy Department of the College of Commerce to the Department of Social Sciences of the College of Arts and Sciences after she was charged with alleged mismanagement of the Multi-Purpose Cooperative of the said university. No moral and exemplary damages were awarded to her.

The case was appealed and it was affirmed in toto. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Subsequently, a petition for certiorari (Rule 65) was filed with the Court of Appeals by the petitioners. The said petition was dismissed in a resolution stating that the verification and certification against forum shopping was fatally defective being signed by Fr. Tabora only, one of the three petitioners. It further held that all petitioners must sign, unless one is authorized by the other co-petitioners.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that Fr. Tabora was duly authorized to sign for all the petitioners as evidenced by a Special Power of Attorney which they failed to attach to the petition and which was only attached to the said motion.

The respondents filed an opposition to the motion for reconsideration asserting that no secretary’s certificate or board resolution was attached to the said motion. She also contended that there was lack of authorization file the petition in behalf of ADNU.

A comment was filed by the petitioners praying that the opposition be removed from the records due to its belated filing. Two secretary’s certificates were also attached thereto respectively authorizing and ratifying Fr. Tabora’s acts of filing the petition and signing the certificate of non-forum shopping.

The respondent filed a reply arguing that there was failure to mention the certificates in their petition for certiorari and motion for reconsideration. She further pointed out that the petitioners argued that Fr. Tabora has authority to represent ADNU by virtue of his office and not because of any secretary’s certificate. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration but only as to the co-petitioners who did not sign.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of proper verification and certification against forum shopping.

HELD: Yes.

Petition GRANTED.

As regards the verification requirement, this Court explained in Torres vs. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation that such requirement is deemed substantially complied with when, as in that case, two out of 25 real parties-in-interest, who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition, signed the verification attached to it. Such verification is deemed sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative.

Applying the foregoing to the instant petition, this Court finds that, at the minimum, the lone signature of Fr. Tabora is sufficient to fulfill the verification requirement. Undoubtedly, Fr. Tabora, whose acts as president of petitioner ADNU are in issue, is a real party-in-interest. As ADNU’s president and himself a party to the instant case, Fr. Tabora has sufficient knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in their petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. His signature, therefore, is sufficient assurance that the allegations in their petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative.

In fact, the signature of Fr. Tabora is sufficient to stand for petitioners ADNU and Bernal. Although belatedly shown, the authority of Fr. Tabora to sign on behalf of petitioners is apparent from the record. While these documents were not attached to the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals and were submitted only after the filing of said petition, they nonetheless



confirm the authority of Fr. Tabora to act on behalf of petitioners in filing the petition.

Any suspicion on the authenticity and due execution of the special power of attorney and the two secretary’s certificates, which are notarized documents – and as such, public documents – cannot stand against the presumption of regularity in their favor absent evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. In the instant case, except for respondent’s bare allegations to cast doubt on these documents, there was no evidence adduced in support thereof. Absent such evidence, the presumption must stand and the special power of attorney and secretary’s certificates must be upheld.

Considering the foregoing, this Court finds Fr. Tabora to be duly authorized to sign on behalf of petitioners the verification attached to their petition for certiorari, and, for the same reason, the certification against forum shopping.

It appearing that Fr. Tabora was, in fact, a duly authorized signatory, it can be said that there was at least substantial compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural requirements. The delay in the presentation of the documents showing the authority of Fr. Tabora to sign on behalf of petitioners cannot be allowed to defeat the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals.

Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are established to secure substantial justice. Being instruments for the speedy and efficient administration of justice, they must be used to achieve such end, not to derail it. In particular, when a strict and literal application of the rules on non-forum shopping and verification will result in a patent denial of substantial justice, these may be liberally construed.

FILOMENA DOMAGAS v. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN

G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005, SECOND DIVISION

(Callejo, Sr., J.)

FACTS:

Petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against

respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan.

Petitioner alleged that respondent gained entry into her property by

excavating a portion thereof and constructing a fence thereon. As a result,

she was deprived of 68 square meters of her property. She likewise prayed

that the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and the writ of preliminary

injunction be made permanent.

The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. The respondent failed to appeal the

decision. A writ of execution was issued thereafter.

Almost a year after the writ of execution was issued, the respondent filed a

complaint with the RTC of Dagupan City for the annulment of the MTC

decision on the ground that there was failure to serve summons on her

because she was out of the country. Hence, the MTC never acquired

jurisdiction over her person. She further alleged that the substituted service

on her brother was improper because she was a resident of Oslo, Norway

and not of Calasiao, Pangasinan and that although she was the owner of the

house where the summons was served, her brother was merely a visitor who

collected rental payments from the lessor of her house and was never

authorized by her to receive the summons on her behalf.

An answer was filed by the petitioner arguing that the substituted service of

summons was proper.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent holding that the

MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent and the

subject matter because her brother was not authorized to receive the

summons.

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a judgment

affirming the RTC decision with modifications. The appellate court held that



the complaint of the petitioner is one for forcible entry, hence an action quasi

in rem. Following this, there should have been an extraterritorial service of

summons on the respondent with prior leave of court and not a substituted

service of summons.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not the complaint the MTC is an action in personam

or quasi in rem.

2) Whether or not there was a valid service of summons on

respondent Vivian Jensen.

HELD: Petition DENIED.

1) The ruling of the CA that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry

of the petitioner against the respondent is an action quasi in rem, is

erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real

action and one in personam.

The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the

judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the

person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a

defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a

pecuniary liability on him. Actions for recovery of real property are in

personam.

On the other hand, in an action quasi in rem, an individual is named

as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his

interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property.

An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in

personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal

obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New

Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action,

restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual

damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or

occupation of the property.

2) No. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the

defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the

case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does

not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of

summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of

Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a

reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance

with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country,

any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a)

substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside

the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with

leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem

sufficient.

The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of

summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return;

otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service

cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is

in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method

extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as

prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute.

As gleaned from the sheriff’s return, there is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latter’s residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.

In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the complaint by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, the decision of the MTC is null and void.



VLASON ENTERPRISES CORPORATION v.

COURT OF APPEALS and DURAPROOF SERVICES,

represented by its General Manager, Cesar Urbino Sr.

G.R. Nos. 121662-64, July 6, 1999, THIRD DIVISION (Panganiban, J.)

FACTS: Poro Point Shipping Services was then acting as the local agent of Omega Sea Transport Company of Honduras & Panama (Omega) when it requested permission for its vessel M/V Star Ace, experiencing engine trouble, to unload its cargo and have it stored in the Philippine Ports Authority compound in San Fernando, La Union while awaiting transhipment to Hongkong. It approved by the Bureau of Customs. Howvever, the customs personnel still boarded the vessel when it docked on the suspicion that it was the hijacked M/V Silver Med owned by Med Line Philippines and that its cargo would be smuggled into the country. The vessel and its cargo were seized. A notice of hearing was served on its consignee, Singkong Trading Co. of Hongkong, and its shipper, Dusit International Co., Ltd of Thailand.

While seizure proceedings were ongoing, three typhoons hit La Union, and the vessel ran aground and was abandoned. A salvage agreement was entered into with the respondent Duraproof Services to secure and repair the vessel.

The warrant of seizure was lifted upon finding that there was no fraud. However, the Customs Commissioner declined to issue a clearance and even forfeited the vessel and its cargo. A decision was decreed for the forfeiture and sale of the cargo in favor of the government.

Seeking to enforce its preferred lien, the Duraproof filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the RTC of Manila attacking the actions of the Bureau. PPA, Rep. Silverio Mangaoang and Med Line Phils. were are named as respondents. Subsequently, Duraproof amended its petition as to include former District Collector Quiray, PPA Port Manager Adolfo Amor, Jr., Vlason Enterprises Singkong Trading Company, Dusit International Co., Inc., Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. And Thai-United Trading Co., Ltd as respondents. In both its petitions, there was failure to allege against Vlason Enterprises or pray for a relief against it.

Summonses for the amended petition were served to the respondents and their counsels. Summons by publication were allowed to be served upon the alien respondents who had no representatives in the country.

The cases against the other respondents were dismissed on the grounds of litis pendentia and lack of jurisdiction despite Duraproof moving to declare them in default. Duraproof again moved to declare the other respondents in default. There was no record that these motions were acted upon. Thereafter, Duraproof amended again its petition with supplemental petition. The rest of the respondents were declared in default and Duraproof was allowed to present its evidence. With regard to Vlason Entreprises, it was alleged that it exhibited constant intimidation and harassment and incurred heavy overhead expenses causing irreparable damages. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Duraproof.

Vlason, by special appearance, filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds it was not impleaded, served summons or declared in default. It also filed a special appearance before the CA praying that the levy be lifted off its properties, or a TRO be issued against the auction. Its motion was granted and the previous decision was reversed. However, Duraproof countered that although Vlason filed the motion for reconsideration in a timely manner, it has otherwise failed to include a notice of hearing making its motion a mere scrap of paper

Duraproof filed a motion to file a supplemental petition impleading Vlason as one of the respondents. It was granted by the CA. Furthermore, it was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents to prevent them from interfering in the transfer of the vessel and its cargo from the PPA compound.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Vlason Enterprises was properly served with summons.

HELD: No.

Appeal GRANTED.

A corporation may be served summons through its agents or officers who under the Rules are designated to accept service of process. A summons addressed to a corporation and served on the secretary of its president binds that corporation. This is based on the rationale that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued, that it is safe to assume that said representative had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served and to relay the same to



the president or other responsible officer of the corporation being sued. The secretary of the president satisfies this criterion. This rule requires, however, that the secretary should be an employee of the corporation sought to be summoned. Only in this manner can there be an assurance that the secretary will “bring home to the corporation [the] notice of the filing of the action” against it.

In the present case, Bebero was the secretary of Angliongto, who was president of both VSI and petitioner, but she was an employee of VSI, not of petitioner. The piercing of the corporate veil cannot be resorted to when serving summons.

Doctrinally, a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate from the members and stockholders who compose it. However, when the corporate fiction is used as a means of perpetrating a fraud, evading an existing obligation, circumventing a statute, achieving or perfecting a monopoly or, in generally perpetrating a crime, the veil will be lifted to expose the individuals composing it. None of the foregoing exceptions has been shown to exist in the present case. Quite the contrary, the piercing of the corporate veil in this case will result in manifest injustice. This we cannot allow. Hence, the corporate fiction remains.

Petitioner claims that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it, because the former had not been served summons anew for the Second Amended Petition or for the Second Amended Petition with Supplemental Petition.

We disagree. Although it is well-settled that an amended pleading supersedes the original one, which is thus deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record, it does not follow ipso facto that the service of a new summons for amended petitions or complaints is required. Where the defendants have already appeared before the trial court by virtue of a summons on the original complaint, the amended complaint may be served upon them without need of another summons, even if new causes of action are alleged. After it is acquired, a court’s jurisdiction continues until the case is finally terminated. Conversely, when defendants have not yet appeared in court and no summons has been validly served, new summons for the amended complaint must be served on them. It is not the change of cause of action that gives rise to the need to serve another summons for the amended complaint, but rather the acquisition of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants. If the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over them, a new service of summons for the amended complaint is required.

In this case, the trial court obviously labored under the erroneous impression that petitioner had already been placed under its jurisdiction since it had

been served summons through the secretary of its president. Thus, it dispensed with the service on petitioner of new summons for the subsequent amendments of the Petition. We have already ruled, however, that the first service of summons on petitioner was invalid. Therefore, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction, and the said court should have required a new service of summons for the amended Petitions.



SPOUSES DAISY and SOCRATES M. AREVALO v. PLANTERS

DEVELOPMENT BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF

PARAÑAQUE CITY

G.R. No. 193415, April 18, 2012, SECOND DIVISION (Sereno, J.)

FACTS:

Petitioner Spouses Arevalo executed a loan agreement with Planters

Development Bank where they obtained a P2,100,000 loan secured by a

mortgage on their property in Muntinlupa. For their failure to pay the loan, the

bank proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage.

The spouses filed a complaint praying for the nullification of interests,

penalties and other charges, as well as for specific performance with an

application for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction

to enjoin the auction sale.

During the hearing of petitioners’ application for preliminary injunction, the

trial court ruled that, as a precondition for the issuance of the writ and

pursuant to the Procedure on Foreclosure, petitioners were directed to pay

12% per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the

application for foreclosure sale. Otherwise, the writ shall not issue.

Petitioners inquired whether they should be required to pay 12% per annum

interest. They argue that the rule was applicable only when applicant alleges

that the interest rate is unconscionable. According to petitioners, nowhere in

the Complaint did they allege that the interest charges were unconscionable.

The trial court, however, affirmed its earlier ruling.

They moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Consequently, they did

not pay the required interest; thus, no writ of preliminary injunction was

issued in their favor.

They filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The CA held that the

words used by petitioners in their First Complaint, such as “manifestly

unjust,” “purely potestative condition,” “void ab initio,” “clearly contravenes

morals, good customs and public policy,” “whimsical,” “capricious violation of

the legal and inherent principles of mutuality of contracts,” “illegal, invalid,

unilateral impositions”—all of which pertained to interest imposed by the

Bank—undeniably meant that petitioners were challenging the interest for

being unconscionable, while opting to use other words of similar import.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.

Hence, they filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before this

Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the requirement to pay 12% interest per annum

before the issuance of an injunctive writ to enjoin an impending

foreclosure sale is applicable to the instant case.

HELD: The issue has become moot.

Petition DENIED.

A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual

controversy between the parties or useful purpose that can be served in

passing upon the merits.

There remains no actual controversy in the instant Petition because the First

Complaint has already been dismissed by the trial court. Upon its dismissal,

the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction

necessarily died with it.

A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy. It is auxiliary to, an

adjunct of, and subject to the outcome of the main case. Thus, a writ of

preliminary injunction is deemed lifted upon dismissal of the main case, any

appeal therefrom notwithstanding, as this Court emphasized in Buyco v.

Baraquia from which we quote:



The writ is provisional because it constitutes a

temporary measure availed of during the pendency of

the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere

incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main

action.

It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary

injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve

the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is

usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a

substantial controversy between the parties and one of them

is committing an act or threatening the immediate

commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or

destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full

hearing can be had on the merits of the case.

x x x x xx x x x

The present case having been heard and found

dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of

preliminary injunction is deemed lifted, its purpose as a

provisional remedy having been served, the appeal

therefrom notwithstanding.

Unionbank v. Court of Appeals enlightens:

xxx a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an

action in which a restraining order or temporary

injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of

the restraining order or temporary injunction,” regardless

of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of

the order dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has

expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases

where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an

action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the

judgment, hence the general rule applies that a

temporary injunction terminates automatically on the

dismissal of the action. (Emphases supplied.)

There will be no practical value in resolving the question of the non-

issuance of an injunctive writ in this case. Setting aside the assailed Orders

is manifestly pointless, considering that the First Complaint itself has already

been dismissed, and there is nothing left to enjoin.

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