remedial law recent cases

8/11/2019 REMEDIAL LAW Recent Cases

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REMEDIAL LAW 2010-2013

Dean Ed Vincent S. Albano

JURISDICTIONQ A is the owner of a house and lot located in Manila with a market value of P1M, leased toB. For failure to pay the rentals, A demanded for payment and vacation of the premises in

2011. On September 4, 2013, he sought advice as to how he could recover the property. Giveyour advice and explain.Answer: I would advice A that he can file an accion publiciana before the MTC or RTC because the courtthat has jurisdiction depends upon the assessed value of the property. Under BP 129, as amended,jurisdiction even in accion publicianacases is determined by the assessed value of the property.In Spouses Alcantara v. Nido, G.R. No. 165133, April 19, 2010 that assessed value is the value of theproperty as fixed by the taxing authorities for the purpose of determining the applicable tax rate. Theassessed value does not necessarily represent the true or market value of the property. Hence, if forexample the subject lot has an assessed value below the jurisdictional limit of P50,000.00 for MetroManila it comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MeTC under BP 129, as amended. Thus,the RTC erred in holding that the MeTC had no jurisdiction in this case (BF Citiland Corp. v. Otake, G.R.No. 173351, July 29, 2010). The market value is immaterial for purposes of determining the court that hasjurisdiction.

When action is beyond pecuniary estimation; test.Q There was a complaint for declaration of nullity of share issuance, seeking to declare

void the issuance of 600,000 unsubscribed and unissued shares for a price of 1/8 of theirreal value, for being inequitable. What is the nature of the action? Why?Answer: It is one beyond pecuniary estimation. The test in determining whether the subject matter of anaction is incapable of pecuniary estimation is by ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedysought. To be sure, the annulment of the shares, the dissolution of the corporation and the appointmentof receivers/management committee are actions which do not consist in the recovery of a sum of money.If, in the end, a sum of money or real property would be recovered, it would simply be the consequence ofsuch principal action. Therefore, the case before the RTC was incapable of pecuniary estimation. (Lu v.Lu Ym, Sr., et al., G.R. Nos. 153690; 157381, February 15, 2011, Carpio-Morales, J).

Recovery of damages due to malicious prosecution; total amount of damages determines thejurisdiction of the court.Q A filed a complaint against B for damages due to malicious prosecution. He sought anaward of moral damages in the amount of P250,000.00 and exemplary damages in theamount of P300,000.00 suffered by reason of the utterances while they were at a policestation. What court has jurisdiction? Explain.Answer: The RTC has jurisdiction. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the factsalleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constitutingthe plaintiffs causes of action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that respondentsmain action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g.,exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to orconsequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.In Mendoza v. Soriano, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 639 it was held that in cases

where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount ofsuch claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. In the said case, therespondents claim of P929,000.06 in damages and P25,000 attorneys fees plus P500 per courtappearance was held to represent the monetary equivalent for compensation of the alleged injury. TheCourt therein held that the total amount of monetary claims including the claims for damages was thebasis to determine the jurisdictional amount. (Iniego v. Purganan, G.R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006, 485SCRA 394; Sante v. Hon. Claravall, et. al., G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010).

Q A, through the phone authorized B to sell his house and lot which B did. He sought foryour advice as to whether the sale is valid or not and the proper remedy if it is not. Give youradvice to A and explain.Answer: I would advice A to file an action for quieting of title. The original and exclusive jurisdiction over acomplaint for quieting of title and reconveyance involving land belongs to either the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), depending upon the assessed value of the property.Conformably with Sec. 19, BP 129 as amended by RA 7691, because an action for reconveyance or toremove a cloud on ones title involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,exclusive original jurisdiction over such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of theproperty does not exceed P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 in which instance the MTC having territorialjurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction. Determinative of which regular court has jurisdictionwould be the allegations of the complaint on the assessed value of the property and the principal reliefthereby sought. (Heirs of Generoso Sebe v. Heirs of Sevilla, G.R. No. 174497, October 2, 2009, 603SCRA 395; Heirs of Reterta, et al. v. Sps. Lopez, G.R. No. 159941, August 17, 2011).

Estoppel to question jurisdiction.

Q There was a reinvindicatory action over an ancestral land in Baguio City filed with theRTC. The parties participated, but with the enactment of RA 8371, otherwise known as the

Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), it was contended that the case should bedismissed as the law gives original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving


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ancestral lands and domains to the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). This

issue was raised for the first time in the Supreme Court, or only after 8 years from the filingof the complaint where full-blown trial was conducted by the trial court and decision on the

case rendered by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. Is the contention of petitionerscorrect? Why?Answer: No. They are barred by laches from raising their jurisdictional objection. As a rule, an objection

over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings. This is because jurisdictioncannot be waived by the parties or vested by the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law,which prevails at the time of the filing of the complaint.An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam v.Sibonghanoy, 131 Phil. 556 (1968), the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party fromraising the courts lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonableand unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have beendone earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting thepresumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.(Lamsis, etal. v. Dong-E, G.R. No. 173021, October 20, 2010).

RULE 3 - PARTIESQ A filed a complaint against B, a co-owner of a property without impleading C, D, & E who

are co-owners. State the effect of impleading or non-impleading of an indispensable party.Explain.Answer: The presence of indispensable parties is a condition sine qua nonfor the exercise of judicialpower. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action should bedismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null andvoid for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. (Regner v.Logarta, G.R. No. 168747, October 119, 2007, 537 SCRA 277).The omission to implead indispensable parties is not immediately fatal, considering that Section 11, Rule3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal ofan action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the samerule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be made on motion of any party or on thetrial courts own initiativeat any stage of the actionand on such terms as are just. (Ablaza v. Rep., G.R.No. 158298, August 11, 2010).

Q Petitioners, as lessees over a property belonging to the City of Calapan, sought to annulthe titles of the Catlys, a recognition of the Citys superior interest but did not implead theCity. It was contended that the lessees do not have the right or personality to sue. Thelessees contended that they have interest as lessees. Is the contention correct? Explain.Answer: No, the contention is not correct. Since the plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest, the actionis dismissible. In instituting the action, what they were asserting was a title or right that was not personalto them, but that of another. That they are lessees with option to purchase did not suffice to constitutethem as parties with material interest to commence the action. It must be commenced by the real partiesin interest. (Rule 3, Sec. 2, Rules of Court). (Goco, et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 157449, April 6, 2010).

Effect of death of a party in an action that survives.

Q During the pendency of an action to annul a deed of sale which involved property and

property rights, the plaintiff died. The RTC dismissed the action upon motion of thedefendant. Is the dismissal correct? Why?Answer: No, because there can be substitution of the decedent by his heirs. (Sec. 16, Rule 3, Rules ofCourt).If the action survives despite death o f a party, it is the duty of the deceaseds counsel to inform the courtof such death, and to give the names and addresses of the deceaseds legal representatives. Thedeceased may be substituted by his heirs in the pending action. (Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. 173292,September 1, 2010).If no legal representative is named by the counsel of the deceased, or the legal representative fails toappear within a specified period, it is the duty of the court where the case is pending to order theopposing party to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of thedeceased. The reason for this rule is to protect all concerned who may be affected by the interveningdeath, particularly the deceased and his estate. (Sumaljag v. Literato, G.R. No. 149787, June 18, 2008,555 SCRA 53; Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010).

Q Explain the reason for the substitution by the heirs of a decedent after his death during

the pendency of an action.Answer: Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that the rights to the succession are transmitted from themoment of the death of the decedent. From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs becomethe absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannotbe deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is thedetermining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure orcontingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicialdeclaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. When plaintiff, therefore, died, herclaim or right was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Herheirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case.There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest


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for the deceased plaintiff. (Bonilla v. Barcena, 163 Phil. 516 (1976); Torres v. Rodellas, G.R. No. 177836,September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 390; Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010).

Petition for relief from judgment is prohibited under the Summary Procedure but treated asspecial civil action for certiorari.QA complaint for ejectment was filed with the MTC. After judgment was rendered there

was a petition for relief from judgment filed with the RTC which the latter dismissed for lackof jurisdiction. Is the dismissal correct? Why?Answer: Yes. A petition for relief from judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, is aprohibited pleading. The reason for this is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of thecases subject of summary procedure. (Sec. 36, BP 129; Sec. 13(4) Rule 70; Sec. 19(d), Rule onSummary Procedure; Afdal, et al. v. Carlos, G.R. No. 173379, December 1, 2010).

QA case, the defendants were not properly served with summons as the return merelyshowed that it was signed by one Gary Acob (a relative) and the other return showed thatit was duly served but refused to sign without specifying to whom it was served. Judgment

was rendered against the defendants, who filed a petition for relief from judgment with theRTC, which dismissed the petition. Under the circumstances, what is the appropriateremedy? Explain.

Answer: The defendant can file a special civil action for certiorari before the RTC as there was a showingof grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The court did not acquire jurisdiction overthe persons of the defendants due to improper service of summons.A petition for relief from judgment, if allowed by the Rules and not a prohibited pleading, should be filedwith and resolved by the court in the same case from which the petition arose.In the present case, petitioners cannot file the petition for relief with the MTC because it is a prohibitedpleading in an unlawful detainer case. Petitioners cannot also file the petition for relief with the RTCbecause the RTC has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions for relief from judgments of theMTC. Therefore, the RTC did not err in dismissing the petition for relief from judgment of the MTC.The remedy of petitioners in such a situation is to file a petition for certiorari with the RTC under Rule65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the MTC over the person of petitioners inview of the absence of summons to petitioners. Here, the petition for relief from judgment was treated asa petition for certiorari before the RTC. (Afdal, et al. v. Carlos, G.R. No. 173379, December 1, 2010).

RULE 7VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING

No need to state that a case was filed and dismissed in the certificate of non-forum shoppingif the dismissal is without prejudice.Q A case was originally filed before the RTC of Pasig City. It was however dismissedwithout prejudice to the filing of another case. When the other case was filed, there was nostatement to that effect that a previous case was filed in the certificate of non-forumshopping. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping for failure tostate the filing of a previous action. The plaintiff sought for your advice on that issue. Giveyour advice to your client and explain.Answer: I would advice my client that there is no forum shopping. As early as Roxas v. Court ofAppeals,415 Phil. 430 (2001), it has been ruled that when a complaint has been dismissed without

prejudice at the instance of the plaintiff, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure, there is no need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in a subsequent re-filedcomplaint the fact of the prior filing and dismissal of the formal complaint. The rule was designed to serveas an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not beinterpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or thegoal of all rules or procedure- which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. The factthat Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its mandatory nature in that itcannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdictsubstantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.Thus, an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute resjudicata and litis pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification ofthe entire proceeding considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not[present. (Roberto Benedicto, et al. v. Manuel Lacson, et al., G.R. No. 141508, May 5, 2010).

RULE 9 - EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

Default is not an admission of the allegations in the complaint.Q There was an action for reconveyance alleging that with the use of fraud, there was

acquisition of title over a property. The defendants did not file an answer hence, an order ofdefault was issued. But the plaintiffs failed to prove the fraudulent act. It was contendedthat the failure to answer is equivalent to an implied admission of the allegations in the

complaint. Is the contention correct? Why?Answer: No. Being in default, does not imply a waiver of rights, except that of being heard and ofpresenting evidence in his favor. It does not imply admission by the defendant of the facts and causes ofaction of the plaintiff, because the codal section requires the latter to adduce his evidence in support ofhis allegations as an indispensable condition before final judgment could be given in his favor. Nor could

it be interpreted as an admission by the defendant that the plaintiffs causes of action finds support in thelaw, or that the latter is entitled to the relief prayed for. (Heirs of Pedro de Guzman v. Angelina Perona, et


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al., G.R. No. 152266, July 2, 2010, citing Luxuria Homes, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 125986, January 28, 1999,302 SCRA 315; Delos Santos v. Dela Cruz, 37 SCRA 555 (1971)).

RULE 10AMENDED & SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

Rule on amendment of pleading not to be applied rigidly.

Q The plaintiff filed a complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land, alleging thatthe defendants were merely tolerated to possess it but refused to vacate when there was ademand to do so. The defendants countered that they have been occupying the land ascaretakers of the heirs of a certain Paz-Lesaca evidenced by a Kasunduan. After trial,

judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The trial court did not admit the Kasunduan and the

title of Lesaca saying that there was variance of the allegation and proof as they were notraised in the answer. The MTC ruled that the defendants should have amended the pleadingto conform to evidence. The RTC affirmed the MTC decision and disregarded the Kasunduan

and the title. The CA reversed on appeal, hence, their right of possession must prevail. Therewas reservation of additional documentary exhibits during the pre-trial. Is the ruling of theCA correct? Why?Answer: Yes. The rule on amendment need not be applied rigidly, particularly where no surprise orprejudice is caused the objecting party. Where there is a variance in defendants pleadings and the

evidence adduced at the trial, the Court may treat the pleading as if it had been amended to conform tothe evidence. (Sy v. CA, G.R. No. 124518, December 27, 2007, 541 SCRA 371). The failure of a party toamend a pleading to conform to the evidence adduced during trial does not preclude adjudication by thecourt on the basis of such evidence which may embody new issues not raised in the pleadings. x x xAlthough, the pleading may not have been amended to conform to the evidence submitted during trial,judgment may nonetheless be rendered, not simply on the basis of the issues alleged but also on theissues discussed and the assertions of fact proved in the course of the trial. The court may treat thepleading as if it had been amended to conform to the evidence, although it had not been actuallyamended. x x x Clearly, a court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence before it eventhough the relevant pleading had not been previously amended, so long as no surprise or prejudice isthereby caused to the adverse party. Put a little differently, so long as the basic requirements of fair playhad been met, as where the litigants were given full opportunity to support their respective contentionsand to object to or refute each others evidence, the court may validly treat the pleadings as if they had

been amended to conform to the evidence and proceed to adjudicate on the basis of all the evidencebefore it. (Royal Cargo Corp. v. DES Sport Ltd., Inc., G.R. No. 158621, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA414).

RULE 14 - SUMMONS

Substituted service of summons; person in charge need not be specifically authorized.

Q A filed a complaint against B alleging that B has his office address at Suite 555 SyjucoBldg., Ermita, Manila. The sheriff could not serve the summons personally upon B hence,

after inquiring from C who was the officer-in-charge, where C informed him that he was theone, he served it to C. B moved to dismiss on the ground that there was improper service as

he did not authorize C to receive the summons. Is it necessary that the person in charge ofthe office of the defendant be specifically authorized to receive summons? Explain.

Answer: No. In substituted service of summons in a place of business, it is not necessary that the personin charge of the defendants regular place of business be specifically authorized to receive the summons.It is enough that he appears to be in charge. (Guanzon v. Arradaza, 510 SCRA 309 (2006). In this case, asecretary whose job description necessarily includes receiving documents and other correspondence,would have the semblance of authority to accept the court documents. (Gentle Supreme Phils., Inc. v.Consulta, G.R. No. 183182, September 1, 2010).

Summons, how served upon one who is temporarily out of the country.Q A filed a complaint for sum of money against B. When summons was served, the sheriff

was informed that B was on vacation for one (1) year in the USA, hence, he made a return tothat effect. A came to you for advice how may summons upon a Filipino who is a resident of

the Philippines but temporarily out of the country be served? Give your advice to your client.Explain.

Answer: In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by theservice of summons or by the latters voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former.Private respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the Philippines at the time of theservice of summons; thus, service of summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules ofCourt, which provides that when an action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resideswithin the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected outof the Philippines, as under the preceding section which is Section 15, that speaks of extraterritorialservice.In Montefalcon v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 513, it was said that becauseSection 15 of Rule 14 uses the words may and also, it is not mandatory. Other methods of service ofsummons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-residentwho is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the country,any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 7

(formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service bypublication, also with leave of court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.


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A dwelling house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at thetime when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is,thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitableage and discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding theservice of summons is as important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.Section 7 also designates the person with whom copies of the process may be left. The rule presupposesthat such a relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendantand, therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give himnotice thereof. (Padua v. Galvez, et. al., G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010).

RULE 15MOTIONS

Objections and defenses not raised in the Motion to Dismiss are deemed waived.Q In a case, there was an action for specific performance for the execution of a deed ofabsolute sale after the payment of the price of the property sold. Judgment was renderedand it became final and executory but the losing party wanted to thwart the execution onthe ground that she was disqualified from owning land in the Philippines, raising the issue ofcitizenship on execution. Is the act of the respondent correct? Explain.Answer: No. The issue of citizenship of the registered owner of land cannot anymore be raised to forestall

the execution of a final and executory judgment where the objecting party had the opportunity to raise theissue prior to the finality of the judgment. The time for assailing the capacity of the winning party toacquire the land was during the trial, not during the execution of a final decision.The petitioner did not raise any issue of the qualifications to own land in the Philippines during the trial or,at the latest, before the finality of the RTC judgment. The petitioner was thereby deemed to have waivedthe objection, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. (Mabanag v. Register of Deeds ofQuezon City, et. al., G.R. NO. 153142, March 29, 2010).

Q State the reason why all defenses must be allege in a motion to dismiss. Explain.Answer: In every action, indeed, the parties and their counsel are enjoined to present all availabledefenses and objections in order that the matter in issue can finally be laid to rest in an appropriatecontest before the court. The rule is a wise and tested one, borne by necessity. Without the rule, there willbe no end to a litigation, because the dissatisfied litigant may simply raise new or additional issues in order to prevent, defeat, or delay the implementation of an already final and executory judgment. Theendlessness of litigation can give rise to added costs for the parties, and can surely contribute to theunwarranted clogging of court dockets. The prospect of a protracted litigation between the parties annulsthe very rationale of every litigation to attain justice. Verily, there must be an end to litigation. (Mabanag v.Register of Deeds of Quezon City, et. al., G.R. NO. 153142, March 29, 2010).

No valid substituted service of summonsQIn a case, the Return of Summons did not specifically show or indicate in detail the

actual exertion of efforts or any positive step taken by the officer or process server inattempting to serve the summons personally to the defendant. The return merely stated thealleged whereabouts of the defendant without indicating that such information was verifiedfrom a person who had knowledge thereof. Indeed, the sheriffs return shows a mereperfunctory attempt to cause personal service of the summons on defendant. There was no

indication if he even asked defendants mother as to her specific whereabouts except thatshe was out of the house, where she can be reached or whether he even tried to await herreturn. Did the court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant? Why?Answer: No. The sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons due to his failure to serve itpersonally. In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court detailed the requisites for a valid substituted serviceof summons, summed up as follows: (1) impossibility of prompt personal servicethe party relying onsubstituted service or the sheriff must show that the defendant cannot be served promptly or there isimpossibility of prompt service; (2) specific details in the return the sheriff must describe in the Return ofSummons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service; (3) a person ofsuitable age and discretionthe sheriff must determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling orresidence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipients relationship with the defendant is, and whethersaid person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediatelydeliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons, which matters mustbe clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons; and (4) a competent person in charge,who must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, itsimportance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. These were reiterated andapplied in Pascual v. Pascual, where the substituted service of summon made was invalidated due to thesheriffs failureto specify in the return the necessary details of the failed attempts to effect personalservice which would justify resort to substituted service of summons. The efforts exerted by the sheriff didnot suffice to justify substituted serve and his failure to comply with the requisites, rendered such serviceineffective.

QIn an action for revival of judgment, the prescriptive period is not apparent. May thedefendant file a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription? Explain.Answer: No. The defense of prescription to bar the action for revival presents an evidentiary concern.Article 1144 of the Civil Coderequires, indeed, that an action to revive a judgment must be brought beforeit is barred by prescription, which was ten years from the accrual of the right of action. Such a defense

could not be determined in the hearing of the petitioners motion to dismiss considering that the complaint


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did not show on its face that the period to bring the action to revive had already lapsed. An allegation ofprescription, as the Court put it in Pineda v. Heirs of Eliseo Guevara, can effectively be used in a motionto dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed,[o]therwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full blown trial on themerits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss. (Juan Banez, Jr. v. Hon. Concepcion, etal., G.R. No. 159508, August 29, 2012).

RULE 19 - INTERVENTION

Intervention must not cause delay; requisites.Q The heirs of Minoza sought to buy back a property which the Minoza children sold to the

National Airports Corporation with an assurance that if it was no longer needed for airportuse, they can buy back the property but there was refusal on the part of MCIAA to resell.

During the pendency of the action, there was a Motion for Intervention filed by the heirs ofFilomeno Minoza, claiming that the plaintiffs in the main action are not related to the latespouses Estanislao and Inocencia Minoza and that the heirs of Estanislao and Inocencia

committed fraud in the Extrajudicial Settlement of their Estate. The RTC denied the motionas the principal issue is only the right to repurchase and the right being claimed byintervenors should be asserted in a separate proceeding and finally, it would cause delay,

hence, the intervenors questioned the order before the CA which reversed the order andruled that the determination of the true heirs of the later Estanislao Minoza is not only a

collateral, but the focal issue of the case, for if the intervenors can prove that they areindeed the true heirs of Estanislao Minoza, there would be no more need to determinewhether the right to buy back the subject lots exists or not as the MCIAA would not haveacquired rights to the subject lots in the first place. In addition, to grant the motion forintervention would avoid multiplicity of suits. Is the ruling of the CA correct? Why?Answer: The intervenors contentions that Leilas predecessors-in-interest executed, in fraud of theintervenors, an extra judicial settlement of the estate of the late spouses Estanislao Mioza and InocenciaTogono and adjudicated unto themselves the estate of the deceased spouses, and that subsequently, herpredecessors-in-interest fraudulently and deceitfully sold the subject lots to the NAC, would unnecessarilycomplicate and change the nature of the proceedings.In addition to resolving who the true and legitimate heirs of Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono are,

the parties would also present additional evidence in support of this new allegation of fraud, deceit, andbad faith and resolve issues of conflicting claims of ownership, authenticity of certificates of titles, andregularity in their acquisition. Verily, this would definitely cause unjust delay in the adjudication of therights claimed by the original parties, which primarily hinges only on the issue of whether or not the heirsrepresented by Leila have a right to repurchase the subject properties from the MCIAA.The allegation of fraud and deceit is an independent controversy between the original parties and the

intervenors. In general, an independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, hence,such intervention will not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in the action and expand thescope of the remedies. It is not proper where there are certain facts giving the intervenors case anaspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it clearly from that of the original parties; the proper course isfor the would-be intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate suit. Intervention is not intended to changethe nature and character of the action itself, or to stop or delay the placid operation of the machinery ofthe trial. The remedy of intervention is not proper where it will have the effect of retarding the principal

suit or delaying the trial of the action.To be sure, not only will the intervenors rights be fully protected in a separate proceeding, it would bestdetermine the rights of the parties in relation to the subject properties and the issue of who the legitimateheirs of Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono, would be laid to rest. (Mactan-Cebu InternationalAirport Authority v. Heirs of Estanislao Minoza, G.R. No. 186045, February 2, 2010).

RUL 34/35JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

If defendant moves for the judgment on the pleadings, there is an admission of the factsalleged in the complaint.Q A suit for unlawful detainer was filed by the lessor against the lessee for failure of the

latter to pay the rents. During the pre-trial, the defendant moved that the case be submittedfor judgment on the pleadings considering that the only disagreement between the parties

to submit their respective memoranda. The MTC rendered a judgment for the plaintiff. Statethe effect of the act of the defendant in moving for judgment on the pleadings. Explain. Answer: In moving for a judgment on the pleadings without offering proof as to the truth of her ownallegations and without giving the plaintiff the opportunity to introduce evidence, the defendant is deemedto have admitted the material and relevant averments in the complaint and to rest her motion for judgmentbased on the pleadings of the parties. (Rodriguez v. Llorente, 49 Phil. 823 (1926). As held in TropicalHomes, Inc., v. CA, 338 Phil. 930, when there is judgment on the pleadings, the defendant is deemed tohave admitted the allegations of fact in the complaint, so that there is no necessity for plaintiff to submitevidence of his claim. (Sunbanun v. Go, G.R. No. 163280, February 2, 2010, Carpio, J.)

When partial summary judgment is appealable or not.Q In a case, petitioners maintained that the order granting partial summary judgment wasmerely interlocutory in nature and did not dispose of the action in its entirety. They cited the

doctrines laid down in Province of Pangasinan v. Court of Appeals and Guevarra v. Court of


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Appeals, where the Court categorically stated that a partial judgment is not a final or

appealable judgment. Is the position tenable? Explain.Answer: The rulings in Province of Pangasinan and Guevarra are not applicable in the case at bar. Thesaid case specifically delved on the appeal of a summary judgment, which did not dispose of all the reliefssought in the complaint. In the case at bar, other than the admitted liability of petitioners to respondentsunder the contract growing agreement, all other reliefs sought under the complaint had already been

expressely waived by respondent before the trial court. Accordingly, Order of the trial court which grantedpartial summary judgment in favor of respondent was in the nature of a final order which leaves nothingmore for the court to adjudicate in respect of the complaint. In such a case, appeal not special civil actionfor certiorari is not the appropriate remedy. (Monterey Foods Corp. v. Eserjose, 457 Phil. 771 (2003);Philippine Telephone Co. v. Radiomarine Network, Inc., G. R. No. 152092, August 4, 2010).

If there are triable issues, summary judgment is improper.QThe plaintiff filed a complaint to Annul a Promise to sell two (2) parcels of land to SolidBuilders Inc. alleging that its offer to buy was more advantageous to PNB-Republic. Theoffer of Solid Builders was lower than its offer, hence, its offer should be approved butinstead of doing so, PNB-Republic executed a Promise to Sell to Solid. The defendant PNB-Republic filed an answer alleging that the complaint stated no cause of action as the offer ofSolid was the highest and most advantageous at the time and that the plaintiff First

Leverage & Services Group, Inc. never made an offer. At the time it submitted its offer, theoffer of Solid was already approved. Same line of defense was adopted by Solid.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings was filed after pre-trial which was granted, ordering

the declaration of nullity of Solids verbal offer as the offer of First Leverage was moresuperior it being written. On appeal, the Court set aside the order, hence, First Leverageappealed to the SC contending that the CA erred in not setting aside the Judgment on the

Pleadings. Rule on the contention. Explain.Answer: The contention is not correct as the answer tendered issues. Whether the offer was moreadvantageous or not and whether the offer was validly made are issues that must be resolved at the trial.In fact, what the RTC issued as a Summary Judgment which was not even proper.A perusal of the answer would show that Solid denied the material allegations in the complaint, hence,issues were raised. Even a summary judgment is not proper in this case. (First Leverage & ServicesGroup, Inc. v. Solid Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 155680, July 12, 2012).

Forfeiture proceeding is civil in nature.QWhat is the effect if the defendant files an answer and alleges no knowledge sufficientto form a belief but done in bad faith? Explain.Answer: There is a negative pregnant which is equivalent to an admission of the material allegations inthe complaint. In the first Republic case, the SC said that petitioners give the same stock answer to theeffect that the Marcoses did not engage in any illegal activities, and that all their properties were lawfullyacquired. They failed to state with particularity the ultimate facts surrounding the alleged lawfulness of themode of acquiring the funds in Arelma (which totaled USD 3,369,975.00 back in 1983), considering thatthe entirety of their lawful income amounted only to USD 304,372.43, or only 9% of the entire Arelmafund. Then, as now, they employ what the Court in G.R. No. 152154 characterized as a negativepregnant, not just in denying the criminal provenance of the Arelma funds, but in the matter of ownershipof the said funds. As discussed by the Court in the first Republic case, cited by the Sandiganbayan:

Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negativepregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading respondedto which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Statedotherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or atleast an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admissionof the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifyinglanguage and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been heldthat the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted. (Marcos, Jr. v. Rep.,G.R. No. 189434 & companion cases, April 25, 2012, Sereno, J).

RULE 39 - EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT

Rule 39, Sec. 10 sets the procedure for execution of judgment for specific acts.

Q Spouses Soro filed an action for annulment and recovery of ownership of a real property.The RTC of Cabanatuan City rendered a judgment annulling the title and the sale. On appeal,the CA and the SC affirmed the decision. After it became final and executory, the RTC issueda writ of execution. The Register of Deeds cancelled the title and transferred it to the

prevailing parties who later on filed a motion that they be restored to possession of theproperty and the demolition of the improvements thereon. The RTC denied it because thewrit of execution must conform to the judgment which the CA affirmed. Is the rulingcorrect? Why?Answer: No. As a general rule, the writ of execution to must conform to the dispositive portion of thedecision to be executed; an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment oraward. The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essentialparticular of the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce,nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed.

Nonetheless, a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but extends as wellto those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (DHL Philippines Corp. United Rank and File


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Asso.-Federation of Free Workers v. Buklod ng Manggagawa DHL Philippines Corp., 478 Phil. 842, 853;Jaban v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 896, 904; 370 SCRA 221, 228 (2001). Thus, in Perez v. Evite, 111Phil. 564 (1961), where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery ofpossession of the land was considered included in the decision where the defeated partys claim topossession was based solely on his claim of ownership. (See also Baluyut v. Guiao, 373 Phil. 1013(1999); Tumibay, et al. v. Sps. Soro, et al., G.R. No. 152016, April 13, 2010).

5-year period to execute; 10-year to revive a judgmentQ A complaint for forcible entry was filed where the judgment became final and executory.The plaintiff moved to defer the execution of the judgment and the defendant had no handon it. Neither was there an agreement. After 5 years the plaintiff moved for execution. It

was denied due to prescription. On the 11thyear, he finally sought its revival. Will the actionprosper? Why?Answer: No, because of prescription. An action upon a judgment must be brought within 10 years fromthe time the right of action accrues. (Aart. 1144, NCC). Furthermore, the law provides that once ajudgment becomes final and executor, the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motionafter the lapse of five years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced bythe institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten years from the time the judgment becomes final.When the complaint for revival of judgment was filed, it had already been eleven (11) years from the

finality of the judgment he sought to revive. Clearly, the statute of limitations had set in. (Villeza v.German Management & Services, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 182937, August 8, 2010). It was the fault of theplaintiff, that he asked for suspension of the execution of the judgment. Being the prevailing party, heshould be more interested in the execution of the judgment. That is why the Rules provide for a period toexecute to prevent the prevailing party from sleeping on his right to execute the same.

Q A creditor has the right to redeem a property sold by virtue of a Notice of Levy on theproperty of the debtor. State the reason and when is redemption by him valid? Explain.Answer: Yes, because he has a lien over the property. (Sec. 37, Rule 39). For a valid redemption, theamount tendered must include the following: (1) the full amount paid by the purchaser; (2) with anadditional one percent per month interest on the purchase price up to the time of redemption; (3) togetherwith the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase;(4) interest on the taxes paid by the purchaser at the rate of one percent per month up to the time ofredemption; and (5) if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner,other than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, withinterest. However, in Baluyut v. Poblete,the court held that the purchaser is required to furnish copies ofthe amounts of assessments of taxes which he may have paid to inform the mortgagor or redemptioner ofthe actual amount which he should pay in case he chooses to exercise his right of redemption and if nosuch notice is given, the property may be relieved without paying such assessments or taxes. Then,in Cayton v. Zeonnix Trading Corporation, the court reiterated the ruling in Estanislao, Jr. v, Court ofAppealsthat the payment of the full purchase price and interest thereon by a redemptioner who had notbeen apprised of the amount of taxes paid by the purchaser, should already be considered sufficient forpurposes of redemption if the redemptioner immediately pays the additional amount for taxes oncenotified of the deficiency. The Court deemed this to be in consonance with the policy of the law to aidrather than defeat the right of redemption. (Torres, et al. v. Sps. Alamag, G.R. No. 169569, August 3,2010).

When res judicata applies.Q The petitioner was appointed co-special administratrix of the estate of Father Caparas

where a parcel of land located in San Juan, Metro Manila was included in the inventory. As itwas in the possession of the respondents, a motion for the issuance of a writ of possessionwas filed which was granted ordering the respondents to turn over possession of the

property to the adminsitratrix. This was questioned on certiorari. In the meantime,petitioner filed a complaint against the respondents for annulment of the title over the sameproperty and to recover the property to the estate. The respondents contended that theaction cannot prosper because of res judicata. Rule on the contention. Explain.Answer: There is no res judicata, because while there is identity of parties and subject matter in the twocases, the order granting the issuance of a writ of possession is merely a mere interlocutory order. As toidentity of causes of action, it is hornbook rule that identity of causes of action does not mean absoluteidentity, otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicataby changing the form of theaction or the relief sought.The certiorari proceedings which emanated from the intestate proceedings involved estate proceedings,while the other action is for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance, Recovery of Possession and Ownershipand Damages. These two cases differ in the form of action, but they raise the same issueownershipand possession of the same property, and they invoke the same relief for Fr. Balbinos estate to bedeclared the owner of the property and for it reconveyed to his estate, and for the TCT in the name ofrespondents to be annulled. And the evidence required to substantiate the respective claims of theparties is substantially the same.But an important requisite for the principle of res judicata is wanting. The appellate courts ruling in thecertiorari case was not a final and executory decision on the merits to put the present case within theambit of res judicata. (Reforzado v. Sps. Lopez, et al., G.R. No 148306, February 24, 2010).


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Res Judicata; Requisites; donation declared void action to quiet title will not prosper

anymore.Q A donated a property to B. After the final and executory judgment declaring the donation

void, the donee filed an action for quieting of title against the donor. A moved to dismiss thelatter action citing re judicata. B countered that there is no identity of causes of actionhence, the motion must be denied. Will the action for quieting of title will prosper? Why?

Answer: No, because of the principle of res judicata. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment,such material fact becomes binding and conclusive on the parties. When a right or fact has beenjuridically tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trialhas been given, judgment of the court as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon theparties and those in privity with him. Thus, petitioners can no longer question donors ownership over theland in the suit for quieting of title. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation ofparticular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause ofaction. (Tan v. CA, 415 Phil. 675 (2001); Sps. Noceda v. Directo, G.R. No. 178495, July 26, 2010).

Spouse is not stranger to the conjugal partnership; remedy if levied upon.Q A corporation obtained loans from the bank with the petitioner as one of the signatoriesin a Continuing Suretyship Agreement. For failure of the debtor to pay, the bank filed acomplaint for sum of money where after due proceedings. Judgment was rendered holding

defendants liable for sum of money. As the judgment has become final and executory, therewas levy upon a property of the petitioner. She filed a Motion to cancel and nullify the levy,contending that the property is not answerable for the liabilities incurred by the defendantwhich was granted. The CA reversed the order, ruling that a terceria is the proper remedy. Isthe ruling of the CA correct? Why?Answer: No. The remedy of terceriaor separate action under Sec. 16, Rule 39 is no longer availablebecause petitioner is not deemed a stranger to the case. It would have been inappropriate for him toinstitute a separate case for annulment of writ of execution. The husband of the judgment debtor cannotbe deemed a stranger to the case prosecuted and adjudged against the wife. The appropriate remedy isto file a motion to annul the execution, sell or certification of sale. (Imani v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 187023,November 17, 2010).

Q What is the remedy of a third person if his property is seized by the sheriff to answer for

a judgment against another? Explain.Answer: No, because C can file a third party claim and an action to prevent the sale of the property.When the sheriff seizes property of a third person in which the judgment debtor holds no right or interest,and so incurs in error, the supervisory power of the Court which has authorized execution may be invokedby the third person. Upon due application by the third person, and after summary hearing, the Court maycommand that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner orpossessor. What the Court can do in these instances however is limited to a determination of whetherthe sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of the judgment,more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property not belonging to the judgment debtor. TheCourt does not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with any character of finality. Itcan treat the matter only in so far as may be necessary to decide if the Sheriff has acted correctly ornot.Upon the other hand, if the claim of impropriety on the part of the sheriff in the execution proceedings is

made by a party to the action, not a stranger thereto, any relief therefrom may only be applied with, andobtained from, only the executing court; and this is true even if a new party has been impleaded in thesuit. (Ong v. Tating, 233 Phil. 261 (1987); Imani v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 187023, November 17, 2010).

APPEALQA complaint was filed and after trial, judgment was rendered. A motion forreconsideration was filed but denied, hence appeal was filed from the order denying the MR.It was contended that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the appealof Shell and Tabangao in contravention of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, whichproscribes an appeal of the denial of a motion for reconsideration.Shell and Tabangao countered that their appeal was not proscribed because the action couldbe said to be completely disposed of only upon the rendition on October 5, 1999 of theassailed resolution denying their motion for reconsideration; that, as such, the decision of

February 3, 1998 and the denial of their motion for reconsideration formed one integrateddisposition of the merits of the action; and that the CA justifiably applied the rules ofprocedure liberally. Is the appeal prohibited? Why?Answer: No. Appeal by Shell and Tabangao of the denial of their motion for reconsideration was notproscribedThe contention that the appeal by Shell and Tabangao should be rejected on the ground that an appeal ofthe denial of their motion for reconsideration was prohibited cannot be sustained. It is true that the originaltext of Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly limited an appeal to a judgmentor final order, and proscribed the taking of an appeal from an order denying a motion for new trial orreconsideration.In Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the Court has interpreted the proscription against appealing the orderdenying a motion for reconsideration to refer only to a motion for reconsideration filed against aninterlocutory order, not to a motion for reconsideration filed against a judgment or final order. That that

was the intention of the above-quoted rules is gathered from Pagtakhan v. CIR, 39 SCRA 455 (1971),


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cited in above-quoted portion of the decision in Republic, in which this Court held that an order denying amotion to dismiss an action is interlocutory, hence, not appealable.The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an interlocutory order is to preventundue delay, useless appeals and undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail ordersas they are promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a single appeal. The appropriateremedy is thus for the party to wait for the final judgment or order and assign such interlocutory order asan error of the court on appeal.The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is not an interlocutoryorder, however, but a final order as it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, or settles definitely thematter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do other than to execute the order.Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal ofa complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself. (Sps. Ramon & Araceli Mendiola v. CA,et al., G.R. No. 159746, July 18, 2012).

QIn a case, the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordinglydismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motionto set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appealthe order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibusmotion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been

filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 daysafter the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable underthe Rules. Is the ruling correct? Why?Answer: No. It was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaintwhich constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.In the more recent case ofApuyan v. Haldeman et al. the Court considered the order denying the motionfor reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners view thatthe order dated July 1, 1998denying their motion for reconsiderationwas the final order contemplated in the Rules.

Note:As the aftermath of these rulings, the Court issued its resolution in A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC toapprove certain amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the Rules of Court effective on December 27,2007. Among the amendments was the delisting of an order denying a motion for new trial or motion forreconsideration from the enumeration found in Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure ofwhat are not appealable. The amended rule now reads:Section 1. Subject of appeal.An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completelydisposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. Noappeal may be taken from:(a) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;(b) An interlocutory order;(c) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;(d) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on theground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;(e) An order of execution;(f) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the courtallows an appeal therefrom; and(g) An order dismissing an action without prejudice. In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved

party may file an appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule 65.

Neypes principle applies to criminal cases with more reason; what are at stake are life andliberty.Q Accused was charged with the crime of estafa. She was convicted. Fourteen (14) daysafter receipt of the decision, she filed a motion for new trial which was denied. On November16, 2005, she filed a notice of appeal invoking Neypes v. CA, contending that she has a fresh15-day period from November 3, 2005 the receipt of the denial of her motion or up toNovember 18, 2005 within which to file a notice of appeal. The prosecution contendedotherwise and filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days late, contendingthat the Neypes ruling is inapplicable, hence, filed a motion for execution. It was contendedthat the Neypes principle involved a civil case and the pronouncement of standardization ofthe appeal period only to civil cases. Whose contention is correct? Explain.Answer: The contention of the accused is correct. The Neypes principle is applicable to criminal caseswith more reason.The raison dtrefor the fresh period rule is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules anddo away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-dayperiod to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion forreconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-dayperiod to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion fornew trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.A strict interpretation of the fresh period rule inNeypesand make it applicable only to the period toappeal in civil cases, shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civilcase will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case a situation that gives unduefavor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a doublestandard of treatment to favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation

where liberty stands to be prejudiced. This double and unequal standard must be rejected for beingcontrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is


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contrary to reason is not allowed in lawQuod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum estin lege.(Judith Yu v. Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, et al., G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011).

RULE 58 - INJUNCTION

Injunction is not available if contract has already expired.

Q The petitioner sought to prevent NFA from awarding contracts to other agencies despitethe expiration of its contract and its failure to submit the needed requirements to qualify inthe bidding. The RTC granted the petition but the CA reversed the order. Is the ruling of theCA correct? Why?Answer: No, because petitioner has no more legal rights under the service contract which alreadyexpired. Therefore, it has not met the first vital requisite that it must have material and substantial rights tobe protected by the courts. (Manila International Airport Authority v. Olongapo Maintenance Services,Inc., G.R. Nos. 146184-85, 161117 and 167827, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 269, 288-289). Aninjunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue toprotect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to acause of action. There must exist an actual right. (Go v. Villanueva, Jr., G.R. No. 154623, March 13,2009, 581 SCRA 126, 133-134, citing Republic v. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 117733, September 5, 1997,278 SCRA 736, 749). Verily, petitioner cannot lay claim to an actual, clear and positive right based on an

expired service contract.Moreover, well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that no court can compel a party to agree to a contractthrough the instrumentality of a writ of preliminary injunction. (See Manila International Airport Authority v.Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc., supra note 33 at 289; Light Rail Transit Authority v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. Nos. 139275-76 and 140949, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 125, 139; and National

Food Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 115121-25, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 470, 479).Acontract can be renewed, revived or extended only by mutual consent of the parties. (Thunder Security &Investigation Agency, etc. v. NFA, et al., G.R. No. 182042, July 27, 2011).

RULE 70 - FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

MTCs adjudication on ownership in UD is merely provisional

Q In an unlawful detainer case, the MTC made an adjudication on ownership. What is the

nature of the decision? Explain.Answer: The courts adjudication of ownership in an ejectment case is merely provisional, and affirmanceof the trial courts decision would not prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to theproperty. Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the judgment rendered in anaction for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in nowise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an actionbetween the same parties respecting title to the land or building. (Sps. Fernandez v. Sps. Co, G.R. No167390, July 26, 2010).

Judgment in Unlawful Detainer is immediately executory; there are exceptions.

Q There was a complaint for ejectment filed by the lessor against the lessee. Judgmentwas rendered against the defendant which was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court. It wascontended by the defendant that the lessor had no more right to eject the defendant since

the property was already in the possession of the Development Bank of the Philippines afterit foreclosed the mortgage. The Court of Appeals issued an order enjoining the execution of

the judgment considering the change in the nature of the title of the lessor during thesubsistence of the lease. Is the ruling of the CA correct? Why?Answer: Yes. It is true that Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the judgment of theRegional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a furtherappeal that may be taken therefrom. However, it was ruled inBenedicto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.157604, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 363, that on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writshould circumstances require. x x x even if the RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases areimmediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted.In City of Naga v. Asuncion, 557 SCRA 528 (2008), that when exigencies in the case warrant it, theappellate court may stay the writ of execution issued by the RTC in an action for ejectment if there arecircumstances necessitating such action. An example of such exceptional circumstance can be seenin Laurel v. Abalos, 140 Phil 532 (1969). Therein, a defendant was ordered by the trial court to vacate thepremises of the disputed property and return possession thereof to the plaintiffs, but while the ejectmentcase was on appeal, a judgment was promulgated in a separate case where the sale of the property tosaid plaintiffs was declared null and void, making the plaintiffs right to possess the disputed propertyinconclusive. The Court ruled in said case that:Where the supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring about a material change inthe situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable, or where there is no compellingurgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court may stayimmediate execution of the judgment.Based on the foregoing earlier ruling in Laurel, the Court also considered it just and equitable to stay theexecution of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case against the City of Naga, stating that:Needless to reiterate, grave and irreparable injury will be inflicted on the City of Naga by the immediateexecution of the June 20, 2005 RTC Decision. x x x the people of Naga would be deprived of access tobasic social services. It should not be forgotten that the land subject of the ejectment case houses


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government offices which perform important functions vital to the orderly operation of the localgovernment. x x x

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Will of a foreigner executed abroad can be probated in the Phils.; no need for prior probate

abroad.Q In a case, petitioners maintained that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be

probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated here. This,they claimed, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country of itsexecution. They insisted that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the

proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreigncountry, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c) the probate courthas jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign

country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the validexecution of a will. Is the contention correct? Why?Answer: No. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although thesame have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can begiven legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alienwho is

abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the lawof the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.

Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitantof a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of thesettlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legateenamed in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of thetestator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in hispossession or not, or is lost or destroyed. (In Re: Palaganas v. Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, January 26,2011).

Note: Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known tothe petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, anddevisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate;(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the

court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional factsrefer to the fact of death of thedecedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if heis an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. (Cuenco v. CA, 153 Phil.115). The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in thecountry of its execution.

Judicial declaration of heirship and cancellation of entries in the civil register are notidentical.QIs there a distinction between judicial declaration of heirship and cancellation of entriesin the civil register? Explain.Answer: Yes. An action for declaration of heirship (declaracion de herederos) refers to a specialproceeding in which a person claiming the status of heir seeks prior judicial declaration of his or her rightto inherit from a decedent. (Suiliong & Co. v. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil. 13 (1908); Cabuyao v. Caagbay, 95

Phil. 614 (1954)). On the other hand, an action for cancellation of entry in the civil register refers to aspecial proceeding whereby a substantial change affecting the civil status of a party is sought through theamendment of the entry in the civil register. (Rep. v. Medina, 204 Phil. 615 (1982)).In the former, what isestablished is a partys right of succession to the decedent; in the latter, among those settled are theissues of nationality, paternity, filiation, legitimacy of the marital status, and registrability of an eventaffecting the status or nationality of an individual. Because the respective subject matters in the twoactions differ, any decision that may be rendered in one of them cannot constitute res judicatain theother. A judicial declaration of heirship is inconclusive on the fact of occurrence of an event registered orto be registered in the civil register, while changes in the entries in the civil register do not in themselvessettle the issue of succession. (United Abangan Clan, Inc. v. Yolanda Sobellano-Sumagang, et al., G.R.No. 186722, June 18, 2012).

Power to appoint administrator of an estate is discretionary.

Q Florentino and Engracia Manugas were married. After the death of Florentino, and thedistribution of his estate, a niece of Engracia, was appointed guardian of the properties and

person being incompetent. Later on, Diosdado who claimed to be the illegitimate son ofFlorentino filed a petition for letters of administration of the Estate of Engracia claiming thathe is an heir as he is the illegitimate son of Florentino. The petition was granted by the RTC,

resulting in the revocation of the appointment of her niece as administrator. Is the ordercorrect? Why?Answer: No. The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not mean thathe is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion of the

court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, it was said that it is well settled that thestatutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administratorunder Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor oradministrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection orremoval of special administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special


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administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in theselection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contraryto reason, justice or equity. (G.R. No. 162934, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 747; Diosdado Manugasv. Loreto, et al., G.R. No. 193161, August 22, 2011).

RULE 86CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE

Quasi-contracts are included in claims that should be filed under Rule 86, Sec. 5.

QA is the owner of a property. B, in good faith took possession and introduced necessaryimprovements. After his death, his heirs inherited the property, hence, B filed a complaint forreimbursement of the expenses in introducing the improvements. The heir contended thatthe claim should be filed against the estate of A. Is the contention correct? Why? Answer: Yes. A claim for necessary expenses by a possessor of a parcel of land is a kind of quasi-contract, hence, it should be filed in the estate proceedings.A claim for necessary expenses spent as previous possessor of the land is a kind of quasi-contract.Citing Leung Ben v. OBrien, it was explained that the term implied contracts, as used in our remediallaw, originated from the common law where obligations derived from quasi-contracts and from law areboth considered as implied contracts. Thus, the term quasi-contract is included in the concept impliedcontracts as used in the Rules of Court. Accordingly, liabilities of the deceased arising from quasi-

contracts should be filed as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of theRules of Court. (Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Absolute Management Corp., G.R. No. 170498,January 9, 2013, Brion, J).

RULE 108CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

Petition for change of name; adversarial proceedings; who should be impleaded.

Q The certificate of live of birth of respondent showed that he was born in Makati onSeptember 9, 1972 of the parents Fulvio Magpayo, Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim

Coseteng who contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. He alleged that his parents never gotmarried, hence, he filed a petition for change of name from Julian Edward Emerson CosetengMagpayo to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez-Lim Coseteng. He further prayed that the date

of marriage of his parents be deleted; to correct his last name to Coseteng from Magpayo;

delete the entry Coseteng as middle name; and the name of his father be deleted. Thepetition was granted. The OSG filed a MR but it was denied, hence, it went to the SCcontending that the deletion of those entries has the effect of changing his civil status fromlegitimate to illegitimate, hence, it must be effected through an adversary proceeding. Therespondent contended that it was an adversary proceeding since there was service upon theCivil Registrar General and the OSG; there was publication and posting. Is the petition of theOSG proper? Why?Answer: Yes, because the changes sought were substantial. Where a petition for cancellation orcorrection of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations including thoseon citizenship, legitimacy, paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, strict compliance with therequirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. Section 3 of Rule 108 requires that the civilregistrar and all parties who would naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correctionor cancellation of entries must be impleaded. Non-impleading of a party who may have been inadvertently

left out may be notified through publication. (Rep. V. Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng-Magpayo, G.R.No. 189476, February 2, 2011)

QIn a case, the accused claimed that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature

and cause of accusation against him was infringed when he was convicted of Murder, sincethe manner by which he carried out the killing with the qualifying circumstance of treacherywas not alleged in the Information against him. Thus, he asserted, he was effectively onlycharged with Homicide. Is the contention correct? Why?Answer: No. Under Section 6, Rule 110 the Information is sufficient if it contains the full name of theaccused, the designation of the offense given by the statute, the acts or omissions constituting theoffense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date, and the place of the offense. TheInformation herein complied with these conditions. Contrary to his contention, the qualifying circumstanceof treachery was specifically alleged in the Information. The rule is that qualifying circumstances must

be properly pleaded in the Information in order not to violate the accuseds constitutional right to beproperly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.He never claimed that he wasdeprived of his right to be fully apprised of the nature of the charges against him due to the insufficiencyof the Information. (People v. Asilan, G.R. No. 188322, April 11, 2012).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURERULE 111PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

Prejudicial QuestionQ After the death of Bella Torres, her daughter Rosemary filed a petition for the issuanceof letters testamentary. There was an opposition by petitioner but there was a compromiseagreement between them which was approved by the intestate court. Later on, Peter andCatherine who claimed to be biological children of Bella filed an action for declaration ofnullity of the compromise alleging that they were entitled to inherit from the estate of Bella.

Rosemary filed an answer alleging that the plaintiffs in the annulment case were notbiological children of Bella but were merely purchased from third persons. This was never


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revealed to them and that they were not legally adopted. While the action for the annulment

of judgment was pending before the CA, they filed a complaint for falsification and perjuryagainst Rosemary, alleging that Rosemary and petitioner falsely and maliciously stated in

pertinent pleadings before the RTC of Pasig that the late Bella had only two heirs, thepetitioner and Rosemary. There was a motion to suspend the criminal action on the groundof prejudicial question. They argued that the issue of whether Peter, etc. are related to Bella

and therefore legal heirs of the latter was pending before the CA. The same was denied. Wasthe denial proper? Why?Answer: No. For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend a criminal action, it must appear not onlythat said civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would bebased, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocenceof the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial questionis to avoid two conflicting decisions.Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of thecriminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present:(1)the present civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecutionwould be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocenceof the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodgedin another tribunal. (Rule 111, Sec. 6, Rules of Court).

A perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows that the case pending before theCourt of Appeals is principally for the determination of the validity of the compromise agreement which didnot include Peter, Catherine, and Fannie as heirs of Bella. Peter, Catherine and Fannie presentedevidence to prove that they are also biological children of Bella and Alejandro. On the other hand, criminalcases before the MeTC involve the determination of whether petitioner committed falsification of publicdocuments in executing pleadings containing untruthful statements that she and Rosemary were the onlyheirs of Bella.It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in thecriminal cases for falsification of public documents. The criminal cases arose out of the claim of Peter,Catherine and Fannie and that they are also the legal heirs of Bella. If it is finally adjudged in the civilcase that they are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not entitled to a share in herestate as heirs, there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal cases against petitioner who could nothave committed falsification in her pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig City, the truth of herstatements regarding the filiation of Peter, Catherine and Fannie having been judicially settled.

(Zuzuarregui v. Hon. Joselito Villarosa, et. al., G.R. No. 183788, April 5, 2010).

Civil liability despite acquittal.Q The accused was acquitted beyond reasonable doubt in a charge for violation of BP 22for failure to prove actual receipt of the notice of dishonor of the check. But despiteacquittal, he was held civilly liable. State the effect of acquittal on the civil liability of anaccused. Explain.Answer: The accuseds acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove all elements of the offense beyondreasonable doubt does not include the extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored checks.Despite acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action doesnot carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt asonly preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is onlycivil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of whichthe accused was acquitted. (Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, 515 SCRA 502 (2007)). In a number ofsimilar cases, it was held that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of civildamages. (Bax v. People, G.R. No. 149858, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 284; Domangsang v. CA,G.R. No. 139292, December 5, 2000, 347 SCRA 75; Alfarez v. People, et al., G.R. No. 182301, January31, 2011).

No independent civil action under BP 22.

Q During the pendency of a case for violation of BP22, a civil action for the recovery of sumof money equivalent to the check was filed. The lower courts dismissed the civil action. Onappeal, it was contended that the dismissal was not correct because the liability under the

civil code is separate from the liability under the penal law and the civil action can beprosecuted independently of BP22. Is the contention proper? Why?Answer: No. Supreme Court Circular 57-97 provides that the criminal action for violation of BatasPambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and noreservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, itmay be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If theapplication is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with the pertinent procedureoutlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated.The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial ManufacturingCorporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation, thus:This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditorsactually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases foractual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis andsometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action inthe criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for

collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases.Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be


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filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separatefiling of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which meansthat one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The onlyinstance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminalcase. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We havepreviously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of thedishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties andwould further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Wherepetitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separateaction to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions forviolation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.(Heirs of Simon v. Chan, et al., G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011).

Action for nullity of marriage is not prejudicial to a case of parricide.Q The wife filed a complaint for parricide against the husband in 2004. In 2005, the

husband filed a complaint for nullity of marriage and moved to suspend the criminal case onthe ground of a prejudicial question. The RTC denied it. A petition for certiorari was filedwith the CA which sustained the ruling where it said that even if the marriage between

petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal

case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime offrustrated parricide had already been committed. It ruled that all that is required for thecharge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, themarriage is still subsisting, hence, a petition for certiorari with the SC where the only issue iswhether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question thatwarrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.Decide.Answer: No, it is not a prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previouslyinstituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequentcriminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action mayproceed. (Section 7,

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