reluctant warriors: the united states, the soviet union, and arms controlby coit d. blacker

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Reluctant Warriors: The United States, the Soviet Union, and Arms Control by Coit D. Blacker Review by: William G. Hyland Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 5 (Summer, 1987), p. 1100 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043213 . Accessed: 16/06/2014 12:47 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foreign Affairs. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 62.122.78.43 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 12:47:35 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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Reluctant Warriors: The United States, the Soviet Union, and Arms Control by Coit D.BlackerReview by: William G. HylandForeign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 5 (Summer, 1987), p. 1100Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043213 .

Accessed: 16/06/2014 12:47

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to ForeignAffairs.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 62.122.78.43 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 12:47:35 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1100 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

which tend in the other direction?that of limiting options. Theodore

Jarvis concludes that while strategic defenses on both sides would complicate planning for an offensive strike, the existence of strategic defense would

perforce mean granting some degree of automation in the decision to use

weapons. A great paradox is that delegating authority to use nuclear

weapons may increase deterrence, while maintaining all authority in one

central place (i.e., with the president) could create vulnerabilities.

ESSAYS ON ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY. Edited by Bernard F. Halloran. Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1987, 395 pp. $12.00 (paper).

This book is an answer to a researcher's prayer: in one volume a collection of classic and near-classic articles has been assembled by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to honor its 25th anniversary. The essays span almost 40 years, starting with one of Bernard Brodie's pieces in 1948 and

ending with "Maintaining Global Stability" by James Schlesinger. Still

provocative and worth rereading is Thomas Schelling's "What Went Wrong With Arms Control?", in which he suggests that effective arms control ended with the ABM treaty in 1972. Notably absent from this collection, as well as many similar ones, is an essay evaluating the 25-year record of the agency itself.

NUCLEAR FALLACY: DISPELLING THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY. By Morton H. Halperin. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987, 173

pp. $19.95. This slender essay marks the return to the strategic field of Halperin,

who coauthored (with Thomas Schelling) Strategy and Arms Control, one of the pioneering works in arms control studies. Halperin argues that most of

the history of nuclear confrontations since the 1940s has become myth: nuclear threats were "never" decisive in these crises; but the mythology has imprisoned American strategy, and created a dangerous reliance on

nuclear threats. His solution is a familiar one: disavow any military use of nuclear weapons except in extreme circumstances and then only for "dem onstration." Under the Halperin alternative, the president would inform the joint chiefs of staff never to plan on using any nuclear weapons.

RELUCTANT WARRIORS: THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, AND ARMS CONTROL. By Cok D. Blacker. New York: Free

man, 1987, 193 pp. $12.95 (paper). A straightforward chronological narrative and analysis of arms control

negotiations and maneuvering between the two superpowers. The author

strives for and achieves an objectivity rare in this field. He concludes on a

mild note of pessimism because each superpower is still too suspicious of the other's intentions. For the near term, he argues that to prevent matters

from worsening the two sides should reaffirm and stick to the ABM treaty, rather than risk the unknown of SDL

THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF WAR. By Seyom Brown. New York: St. Martin's, 1987, 274 pp. $32.50.

The author's approach is not to study the causes of particular wars, but to examine a wide variety of potential contributing causes. He carefully and systematically goes through both functional and structural issues that

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