ReligiousorMinority?ExaminingtheRealisationofInternationalStandardsinRelationtoReligiousMinoritiesintheMiddleEastNAZILAGHANEAABSTRACTThe Middle East region has had a long, and periodically impressive, record of religious diversity, yetthere is much concern regarding the contemporary standing of its religious minorities. Rather thanassessing the chequered historical record of religious minorities in the Middle East, the purpose ofthisarticleistoprovideanassessmentofhowinternationalhumanrightsstandardsmaybestbeutilisedtoadvancetheirrights.Thecontentionofthisarticleisthatthehumanrightsofreligiousminorities in the Middle East have primarily been considered under the lens of freedom of religion orbelief. Relevant though this framework is to their concerns, it will be suggested that promoting therights of theMiddleEasts religious minorities throughtheframeworkof minorityrights mayprovideamorepromisingavenuefortheirprotection. Thepurposeofthearticleisthereforetoprovide a reassessment of how best to negotiate the rights of religious minorities in the Middle East.The focus will be on formal legal and political obstacles to the enjoyment of their rights entitlements.Thoughabroadercontextual analysisalsoassessingeconomic, cultural andsociological factorswouldbe highlyinformative,itlies beyondthe scopeof this article.Despitethe factthatminorityrightsprovisionsapplytomembersofminoritiesalongsideallotherhumanrightsamongthemfreedomofreligionorbeliefthetwolensesofminorityrightsandfreedomofreligionorbeliefhighlight somewhat dierent provisions and protections. The two are certainly not mutuallyexclusive or in contradiction with one another, but a state that prioritises one set of legal and policyoptionsover the other willarrive in dierent places.HistoricalOverview:MinoritiesoftheReligiousKindinInternationalLawProtectionforreligiousminoritiesininternational lawcouldhardlybeof ahigherpedigree. It has a record dating back to the mid- to late 1600s (see Thornberry, 1993;Evans, 1997), when successive treaties sought toprovide protection for religiousminorities. The scope of these legal agreements, however, should not be overstated orromanticised. The underlying concern was that of security, and the scope of protectionwastightlydrawnintermsbothofgeographyandofbeneciaries. Theprotectionswerediscreteratherthangenerallyapplicableandtheobjectivewasthemaintenanceof the status quo rather than motivated by broader humanitarian concerns.Nevertheless, the fact remains that international legal awareness of the needforparticularprotectionforreligiousminoritiespre-datedtheemergenceofthemodernhumanrightsmovementbysome300years.Religion,State&Society,Vol.36,No.3,September2008ISSN0963-7494print;ISSN1465-3974online/08/030303-23 2008Taylor&FrancisDOI:10.1080/09637490802260385The post-First WorldWar periodandthe Treaty of Versailles acceleratedthisconcern and a new generation of religious minority protection clauses were enshrinedasnon-negotiableelementsofemergingpeacetreaties(Thio,2005).Insum,itwouldbe noexaggerationto suggestthatthe rootsof minorityrightsareto be found intheprotection of religious minorities in Europe, protections that were enshrined explicitlyin bilateral and multilateral treaties over three centuries. This was all the moreremarkableconsideringthefactthattheproposedLeagueofNationsArticle21hadfailed on the grounds that protection for racial minorities was deemed unpalatable bythe great powers of the time. Some 90years on, however, racial minorities enjoyformal protections that religious minorities can only be dazzled by in envy (seeGhanea,2003b).Whatisclear,however,isthatreligiousminoritiesareformallycoveredinhumanrights protections oered under both freedom of religion or belief and minority rights these being in addition to human rights standards that apply to all regardless of thesecategories. The question to be tackled in this article is that of which framework oersmore, inwhatcircumstances, toreligiousminorities, andparticularlyhowaccesstothese frameworks applies in the Middle East context. Though a distinction can rightlybe made between the enjoyment of these rights as they apply to individual members ortocommunitiesof religionorbelief intheMiddleEast, itsexaminationcannot beentered into in this article.FreedomofReligionorBeliefinInternationalHumanRightsLawThe modern humanrights era, or post-United Nations age, is when religious libertycametobeenshrinedasasubjectworthyofindependentprotectionininternationalhumanrights. Theformof itsencapsulationconsistentlyasreligionorbelief hasimportant implications in terms of both its scope and its challenge. Four main sourcesinformus of its keyelements: Article 18of the Universal Declarationof HumanRights (UDHR, 1948); Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights(ICCPR, 1966); General Comment22oftheUNHumanRightsCommitteeconsidering Article 18 of the ICCPR(HRC, GC22, 1993) and the 1981 UNDeclarationontheEliminationof IntoleranceandDiscriminationontheBasis ofReligionorBelief (UN, 1981). Fromthesesources, andparticularlythelatter, onemayidentifythefollowingelements.(A)NoDerogationThe Human Rights Committee draws attention to the fundamental character of thisfreedombeingreectedinthefactthatitcannotbederogatedfromevenintimeofpublicemergency(HRC, GC22, para. 1). Minorityrightsprovisionsaresubjecttoderogationintimes of public emergency, whichsuggests bothaless fundamentalnaturecomparedtofreedomof religionorbelief aswell asthewiderscopeof theprotectionsminorityrightsoers.(B)ScopeFreedom of religion and belief1is far-reaching and profound; it encompasses freedomof thought onall matters, personal convictionandthecommitment toreligionorbelief,whethermanifestedindividuallyorincommunitywithothers(HRC,GC22,para. 1). It includes theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not304 NazilaGhaneato profess any religion or belief (HRC, GC 22, para. 2). It should not be restricted totraditional religions alone (HRC, GC 22, para. 2) nor to ocial ones alone (HRC, GC22, paras9and10). Amajorlimitationofminorityrightscomparedtofreedomofreligionorbelief protectionsisthat minorityrightsexplicitlyprotect onlyreligiousminorities.Itisnotatallclearwhetheritsprotectionistocoverbeliefcommunitiesaswellornot.Consideringthelackofagreeddenitionofreligionininternationallawandthecleardecisiontoextendfreedomofreligiontothought, conscienceandtherefore belief, it may be assumed that minority rights protection should also stretchtobelief whereindeedtherearecommunal aspectsthat call uponit. Theprincipalreason for this is that states often attempt to restrict religion or belief rightsentitlements only to specic recognised religions. This reduces religion or belief rightsto privileges extendable only by state decree. Regardless of that challenge, however, itis clear for example that Scientologists in Germany or the Ahmadiyyah in Pakistan area minority community that cannot be subsumed under linguistic or ethniccharacteristics. Inother instances non-theisticbelief communities maynot wishtobereferredtoasreligions,yettheywouldstillwishtoavailthemselvesofminorityprotections. HenceIcontendthatminorityrightsprotectionshouldextendtobeliefcommunities,wheretheyconsistofanalogouscommunitieswithasenseofsolidaritytowardspreservingtheirbelief-basedcharacteristics.(C)ForumInternum/Externum?Whilehaving oradopting areligionorbelief shouldnot besubject tocoercion,manifestingreligionorbeliefmaybesubjecttosuchlimitationsasareprescribedbylawand are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or thefundamentalrightsandfreedomsofothers(ICCPR,Article18,para.3).Thesetwoaspectsarereferredtoastheforuminternum, enjoymentoftherightsofwhichareabsolute,andtheforumexternum,enjoymentofwhichmaybesubjecttolimitation.Such duality of protection between identity status and expression of minoritycharacteristics (be they religious, linguistic or ethnic) is not distinguished with respectto minority rights. Its assertion in freedom of religion or belief, however, is itself morelegal myththanofpractical consequence. Althoughhavingorchangingreligionorbeliefisnotsubjecttolimitation, clearlyextensivelimitationsonmanifestationcanputsuchpressureonindividualsandcommunitiesofreligionorbeliefthathavingitselfisactuallylimited.Ontheotherhand,ifthereisanenvironmentconducivetomanifestationof religionsandbeliefs, thereismorelikelihoodof individualsbeinginformedabout minority communities andtheir beliefs andtherefore of possiblychoosingtochangereligionorbelieftojointhem.(D)Non-CoercionCoercionhasbeendenedbytheUNHumanRightsCommitteeasthatwhichwould impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the useofthreat ofphysical forceorpenal sanctionstocompel believersornon-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs and congregations, to recant theirreligionorbeliefortoconvert.Policiesorpracticeshavingthesameeect,suchas, for example, thoserestrictingaccess toeducation, medical care,employment or. . .other provisions of the Covenant are similarlyincon-sistent witharticle18.3 [regardingnon-coercion]. (HRC, GC22, para.5)ReligiousorMinority? 305Thisfreedomfromcoerciontohaveortoadopt areligionorbelief. . .cannot berestricted(HRC,GC22,para.8).Coercionisnotaconceptthatndsitswayintominority rights, though of course discrimination and external pressures are oftentimesbornebyminoritieswithrespecttotheirminoritystatusandcharacteristics.(E)NoOnetobeCompelledtoRevealHisorHerReligionorBeliefLinkedtotheaboveistheobservationthattheUNHumanRightsCommitteehasemphasisedthatnoonecanbecompelledtoreveal histhoughtsoradherencetoareligion or belief (HRC, GC 22, para. 3). This requirement of not being compelled toreveal this component of identity, which may in turn trigger certain rights to accrue tothe beneciary, is not so clearly recognised with respect to minorities. The independenttreaty body the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has taken theapproach of highlighting self-identication by the individual concerned (CERD, GC8, 1990, para. 2) as the means of identifying the rights holders in its sphere of concern racial or ethnic groups. The Committee goes further to express concern that if states usetheirowndiscretionordieringcriteriainordertoassesswhichgroupsconstituteethnic or indigenous groups, this may lead to dierent treatment. Instead, theCommittee believes there is an international standard concerning the specic rights ofpeople belonging to such groups, together with generally recognized norms concerningequal rights for all andnon-discrimination (CERD, GC24, 1999, para. 3). The1992UNDeclarationontheRights of Persons BelongingtoNational or Ethnic,ReligiousandLinguisticMinorities(Minorities, 1992) notesthat Nodisadvantageshall result for any person belonging to a minority as the consequence of the exercise ornon-exercise of the rights set forthinthe present Declaration (Minorities, 1992,Article 3.2).Whilefreedomofreligionorbeliefemphasisesnon-compulsioninrevealingonesreligion or belief, minority rights oers special rights on the basis of minoritybelonging. This therefore compels individuals belongingtoreligious minorities toidentify their religion or belief in order to avail themselves of minority rightsentitlements. A tension arises between the need to identify minorities if they are to beprotected and the religious freedom right of not being forced to reveal ones religion orbelief. While the desirability of the standard of voluntary self-identication remains,certain costs will still be incurred by those who do not want to reveal their religion orbelief.States,however,needtobesensitivetothereluctanceofminoritieswhohavesuereddiscriminationorevenpersecutiontoself-identityasminorities. Theaddedcomplexitywithregardtoreligiousminorities stems fromthepossibleincoherencebetweentheforuminternumandtheforumexternumforsome:thoseindividualswhomaintaincultural identicationwithaparticularreligionorbelief whilst nolongerretaining, orwhilebeingsomewhat ambivalent about, itsbeliefsand/orlaws. Suchindividualsmaywishtomanifestaspectsofthereligionorbeliefincommunitywithothers while not in fact being fully convinced about internally holding that religion orbelief. The voluntaryaspect of self-identication, therefore, becomes all the morepertinent.(F)MoreVigilancewithRespecttoNon-DominantStatusFurther totheclaricationregardingthewidescopeof religionor belief, theUNHumanRightsCommitteeexpressesconcernforthosewhondthemselvesagainstthestreamofthedominantorocial religionorbelief. TheCommitteeviewswith306 NazilaGhaneaconcernanytendencytodiscriminateagainst anyreligionorbelief foranyreason(HRC,GC22,para.2).Additionally,The fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or that it is establishedasocial ortraditional orthatitsfollowerscomprisethemajorityofthepopulation, shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of therights under the Covenant. . .nor in any discrimination against adherents toother religions or non-believers.(HRC, GC 22,para. 9)Further,If aset of beliefs is treatedas ocial ideologyinconstitutions, statutes,proclamations of ruling parties, etc., or in actual practice, this shall not resultin any impairment of the freedoms under article 18 or any other rights recog-nized under the Covenant nor in any discrimination against persons who donot accept the ocialideology or whooppose it. (HRC, GC 22, para.10)TheCommitteealsorecognisestheinterrelatednessof freedomof religionorbeliefandminorityrights:. . .the rights of religious minorities and of other religious groups to exercisetherightsguaranteedbyarticles18and27,andagainstactsofviolenceorpersecutiondirectedtowards those groups. The Committee wishes tobeinformed of measures taken by States parties concerned to protect thepracticesof all religionsorbeliefsfrominfringement andtoprotect theirfollowersfromdiscrimination.(HRC,GC22,para.9)CollectiveRightsRegardingFreedomofReligionorBelief?A20-year draftingeort complementingthesestandards resultedinthe1981UNDeclarationontheEliminationof IntoleranceandDiscriminationontheBasis ofReligionor Belief (UN, 1981). Whilst inpart it echoes the above standards, theDeclarations addedvalue is mainlyinterms of its Article 6, whichoers anon-exhaustivelistofthescopeoffreedomofthought,conscience,religionorbelief.Allthe provisions of this article relate to the collective aspects of this freedom: assemblingfor worshipandmaintainingplaces of worship(6a); establishingandmaintainingcharitable institutions (6b); acquiring and using articles required for customs and rites(6c); publishinganddistributingpublications (6d); teachingreligionor belief (6e);receiving nancial and other contributions (6f); training leaders and calling into beingtheleadershipof thereligionorbelief (6g); celebratingholidaysandceremonies(6h);communicatingregardingthereligionorbelief withindividualsandinstitutions, atnational or international levels (6i). While the 1981 Declaration does not referexplicitlyto the collectiveright to freedomof religionor belief, or indeedto religiousminorities (see Ghanea, 2003b), it is signicant that virtually all the concrete examplesof the protected freedom in Article 6 involve the collective right. The only reference isthe standard one that this right includes the freedom of everyone to manifest religionor belief in community with others (UN, 1981, Article 1). In 1986 the formerReligiousorMinority? 307UNCommission on Human Rights appointed a mandate holder with specicresponsibilityinteraliatopromotethestandardsof theDeclaration. Themandate(knownbefore2000asthespecialrapporteuronreligiousintolerance,butsincethenas thespecial rapporteuron freedomof religionorbelief)wasmostrecently renewedbytheUNHumanRightsCouncilon14December2007(Resolution,2007).Inherreports the current special rapporteur onfreedomof religionor belief has drawnattentiontotheparticularlyvulnerablesituation ofanumberofgroups, includingminorities, with regard to their freedom of religion or belief (Jahangir, 2007, para. 11).ShehasalsorecommendedthatStatesshoulddeviseproactivestrategiesinordertopreventviolationsforreasonsofreligionorbelief(Jahangir,2007,para.31).Freedom of religion or belief standards alone appear to go no further than passivelytracing the possibility of collective manifestation of this freedom. Their explicitprotectionofcollectiverightsneedsstrengthening.MinorityRightsinInternationalHumanRightsLawMinorityrightsareexplicitlyconcernedwiththeprotectionof collectiveaspectsofindividual rights. Theextenttowhichtheyadditionallyprotectgrouprightsperse,rather than the existence of a group so that individual rights holders may benet fromgroupprotection,remainsamatterofmuchcontention.Neverthelesstheircollectiveaspectisbeyonddispute.Adetaileddiscussionofthispointisunfortunatelybeyondthescopeofthisarticle.Furthermore,itisunderstoodthatminorityrightsaretobeenjoyedinadditiontoexistingrights. The UN has recognised them as special rights that accrue to personsbelongingtominoritiesontheunderstandingthatequalityalonewouldnotprovidesucient protectionagainst discrimination. Minorityrights as special rights allowmembers of minority communities to start o on a platformof equality withmajorities.AstheUNindependentexpertonminorityissueshasobserved,Minority rights go beyond anti-discrimination to address the issues of thosewho may seek to promote and preserve their distinct identity. Theopportunity toparticipate fully andeectively inall aspects of society,while preserving group identity, is essential to true equality and may requirepositive steps onthe part of government. Minority rights. . .are aboutrecognizingthat,owingtotheirminoritystatusanddistinctidentity,somegroups are disadvantaged and are at times targeted, and that thesecommunitiesneedspecial protectionandempowerment. All Statesshouldseek to realize the goal of equality in diversity, in law and in fact.(McDougall,2006,para.84).Whilst thereis nodenitionof minority agreedininternational legal provisions,reference to minorities is routinely prefaced by the designations ethnic, religious orlinguistic. Religious minorities, as we shall see, have always beenassumedtobepart andparcel of the minorities regime, but have infact rarely beenprotectedthroughit.TheUNerastartedoutwith30yearsofdownplaying,ifnotoutrightrejection,ofminorityrights.TheUNhadbeenbuiltontheashesoftheSecondWorldWar,andHitler achieved interimvictories at least in part through his exploitation of theminorities clauses of the Treaty of Versailles; it was also formed just three years beforethecomingtopowerofSouthAfricasapartheidgovernment.Therewasnoappetite308 NazilaGhaneaintheUNforprovisionsforminorities. Infact, theideologyof thetimeheldthatuniversal rights wouldbe the panaceaforall ills;equalityservedas the answerto all,andremovedthepremiseforanykindofsinglingoutofcategoriesofrightsholders.It took a number of decades forthe realisation to dawnthat equal treatment oftenresulted in discrimination for those who started lower down the pecking order. If, forexample, the Brahmins and the Dalits are treated equally in India, the discriminationagainst theDalitswill onlybecomefurtherentrenched. Equal treatment couldtooeasily continue,orfailtocure,discriminationagainst thosewhohadpreviouslybeenunequal; it merely concealed that inequality with the gloss of equal treatment. In 1976the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) came into force. ItsArticle27holdsthatIn those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, personsbelonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community withthe other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess andpractisetheir own religion, or to use theirown language.TheUNHumanRightsCommittee, however, tooksomeyearstofeel comfortablewiththis provisionandtoutiliseit, but it eventuallystartedreectingonit initsjurisprudence and referred to it in drafting its 1994 General Comment 23 on Article 27of theICCPRregardingtherightsofminorities. It wasCapotortis1977UNSub-Commission study that triggered a gradual return to a reinvigorated notion ofminorities, this time under the UNs umbrella. Capatorti, who was a UNSub-Commissionexpert,heldthataminorityisagroup, numericallyinferiortotherestofthepopulationofaState, inanon-dominant position, whosemembers beingnationals of theStatepossessethnic, religiousorlinguisticcharacteristicsdieringfromthoseoftherest of the population and show,if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity,directedtowardspreservingtheirculture, traditions, religionorlanguage.(Capotorti,1977)Then in 1978 the UNstarted a drafting eort that resulted in the 1992 UNDeclaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious andLinguistic Minorities (Minorities, 1992). Later still, from1995 to 2006, the UNsponsored the annual meeting of the UNSub-Commission Working Group onMinorities. In the aftermath of change from the UN Commission on Human Rights totheUNHumanRightsCouncil(seeGhanea,2006a),thiswillhenceforthbemeetingfor just twodays per annumas the newForumonMinorityIssues (Resolution,2007b).Some 30years hadpassedfromthe formationof the UN, therefore, before itsconcern for minorities came into full eect. This 30-year question mark over minorityrights meant that minority protection ceased to be the primary vehicle through whichreligiousfreedomswereaddressedontheinternational plane (Evans, 1997, p. 183).Whenreligiousminoritiesfacediscriminationandpersecutionasagroup,then,theircaseisaddressedunderthefreedomofreligionorbelief umbrellaininternationalhumanrightsandnotunderminorityrights. Thisobservationcanbededucedfromtheexaminationofthejurisprudenceof UNtreatybodiessuchas theHumanRightsCommittee, butalsofromhowsuchviolationshavebeenhandledbyUNCharter-basedbodiesforexampleunderthe1235and(nowrevised)1503procedures,inanReligiousorMinority? 309analysisof thereports ofmandate holderssuchas thespecial rapporteuronfreedomofreligionorbelief,andthelackofconsiderationtodatebytheindependentexperton minority issues. For example, on being appointed to this mandate the latter did notlist the 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Intolerance and Discrimination onthe Basis of Religion or Belief (UN, 1981) as part of the UN instruments she believedto be most relevant to minority issues, whereas she even listed the 1989 Convention ontheRightsoftheChildasbeingso(McDougall,2006,para.11).2CollectiveRightsforReligiousMinorities?Havingobservedthat religiousminoritiesarerarelyconsideredundertheminorityrightsframework, weneedtoaskthequestionastowhattheywouldhopetogainfromsuch a consideration. What added benets could accrue regarding theirprotection,whicharenotalreadyduplicated,ifnotenhanced,withinthefreedomofreligion or belief framework? In view of the fact that the latter is the lex specialis, whatistheretobegainedfromminorityrights?AsinthesectionFreedomof ReligionorBelief inInternational HumanRightsLaw above, I shall identifythree mainsources as informingthe keyelements ofminority rights: Article 27 of the ICCPR; General Comment 23 of the Human RightsCommitteeonArticle27(HRC,GC23,1994);andthe1992MinoritiesDeclaration(Minorities, 1992). Some key elements in minority rights which could serve tocomplement and enhance the protection of religious minorities beyond the protectionsoeredwithinfreedomofreligionorbelieffollow.(A)CultureandReligionArticle 27 holds that persons belonging to religious minorities shall not be denied theright, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture,toprofess andpractise their ownreligion, or touse their ownlanguage. Whileprofessing and practising their own religion would appear to be the most appropriateoftheenjoymentsaccruingtoreligiousminorities, somereligiouscommunitiesmayworshipinalanguagedieringfromthemajoritycommunity.Furthermorethetermculture maybethemost apt descriptionfor their literature, symbols, cumulativemanifestation and practice of relevant rites, customs, observances for exampleholidays,dietarycodes,fasting,pilgrimage,worshipandaseparatecalendaragainespeciallywhenthesedierfromthoseofwidersociety.(B)InCommunitywithOthersThelanguageof Article27echoesthat of Article18of theICCPR. However, theformerprotectstherightofpersonsbelongingto religiousminoritiestohavetheirrights protected in community with the other members of their group regarding theircultureandtheprofessionandpracticeoftheirreligion; whereasthelatterprotectsonlymanifestationeither individuallyor incommunitywithothers,andinpublicorprivate. . .in worship, observance, practice and teaching though the implications ofthisaretobebroadlyconstruedandnotrestrictedtoocialortraditionalreligions(HRC,GC22,paras.9and10).Itistoinclude:not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as the observance ofdietaryregulations, the wearingof distinctive clothingor headcoverings,310 NazilaGhaneaparticipation in rituals associated with certain stages of life, and the use of aparticular language customarily spoken by a group. In addition, the practiceandteachingof religionorbelief includesactsintegral totheconduct byreligious groups of their basic aairs, such as the freedomto choosetheir religious leaders, priests and teachers, the freedomto establishseminariesorreligiousschoolsandthefreedomtoprepareanddistributereligioustextsorpublications.(HRC,GC22,para.4)Thescopeof thecollectiveelement inminorityrightsis, nevertheless, morewidelydrawnthanthatoutlinedmorespecicallyinfreedomofreligionorbelief.(C)AGroupSharingParticularCharacteristicsMinority rights are to be enjoyed by persons who belong to a group and who share incommona culture,a religionand/ora language (HRC, GC23,para.5.1).There areno other conditions on the enjoyment of these rights, not even citizenship orpermanent residence. The Human Rights Committee has claried that these rights aretobeenjoyedequallybymigrantworkersorevenvisitors.(D)ExistencetobeEstablishedObjectivelyThe Human Rights Committee has emphasised that The existence of an ethnic, religiousor linguistic minority in a given State party does not depend upon a decision by that Stateparty but requires to be established by objective criteria (HRC, GC 23, para. 5.2). Nofreedomof religionor belief standardmakes suchaclear declarationof objectiveestablishment regardingreligious minorities and, bydeduction, theexistenceof areligion in a particular country. In General Comment 22, however, it is made clear thatreligionorbeliefshouldbebroadlyconstruedandnotlimitedtotraditionalreligions(HRC,GC22,para.2).Sinceself-identicationhasbeenhighlightedbyhumanrightsbodiessuchasCERDasthepreferredmeansofestablishingaparticularindividualsidenticationas amember of aminority, this raises aninterestingtensionbetweenobjective identication of the existence of the minority group as a whole alongside self-identication by individuals in relation to that group.Theemphasis onobjectivecriteriais important inpreventingstates denyingtherelevanceofminorityrightsbyjustdeclaringthattheyhavenominorities.Objectivecriteria should privilege self-identication as well as considering independent legal andpolicyanalysesoftheexistenceofgroupsinthelight ofdenitionssuchasthatofCapotorti. Existence ofminoritiesshouldnotjustrelyonthequestionofpoliticalconvenienceforthestatesconcerned.Thecriterionofobjectivityhasnotspecicallybeenraisedinrelationtofreedomofreligionorbeliefcommunitiesininternationalstandards,buttheclarityifoerswouldbeadvantageous.(E)PositiveMeasuresofProtectionRequiredMinorityrightsarecontingentontheabilityoftheminoritygrouptomaintainitsculture, language or religion (HRC, GC 23, para. 6.2). The Human RightsCommitteedrawsfromthisthatAccordingly, positivemeasuresbyStatesmayalsobenecessarytoprotectthe identity of a minority and the rights of its members to enjoy and developReligiousorMinority? 311their culture and language and to practise their religion, in community withother members of the group. . .as longas those measures are aimedatcorrectingconditionswhichpreventorimpairtheenjoymentoftherightsguaranteed under article 27, they may constitute a legitimate dierentiationunder the Covenant, provided that they are based on reasonable andobjectivecriteria.(HRC,GC23,para.6.2)While cautious that suchpositive measures shouldbe reasonable andobjectivelybased, the Human Rights Committee is applying the possible need for positivemeasures to religious minorities qua a minority and not qua a group. The relevance ofpositive measures with regard to religion is not found in any of the freedom of religionor belief instruments. In this regard, therefore, minority rights extend the protection ofreligiousminoritiesbothindividuallyandcollectively.(F)EectiveParticipationTheHumanRightsCommitteealsocommentsthattheenjoymentofcultural rightsmay require positive legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the eectiveparticipationof members of minoritycommunities indecisions whichaect them(HRC, GC 23, para. 7). The relevance of cultural rights to freedom of religion or beliefwasoutlinedabove. Hereagain, minorityrightsextendstheprotectionof religiousminorities, as no instruments concerned with freedom of religion or belief delineate theneedfortheeectiveparticipationofmembersindecisionsaectingthem.Logicallythis wouldat least include the areas outlinedregardingmanifestationworship,observance, practiceand teaching.The Minorities Declaration further calls for their full participation in the economicprogress and development of their country, due regard for the legitimate interests ofpersons belonging to minorities and state cooperation with themon questionsrelating to them in order to promote mutual understanding and condence, as well asadvancing respect for their rights (Minorities, 1992, Article 4.5, Article 5, Article 6 andArticle7).ThereisnoparallelrequirementreectedintheReligiousDiscriminationDeclaration.(G)SurvivalandContinuedDevelopmentofIdentityThe objective of minority rights is directed towards ensuring the survival andcontinueddevelopmentofthecultural,religiousandsocialidentityoftheminoritiesconcerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole. . .. States parties,therefore, have an obligation to ensure that the exercise of these rights is fullyprotected (HRC, GC 23, para. 9). Freedom of religion or belief standards themselvesmakenomentionofbeingdirectedtowardsthesurvivalandcontinueddevelopmentof religiousminorities, let alone observing that this would enrich the fabric of societyatlarge.This positive purposive approach is unfortunately not cast as the objective offreedomofreligionorbeliefininternationalstandards.Bywayofexample,suchanobjective is not outlined in the preamble to the Religious Discrimination Declaration.Instead, the purpose behind the Declaration is cast in negative terms in recognition ofthewars,greatsuering, foreigninterferenceandhatredcausedbydisregardofthisfreedom(UN, 1981, preambular paragraph 3). The preamble of the MinoritiesDeclaration, however, considers the promotion and protection of the rights of persons312 NazilaGhaneabelongingtointeraliareligiousminoritiesasanintegralpartofthedevelopmentofsocietyas awhole andas acontributiontothe strengtheningof friendshipandcooperation among peoples and States (Minorities, 1992, preambular para. 6).Ensuring the survival and continued development of religious identity is not explicitlystressedanywhereinfreedomofreligionorbeliefinstruments.Perhapsthedierentfacets Gunn draws out regarding religion will be helpful here. He oers threeunderstandings of religion: religion as belief, religion as identity and religion as a wayof life (Gunn, 2003, pp. 2005). Inquestioningwhyfreedomof religionor beliefstandards do not explicitly uphold the survival and continued development ofreligious communities whereas minority standards do, one may conclude thathumanrights standards appear to prioritise collective religion insofar as it expresses identityrather thanbelief or perhaps more threateningstill wayof life. If so, thisimposes a notable limitationtothe protectionof the full scope anddiversity offreedomofreligionorbelief.AmalgamatingtheFrameworks,TracingtheOptionsFromtheabove, wecanseethat therearenotabledistinctionsbetweentheformalprotectionsowingfromminorityrightsandfromfreedomofreligionorbelief theprotectionsoered,thedutiesspeciedandthetestssetupfortheirassessment.Minorityrights for example inaccordance withthe ICCPRare subject toderogationat times of emergencywhichthreatenthe nation whereas freedomofreligionorbelief isnot. Nevertheless, noderogationshouldinvolvediscriminationsolely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin (ICCPR,Article4.1). The scope of freedomof religionor belief explicitlyincludes belief whether theistic,non-theistic or atheistic whereasthe extension beyond religion tobelief communities as well is questionable in minority rights. In freedom of religion orbelief the freedomtohave, adopt andchange religionor belief is absolute; onlymanifestation of religion or belief can be limited and only then in accordance with theexactlimitationgroundsgiven, strictlyinterpreted. Inminorityrights, thelawdoesnotrecognise such a sharpdistinctionbetween the belief aspect and its engagementof the principle of non-coercionandits manifestation. The collective aspect ofminorityrights at aminimumrelates totheright of individuals toenjoycultures,religions and languages. Freedom of religion or belief, in turn, spells out manifestationasincludingworship,observance,practiceandteaching.Non-compulsioninidentifyingoneselfaccordingtoaparticularreligionorbeliefhas been emphasised explicitly in international norms regarding freedom of religion orbelief.Inthecaseofracialidentity,theUNCommitteeontheEliminationofRacialDiscrimination has put forward the standard of self-identication which alsoincludestherightnottoidentifyaccordingtoaparticularraceasthecriterionforidentifyingmembershipof racial groups. Inbothfreedomof religionorbelief andminority rights one can observe the need for vigilance in relation to individualmembers and groups that are in a non-dominant position. But whereas minority rightsrecognisestheneedforthesurvival ofthegroupscharacteristicsperse, freedomofreligionor belief standards have not explicitly emphasisedthe importance of thesurvival of (diverse, religious) group characteristics though the principle of religiouspluralismhas beenhighlightedas afactor inmorerecent Europeanjurisprudence(Evans, 2003). On the contrary, many countries are adept at purposefullycompromising the long-termdevelopment and survival of religious communitieswhileaordingthemsomecontrolledcultural freedomsintheshort term, at timesReligiousorMinority? 313under the forced agreement that they do not gain members from amongst the majoritypopulation. Some states,therefore,ostensiblyprotectthereligiouscharacteristicsofthemajoritywhilstinfringingbothminorityrightsandfreedomofreligionorbeliefstandards. Humanrights shouldnot allowsuchpolitical opportunism, or outrightchauvinism, to become confused with the legitimate balancing of rights standards thatsometimesarises. Special rights andprotectionismformajoritiesattheexpenseofminoritieshasnoplaceinhumanrights.Positivemeasuresofprotectionrequiredofstates to nurture a religious groups characteristics relate to minorities, not majorities,otherwise it is both minority rights and freedomof religion or belief that arecompromised, andthis mayevenjeopardisetheverysurvival of minorityreligiousgroups.Thecriteriaofsurvivalandcontinueddevelopmentofidentityinminorityrights have a bearing here too. The bar for continued development is higher than thatformeresurvival, andindeedthananyspelledout infreedomof religionorbeliefstandards. Continued development should not just be assessed for the groupsinternal andseparate development, but alsorequires a healthy interactionwithsociety at large. Minority rights recognise that minorities should be able to participateeectively insocietyatlargeandinall mattersconcerningthem. Itisonlythroughthese provisions that religious communities can achieve continued and healthydevelopment.Lesttheseprovisionsbedeniedtominoritiesassessedunfavourablyatthewhimor indeedcalculationof thestate, minorityrights reiterates that theexistenceofaminorityshouldbedecidedobjectively.Freedom of religion or belief standards, alone, only implicitly outline the collectiveaspects of manifestation. We need to turn to minority rights more exacting provisionsto complement these standards with a richer and more explicit recognition ofcollectiverights.ApplyingtheMinoritiesFrameworktoReligiousMinoritiesintheMiddleEastCostsandBenetsofaMinoritiesApproachIf we now turn to the Muslim Middle East, we discover further arguments in favour ofapproaching freedomof religion or belief rights primarily through the prismofminority rights. I am considering only the Middle East region because of this articlesfocus on the formal legal and political positions of these states. What these states haveincommonis that, withthe exceptionof Lebanon, all declare Islamas the statereligionwithintheir constitutions, whereas anotable number of Muslimstates inAfrica,EastAsiaandEurasiadonotdoso(seeStahnkeandBlitt,2005,pp.5367).The Islamic tradition, which later largely shaped the Ottoman millet system,arguablycaters for thediversityof religions throughaminorityframeworkratherthanthroughfreedomofreligionorbelief provisions. Whilethenocompulsioninreligion provision in the Quran is central to this debate and is arguably moreindividualistic in orientation, there is no protection regime as such that ows from thisotherthantheahli-lkitabordhimmaprovisionsforacertainlevelofself-autonomyand space to continue in existence for recognised religious minorities in exchange for acontract of loyalty, taxes and self-restraint (Arzt, 1996; Yeor and Maisel, 1985). Arztdistinguishes the two terms by explaining that ahli-l kitab or People of the Book werethosewhosefaithwasbased, likeMuslims, onrevealedscripture. . ., theJewsandChristianswhomMuhammedhaddecreedtobetreatedwithtolerance(Arzt,1996,p. 413). The dhimma, however, were conquered peoples who had agreed to submit toMuslimrule.Oeredacompactorcovenantofprotection,. . .[they]werepermitted314 NazilaGhaneacertainprivileges, includingthe autonomytopractice their faith, inexchange forpayment of the jizya tax. . ., certain restrictions on their freedom, and a commitmenttolivepeacefully (Arzt, 1996, p. 413). Whilethisregimewhetherashistoricallypractised in dierent contexts or as it is now more loosely applied in a number of ArabandotherMuslimcountriesfallsshortofminorityrightsprovisionsinnumerousways, it is nevertheless more hospitable to the protection of minority rights than to theprotectionof freedomof religionor belief as such. This is because conservativedecision-making as to who freedomof religion or belief rights should apply to makestheminaccessibletomanyreligiouscommunitiesintheMiddleEast. Fromthisonemay deduce that there will be a greater receptiveness to or at least, fewer grounds forobjecting to approaching the question of enhanced protection for religiousminoritiesintheMiddleEastthroughaminorityrightsregimeratherthanthroughfreedomof religionor belief. As An-Naimhas argued, thestatus of non-Muslimreligious minorities whether under sharia, constitutional provisions of Muslim statesor Muslimcultural norms is not consistent withcurrent universal standards ofhuman rights. However, it is imperative that this anomaly be authoritativelydiscussed and settled with the Islamic tradition, from within the fundamental sourcesof Islam. This is in order to render such reform both Islamic and fully consistent withuniversalhumanrightsstandards(An-Naim,1987,p.17).It is interesting to note that the ahli-l kitab scheme historically caters exclusively forreligiousminoritiesand notforracialandlinguisticminorities, except insofar as raceor language maybe incidentallyprotectedas aspects of the identities of religiousminoritiesthisbeingthecaseforreligiousminoritiesthatuseaparticularlanguageinreligious services andmaintainit as part of their community life or religiousminoritiesthatshareaparticularracial identity. Theapplicabilityofthisschemetoreligious minorities is therefore clear. However, the limitations of the ahli-l kitabschemeasameansofrealisinghumanrightslawstandardsapplicabletotheMiddleEasts religious minorities whether through minority rights or freedom of religion orbelief needalsotobe duly noted. The ahli-l kitab model was basedondirectinstruction by the Prophet Muhammad to tolerate and prevent fear and grief (Quran5:69) coming upon such people. Dhimma protection was arrived at pragmatically bycontract as a guarantee of peace with a subjugated non-dominant religiouscommunity, andentailedburdens, second-class status andcoercedsubmission(Arzt,1996,p.414).Bothmodelsrequiredthatthereligiouscommunitiesconcernedbe forbidden to manifest their religion too publicly, and certainly forbidden to spreaditamongstthemajorityMuslimcommunityandgainconverts.Theirlimitationsarethusverysignicantasfarasminorityrights(particularlycontinueddevelopmentand full participation) and freedom of religion or belief (particularly in manifestationin community with others, in teaching and practice and in change of religion or belief)are concerned. Indeed the fact that their standards fall short of current norms is to beexpectedconsideringthe some 1200years separatingthese schemes of protection.Furman has in fact described the dhimma status as being a priori an inferiorsituation,notingthat[w]hilsttheIslamistsrequiredthatprotected-peopledonotoendMuslims sensitivities, theydonot oerareciprocal undertaking (Furman,2000, p. 4) andreferredtothe protected-people regime as one that allows forcultural andreligious pluralismbut not fullyequal rights (Furman, 2000, p. 17).Hussainhas alsonotedthat the Islamic policy relating tominorities is orientedtowardsculturalpluralismratherthanhomogeneity(Hussain,1997,p.93). Despitetheseveryseriousshortcomings, however, onemayyet decidethat buildingontheahli-l kitabanddhimmamodelsasthebasisforenhancedunderstandingsmaywellReligiousorMinority? 315prove more successful than importing models that have had no prior culturalframeworkstosustainthemandriskoutrightrejection. Thoughneithermodel wasbased on the idea of rights or lives up to any notion of equality, they at least providesomelegalandpoliticalprotectionfornon-MuslimslivinginMuslimcountries.Thisis astandardwhichis deniedeventodaytosome communities livinginMuslimcountries for example Bahais in Iran, Mandeans and Yizidis in Iraq andAhmadiyyahinPakistan.The most serious of the challenges facedbythese schemes, though, is the veryquestion of who they can apply to. Classic jurists may argue for limiting both schemestoChristiansandJewsalone.However,themodelhasinfactlongbeenextendedtomanyotherreligiouscommunitiesintheMuslimworld: toZoroastriansinIran, toHindus, Sikhs andBuddhists inIndia, andtoMandeans inpresent-dayIraqanumberoftheseextensionshavingbeencalleduponasaresultofIslamicconquests.Clearlythe models andparticularlythe dhimmamodel have not purelybeenrestricted to relations with monotheistic or pre-Islamic religions for centuries. It wouldthereforebelogical toassumethat therearenoinsurmountablehistorico-religiousbarriers to extending themfurther still, or to replicating the models in Muslimcountries that have not yet extendedtheir benets beyondChristianandJewishcommunities. Indeed if one sees their essential relevance as being to those whoworshipaccordingtotheirownscripturesandtrytoberighteous, thenthemodelsprovepromisingintermsofbothdepthandbreadththatis, intermsofbuildingupon them to advance greater rights and in terms of extending their application to allreligionorbeliefcommunities.Whatthiswouldpotentiallyoeristhepossibilityofdistinguishingobstacles that Middle EasternMuslimstates allege inthe name ofreligion from enduring domestic resistance to respect for human rights values (thoughthis is not to say that states can wash their hands of their obligations in the case of thelatter; suchenduringresistanceinfactunderscorestheirobligationsfurther). Whilemany states claim a variety of highly questionable obstacles to the extensionof equalenjoymentofhumanrightstoallwithintheirjurisdiction,thoseclaimedinthenameof religion appear particularly obstinate and dicult to overcome. Since a number ofMuslimMiddleEasternstateshaveconstitutionalandotherlawsthatimplicatenotonly a religionstate relationshipbut alsoa hierarchy of citizenship indeedofenjoyment of fundamental humanrights onthebasis of religious aliation, thereligious objection to rights takes enduring legal shape and becomes yet moreobstinate. In a studyof the constitutions of Muslim states, forexample,StahnkeandBlitt (2005) observe numerous constitutional barriers to the full enjoyment of freedomof religion or belief rights in the name of upholding Islam. As Arzt notes, however, itis important todetect whenIslamis beingexploitedor distortedas aconvenientrationaleforrepression(Arzt,1996,p.400).There is also another consideration that needs to be borne in mind. Whilst historicalexperiencemakestheadoptionofaminoritiesapproachappearquitefavourableinthe Middle East, because of its historico-religious precursors, one needs to becognisantoftherealityofthewidespreadrejectionofthetermminorities(Ghanea,2006b) by political regimes across the Middle East. The term tends to be rejected morestronglyinthecaseof ethnicandnational minorities thaninthecaseof religiousminorities (see the examplesof the Kurds in Syria and the Bidoun in Kuwait and theUAE(Ghanea, 2006b)). OnereasonforthisisperhapsbecausethevastmajorityoftheMiddleEastsminoritiesareinfactethnicratherthanreligious.Thereisalsothefact that Islam formally both accepts religious minorities and rejects racialdiscrimination.ThismakesMuslimregimesreluctanttoadmittheexistenceofracial316 NazilaGhaneadiscrimination in their countries. The result, then, is that while many Muslim countriesarereligiouslyawareintermsof questionsof diversitytheyarealsounfortunatelyethnicallyblind(Ghanea, 2003a, p. 9). As Furmanhas noted, Minorities, intheIslamistconcept,arenon-MuslimswhocontinuetoliveunderIslamicruleonthebasis of an agreement(Furman, 2000,p. 2), theyare not ethnic minorities.HardeningStanceagainstFreedomofReligionorBeliefIt would be possible to give many examples showing a greater anity with the conceptofupholdingsomerightsforreligiousminoritycommunitiesratherthanupholdingstandards of freedom of religion or belief per se. For example, whilst the Organisationof the Islamic Conference(OIC)is becomingincreasinglyactiveat the UN, and aimstowards block voting on matters of mutual concern at international human rights fora(OIC, 2008, p. 22), its freedomof religionconcerns have exclusively focusedonMuslimsandIslamophobia(OIC, 2008, pp. 3537andOIC, 2007, pp. 78). Iwantnow, however, tofocusononeparticularlyalarmingrecentcasefromEgyptwhichindicatesa hardeningstance against freedomof religionor belief. I donot claimthatthe experience of the whole of the Middle East withits wide range of religiouscommunities can possibly be summed up in this one case, but the case does provide anotablystarkillustrationofamoregeneralchallengetofreedomofreligionorbeliefinthe region. (For anexaminationof this challenge as reectedin44 Muslimconstitutions, see Stahnke andBlitt (2005), andfor further discussion, see Mayer(2006),Arzt(1996)andArjomand(1996).)The case in question arose out of the computerisation of applications forcompulsoryidentitycardsinEgypt, whichalteredthepreviousoptionsof Muslim,Christian,JewishorOtherinthestatementofreligiousaliation.Thecomputerisedsystemretainedtherst threecategories onlyanddidnot allowtheapplicant theoptionof tickingnoneof them.While theserequirementsaectedall thosewhowereeither not aliated to any of these three religions or were unwilling to be legally forcedto indicate religious aliation, it was the Egyptian Bahais who challenged thisadministrative practice inthe courts. The case of HusamIzzat MusaandRanyaEnayat Rushdy was decided in the Administrative Court on 4 April 2006 (Egypt Case,2006a). The decision upheld the Bahai case. However, the government led an appealand, afteranumberofdelays, on16DecembertheSupremeAdministrativeCourtupheld the governments denial of the right of Bahais to have their religious aliationrecorded on the identity card application form (Egypt Case, 2006b: extractsreproducedasanAppendixtothisarticle).Whatisparticularlyalarmingfromthelegal pointofviewinthisjudgmentisitsclaimthat denyingfreedomof religionor belief totheBahais of Egypt does notviolatetheUniversal Declarationof HumanRights, onthegroundsthat therightdescribedinArticle18shouldbeunderstoodwithinthe limits ofwhatisrecognized,i.e. what ismeant byreligionisoneof thethreereligions: Islam, ChristianityandJudaism. Thejudgment goesontoclaimthat recognisedreligionsarenamelythethree heavenly religions: Islam, Christianity and Judaism, on the grounds that they arethe religions for whose rites the successive Egyptian constitutions guaranteedfreedom. OthersaresaidnottobeamongtheheavenlyreligionstheyaresaidtodissentfromIslamaswellasthereligionsofthebook(ChristianityandJudaism)andtheconclusionisthattherecordingofsuchdatainthecompulsoryidentitycardsystem of Egypt would be contrary to public order since the foundation and origin ofEgyptisbasedonsharia.ReligiousorMinority? 317In a separate development, on 29 January 2008 the Administrative Court issued itsdecisionontwocases,thatofImadandNancyRauf HindiandHosniHusseinAbdAl-Massih(Court, 2008;Prohibited, 2008)andthistimeupheldtherightsofBahaiapplicantstonothavetoindicateanyreligiousaliationwhenapplyingforidentitycards. The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights has urged the Egyptian governmenttoimplementthedecisionwithoutdelay,andnottoappealthisclearverdictofthecourt(Court,2008).IfthepoliticalandlegaldynamicsinMiddleEasternstates suchas Egyptare suchthattheextentoffreedomofreligionorbelief rightseventheobligatorydisclosureandrecording of ones religionor belief aliationinocial documentation isassessedthroughatheological schemaof religious hierarchies, thenagainperhapsbypassingitthroughreplicatingahistoricalIslamicmodel oftolerationthroughthedhimmaschemewouldoer amore promisingwayforward. So, for example, thegovernment of Egypt could politically justify the toleration of the Bahais of Egypt noton grounds of any theological anity, but on the basis of the extension of the dhimmascheme to them in the same terms as it was oered to another post-Islamic community,that of Sikhs in India. As noted above, if this judgment and other arguments of its ilkclaimthat denyingfreedomof religionorbelief toall thosewhodonot orcannotprofess to be Muslims, Christians or Jews is justiable according to the sharia, then atleast recasting their minority status would require the provision of additionaljustications as towhytheycannot evenbeconsideredminorities. If oneassumesthe good faith of governments of the Muslim Middle East such as Egypt regardingtheir humanrights obligations, thenone maybe sensitive tothe challenge of thedenition of religion that arises in states with both a strong statereligion relationshipandstrongpolitical dominanceof themajorityreligion. Assumingthat this is thechallengebeingfacedincountriessuchasEgypt,thenperhapsthatdilemmacanbesomewhat bypassedbynot wavingthe redagof religion insuchcontexts andinstead, at least initially, normalisingthe ideaof equal rights toall regardless ofreligious or belief aliation by approaching the issue via the arguably less contentiousminority rights framework. This shifts the focus from the ahli-l kitab model (explicitlymentioned by the Prophet Muhammad) to the dhimma model (pragmatic coexistence),following the latters historico-religious precedent in Islamic history that allcommunities whether monotheistic, pre-Islamic or otherwise deserve politicaland legal protection and should enjoy peaceful existence. If this alternative of minorityrather than religious status failed, then at least some evidence as to the question of thegood faith of the governments concernedwould have been obtained.ConclusionIbeganthisarticlebyassessingthecomplementarybenetstoreligiousminoritiesofthe minority rights framework, comparedwiththe protections oeredwithinthefreedomofreligionorbeliefframework.TurningtotheMiddleEast,Idonotarguethat a choice must be made between freedom of religion or belief and minority rights,nor between minority rights and ahli-l kitab or dhimma status. International standardsregardingbothfreedomofreligionorbeliefandminorityrightsapplytotheMiddleEasts religious minorities, andthose standards cannot be dilutedbyreference totraditional or historical precedents that existed in particular regions; but wherefreedomof religionorbelief isdeniedtotheseminorities, Iarguethat thedhimmastatus,whileitfallswellshortofanumberofinternationalhumanrightsstandards,nevertheless has potential as an initial means of breaking the deadlock (and that it has318 NazilaGhaneamorepotential thantheahli-l kitabstatustooerexibilitybecauseit stemsfrompragmatic decision-making rather than Prophetic instruction). As a historico-religioussanctioned model it can potentially build a foundation of tolerance for neworexcludedreligious minoritycommunities, hence oeringanon-antagonisticoptionand a politically and legally acceptable stepping-stone on which to advance rights in asphere where violations are often rampant, and lead both to a deepening ofentitlements and to a broadening of beneciaries. The examination of a notably high-prole case where sharia objections were stated as the grounds for rejecting freedom ofreligionor belief rights illustrates the motivationtosidestephighly dubious andheatedfreedomofreligionorbeliefrejections. AsFurmanhasargued, intermsofpractical thinking. . .one nds awareness of the need to escape the frozen doctrinaireframework and try to refresh it without contradicting it, whether by expanding it andadding elements. . .or by nding temporary alternatives (Furman, 2000, p. 19). SincethealternativeofhumanrightsstandardshasfoundaninsucientreceptionintheMiddleEast withregardtoits religious minorities, andfewother alternatives areenhancingenjoyment of rights for the regions religious minorities, refreshingtheframework would seem an option well worth pursuing. The primary objective in sucha context is to break the deadlock of alleged or actual theological challenges formallyput forwardbystates inorder toadvance respect for the humanrights towhichreligiousminoritiesarelegallyentitled.Notes1 Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 18 of the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights refer to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.In its General Comment 22, the Human Rights Committee explains that this freedomincludesthefreedomtoholdbeliefshenceitsabbreviationtoreligionorbelief.2 She did, however, highlight the demographics of religious minoritycommunities in Hungary(seeMcDougall, 2007a, para. 8) andrecommendedthat disaggregateddataby, interalia,religionbecollectedinorder toassess therealisationof MillenniumDevelopment Goals(MDGs) in relation to minorities and ensure lack of discrimination against them, the workingthesis beingthat suchminorities suereddisproportionatedisadvantageandpoverty(seeMcDougall,2007b,para.108;McDougall,2007c,para.12).ReferencesAn-Naim, A. 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(1996) The treatment of religious dissidents under classical and contemporary Islamiclaw,in J.WitteandJ.vanderVyver(eds),ReligiousHumanRightsin GlobalPerspective:ReligiousPerspectives(TheHague,MartinusNijho).CERD, GC 8 (1990) Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Comment8onArticle1para. 1and4of theConvention, Identicationwithaparticularracial orethnic group, www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/3ae0a87b5bd69d28c12563ee0049800f?Opendocument (last accessed June 2008).CERD, GC24 (1999) Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, GeneralComment 24 on Article 6 of the Convention, www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/9ce4cbfde77a452a8025684a0055a2d0?Opendocument(lastaccessedJune2008).ReligiousorMinority? 319Capotorti, F. 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(1985) The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam, rev. edn(Cranbury,NJ,FairleighDickinsonUniversityPress).AppendixThe case of HusamIzzat Musa and Ranya Enayat Rushdy was decided in theAdministrative Court on4April 2006andupheldthe complaint of aBahai coupleReligiousorMinority? 321against the Egyptian government regarding the denial of (compulsory) identity cards tothem. Such a denial makes daily existence in Egypt near impossible, as ID cards need tobecarriedatalltimesandarenecessarytoawholearrayofessentialproceduresfromschool registration to receiving hospital treatment or applying for bank accounts.However, thegovernmentledanappeal andon16DecembertheEgyptianSupremeAdministrative Court upheld the governments denial of the right of Bahais to have theircorrectreligiousaliationrecordedontheidentitycardapplicationform.ThefollowingexcerptsfromthetextofthedecisionoftheSupremeAdministrativeCourtexplaintheCourtsreasoning.ThefulltextofthetranslationisprovidedbytheBahai International Community, andits original source is The Bahai WorldNewsService Web Site at http://info.bahai.org/pdf/EGYPTSAC_16DEC06_ENGLISH.pdf(last accessedMay2008). The text reproducedhere has not beenalteredfromthatversion,buthasbeenslightlyeditedforlayout.ThecircumstancesofthislitigationasisreectedinthedocumentsarethatHusamIzzat Musa and Rania Inayat AbduRahman Rushdi had submitted their applicationno.24044of58J.totheAdministrativeCourtofCairoon10/6/2004requestingthestay of execution and annulmentof the negative decision under examination.The applicants explained their grievances saying that they are Egyptian citizens andtheirreligionisBahai.TheysubmittedanapplicationforthepurposeofaddingthenamesoftheirdaughtersBakinam,FarahandHanaHusamIzzattotheirpassports,but surprisinglythe administrationrefusedtogive thembacktheir passports andwithdrewtheirIDcardswithnolegalreason.TheapplicantsallegedthatthisactionviolatestheConstitutionandtheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.However,the applicants changed their request later on and asked the court to stay the executionofthenegativedecisionconcerningtherefusaltoissuethemIDcardsonwhichitismentionedthattheirreligionisBahaiaswellastherefusaltoissuebirthcerticatesfor their daughters Bakinam, Farah and Hana in which the same religion ismentioned. During the hearings Adv. Abdul-Majid AlAnani interfered as a party insupportoftheadministrationandrequestedthatthecasebedismissed.On 4/4/2006 the court delivered its ruling, which is now under consideration, statingthat, concerning the absence of a negative administrative decision and the issue of notfollowingtheappropriatecourse,these[points]arerejectedonthegroundsthattheCivil StatusCommitteeisnotcompetenttoexaminetheissuesraisedinthepresentcase according to Article 47/2 of Lawno. 143 of 1994. In addition, a negativeadministrative decision exists in the present case. The court based its decisionconcerning the inadmissibility of the request for intervention in support of theadministrationontheabsenceof therequiredinterest for suchintervention. Thecourtalsorescindedthenegativedecisiononthegroundsthatexisting authoritative reference books on Islamic jurisprudence indicate thatMuslimlands havehousednon-Muslims withtheir dierent beliefs; thatthey have lived in them like the others, without any of them being forced tochange what they believe in; but that the open practice of religious rites wasconnedtoonlythoserecognizedunderIslamicrule.InthecustomsoftheMuslims of Egypt this is limited to the peoples of the Book, that is Jews andChristians only. The provisions of the sharia [Islamic jurisprudence] requireadisclosurethatwouldallowtodistinguishbetweentheMuslimandnon-Muslim in the exercise of social life, so as to establish the range of the rightsandobligationsreservedtoMuslimsthatotherscannotavail [themselves]322 NazilaGhaneaof, for these [rights and obligations] are inconsistent with their beliefs. Thus,the obligation prescribed by the Lawof Civil Status no. 143 of 1994concerningthe issuance of anidentitycardtoeveryEgyptianonwhichappears his name and religion and the same on birth certicates is arequirementoftheIslamicsharia.ItisnotinconsistentwithIslamictenetstomentionthe religionona personscardeventhoughit maybe areligionwhoseritesarenotrecognizedforopenpractice,suchasBahaismandthelike. On the contrary, these [religions] must be indicated so that the status ofits bearer is known and so he cannot enjoy a legal status to which his beliefdoesnotentitlehiminaMuslimsociety.ItisnotfortheCivilRegistrytorefrainfromissuingidentitycardsorbirthcerticatestothefollowersofBahaism, nor it is uptosuchRegistrytoleaveout thementionof thisreligionontheiridentitycards.Thecourt concludedthat therefusal oftheadministrationtogivetheplaintisIDcards on which mention is made of this religion (Bahaism) and its refusal to issue birthcerticates to their daughters which mentions the Bahai religion. . .(sic) constitute aninvalid negative decision that should be annulled with all the consequences ofsuch annulment, in particular, to issue the plaintis ID cards and birth certicates fortheirdaughters onall of which the Bahai religionis inscribed.[. . .]Astothemeritsoftheappeal, itisclearfromtheprovisionsregardingfreedomofbelief in successive Egyptian constitutions that they originated in Articles 12 and 13 ofthe Constitution of 1923. The former stipulated that the freedom of belief is absolute,but the latter statedthat the State protects the freedomof practicingthe rites ofreligionsandbeliefsin accordance withthe observedcustoms ofEgypt,onconditionthat they do not violate the public order or morals. The travaux pre paratoirs indicatethatthesetwoarticleswereoriginallyoneinthedraftpreparedbythecommitteeincharge of the general principles whowas guided by a model proposedby LordCurzon, the Minister of Foreign Aairs of Britain, the country that occupied Egypt atthe time. The draft ran as follows: freedomof religious belief is absolute. Allinhabitants of Egypt may practice with complete freedom in public or private the ritesof any confession, religion or belief provided these rites do not violate the public orderor the public morals. This text gave rise to strong opposition from the members of theconstitutionalcommittee,becauseitwassogeneralthatitcoveredallreligiousrites.Meanwhile, the religious rites that needed to be protected were those of the recognizedreligions, namely the three heavenly religions: Islam, Christianity and Judaism. It wasthen decided to conne the provision to the protection of these religions so that therewill be no possibility to create another religion. These provisions were divided into thetwo aforementioned Articles: 12 and 13. The former provided for the freedom of beliefand the latter provided for the freedomof practicing religious and belief ritesetc.. . .Thesetwoarticlesremainedinforceuntil theConstitutionwasreplacedbythat of 1956, whichcombinedthetwoprovisionsinone, whichbecameArticle43:The freedom of belief is absolute and the state protects the freedom of the practicingof religious and belief rites in accordance with the customs observed on condition thattheydonot violate the public order and morals. Thesame provisionsappearedlaterunder Article 43 of the Constitution of 1958. The same provision was prescribed againunderArticle34oftheConstitutionof1964.FinallyithasbecomeArticle46oftheReligiousorMinority? 323present constitution which reads as follows: the state guarantees the freedom of beliefandthefreedomofpracticeofreligiousrites.It is clear from the above that all Egyptian constitutions guaranteed the freedom ofbeliefandthefreedomofreligiousrites,astheyconstitutefundamentalprinciplesofall civilizedcountries. Everyhumanbeinghastherighttobelieveinthereligionorbeliefthatsatiseshisconscienceandpleaseshissoul.Noauthorityhaspoweroverwhathebelievesdeepinhissoulandconscience.Astothefreedomof practicingreligiousrites, thishasthelimitationsthat wereexplicitly mentioned in previous constitutions and were omitted in the presentconstitution, i.e. the condition of respecting the public order and morals. Thisomission does not mean the purposeful forfeiting of this stipulation and the permittingofthepracticeofreligiousriteseveniftheyviolatethepublicorderandmorals.Thelegislature considered that this stipulation is self-evident and a fundamentalconstitutional provisionthat must be observedwithout express mention. But, thereligions whoserites areprotectedbythis provision, as deducedfromthetravauxpre paratoirsofArticles12and13oftheConstitutionof1923, theoriginofall theprovisions that appeared in the successive Egyptian constitutions, including Article 46of thepresent constitution, arethethreeheavenlyreligions: IslamChristianityandJudaism.Consideringthat the Bahai belief as unanimouslyconcludedbythe MuslimimamsaswellastherulingsoftheSupremeConstitutionalCourtandtheSupremeAdministrative Court is not among the recognized religions, whoever follows it fromamongtheMuslimsisconsideredapostateMurtad. Investigationofthehistoryofthisbeliefreveals thatit began in1844 whenits founder MirzaMuhammadAli(sic)entitled the Ba b declared in Iran that he intends to reform Islam and redress the aairsof the Muslims. People were divided about this belief especially in its attitude towardstheMuslimshariah.Inordertoputanendtothisdivision,itsfoundercalledforaconference in 1848 that was held in Badasht in Iran wherein he revealed theconcealed[purpose] of this belief andits complete separationfromIslamanditsshariah. The books of their belief, the most important of which are the Baya n, whichwas written by the founder of the movement, and the book that they call The Aqdas,which was written by his successor Mirza Hasan Ali (sic) entitled Baha ulla h, whichhe styled after the Koran, are overowing with principles and tenets that conrm thisdeclaration by their variance with the principles of the Islamic religion as well as theircontradictiontoall the heavenlyreligions. TheyabsolutelyandtotallyforbidtheJihadthat is providedfor inthe Islamic shariah, because theywant people andnations to submit to their executioners without any resistance, in return for poetic andsweetenedwordscallingfortheestablishment of aworldgovernment, whichisthemain purpose of the Bahai movement. This is one of the secrets of their ties with thecolonialists, old and new, who embrace and protect them. Furthermore, they made upa shariah for themselves in accordance with their beliefs which forfeits theprovisions of fasting, praying, family lawinIslamandmakes newanddierentprovisions. The founders of this belief were not satised to come to an end with theirclaimof prophethood and divine message (for they proclaimed that they wereMessengers from God who receive revelation from the Most High Almighty in denialof Muhammad, Gods blessing and peace be upon him. [He] is the seal of the Prophetsand Messengers of God as is stated in the Koran: Muhammad is not the father of anyman among you, but he is the Apostle of God, and the seal of the prophets), but wenton to claim godhood for themselves. For this reason, the legislator promulgated Lawno. 263of 1960concerning the dissolutionof all existingBahai Assemblies and324 NazilaGhaneacentresinthecountryandforbadeat thesametimeindividuals, establishmentsorbodies toperformanyof the activities that these Assemblies andcentres usedtoperform. This is the law that was brought before the Supreme Court under no. 7 of 2J. C. onallegationsof beingunconstitutional, whichcaseit wasdecidedon1st ofMarch1975wasunfoundedandtobedismissed.Thisrulingisbindinguponalltheauthoritiesofthestate. Inaddition,thatcourtalsoruledthatthesaidlawdoesnotviolate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assemblyof the United Nations on 10/12/1948 and which Egypt signed, because thisdeclaration, despiteitsguaranteeinArticle18togiveeveryonetherighttofreedomof thought, expression and religion, [provides that] this latter right should beunderstood within the limits of what is recognized, i.e. what is meant by religion is oneofthethreereligions:Islam,ChristianityandJudaism.Considering that the study of the provisions of Lawno. 143 of 1994 and itsregulations made by the Minister of the Interior, Decision no. 1121 of 1995, shows thatreligion is an item of basic data that the legislation requires to be recorded on birth anddeathcerticates, IDcards, familyrecord, marriageanddivorcerecordsaswell asother documents issued by the Civil Status Department issued in implementation of theaforementioned Law no. 143 of 1994 and its regulations: In light of this it is imperativeto determine that what is meant by religions are those that are recognized, namely thethree heavenly religions: Islam, Christianity and Judaism, on the grounds that they arethe religions for whose rites the successive Egyptian constitutions guaranteed freedom.Other than these (such as Bahaism or others), which the scholars fuqaha of the nationand the successive rulings of both the constitutional and administrative courtsunanimously agreed are not among the heavenly religions, and which thus dissent fromIslam as well as the religions of the book (Christianity and Judaism), their recording ineither the documents of the Civil Status Department [documents] which arementioned in the civil status law, including the documents under consideration or inany other ocial documents issued by the government administration that requires thementionofreligionisnotallowed.Thisisestablishedonthegroundsthatthelegalprovisions that regulate all these issues are considered part of the public order.Thereforenodatathat conictordisagreewithitshouldberecordedinacountrywhose foundation and origin are based on Islamic shariah. Consequently, the demandsof the plaintis for the annulment of the negative decisionof the administrationregardingnotwritingthewordBahai inthespaceassignedforreligionintheirIDcards and for their three daughters Bakinam, Farah and Hana are unfounded and musttherefore be dismissed.Considering that the court ruling under examinationis inconsistent withtheseviews,suchjudgmentiscontrarytolawandthusmustreversed.Consideringthat thepartywholoses his casemust bear thecosts accordingtoArticle184oftheprocedures.For these reasonsthe court decides to admitthe two appeals as to the form and astothemeritsofthecasetoannultheappealedruling,dismissthecaseandenjoinonthe rst and second respondents in the appeal nos. 16834 and 18971 of 52 J.S. to paythecosts.ReligiousorMinority? 325