ARTICLE

Reiigion and VioienceAn Anthropological Studyon Religious Belief and Violent BehaviorBY BENJAMIN GRANT PURZYCKl AND KYLE GIBSON

"Tradition is a precious thing, a kind of distillation oftens or hundreds of thousands of generations of hu-mans. It is a gift from our ancestors. But it is essentialto remember that tradition is invented by human be-ings and for perfectly pragmatic purposes."—Carl Sagan in The Varieties of Scientific Experience^

ON NOVEMBER 28,1994, CHRISTOPHER SCARVER

beat Jesse Anderson and serial killer Jeffrey Dahmerto death with a bar from a weight-lifting machine.Scarver claimed that God had told him to do it.Here was an act of murder by an evidently religiousman. Did Scarver's belief in a deity cause him tomurder these men? Did it even increase the likeli-hood of his violence? Or, did he simply invoke thename of a god to justify what he did? In this hemi-sphere alone, Christian concepts were used and in-voked to rationalize the religious brainwashing ofand the physical and psychological torture of Amer-ican Indian children in off-reservation boardingschools,̂ the outright genocide of North and SouthAmerican Indians, the killing of men and womenalleged to be witches, the shooting of abortion doc-tors, etc. Were these atrocities caused by Christianity?Does religion cause violence? Here we survey theevidence and demonstrate that at this point there islittle scientific evidence to subscribe to or continueto make the claim that it does.

Does Religion Really Cause Violence?Perhaps the most common problem with makingthe claim that religion causes violence is one oflogic; are we finding causal relations where theremay be only correlations? Worse, are we fairlyweighing a sufficient number of examples to makesafe generalizations? In his 2007 bestseller God isNot Great, Christopher Hitchens, for example, fo-cuses on "religiously inspired cruelty," and in eachof his examples he uses correlations but never onceestablishes a causal relationship between religionand violence.^ Should he instead have said "reli-giously rationalized cruelty"? These are not mereword games or chicken-egg stories. Correlation isnot causation. One of the primary jobs of any scien-

tist is to establish and explain causality in corre-lated phenomena. The claim that religion causes vi-olence is as deserving of such a causal explanationas any other empirical observation.

In his 2005 book The End of Faith, Sam Harrislists a number of global conflicts, concluding: "Inthese places religion has been the explicit cause ofliterally millions of deaths in the last ten years."(Italics in original.) Harris takes it as "self-evidentthat ordinary people cannot be moved to burn ge-nial old scholars alive for blaspheming the Koran,or celebrate the violent deaths of their children, un-less they believe some improbable things about thenature ofthe universe.'"* But he fails to considerthat there may have been plenty of people who be-lieve that blaspheming the Koran is worthy of deathbut who are unwilling to engage in such mortaljudgment because of differential emphasis and ex-perience. When someone presents a causal thesis as"self-evident," we should proceed v̂ rith caution.After all, isn't it abundantly clear that heavy metaland gangsta rap cause violent tendencies in theirlisteners? No, actually, these self-evident causalconnections are far from clear. In fact, it has beensystematically difficult for social scientists to under-stand what causes violence, and evolutionary theo-rists are only beginning to uncover it. Harvardpsychologist Steven Pinker's advice is instructive:"The first step in understanding violence is to setaside our abhorrence of it long enough to examinewhy it can sometimes pay off in personal or evolu-tionary terms." ̂ Likewise, anyone wishing to under-stand religion has to set aside how utterlyimprobable religious claims are in order to see howit operates.

So in taking Pinker's advice, what can we sayabout the roots of violence? It appears that interper-sonal and collective violence are both historicallyand even evolutionary old. Groups of male chim-panzees regularly patrol their borders and engage in"hits" on rivals from other groups.'' Modern foren-sic analysis shows clear evidence of interpersonalviolence in the form of head trauma in a 36,000year Neanderthal skull."" Collective violence inchimpanzees is surely caused by things other than

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religion and the same was likely the case ior Nean-derthals—access to iood and reproductive resourcesor competition ior status are just a iew possiblemotivations.

Demographic, ecological, and cultural iactorsall play roles in increasing the probability oi vio-lence. Relatively large populations oi young men,rapid expansions oi urban populations, diiierentialpopulation growth between ethnic and religiousgroups, a strong reliance on agriculture or pastoral-ism, and a high valuation oí honor and revenge arejust a short list oí phenomena that are both corre-lated with and well-argued as causes oí human vio-lence." The point is that the causes oí collectiveviolence are many, and to take the stance that reli-gion somehow lies at the heart oí it all—or is even aprimary cause—is shaiky at best and untenable atworst.

In step with and citing Harris, Richard Dawkinswrites oithe 2005 London bombers, "Only religiousiaith is a strong enough iorce to motivate such uttermadness in otherwise sane and decent people." Inthis statement Dawkins circles a key empirical ques-tion. Is religious iaith truly the only thing that couldhave motivated these bombers? What about power?Personal glory? Freedom? Democracy? Money? Be-trayal? Sex? Control oi one's turi? Revenge? EvenOsama bin Laden's reading recommendation oiWilliam Blum's Rogue States suggests there is more tohis motives than merely or even primarily religion.In iact, such "utter madness" maniiests itseli quiteregularly without the help oi religious iaith. Dawkinslists the Tamil Tigers and kamikazes as examples oisecular motives oi making "the world saie ior [their]own version oí extremism," noting that contrary topatriotism, "religious iaith is an especially potent si-lencer oi rational calculation" and open questioning.'Dawkins's implied claim is that secular extremism is

not religion and his explicit claim is that religiousiaith decreases the probability oí engaging in "ratio-nal calculation," arguably circular in and oí itseli.

On the other hand, Sam Harris claims thatcharacterizing the Tamil Tigers as secular "is mis-leading. While the motivations oi the Tigers are notexplicitly religious, they are Hindus, who undoubt-edly believe many improbable things about the na-ture oi liie and death."'" Here, Harris suggests theTigers' Hinduism increases the likelihood that theywill engage in suicide terror. He also details the his-tory oi martyr worship there to steer our attentiononce again toward the obvious correlation betweenreligion and violence. While stated as iacts, thesetwo variables can (and should) be properly framedas hypotheses: a history oi martyr worship coupledwith Hinduism (i.e. beliei in improbable things)causes suicide terror. Controlling ior the circularityoi martyr worship and martyrdom, we're leit with"improbable belieis" playing a causal role in suicidebombing."

Other Causes of ViolencePerhaps surprisingly, religion gives us little pur-chase when it comes to explaining suicide terror-ism. Some violence perpetrator groups are veryreligious, others are not. Religious diiierences be-tween attackers and victims, however, do explainsome oi the variation in the use oi suicide attacks.'^This lends support to the idea that religion finds itsgreatest use in strengthening in-group/out-groupidentities—as do race, birthplace, ethnicity, lan-guage, and so on. Religion is just another arrow inthe quiver oi those who masteriully manipulate oth-ers into doing irrational things.

Ordinary people are moved quite regularly todo atrocious things ior equally (ii not more so) ab-surd and secular reasons. This is not inconsistent

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with the claim that religion causes violence. How-ever, if there are conditions under which most peo-ple engage in violence and it is demonstrated thatreligion shows no significantly different effectsfrom a control condition, then we have little reasonto conclude that religion is more likely to cause vio-lence. The question, of course, is how to locate asufficient control sample. Even when individualsknow for a fact that their experience is a simula-tion, people will engage in violent behavior. TheStanford Prison Experiment, Jane Elliot's informal"Blue Eyes/Brown Eyes" experiment (with bothchildren and adults), and Milgram's classic obedi-ence-to-authority shock experiments are cases inpoint: all of us—regardless of religion—have in usthe potential to engage in atrocious acts whenunder the same conditions as we find religious vio-lence." Considering the effects of supervision,leadership, or authority, if religious concepts hadbeen used as appeals or ways to differentiate popu-lations, violence may have very well occurred muchfaster or with more intensity.

Religion played a role in the horrendous acts atAbu Ghraib and Guantanamo Prison, but the causalpathway was potentially reversed; American soldierstortured Muslims in a way that was very obviouslyinspired by their beliefs about Islam. State-sanc-tioned eugenics programs such as the forced sterili-zation of American Indian women''' were alsoeffectively secular in their rationale. Children andadults alike are particularly adept in creating maxi-mally ludicrous ways to isolate each other simply byfinding a feature of the target they can exploit, andusing it to further demonstrate why the target ofridicule deserves a lower status. Religious affiliationis conveniently pre-packaged and typically correlatedwith class and race. Imagine if Anglo-Americans inTexas complained that "those" Catholics were tak-ing all of their jobs and adding an extra burden tothe state. It's clearly an ineffective strategy now, al-though it worked in the i8oos with the Irish. If wewere all one race and one religion, perhaps thosewith hitchhiker's thumbs or connected earlobeswould be targeted. We excel in finding ways to justifythe subjugation of others, just as we do extremelywell in demonstrating and justifying our own unrea-sonableness. Evidence suggests that if conditions areright people will find ways to violate others. If reli-gious concepts can play a role, they likely will, butthey may not be the cause. The determination toengage in violence may pre-exist.

From Emile Durkheim to David Sloan Wilson,researchers of religion have observed yet another

remarkable feature of religion, and that is its "secu-laur utility."'̂ Regardless of whether it is consciousor not, religious beliefs and rituals regularly con-verge around very practical concerns. Whether themost significant events in the life history of an indi-vidual'* or coordinating access to valuable re-sources, "'or motivating people to organize against acolonial power,'̂ religion is—at least in traditionalsocieties—inextricably linked to all social life andmay increase in significance during time of organi-zational need. And evidence strongly suggests thatthe various components of religious traditionschange to accommodate the needs of people, sug-gesting that contrary to our immediate intuitionsand emphasis on the rigidity of dogmatic religiousleaders, religion is remarkably flexible.'^ So are in-dividuals' rationalizations for doing unreasonablethings. Notice too, that people do not need to con-sciously represent the functions of their religion inorder to reap the practical benefits of participatingin it. If those practical benefits of participationwere provided more effectively or less expensivelyby other institutions, religious participation wouldlikely dwindle.

Socioecological Factors and ViolenceDrawing from a number of empirical studies, evolu-tionary anthropologist Scott Atran illustrates thereare many practical factors involved in religious vio-lence in the case of suicide bombing, concludingthat "both psychosocial (unattached males in sup-portive religious and peer groups) and socioecologi-cal factors (small cells organized under charismaticleadership) shape the causal network of intercon-nected representations, emotions, and behaviorsthat are broadly characteristic of contemporary sui-cide bombing."^" In other words, under the rightconditions, individuals will engage in destructivebehavior. When matched against these other condi-tions, even if the presence of religious motivationsdid affect the likelihood of engaging in violence, itwould play a minimal role.

Compare this to the mafia and other criminalorganizations.^' The mafia's initiation rites areshrouded in religious symbolism, but their crimesare economically motivated. The Blanquist appealsof the anarchist—"Ni dieu, ni maitre!" ("Neither godnor master")—are actually anti-theist and anti-sta-tist appeals.̂ ^ All share the similar internal features.Appeals to atheism or gods are not demonstrationsof causation or even probability of causation. Thisagain does not support the claim that religioncauses violence. Brian Barber and the Adolescents

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and Political Violence Project (APVP) have demon-strated that there are many factors at work that af-fect individuals' willingness to participate inviolence." Bosnian Muslims, for instance, are lessinclined to engage in violence than PalestinianMuslims. As it turns out, it is the nature of the con-flicts that play a significant role and not religion.For instance, Palestinian children regularly person-ally witness the Israeli Defense Force's public humili-ation of their own and each others' fathers, whereas90% of Bosnian Muslim adolescents report neverhaving personally seen such humiliation. The factthat Bosnian children see their conflict as distantfrom themselves even though the "rate of [a Pales-tinian adolescent] having a family member killed inthe conflict was approximately half that of theBosnian experience."'̂ '' This evidence suggests thatif anything, violence causes religion to become partof one's perceived essential identity and this leadsto more violence, arguably the reverse of the claimunder question.

Religion as RationalizationThe idea that certain forms of any religion cause vi-olence still requires support beyond simply the cor-relations provided by those making such claims.When we look at the evidence—with controlgroups as in the case of the APVP's work—we findlittle if any reason to conclude that any essentialfeature of religion(s) plays any real role in causingviolence or oppression. There may indeed be some-thing particular to Christianity that caused the in-sidious acts mentioned in the introduction of thisarticle, but without any evidence as to the causalforce of this tradition, we're lefr with a correlationand depending on what it is we're counting, not avery good one at that. The only things that we cansay are particular to this or that religion are the be-liefs, which of course are internally inconsistent be-tween members.

Nevertheless, is it possible that a completelysecular society would have also committed genocideagainst the indigenous people of this hemisphere?It's likely they would have. Unless the cost of circum-navigation was borne exclusively for exploration inthe pursuit of knowledge, things would have beenin all probability not that radically different. Thepractical, "secular utility" of exploration was gold,spices, and control of trade routes even though itwas done in the name of God and royalty. And theatheistic-ish Soviet Union assassinated monks andshamans throughout Siberia not because theseleaders were religious, but because of the influence

they had over their constituents, a classic and effec-tive tactic for social control. The allegedly enlight-ened British Anglicans said the Catholic Gaels ofScotland were "lost" to their priests' influence, sothat "every attempt to reform them would fail," andsaw "Roman Catholicism and progress of any kind[as] mutually incompatible because ofthe allegedsuperstition and aversion to change inherent inthat faith"!" Afrer the Battle of Culloden, tartanswere banned. These were not acts inspired by peo-ple who thought their beliefs were the "right ones";they were an attempt to abolish any sense or indica-tion of cohesion in the subordinate group for thebenefit of empire. Religion was simply used as an-other means to amplify difference,

Richard Dawkins argues that we have no reasonto believe or bother with claims that Hitler's allegedor Stalin's real lack of faith (i.e. different models ofthe world) caused their atrocities. "What matters isnot whether Hitler or Stalin were atheists, butwhether atheism systematically influences peopleto do bad things. There is not the smallest evidencethat it does."̂ *" When considered together, Dawkins,Hitchens, and Harris' demonstrations of the so-called secular states' religious roots and/or connec-tions pose serious problems for the tu quoquearguments typically posed by individuals defendingreligion. Religious belief undoubtedly has a highcorrelation with violence. Yet, we are also likely tofind correlations just as high if not higher withbipedality, music, parents who love their children,etc.; there is not, nor has there ever been any-known non-religious human society nor any societyfree from violence. Both—given the right circum-stances—seem to be natural parts of the human ex-perience. This, of course, makes them neitheracceptable nor inevitable. Considering religion'strack record with regard to truth, reflection, con-sideration of unorthodox and/or far more reason-able ideas, its perpetual unwillingness to have itsideas empirically tested, its demands for the nonre-ligious to respect it as a system of truth statements(yet retreat to "faith" once put to even a mild test),it certainly seems intuitive that such a systemwould cause aggression. Likewise, it's just as easy toclaim that intolerance, ignorance, and the inabilityto reflect also cause violence. While they certainlymake violence easier to accomplish with the rightsupport, they are the conditions which, when pres-ent increase the chances of violence. We must alsopoint out a possible ascertainment bias in the attri-bution of violence to religion. It may be that peoplepredisposed to religious belief are accordingly less

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tolerant of out-groups and more likely to act vio-lently toward them.

If religion plays a significant causal role in any-thing, it is maximizing and maintaining in-groupcooperation and identity. But so do sports, politicalparties, gangs, music, universities, etc. Religiondoes provide two things beyond what these non-theistic groups can. First, religion can unify muchbigger and more varied groups of people thansports teams and the like. Second, religion offers avaguely defined supernatural agent whose presenceis unverifiable and thus unchallengable. While thismay increase the likelihood that someone will en-gage in costly behaviors, these costs are demonstra-tions of commitment and thus provide reliableindicators that one won't betray the group. Beyondsupernatural claims, there is not anything about re-ligion that is not found elsewhere.

What Makes Religious Violence So Special?It would be interesting to find a case of where tworeligious traditions came to physical blows overwhich had more truth value and actually used suchterms in their fight. This is essentially the argu-ment being made when someone suggests that"they fought over religion." They certainly wouldn'tfight over who has more empirical support. Werethe imperial benefits reaped ftom the Crusades amere convenient consequence of a religious war orthe "real" motivation? When President McKinleyclaimed that Cod told him that "there was nothingleft for us to do but to take them all, and to educatethe Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christian-ize them," this was an appeal to other Christiansinasmuch as it was a way to rationalize his partici-pation in the slaughtering of Filipinos. Regardlessof whether or not George W. Bush believes Cod in-structed him to invade Iraq, the National DefenseCouncil Foundation—a think tank that he, whilegovernor of Texas, characterized as "a warrior forfreedom [with a] relentless drive to work for thebetterment of all mankind"—makes it remarkablyclear that control of oil reserves is the reason theUnited States has been involved in the Middle Eastfor so long.̂ '̂

In state societies, there is a concentration ofdecision-making power "at the top" of most institu-tions, including religious organizations. Religiousleaders certainly do not suffer skeptics lightly andwith good reason; an active, persistent requirementof evidence and sound reason in any context is anuisance to those who wish to maintain their owninfiuence by appealing to tradition. Political leaders

do much the same. Religious leaders in traditionalsocieties are notoriously competitive over both ma-terial and ideological resources using magic andother supernatural claims to propel their status.However, such ideas do not necessarily becomedoctrine, but are associated with their performers.Christians don't worship Jesus' alleged walking onwater, they use it as "evidence" of his divinity. Alle-giance to religious leaders comes with its benefitsas well.̂ " In such cases, it is not even dogma that isthe root of the problem; it is the utter lack of activeparticipation in the establishment of tradition. Top-down decision-making in any institution or socialorganization is a matter of efficiency; real democ-racy is notoriously slow because individuals have adirect infiuence on their destinies.

In their 2009 article in SKEPTIC (Vol. 15, No. 2),Robert Kurzban and Peter DeScioli detail a com-pelling case for the evolutionary reasons behind reli-gious organizations' desire for so much control, alongwith our willingness to buy into it.^' Sosis, et al.found a positive correlation between the brutalityof male religious rituals and warfcire frequency;rates of violent confiict co-occur with disfiguringrituals (e.g., scarification, tattooing, etc.).'" Secularexamples abound as well, ranging from tattoos ofone's fraternity or gang to carving the name of one'sfavorite band onto an arm. Warfare requires signifi-cant coordination, cooperation, and obedience, andit appears that costly religious rituals are one way inwhich groups increase male solidarity to maximizeand maintain such bonds. Indeed, Cinges, et al.found that religious attendance predicted out-grouphostility and support for suicide terrorism, not reli-gious belief. Contrarily, their commitment hypoth-esis accurately predicted that "any relationshipbetween religion and support for suicide attacks isa by-product of the positive effect of collective reli-gious ritual on coalitional commitment and, thus,that attendance in collective religious activities...positively predict[s] support for suicide attacks.""Steadman and Palmer make a compelling case thatthe witch hunts were not because of religion, butrather, "to intimidate a category of people who ac-tually threaten the social relationships (particularlythe social hierarchy) of the killers. "̂ ^ Sosis andBressler found that religious organizations withcostly rituals last longer than those without or secu-lar organizations."

These results suggest that religion may facili-tate social bonds that are necessary for engagementand success in war. They do not, however, demon-strate that religion causes war. Likewise, there is

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significant evidence that commitment to supernatural agentsfunctions to inhibit self-interested behavior, and thus in turncontribute to the evolution and persistence of human coop-eration at least among in-group members." Does this meanthat religion causes prosocial behavior? No, it suggests thatcomponents of religion facilitate and serve to maintain coop-erative behavior. Remarkably, many rituals originally done"for" spirits—from firewalking to making donations at sacredplaces—are presently rationalized in secular terms with ap-

peals to tradition (i.e., "our ancestors did this and we want tokeep up the tradition") rather than supernatural agents.

Like any tool, religion can be used for ends of all kinds. Itis maximally effective at organizing and mobilizing collectiveaction but has little success when it comes to explaining theway the universe operates. There are plenty of compelling ar-guments why religion should have as little influence on ourlives as possible, but the idea that it causes violence has yet tobe ranked among them. D

REFERENCES1. Sagan, C. 2006. The Varieties of Sci-

entific Experience: A Personal View ofthe Search for God. New York: ThePenguin Press, p. 192.

2. Adams, D. W. 1995. Education for Ex-tinction: American Indians and theBoarding School Experience, 1875-1928. Lawrence: University Press ofKansas.

3. Hitchens, C. 2007. Ood Is Not Great:How Religion Poisons Everything. NewYork: Twelve. 18.

4. Harris, S. 2005. The End of Faith: Re-ligion, Terror, and the Future of Rea-son. W. W. Norton, 26, 31.

5. Pinker, S. 2002. The Blank Slate: TheModern Denial of Human Nature. NewYork: Viking, 318. Pinker's entire chap-ter on vioience details the difficuities inestablishing what causes violence.

6. Wrangham R. 1999. "Evolution ofCoalitionary Killing." Yearbook of Phys-ical Anthropology 42: 1-80.

7. Zollikofer C.P.E.. M. S. Ponce de León,B. Vandermeersch, F. Lévêque. 2002."Evidence for Interpersonal Violence inthe St. Césaire Neanderthal." Pro-ceedings of the National Academy ofSciences. 99: 6444-6448.

8. Gat, A. 2006. War in Human Civiliza-tion. New York: Oxford University Press;Mesquida, C. G. and N. I. Weiner.1999. "Male Age Composition andSeverity of Conflicts." PLS 18:181-189: Cincotta, R. P., R. Engelman, D.Anastasion. 2003. The Security Demo-graphic: Population and Civil ConflictAfter the Cold War. Washington DC:Population Action Internationai.

9. Dawkins, R. 2008. The God Delusion.New York: Mariner Books. 343, 346.

10. Harris, op cit.. 239.11. The historical rationale can be used to

support all sorts of currently secularbehaviors abominable, benevolent, andinconsequential alike. Depending onwhere we draw the line, everything canbe historically connected to religion.Mendelian genetics is but one of manytraditions that would be considered areligious tradition by this rationale.

12. Pape, R. A. 2005. Dying to Win: TheStrategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.New York: Random House.

13. Zimbardo, P. 2008. The Lucifer Effect:Understanding How Good People TurnEvil. New York: Random House.

14. Lawrence, J. 2000. "The Indian HealthService and the Sterilization of Native

American Women." The American In-dian Quarterly, 24(3): 400-419.

15. Durkheim, É. 2001/1915. The Ele-mentary Forms of Religious Life. NewYork: Oxford University Press: Wilson,D. S. 2002. Darwin's Cathedral: Evo-lution, Religion, and The Nature of So-ciety. Chicago: The University ofChicago Press.

16. Reynolds, V. and Tanner. R. 1995. TheSocial Ecology of Religion. 2nd ed.New York: Oxford University Press.

17. See Lansing J. S. 2007. Priests andProgrammers: Technoiogies of Powerin the Engineered Landscape of Bali.Princeton: Princeton University Press.;Lansing J. S. and J. N. Kremer. 1993."Emergent Properties of BalineseWater Temple Networks: Coadaptationon a Rugged Fitness Landscape."American Anthropologist 95(1):97-114.

18. Revitalization movements such ascargo cults are textbook examples ofhow religious concepts are useful inrallying people together against an op-pressive regime.

19. Purzycki. B. G. and Sosis, R. 2009."The Religious System as Adaptive:Cognitive Flexibility, Public Displays,and Acceptance." In Voland. Eckart,and Wulf Schiefenhövel (eds.). The Bi-ological Evolution of Religious Mindand Behavior, 243-256.

20. Atran, S. 2002. In Gods We Trust: TheEvolutionary Landscape of Religion.Oxford: Oxford University Press. 135.

21. Paoli, L. 2008. Mafia Brotherhoods:Organized Crime, Italian Style. OxfordUniversity Press.

22. Guérin. D. 2005. No Gods, No Mas-ters. Oakland: AK Press, 1-3.

23. Barber, B. K. 2008. "Contrasting Por-traits of War: Youths' Varied Experi-ences with Political Violence in Bosniaand Palestine." International Journalof Behavioral Development, 32(4):298-309.

24. Ibid., 301.25. Clyde. R. 1998. From Rebel to Hero:

The Image of the Highlander, 1745-1830. Tuckwell Press.

26. Op cit., 309.27. See their "Hidden Costs of Oil" re-

ports at http://ndcf.org. Former Na-tional Review columnist Ann Coulternotes: "We should invade their coun-tries, kill their leaders and convertthem to Christianity. We weren't punc-

tilious about locating and punishingonly Hitler and his top officers. Wecarpet-bombed German cities: wekilled civilians. That's war. And this iswar." http://www.nationalreview.com/coulter/coulter.shtml. AccessedJanuary 26, 2010.

28. Van Vugt, M. and R. K. Kurzban.2007. "Cognitive and Social Adapta-tions for Leadership and Followership:Evolutionary Game Theory and GroupDynamics." In Forgas J.. W. Von Hip-pel, and M. Haselton (eds.). SydneySymposium of Sociai Psychology, Vol-ume 9: The Evolution of the SocialMind: Evolutionary Psychology and So-cial Cognition: Van Vugt, M., R. Hogan,and R. Kaiser. 2008. "Leadership, Fol-lowership, and Evolution: Some Les-sons from the Past." AmericanPsychologist 63:182-196.

29. Kurzban, R. and Descioli, P. 2009."Why Religions Turn Oppressive."Skeptic 15(2): 38-41.

30. Sosis. R., H. C. Kress, and J. S.Boster. 2007. "Scars for War: Evaluat-ing Alternative Signaling Explanationsfor Cross-Cultural Variance in RitualCosts." Evolution and Human Behav-ior 28(4): 234-247.

31. Ginges, J., I. G. Hansen, and A. Noren-zayan. 2009. "Religion and Supportfor Suicide Attacks." PsychologicalScience, 20, 224-230.

32. Steadman, L. B., and Palmer, C.2009. The Supernatural and NaturalSelection. Boulder: Paradigm Publish-ers, 163.

33. Sosis, R. and E. R. Bressler. 2003."Cooperation and CommuneLongevity: A Test of the Costly Signal-ing Theory of Religion." Cross-CulturalResearch 37(2): 211-239.

34. Bering J. M. and D. D. P. Johnson.2005. "'0 Lord...You Perceive MyThoughts From Afar': Recursivenessand the Evolution of SupernaturalAgency. " Journal of Cognition and Cui-ture, 5:118-142: Johnson, D. D. P.2005. "God's Punishment and PublicGoods: A Test of the SupernaturalPunishment Hypothesis in 186 WorldCultures." Human Nature 16: 410-446; Shariff. A. F. A. and Norenzayan.A. 2007. "God is Watching You: Prim-ing God Concepts Increases ProsocialBehavior in an Anonymous EconomicGame." Psychological Science,18:803-80.

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