reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (rams ... · keymile umux; network components...

2014 ARS, Europe: Paris, FranceRed Room, Session 5

Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) - Application for

Self-Contained Power Supply of Gotthard Base Railway Tunnel

Dr. Andreas van LinnAmstein+Walthert ProgressAndreasstrasse 118050 Zürich

Begins at 3:30 PM, Wednesday, April 23rd

PRESENTATION SLIDESPRESENTATION SLIDESThe following presentation was delivered at the:

International Applied Reliability Symposium, EuropeApril 23 - 25, 2014: Paris, France

http://www.ARSymposium.org/europe/2014/

The International Applied Reliability Symposium (ARS) is intended to be a forum for reliability and maintainability practitioners within industry and government to discuss their success stories and lessons learned regarding

the application of reliability techniques to meet real world challenges. Each year, the ARS issues an open"Call for Presentations" at http://www.ARSymposium.org/europe/presenters/index.htm and the presentations

delivered at the Symposium are selected on the basis of the presentation proposals received.

Although the ARS may edit the presentation materials as needed to make them ready to print, the content of the presentation is solely the responsibility of the author. Publication of these presentation materials in the

ARS Proceedings does not imply that the information and methods described in the presentation have been verified or endorsed by the ARS and/or its organizers.

The publication of these materials in the ARS presentation format is Copyright © 2014 by the ARS, All Rights Reserved.

Dr. Andreas van Linn, Amstein+Walthert Progress Slide Number: 2Session 5Red Room Ap

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Agenda

Project - Introduction 5 min

Requirements 10 min

Reliability Prediction 20 min

RAMS - Life Cycle Management 10 min

Conclusion 5 min

Questions 10 min

Introduction Requirements Life Cycle ConclusionReliability


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Project - Introduction


© AlpTransit Gotthard AG

Gotthard Base Tunnel


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Gotthard Base Tunnel North portal: Erstfeld

South portal: Bodio

2 x 57 km single-track tubes

Crossways all 325 m

Considering all connecting tunnels, the system length measures 152 km

Rock cover: 2300 m

2 x multifunctional sites (MFS)

with emergency stops

Introduction Requirements Life Cycle Conclusion


Reliability


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The first flat trajectory railway through the Alps


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Tunnel System of the Gotthard Base Tunnel


Emergency stop

Emergency stop

Shaft Shaft

Multifunctional site (MFS)

Multifunctional site (MFS)

Access tunnel

Cable tunnel

Access tunnel

Intermediate excavationand shafts Sedrun

Crossway


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Organisation

Operator: SBB AG

Client: Alp Transit Gotthard AG

General contractor rail-engineering: Transtec Gotthard:

General partner:

Alpiq Alcatel-Lucent/Thales Renaissance Construction Balfour Beatty Rail



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Maintenance Group / Lot


Sub-Contractor Area of Expertise

Sub-Arge BBR / RC

Rail track

Power supply 50 Hz and cables

Sub-Arge BBR / K+M

Rail power supply 16.7 Hz

Sub-Arge ALU / TRSS

Signalling, control andcommunication

Reliability


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Project Partner


Company Area of Expertise Service Package (LP)Andrew Radio communicaton LP70

Avesco No Break LP22; LP40

Ascom Service communication (BKA) LP61

Hirschmann Access; telecommunication LP61

Keymile UMUX; network components LP80; LP81; LP82; LP83

ABB Secheron Medium-high voltage LP40

Siemens Control system; IT LP60

Swisscom Solutions Cisco; network components LP61

Leoni-Studer Cable systems LP22; LP40; LP41; LP42; LP43; LP44

Swibox Electrical connection cabinets LP45

Pöyry Planning-coordination, management support LP10

Grunder Ingenieure Survey and mapping LP30; LP31; LP32; LP33

ABB Schweiz Transformer LP40

Planning, RAMS, PQM,… LP40; LP41; LP42; LP43; LP44; LP45; LP46; LP47

Scheuchzer Realisation LP30; LP31

Alpha Plan Planning LP40; LP41; LP42; LP43; LP44; LP45; LP46; LP47

Hefti, Hess, Martignoni Planning; consulting LP40; LP41; LP42; LP43; LP44; LP45; LP46; LP47; LP22

Reliability


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Requirements According To Reliability


Based on EN 50126:

Railway applications –

The specification and demonstration of

Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and

Safety (RAMS)


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Requirements According To Reliability


Rail Track 50Hz and Cables

Rail Power Supply 16,7Hz

TC-Fixed Network

TC-Radiocom.

Safety Devices

Complete System – Railway Technology

Disturbance rate per year

Disturbance Class (SK)

SK 1 SK 2 SK 3 SK 4

40 20 5 0.4

Rail System

Switch Points

Switchgear panels

Cable systems

El. Lighting

El. Cabinets

Signs

Handrail

Overhead contact lines and cables

Switching Stations

Control and comm. sytem

El. grounding

Protective section north

Tunnel controlsystem

Data network

Service comm.

TC- Radiocomm. Railway controlsystem

ETCS Level 2

Train control andcomm. system

Reliability


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Disturbance Classes (SK)

Definition of disturbance classes 1-4

Factors

Influence on train’s schedule

Elimination with/without intervention on trail

Blocking of route sections




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Disturbance Classes


Class Influence On Railway System Example

1 No longer than 1h influence on timetable stability. The sum of delays of directly affected trains is less than 10 minutes.

• Emergency braking of a train because of system failure.

• Local outage of GSM-R for one minute.

2 More than 1h influence on timetablestability. The sum of delays of directly affected trains is more than 10 minutes.

• Disturbance of wheel-countingapparatus driving on sight.

3 Immediate blocking of one track sectionas result of failure or for fault repair.

• Switch points not in final position and impassable.

• Railbreakage (ultrasonic failure).• Enduring outage of overhead

contact line.

4 Immediate blocking of more than one track sections (one track) or total blocking (both tracks).

• Total failure of signalling / safetydevices

• Total outage of GSM-RReliability


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Requirements for 50Hz and Cable


Subsystem Availability1: Standard power supply centre Sedrun

(medium voltage) 99.941 %

2: Standard power supply centre Sedrun(low voltage)

99.936 %

3: Standby power supply centre Sedrun(low voltage)

99.937 %

4: Standard power supply transverse tunnel(low voltage)

99.852 %

5: Standby power supply transverse tunnel(low voltage)

99.976 %

Reliability


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ReliabilityIntroduction Requirements Life Cycle Conclusion

Example: Subsystem 3

Circuit Breaker

Transformer

Static Transfer System (STS)

FuseConsumer Load

No Break Diesel:Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)

Cables


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Requirements

Additional requirements on Maintainability

o Based on maintainability concepts of SBB

Safetyo Based on Quantitative Risk Analyses (QRA) from SBB

Introduction Requirements Reliability Life Cycle Conclusion


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Reliability Prediction

The basic principle of reliability prediction and integration of single results of one Subsystem into the complete tunnel system is described. This includes:

o Basic component data

o RAM-interfaces

o Reliability calculations

o Disruption protocol

The bottom up approach

The Causer principle



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Reliability Prediction


1 Components 2 RAM-interfaces

3 Reliability calculation

singlefailures

single & multiple failures

additional failures

singlefailures

failures

4 Disruption protocol

singlefailures; SK

Bottom

Up


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Bottom

Up

Components – Single Failure List


2 RAM-interfaces


singlefailures


additional failures

singlefailures

failures


singlefailures; SK

1 Components


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Up

Bottom

Components – Single Failure List

Circuit Breaker

Transformer


Fuse


…

Describe Failure Mode, Cause, Effects

Certificate Producer Specifications

Benchmarks

Statistics

Basic Data MTBF (Mean Time Between Failure)

MTTR (Mean Time To Repair)



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Up

Bottom

Components – Basic Data


Example 1:Certificate

Producer Specifications

Basic Data

MTBF [a] = 42.2

MTTR [h] = 8



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Up

Bottom

Components – Basic Data

Example 2:Certificate

Producer Specifications

Basic Data

MTBF [h] = 2.5 10+6

MTTR [h] = 4




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RAM-Interfaces

Bottom

Up

1 Components


singlefailures


additional failures

singlefailures

failures


singlefailures; SK

2 RAM-interfaces

ReliabilityIntroduction Requirements Life Cycle Conclusion


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RAM-Interfaces - Matrix


• High complexity • Hundreds of technical interfaces


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RAM-Interfaces - Causer Principle


• Investigate each component failure and combinations (source) on the effect of each consumer (sink).

• Determine disruption class. • Protocol in RAM-interfaces lists.


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1 Components

RAM-Interfaces – Example




singlefailures


failures

additional failures

singlefailures; SKsingle

failures

2 RAM-interfaces

ID

Source

Sink

Single or combined failures

Location Failure mode

Cause

Effect

Criticality disruption class

(Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis) FMECA


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Reliability Calculation

Bottom

Up


singlefailures


additional failures

singlefailures

failures


singlefailures; SK



Reliability Block Diagrams (RBA)


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Bottom

Up

Reliability Calculation – Basic Formula

Reliability Availability

In Series

www.eventhelix.com



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Bottom

Up


In Parallel

www.eventhelix.com



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Up

Bottom


Considering Common Cause Failures in Parallel Systems

Determine β-factor according to (61508-6 © IEC:2010)



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Bottom

Up


Considering Common Cause

Failures in Parallel Systems

β = 1 %

Example: R1=R2=R



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Bottom

Up

Disruption Protocol



singlefailures


additional failures

singlefailures

failures singlefailures; SK




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Disruption Protocol


Description

Location

Source function

Interfaces

Source lot

ID

1 row for each source – sink –interface with disturbance class > SK0


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Disruption Protocol


FMECA

Failure mode

Cause

Effect

Criticality disruption class

Detection

Interfaces sink


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Disruption Protocol


Disruption Rate

Failure rate per Element/Subsystem

Quantity Total failure rate [1/h]

MTTR

Total failure rate [1/a]

Availability

∑ of all rowsbelonging to thesame disturbanceclass (SK1-4): Total

Disruption rate per SK forrailway technique

∑


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RAMS - Life Cycle Management

It is not only the prediction of reliabilities but also the monitoring of the project from a RAMS point of view during the whole life cycle of the GBT.

The management comprises:

o Verification

o Validation

o Integration of RAMS-process into the general project management to practically use synergy

effects.



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RAMS - Life Cycle Management


V-Modell

operation

1 Concept

2 System definition

3 Risk analysis

4 System requirements

5 Assignment

6 Construction 8 Installation

9 System validation

10 Approval; acceptance

11 Operation; maintenance 14 Suspension; disposal

7 Fabrication

12 Capture performance

13 Change; retrofiting

Reliability


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Verification - Validation


V-ModellV-Modell

operationoperation

1 Concept

2 System definition

3 Risk analysis

4 System requirements

5 Assignment

6 Construction 8 Installation

9 System validation

10 Approval; acceptance

11 Operation; maintenance 14 Suspension; disposal

7 Fabrication

12 Capture performance

13 Change; retrofiting

Specification Validation

Verification

Implementation

Reliability


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RAMS - Other Management Systems


RAMS

ServiceabilityOperating system

ValidationQualityProject specific

PQM

RAMSOperating system

Supporting Systems:• FRACAS (Failure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action System)

• MSMT(Maintenance Service Management Tool)

• Risk Management


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Conclusion

Project still ongoing.

High complexity.

Different calculation methods (Fault Tree Analysis - FTA, ReliabilityBlock Diagram – RBD,…) for different subsystems / lots.

Not one calculation model for the whole system.

Quantities are implicitly resolved by the interfaces analysis and the Causer Principle.

Requirements for reliability (50Hz and cable system) met by direct RBD calculations.

RAMS is one management system in addition to others, but each with its own focus.

Use synergies with PQM, Validation,…



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Outlook

Application of the RAMS method is also interesting in fields other than railway engineering.

Data centers

Roads

Research



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Contact

Andreas van Linn

Dr.-Ing.

Senior Consultant, Risk Management

Amstein + Walthert Progress AG

Andreasstrasse 11, Postfach, CH-8050 Zürich

[email protected]



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Questions

Thank you for your attention.


Do you have any questions

reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (rams ... · keymile umux; network components...

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