reliability assessment subcommittee status report highlights and minutes 201… · 11/09/2018 ·...
TRANSCRIPT
Tim Fryfogle, RAS ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 11-12, 2018
Reliability Assessment SubcommitteeStatus Report
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY2
Reliability Assessment SubcommitteeOutline
Summary• 2018 Long Term Reliability Assessment• 2018 Winter Reliability Assessment• Probabilistic Assessment Working Group• Schedule• July and August Meeting Overview
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Reliability Assessment Subcommittee2018 Long-Term Reliability Assessment
Date Milestone
January 22 2018 LTRA Materials Posted; Request Letter Sent to Regional ExecutivesJanuary 22 – June 22 Regional Entities and Assessment Areas Collect Data and Develop NarrativesMay 1 – June 22 NERC Webinars with Individual Assessment Areas / Regions to Discuss and Address Data / Narrative IssuesJune 22 Draft Narratives and Final Data Due to NERCJune 25 Narratives Posted for Peer Reviewers; Peer Review Comment Period BeginsJuly 9 Peer Review Comments Due to NERC and RAS Assessment Area RepresentativesJuly 17 Responses to Comments Prepared by Assessment Area Representatives for RAS MeetingJuly 17 – 19 RAS Meeting: Assessment Area Presentations, Review of Narratives, Discuss Initial Responses to FeedbackJuly 27 Final Narratives and Draft Summaries due to NERC; Final PMU Data Due to NERCAugust 20 ProbA Dashboards Submitted to NERC; NERC to Post on SharePoint For RAS ReviewAugust 21 – 22 RAS Meeting: Review Front Section; Discuss Integration of ProbA Summaries and DataAugust 27 – 31 NERC Staff to Review RAS Feedback and Incorporate ProbA Dashboards into ReportSeptember 5 RAS Webinar to Discuss LTRA Draft and Provide Informal FeedbackSeptember 11 – 12 Presentation of Initial LTRA Key Findings to OC/PCSeptember 26 – October 10 PC Review of Draft LTRA Report (RAS Will Be Copied); PC Feedback Due to NERC by COB on September 28October 10 – 17 NERC Reviews PC FeedbackOctober 17 NERC Hosts Webinar on Updated Report; Discuss Any Remaining FeedbackOctober 17 – 23 PC Electronic Vote for Report AcceptanceOctober 22 – November 29 NERC Technical Publications and NERC Executive Management review
November 29 – Dec 13 NERC Board of Trustees Review of LTRADecember NERC Board of Trustees Approval of LTRA and Release
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Reliability Assessment Subcommittee2018-2019 Winter Assessment
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• 2018 ProbA Presentations RAS Approval on Scenario, April 2018 Base Case Integration into LTRA Presentations to be reviewed by RAS at November meeting Assessment areas to produce a reporto Links to be provided to NERC – Q1 2019
• Data Collection Approaches and Recommendations Report Scope to be determined at the November Face to Face PAWG meeting
• NERC- Special Probabilistic Assessment on Natural Gas Availability and Pipeline Outages Preliminary results shared with the RAS meeting in August
PAWG Work Plan
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2018 ProbA Schedule
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Reliability Assessment SubcommitteeSchedule
July 17-19 Toronto, Canada
• LTRA Peer ReviewAugust 21-22 PJM• Review ProbA base case scenarios• 2018 Winter Reliability Assessment schedule and data collection
forms• NERC Special Assessment on Accelerated RetirementsNovember 13-15 San Antonio, Texas• Discuss data collection forms for 2019
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SPCS Leadership Report and Work Plan UpdateMark Gutzmann, SPCS ChairNERC Planning Committee MeetingSeptember 11, 2018
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•Last Meeting July 31-August 1 in St. Paul, MN
•Future Meetings January 2019 – Location TBD
Meetings
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•PRC-024 Implementation Guidance Document PC Action Complete Submitted for ERO Enterprise Endorsement in January
2018•PRC-019 Implementation Guidance Document Team Currently Drafting Document Submission to PC for Endorsement by 2019Q1 Need 2-3 PC Reviewers to Review Prior to PC Submission
•Discuss potential PRC-025 IG with PCEC Completed SPCS Reviewed and Found Guidance within Standard
Sufficient
Work Plan
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System Analysis and Modeling Subcommittee (SAMS) UpdateSAMS, PPMVTF and LMTF
Hari Singh, SAMS ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 11-12, 2018
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Synchronous Generation• Reliability Guideline: Power Plant Model Verification and Testing
for Synchronous Machines – Approved June 2018• Reliability Guideline: MOD-032-1 Generator Data Requests – On
track; Q1 2019• Reliability Guideline: Turbine-Governor Model Application – On
track; Q1 2019 (previously SAMS task)• Power Plant Model Review – Ongoing
Inverter-based (Renewable) Generation• Reliability Guideline: Power Plant Model Verification for
Inverter-Based Resources – PC Approval item• Inverter-Based Resource Short Circuit Representation – Ongoing
PPMVTF Update - Sept PC Meeting
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Phase 1:Initial adoption of a dynamic load model for TPL and operational planning studies in North America – by June 2020Inclusion of DER models in the dynamic load model – by June 2020Phase 2:Modular approach for implementing and managing composite load model studies – by October 2022Special studies:System impact of high percentage of power electronic loads – by June 2019 in the West, June 2021 in the East
LMTF Update - Sept PC Meeting
LMTF Deliverables
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1. Load model structure is implemented and benchmarked in PSLF, PSS®E and PowerWorld
2. Default load model data is available
3. Tools for data management are in place
4. Model validation studies are performed with default to “validate in principle” observed events
5. System impact studies are performed
LMTF Update - Sept PC Meeting
Check List for Phase 1 – Implementation of Dynamic Load Models in Production Studies
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LMTF Update - Sept PC Meeting
Load Model is Benchmarked
Updated Default Data Sets for Dynamic Load Model
Data Management Tools
Green = completedRed = in progressBlue = planned
Jan.2019
Jan.2020
Jan.2021
Default Data Sets for DER Models
Industry Workshop #1
System Impact Studies
DER Model is included in Dynamic Load Model in PSS®EDER Benchmarking Studies
Review of studies, finalize data sets, update NERC Guidelines
Industry Workshop #2Start using dynamic load model in TPL studies
LMTF Phase 1 Timeline
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• Node-Breaker Representation in Planning Models – Ongoing Small-scale pilot of node-breaker implementation Q4-2019
Pilot projects underway with select TOs within EI; Receive updates on existing initiatives in TI-ERCOT and WI-WECC
Wide-scale construction of planning base case with full node-breaker capability by MOD-032 Designee Q4-2022
• NERC Acceptable Models List – Ongoing; Last updated July 2018• 2018 NERC Case Quality Metrics Assessment Report –
Completed August 2018• Governor Deadband Modeling (now PPMVTF task) – Q1 2019• Applicability of Transmission-Connected Reactive Power
Resources (Identify changes to Reliability Standards) –Delayed; Q4 2018
SAMS Update - Sept. PC MeetingSAMS Work Plan
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• Special Reliability Assessment of Case Creation Practices for Development of MOD-032-1 Interconnection-wide Models –Delayed; Phase 1 – Q1 2019, Phase 2 – Q3 2019
New/Potential Tasks• Eastern Interconnection Frequency Response Assessment for
Increased Inverter-Based Resources Penetration – Provide technical guidance & oversight along with CRM-TSS (Changing Resource Mix – Technical Steering Committee)
• Interconnection-wide Short Circuit Analysis for Changing Resource Mix (RISC Report, Profile 1) – Alternative proposed for RISC consideration; based on PC feedback from May 2018
• Clarify “Load Loss” Terminology Connotations – Technical Brief?
SAMS Update - Sept. PC MeetingSAMS Work Plan
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Proposed SAMS Task – Short Circuit Analysis for Changing Resource Mix
Risk Profile #1: Changing Resource Mix The ERO Enterprise and industry are engaged in a number of activities in connection with this risk, including but not limited to: • Conducting interconnection-wide technical studies and
assessments, such as studies and assessments of frequency and inertia response, voltage support, short-circuit analysis, and inter-area oscillation;
Recommendations for Mitigating the Risk • The ERO Enterprise and industry need to provide more effective
guidance to evaluate and improve controllable device settings and how the interaction between these devices can affect BPS reliability, particularly during transient conditions.
2018 ERO Reliability Risk Priorities Report by RISC
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Proposed SAMS Task – Short Circuit Analysis for Changing Resource Mix
• ERCOT – Dynamic Stability Assessment of High Penetration of Renewable Generationhttp://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/144927/Dynamic_Stability_Assessment_of_High_Penetration_of_Renewable_Generation_in_the_ERCOT_Grid.pdf
1.3 System Strength Assessment (pp. 9)
• IEEE PES Industry Technical Support Task Force –Impact of Inverter Based Generation on Bulk Power System Dynamics and Short-Circuit Performancehttp://resourcecenter.ieee-pes.org/pes/product/technical-publications/PES_TR_7-18_0068
3.4.2 Short Circuit Study Process Issues (pp. 54)
Recent Technical Resources:
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Proposed SAMS Task – Short Circuit Analysis for Changing Resource Mix
Key Observations/Gaps
ERCOT Observation 4: Inverter-Based Generation Controllers Require Sufficient System Strength for Reliable OperationIEEE: Better criteria for quantifying what is a low-short circuit
region of the system Greater clarity on the limitations and boundaries of
applicability of the various modeling tools and techniques There is perhaps not a single reference available to give
concise guidance on these issues and so NERC/IEEE should consider the need for such a technical task force group to develop a guide document on this subject
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Proposed SAMS Task – Short Circuit Analysis for Changing Resource Mix
SAMS requests RISC to: Recognize that interconnection-wide short-circuit studies and
assessments cannot be performed since interconnection-wide short-circuit models are not available.
Recognize that short-circuit studies performed by individual Transmission Owners/Planners for their respective footprints (using dedicated software tools) are adequate to reveal any adverse system performance/reliability impact due to changing resource mix.
Modify the existing activity description to delete “short-circuit analysis” and replace it with the following new activity: Develop reliability guideline providing recommendations for comprehensive planning studies and/or analyses needed to adequately assess system performance and identify the emerging reliability risks due to changing resource mix.
SAMS Request to RISC
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Proposed SAMS Task – Short Circuit Analysis for Changing Resource Mix
Reliability Guideline would build on Prior PC/SAMS Work, Existing SAMS/PPMVTF Activity and ongoing industry explorations/pilots Approved Reliability Guideline:
Integrating Inverter-based Resources into Low Short Circuit Strength Power Systems
PPMVTF Task: Inverter-Based Resource Short Circuit Representation: Coordinate with IEEE PSRC WG C24 focused on short circuit modeling improvements for inverter-based resources
Need & Value of EMT (three-phase) Modeling for System Performance Evaluation
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Loss of Solar Resources NERC Alert II UpdateRyan QuintNERC Planning CommitteeMinneapolis, MNSeptember 2018
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NERC Alert
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NERC Alert
• Q8: Do the existing inverter settings use momentary cessation when voltages fall outside the continuous operating range?
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NERC Alert
• Q9a: If you answered "Yes" to Question (8), what is the existing low voltage momentary cessation voltage threshold?
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NERC Alert
• Q9a: If you answered "Yes" to Question (8), what is the existing low voltage momentary cessation voltage threshold?
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NERC Alert
• Q9c/d: what is the existing time delay and ramp rate for return of current injection, once voltage has returned to within the momentary cessation voltage threshold?
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NERC Alert
• Q10: Can the inverters be updated to COMPLETELY ELIMINATE the use of momentary cessation?
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NERC Alert
• Q10: If you cannot eliminate momentary cessation, can you change the settings to < 0.40 or are the existing settings < 0.40?
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NERC Alert
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0.9 pu Extent of Impact
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Clarification and Recommendation for Momentary Cessation
tfault + 2.8 sec
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0.8 pu Extent of Impact
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0.7 pu Extent of Impact
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0.6 pu Extent of Impact
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0.5 pu Extent of Impact
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0.4 pu Extent of Impact
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NERC Alert
• 114 responses that their inverters use momentary cessation
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NERC Alert
• 53 responses that their inverters use do not use momentary cessation
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NERC Alert
• 20 responses that they can make changes to their momentary cessation settings
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Ryan Quint, PhD, PESenior Manager, Advanced Analytics and ModelingNorth American Electric Reliability CorporationOffice (202) 400-3015Cell (202) [email protected]
Inverter Based Resource Performance Task ForceStatus Report
Jeff Billo, IRPTF Vice ChairNERC Planning Committee MeetingSeptember 11-12, 2018
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IRPTF Scope Deliverables
Reliability guideline on inverter-based resource performance addressing, at a minimum, the topics listed above
Recommendations on inverter-based resource performance and any modifications to NERC Reliability Standards related to the control and dynamic performance of these resources during abnormal grid conditions
Detailed studies of any potential reliability risks under high penetration of inverter-based resource (particularly solar PV) given the findings from the Blue Cut Fire event and other related grid disturbances involving fault-induced solar PV tripping
Webinars and technical workshops to share findings, technical analysis, and lessons learned to support information sharing across North America
Other activities as directed by the NERC Planning Committee (PC) and Operating Committee (OC) in coordination with the Standards Committee
TBD
In Progress
For Vote
In Progress
In Progress
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GMDTF Update
Ian Grant, TVAPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 11, 2018
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• NERC Board Authorized Rules of Procedure Section 1600 Data Request for GMD Data at the August NERC Board Meeting Endorsed by PC at the June 2018 meeting NERC and GMDTF developing Data Reporting Instruction (DRI)
• FERC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) on proposed TPL-007-2 comment period ended July 23, 2018 Industry commenters support approval of Proposed TPL-007-2
Significant Updates
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• FERC Final Order is pending Public comment April 20 – May 21, 2018 No specific changes recommended by commenters
• EPRI provided update to GMDTF June 13 All tasks are on track for completion by Q1 2020
• Upcoming EPRI reports and tools related to TPL-007 Earth Conductivity Model Technical Report (Q4 2018) – Analysis of earth
survey data and models for GIC calculations Software tool for wide-area GMD-related Harmonics assessment (beta
version) (Q4 2018)
NERC GMD Research Work Plan
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NERC GMD Research Work Plan
Improved Earth Conductivity
Models
Improved Harmonic Analysis
Capability
00.20.40.60.8
11.21.41.61.8
2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4
pu fl
ux
Current, pu
Per Unit Saturation Curve
Harmonic Impacts
Transformer Thermal Impacts
Spatial Averaging
Latitude Scaling Factor
Geoelectric Field Evaluation• Work is on schedule to
complete by Q1 2020• EPRI will publish technical
reports for each objective
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• NERC will collect geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) monitoring and magnetometer data for strong GMD events Request includes historical (2013 to present) and future GMD events NERC will designate collection periods in coordination with U.S. Space
Weather Prediction Center (SWPC) Technical specifications developed by the GMD Task Force (GMDTF) and
align with existing industry GMD data capabilities
• Data supports GMD model validation and research applications NERC will make data available to researchers
Data Description
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• Transmission Owners and Generator Owners with GIC and/or magnetometer data are applicable reporting entities Reports are not required for entities that do not collect data Non-U.S. entities are not obligated to participate but are encouraged
• Reporting threshold provides useful data with minimal burden Strong GMDs average 200 times per 11-year solar cycle
• Data will be collected by annual electronic submission NERC will develop a technology application for collecting GMD data Anticipate beginning collection in 2020
Data Reporting
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• NERC does not anticipate that requested GMD data will contain Confidential Information as defined in Section 1501 Consistent with FERC’s determination in Order No. 830
• Reporting Entities can request confidential treatment and specify: Category or categories of the information under section 1501 Reasons why the information is believed to be confidential
• NERC will make a determination consistent with definitions in Section 1501 and FERC Order No. 830 guidance
Data Confidentiality
Methods for Establishing IROLs Task Force (MEITF)Status Update
Dan Woodfin, Hari Singh, Wayne Guttormson; MEITF MembersJoint Planning Committee (PC), Operating Committee (OC) MeetingsSeptember 11 & 12, 2018
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Task Force Update – Objectives
• Joint PC/OC Status Update • Requested PC/OC actions: Approve reliability guideline - Methods for Establishing IROLs Endorse IROL Framework Assessment Report report to be provided to Project 2015-09 SDT for their use Approve disbanding of task force
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Task Force Goals - What is an IROL?
Goals• Address requests of Project 2015-09
SDT Develop recommendations for IROL
related definitions and framework
• Develop technical guidance material around methods for establishing IROLs
• Balance flexibility with the need to ensure an adequate level of reliability.
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Task Force Representation / Consultation
• Eastern Interconnection -PJM, ISO-NE, MISO, TVA, SOCO, FPL, SPC, DVP, FMPA, CU
• Western Interconnection -PEAK, NWPP, XCEL, BPA
• ERCOT Interconnection -ERCOT
• Quebec Interconnection -HQ
• Regulatory - FERC/NERC/RF• SDT - Project 2015-09
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Task Force Progress / Work Plan
• Finished guideline on Establishing IROLs Responded to comments from industry Seeking approval from PC/OC
• Completed an IROL Framework assessment report Assessed regulatory staff comments on framework whitepaper Seeking endorsement prior to delivery to the Project 2015-09 SDT
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• Guideline areas: Analytical Framework for Establishing IROLs
(Chapter 1) Classification of Power System Stability
(Chapter 2) Recommended Practices to Assess Instability
(Chapter 3) Uncontrolled Separation Assessment
Techniques (Chapter 4) Cascading Analysis Assessment Techniques
(Chapter 5)
Reliability Guideline –Methods for Establishing IROLs
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• Comments: Addressed 368 commentso No major concerns with content
Comments fromo ISO/RTOs: PJM, NYISO, ERCOT, IESO, SPPo Utilities: BPA, WAPA, Ameren, SOCO, LGE, National Grid, Idaho Power, KCPL,
ACES Standards Collaboratorso Regulatory: TRE, RF
Reliability Guideline –Methods for Establishing IROLs
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• Reviews regulatory staff comments on the whitepaper framework for establishing IROLs. Concerns shared with MEITF that original framework is not sufficiently
stringent based on interpretation of FPA language. Determined best approach was to create a comparative technical
assessment between original framework (A) and a more “stringent” framework (B) qualified by technical considerations. o Complements (does not replace) previously approved IROL framework .o Lay out technical considerations that should be considered by Project 2015-09
SDT
• Assessment included: IROL frameworks (A and B) and technical considerations Key findings and recommendations Examples of applying IROL frameworks.
IROL Framework Assessment Report
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IROL Framework Assessment - Original Framework (A)
RC IROLs based on preventing System Instability • Upper Size Threshold on Load Loss – 2000mw• Lower Threshold of 300mw Load Loss • Risk Assessment between Upper and Lower Load Loss
Thresholds Amount of pre-contingency load shedding Resulting impacts to neighboring RCs Nature of the affected load at risk Restoration plans Risk of contingencies
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IROL Framework Assessment – Framework (B)
RC IROLs based on preventing:• Any System Instability• Any voltage Instability• Any transient Instability Excluding most types of unit Instability
• Any Cascading resulting in load loss• Any Uncontrolled Separation
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IROL Framework Assessment – Key Findings
Key Findings
RC Assessment Questionnaire:
• Responses from RCs varied as to the impact if the industry adopted a more stringent framework.
Quantifying Impact:
• Instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading needs to be quantified ahead of real-time operations.
Considering Local Load Service:
• The establishment of IROLs to prevent any instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading can present challenges.
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IROL Framework Assessment – Key Findings
Key Findings
Forms of Transient Instability:
• Unquantified angular instability should warrant establishment of an IROL.
Bounded Cascading and Load Loss:
• Definition of cascading currently uses the term widespread creates ambiguity on how it gets practically applied.
Pre-Contingency Load Shedding:
• Pre-contingency load shedding is not the most appropriate action to mitigate potential violations in reliability criteria, and may result in a degradation in reliability of load service.
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IROL Framework Assessment – Key Findings
Key Findings
Uncontrolled Separation Analysis:
• Applying the definition of uncontrolled separation is often challenging since reliability studies use known contingencies and operating conditions.
Alignment Issues Between Planning and Operations:
• Operating conditions often vary from planned conditions, the RC may need to establish IROLs that were not identified in the planning horizon.
Contingency Selection:
• RCs used different methods for applying selected contingency events to the studies for establishing SOLs and IROLs.
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IROL Framework Assessment – Key Findings
Key Findings
Establishing IROLs for Expected Operating Conditions:
• Unforeseen conditions may arise where the unplanned or unforeseen operating conditions do not match the planned, expected conditions.
Understanding Risk:
• Consideration should be given for whether an SOL should be an IROL, otherwise all SOLs related to instability, uncontrolled separation, and cascading would be considered an IROL.
Recommended Analytical Methods:
• Analytical techniques for studying the impacts of instability, uncontrolled separation, and cascading are not well documented across SOL Methodologies.
Separation of IROLs form Use in Other Reliability Standards:
• IROLs are used in a number of other Standards, which can create added compliance obligations when establishing IROLs.
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IROL Framework Assessment- Illustrative Example
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IROL Framework Assessment - Illustrative Example
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IROL Framework Assessment - Illustrative Example
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Reliability Guideline:BPS-Connected Inverter-based Resource PerformanceFinal ApprovalJeff Billo, IRPTF Vice ChairNERC Planning Committee MeetingSeptember 2018
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Topics of Reliability Guideline
• Key Findings from disturbance analyses• Momentary cessation• Inverter-based resource performance recommendations Active power frequency control Reactive power voltage control
• Inverter-based resource protection and ride-through• Measurement data and performance monitoring
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Industry Comments
• Comment period: May 4, 2018 – June 29, 2018• 162 comments received• IRPTF finalized guideline August 14-15, 2018• OC and PC approval vote: September 11, 2018
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Proposed Motion
I move for the NERC Planning Committee to approve the BPS-Connected Inverter-Based Resource Performance Reliability Guideline, as presented.
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Accelerated Generation RetirementsSpecial Assessment UpdateMark Olson, Senior Engineer Reliability AssessmentsPlanning Committee Meeting June 6, 2018
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• Special Reliability Assessment continues effort to address BPS risks due to changing resource mix (RISC Report Profile #1)
• Examine the potential impacts of accelerated generator retirements on: Resource and transmission adequacy BPS reliability in event scenarios (e.g., extreme weather, generator fuel
supply disruptions)
• Understand potential impacts on future resource mix and reliability
Assessment Objectives
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• As conventional resources retire, sufficient amounts of Essential Reliability Services (ERS) must be maintained for reliability
• Higher reliance on natural gas can expose electric generation to fuel supply and delivery vulnerabilities
• Resource flexibility is needed to supplement and offset the variable characteristics of solar and wind generation
• As the system changes from large central-station generation significant amounts of new transmission may be needed
Background | Prior Report Findings
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Background | Retirement Trends
Over 100 GW of Conventional Generation Retired Since 2011 (2017 LTRA)
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Notional View of Accelerated Retirements
Accelerated Generation Retirements occur within the long-range planning horizon and stress BPS planning processes
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• Assess resource levels under two retirement scenarios Lower retirement scenario reduces coal-fired by 30% / nuclear by ~45% Higher retirement scenario reduces coal-fired by 60% / Nuclear by ~75%
• Compare with reference margin levels• Analyze impact of extreme events (weather, fuel disruption)
Approach | Resource Adequacy
Scenario Retirement Capacities – Year 2022
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• Two power flow studies are included in the assessment to illustrate the impact of retirements on transmission system ERCOT PJM Area
Approach | Planning Studies
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• Describe regional processes for managing generator retirements Timelines and responsibilities for
review and approval Studies performed
• Identify recommendations to mitigate risks from accelerated generator retirements
• Inputs: Regional Entity inputs RTO responses to FERC AD 18-7
Approach | Retirement Processes
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• Reserve margins decline in the retirement scenarios Generation resources in near-term planning are insufficient to make up for
large-scale retirements of coal-fired and nuclear generation
Planning Reserve Margins
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• Natural gas-fired generation occupies an increasing share of the resource mix in the retirement scenarios
Generation Resource Mix
Natural Gas-Fired Generation Contribution to Resource Mix
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• Declining reserve margins and increased dependence on natural gas-fired generation degrades BPS reliability in extreme events
Extreme Event Impacts
Winter 2024-25 Projected Hours of Load Shed in New England due to Season-Long Outages of Fuel and Energy Sources (ISO-New England Operational Fuel Security
Assessment, 2018)
Polar Vortex Analysis for MISO Area
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• Large amounts of generation retirements can result in extensive transmission upgrade needs
• Time and resources are constrained when retirements are accelerated
Transmission System Needs
PJM Area study case summer 2022: locations of thermal violations
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• Reliability-must-run (RMR) provides a temporary mechanism to bridge reliability risk exposure from generator retirements May be used more frequently to address accelerated retirements
• Assessment report describes RMR processes, generator deactivation notification timelines, and capacity procurement program features in ISO/RTO areas
Retirement Processes
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• August 22 | RAS meeting discussion• August 27 | RAS comments requested by email• September 12 | NERC Planning Committee (PC) discussion Request PC written comments in September
• Report is being prepared for presentation to the NERC Board in November
Next Steps and Coordination
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2018 Long-Term Reliability AssessmentOverview
John MouraNERC Planning Committee MeetingSeptember 11-12, 2018
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NERC Reliability Assessments
• Reliability Resource Adequacy Operating Reliability
• Transmission adequacy• Demand and Generation forecasts• Demand-Side Management• Regional coordination• Key issues - emerging trends Technical challenges Evolving market practices System elements/dynamics Potential legislation/regulation
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• In ERCOT, Planning Reserve Margins are projected below Reference Margin Level for the entire first five year period due to coal unit retirements and planned generation project delays.
• Two additional areas are projected to have Planning Reserve Margin shortfalls beginning in 2022 or 2023. MISO Ontario
• Increasing variability, energy limitations, and generator performance are increasing upward pressure on Planning Reserve Margin requirements.
• Probabilistic Assessment: results show increasing EUE and LOLH in five areas
• Essential Reliability Services Adequate disturbance performance expected; projected reductions in inertia not
expected to impact reliability over next 5 years As solar generation increases, larger amounts of flexible capacity are needed to
support the increasing ramp and load-following requirements.
Preliminary Key Findings
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Key Finding: Anticipated and Prospective Planning Reserve Margin Shortfall
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Anticipated Prospective Reference Margin Level
Texas-RE-ERCOT Five Year RMs
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0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%55%60%
Anticipated Reserve Margin Prospective Reserve Margin
Projected 2023 Peak Planning Reserve Margins
Key Finding: Anticipated and Prospective Planning Reserve Margin Shortfall
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• 10-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of demand for North America is 0.57% (summer) and 0.59% (winter)
Key Finding: Demand Growth
0.0%0.2%0.4%0.6%0.8%1.0%1.2%1.4%1.6%1.8%2.0%2.2%
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
225
1990
-99
1991
-00
1992
-01
1993
-02
1994
-03
1995
-04
1996
-05
1997
-06
1998
-07
1999
-08
2000
-09
2001
-10
2002
-11
2003
-12
2004
-13
2005
-14
2006
-15
2007
-16
2008
-17
2009
-18
2010
-19
2011
-21
2013
-22*
2014
-23
2015
-24
2016
-25
2017
-26
2018
-27
2019
-28
CAG
R
GW
10-Year Summer Growth (MW) 10-Year Winter Growth (MW)
Summer CAGR (%) Winter CAGR (%)
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• Load growth in all Assessment Areas is under 2%, with five projecting negative load growth
1.80%1.76%
1.60%1.48%
1.11%1.01%
0.93%0.90%
0.84%0.70%
0.63%0.37%
0.27%0.25%
0.19%0.12%
-0.13%-0.25%
-0.33%-0.42%
-0.52%
WECC-RMRGTexas RE-ERCOT
WECC-SRSGWECC-NWPP-BCWECC-NWPP-US
FRCCSERC-E
WECC-NWPP-ABMRO-SaskPower
NPCC-QuébecSPPPJM
SERC-NMISO
SERC-SENPCC-Ontario
NPCC-New YorkNPCC-New England
NPCC-MaritimesMRO-Manitoba Hydro
WECC-CAMX
Key Finding: Demand Growth
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY8
• On-peak natural gas-fired capacity has increased to 442 GW, up from 280 GW in 2009.
• 32 GW of Tier 1 gas-fired capacity is planned during the next decade.Assessment
Area2022 (%)
FRCC 78.1%WECC-CAMX 68.2%
Texas RE-ERCOT
63.3%
NPCC-New England
52.3%
WECC-SRSG 51.8%WECC-AB 51.8%
Changing Resource Mix: Increasing Gas-Fired Generation
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY9
Key Finding: Solar Increases Need for Flexible Resources
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY10
• Solar PV continues to expand at a rapid pace 37 GW of utility-scale 20 GW of distributed energy resources
U.S. Non-Utility PV Cumulative Additions
Key Finding: Solar Increases Need for Flexible Resources
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY11
• May 2017 – CAISO first Stage 1 Emergency in 10 years • October 2017 – EEA3 (demand response activated; no load shed)• March 2018 – Record breakers: All-time demand served by transmission-connected solar was 49.95% 3-Hour upward net-load ramp was 14,777 MW; 1-Hour 7,545 MW
• Larger ramps in shoulder seasons; however, supply scarcity more likely during summer conditions
• Projected 2021 Maximum 3-Hour Ramp = 17,048 MW
Key Finding: Solar Increases Need for Flexible Resources
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY12
Key Finding: Sufficient Disturbance Performance
• Despite decreasing inertia from generation, each of the four interconnections expect to have adequate and diverse sources of frequency response Low risk of activating Under Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS) schemes.
• FERC Order No. 842 does not compel performance, but assures new resources have the capability to perform if directed.
• Maintaining interconnection frequency within acceptable boundaries following the sudden loss of generation or load can be accomplished using control functions of inverters (which includes energy storage) and load-shedding relays—this is generally known as Fast Frequency Response (FFR). The application of FFR is expected to increase over the next 10 years.
• It is not necessary to periodically monitor Quebec Interconnection frequency response in NERC’s future assessment activities due to the operational controls in place and lack of projected resource mix changes
• Unplanned changes to the resource mix will impact the results of this analysis and NERC’s assessment.
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY13
Summary Table of Results of NERC Frequency Response Sufficiency AssessmentInterconnection Highest Non-Synchronous
Penetration at Minimum Inertia
Number of Critical Inertia Conditions
Reached?
Lowest Frequency Nadir Observed in Planning Studies
Risk of Credible Disturbance Resulting in
UFLS activationEastern Interconnection 5% 0 59.85 Hz LowWestern Interconnection 15% 0 59.84 Hz LowTexas Interconnection 54% 0 N/A LowQuebec Interconnection 18% 0 N/A Low
[1] Risk determined by the study results and assumptions. Low risk indicates that studies are being performed, the expected dynamic response of the system is generally known, and the simulated frequency nadir is above UFLS set-points. If simulated frequency nadir is less than UFLS set-points, then the risk is high. Medium risk is used to describe and interconnection that is experiencing a significant shift in resources, may not have the market processes in place to ensure resource performance, and/or studies are not sufficiently representative of system behavior.
0%5%10%15%20%25%30%
0200400600800
1,0001,2001,400
2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018
EasternInterconnection
WesternInterconnection
TexasInterconnection
QuebecInterconnection
GW
Interconnection Minimum SIR (GVA-seconds) by Year
Minimum Synchronous Inertia H (GVA*s) System Load at Minimum inertia (GW)
Ratio of System Load to Minimum SIR
59.89
60.00
59.8659.87
59.85
59.45
59.50
59.55
59.60
59.65
59.70
59.75
59.80
59.85
59.90
59.95
60.00
60.05
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Freq
uenc
y (H
z)
Time (s)
A: Starting Frequency (Hz)
B: Primary Frequency (Hz) Response
C: Maximum Frequency (Hz) Decline for the Disturbance
59.5: Under Frequency (Hz) Load Shedding (UFLS) Set Point
Eastern Interconnection FR Simulation - 2022
Key Finding: Sufficient Disturbance Performance
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY14
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY15
Energy Projections
-15.892%
-23.564%
-19.544%
-3.524% -13.549%-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
-
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
6,000,000
NERC TL Eastern Western Texas Quebec
GWh
Change in Net Energy for Load for 2017: 2008 vs 2017 Forecasts
Net Energy for Load 2008 Projetion Net Energy for Load 2017 Projetion
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY16
Peak Demand Changes
(30,584)
(3,327)(15,893)
(9,838)(9,581)
(1,493)(3,584)
(4,768) (1,467) 1,407
159 (617)
-18.2%
-4.4%-25.5%
-17.2%-18.6% -3.8%
-9.7%-15.3% -6.1%
6.3% 1.9% -10.0%
-30.0%
-25.0%
-20.0%
-15.0%
-10.0%
-5.0%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
(50,000)
-
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
Difference in Projected Peak Demand Between 2008's 10-Year Projection Compared to the 2017 Projection for 2017 Peak
2008 2008 Peak Projection 2008 2017 Peak Projection 2017 2017 Peak Projection
Difference in Projection vs Actual Difference in Projection vs Actual
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY17
Supply Projections
050000
100000150000200000250000300000350000400000450000500000
Coal Gas Wind Solar Nuclear
MW
Fuel Mix Nameplate Capacity: 2008 versus 2017
2008 10-year Projection 2017 Existing
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY18
Actual Fuel Mix Changes
-100000
-50000
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
Coal Gas Wind Solar Nuclear
MW
Fuel Mix Nameplate Capacity: 2008 10-year Projection versus Existing Mix 2017
10 Year Projection Actual Change
System Planning Impacts from DER (SPIDER)Working Group Formation
Jeff BillintonCalifornia ISONERC PC Meeting – September 2018
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY2
• Increasing penetration of DER across North America• Aggregate DER impacts to BPS• Need for focus on DER modeling, system analysis, and BPS
impacts• Need to evolve study approaches and practices to account for
aggregate DER
Background
Source: FERC
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY3
• SPIDER = “System Planning Impacts from Distributed Energy Resources”
• Working Group reporting to the NERC PCMembership solicitation - expertise in…• DER modeling• DER planning/interconnection• Distribution planning under high DER penetration • BPS reliability studies under increasing penetration of DER• Including DER in dynamic load modeling and load forecasting• IEEE Std. 1547-2003 and IEEE Std. 1547-2018, CA Rule 21, and
other applicable DER policies
SPIDER Group
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY4
Activities/Deliverables
Scope Document Deliverables
1. DER performance assessment and event analyses
2. Reliability Guidelines on DER impacts to system
planning
3. Reliability Guideline on data collection and
information sharing
4. Modeling Notification on DER modeling
5. Recommended improvements to DER modeling and
model benchmarking.
6. Recommended software improvements
7. Recommendations to MOD-032 Designees for DER in
interconnection-wide planning cases
8. Recommended distribution system monitoring
9. Review and recommendations for adoption of IEEE
Std. 1547-2018
10. Educational workshops/webinars
11. Other tasks as deemed appropriate
Count Draft Work Plan Tasks
1 Reliability Guideline: DER Data Collection for BPS Planning and System Operations
1a
Ensure MOD-032 Designees have sufficient processes and procedures for collecting DER data for inclusion in interconnection-wide planning cases; recommendations on dispatch and case setup for various DER scenarios.
2 Reliability Guideline: System Planning and BPS Reliability Impacts of Aggregated DER
3
Assessment of DER performance and events analysis, distribution system monitoring and data analysis, and recommended model validation and model benchmarking activities.
4Recommended model improvements, model practices, software improvements, and guidance material related to aggregate DER modeling
5
Review of, and recommendations related to, the adoption of IEEE Std. 1547-2018; ensure state regulators and policymakers clearly understand BPS reliability perspectives.
6 Industry workshop or webinar related to aggregate DER impacts to the BPS
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY5
Plans for SPIDER:• Solicit feedback on Scope document (mid-Sept)• Solicit SPIDER membership (after PC mtg)• PCEC approval on Scope document (late Sept)• Form and kick off group (mid Oct)
Discussion and Next Steps
RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY6