Regional Approach for the Western Balkans

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CONTENTS

1. Summary ……………………………………………………………………. 2

2. Principles of Dutch policy ……………………………………………… 4

3. Regional context

3.1. From post-conflict to transition………………………………………. 63.2. Closer relations with the EU and NATO……………………………. 8

4. Regional approach and integrated policy

4.1. Need for a regional approach………………………………………… 9

4.2. Principles of the policy framework …………………………………. 111

4.3. Regional cooperation ……………………………………………….. 13

4.4. Refugees and displaced persons, integration and migration…….. 14

4.5. Environment…………………………………………………………… 15

4.6. Private sector development ………………………………………… 16

4.7. Promoting the rule of law, public safety and military security……. 18

4.8. Military security and the Dutch presence in the region…………… 19

4.9. Review per country ………………………………………………….. 23

4.10. Multilateral forums …………………………………………………… 30

Abbreviations ……………………………………………………………. 31

1 This policy paper was sent to Parliament in March 2004

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1. Summary

The regional approach is based on integrated policy from a regional perspective,

aimed at promoting peace, stability and sustainable development in the Western

Balkans. It encompasses Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia

and Montenegro and Kosovo. In the Balkans, political, military, development

cooperation and economic instruments are used in an integrated manner.

In accordance with the policy memorandum ‘Mutual interests, mutual responsibilities’,

the Netherlands wants to help find solutions to problems to be tackled in a regional

context. In the context of development cooperation, the regional approach is

applicable to the three partner countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and

Macedonia), Serbia and Montenegro and Kosovo. From the regional perspective full

use will be made of the opportunities offered by bilateral development cooperation in

the partner countries and a new Balkans programme to be implemented at regional

level. Regional resources should be deployed in such a way as to ensure optimal use

of EU and other funds in the Balkans. A regional approach is equally important from

an economic perspective; for example, in terms of trade liberalisation, improving the

investment climate, regional energy markets and regional environmental projects.

Developments in Croatia also affect developments in the region as a whole. Croatia

will, however, not be considered eligible for Dutch ODA funds. The Ministry of

Economic Affairs does have a strong focus on the country. The Netherlands is

involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the field of military security.

An important orientation point for the countries of the Western Balkans is their

ambition to be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic structures. The EU specifies regional

cooperation as a condition for further integration in the context of the Stabilisation

and Association Process. The prospects for membership of the EU and NATO have

been an important stimulus for the countries of the Western Balkans to take part in

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various regional initiatives set up by the international donor community. Such

initiatives have certainly been useful, but have rarely amounted to more than political

statements. In recent years, there has been a growing awareness in the countries of

the region itself that problems like the sustainable return of refugees and displaced

persons, military security, public safety and the fight against organised crime can

only be tackled effectively through regional cooperation. Solving these problems is

essential for integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. This is a continuous

political-military-economic process reflected in the international presence in the

Balkans, including that of the Netherlands.

The regional approach will take shape in the coming years on the basis of the

following principles:

� the focus of Dutch efforts will shift from post-conflict to long-term stability and

support for the transition process;

� if the regional approach is to be effective, a sustained effort is required; given the

ambitions of the countries in the region to accede to the European Union, a

timeline up to and including 2007 seems realistic;

� if they are considered essential to the success of a regional development activity,

bilateral activities can be implemented in Serbia and Montenegro and Kosovo

(which are not partner countries);

� the guiding principle for Dutch support is explicit demand from the region itself;

this can be from governments, civil society or the private sector;

� niches will be sought for Dutch support: where can Dutch interventions make a

real difference? Where can the Netherlands act as a catalyst to expedite activities

by larger donors like the EU?

� priority will be given to linking up with and supporting the regional programmes of

international organisations like the European Commission, IOM and the World

Bank. This will of course require close coordination with other donors, especially

with the EU (through CARDS), the World Bank and EBRD, and with development

cooperation instruments (FMO, TMF, Stability Fund) and non-development

cooperation instruments (PSO, MATRA);

� strengthening the role of the private sector. Efforts will be made to achieve

greater complementarity with Dutch civil society and Dutch companies active in

the region, if possible through entering into partnerships;

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� contributing to security as part of the military presence in the Balkans (i.c. Bosnia-

Herzegovina).

Regional development cooperation activities will be supported within the following

themes:

� the return of refugees and displaced persons, the integration of minorities and the

migration problem;

� the environment: linking up with regional environmental programmes so that the

countries in the region can comply with European standards;

� private-sector development, including through enabling activities in the area of

economic good governance, such as improving the business climate for local and

foreign companies and the integration of regional markets. The Foreign Affairs

(Development Cooperation) and Economic Affairs ministries will examine ways in

which this can be worked out in more detail, and whether their respective

instruments can be better harmonised;

� promoting the rule of law, public safety and military security;

� supporting cross-border initiatives of municipalities in the region.

2. Principles of Dutch policy

The Netherlands has long had a high profile regarding developments in the Western

Balkans, in terms of foreign policy, military and economic involvement, and

development cooperation. The most important frameworks for the deployment of

ODA funds are described in the following memoranda: ‘The deployment of

development cooperation instruments in South-Eastern Europe’ (February 2000),

‘The role of the Netherlands in a changing landscape’ (June 2001) and ‘Mutual

interests, mutual responsibilities’ (October 2003). ‘Mutual interests, mutual

responsibilities’ announces that a regional approach for development cooperation in

the Western Balkans is to be elaborated. This memorandum outlines the framework

within which the regional approach for the Western Balkans will be developed in the

coming period. It supports the integrated policy on peace, stability and sustainable

development in the region announced by the first Balkenende government in August

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2002, shortly after it took office. The starting point was that, from the perspective of

an integrated, foreign, development cooperation, military and economic policy, the

Western Balkans would continue to be a crucial area of attention for the Netherlands.

The focus would however have to shift from crisis management to post-conflict and

transition. This would also require a change in the Dutch effort. An explicit choice

was made to work from a regional perspective, with involvement of various ministries.

For ODA funds, this meant aiming for more balanced deployment in the region: the

decision to phase out bilateral aid to Serbia and Montenegro and Kosovo at the end

of 2002 was reconsidered. Total expenditure on development cooperation activities

in the Western Balkans in 2003 was around €60 million. The Ministry of Economic

Affairs also has a variety of instruments. The Eastern Europe Cooperation

Programme (PSO) in particular provides substantial support. The main aims of the

programme are to enhance the position of the private sector and to contribute to the

transition to a market economy. Support is also provided at institutional level. In

2003, the economic affairs ministry committed nearly €13 million to projects in the

Balkans.

Since the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, the countries of the Western

Balkans have experienced a series of major violent conflicts. During these conflicts

and in the early stages of reconstruction, they received substantial support from the

international donor community. However, as new conflicts have flared up elsewhere

in the world, attention for the region has declined. The Netherlands believes that the

donors still have work to do in the Balkans. In the former Yugoslavia – and in

Albania, although it has not been involved in a conflict between states or ethnic

groups – stability and the transition to full democratic rule of law and a free market

economy are under threat from weak institutional structures, organised crime,

sometimes latent ethnic tensions and rising unemployment. There is still a role for

development cooperation to play here. The focus of Dutch development cooperation

will, however, shift from post-conflict activities to support for the transition process. In

all the countries in the region, the transition process is determined by their ambition

of being integrated into the EU and other Euro-Atlantic structures. Both the EU and

NATO are giving substantial support to this process. The current weakness of

economic structures and the importance of economic development on the path to EU

membership emphasise the essential role that economic instruments have to play in

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the coming period. In this context, it is important that the Netherlands continues to

contribute to security in the region in the form of a Dutch military presence. This

contribution is made within the context of a shift in emphasis from international

military to police presence.

3. Regional context3.1. From post-conflict to transitionAs a result of the conflicts in the region, the Balkans have started the twenty-first

century heavily damaged, socially, politically and economically. Stability in the

Balkans – Europe’s backyard – can still not be taken for granted. It is a process that

demands active international involvement. An important starting point is to enable the

countries in the region to take on more of their responsibilities. The Dayton process,

the future status of Kosovo and of the state union Serbia and Montenegro require

continued international attention.

The aftermath of the crisis in Macedonia in 2001 continues to be a source of tension.

Not unexpectedly, implementation of the Ohrid peace agreement has been delayed.

Tension may increase as more concrete measures are taken to implement the

agreement. The military presence of SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo, and the

police presence of EUPM in Bosnia and Operation Proxima in Macedonia are

currently essential to the stability of the region. This involvement must, however, be

finite. Sustainable embedding of the countries in the region will then have to be

assured by integrating them into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

In any case, guaranteeing long-term stability in the Balkans will have to remain a top

priority for the international community in the coming period. The EU and NATO in

particular have a crucial part to play. The expected declining role of the United States

will mean more active involvement on the part of Europe.

At the same time, the virtual disappearance of a generation of ‘war leaders’ – with the

turning over of Milosevic to the ICTY as an important turning point – has enhanced

the prospects for sustainable peace and prosperity in the region. The EU’s

Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) offers realistic prospects of future EU

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membership, and thereby a favourable political and economic future for the region.

The risk of conflicts of the scale of those in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s has

therefore declined, increasing the chances of peaceful settlement of remaining

differences. The 2001 agreement between the successor states to Yugoslavia on

how to divide up the property of the former republic was another step towards

normalisation of relations, as were the many free-trade agreements that have been

concluded since. The progress made by the South-East Europe Process (SEECP)

shows that the regional cooperation agenda is no longer exclusively defined by

international arrangements set up by donors. There is growing awareness in the

region that cooperation between the countries themselves is indispensable to

achieving long-term stability and integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. The fact

that regional cooperation is an important condition for closer cooperation with the EU

in the SAP context is of course an important added incentive. Despite this, it should

be noted that the importance of regional cooperation is not always recognised. In

Albania, for example, people are concerned that regional integration and open

borders will damage the country’s competitive position.

After the conflicts in the region ended, official development assistance (ODA) to the

Western Balkans declined rapidly. The main reason for this decline was the reduced

need for emergency and humanitarian aid. The main target areas for ODA in the

region are currently: the return of refugees, economic reconstruction, good

governance and macroeconomic support.

Practically all countries in the Western Balkans have made progress at

macroeconomic level. The private sector, however, continues to lag behind. At the

same time, the reform programmes – including the essential reform of the

government apparatus – make a social safety net necessary, for which there are

often insufficient funds. Faced with rising unemployment, corruption and organised

crime, the majority of the people feel that their own economic position has not

improved, despite the promises of their political leaders. Most of the countries in the

region, with the possible exception of Croatia, have limited access to the capital

market, so that they still have to rely on international donor funds. However, the

international donor community has now turned its attention to other crisis areas, such

as Afghanistan and Iraq, and is less interested in giving money to the countries of the

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Western Balkans. The Netherlands believes that, with a view to achieving long-term

stability and development in the region, it is important to continue to provide

development funding in the Balkans. As the transition process moves forward and

relative stability increases, the focus of Dutch development efforts will shift from

helping to solve problems associated with the violent conflicts in the region to

assistance with transition.

The current situation in the Balkans – characterised by a series of unsolved problems

and smouldering tensions, but also by the region's shared goal of integration into

European and Euro-Atlantic structures – calls for a different kind of aid from the

international donor community than previously. Requests for assistance from the

region are increasingly related to the rapprochement to the EU. For example, the

economic affairs ministry has provided assistance to export and investment

organisations in various countries. Qualification for EU membership requires the

solution of a series of problems of a regional nature.

3.2. Closer relations with the EU and NATOAll the countries of the Western Balkans now have the status of potential candidates

for EU membership and wish to join the EU and other Euro-Atlantic structures

(NATO/Partnership for Peace) as soon as possible. The pace at which this can be

achieved depends on the extent to which the necessary reforms are introduced. The

Netherlands supports the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the countries in the region. The

emphasis is on the countries complying with the conditions imposed and supporting

them in the most effective way possible in the various stages of accession to the EU

and NATO/PfP. The latter is crucial: the above-mentioned bottlenecks in the reform

process are feeding radical-nationalist and other divisive forces in the Balkans. For

the same reasons, it is essential that the EU and NATO continue to provide their full

support. The Netherlands supports the ‘regatta model’: the countries that advance

the furthest will be the first to be considered for EU membership and partnership with

NATO, if they fulfil the conditions.

The relationship between the EU and the region is defined by the Stabilisation and

Association Process. SAP offers the countries in the region concrete prospects of

future EU membership, if they fulfil the economic and political criteria, including

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regional cooperation. That the future of the countries of the Western Balkans lies in

the European Union was reconfirmed at the EU-Balkan summit in Thessaloniki on 21

June 2003. At the summit, agreements were made about extending the EU

instrumentsavailable to the countries in the region through the SAP to include

twinning options and EU programmes on education and research. The SAP is

financed by the EU through the CARDS programme, which has a budget of €4.65

billion for the period from 2002 to 2006. Within CARDS there is a regional

programme, which will focus in 2004, with a budget of €35 million, on integrated

border management, institutional capacity development, democratic stabilisation and

the development of regional infrastructure.

Two countries, Macedonia and Croatia, have so far concluded Stabilisation and

Association Agreements (SAAs). For the Netherlands and the United Kingdom,

cooperation with the ICTY is an important condition for ratification of the SAA with

Croatia. Croatia has submitted an application for EU membership, and Macedonia

has indicated that it will be doing the same in the near future.

4. Regional approach and integrated policy

4.1. Need for a regional approachIn ‘Mutual interests, mutual responsibilities’, Albania, Bosnia and Macedonia are

listed as partner countries. In addition, the document emphasises the complex and

integrated nature of the problems in the Balkans, compounded by factors like history,

migration, the economy and the fact that many people feel that the national borders

are artificial. Many of the problems in the partner countries affect each other and

require a regional approach. The development ministry therefore believes that

restricting development cooperation to the three partner countries is inadequate.

The regional approach will extend to the entire Western Balkans. Serbia and

Montenegro and Kosovo are not on the list of partner countries, but are key to the

development of the region as a whole. They are potential destabilisers, where

political developments often have an impact beyond their own borders. Serbia and

Montenegro plays an essential role when tackling the Kosovo question. Serbia has

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the most refugees and displaced persons in the Western Balkans and the minority

problem in Kosovo is relevant to the further development of Macedonia and Albania.

The question of the status of Kosovo is a symbol of the many contentious issues in

the region. Through the mediation of the international community, a process has

been initiated that must eventually lead to a sustainable settlement of the status

question. This means that the development of the region, and therefore of the three

partner countries, is affected by the extent to which Serbia and Montenegro and

Kosovo succeed in finding answers to the minority and refugee return issues and can

achieve sustainable democratisation. Because of its economic potential, Serbia and

Montenegro is of economic importance to the development of the region as well.

Developments in Croatia also affect developments in the region as a whole. Croatia

will, however, not be considered eligible for Dutch ODA funds. The Ministry of

Economic Affairs does have a strong focus on the country. The ministry’s financial

instruments are open to all of the countries in the region, with the exception of

Kosovo (because it is under international supervision). In addition to its financial

instruments, the ministry is also able to provide assistance at institutional level, and

in organising trade events and visits.

Financing regional projects is nothing new for the Netherlands; between 1999 and

2001, it supported a wide range of regional projects in the context of the Stability

Pact for South-Eastern Europe. The regional approach, however, covers more than

just financing regional projects. Efforts in the context of development cooperation are

part of an integrated approach to helping the Western Balkans to tackle its problems.

This means working in tandem with other international actors, Dutch civil-society

organisations and companies active in the Balkans, and other forms of Dutch

assistance, such as the military, police experts and economic support programmes.

From an economic perspective a regional approach is also of great importance. This

includes trade liberalisation and improving the investment climate, as well as the

regional energy market and regional environmental projects. The aim is for the

various forms of support to complement and reinforce each other as much as

possible.

4.2. Principles of the policy framework

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The regional context is extremely important for the development of the countries in

the region. In the context of ‘Mutual interests, mutual responsibilities’, the regional

approach is applicable to the three partner countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina

and Macedonia), Serbia and Montenegro, and Kosovo. From the regional

perspective full use will be made of the opportunities offered by bilateral development

cooperation in the partner countries and a new Balkans programme to be

implemented at regional level. This regional programme must serve to encourage

optimal use of EU and other funds by the Balkan countries. The interaction between

the bilateral programmes and the regional Balkan programme will require more

intensive exchange of information and coordination between the ministry in The

Hague and the embassies.

The regional approach will take shape in the coming years on the basis of the

following basic principles:

� the focus of Dutch efforts will shift from post-conflict to long-term stability and

support for the transition process;

� if the regional approach is to be effective, a sustained effort is required; given the

ambitions of the countries in the region to accede to the European Union, a

timeline up to and including 2007 seems realistic;

� if they are considered essential to the success of a regional development activity,

bilateral activities can be implemented to a limited extent in Serbia and

Montenegro and Kosovo (which are not partner countries);

� the guiding principle for Dutch support is explicit demand associated with the

problems experienced in the region itself; this can be from governments, civil

society or the private sector;

� niches will be sought for Dutch support: where can Dutch interventions make a

real difference? Where can the Netherlands act as a catalyst to expedite activities

by larger donors like the EU?

� priority will be given to linking up with and supporting the regional programmes of

international organisations like the European Commission, IOM and the World

Bank. This will of course require close coordination with other donors, especially

with the EU (through CARDS), the World Bank and EBRD, and with development

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cooperation instruments (FMO, TMF, Stability Fund) and non-development

cooperation instruments (PSO, MATRA);

� strengthening the role of the private sector. Efforts will be made to achieve

greater complementarity with Dutch civil society and Dutch companies active in

the region, if possible through entering into partnerships;

� contributing to security through military presence in the Balkans (Bosnia-

Herzegovina) (see section 4.8).

Regional development cooperation activities will be supported within the following

themes:

� the return and integration of refugees and displaced persons, the integration of

minorities and the problem of (illegal) migration;

� the environment: linking up with regional environmental programmes so that the

countries in the region can comply with European standards;

� private sector development, including through enabling activities in the area of

economic good governance, such as improving the business climate for local and

foreign companies and the integration of regional markets. The Foreign

(development cooperation) and economic affairs ministries will examine ways in

which this can be worked out in more detail, and whether their respective

instruments can be better harmonised;

� promoting the rule of law, public safety and military security;

� supporting cross-border initiatives of municipalities in the region.

The Netherlands has built up considerable experience with refugee return

programmes and the environment through bilateral development programmes and

incidental regional activities. A number of new regional activities will already be

carried out within these themes in 2004. This will not be the case for the remaining

themes. There are clearly niches for these themes and demand for bilateral activities.

The scope for a specific Dutch contribution in this context will have to be explored. In

particular, it presents an opportunity to strengthen the role of the Dutch private

sector. This calls for closer coordination with the actors involved. The scope for

forming partnerships will be examined.

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Dutch efforts in the coming period will increasingly shift from assistance in solving

problems arising from the violent conflicts in the Balkans to assistance with the

process of transition. This means devoting more attention, including in the regional

context, to institutional strengthening, enabling activities in the field of good

governance and the economic dimension. With this assistance, too, there will be

closer coordination than before between development cooperation and economic

affairs instruments.

4.3. Regional cooperationExperience in recent years has shown that genuine regional cooperation between the

countries of the Balkans takes a long time to gather momentum. That is not

surprising given the events of the recent past and the fact that the countries first have

to build up their own national capacity. Many initiatives for regional cooperation

therefore do not get much further than meetings and declarations of intent. In the

Western Balkans, too, the many regional fora and initiatives are often ‘donor-driven’

and frequently overlap. The more explicitly the countries of the Western Balkans

express their wish to become a part of the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, the

more a common agenda is emerging in the region, albeit with some difficulty.

From 2004, the Netherlands wishes to contribute to initiatives from the region itself.

Ways will be explored in which South-East European cooperation structures like

SEECP can be supported in agreements made on activities at political level. In

addition, the scope for supporting cross-border cooperation between municipalities in

the region will be examined.

An important element in the regional approach is promoting interethnic cooperation

as a means of safeguarding stability in the region. Support for networks in the region

will focus on multiethnic initiatives.

South-East European cooperation

In 1996, a number of South-East European countries established the South-East

European Cooperation Process (SEECP). The countries involved are Albania,

Macedonia, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Greece and

Croatia (recently became a member). The SEECP therefore extends beyond the

Western Balkans. It aims to promote regional cooperation to intensify relations

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between the countries of South-East Europe and to safeguard stability, security and

cooperation.

The members consider regional cooperation essential in the areas of energy, trade

liberalisation, the fight against organised crime, transport and communications. The

main incentive continues to be integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic

structures. The SEECP has acquired greater political power in recent years. It

expects the international community to provide political, technical and financial

support for its activities. The Netherlands is prepared to support specific activities

initiated in the region itself and will investigate the scope for doing so.

In addition, the Netherlands will collaborate with REReP, a regional initiative set up in

2000 and aimed at environmental cooperation, in which the Balkan countries have

shown their political reliability (see 4.5. Environment).

Cross-border municipal cooperation

Within the region, cautious initial steps have been taken towards cooperation

between municipalities, especially by border municipalities confronted with shared,

cross-border problems. These include small-scale economic initiatives, anti-crime

measures and good governance.

Together with the Dutch private sector, ways will be explored of contributing to these

cross-border initiatives. Exploratory talks have already been held with civil society

organisations in the Netherlands. This issue can be discussed further at the regular

consultations with CSOs, initiated in 2002.

4.4. Refugees and displaced persons, integration and migrationThroughout the Western Balkans, the situation regarding refugees and migration

issues - combined with criminality - are hampering the transition process and the

path towards closer relations with the EU. This is also a significant bilateral problem

for the Netherlands. Serbia and Montenegro are on the list of priority countries in the

November 2003 paper on the return of refugees (House of Representatives,

2003/2004, 29344 no. 1).

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The refugee issue has become less problematic in recent years; in 2003, 1.5 million

people had returned. But there are still nearly a million people for whom a long-term

solution has not yet been found. Return is increasingly being hampered by economic

problems, as in Bosnia, and security is becoming less of an issue. In Kosovo,

however, security is still a major obstacle to the return of Serb and Roma refugees.

The bilateral programmes in partner countries continue to devote attention to the

reception of refugees and displaced persons, activities relating to returned persons,

and the integration of minorities. The focus of those activities will be directed more at

sustainable solutions. A number of programmes supported by Dutch funds already

focus on enhancing the economic perspectives of returning refugees and displaced

persons by, for example, promoting income-generating activities. It is also important

that returning persons have full access to social services and health care, and that

the municipalities receiving them are actively involved in projects. This helps to

improve the sustainability of the return process.

Experience with projects in the bilateral programmes shows that close cooperation

between the countries in the region is a precondition for finding genuinely sustainable

solutions for the return and integration of minorities.

The Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI) launched by the

Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe in 2002 outlines various initiatives for the

return of refugees in a regional context. MARRI focuses explicitly on asylum and

migration, which safeguards the link with the requirements imposed on these

countries in the European context. The Netherlands may be able to contribute to the

setting up of a regional database for exchanging personal data and to regional

initiatives aimed at safeguarding access to civil rights for returning refugees.

4.5. EnvironmentIn the context of Dutch development cooperation, Albania was the only country in the

region on the environment list. The legacy of the communist period has left the

country with serious environmental problems. For the region as a whole, a strategy

aimed at economic growth and poverty reduction cannot be effective without

sufficient attention to good environmental management. In addition, now that the

process of establishing closer relations with the EU has been set in motion, these

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countries will gradually have to comply with European standards. Environment

ministries tend, however, to be small and faced with capacity problems.

Production structures are often out of date and therefore impose an especially heavy

burden on the environment. As yet, little or no attention is devoted to national forestry

management, let alone cross-border collaboration, with illegal felling and

deforestation as a consequence. There are challenges, too, in the area of water

management; for example, in managing the catchment basins of rivers in the region.

Such issues often have political implications; on the other hand, the imperative to

work together on environmental problems can sometimes open the door to further

political cooperation.

From the regional perspective, the Netherlands wishes to help strengthen

cooperative structures in the area of good environmental management. To ensure

that the countries in the region can make an effective contribution to tackling cross-

border problems at regional level, it is important that the capacity of national

governments is also strengthened. Within the context of the Stability Pact for South-

Eastern Europe, the Regional Environmental Reconstruction Programme (REReP)

was set up in 2000 in collaboration with the Regional Environment Centre in

Hungary. The Netherlands supported REReP financially in the first few years. It is

now clear that the countries in the region are politically involved in the further

development of activities in the context of REReP. Ways of intensifying the

relationship will be explored.

4.6. Private sector developmentThe renewed stability in the region can only be safeguarded if people finally have

better economic prospects. Unemployment figures are still very high and economic

growth is not sufficient to offer the perspective of rapid improvement.

Generally speaking, macroeconomic stability is reasonably good, but this often

conceals the fact that many Balkan economies only appear healthy because they

depend heavily on transfers from abroad and money generated by illegal activities.

Development of the private sector and foreign investment lag far behind, because of

the unfavourable business climate, high political risks, legislation that is out of date or

not implemented, weak institutional frameworks, inadequate financial and physical

infrastructure, an as yet underdeveloped feeling for marketing and consumer

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demand, and serious crime, which often extends beyond national borders. The

organisation of the local business sector often leaves much to be desired, with very

few well-functioning chambers of commerce. Foreign companies are mostly

interested in Croatia and Serbia. Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo are

economically less developed, but have close economic relations with neighbouring

countries and can therefore benefit from improving growth rates elsewhere in the

region.

Within the theme of private sector development, the focus will not only be on joining

Europe, but also on further integration of the economies in the Balkans. It is therefore

important to support initiatives in the region which may promote development of the

private sector and improve the business climate. The Netherlands already supports a

number of activities in this area through the bilateral channel. In Bosnia, for example,

support is given to the OHR’s Bulldozer Initiative, which aims at implementing a

number of priority measures to generate an enabling environment, while in

Macedonia the provision of microcredits is facilitated. The Foreign Affairs

(development cooperation) and Economic Affairs ministries will cooperate closely to

further elaborate policy on improving the local business climate and private sector

development. They will do this amongst others by addressing focal points of attention

identified by the Dutch private sector and seeking economic and development

instruments which are better suited to the needs of the region. The economic affairs

ministry already has a number of instruments. The Eastern Europe Cooperation

Programme in particular provides substantial support. Until 2003, there were specific

budgets available for individual countries. Since then, there has been an open

procurement procedure, in which the response from the private sector is decisive.

The main aims of the programme are to enhance the position of the private sector

and to contribute to the transition to a market economy. In 2003, 13 new projects

were started, with a joint budget of almost €9 million. A total of 84 projects are

currently under way. In addition, almost €4 million was committed in 2003 to support

various institutional development projects in the Balkans. Support is also given to

microcredit facilities in the region through the Netherlands Development Finance

Company (FMO). The Netherlands wishes to strengthen this dimension of private

sector development at regional level and will participate in regional initiatives in the

context of, for example, the SEECP. The extent to which is it possible or desirable to

18

apply existing private sector instruments like PESP or ORET/MILIEV more

intensively in the region will be examined. The extent to which the CBI (Centre for the

Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries) can contribute to enhancing export

potential in the countries of the region will also be explored.

4.7. Promoting the rule of law, public safety and military securityAchieving long-term stability and economic development is partly dependent on a

well-functioning and solidly embedded rule of law in the various countries. Partly in

the light of the requirements imposed by the EU for establishing closer relations, the

governments in these countries must have adequate laws and regulations, and the

institutions to implement them. Unfortunately, in the Western Balkans, the institutions

which should safeguard legal certainty and public safety are often not equipped to

perform these tasks. Through the bilateral programmes in the partner countries and

programmes like TMF and MATRA, the Netherlands is already contributing to

capacity development in this area. Activities supported under the regional approach

will have to have added value with respect to these activities and those of other

leading donors like the European Commission.

The rule of law and public safety in the various countries of the Western Balkans are

under threat from corruption, economic crime, and people trafficking and smuggling.

Organised crime transcends national borders. The countries of the region play a

pivotal role in human trafficking – after drugs and arms, one of the most popular

forms of illegal trade – not only as countries of origin, but also as transit and

destination countries. Such extensive cross-border problems are a threat to security

in the rest of Europe, including the Netherlands, and demand a regional and even

broader international approach. Through the regional Balkan programme, the

Netherlands will be able to contribute to capacity development in this area and

support a regional approach. In the context of integrated policy on the Western

Balkans, there will naturally be close coordination between the various ministries in

the Netherlands.

In areas like border management, anti-trafficking measures and regional police

cooperation the European Commission and the OSCE are lead donors. The

Netherlands has contributed to these areas in a multilateral context, including during

19

its chairmanship of the OSCE. It is also involved in building up the police apparatus

in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro. Support for the reform of

the security sector (police and armed forces), which is important in establishing the

rule of law, can be provided through the recently set up Stability Fund. In the

interests of an effective regional programme, there will be ongoing consultation with

the ministries involved.

With a large number of war crime suspects still on the loose, many of whom are often

involved in criminal activities, the people of the Balkans have a permanent feeling of

insecurity. The ICTY is responsible for trying certain categories of war criminals

(including ‘big fish’ like Karadzic, Mladic and Gotovina) but, in accordance with the

Completion Strategy, will not be initiating any new investigations after 2004. The

intention is that, in the future, the countries in the region try war criminals themselves.

To this end, funds have been made available from the development budget (Human

Rights Fund) to support the setting up of a War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia. The

protection of witnesses is a serious problem, especially in Kosovo. In the context of

reconciliation and dealing with the legacy of the war, it is worth examining the scope

for supporting activities in this area.

4.8. Military security and the Dutch presence in the regionThe security situation in the strategically important Balkan region is stable at the

moment but remains fragile. The NATO-led operations Joint Guardian, under which

KFOR is stationed in Kosovo, and Joint Forge, under which SFOR falls in Bosnia-

Herzegovina, have been indispensable in preserving stability. Improvement in the

security situation in recent years presents an opportunity to review these missions. In

Macedonia, for example, the EU-led military operation Concordia has been replaced

by the EU-led police mission Proxima.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the threat of open armed conflict between the different

population groups has largely disappeared. The military task, based on the Dayton

Peace Agreement, to prevent the resumption of interethnic violence, has become

considerably less urgent. In early December 2003, NATO therefore decided to (1)

reduce the SFOR force from 12,000 to 7,000 in 2004, and (2) to review its working

method. The EU has indicated its willingness to take on responsibility for the

20

international military presence and NATO has announced that it will withdraw SFOR,

probably at the end of 2004. An ESDP mission, using NATO resources and capacity,

could be combined with a new, smaller NATO Headquarters to advise the Bosnian

authorities. The EU-led security presence will probably also deploy civil instruments,

including a significant police component. One potential advantage of an EU-led

security presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina is that it could easily link up with the EU’s

civil instruments, such as the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and the EU Monitoring

Mission (EUMM). The EUPM and the EUMM may also need to be reviewed in the

light of the new EU-led security presence.

In Kosovo, KFOR’s presence continues to be essential. The status question is a

major factor in the security situation there. The future of KFOR will therefore depend

partly on the progress made in achieving the standards that must be met before the

status of Kosovo can be discussed. It is unlikely that the NATO presence can be

terminated or reduced until the status question has been settled. The Contact

Group’s proposal to evaluate progress in Kosovo is welcome. For the time being, the

scale of the KFOR presence, currently around 17,500 troops, will not be further

reduced, but its working method will be adjusted to suit the present security situation.

The new NATO working method and presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Under the new SFOR structure, known as ‘Deterrent Presence’, NATO units will

make a less active contribution to the security situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The

three multinational brigades will be converted into Multinational Task Forces

(MNTFs), each consisting of one battalion. The NATO units will focus on actively

gathering intelligence on the security situation in their area of responsibility. The

battalions may be deployed if intelligence suggests that tensions may increase or

that there is a risk of open hostilities between the various local population groups.

SFOR also has a sizeable reserve force outside Bosnia-Herzegovina which can, in

exceptional circumstances, be deployed throughout the country.

In the spring, the Multinational Brigade North West, in which the Netherlands,

Canada and the United Kingdom participate on an equal footing, will change its name

to ‘Multinational Task Force North West’. The three battalions in the current brigade

will be restructured to form a single battalion under British leadership. The Task

21

Force will also have a reconnaissance company to gather operational intelligence

and a Monitoring, Observation, Surveillance and Targeting (MOST) unit charged with

specific intelligence tasks on which the operational plan and the possible deployment

of supplementary military resources are based.

These MOST teams, which actively gather information from the Bosnian people, are

the most visible part of SFOR. They gather information on the security situation in

their area of deployment. They also maintain contact with international organisations.

This provides SFOR with an insight into the social, political, economic and military

security structures. Each MOST team consists of eight military personnel. The

majority of MOST teams are not located at regular military bases but in communities,

where they are closer to the local people. In addition, there are sector teams, whose

task is to perform MOST activities at a higher level. In the Muslim-Croatian

Federation this is at canton level and in the Serb Republic at government level. The

sector teams are also responsible for the operational and administrative

management of a number of MOST teams. A sector team consists of 18 military

personnel. In the area of responsibility of the Multinational Task Force North West,

there are expected to be 12 MOST teams and four MOST sector teams. The

operational plan is comparable to the successful working method of the Field Liaison

Teams during the NATO-led operation Amber Fox in Macedonia.

The new structure will be introduced as of 20 February, partly by making use of the

troops already present. The transition to the new structure is expected to be

completed by 1 April. In the Dutch sector, the transition means that the bases in Novi

Travnik, Suica, Jaice and Split will be closed.

The consequences for the Dutch contribution to SFORUnder the new concept, SFOR can be reduced in strength this spring from 12,000 to

7,000 troops. This means that, from April 2004, the Dutch military presence will be

reduced from almost 1,050 to around 530. The Dutch contribution to the MNTF will

then consist of two MOST sector teams and four MOST teams. The Netherlands will

also provide the first commander of the MOST component, for a period of a year. In

addition, the Netherlands will supply a company in the British battalion, troops for the

unit gathering specific intelligence, personnel for the SFOR HQ in Sarajevo and the

22

MNTF North West HQ in Banja Luka, a communications groups, a detachment of the

Royal Military Police for the multinational police unit in the Task Force, medical

capacity and a national Support Element. The British military contribution will remain

at approximately the same level. Because the United Kingdom supplies the lion’s

share of the military personnel, the rotating command system for the MNTF-NW will

be stopped and the UK will take permanent command.

Partly in the light of the modification of the operational plan, Slovakia has decided to

withdraw its transport helicopter from SFOR. Cooperation with the Slovakian

helicopter unit, which was stationed at the Dutch base in Bugojno, came to an end in

mid-December 2003. There are still a number of shortfalls in the military resources

the MNTF-NW command needs to execute the new operational plan. The Dutch

Cougar helicopters which are at the disposal of the current multinational brigade for

medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) purposes, will be withdrawn in June 2004. Ways of

making up for this shortfall are being explored by using MEDEVAC helicopters from

the other task forces more efficiently. Moreover, not all the necessary MOST teams,

as specified in the MNTF-NW operational plan, have been pledged. The UK is

negotiating with potential new partner countries for MNTF-NW, including Sweden and

Austria.

As mentioned on previous occasions, the Netherlands periodically places an Orion at

the disposal of the Bosnia and Kosovo Air Component (BKAC), the NATO air mission

in support of military operations on the ground. A Dutch P-3C Orion maritime patrol

aircraft will be deployed between February and May 2004. It will be used for periods

of two weeks at a time and will be based at Sigonella airfield in Sicily. The aircraft

performs observation and reconnaissance missions for NATO missions in the

Balkans. In 2003, the Dutch P-3C flew a total of 197.5 hours for BKAC.

In the new structure, the Netherlands will continue to work with Bulgarian and

Romanian forces. Bulgaria supplies one of the three infantry platoons in the Dutch

company. This platoon operates on an equal footing with the two Dutch platoons.

The Dutch contingent’s transport tasks are partly performed by a Romanian transport

unit. The government is of the opinion that other countries which will be joining NATO

and the EU in the near future should consider taking part in the stabilisation forces in

23

the Western Balkans. The Netherlands will assess a potential contribution to the EU-

led operation separately.

The military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina is expected to become less important

as the pace at which the security situation improves increases and as the countries in

the region establish closer relations with NATO and the EU.

4.9. Review per country

Albania

� Closer relations with the EU and NATO

Albania is negotiating a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, but implementation

of EU standards, especially relating to the fight against organised crime and

corruption, has proven to be problematic. As for other countries in region, Albania

itself will determine the speed of the process of establishing closer relations with the

EU. Albania is a partner in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) and hopes to be

invited to join the alliance in the near future.

Partly as a result of the agreements with NATO and the assistance provided under

the Membership Action Plan (MAP), the Albanian defence ministry is the most stable

government institution in the country. However, NATO has also stated that a greater

effort is still needed to reform the security services and bring them under civil control.

� Bilateral programme

Albania is one of the poorest countries in Europe. Poverty is rife, especially in the

rural north. Infrastructure, the health care system, the level of education and the state

of the environment are seriously neglected. To achieve the transformation from a

developing country to a genuine potential EU candidate state, Albania must make a

serious effort to move forward. It has already set out on the road to reform. The

immature political culture, insufficient administrative capacity and unstable rule of law

– and the resulting unfavourable business climate – still present significant obstacles.

The Dutch bilateral development programme, in which good governance is the major

theme, focuses on these problems. Specific attention is paid to strengthening

institutional capacity, supporting the decentralisation process and encouraging civil

24

participation (strengthening civil society). In the coming period, special efforts will be

made to seek ways in which Dutch assistance can be deployed to improve the

business climate (economic governance).

Since 2003, there has also been a special focus on the environment sector. Albania

has a substantial legacy of environmental degradation, dating back to the heavy

industry of the communist period. The fact that the Albanian government has, as yet,

been unable to respond adequately to these problems is largely because of

institutional weakness in the face of a multiplicity of priorities. In line with the general

focus on good governance, efforts in this sector are therefore focused on

strengthening government capacity (supporting the environment ministry) and

supporting local environmental initiatives and non-governmental organisations. At

present, the volume of the programme is still modest. Finally, the Eastern Europe

Cooperation Programme (PSO) is also active in Albania.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

� Closer relations with the EU and NATO

Bosnia-Herzegovina is also hoping to join the Euro-Atlantic structures as soon as

possible. Under the leadership of High Representative Paddy Ashdown, the

international community and the Bosnian authorities are working on transforming

Bosnia-Herzegovina into a viable state with a European perspective. The

Netherlands participates as an observer with speaking rights on the Steering Board

of the Peace Implementation Council, which gives guidance to the High

Representative in performing his tasks. The still weak government apparatus and the

frequent reluctance of the Bosnian authorities to take up reforms are among the main

problems. The provisions of the Dayton Agreement, which created a Bosnian state

with a complex division of power along ethnic lines with restricted authority at central

level, also often present an obstacle. Lord Ashdown’s mandate was recently

extended to May 2005: after that, transferring his tasks to an EU-led mission is a

plausible scenario. For the Netherlands an important basic principle is that the

Bosnian authorities increasingly take responsibility themselves for the reform

process. A future EU mission would then ideally operate without the ‘Bonn powers’,

under which the High Representative has far-reaching authority to intervene in the

governance of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25

In December 2003, the European Commission published a feasibility study listing 16

areas in which substantial progress must be made before negotiations can start on

an SAA. These include better implementation of legislation, more effective

governance and the implementation of economic reforms. In June 2004, the

Commission will assess whether Bosnia-Herzegovina has made sufficient progress

to start the negotiations.

Bosnia-Herzegovina has indicated that it would like to join NATO’s Partnership for

Peace. Here, too, cooperation with the ICTY is one of the components. The country

has made good progress in reforming the armed forces and the security services.

These changes have the ultimate aim of creating a single national army for Bosnia-

Herzegovina, incorporating the armed forces of both the Muslim-Croat Federation

and the Republika Srpska. In this connection, the parliament decided last year to

take steps to form a single Ministry of Defence for the country as a whole.

� Bilateral programme

In the past, Dutch bilateral development efforts focused on supporting the return of

refugees and displaced persons to their original places of residence. In recent years,

increasing attention has also been given to good governance. Here, the focus is on

strengthening state institutions (capacity development) in relation to the entities and

development of civil society. An important focus in the bilateral programme is in and

around Srebrenica. Activities include assistance for people who cannot or do not

want to return to the area. Despite a stable macroeconomic climate the Bosnian

economy is not in a sound state. It is therefore crucial for stability in the country that

there is economic development in the short term. As of 2004, the Dutch programme

will devote more attention to activities in the fields of economic good governance and

private sector development. Bosnia-Herzegovina receives special attention as a

member of the Dutch constituency at the World Bank and the IMF. The Eastern

Europe Cooperation Programme (PSO) is also active in Bosnia.

Macedonia

� Closer relations with the EU and NATO

Since the 2001 crisis, the domestic political agenda in Macedonia has been

dominated by implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which is intended

26

to result in a decentralised and multi-ethnically governed state. Successive NATO

and EU missions (Operations Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Concordia and the

Proxima police mission) have made, and continue to make, a significant contribution

towards this end. In addition, the EU Special Representative helps to monitor

implementation of the provisions of the Ohrid Agreement. Since February 2004, the

Special Representative has been Søren Jessen-Petersen from Denmark. Relations

between the various political parties are still tense. In addition, there are a number of

ethnic splinter groups which try to sabotage the peace process by carrying out

attacks. These groups enjoy almost no popular support. Macedonia has indicated

that it will be submitting an application for EU membership at the end of February. It

hopes that this will generate sufficient domestic political support for the radical

changes required by the Ohrid Agreement.

Macedonia is a partner in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) and hopes to be

invited to join the alliance in the near future. Before that can occur the country must

implement reforms in the security sector. The Macedonian government has drafted a

reform programme, which must now be approved by the parliament. NATO supports

these efforts through cooperation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP).

� Bilateral programme

Although Macedonia has made good progress in the area of macroeconomic

stability, there is still much to be done, especially in the field of reform of the

government apparatus and improvement of the socioeconomic situation. The most

important components of the Ohrid Framework Agreement also have to be

implemented, especially in the area of decentralisation. For the Macedonian

government, partly with a view to the expected application for EU membership, this

has very high priority. Other important aims of the Macedonian government are to

strengthen the rule of law, and to achieve economic growth and reforms in education

and health care. The Dutch bilateral programme is contributing to these goals. In

addition to a programme on basic education – which will be expanded in the coming

period – good governance, public finance management and private sector

development have been core components of the programme since 2003. Specific

attention is given to supporting the decentralisation process and implementation of

the Framework Agreement. In the field of private sector development a large

27

microcredit project for small entrepreneurs has recently started. Both core

components will be further elaborated in the coming period. Macedonia receives

special attention as a member of the Dutch constituency at the World Bank and the

IMF. The Eastern Europe Cooperation Programme (PSO) is also active in

Macedonia.

Croatia

� Closer relations with the EU and NATO

In Croatia, the parliamentary elections of 23 November 2003 resulted in a clear

victory for the opposition HDZ party. The new coalition government, led by Ivo

Sanader, took office in December. Like his predecessor, Prime Minister Sanader has

pledged to strive for EU membership, and the first indications of the government’s

actions to achieve this goal are positive. Croatia has signed an SAA and applied for

EU membership. It hopes to join the EU in 2007. The extent to which Croatia meets

the political and economic criteria, including cooperating with the ICTY, will have to

be assessed in the coming period. Like the UK, the Netherlands has suspended

ratification of the SAA with Croatia in response to insufficient cooperation on the part

of the Croatian authorities with the ICTY. The European Commission has made clear

that the Dutch and British positions will be taken into account in its avis on the

Croatian application for EU membership, due to be published in the spring of 2004. If

the avis is positive and the European Council grants Croatia the status of candidate

country, the first contacts with the country on the process towards full membership

are likely to be made during the Dutch EU presidency.

Croatia is a partner in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) and hopes to be invited

to join the alliance in the near future. Developments in that direction are positive, but

the country still has to implement a number of reforms in the security sector. NATO

supports these efforts through targeted assistance in the context of the Membership

Action Plan (MAP). Croatia and NATO have agreed on a timepath, requirements and

conditions that the country has to comply with before it can become eligible for actual

membership of the alliance. One condition is cooperation with the ICTY.

� MATRA and PSO

28

Croatia – which is also a member of the Dutch constituency at the World Bank and

the IMF – is not eligible for Dutch development assistance, but does receive support

through the MATRA and PSO programmes and is eligible for support for non-ODA

constituency countries.

Serbia and Montenegro/Kosovo

� Closer relations with the EU and NATO

In Serbia and Montenegro reform oriented forces are still having to deal with the

political and economic legacy of the Milosevic era. This presents a significant

obstacle to the implementation of the necessary reforms. In addition, Serbia and

Montenegro still has the largest refugee population in Europe (more than 500,000

people, including a large number of displaced persons from Kosovo).

The murder of the Serb prime minister Zoran Djindjic in March 2003 resulted in a

serious political crisis in the country. Political wrangling led to the fall of the

subsequent government of Zoran Zivkovic, and in the parliamentary elections of 28

December 2003 the extreme-nationalist SRS party emerged as the largest party.

Relations with neighbouring countries have improved significantly and ties with

Montenegro were formalised in the new state union of Serbia and Montenegro. Time

will tell whether the young state will be able to survive. Another hot issue in Serbian

politics is the definitive status of Kosovo. This spring the European Commission is

expected to publish a feasibility study on starting negotiations with Serbia and

Montenegro on an SAA.

Serbia and Montenegro has indicated that it wishes to be considered for membership

of the PfP. Although NATO is of the opinion that considerable results have been

achieved in the reform process, membership of PfP will depend on cooperation with

the ICTY.

� Cooperation on defence/MATRA and PSO

During his visit to Belgrade on 5 November, the Dutch Minister of Defence signed a

Declaration of Intent with the then defence minister Boris Tadic. This document

provides a framework for bilateral military cooperation with Serbia and Montenegro.

The Netherlands’ willingness to cooperate with Serbia and Montenegro on military

activities is an indication of our confidence in the development of the security

29

structures in the country. Partly with a view to the formation of a new government

coalition, the international community will continue to follow these important

developments with a critical eye. Over the past few years, steps have been taken to

reduce the size of the Serbian and Montenegran armed forces and make them more

professional. A process is under way to improve civil control of the armed forces. A

small-scale bilateral military cooperation programme has been agreed for 2004,

which entails the provision of courses for Serbian and Montenegran military

personnel. In addition, there is an agreement to exchange information on crisis

management operations. A military delegation from Belgrade recently visited the

Ministry of Defence, where they had talks on the planning, preparation and

implementation of a political and military crisis management operation, and

cooperation with other countries in a military operation.

MATRA and PSO are active in Serbia and Montenegro, which is not a partner

country. MATRA activities are restricted to ‘classical’ support to strengthen civil

society and local government.

Kosovo

In Kosovo, which – on the basis of Security Council Resolution 1244 – has been

under UN control (UNMIK) since 1999, the Albanian-Kosovar majority is striving for

independence in the short term. On 12 December 2003, the ‘Standards for Kosovo’

were approved by the UN Security Council. Shortly before that, in October 2003, the

dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina on a selected number of issues (including

the return of minorities) formally started. In mid-2005, or earlier if possible, progress

made in implementing the standards will be assessed on the basis of a working plan

drafted by the UN Special Representative to Kosovo, Harri Holkeri. If sufficient

progress has been made, the question of Kosovo’s final status can be discussed.

The Netherlands emphasises the importance of the standards process because it

provides clarity on the conditions to be met before the status question can be

addressed. Perhaps more importantly, it also means that the process can be kept

under control in the runup to the talks on the status question. Especially through the

Contact Group, the international community is involved in the search for a permanent

solution to the Kosovo status question. Partly at the Netherlands’ request, proposals

30

are being drawn up within the EU calling for greater EU involvement in the Kosovo

issue.

4.10. Multilateral foraThe regional context lies at the heart of the Netherlands’ strategy regarding

developments in the Balkans in multilateral fora like the EU, UN and OSCE. This

means in the first instance that the Netherlands seeks to participate in regional

initiatives developed by these organisations themselves. This includes, for example,

taking part in the activities of UN agencies in the field of long-term provisions for

refugees and in the regional component of the EU’s Stabilisation and Association

Process. In addition, where possible in consultation with its partners, the Netherlands

will call for the closest possible cooperation between the various organisations. This

will not only avoid overlap in activities in the region, but will enable the different

programmes to complement each other and where possible strengthen each other’s

civil society and local government.

31

AbbreviationsAEV ‘Mutual interests, mutual responsibilities’ policy document

BKAC Bosnia Kosovo Air Component

CARDS Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratisation and

Stabilisation (EU aid programme for the Western Balkans)

CBI Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries

EU European Union

EUMM European Union Monitoring Mission

EUPM European Police Mission

FMO Netherlands Development Finance Company

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia

IOM International Organisation for Migration

KFOR Kosovo Force

MAP Membership Action Plan

MARRI Migration, Asylum, Return Regional Initiative

MATRA Social Transformation Programme

MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation

MILIEV Environment and Economic Self-Sufficiency Programme

MNTF Multinational Task Force

MOST Monitoring, Observation, Surveillance and Targeting

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

ODA Official Development Assistance

OHR Office of the High Representative (Bosnia)

ORET Development-related Export Transactions Programme

OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PESP Economic Cooperation Projects Programme

PfP NATO Partnership for Peace programme

PSO Eastern Europe Cooperation Programme (Ministry of

Economic Affairs

REReP Regional Environmental Reconstruction Programme for South-eastern

Europe

SAA Stabilisation and Association Agreement

32

SAP EU Stabilisation and Association Process

SEECP South-East European Cooperation Process

SFOR Stabilisation Force

SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

TMF Theme-based Cofinancing

UN United Nations

UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo