regime change by the book-2004

8/10/2019 Regime Change by the Book-2004

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Regime Change by the Book:

Constitutional Toolsto Preserve Democracy

Theodore J. Piccone, Editor

Alexander S. Kirshner, Project DirectorCorey Whiting, Project Assistant

Siham Nurhussein, Project Assistant

Supported by a grant from the Open Society Institute.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i

PREFACE ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

INTRODUCTION 1

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6

RECALL/VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE 9

IMPEACHMENT 12

SUCCESSION 15

CRIMINALIZING COUPS 19

SLIDES 23

PRESIDENTIAL RECALL:

THE CASE OF VENEZUELA 28

PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT:

THE CASE OF KOREA 43

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:

THE CASE OF ARGENTINA 56

COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 69

ARGENTINA 69

CANADA 76

KOREA 83


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NIGERIA 89

ROMANIA 96

RUSSIA 104

SOUTH AFRICA 113

SPAIN 121

THAILAND 129

VENEZUELA 138

APPENDIX

ABOUT THE DEMOCRACY COALITION

PROJECT 148

LIST OF REVIEWERS 151


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Regime Change by the Book

17

Finally Nigeria, Argentina and Venezuela offer mixed systemsunder certain circumstances the successor is permanent and under other

circumstances new elections are held. Under both the Nigerian andArgentine constitutions, when the president is no longer able to serve, a vice

president assumes the presidency and serves out the term with the fullpanoply of powers. If there is no vice president or he or she is unable toserve, then an interim president is named. In Nigeria, the interim presidentis the president of the senate and elections are held within three months. In

Argentina, the Congress determines who assumes power, whether theinterim president will fill out the full term, and when the next election willtake place. In Venezuela, if the president becomes unable to serve out theterm during the first four years of his six-year term, the vice president (who

is handpicked by the president) serves for no more than thirty days; newelections must be held by the end of this period. However, if the presidencyis vacated during the last two years of the term, the unelected vice president

serves out the remainder of the two years.

Recommendations

1) Succession provisions in democratic constitutions should clearlyspecify at least two successors and delineate a process for choosing

the next in line for succession. When a chief executive leaves officebefore his or her term expires, the identity of a replacement should be

clear and predictable. This applies even in temporary instances when theconstitution establishes a short period before a permanent successor ischosen. In Venezuela, Russia, Thailand, and Canada, either only thefirst successor is determined or the succession is handled according to

internal party rules. This situation could lend itself to ad hoc solutionsmanipulable by whomever has the most power at the time of the crisis,rather than being driven by a consensus among the larger body politic.

Further, there are frequently occasions when the first in line is unable orunwilling to serve. To account for these circumstances, clear rules fordesignating the next chief executive should be articulated in order to

respond with a minimum amount of confusion and maximum amount ofdemocratic legitimacy.

2) Constitutions should mandate that positions in the line of successionbe filled when they become vacant and outline a procedure for doing

so that comports with democratic practice. One institutional cause of

the Argentine game of presidential hot-potato that was played in 2001-2002 is that the Argentine constitution neither insists that the viceasefad


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23

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Succession

Provision4

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Impeach-

ment

Provisions3

X

X

X

X

X

X

Recall

Provisions/

MotionofNo

Confidence

forChief

Executives2

Presidential

Constitutional

Monarchy/

Parliamentary

Constitutional

Monarchy/

Parliam

entary

Presidential

Parliamentary

Presidential1

Mixed

Presidential

Constitutional

Monarchy/

Parliamentary

Presidential

Systemof

Government

Venezuela

Thailand

Sp

ain

South

Korea

South

Africa

Russia

Romania

Nigeria

Canada

Argentina

Transfe

rsofExecutivePower

1

TheRuss

iansystemofgovernmenthaselementsofamixedsystem,butinpractice

isconsideredapresidentialsystem.

22

TheTheArgentine,Russian,SouthKoreanandVenezuelanconstitutionsallincludesomefeaturesintheirpresidentialsystem

sthatservethefunctionofamini-

noconfide

ncemotion,forexample,allowingthe

legislaturetoremoveatleastoneme

mberofthepresidentsadministrationonamotionofnoconfidence.

3

WhileCanadaandSpainallowprosecutionoftheirprimeministersforcriminalviolations,theonlymeanstoremovetheprimeministerfromofficeisavote

ofnoconfidence.

4

Canadaa

ndThailanddonothaveconstitutiona

lprovisionstoidentifyanimmediates

uccessortoactasinterimprimeminister,thoughtheydohave

processes

tochooseanewpermanentprimem

inister.Spainssuccessionprovisionscanbefoundinthebasiclawofgovernment,ratherthanthe

constitutio

n.


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Democracy Coalition Project

24

Mustoccur

after

the

3rd

year

of

pre

sid

en

tsterm.

20

%ofre

gis

tere

d

votersm

ustsign

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a

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dum.

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ustbe

casttorem

ov

ethan

wereinitially

castto

ele

ctthepre

sid

en

t.

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um

ber

of

votescastm

ustbe

25

%of

thetotal

num

ber

of

regis

tere

dv

oters.

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aybe

filedon

cedurin

ga

termin

offic

e.

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ustbe

proposedby40%of

theHouseof

Representa

tives.It

mustalsoincludea

candidateto

replace

theprimem

inister.

Majority

ofall

members

ofthe

Houserequiredfor

passage.

Ifvotedoes

notpass,

thememberswho

proposedth

emotion

maynotdo

soagain

insame

parliame

ntary

sessio

n.

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motionspr

oposed

duetoalleged

impeachable

offenses

mustbereferredto

theSena

tefor

impeachmentfirst.

Motionm

ustby

pro

posedby10

%of

theCon

gre

ss.It

mustals

oin

clu

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can

did

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quire

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otion

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ot

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ew

on

e

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eparliam

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confid

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aybe

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eor

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drawn

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ew

parliam

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ction

sare

calle

d

.

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otionmustbe

proposedby25%of

the

totalnumberof

deputiesand

senators.

Deb

atebeginsthree

da

ysaftermotion

initiated.

Majorityofall

deputiesand

senatorsrequiredfor

passage.

Newparliamentary

electionsarenot

calledifconfidence

with

drawn,unlessa

new

primeminister

ca

nnotbeagreed

uponwithin60days.

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an

ewonemaynot

beheldinsame

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session.

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oteof

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Comm

on

s

require

dfor

passage(by

custom

).

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sm

ayor

mayn

otbecalle

dif

confid

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ce

with

drawn.

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ents

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ofN

o

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enc

e

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ofN

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en

ce

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ofN

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en

ce

Motion

ofN

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en

ce

Motion

ofN

o

Confid

en

ce

Mech

an

ism

Pre

sid

en

tial

Con

stitu

tional

Mon

arch

y/Parl

Con

stitution

al

Mon

arch

y/P

arl

Parliam

en

tary

Mix

ed

Con

stitution

al

Mon

arch

y/P

arl

System

of

Gov

ernm

ent

Venezuela

Thaila

nd

Spain

SouthAfrica

Romania

Canada

PresidentialRecall/ParliamentaryMotiono

fNoConfidence


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26

ForPM:

Untilnew

Government

isformed

ForPM:

InterimPM

chosenby

President

N

N/A

N/A

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

N/A

Yes

FirstinLine

Elected?

Ifwithin1st

fouryearsof

presidents

term,new

elections

within

30days

Ifafterthe

fourthyear,

successor

servesout

remainderof

presidents

term

N/A

Untiln

ew

Government

ischosen

New

elections

within

60days

Assembly

must

choosenew

president

within

30days

New

elections

within

3months

For

President:

New

elections

within

3months

Ifvice

presid

ent,

remainderof

presidents

term

.

IfSen

ate

Presid

ent,

elections

heldwithin3

months.

Bycustom,

Gov.

General

appoints

actingPM

whoserves

until

replacement

chosenby

majority

party

Ifvice

president,

remainderof

presidents

term.

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successors

canfulfillthe

termor

serveuntil

the

legislature

declares

new

elections.

Lengthof

InterimChief

Executives

Term

Yes

N/A

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

N/A

Yes

InterimChief

Executive

WieldsFull

Power

Yes

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N/A

Yes

InterimChief

Executiveis

Eligibleto

runforthe

Positionin

Next

Elections

Executive

Vice

President

Successor

chosenby

King

FirstVice

President

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rof

theCab

inet

Prime

Minister

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theState

Council

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Chamberof

Deputies

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Vice

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ent

Sena

te

Presid

ent

Successor

formally

chosenby

Governor

General;

partyin

power

designates

newleader

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President

Subsequen

t

successors

chosenby

the

legislature

Lineof

Succession

Venezuela

Thailand

Spain

South

Korea

South

Africa

Russia

Romania

Nige

ria

Canada

Argentina

Success

ion


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27

No

N/A

Ye

s

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Prohibition

s

on

Convicte

d

Coup

Particip

an

ts

Holdin

g

Public

Offic

e

Righ

tto

Resist

Non-

con

stitutio

nalA

cts

Crimin

alize

sn

ot

resis

ting

cou

ps

Crimin

aliz

e

snot

inf

ormin

g

aboutcoup

plots

Crimin

alize

sn

ot

informin

g

aboutcoup

plo

ts

Whistle

blo

wer

Pro

tection

Righ

tto

Resist

Non-

con

stitutio

nalA

cts

Law

sthat

En

coura

ge

Resistan

ce

to

Coups

(e.g.

den

un

ciation

of

plo

tsan

d

non-

particip

atio

n

inille

gitim

a

te

gov

ernm

en

t)

X

N/A

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Crimin

al

Code

Crimin

aliz

es

Coups

X

X

X

X

Con

stitutio

n

Crimin

aliz

es

Coups

Venezuela

Thailand

Spa

in

South

Korea

South

Africa

Russia

Romania

N

igeria

Canada

Argentina

CriminalizingCoups


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39

procedures for counting the vote, the role of international observers, andwhether President Chavez could run again in the election if he were

removed from office.

In the predawn hours of August 16, with initial results projecting abig 58-42 percent win, President Chavez appeared before thousands ofpartisans gathered at the presidential palace to declare victory. Leaders ofthe opposition coalition cried foul, claiming this was massive fraud.

48

According to news reports, gunmen fired on an opposition demonstrationlater the same day, wounding seven people including a woman who laterdied.

49 Former President Carter and Secretary General Gaviria quickly

announced that their own quick count had confirmed the official results and

urged the National Electoral Council to allow a transparent audit and toexamine any credible concerns raised by the opposition. After two roundsof audits, and no credible evidence of electoral fraud, the Carter Center

called on all parties to work together to solve the pressing problems of thecountry.

50

Conclusions

1. Venezuelas popular recall mechanism offers a novel constitutional

avenue for removing an unpopular president. However, the complexity of

any recall process and the strain placed on Venezuelas political discourse

and political institutions may outweigh its advantages.

The Venezuelan constitutions unusual recall mechanism (article72) has the potential to act as a popular counterbalance to the broad powers

granted to the chief executive. It offers something like a parliamentarymotion of no confidence but is instead directly controlled, in theory, by the

voters. At the same time, article 72s requirement that a recall cannot occur

until halfway through an officials term in office and thresholds for voterturnout and winning majorities protect against frivolous attempts todestabilize an elected government. The mechanism has provided both sides

an imperfect, but important, incentive to follow the rule of law to settle theirdisputes

48

US Withholds Judgement on Venezuelan referendum, Urges Probe of Fraud Claims,

Agence France Presse, 17 August 2004.

49For example Venezuela to Hold Partial Audit of Recall, The Associated Press, 18

August 2004.50

For a definitive account of the recall process and investigation of the oppositions claims

of fraud, see Jennifer McCoy, What really happened in Venezuela?, The Economist, 2

September 2004; available at

http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3157671


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91

Within fourteen days of the presentation of the notice, the NationalAssembly must decide whether the allegation should be investigated.

Investigation requires approval of two-thirds of each house in theAssembly.

180

Within seven days of a National Assembly decision to investigatethe charges, the Chief Justice of Nigeria must appoint a non-partisan, seven-

person panel to conduct the investigation. The panel must report its findings

within three months of its appointment. If the panel concludes that thecharges have not been proven, impeachment proceedings cease. If the panelfinds grounds for impeachment, then the National Assembly has fourteendays to adopt the report, with the approval of two-thirds of the members of

each house. If adopted, the president is immediately removed from office.There is no right of appeal.

181

Nigerias impeachment provision has been tested several timessince the adoption of its latest constitution. The National Assembly hasthreatened to impeach President Obasanjo three times since his election in

1999.182

The most recent and most serious of the cases occurred fromAugust to November 2002. It began when the House of Representativesgave Obasanjo an ultimatum to resign or face impeachment proceedings on

charges of inadequacies, ineptitudes, persistent disregard for the rule of law,and the obvious corruption being perpetrated in the presidency.

183 At the

end of the two weeks, the House and the Senate each drew up a list ofallegations of constitutional violations.

184 Much brinksmanship and

political infighting within Obasanjos own party ensued. The situation grewso heated that, given Nigerias history of military coups, some became

concerned the confrontation could lead to another military takeover, despitea pledge by the countrys top military leader that the armed forces weredfg

180Ibid: Article 143

181Ibid

182See Obasanjos Impeachment Threat Provokes Uproar in Parliament,Panafrica NewsAgency, 19 April 2000, and Nigerias Senate Seeks to Impeach President,Xinhua News

Agency,7 June 2002.183

Nigerian Parliament Threatens to Impeach President Obasanjo,Xinhua News Agency,13 August 2002.184

The majority of the allegations in the last two impeachment efforts seemed to have arisenover the 2002 budget process and accused the president of not implementing the 1999, 2000,

2001, and 2002 budget acts. This latest effort, however, adds a more serious charge ofordering the massacre of innocent civilians to the list of impeachable offenses. See NigerianSenate Joins Plot to Impeach Obasanjo,Panafrican News Agency,27 August 2002, andNigerian Lawmakers Accuse Obasanjo of Ordering Army Massacres,Associated Press,4

September 2002.


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98

designate a candidate for prime minister in consultation with the parties inthe parliament.

207 New parliamentary elections are not called.

The government may also initiate a vote of confidence by assuming

responsibility for a program, general policy statement, or bill presentedbefore a joint session of the parliament. Upon such a presentation, theparliament has three days to initiate a motion of censure. If passed, thegovernment is dismissed. If the motion is not passed, the bill before the

parliament is considered passed or the program or general policy statementbecomes binding on the government.

208

The only time the parliament can be dismissed is when it has failed

to grant confidence to a new government within 60 days after the firstproposed government was presented and at least two requests for investiturehave been made. In such instances, the president, after consultation with the

presidents of both chambers of the parliament and the leaders ofparliamentary groups, may dissolve the parliament and call new electionswithin three months.

209 The parliament cannot be dissolved more than once

in the same year, during the last six months of the presidents term in office,or during a state of emergency or siege.

210

Impeachment

The President

There are two constitutional provisions authorizing the parliamentto remove the president from office. The first provision is used in cases

where the president is accused of grave infringements of the constitution.The president may be suspended from office for such acts by a majority voteof deputies and senators after they have consulted with the Constitutional

Court.211

At least one third of the members of parliament must initiate amotion for the presidents suspension and he or she may explain his or heractions before the parliament. If the motion to suspend the president passes,

a referendum must be held within 30 days, allowing the public to determinewhether to remove the president permanently.

212

207Ibid: Article 110(3)208Ibid:Article 114209Ibid: Article 89(1) and 63(2)210Ibid: Article 89(2) and (3)211Accordingly, in Article 146 the Constitutional Court is authorized, inter alia, to give

advisory opinion on the proposal to suspend the President of Romania from office.212Ibid: Article 95


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145

since the generals had ordered their troops to stay in the barracks, they hadnot forced Chavez to resign. The majority portrayed the generals actions as

simply that of filling a power vacuum created by the resignation of thepresident. The court, however, did not address the generals active

participation in undermining the constitution, with respect to theappointment of Carmona and the dissolution of Venezuelas politicalinstitutions, throughout the crisis. Following this ruling, the AttorneyGeneral, Isaias Rodriguez, ended investigations into sixteen other military

officials who had taken part in the coup.

Possibly encouraged by the STJs ruling, members of the military

have taken aggressive public positions against the government in the monthsfollowing that decision. In November 2002, a group of military officers,labeling themselves Comacates, publicly threatened pro-Chavez military

officers. Around the same time, 14 senior officers peacefully assumedcontrol of a public square and called for the resignation of President Chavez.The ranks of those who occupy the square include some who took part in

the April coup. The officers have argued that their actions amount toneither rebellion nor insubordination. They assert under Article 350 of theconstitution that their actions are legitimate.

358

Instead of prosecuting anyone directly involved in the coup, in atleast two instances, Venezuelan authorities have stretched the laws aimed at

deterring seizures of power to target members of the opposition. Forexample, two leaders of the massive anti-Chavez strikes of 2002-2003,Carlos Fernandez, leader of the business association Fedecamaras, andCarlos Ortega, president of the countrys largest labor union, were indicted

on charges of treason, rebellion, and inciting violence for their participationin the economically-crippling strike.

359 Pending an appeal of his case,

Fernandez fled to the United States. Similarly, Ortega has spent a

controversial tenure as a political refugee in Costa Rica. While the STJaffirmed the indictments of rebellion and instigation of violence, both menremain abroad.

Conclusion

The Venezuelan constitution has ushered in novel forms of directdemocracy which Chavez has effectively manipulated to centralize power.It is poorly drafted and vaguely worded, with obscure provisions and

358Joseph Contreras and Phil Gunson, Division in the Ranks,Newsweek, 4 November

2002.359

Judge Orders House Arrest for Chavez Foe,Associated Press, 23 February 2003.


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148

THE DEMOCRACY COALITION PROJECT

The Democracy Coalition Project is an independent nongovernmentalorganization that conducts research and advocacy relating to democracy

promotion policies at the national, regional and global levels. Begun in June2001 as an initiative of the Open Society Institute, the Democracy CoalitionProject relies on an international network of civil society organizations,

scholars, foreign policy experts and politicians committed to democracypromotion as an essential element of international peace and humandevelopment.

The Projects policy agenda covers such areas as:

Improving international responses to democratic crises

Encouraging the donor community to support emerging democracies

Promoting reform of the UN through greater collaboration among

democratic governments

The Democracy Coalition Project also plays a leadership role in encouraginga more transparent and active Community of Democracies, an association ofdemocratic states established in 2000 to promote and protect democracy. Its

flagship publication, Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of ForeignPolicy Trends 1992-2002, which Foreign Policy magazine called one of themost comprehensive research and evaluation tools available on democracy,

examines the democracy promotion records of forty governments.

The Democracy Coalition Project was inspired by the inaugural meeting of

the Community of Democracies in Warsaw, Poland in June 2000, in whichover 100 governments participated. In an effort to advance their commoncommitment to democratic principles, they endorsed the Warsaw Declaration,which commits them to build an association of democratic states dedicated to

strengthening democratic values and institutions at home and abroad.

The Democracy Coalition Project is a strategic partner of the Club of

Madrid, an independent organization dedicated to strengthening democracyaround the world by drawing on the unique experience and resources of itsMembers - democratic former heads of state and government. In partnership

with other organizations and governments that share its democracy-promotion goals, the Club of Madrid provides peer to peer counsel, strategic


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149

support and technical advice to leaders and institutions working towardsdemocratic transition and consolidation.

Ted Piccone, who designed and edited the report, is Executive Director andCo-Founder of the Democracy Coalition Project. A lawyer and international

relations expert, he has written and edited books and articles on democracy,human rights and foreign policy.


International Advisory Board

Asma JahangirPakistan, Co-Founder of the Human Rights Commission of

Pakistan and the Women's Action Forum.

Aung San Suu KyiBurma, Secretary-General of the National League for

Democracy in Burma. In 1991 she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize inrecognition of her tireless effort in the struggle for democracy in Burma.

Bronislaw GeremekPoland, Member of the European Parliament, formerForeign Minister of Poland and a former Member of the Polish Parliament.

Emeka AnyaokuNigeria, Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the LondonSchool of Economics' Centre for the Study of Global Governance. Mr.Anyaoku is the former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth (1990-2000).

Emma BoninoItaly, Member of the European Parliament and the formerEuropean Commissioner of Humanitarian Affairs and Fisheries.

Frene Ginwala South Africa, Speaker of the National Assembly of the

Parliament of the Republic of South Africa since 1994.

George Soros United States, Chairman of the Open Society Institute and thefounder of a network of philanthropic organizations that are active in morethan 50 countries.

John Lewis United States, Member of the U.S. Congress since 1986.


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150

Jose Ramos-HortaEast Timor, Foreign Minister of the newly independentTimor Leste. In 1996 Mr. Ramos-Horta was awarded the Nobel Price for

Peace in honor of his efforts against the oppressive Indonesian control of his

homeland.

Madeleine AlbrightUnited States, Chairman of the National DemocraticInstitute for International Affairs. She previously served as Secretary of Stateof the United States and as the United States Permanent Representative to the

United Nations.

Michel RocardFrance, Member of the European Parliament and former

Prime Minister of France from 1988-1991.

Mohamed SahnounAlgeria, is a Special Advisor to the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations. Previously Mr. Sahnoun was Co-chair of theInternational Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.

Pavol Demes Slovakia, Director for Central and Eastern Europe of theGerman Marshall Fund of the United States based in Bratislava, Slovakia.

Samira A.S. OmarKuwait, an environmental activist and advocate for

women's rights.

Sergey KovalevRussia, Member of the Russian Duma. In 1993 he was

elected as national ombudsman by the Russian Parliament. He is the formerChairman of the President's Human Rights Commission.

Sonia Picado Sotela Costa Rica, President of the Inter-American Instituteof Human Rights. She was the first woman judge on the Inter-AmericanCourt of Human Rights and served as its Vice-President from 1992-1994.

Surin PitsuwanThailand, Member of the Parliament of Thailand and former

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Valentin PaniaguaPeru, the interim President of Peru after the collapse ofthe Fujimori regime. He was first elected to Parliament in 1963.

Wangari MaathaiKenya, founder of the Green Belt Movement andcurrently Kenya's Deputy Environment Minister. In 2004, she received the

Nobel Prize for Peace.


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LIST OF EXPERT REVIEWERS

*Affiliation for identification purposes only

Diego Hidalgo, President, Fundacion par las Relaciones Internacionales y elDialogo Exterior, Spain

Jorge Dominguez, Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs,Harvard University, United States

Kim Campbell, Secretary General, Club of Madrid, Canada

James Klein, Thailand and Laos Representative, The Asia Foundation,

United States

Thomas Remington, Professor and Chair of the Political ScienceDepartment, Emory University, United States

Yuri Dzhibladze, President, Center for the Development of Democracy andHuman Rights, Russia

Rotimi Suberu, Professor of Politics, University of Ibadan, Nigeria

Rut Diamint, Professor of Political Science, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella,

Argentina

Jack Greenberg, Professor of Law, Columbia University, United States

Robert Mattes, Director, Democracy in Africa Research Unit, University ofCape Town, South Africa

Christina Murray, Professor of Law, University of Cape Town, South

Africa

Daniel Berzosa Lopez, Adjunct Professor of Law, Universidad Complutensede Madrid, Spain

Joseph Tulchin, Director, Latin American Program, Woodrow WilsonInternational Center for Scholars, United States


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Steven Levitsky, Associate Professor of Government and Social Studies,Harvard University, United States

Gabriel Negretto, Research Professor, Centro de Investigacin y DocenciaEconmicas, Mexico

George Rogers, Attorney, Inter-American Development Bank, United States

Debora Benchoam, Principal Specialist, Inter-American Commission onHuman Rights, United States

Sook-Jong Lee, Senior Research Fellow, Sejong Institute, Republic of Korea

Jeong-Ho Roh, Director, Center for Korean Legal Studies, ColumbiaUniversity, United States

Derek Mitchell, Senior Fellow, Asia Project, Center for Strategic and

International Studies, United States

Christopher Sabatini, Senior Program Officer, Latin America and theCaribbean, National Endowment for Democracy, United States

Peter Quilter, former Senior Advisor, Organization of American States,United States

Ruben Perina, Coordinator, Unit for Promotion of Democracy, Organizationof American States, United States

Pedro Villagra Delgado, Coordinator for Strategic Projects, Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Argentina

Enrique Ter Horst, former United Nations Deputy High Commissioner of

Human Rights, Venezuela

Richard Simeon, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, Canada

Elizabeth Clark, Associate, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy,Georgetown University, United States

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Acting President, Romanian Academic Society,Romania


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Sergey Kovalev, Member of the Russian Duma, Russia

Margaret Crahan, Dorothy Epstein Professor of Latin American History atHunter College, City University of New York, United States

Charles Sampford, Director, Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice andGovernance, Griffith University, Australia

Jusuf Wanandi, Member, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic andInternational Studies, Indonesia

Yossi Beilin, former Minister of Justice, Israel

Morton Halperin, Director, Open Society Policy Center, United States


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