Michael Kuzmin 208-406-381

Regarding “Corporate executives: Disaster and

Moral Responsibility” by Robert Larmer

“The greatest minds, as they

are capable of the highest

excellencies, are open likewise to

the greatest aberrations.”

René Descartes

In his review Robert Larmer, an Associate Professor from University of New Brunswick,

thoroughly discusses a paper written by his colleague, John D. Bishop, “The Moral

Responsibility of a Corporate Executive for Disasters”. I would like to make some comments on

the work done by the former as well as provide a brief overview of the problem.

The main point of conflict is the claim made by Bishop that as long as any employee of a

certain establishment was in possession of information that could be used to prevent the disaster

the corporate executive of that company can be held morally responsible. He wishes to hold that

this claim is true even if the executive was not in a position to obtain that information. Larmer

mainly focuses on proving this statement wrong or more precisely, as he annotates himself, he

attacks Bishop‟s view on that subject. He instantaneously remarks that a statement of this nature

generally contradicts the Kant‟s principle of implication of ability in the context of duty.

However he agrees that in the causes where the inability is cased by ignorance Bishop‟s argument

“has merit”. Larmer takes advantage of using the example of a drunk driver that can not be

expected to drive safely but nonetheless is fully responsible because he failed to keep himself

sober. I personally disagree with Mr. Larmer or this particular detail and believe that the case of

responsibility should be determined chronologically (i.e. by the latest immoral action taken). In

this case that decision was driving, not consuming alcohol. That, of course, implies that the

degree to which the person has been intoxicated still allows him to make a legitimate decision.

The most interesting topic that Larmer and Bishop touch upon is the concept of

professional responsibility. Larmer explains that Bishop is falling victim of a formal fallacy that

could be represented by the attached diagram (see Diagram 1, page 2)

My strongest disagreement with Robert Larmer is based of his understanding of the “third

problem” which implies that Bishop does not provide any explanation why „acts of god‟ need to

be excluded from the events that corporate executives should be held accountable for. Larmer in

his hyper-aggressive attempts to disprove Bishop fails to see that the explanation is self-evident,

no employer can see how the event can de avoided, unless of course God is in fact considered to

be an employee of the corporation.

And finally, going back to the topic of concept of professional responsibility I very much

support Larmer‟s well-stated opinion and I don‟t think there is much to add to it: Given “the human” tendency to pass the buck, it is useful to have a practical rule that,

in cases where it may possibly be doubted that he took all reasonable steps to prevent the disaster, a corporate executive be judged as failing in his professional duties, even though it is far from clear that he is actually morally culpable. Should it become clear, however, that he did take all reasonable steps to prevent the disaster and that he is in no way morally culpable, it also becomes clear that he cannot be held professionally responsible.

Diagram 1, “Regarding “Corporate executives: Disaster and Moral

Responsibility” by Robert Larmer”, M. Kuzmin

One fails professionally

↓

One fails morally

One fails to succede

↓

One fails professionally

One fails morally

↓

One fails professionally

One fails to make best effort

↓

One fails morally