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Reforming Bengalurus Governance:

Political Devolution and Democratic Accountability

Submission to the Expert Committee on BBMP Restructuring1

February, 2015

Contents

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 2

2. Devolution of Political and Administrative Powers ........................................................................ 5

2.1 Devolution of Powers to Wards ..................................................................................................... 6

2.1.1 Ward Committee ............................................................................................................................ 7

2.1.2 Area Sabha ........................................................................................................................................ 7

2.1.3 Improving Quality of Life through Ward-based Governance ........................................ 8

2.2 Devolution of Powers to Zones ...................................................................................................... 9

2.3 Devolution of Powers to BBMP ................................................................................................... 10

3. Fixing Democratic Accountability ....................................................................................................... 12

3.1 Executive Power of Local Government .................................................................................... 13

3.2 Role of Parastatal Agencies ........................................................................................................... 14

4. Governance of Metropolitan Bengaluru ........................................................................................... 17

4.1 Metropolitan Area ........................................................................................................................... 18

4.2 Metropolitan Planning Committee ........................................................................................... 18

5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................... 21

6. Summary of Recommendations ........................................................................................................... 23

1 Authored by Sudhir Krishnaswamy and Mathew Idiculla with inputs from Harini

Nagendra and Manu Mathai. An earlier version of the draft was discussed among other

faculty members at Azim Premji University and suggestions by Chiranjib Sen, Gladwin

Joseph and Narayana A have been incorporated.

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1. Introduction

Bengaluru, until Indias Independence, existed as two cities Bengaluru, the Indian part of

the town governed by the Bangalore City Municipality and Bangalore, the cantonment

established by the British and governed by the Civil and Military Station Municipality. After

Indias independence, a single municipal body called the City of Bangalore Municipal

Corporation was set up in 1949 by amalgamating the two municipalities.2 Since then, the

spatial boundaries of the city corporation have expanded by more than 10 times. With the

formation of Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) in 2007 by merging seven City

Municipal Councils, one Town Municipal Council and 110 Village Panchayats into the city,

the total area of the Corporation increased from the 226 sq. km. to 716 sq. km.

Expanding Boundaries of Bengalurus Municipal Corporation

Year Name of Corporation Size of Corporation

1949 Bangalore City Corporation 69 sq. km

1995 Bangalore Mahanagara Palike 226 sq. km

2007 Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike 716 sq. km

The Government Notification which increased the area of Bengalurus Corporation in 2007

proposed that the expanded boundaries would help coordinate and improve infrastructure

development and service delivery and strengthen administrative capacity across the region.

However the legal framework within which the Corporation operates has remained the

same The Karnataka Municipal Corporation (KMC) Act, 1976. Notably, the integration of the

peripheral areas into the BBMP was carried out without consulting the municipalities and

village panchayats which were subsumed into this larger body.3 Eight years later, the

decision to amalgamate these areas is seen by the State government to be a failure. The areas

2 Nair, Janaki. The promise of the metropolis: Bangalore's twentieth century. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005. 3 Idiculla, Mathew Prasad, Who decides where your city ends? India Together, November 29, 2014. Available at http://indiatogether.org/city-metropolitan-region-municipal-corporations-governance-government

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that were added, especially the 110 villages, continues to languish in terms of basic

infrastructure and service delivery.4

A three member Expert Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. B.S. Patil (IAS (R)), and

with Mr. Siddaiah (IAS (R)) and Mr. V. Ravichandar as members, was constituted by the

government in September 22, 2014 to recommend the best way to divide BBMP to improve

the ease of administration and provide basic amenities and facilities to the people.5 An

addendum note on November 19, 2014 clarified that the committees mandate was to

restructure BBMP to improve the quality of life through suitable government system and

infrastructure for Bengaluru.6

The public debate on this issue has been framed as a choice between having multiple

corporations and having administrative decentralization within BBMP. A Committee headed

by BL Shankar, constituted by the Karnataka Pradesh Congress Committee (KPCC) for giving

suggestions on the division of BBMP, suggested trifurcating the BBMP into three municipal

corporations - Bengaluru Central, consisting of the core Bengaluru region which was part of

the old Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BMP), Bengaluru South and Bengaluru North.7

Dividing BBMP into multiple corporations would mean that each unit would work as an

independent urban government with separate city councils. The alternative is to not split

BBMP into various independent corporations but to have more decentralized modes of

administration through zonal and regional offices.

The key question before the Committee is how BBMP must be restructured to ensure better

quality of life for the citizens of Bengaluru. We argue that division or administrative

decentralisation of BBMP is not to be taken by itself as a solution for Bengalurus governance

problems. The problem with governance in Bengaluru is not primarily in its size but rather

in the manner in which power is organised. In this submission, we propose a new governance

framework that is based on the constitutional principles of political devolution and

democratic accountability. These principles may be consistent with a divided or a

decentralised BBMP. In this submission we have laid out a framework for restructuring

BBMP that does not include its division. Irrespective of whether BBMP is split, unless these

constitutional principles are respected, no restructuring will achieve their objectives.

4 BBMP Restructuring: Expert Committee Preliminary Report, Dec 2014 5 Government order no. NaAaE484 MNY 2013 dated Sept 22, 2014. Available on http://www.bbmprestructuring.org/wp/government-order/ 6 Addendum Notice 19.11.2014 Available on http://www.bbmprestructuring.org/wp/government-order/ 7 Shankar Committee for BBMP Trifurcation, The New Indian Express, 18th November 2014

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A mere division of BBMP without altering the manner in which power is organised and

distributed will not achieve any positive change. If the division of BBMP is carried out by

issuing a Notification under the KMC Act, 1976, it will only result in the replication of the

same structure of governance over smaller geographical units. Division without reform will

not resolve the core defects of our current structure of BBMP governance. Similarly, a purely

administrative decentralization of BBMP will also not be effective. Administrative

decentralization, carried along the lines of the eight zones that presently constitute BBMP,

will not be able to address the basic issues faced by the citizens since these units will

continue to lack substantive political accountability.

An alternative to both pure administrative decentralization and a routine division of BBMP

is a restructuring of BBMP based on the constitutional principles of political devolution and

democratic accountability. The 74th Constitutional Amendment, passed in 1992, created an

independent third tier of government in urban areas. However, the statutory framework for

urban local bodies in the State have not substantially changed and has failed to realize the

promise of the constitutional amendment. For political devolution that respects the principle

of local self-governance in the Constitution, we must begin by recognizing that the unit of

city government closest to the people- the Ward- must be vested with as much power as

possible. At the next level, the Zones must be vested with the powers to address issues that

affect multiple wards and the Municipal Corporation must only be made responsible for city-

wide policy making.

Once devolution of powers has been carried out, the next step is align political and executive

powers to ensure that administrative authority is politically accountable on a daily basis.

This alignment must be achieved at all levels- Ward, Zone and Municipal Corporation. A

politically empowered mayor and legally and politically accountable parastatal agencies are

key elements of such reform. In this submission we explain how by fixing democratic

accountability and devolving political and administrative powers, the governance crisis of

Bengaluru can be addressed. We aim to show that only by restructuring Bengalurus

governance along these constitutional principles is there any hope for a division of BBMP to

usher in meaningful reform.

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2. Devolution of Political and Administrative Powers

The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 sought to achieve the empowerment of local

democracy through the devolution of functions, funds and functionaries to elected municipal

bodies. It also provides for the formation of Ward Committees below the municipality to

ensure that responsibilities within the ward are effectively carried out by a body closer to

the people. The constitutional entrenchment of local governments was required to ensure

that State endow the local government with powers necessary to enable them to function

as institutions of self-government.8 Despite these provisions, Municipal Corporations and

Ward Committees in India continue to find themselves beholden to the state government.

We argue that for effective local governance, the devolution of powers from large, centralized

governmental bodies to smaller, decentralized units are necessary. Devolution includes both

political and administrative decentralization whereby decision-making powers are handed

over from higher levels of the government to lower levels.9 In this section we explain how

the constitutional principle of devolution can be achieved by endowing the wards, zones and

city governments with necessary powers to solve local problems. At the ward level, the Ward

Committee can be made responsible for the municipal functions within the ward and at the

zonal level, a Zonal Council can be made politically accountable for the tasks of BBMP within

the zone. We argue that the Ward must be made the basic unit of governance and only those

matters that cannot be decided at the ward level should be taken up to the zone and city

level. The underlying principle behind this governance framework is the idea of subsidiarity.

Subsidiarity is the principle of governance which says that power should be located as close

to people as possible in the smallest units that are feasible.10 Essentially, it states that

government action should be taken at the lowest level at which that problem can be

addressed.11 Subsidiarity, a term used more in the context of European Union, is closely

associated with localism, a term used in United States, which argues that local autonomy

should be protected and enhanced. The normative justifications for localism is dominated by

two theories which emphasize different fundamental values. One normative basis for

8 Article 243W, Constitution of India 9 Rondinelli, Dennis. What Is Decentralization? in Litvack, Jennie, and Jessica Seddon, eds. Decentralization briefing notes. Washington DC: World Bank Institute, 1999. 10 Daly, Herman E. For the common good: Redirecting the economy toward community, the environment, and a sustainable future. No. 73. Beacon Press, 1994. 11 Blank, Yishai. "Federalism, subsidiarity, and the role of local governments in an age of global multilevel governance." Fordham Urban Law Journal 37 (2010): 509; Bermann, George A. "Taking subsidiarity seriously: federalism in the European Community and the United States." Columbia Law Review (1994): 331-456

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localism is that it promotes participation in public life while the other is that it provides for

more efficient provision of public sector goods and services.12

A public sphere that facilitates maximum public participation and debate has been

characterized as the most authentic and radical form of democracy.13 Since individual

participation can effectively take place only in small units, transfer of power to local level is

said to be essential.14 Local government hence promotes public freedom, which is the

ability to participate actively in the basic societal decisions that affect one's life.15

Devolution of powers to local level can also ensure that services are provided as per the

particular needs of the locality. Hence, going by the principle of subsidiarity, the Ward must

be empowered to take necessary action to solve any issue faced by a locality. If the subject

matter concerns more than one ward, the Zone would be made responsible and if it concerns

more than one zone, the Municipal Corporation would be made responsible.

2.1 Devolution of Powers to Wards

Many of the daily problems confronted by citizens are local and can be solved at the lowest

level of government if they are sufficiently empowered to do the same. If the Corporator of

the Ward is given more decision-making powers for municipal functions within his/her

Ward, local problems can be addressed more effectively. Governance at the local level, since

its the one closest to the people, is also the ideal domain at which citizen participation can

be promoted. Area Sabhas, like the Gram Sabha in the villages, can serve as a forum for the

discussion and articulation of the needs of the citizens. Elected representatives can be held

accountable to the people through forums like Ward Committees and Areas Sabhas. Hence,

ward level governance has the potential to promote participation, ensure accountability and

solve basic civic issues faced by the people of Bengaluru.

Making the Ward the basic unit of governance would involve more than the formation of

Ward Committees and Area Sabhas. It would also involve strengthening the ward level

administration. Each Ward office must be structured in such a way that each of the key

functions of BBMP has its specific ward level unit. Hence, whether it is public health,

sanitation, solid waste management, parks and lakes management, or land use, the Ward

must have officers appointed to deal with these functions. To ensure that each Ward has the

12 Briffault, Richard. "Our Localism: Part II--Localism and Legal Theory." Columbia Law Review (1990): 346-454. 13 Habermas, Jrgen. The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society. MIT press, 1991. 14 Frug, Gerald E. "The City as a Legal Concept." Harvard Law Review (1980): 1057-1154. 15 Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. London 1990 (1963) quoted in Frug, Gerald E. "The City as a Legal Concept."

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necessary financial capacity to administer these functions, we suggest that a percentage of

the property tax collected from the ward to be remitted directly to Ward administration. All

cesses and fees collected at the Ward level may also be retained by the ward. If the ward

level bureaucracy is also strengthened in this manner, the ward can become a powerful

administrative and political unit.

2.1.1 Ward Committee: The 74th Constitutional Amendment mandates the

formation of Ward Committees, consisting of one or more wards, for every municipality with

a population of more than three lakh.16 The Karnataka State Legislature on January 13, 2011

passed the Karnataka Municipal Corporations (Amendment) Act, 2011 providing for Ward

Committees and Area Sabhas modeled on the Community Participation Law or Nagara Raj

Bill which was one of the mandatory reforms to be implemented by the states receiving funds

under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM).17 Despite

constitutional provisions and state legislations, Ward Committees were not functional for

most periods of time in the last two decades. Ward Committees were formed in Bengaluru

in 2013 after the Karnataka High Court directed the constitution of such bodies.

Ward Committees must be provided with greater capacity and entrusted with more

responsibilities. The law enacted by the State requires every ward to have a Ward Committee

which consists of the councilor from the ward as its Chairperson and a maximum of ten

persons.18 However the 10 members representing the civil society are to be nominated by

the municipality on the recommendation of the councilor and not elected. Further, the

Councilor is given veto powers over ward committee decisions. To ensure that Ward

Committees becoming meaningful decision making institutions, we recommend that

decisions in Ward Committee be taken consensually as far as possible.

2.1.2 Area Sabha: As per Karnataka Municipal Corporations (Amendment) Act, 2011,

every Ward shall be further divided into areas' comprising all persons registered as voters

in one or more than one contiguous polling booths.19 Area Sabhas are required to meet at

least once in three months. Despite these provisions, even efforts to make Area Sabhas active

have not begun. The creation of Area Sabhas as a third-tier of local governance, below the

Ward Committee, can deliver on the promise of participatory democracy that is close and

accessible to the people. Hence there should not be further delay in the institutionalization

16 Article 243-S, Constitution of India 17 See Chapter IIIA, Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 18 Section 13H, Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 19 Section 13C, Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976

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of Area Sabhas. To ensure that Area Sabhas are institutionalized, it can be provided, by a legal

provision, that the devolution of revenue to the Wards be subject to the condition that all

Area Sabhas are made functional in that Ward.

The Model Nagar Raj Bill circulated by the central government under JNNURM requires the

Area Sabha Representative (ASR) for each area to be elected but Karnataka's law requires

the ASR to be nominated by the municipality on the recommendation of the Corporator.20

Under the Karnataka law, the Ward Committee members do not include the ASRs coming

within the wards. Hence currently, there is complete disconnect between the Areas Sabha

and Ward Committee. We recommend that at least 2/3rd members of the Ward Committee

be constituted of the Area Sabha Representatives to ensure that there is more synergy

between the two bodies. We also recommend that the Area Sabha Representative be directly

elected from voters in a particular area.

2.1.3 Improving Quality of Life through Ward-based Governance: Making the

Ward the basic unit of governance can also improve the quality of life for the citizens of

Bengaluru since it will be more responsive to local needs. While centralized service agencies

have a very important role to perform in the city, they are not always responsive to the

specific local needs of an area. For a service like transport, issues of last-mile connectivity

can be better addressed if the Ward is empowered to take actions to solve the issue.

Similarly, the management of urban commons is best dealt by the locality than by centralized

city or state agencies. Centralized modes of waste disposal has failed miserably in Bengaluru

and hence ward-based garbage management can deal with the concern more effectively.

Every Ward office can also be provided with a grievance redress cell which deals with

citizens concerns regarding various municipal services within the ward. We provide two

examples of how making the ward the basic unit of governance can improve the quality of

life of the citizens of Bengaluru.

Governance of urban commons: Decentralized modes of monitoring and governance

of urban environment, lakes and commons is far more effective than a system of centralized

administration. Urban commons such as parks and lakes provide important services to

urban residents, by cleaning polluted air and water, mitigating urban heat islands, providing

livelihoods for the urban poor and recreational benefits for city residents living in stressed

environments. Ward Committees and Area Sabhas should be provided with the necessary

capacity to protect, maintain and manage these commons. In several parts of Bangalore,

20 Model Nagara Raj Bill, Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India

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citizen groups and RWAs have effectively protected, restored and are managing local parks

and lakes in collaboration with the BBMP and BDA, such as the Kaikondrahalli lake in

Bellandur and the Puttenahalli lake in J.P. Nagar. Yet there are many more groups who have

taken the initiative to protect their commons, but are unable to do so because of the lack of

recognition and empowerment. To prevent the elite capture of these commons, it should be

mandatory for such groups to disallow the exclusion of any groups of local residents. It is

also important to have reliable, updated information on environmental and ecological

quality to monitor the effectiveness of such management. Decentralised environmental

monitoring of important indicators such as air and water quality by the Area Sabhas and

Ward Committees is therefore essential, along with the transparent and immediate updation

of such information. Interconnectivity between lakes for rainwater storage and flood

management, and as biodiversity and recreational corridors should be planned at the zonal

and city level, but governance should be at the ward level.

Urban mobility: Recognizing the ward as a critical foundational level for governing

mobility in Bengaluru is important. As is easily evident and widely documented, an

important lacuna in the physical infrastructure of Bengaluru is the provision of safe, dignified

and effective last-mile connectivity to main (trunk line) public transport options, i.e.

connectivity from the main road public transport point of service to places of residence,

work, commerce and social life. The poor quality of infrastructure to walk and cycle at the

neighbourhood and ward level greatly restricts the use of non-motorised transport options.

In turn, this contributes to the rapidly growing dependence on private, motorized vehicles

that adds significantly to gridlock on main trunk routes across the city. In addition to wasted

time, fuel and other ecological and health impacts, gridlock on the main trunk routes also

contributes to undermining the ability of BMTC to provide timely and efficient service.

Decentralization of urban governance offers a means to break this negative cycle and

perpetuation of gridlock. Devolution of governance to Ward Committees and Area Sabhas

with rights and responsibilities to manage and maintain local level infrastructure offers an

effective means to break this cycle of poor service, higher volumes of private vehicle and

gridlock.

2.2 Devolution of Powers to Zones

Presently the administrative body responsible for dealing with the governance of an area as

big as 741 sq. km is the BBMP. The intermediate level of local governance- between the Ward

and the Municipal Corporation- is the Zone. Political Devolution to the level of the Zone can

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ensure that for an issue faced by a locality spread across multiple wards, a zonal level body

instead of the BBMP can address the same. Presently, BBMP is divided into 8 zones: South

Zone, East Zone, West Zone, Mahadevapura, Dasarahalli, Yelahanka, Bommanahalli and

Rajarajeshwarinagar. Each zone is headed by a Joint Commissioner, who is answerable to the

Municipal Commissioner of BBMP. One of the preliminary questions to consider is whether

the present zonal classification is logical or if it needs to be redrawn. Since there is much

variance in the size and demography of each zone, it would be useful to redraw the

boundaries of all the zones taking into consideration the economic, ecological, social and

demographic geographies of the place.

However, presently, the Zone is only an administrative unit and not a political one. We

suggest that along with the bureaucratic machinery headed by the Joint Commissioner, there

should be a Zonal Council consisting of all the councilors elected from the wards coming

within the zone. A similar system of committees constitutive of the Councillors of a

geographic region within the Municipal Corporation exists in Kolkata through its Borough

Committees.21 Unlike a Ward Committee, the members of the Zonal Council would also be

members of the BBMP and can be entrusted with specific functions of the BBMP within the

Zone. Issues that cannot be addressed at the ward-level can be taken at the zonal-level. For

example, while the Ward Committee can be made responsible for waste-collection, the Zonal

Council might be more appropriate to deal with waste-disposal.

The Zonal Council should be empowered to pass resolutions and take decisions regarding

the municipal functions of BBMP coming within the zone. The Zonal Council can be headed

by a Zonal Chairperson, elected by the members of the Zonal Council among themselves. The

zonal boundaries of parastatal agencies like BWSSB also need to be made congruous with

the zones of BBMP to ensure effective governance. Zonal Councils can provide the necessary

political accountability to ensure that the Zone does not remain a purely administrative unit

but becomes a political unit as well.

2.3 Devolution of Powers to BBMP

Considering the principle of subsidiarity, the BBMP must be made directly responsible for

only those issues that cannot be solved at the ward or zonal level. Despite the passing of the

74th Amendment, city governments like BBMP continue to be under the extensive control of

the state government. Hence, the BBMP is often constrained in its ability to solve various

21 Pinto, Marina. Metropolitan city governance in India. Sage Publications, 2000. Ch. 7 Calcuttas Mayor-in-Council, pp. 161-189

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issues faced by the city. The manner in which State government exercises control over the

city government may be through finances, parastatal bodies and the involvement of state

level political representatives in local decision-making.

Presently, city governments like BBMP have very limited taxation powers and other sources

of revenue. Hence they continue to rely on funding from the state and central governments.

We propose that significant revenue generating powers be devolved from the state to the

local government level. Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs), despite being state level

representatives, are also members of local city governments like BBMP.22 Adding to this, is

the expectation of MLAs to perform an executive role in their constituency like providing

basic facilities like water and sanitation. We propose that sufficient measures be taken to

ensure that state level leaders like MLAs are ring-fenced out of the decisions of the local

bodies.

The Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution was added by the 74th Amendment to guide State

Governments in the assignment of various functional responsibilities to the Municipalities.23

However, most of the functions listed under the 12th Schedule are being carried out by

various parastatal agencies which are under the control of departments of the state

government and not the local body. We propose that BBMP be made responsible for the

municipal functions instead of the state-controlled parastatals. We would be dealing with

the role of the parastatals in more detail in the next section.

22 Section 7, Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 23 Twelfth Schedule (read with Article 243-W) Constitution of India

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3. Fixing Democratic Accountability

Democracy, beyond its instrumental values, provides the necessary basis for the political

legitimacy of the state. Democratic institutions are based on the principle of the moral

equality of citizens. Further, actions that are the product of democratic decision-making

provides the citizens a reason to be obligated to the state. Hence, democracy is necessary if

the exercise of political power is to be morally justifiable.24 Beyond the intrinsic moral value

of its procedure, democracys normative appeal also lies in the fact that democratic

procedures are more likely than other procedures at arriving at correct decisions.25 If the

exercise of the states executive power is not based on democracy, it cannot be said to be

politically legitimate. Hence, for the local government of Bengaluru to exercise legitimate

political authority, it needs to be under legitimate democratic control. An examination of how

power is organized in Bengalurus current local governance system reveals that executive

powers are exercised by actors that do not have the necessary democratic and political

mandate at the appropriate level of government.

Discussions regarding the restructuring of local governance in Bengaluru has primarily

focused on the question of territorial restructuring. Sufficient attention has not been paid to

the powers of existing bodies within the local governance structure. One of the key issues in

city governance in Bengaluru is the absence of alignment of the political and administrative

responsibilities of specific units of government. This is manifested in two different ways. On

the one hand Bengaluru has bureaucratic agencies with no political accountability at the

appropriate level and on the other hand we have political bodies with no executive authority.

Currently, while the mayor is the political head of the city, he/she does not have enough

executive powers. And though urban planning, regulation of land use and water services are

municipal functions, these are carried out by parastatals that are not accountable to the local

government.

Since the state government-controlled parastatal agencies perform municipal functions and

the state government-appointed Municipal Commissioner is the chief executive of

Corporation, the democratically elected local government of Bengaluru has limited executive

powers. Bengaluru has also witnessed state government-appointed Task Forces like

Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF) and Agenda for Bangalores Infrastructural

24 Buchanan, Allen. Political Legitimacy and Democracy, Ethics (2002), 112(4): 689719 25 Estlund, David M. Democratic authority: a philosophical framework. Princeton University Press, 2009.

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Development (ABIDe) play a key role in the development of the city in the past.26 To ensure

democratic accountability of the local government, the elected arm of the Municipal

Corporation must be sufficiently strengthened. Hence beyond the question of territorial

restructuring, it is important to reorganise governmental structure in a manner in which

power is vested with the appropriate level of democratic government.

3.1 Executive Power of Local Government

Under the present system, though the mayor is the political head of Bengaluru, he/she is

largely a ceremonial head without adequate executive powers. As per the Karnataka

Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, the Municipal Commissioner is vested with the executive

powers of the Corporation.27 The Commissioner is a non-elected member appointed by the

State Government in consultation with the Mayor of the Corporation. Presently, the election

of the Mayor is indirect since he/she is elected by the elected councillors among themselves

for a period of one year.28 Hence, we currently have a system where the Mayor has limited

influence in the way the city is governed.

One of the options for reform is that of having a directly elected mayor with a fixed term of

5 years.29 In this framework, the Mayor would be vested with executive powers and will

appoint a committee for discharging his/her duties. The mayor can be elected at the level of

the city or for the larger region. However, a powerful directly elected mayor for the whole of

Bengaluru might centralize power and undermine the powers of the councilors representing

various wards. Having a directly elected mayor who can appoint a mayoral committee can

also pose problems if he/she is not from the political party which is in majority in the council.

This can result in a situation where the mayoral committee takes undemocratic decisions

since it does not need the support of the majority in the council. Also, Indias Parliamentary

democracy does not have a system of directly elected political executives either in the state

or central government unlike Presidential systems. Hence, we are not in favour of a directly

elected Mayor.

An alternative to a directly elected Mayor is to adopt a Mayor-in-Council system, similar to

the cabinet system of government followed in central and state governments in India. The

26 Chamaraj, Kathyayini, Parastatals and task forces - the new decision-makers, India Together, 22 February, 2009. Available at http://indiatogether.org/parastate-government 27 Section 64, Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 28 Section 10, Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 29 This is a reform suggested by the Kasturirangan Committee on BBMP, Agenda for Bangalores Infrastructural Development (ABIDe), Bangalore Political Action Committee (B.PAC) among others

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executive power of the corporation can be shifted from the Municipal Commissioner to the

Mayor-in-Council. In a Mayor-in-Council system, as followed in Kolkata, both the Mayor and

the Mayor-in-Council forms the executive and they would typically belong to the political

party or coalition that wins the majority of Wards in the Corporation.30 In the Kolkata

Model, the Mayor-in-Council consists of a Mayor, Deputy Mayor and a ten-member cabinet

chosen among the councilors with each cabinet member dealing with different portfolios.

We feel that the Mayor-in-Council system is the best way to ensure a stable, powerful and

democratically representative executive responsible for governance in Bengaluru. The

Mayor-in-Council shall be collectively responsible to the BBMP council consisting of all the

corporators. Even with the Mayor-in-Council, the present subject-wise Standing Committees

would be retained but they would perform a policymaking and deliberative role and not an

executive role. The alignment of political and executive powers should not be restricted at

the city level and must also extend to zones and wards. Hence, instead of the Joint

Commissioner, the Zonal Council, headed by the zonal chairperson, shall be vested with the

executive powers of the Zone and the Ward Committee, headed by the ward corporator, shall

be vested with the executive powers of the Ward.

3.2 Role of Parastatal Agencies

Despite Constitutional provisions and state legislations, many fundamental aspects of local

governance in Bengaluru continue to be dealt by parastatal agencies and not the municipal

corporation. Though urban planning and development are essential functions of the

municipal bodies, parastatals like Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) and Bangalore

Metropolitan Region Development Authority (BMRDA) perform these functions. The various

urban services like water supply, electricity and transport are also performed by parastatals

like Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board (BWSSB), Bangalore Electricity Supply

Company (BESCOM), Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation (BMTC) and not the

city corporation. However, none of these parastatal agencies have any locally elected

representatives in their panel nor are they held accountable to the BBMP.31 They are only

answerable to specific departments in the state government and not the local government.

Hence these agencies are not held accountable to the people of Bengaluru.

30 See Pinto, Marina. Metropolitan city governance in India. Sage Publications, 2000. Ch. 7 Calcuttas Mayor-in-Council, pp. 161-189 31 See Idiculla, Mathew Prasad A guide to Bangalores Civic Agencies, Citizen Matters, April 28, 2010. Available at http://bangalore.citizenmatters.in/articles/view/1968-all-about-bangalore-civic-agencies

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Another issue which Bengaluru faces with the multiciplity of parastatal agencies is that there

is hardly any overlap between the administrative jurisdictions of these agencies. The

geographical extent of each of these parastatals are different and the various sub-units of

these bodies also have no geographical congruence.32 With each agency having a different

jurisdiction there is difficulty in coordinating the different civic services. The underlying

problem is that none of these bodies have any political accountability either at the ward or

municipality level. There are also many functional overlaps in these bodies as multiple

organs are responsible for similar tasks. For example the BBMP, the BDA and the KSCB

(Karnataka Slum Clearance Board) are responsible for the improvement of slums while the

BBMP, BDA and PWD (Public Works Department) are responsible for road maintenance.33

To ensure democratic accountability, service delivery agencies like BWWSSB, BMTC and

BESCOM need to be brought within the control of the BBMP. This can be done broadly in

three different ways: BBMP having ownership over parastatal agencies, BBMP having

administrative control of the parastatals and BBMP and parastatals having a contractual

relationship. We feel that the relationship between the elected bodies (BBMP, Zonal Councils

and Ward Committees) and the service delivery agencies should ideally be contractual.

Having contractual control over parastatals gives the BBMP and other local bodies the option

to deliver services to the citizens in various innovative ways. Depending upon the kind of

service, the elected bodies at the appropriate level must be free to award contract for service

to the agency of its choice. Hence, the parastatals need to be stripped off their statutory role

and monopoly control over delivery of services.

However, it might be not feasible to immediately opt for these measures. Hence, in the first

stage, other measures of administrative streamlining and political accountability need to be

introduced. The geographic unit and subunits of the various parastatal agencies should be

made as congruous as possible with the units and subunits of BBMP to ensure smooth

delivery of services. The roles of each agency be defined in such a way that two agencies are

not made responsible for the same task. The BBMP, Zonal Councils and Ward Committees

must also have oversight over the functioning of service delivery agencies at various levels

to establish a clear link between democratic governance and service delivery function.

Hence parastatals which perform a service delivery function can be made accountable to the

elected government by oversight measures in the first stage and having a contractual

32 Ramanathan , Ramesh Urban Services: Too many cooks, India Together, 17 January 2005. Available at http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/jan/gov-manycooks.htm 33 Idiculla, Mathew Prasad A guide to Bangalores Civic Agencies, Citizen Matters, April 28, 2010

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relationship in the second. However, parastatals which perform essential regulatory

functions like urban planning and land use should be stripped off those powers. We

recommend that parastatals like BDA and BMRDA should be not be made responsible for

urban planning and land use and instead these should be performed by the Municipal

Corporation and the appropriate units below it. In this manner, the democratic

accountability of executive action can be ensured. Realignment of political and executive

powers along with political devolution are at core of Bengalurus governance crisis. Any

attempt to restructure BBMP to improve civic life must begin with these structural reforms.

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4. Governance of Metropolitan Bengaluru

As the demographic and spatial growth of Bengaluru continues to take place at a very fast

rate, the functional areas of the city is spilling over to spaces that were hitherto rural. This

poses concerns regarding the manner in which the urbanizing areas in the peripheries are

planned and administered. In this context, any discussion on restructuring governance of

Bengaluru cannot be limited to the present BBMP boundaries. Hence, we need to focus our

attention on the governance system of the larger metropolitan region, a topic that has not

received much attention.34 Examining whether empowered metropolitan level governance

institutions is needed for the administration of the Metropolitan Bengaluru is hence

worthwhile.

There is a need to explore metropolitan and regional forms of governments also because of

some of the perceived risks of localism.35 While the principles of subsidiarity is important,

we cannot assume that every issue is local since they can simultaneously have regional and

state-wide implications. Though local self-governance is vital for promoting the interests of

a particular locality, there is also a need to further the collective interest of the region.36

However, the promotion of governance at a metropolitan or regional level should not be

assumed to go against the decision-making authority of lower levels of government.37 Still,

for resolving any matter in which there is a conflict or contestation between two or more

local bodies within an a Metropolitan area, a governmental body representative of all the

various local bodies in the Metropolitan area is more suitable than either the core Municipal

Corporation of the region or the State government.

Ultimately, in restructuring Bengalurus urban governance system, irrespective of whether

BBMP is split, it is essential to examine the institutional mechanisms that are key for

governance reform at all levels- local, city and metropolitan. Strengthening Ward

Committees and Area Sabhas is crucial for addressing the issues of governance at the local

level and restructuring the role of the Mayor and parastatals is necessary for dealing with

city level governance. Since the Metropolitan area consists of multiple local governments,

34 See Sivaramakrishnan, K C. Governing Megacities: Fractured Thinking, Fragmented Setup, Oxford University Press, 2014 35 Prud'Homme, Remy. "The dangers of decentralization." The World Bank research observer 10.2 (1995): 201-220. 36 Frug, Gerald E. "Beyond regional government." Harvard Law Review (2002): 1763-1836. 37 Briffault, Richard. "Localism and regionalism." Columbia Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 1 (1999); Frug, Gerald E. "Beyond regional government." Harvard Law Review (2002): 1763-1836.

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each with its sub-units, the Metropolitan Planning Committee (MPC) as a representative unit

of the whole region has a vital role to play.

4.1 Metropolitan Area

One of the primary questions to consider while discussing metropolitan governance is what

constitutes the larger Bengaluru area. Currently, the region constituting the larger

Metropolitan Bengaluru has two spatial boundaries- i) The Bangalore Metropolitan Area

(BMA) which is the area coming under the BDA covering 1219 sq. km. and ii) the Bangalore

Metropolitan Region (BMR) which is the area under the BMRDA covering 8000 sq. km. The

area that has been notified for the constitution of the Metropolitan Planning Committee is

the 1219 sq. km. Bangalore Metropolitan Area under the BDA and not the 8000 sq. km region

coming under the BMRDA.

The Kasturirangan Committee had recommended that MPC covers the territorial area

presently covered by BMRDA which includes the districts of Bangalore Urban, Bangalore

Rural and Ramanagaram.38 Since the demographic growth of Bengaluru goes beyond the

Bangalore Metropolitan Area covered by the BDA, we feel that the area covered by the MPC

currently is not sufficient. The Bangalore Metropolitan Region, presently coming under the

BMRDA, would be a more suitable boundary for which MPC is given jurisdiction. However,

these need to be verified based on a comprehensive study of the current and projected

spatial and demographic growth of Bengaluru.

4.2 Metropolitan Planning Committee

The 74th Constitutional Amendment requires that a metropolitan area, consisting of two or

more Municipalities or Panchayats with a total population of more than ten lakhs, shall have

a Metropolitan Planning Committee to prepare a draft development plan for the

Metropolitan areas as a whole.39 Despite being a mandatory provision of the Constitution,

Bengaluru never had an MPC even 20 years after the passing of the 74th Amendment. Though

the members to the MPC in Bengaluru were recently elected, it has not started functioning.

The failure to institute a regional level planning body like the MPC is not only a violation of

38 Report on Governance in the Bangalore Metropolitan Region and the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (Kasturirangan Committee Report on BBMP) August, 2008. 4.15, p. 35. Available at http://www.kuidfc.com/website/webpage.nsf/8f50067eff32acf3652574190040e0a2/0214c48af06bc65a652574190040ae1a/$FILE/Dr.%20Kasturirangan%20Committee%20Report%20on%20BBMP.pdf 39 Article 243-ZE, Constitution of India

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the Constitution, but has also not allowed Bengaluru and its suburbs to grow and develop in

a planned manner.

As per the Constitution, at least two-third of the members of the MPC are to be elected

members of the Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) coming within the metropolitan region while the

rest of the members can be nominated.40 Currently, while the Mayor of Bengaluru is not a

member of the MPC, the Chief Minister of Karnataka is a member and could even be elected

as the Chairperson of MPC. The Kasturirangan Committee had suggested that the Chief

Minister should be made the Chairperson.41 But if the Chief Minister is the Chairperson of

MPC, the powerful regional body might work in a centralized manner under the influence of

the State government. To ensure that the MPC works as a metropolitan-level body which is

representative of the interests of the various localities within the metropolitan area, we

recommend that no state level leaders be made part of the MPC.

Currently, the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) is assigned as the Local Planning

Authority (LPA) under the Karnataka Town and Country Planning (KTCP) Act, 1961

responsible for preparing the Master Plan of the Local Planning Area for Bengaluru which

constitutes 1307 sq.km.42 The Bangalore Metropolitan Region Development Authority

(BMRDA) is responsible for preparing the Structure Plan for the BMR of 8000 sq.km and shall

also discharge the functions of the Director of Town Planning whereby BDA and other LPAs

within BMR have to submit their plans to BMRDA for approval.43 The Kasturirangan

Committee had recommended that the MPC be invested with planning and coordinating

functions, necessary executive powers including power to review and suggest changes and

in certain cases, overrule plans of the BBMP and other ULBs and the power to control land

use.44

However if the MPC is made an all-powerful regional government vested with the wide

administrative powers, including the power to overrule the plans of ULBs, the democratically

elected local bodies could be weakened. Following principles of subsidiarity, we suggest that

MPC must not be engaged in a top-down planning process for the whole of the Bengaluru

Metropolitan Region. The Constitution requires the MPC to prepare a draft development

plan having regard to the plans of varios local bodies and the objectives of the State and

40 Article 243-ZE, Constitution of India 41 Kasturirangan Committee Report on BBMP, August, 2008. 4.26, p. 39. 42 Section 25Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 43 Section 81-C, Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 44 Kasturirangan Committee Report on BBMP, August, 2008. 4.31, p. 42.

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Central governments. Hence we propose that the MPC not be made the Local Planning

Authority for the whole of the Metropolitan area. We recommend that the MPC be vested

with the task of preparing the regional development plan of the larger Bangalore

Metropolitan Region while various ULBs in the region be vested with the powers of a Local

Planning Authority. The regional development plan must be based on the inputs of various

city plans which itself must be based on the inputs of various ward level plans. Thus, the

MPC's role is threefold: preparing development plans based on inputs from various local

bodies, coordinating with various local bodies in administering projects spread across more

than one municipality, resolving conflicts that arise between local bodies in the region

including those related to the boundaries of each local body.

Essentially, the MPC works as the aggregate body representative of all the various urban and

rural local bodies and acts as a bulwark against regressive localism as demonstrated in the

NIMBY (Not-In-My-Backyard) syndrome.45 Creating an MPC for Bengaluru can ensure that

the agency responsible for urban planning is not unaccountable parastatal agencies like the

present BDA or the BMRDA. The BMRDA can be made the secretariat to the MPC ensuring

that there is an appropriate administrative machinery that can carry out the political

decisions made by MPC effectively. The Metropolitan Planning Committee, consisting of a

majority of local representatives and also some nominated members, can work as a planning

body that satisfies both democratic accountability and technical expertise.

45 Stahl. Kenneth A. "Neighborhood Empowerment and the Future of the City." U. Pa. L. Rev. 161 (2012): 939

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5. Conclusion

The task before the Expert Committee is to solve Bengalurus governance crisis. We argue

that this is not merely an issue of the territorial boundaries of BBMP. It is an issue of the

failure of institutional design, namely the misalignment between executive power and

democratic responsibility and the over-centralization of power in the hands of the state

government and the BBMP. We propose an option that redesigns Bengalurus governance

through the devolution and realignment of power. We recommend that powers be devolved

from the state to the wards to make them the basic unit of governance and also to the zones.

We also recommend that political power and executive power be aligned to ensure

democratic accountability. To ensure statutory basis for these reforms, a separate law needs

to be passed for the local governance of Bengaluru.

Since the problem with Bengalurus governance is in the way power is organized, we reject

a restructuring of BBMP based on purely administrative decentralization or a division of

BBMP within the current framework in which power is distributed. The underlying issue

with a purely administrative decentralization is the absence of any form of political

accountability at the zonal or any other level to which administrative powers are proposed

to be decentralized. If the problems faced by the peripheral areas is that of political distance

from the centre, administrative restructuring is not likely to suffice. Purely administrative

decentralization is hence severely limited in addressing the multiple civic problems faced by

the citizens.

The underlying problem with a division of BBMP not accompanied by political devolution or

governance realignment is that it will merely result in the replication of problems currently

faced by BBMP at a smaller scale. We are however not opposed to a division of BBMP if it

also includes the rapid devolution of powers to the wards and the restructuring of

governance structures that ensures the executive power of the Mayor and the accountability

of parastatal organs. Hence, having separate Municipal Corporations in place of the proposed

Zonal Councils is a viable option if it is accompanied by political devolution and governance

realignment in the manner we propose.

However, division of BBMP into multiple corporations poses questions regarding geographic

inequality and administrative capacity. Having multiple Municipal Corporations in place of

BBMP would mean that each Corporation is also responsible for raising its own revenue. One

of the issues with the division of the city into independent Corporations is that it can result

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in segregating the poorer areas from richer areas and result in Corporations with poorer

regions not having the resources to generate its own revenue. Division of BBMP also means

the creation of entirely new administrative machineries for the new corporations which

would be cost intensive. Most of bureaucratic infrastructure of BBMP would go to the

Corporation in the core region while entirely new administrative infrastructures would be

needed to be created for the other Corporations.

Considering these issues, any division of BBMP into multiple corporation must be preceded

by a proper study ascertaining the revenue-generation capacities of each of the proposed

Municipal Corporations and the costs involved in setting up new Corporations. The division

of BBMP into multiple Corporations/Zones must take into consideration the economic,

demographic, ecological and social conditions that exist in each of the proposed units.

Ultimately, regardless of the number of Municipal Corporations Bengaluru has, the

restructuring of BBMP must include the devolution of power to the wards and the alignment

of political and executive powers that ensures democratic accountability.

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6. Summary of Recommendations

Ward as the Basic Unit of Governance: The Ward must be made the basic unit of

governance whereby it is empowered to take necessary actions required to solve any

issue faced by a locality. Only those matters that cannot be decided at the ward level

should be taken up to the higher levels of government.

Ward Administration: The Ward must have permanent officers to perform the key

functions of BBMP like public health, sanitation, solid waste management and local

infrastructure. A percentage of the property tax and all cesses and fees collected from a

Ward needs to be directly remitted to the Ward.

Ward Committee and Area Sabha: 2/3rd members of the Ward Committee shall be

constituted of the Area Sabha Representatives to ensure that there is more synergy

between the two bodies. Area Sabhas need to be institutionalized and Area Sabha

Representative shall be directly elected from voters in a particular area.

Zonal Council: The Zone must be made a political unit by the creation of a Zonal Council

consisting of all the councillors elected from the wards coming within the Zone. They

must be entrusted with specific functions of the BBMP within the Zone.

Devolution of Powers to BBMP: Political, administrative and revenue powers must be

devolved from the state to the BBMP. State level leaders like MLAs should not be allowed

to override the decisions of the local bodies.

Mayor-in-Council: BBMP should opt for a Mayor-in-Council system with a fixed term of

5 years where the Mayor and cabinet are chosen among the councilors. The executive

power of the Corporation should be shifted from the Municipal Commissioner to the

Mayor-in-Council.

Streamlining Parastatals: The unit and subunits of the various parastatal agencies

should be made as congruous as possible with the units and subunits of BBMP to ensure

smooth delivery of services. The roles of each agency should be redefined in such a way

that two agencies are not made responsible for the same task.

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Service Delivery Parastatals: The relationship between the elected bodies (BBMP,

Zonal Councils and Ward Committees) and the service delivery agencies (BWWSSB,

BMTC and BESCOM) should be contractual. Elected bodies at the appropriate level must

be free to award contract for service to the agency of its choice.

Regulatory Parastatals: Essential municipal functions like urban planning and land use

should not be carried out by parastatals like BDA and the BMRDA but by the Municipal

Corporation and units below it.

Metropolitan Area: The area covered by the Bangalore Metropolitan Region, presently

coming under the BMRDA, should be the spatial boundary of the Bengaluru Metropolitan

Area for which MPC is given jurisdiction.

Metropolitan Planning Committee: MPC should be vested with the task of preparing

the regional development plan of the larger Bangalore Metropolitan area while various

Local Bodies in the region should be vested with the powers of a Local Planning

Authority.