Reducing Risk and Rehabilitating Terrorists: Clinical Psychology’s Use to the War on Terror

Jessica DeitzerPennsylvania State University

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During Guantanamo Bay repatriations, offenders were released to what seemed to be an

unusual program at first glance. Ibrahim al-Rubaish and Said Ali al-Shihri were among these

former terrorists, released to a Saudi rehabilitation program for terrorists. The Advisory

Committee Counseling Program involves three parts: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare.

This program also involves four subcommittees, described as addressing security, psychological

and social, religious, and media issues (Boucek, 2008). The terrorists in this program partake in

art therapy, are counseled in groups, take courses that redefine their religious theologies, and

when released, are re-integrated into society with support.

On second glance, the Saudi program is not entirely unique. Rehabilitation programs are

being implemented, planned, or otherwise incorporated in Egypt, Yemen, Indonesia, Colombia,

Singapore, Malaysia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iraq, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Afghanistan,

Thailand, Pakistan, and more. The Advisory Committee Counseling Program of the Saudi’s is

not alone. In Yemen, the Religious Dialogue Committee functions according to the belief that

terrorism has “faulty intellectual foundations” and therefore, debate to make a change. Al-Hitar

leads the committee, which strives to weaken terrorism by refuting it’s beliefs. In Indonesia,

former terrorists such as Ali Imron, who took part in the Bali bombings, help “deprogram other

jailed terrorists” by attacking the understanding of Islam and Jihad by Jemaah Islamiyah, a

terrorist organization. They strive to encourage disengagement through changing attitudes,

beliefs, and misconceptions. Colombia’s Disengagement and Reincorporation Program operates

by the theory that people acting on behalf of a terrorist organization lose their personal identity

and have difficulties making their own decisions (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). The program at

Pakistan incorporates psychiatry, education, and religious to encourage terrorists to disengage.

“The basic concept is to provide them all their comparative education, where they are able to

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decide for themselves what is right and what is wrong, that whatever was told to them previously

is not true,” said Pakistani Colonel Iman Bilal (Raddatz, 2010).

Nonetheless, not all terrorists decide that what they knew was wrong and what they are

now told is right. Ibrahim al-Rubaish, the Saudi repatriated to the rehabilitation program, fled

Saudi Arabia to join al Qaeda in Yemen, supposedly with eleven other former Guantanamo

detainees (Horgan & Altier, 2011). Said al-Shihri is suspected of being an al Qaeda leader,

organizing a bombing of the US embassy in Yemen (Goldman, 2010). Recent media outlets have

taken a cynical approach to rehabilitation programs, calling them a “summer camp” and

questioning the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs in changing the ways of terrorists. Is it

truly worth our while? Recently, scholars from psychology and other related fields have taken an

interest in terrorist rehabilitation programs, also known as terrorist de-radicalization or

disengagement programs. The field of psychology can help us evaluate these claims.

What does Psychology have to do with it?

In the face of such tragic and unfortunate circumstances such as Shihri’s attack on the

United States embassy, there are many questions to be addressed. Clearly an emotional and

loaded topic, the difficulty lies in remaining objective in our search for truths. It’s easy to

discount rehabilitation and condemn all former individuals involved with terrorism to any extent

to lifelong incarceration at sites such as Guantanamo Bay. It’s easier still to doubt the application

of psychology, a wildly misunderstood discipline, to the ever-present violence of terrorist

attacks. Like fighting fire with fire, reoffending terrorists cause us to want to lash out, threaten

retaliation with our financial aid, military, or even bombs. However, that doesn’t put out the fire.

The psychology of terrorism could be the water that saves countless precious lives.

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During this semester’s course on the psychology of terrorism, it seemed, again and again,

the “answer “ to posed questions started out with “Well, it’s really a complex issue….” As

frustrating as it may seem, terrorism in and of itself is complicated. If it wasn’t, we would be

closer to a solution. Inherently slow in issues so wide spanned and repeated throughout history,

research has identified a plethora of influences to add to our search for a solution, yet kept us still

far from having all the answers. Such multifaceted issue requires a solution with just as many

dimensions. As new factors are identified, new solutions taking into consideration these multiple

aspects must be invented. As a result, teams of interdisciplinary scholars from all fields are

working on solutions to the problems cause by terrorism, including our own International Center

for the Study of Terrorism, currently operating here at Penn State.

The question is, does psychology have a place in the mix? The posed topic for debate,

which describes the psychology of terrorism as an under-researched or a naïve attempt to

understand a complex issue, seems to believe the answer is no. This is untrue.

Perhaps the reason for a view such as this is the failure of psychology to produce what is

expected. In a time ridden with false expectations of criminal profilers and forensic science from

what criminologists have dubbed “The CSI Effect,” the call for unrealistic and ultra-efficient

results is tremendous. Particularly, the identification of a “typical terrorist” has long been

heralded as the goal for the psychology of terrorism. There is a cry for the “terrorist profile,” an

identification of the traits and behaviors expected, much like serial killers or violent rapists. In

Criminal Minds, in which the profilers bust in at just the right moment to prevent the serial killer

from doing any more harm, all it takes is entering a few predictors and a few clicks on a

computer screen to identify the risky subject. In reality, this is far from true. Even harder to

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pinpoint than the reality of the types of offenders displayed in these exaggerated television

shows, terrorists remain elusive to the discerning eye of the psychologist.

Early attempts at studying terrorism with psychology focused on psychoanalysis and a

“terrorist profile.” Despite try after try, no terrorist profile has been identified. Surprising to the

public, there has been no psychopathology evident in the average terrorists, although they tend to

see the world in a deluded, subjective light. Even suicide bombers are not exempt from this

psychologically sane rule. Not only are most terrorists not “crazy,” most terrorist groups

discourage the involvement of “crazy” individuals in their pursuits through implementing

selective standards for recruitment, so as to avoid responsibilities for unstable individuals who

may hurt their cause. Current terrorist organizations are focusing on recruiting “members who

possess a high degree of intellectualism and idealism, are highly educated, and are well trained in

a legitimate profession” (Hudson, 1999).

Across other personality traits, so much variance has been found that most researchers

identify the search for a “terrorist personality” or a “terrorist mindset” as futile (Hudson, 1999).

So many differential and contradicting varieties of terrorists have been found that it is hardly

useful to use any as a criterion for predicting terrorist activity (Sullwood, 1981). Moreover,

factors outside of personality are not good predictors of involvement of terrorism either.

Terrorists are different in gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and ideological standpoints (Hudson,

1999).

This makes the earliest stabs at the psychology of terrorism unsuccessful and, as the

prompt put it, “at worst, naïve…” The myths of the “terrorist profile” and an abnormal psyche of

a terrorist lending itself to psychoanalysis or easy dissection of traits have perpetuated the field

and the outsider’s opinion of the psychology of terrorism. We cannot change where the field has

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come from; however, we can direct where it is going. The future of psychology is not naïve.

Rather, it is ahead of the trends, particularly concerning some governmental and political entities

who continue to make decisions about counterterrorism efforts without research and objective

truths to back up their proposed claims (Hudson, 1999). Is the psychology of terrorism under-

developed? In some areas, maybe; however, there has been a recent turn of trends in the field and

more novel and exciting questions are being asked.

Instead of continuing with past unsuccessful approaches, there is a need for psychologists

to develop empirically based solutions to specific problems. Massive amounts of money are

allocated to counter-terrorism strategies each year, much of it without clear research supporting

the types of approaches they are taking (Hudson, 1999). Psychology has the potential to advise

governmental policy. However, before we can get to the right solutions, we need to take the right

first step—asking the right questions.

What are the Important Questions for Psychology?

This paper is not the first to take the standpoint that psychology needs to ask better

questions. Previous researchers have identified that we need to stop following unhelpful paths

and identify more specific, functional questions (Borum, 2004). For example, instead of asking,

“who commits acts of terrorism?” we can ask, “who disengages from committing terrorist acts

and what reasons do they give for their disengagement?” Clearly, the latter study, albeit still

complex, would have results targeted on policy implications with practical steps to be taken.

Then, there are the biggest questions—such as, “how do we get terrorists to stop?” and,

“can we treat terrorists?” In the studying and fighting terrorism, a solution to end the lives lost

and countries suffering would be our ultimate goal. Psychology can help find a way to end the

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violence. As we mentioned above, terrorism is complex—and the end would require tremendous

economic, political, and international strides. Although psychology can contribute, other

disciplines, such as political science, or international studies, can best pinpoint some of the

political and international issues. Yet, even the most political and cross-cultural of issues have

roots at the individual level. Any large-scale revolution must start inside the inner workings of

the individual. With the right questions, psychology can correctly identify psychological

underpinnings and encourage positive steps forward.

Specifically, if we want change to happen, psychology can identify the psychological

processes needed for change. Although there are uses for all types of psychology in the study of

terrorism, this paper concentrates on the most immediate and most internal level of making a

change: the disengagement of terrorists. Although there is little merit in studying the individual

without considering the group and the larger society’s effect on the individual, disengaged

individuals go so far as to make a personal decision regardless of the group or society’s

pressures. This type of heightened rationality poses an interesting direction for research.

Groups, prone to phenomenon such as “groupthink,” a tendency towards conformity and

the rejection of opposing viewpoints, and “risky shift,” the tendency of groups under pressure to

resort to extreme means the individual would not have chosen alone, provide a ripe environment

for the absolutist thinking of terrorist organizations. If, however, psychologists can successfully

remove the individual’s psyche from that group and pinpoint the motivation behind engaging in

terrorist organization, perhaps we can reverse the effects of the group involvement and

encourage disengagement and, even more importantly, de-radicalization. The study of truly

disengaged and/or de-radicalized terrorists involves the separation of individual and group and

fascinates scientists who don’t quite understand. As Crenshaw (2000) explains, “Little is known

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about why the users of terrorism would abandon the strategy. Research has focused on the

psychological motivations for engaging in terrorism rather than motivations for renouncing

terrorism. Yet a number of protracted terrorist campaigns have ended by the deliberate decision

of participants…” Clearly, the motivations for engaging, and more importantly, disengaging

have a lot to say for the psychology of terrorism and forward motion towards practical solutions.

Why do People Engage and Disengage from Terrorism?

There are several theories, rooted in criminology, studying the etiology of violent

behavior. For example, Instinct Theory is psychoanalytic in nature. It focuses on Freud’s early

theories that suggest it is within human nature to fight. Misplaced aggression from self onto

others is the cause of violence. Drive Theory posits that violence results from the interplay of

frustration and aggression. It claims frustration absolutely produces aggression, with no other

alternatives. Social Learning Theory works like the basics of operant conditioning, within the

realm of “reinforcement” and “punishment.” It claims that since aggression can be learned,

through the experience of ones self or watching others, terrorism can also be a learned behavior.

There are also Biological Approaches, which include chemical, hormonal, neurological, and

physiological factors. It is important to consider that biological factors may play a role in

participation in terrorism; however, due to the difficult nature of achieving terrorist participation

in studies of the biology of human subjects, little specific and consistent research has been

(Hudson, 1999).

Cognitive Theory, conversely, is more interested in the internal processes and inner

workings of the terrorist’s minds rather than any outward aggression or social processes. It

suggests that people respond to and interact with their environment according to their internal

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perceptions of their external world. This means their construal can be highly subjective and

deluded. Social cognition allows that the subjective construal of one’s environment does not only

apply to the individual; it applies to the terrorist organization as a whole (Crenshaw, 1988). This

means that the beliefs of the group can encompass the internal workings of the individual.

Applying the cognitive behavioral theories to study of the psychology of terrorism has been

supported in recent years (Taylor & Horgan, 2006).

It is important to keep cultural context in mind when treating the terrorists. Terrorism,

often religious, political, or otherwise ideological in nature, cannot be separated from these

issues. Many of the complaints made by terrorists are either legitimate or seem legitimate in their

eyes, and any program attempting to change the mindset of a terrorist without addressing these

larger issues will almost certainly be unsuccessful (Horgan & Altier, 2012). In the case of social

cognition, the cultural consideration needed to be made is primarily the role of ideology.

Many scholars have highlighted the role of ideology in committing violent terrorist

attacks. As Ginges (1997) once said, “ideology is the mechanism that makes possible the

translation of discontent into specific political goals.” Bin Hassan (2012) also argues that

ideology is the real enemy, especially when it comes for the motivation to enter into terrorist

activitiy. Beck (2000) states that amongst terrorists, ideology “concentrates their thinking and

controls their actions.” Although we can’t consider ideology the be all and end all of terrorist

motivations, clearly, the cognitive theory and the internal workings of ideology are at the

forefront of the war on terror. Pluchinsky (2008) has suggested that the rehabilitation of secular

terrorists will be less difficult than religious terrorists, for whom the terrorist activity is ordered

by their higher power. Likewise, Monroe and Kreidie (1997) conclude:

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“Fundamentalists see themselves not as individuals but rather as symbols of

Islam… Islamic fundamentalism taps into a quite different political

consciousness, one in which religious identity sets and determines the range of

options open to the fundamentalist. It extends to all areas of life and respects no

separation between the private and the political… By having moral imperatives as

their goals, the fundamentalist groups perceive the world through the distorting

lens of their religious beliefs.”

Ideology cannot be considered the only contributor to terrorism. The differences between

disengagement and de-radicalization are simple yet vital to our understanding of terrorism.

Horgan and Braddock (2010) found that not all disengaged terrorists are de-radicalized;

conversely, not all de-radicalized terrorists have low rates for recidivism. Disengagement simply

means that the terrorist has ceased participation in terrorist activities. De-radicalization, on the

other hand, suggests the terrorist has foresworn terrorism has a whole. They do not have to come

hand in hand. For example, the reasons for terrorist disengagement could be for reasons outside

of ideology, such as involuntary removal of the means to terrorist activity, aging, or costs that

outweigh the benefits. Conversely, a terrorist could change his or her mind about violence as an

acceptable means to achieving the goals of the group, yet still partake out of loyalty, belonging to

the social group, or threats to his or her safety.

One strong argument for the role of ideology is the advent of “naturally occurring”

disengagement, of which ideology is often a factor (Mullins, 2010). In understanding “naturally

occurring” disengagement, it may be useful to understand first steps of motivation, involvement,

and engagement (Horgan & Altier, 2012). Recent research has pointed towards motivation and

initial involvement being closest related to eventual disengagement. The major contributor to

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disengagement is disillusionment. Put otherwise, the inability to consolidate initial assumptions

about terrorist activities with the reality of terrorist involvement can cause terrorists to forgo the

terrorist lifestyle and as a result, disengage. The ability to disengage from and lose faith in the

terrorist organization holds importance for the psychologist studying disengagement. If

disengagement can occur naturally, there is a possibility that psychologists can encourage it.

With the advent of terrorist rehabilitation programs, this could be a very real possibility in our

lifetimes.

What Does Clinical Psychology Have to Offer?

Today’s Clinical Psychologists function by a science-practitioner model, meaning that

psychologists integrate professional skills with scientific knowledge of psychology. The aim is to

understand and treat harmful or maladaptive behaviors while keeping in mind intellectual,

emotional, biological, social, cultural, socio-economic, and other types of issues. Clinical

Psychologists are involved in research, teaching, professional practice, public policy, consulting,

and more. The education of a Clinical Psychologist is arduous and extensive, and includes

research on empirically-based treatments and the application of these treatments to patients in

need of improvement.

When most clinicians set out to change a patient exhibiting behaviors affecting him or

herself or others, they reference the DSM-IV, the most recent version of the Diagnostic

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. The DSM-IV is the standard classification of mental

disorders, including descriptions and diagnostic criteria for each disorder. The DSM-IV tells the

clinician what signs, what symptoms and for how long must be present in order to make the

diagnoses, and detailed information about each facet of the disorder. The DSM-IV has five axes:

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clinical disorders, personality disorders, medical disorders, psychosocial factors, and global

functioning.

Clinical disorders are what tend to first come to mind when we think about mental

disorders. Disorders such as depression, anxiety, bipolar, or schizophrenia remain on this axis.

Personality disorders maintain differences in how the patients function long-term, with or

without the presence of an exacerbating clinical disorder. Personality disorders are long lasting

(i.e. part of ones’ personality) and persistently present in the patients’ interactions and the way

they see the world, such as in antisocial, histrionic, or borderline personality disorders. This axis

also includes developmental disorders, such as mental retardation, which are apparent early in

ones development and last for life. Medical disorders include any medical condition that may

influence or aggravate any mental conditions. Psychosocial disorders, conversely, deal with

outside influences on the patients. This includes any adverse life events, conditions, or

environments that the patients were exposed to. The global level of functioning the clinician’s

rating of patients’ general ability to function in the outside world, on a scale from 1 to 100.

Since it’s generally established that terrorists are psychologically normal, that refutes the

presence of disorders on Axis I. The existence of personality disorders, as measured by Axis II,

is more controversial. Although no “terrorist personality” has been found, there have been

several attempts at identifying personality abnormalities amongst terrorists, specifically,

antisocial personality disorders. However, no evidence has been found that terrorists are typical

“psychopaths,” although they do commit heinous violent crimes (Borum, 2004).

The axis holding the most effect upon the psychology of terrorist action is certainly Axis

IV, Psychosocial factors. Indeed, there are precipitating psychosocial factors at play in the case

of many individuals that engage in terrorist activities. There are empirically based courses of

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treatments for clinical or personality disorders; yet, psychosocial disorders remain an

unexamined field. Larger theories on the psychology of aggression as it applies to terrorism have

been researched, with the intent of identifying the causes, and thereby, posing the most effective

means for treatment.

The idea of de-radicalization programs hold promise for the psychology of terrorism

because they address issues of Axis IV. Most de-radicalization programs treat offenders by

addressing the psychological, cultural, socio-economic, and community issues that pose

problems for formerly radicalized offenders. The most helpful strategy isn’t mere punishment,

although they shouldn’t be considered absolved of their crimes. According to Ginges (1997) in

his paper about Denial Perspective as compare to Re-integrative Perspective, we must treat

terrorists as psychologically normal to best treat the cultural aspects of terrorism. However, we

must understand that the group is important to all people, and, in the case of former terrorists, the

effect of the group is even more pronounced. Denial Perspective, which suggests punishment,

can be likened to the ideas behind the “War on Terror” and refusing negotiation with terrorists at

all costs. Re-integrative perspective, however, punishes the illegality of the acts with appropriate

sanctions while including positive social actions that take into consideration the needs of the

terrorist and of the community.

The Re-integrative perspective described by Ginges (1997) can be compared to the

rehabilitation initiatives happening today. Punitive approaches in criminology repeatedly show

the opposite of the desired effect, increasing recidivism rates instead of reducing the offender’s

propensity to reoffend (Mullins, 2010). In our “tough on crime” society, this message is not often

heard or believed. Assuredly, there is a need of separation of the offender from society and legal

sentences to be carried out; however, instead of merely releasing the offender back into society

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with a heightened change of reoffending, something must be done to reduce the chances.

Rehabilitation program goals include the re-entry of the offender into society, knowing that the

offender would be lost without social support during their rehabilitation and re-integration into

society. With true understanding of the psychology of the terrorist, re-integrative or rehabilitative

strategies hold the most validity. This paper looks towards terrorist rehabilitation programs as the

next step towards treating the terrorist.

Terrorist Rehabilitation Programs

In 2008, Time decided terrorist rehabilitation was one of the best ideas of the year

(Horgan & Altier, 2012) Functioning de-radicalization programs are present in Saudi Arabia,

Yemen Indonesia, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, Morocco, and many more countries around the

world. De-radicalization programs are inventive and novel approaches in the face of such a

serious issue, which is perhaps why they are so attractive. Yet, they cannot be taken at face

value. The field is still in its infancy. More work needs to be done before these programs can

accurately make claims at true de-radicalization. There are several serious problems with

terrorist de-radicalization programs and plenty areas in need of improvement. The many

programs of today are as varied as they are empirically unsound. The many different approaches

taken by the rehabilitation programs confuse the authenticity of their claimed results.

For example, The Saudi Arabia program is perhaps the most known about, bragged

about, and most controversial de-radicalization program. Some have mistakenly described the

program as a mere “art-therapy rehabilitation program,” (Mullins, 2010), but the program is far

more than just art. The program aims for re-education, rehabilitation, and reintegration. They are

taught “critical thinking skills” and question the “legitimacy” of their previous endeavors

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(Horgan & Braddock, 2010). The Saudi programs claims only 10-20% of their cases reoffend;

however there is little to prove it. Many question their ways of defining recidivism and

discovering whether or not an individual has truly re-engaged with terrorism (Horgan & Altier,

2012). Although, if true, it would be remarkably low compared to any US jail recidivism rates,

most consider the guidelines too subjective to be considered of any real worth. Getting closer to

the truth would involve transparency amongst judgments of recidivism and more.

Clinical psychology is not only about acting, it is about knowing the best actions to take.

According to the science-practitioner model, each clinical psychologist should be a clinician and

a scholar. They should research as well as they practice. These terrorist rehabilitation programs

are not exempt from that philosophy. However, so far these programs have remained stagnant.

Help up to the scrutinizing eye, these programs are based on little research or global standards.

Horgan & Braddock (2010) suggested these problems as our basis for improvement:

1. There are no explicit criteria for success associated with any initiative.

2. There is little data associated with any of these initiatives that can be reliably

corroborated independently.

3. There has been no systematic effort to study any aspect of these programs, even

individually, let alone collectively.

Moreover, to get closer to empirically understanding disengagement and de-radicalization,

Bjorgo and Horgan (2009) developed a list of important next steps to take. These steps included

developing a method of screening out insincere participants in rehabilitation programs,

successfully altering their values and behaviors, employing strategies for supervising former

terrorists and penalizing them upon reengagement, and providing them with the necessary means

to successful re-integration into society without needing to resort to terrorist activities.

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In concurrence with this research, this paper suggests many steps forward in clinical

psychology and terrorism de-radicalization. The first is empirically based guidelines for the

parameters for success and the compilation of data for the scientific study of the programs,

especially for moving towards the discovery of what works and what doesn’t inside predictors of

recidivism. In extension of these ideas, this paper suggests empirically based practice should be

utilized instead of blindly moving forwards with attempts at attacking the ideology of terrorists.

Behavior change, not just ideology change, should be an important factor.

Empirically Based Guidelines

Terrorist recidivism rates remain controversial with uncertain measurements and recent

instances of former detainees participating in terrorist attacks against the United States (Horgan

& Altier, 2012). When you boil it down, what’s missing is an accurate predictor or the detainee’s

risk for recidivism and acts of violence—but how do we reach this seemingly unattainable goal?

As of now, there are not clear criteria for measuring the success of terrorist de-

radicalization programs. Many of the well-known de-radicalization programs fail to release to

the public their measures of “success” (Horgan & Taylor, 2011). With this advantage, they can

claim unusually high levels of success without needing proof to back up their claims. Any claims

from these de-radicalization programs should therefore be taken with a grain of salt.

Clearly, there a strong need for long-term follow up in terrorist rehabilitation program

and the development of concrete standards for determining recidivism. If these decisions remain

subjective and varied between countries, no real progress can be made and scholars can make no

decisions between what works and what doesn’t. However, with the addition of empirically

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based standards used across many countries and programs, the programs’ effectiveness will be

better judged and psychologists will have better knowledge of what works and what doesn’t.

One of the challenges is that these rehabilitation programs have different goals, and

thereby different qualifications for success. Although the blanket terms of “de-radicalization” or

“rehabilitation” programs are often used, the authentic goals of each program vary (Horgan &

Altier, 2012). There is little commonality between programs. Even the term “de-radicalization”

is problematic. De-radicalization suggests the reversal of political/religious ideologies behind

terrorism. As we have discussed, amongst the distinction between de-radicalization and

disengagement, not all programs have the larger aim of altering the terrorist’s views. According

to Horgan and Taylor (2011), programs lumped into the “de-radicalization” category have

varying objectives including rehabilitation, reform, counseling, re-integration, reconciliation,

amnesty, de-mobilization, disbandment, disengagement, dialogue, de-programming, and counter-

radicalization. Although many of these objectives suggest the ultimate throwing away of terrorist

thoughts and values, they are far from identical. Horgan and Braddock (2010) suggest the

blanket term of “risk reduction,” which they argue can apply to most programs and can translate

to many different cultures. Moreover, it allows for the inclusion of programs aimed at changing

behavior without necessarily aiming at ideology or cognitive processes.

Although de-radicalization is the heralded point of most programs, the true goal is

ultimately disengagement. Presumably, a de-radicalized person should not reengage, but since

the two don’t always go hand in hand, it is necessary to find out what works for recidivism, not

just what works for de-radicalization.

There have been some steps made towards empirically based guidelines for recidivism.

Through the repatriation of many Guantanamo detainees, the Department of Defense formed

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standards for what should be judged as recidivism. Although many former detainees initiated

contact with other known terrorist affiliates, a small percentage (about 13.5%) were known to

have re-engaged in terrorist activity with the defined parameters for recidivism (Horgan &

Taylor, 2011). Moreover, psychologists in the United Kingdom developed measures of risk for

recidivism that have so far stood up amongst careful peer reviews (Horgan & Altier, 2012).

These are steps closer towards discovering standard ideas of success, and therefore, getting

closer to a day when psychologists can systematically measure what works and what doesn’t in

predicting recidivism. Once we have empirically based guidelines, it will be simpler to establish

empirically based practice; however, as current efforts stand, empirically based practice can only

focus on what has been done and what looks promising as we move into the next era of terrorist

rehabilitation programs.

Empirically Based Practice

As previously established, empirically-based guidelines should focus on “risk reduction,”

not necessarily “de-radicalization” (Horgan & Taylor, 2011). A bigger rationalization for “risk

reduction” is that disengagement is not necessarily contingent upon de-radicalization. As

discussed by several researchers, not all radicals are terrorists; moreover, not all terrorists are

radicals in the ideological sense (Horgan & Taylor, 2009). “Risk reduction” better captures the

goal of eliminating the terrorist’s propensity towards recidivism, without the assumption that the

terrorists hold terrorist ideologies or that those terrorists must be de-radicalized in order to forgo

recidivism. There may be as many reasons for engagement and disengagement as there are

terrorists. Therefore, it may be more helpful to focus on cognitive and behavior changes rather

than just an internal change of beliefs.

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Despite research showing the distinction between de-radicalization and disengagement,

terrorist behaviors are not often enough assumed to be distinctive from the ideology. In making

this assumption without empirical evidence, psychology risks missing important factors for

encouraging the disengagement of terrorists, and de-radicalization programs risk their

effectiveness. Under the new term of “risk reduction,” empirically based treatment programs

should look at what strategies encourage disengagement as a way towards the ultimate goal of

ending terrorist acts, not just terrorist ideologies. However, with a standard set of data detailing

what types of programs hold the lowest recidivism rates, practicioners can only look at what is

and what may hold promise.

Currently, terrorist rehabilitation programs utilize everything from art-therapy to religious

teaching to victim-offender mediations, differentiated according to culture, customs, and the kind

of terrorism happening in the affected area. The treatments, although most sound intuitive, are

not all supported by any empirical findings. Clinical psychology and the analytical study of

therapies can aid the struggle for the treatment of terrorists. The psychological treatment of the

violent terrorist can only be one facet of his or her treatment; however, without the help of

clinical psychology, the successful rehabilitation of the terrorist could be much more difficult.

This section outlines several proposed treatment plans for empirically based practices.

First of all, an important question must be asked. Can de-radicalization truly exist as

pushed by rehabilitation efforts? With the current lack of empirical evidence, it’s difficult to say.

It’s difficult to operationalize behavioral changes and to find its source. Psychology cannot make

misled assumptions in its fight to move closer to a change, such as assuming ideology is the key,

or that simple efforts to change said ideology will lead to eventual disengagement. Although

ideology is important to terrorist action, as we previously discussed, it is not necessary in order

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to partake in radical violence (Horgan & Taylor, 2011). Our treatments should therefore be

experimental, critical, and multifaceted. Several ideas influenced by clinical psychology and

criminology can lead the way in our search for a solution.

The major themes of today’s rehabilitation programs have been identified by Mullins

(2010) as: “1) rehabilitation, involving efforts to dissuade Islamist radicals from their

religious/political ideological beliefs and narrative; 2) providing a legitimate lifestyle by way of

promoting family commitments and facilitating educational and vocational opportunities; 3) use

of amnesty and restorative justice, whereby lesser crimes are forgiven and extremists sometimes

meet with victims of terrorism; and 4) creation of legitimate opportunities to vent or address

grievances e.g. via group discussion,” while also as including psychological counseling as a

common factor.

Many rehabilitation programs have stressed ideology, the first identified factor. This

involves religious debates, lessons, and discussions, usually involving respected religious figures

or former terrorists (Mullins, 2010). Former efforts have largely focused on ideologies.

Addressing ideology usually involves intercession by respected religious/political leaders and/or

former terrorist leaders. Hearing the terrorist’s ideologies challenged by someone they respect

and even admire can cause the needed cognitive dissonance needed to spark a change. One

weakness of some of these programs is that although the programs require renouncement of their

former terrorist organizations in order to advance in the program, it does not follow that the

individual then has reached the conclusion that these endeavors were wrong (Horgan & Altier,

2012). Without this important cognitive reasoning, it is impossible to say whether or not terrorist

behavior will cease. Some research suggests de-radicalized terrorists spreading their stories and

messages to other high-risk or terrorist groups may be the best next step forward (Horgan &

Deitzer 21

Altier, 2012). Several countries have let this become their forefront in counterterrorism efforts

aimed at terrorist disengagement. However, since there has been no compilation of data or

meaningful analyses, it is impossible to say whether these attacks on ideology are working in

practical concerns of disengagement.

There are several programs, however, that focus more on treating the socio-economic

issues involved than the ideology of the terrorists. The rationalization behind these programs is

that by giving them the means to live a successful legitimate life, the terrorists will not have

motivation to enter back into terrorist organizations. The Saudi program is a good example of

this strategy, with the inclusion of a halfway house called the “Care Rehabilitation Center.” At

this halfway house, the former terrorists are offered education and vocational training, housing, a

stipend, and even wives upon his release and successful reintegration into society. Although this

may be an extreme example, the opposite, leaving “rehabilitated” terrorists on their own with no

forms of aid, would not be successful either. As Mullins (2010) described, certain former

terrorists feel forced back in to terrorist activities, with one former terrorist stating, “I know

militants who repented who have resumed Jihad because they were unable to work and live.”

Amnesty is a far less researched and common field for de-radicalization programs.

Although several programs offer some form of amnesty, particularly to less violent terrorists,

there are varying rules. It generally seems that most programs only offer absolution to less

serious crimes and often involves the offering of a “fresh start”—that is, a new location and life.

Restorative justice, meaning the repairing of wrongs one has caused, typically has involved

victim-offender meetings. Although these can be very painful, meetings such as these are meant

to humanize the “enemy” and give victims closure. Some reports have called these interventions

“largely unsuccessful,” but there is not enough evidence to be conclusive about the effects of

Deitzer 22

restorative justice (Mullins, 2010).

In summary, Mullins (2010) states that it is unlikely that one of these approaches are

most effective alone. A combination of these current efforts would best sway the multiple facets

involved in terrorism In addition to these past efforts, there are many ideas taken from Clinical

Psychology that have empirical support in other areas may be helpful to the treatment of

terrorists. These therapies have not yet been tried and tested in the field with terrorist

populations; however, doing so may be in the near future.

One of these promising field buds from the larger field of risk assessment. Clinical

psychologists have researched, developed, and utilized risk assessment tools for decades and,

although still far from complete, risk assessment may hold significance for predicting terrorist

recidivism. Used by mental health clinicians, forensic psychologists, criminologists, and the like,

risk assessment measures focusing specifically on violence have been developed. Particularly,

the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA) has been adjusted for use with terrorist

populations. This would involve only assessing the individual, not treating. Yet, this is a vital

step in the treatment process, such as in selecting candidates for rehabilitation programs,

examining the depth of need for therapies, and predicting the risk of reoffending if released back

into a civilian population. Empirically supported methods of assessing risk would be a welcomed

addition to “risk reduction” programs.

In treating the identified risk, behavioral therapies have been suggested in order to ensure

useful results outside of changing ideology. Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) has been

suggested in lieu of focusing on changing an offender’s cognitions (Horgan & Taylor, 2011). A

child of behaviorism, this therapy focuses on the “antecedents of behavior, the behavior itself,

and its consequences” in its push to change behavior. Using this 3-factor model, ABA develops

Deitzer 23

specific and scientifically supported plans, personalized by the individual’s unique motivations,

actions, and penalties. However, terrorist ideologies often transcend the costs and rewards of

behaviors for their larger goals and beliefs systems. These belief systems involve internal,

cognitive processes. In order to best understand the range of changes needed to affect the

terrorist behavior, therapies outside the realm of pure behaviorism may be needed.

Therapies used to treat sex offenders have been suggested for terrorist populations

because of the similarities in their strong drives, wounding behaviors, and innocent victims

(Horgan & Taylor, 2011). These Sex Offender Treatment Programs (SOTP’S) include Cognitive

Behavioral Therapies (CBT) and continuous monitoring and prevention of “relapses.” This idea

of “relapse prevention” as part of a treatment program could be key in keeping terrorists away

from re-engagement and has been utilized in many programs with socio-economic support

systems, such as the Saudi’s rehabilitation program, of which one of the goals is “aftercare”

(Boucek, 2008).

Other past research has suggested “cognitive behavioral models of understanding

behavior” because of the influential effect of the organizational beliefs on the behavior of the

individual, especially as controlled by ideology (Taylor & Horgan, 2007). Cognitive Behavioral

Therapy (CBT) is a process during which “The therapist and patient collaborate to identify

distorted cognitions, which are derived from maladaptive beliefs or assumptions. These

cognitions and beliefs are subjected to logical analysis and empirical hypothesis‐testing which

leads individuals to realign their thinking with reality” (Clark, 1995). CBT is one of the most

widely researched and effective types of therapy (Butler et. al., 2006). Offshoots on CBT

suggested for use with terrorists are Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) and

Functional Analytic Psychotherapy (FAP) (Horgan & Taylor, 2011).

Deitzer 24

In Beck’s paper “Prisoners of Hate” (2002), he identifies several cognitive distortions of

the terrorist projected upon an image of the “Enemy.” The first is overgeneralization, such as

terrorist opinions towards the “Enemy” of a country, fostered mostly by political leaders and the

military, applied to each of the innocent citizens of that country. The next is dichotomous

thinking, which is thinking which only holds two categories—“good” or “bad,” “righteous” or

“sinful,” “our side” or “their side.” Lastly, terrorists show signs of tunnel vision, an unwavering

goal fostered by their ideological mission, which causes them to function methodically and

robotically without considering their actions and showing great resistance to change. These

cognitive distortions can clearly cause disastrous consequences if left untreated.

An important strategy to counter these cognitive distortions is the reframing of the

“Enemy” into another human being. Challenging this “us versus them” approach can lead to the

internal recognition of these logical fallacies. Beck suggests educational sessions, group

therapies for former terrorists, and facilitating supervised meetings of victims and offenders. This

would involve “acknowledgement of the suffering, taking responsibility for violent deeds,

ventilation and processing of feelings, any challenging of negative appraisals and over-

generalized interpretations of the events” (Beck, 2002). Applying these cognitive challenges in a

therapy setting requires highly trained clinical psychologists who will work in this challenging

and experimental field. In fact, whether in CBT or other therapies, there is a strong need for

clinicians to conduct therapy sessions and a systematic evaluation of what works.

Empirically Based Education

Deitzer 25

Lastly, after the compilation of standard guidelines, data lending itself well to analysis,

and utilizing the suggested empirically based treatments, it may be the case that this is not

enough. Several sources have claimed that we shouldn’t be expected to reach today’s terrorists—

instead, counter-terrorism should focus on the generation of tomorrow (Wagner, 2006).

Pakistan’s rehabilitation program is unique in reaching out to teenaged offenders.

Younger, more susceptible minds can be more easily changed, and aiming to change the younger

generation while they can still forgo terrorist activity and make a change may be the best route.

As one boy from the Pakistani program put it, “I am going to spread and preach whatever I learn

here and tell people that what they were doing is wrong” (Raddatz, 2010). Likewise, the Chief

Minister Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has said that the promotion of education is the only way to cope

with the challenges of extremism, terrorist, poverty, illiteracy, law and order, and unemployment

(Naeem, 2012). The Ministry of Education Saudi program educates in schools about danger of

terrorism and terrorist ideologies, as well as including a media subcommittee to spread their

messages in further reaching arenas (Boucek, 2008).

It may well be that it is either too late for Clinical Psychology to intervene with older

terrorists, or that it is not worthwhile to focus efforts there when younger generations can be

influenced before they, in turn, offend. Preemptive aims at education and media influences can

work against the realities of terrorist ideologies that many children are brought up believing in,

or even fighting for. Our best bet for today in our striving for empirically based strategies for

dealing with the problem of terrorism is to use multifaceted approaches, establishing empirically

based guidelines, empirically based treatment plans, and perhaps, empirically based education as

well. Then, we may have more of a chance of affecting the strongly held beliefs in violence as an

acceptable answer to religious, political, or otherwise ideological complaints.

Deitzer 26

Conclusion

In summary, this paper has addressed the viewpoint that the psychology of terrorism is

underdeveloped or naïve attempt to address the multifaceted issue of terrorism. This paper

concedes that yes, terrorism is broad and too complex an issue to be tackled by one discipline on

its own, but psychology has much to offer. However misguided the first attempt of psychology in

studying terrorism, the psychology of terrorism has great potential. Particularly, the idea of

disengaging terrorists from their violent militant activities can be addressed by psychologists.

There is a psychological component to disengagement at the individual level, which can be best

addressed by the field of Clinical Psychology.

A part of this paper focused on asking the right questions. Accordingly, an assumption in

this paper must be addressed. Can we truly de-radicalize terrorists? Risk reduction initiatives

have so far shown promise, yet lack the empirical backgrounds and analyses to be conducted in

moving forward expected of psychology as a science. We cannot pinpoint their exact positive

effects until empirically based, standard guidelines are set for the definition of recidivism and the

judgment of risk for recidivism across cultures and programs. Research on ideology’s role in

terrorism and disengaged terrorists reporting “disillusionment” with the realities of the terrorist

organization (as compared to their initial motivations and ideas about terrorist involvement) posit

that casting aside the “terrorist ideology” is possible. If it is possible, counter-ideological

programs aimed at de-radicalization should be included in the risk reduction initiatives in the

future.

However, we cannot blatantly address ideology without considering empirically based

treatment for terrorists. Former risk reduction programs have addressed ideology, without any

Deitzer 27

standard scientific methods to determine the change of the terrorist’s internal cognitions or

whether this supposed change resulted in low rates of recidivism. Empirical guidelines would be

effectual in determining whether counter-ideology holds any real weight in the fight on terror.

An analytical review of the current strategies and their recidivism rates could determine which

tactics work. Moreover, the researched ideas of risk assessment and cognitive behavioral

therapies may hold promise for the field of de-radicalization and disengagement. In addition,

focusing on education and media reaching the younger generations may be important to

dissuading their future participation in terrorism. Many clinicians are needed to scientifically

review past methods and use empirically based guidelines and practice in the future terrorist risk-

reduction initiatives.

Deitzer 28

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