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A Theory of Government "Red Tape"Author(s): Barry BozemanSource: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Jul.,1993), pp. 273-303Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Public Management Research Association

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A Theory Of Government "Red Tape"

BarryBozeman

Syracuse University

ABSTRACT

Despitethegeneralrecognition f theimportancef "red ape"

on organizations' ehaviors ndimpacts, heoryremainspoorlydeveloped.Thepurpose f this article s to develop theoryof theoriginsof redtapeand thentoapplythetheory o thequestion"Whydogovernment rganizationsavemoreredtape?" Theperspectivepresented ssumes hatredtape s bestviewedas pathological,whereas hat ormalizationoncepts re bestviewedas neutralattributes f organizations.The term "ruledensity" s introducedodescribeheextensiveness f rulesand regulations s related o totalorganizationesources.Thetheorymakes distinctionbetween ulesthatare at theirorigindysfunctionalrule-inceptionedtape)andrulesthat nitiallyserveda useful unctionbuttransformednto redtape(rule-evolvededtape). Specific ausesof eachtyperedtapeareidentified.A distinctions maderegardinghe internalvs. externalproductionndimpactof redtapeand a typologys developedwhichis used n hypothesesboutredtape. Finally,thequestionofgovern-ment redtape s considered.A modelof therelationship etweenexternal ontrolandredtape s presented.Themodel mplies hatmost actors eading o redtapearenotan inherentunctionofgovernment.However, wo inherentactorsofgovernment recited,eachof whichgives rise to redtape.

Governmentorganizations seem to have more "redtape"these days--butwhy? Most explanationsgo no furtherthan to

suggest governmentorganizations' red tape is a result of theemphasis on accountability n government (the apologists'explanation) or from the absence of a bottom line (the critics'explanation). Theremay be something to each of these broadexplanations,but neithergoes very far in meeting the require-ments for theory development--namely,sharp conceptualization, interrelatedpropositions, and attention to causal mechanics.

Theauthorgratefullyacknowledgeshelpful suggestions provided by Stu-artBretschneider,HerbertKaufman,GordonKingsley,Steven Maynard-Moody, SanjayPandey,Hal Rainey,PatrickScott,and Dwight Waldo.

J-PART, 3(1993):3:273-303

273/Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

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A Theoryof Government"RedTape"

One objectiveof this articleis to explain why governmentorganizationsoften have more red tape than do private organi-zations. But two even more fundamentalquestions requireattention beforedelving into the relationshipbetween govern-ment ownership and red tape. First,what is red tape? While

most of us have some notion of the natureof red tape, con-cepts employed in researchand theory have been inconsistentand ambiguous. Second,what causes red tape? While there ismuch unsystematicspeculation about the causes of red tape,most researchand theory has treatedit as an independent vari-able, examining its impact on organizationperformanceandproductivity (Bozemanand Crow 1991;Bozemanand Loveless1987),or on employee morale,job satisfaction,and commit-ment (Lanand Rainey 1992;Buchanan1975;Baldwin 1990;Snizek and Bullard1983). (Studiesof the causes of formaliza-tion, a conceptualcousin to red tape, are much more common

[e.g. Langton1984;Meyer, Scott,and Strang 1987;Van de Ven,Delbecq, and Koenig 1976;Duggar 1985;Organ and Greene1981]).

In order is to provide a more detailed and fully developedconceptualizationof red tape, this article will focus on itsorigins and causation. Most studies of the effects of red tapedo not provide a theory of origins. After exanining the etiolo-gy of red tape and introducinga numberof conceptual tools tofacilitate red tape theory development, the articlewill provideexplanationsfor differencesin public and private organiza-tions' red tape.

RED TAPEAND "WHITETAPE":THE SEARCHFORA USEFULCONCEPTUALIZATION

Despite inconsistencyin usage, there are some commonelements to definitionsof red tape. Red tape usually impliesexcessive or meaningless paperwork(Bennettand Johnson1979);a high degree of formalizationand constraint(Hall1968);unnecessaryrules, proceduresand regulations; neffi-ciency;unjustifiabledelays; and as a result from all this,frustrationand vexation. (See Bozemanand Scott 1992 for an

overview of various conceptualizations.)

HerbertKaufman'sRedTape: ts Origins,UsesandAbuses(1977)is still the best known work on red tape and remainsthe only book devoted entirely to the topic. Kaufmanneverprovides an explicit definition of red tape but does note(pp. 4-5) that "(w)henpeople rail against red tape, they meanthat they are subjectedto too many constraints,that many ofthe constraintsseem pointless, and that agencies seem to take

274/J-PART, July 1993







A Theory of Government"RedTape"

forever to act." Thus he includes several elements of commonuse--vexation, constraint,delay.

Kaufman'sbook illustratesa dominant theme in thepublic administration iterature(e.g., Goodsell 1985)-that red

tape may be frustrating,but it sometimes provides socialbenefits. Kaufmanexplains that red tape does not spring upbecause of the malevolence or incompetenceof bureaucratsbutbecause of two compelling and interrelatedreasons--toensurethat government processes are representativeand accountableand to meet the demands, often fragmented,of citizens andinterest groups. The one line of reasoning might be describedas an administrative"tragedyof the commons":

Every restraintand requirementoriginates in someb-ody's demand for it. Of course, each person does not will

them all; on the contrary,even the most broadly basedinterestgroups are concernedwith only a relatively smallband of the full spectrumof government activities ....But there are so many of us, and such a diversity of inter-ests among us, that modest individual demands result ingreat stacks of official paper and bewildering proceduralmazes (p.29).

Thus, part of the reason for red tape is the sheer numberof specialized demands for government action. But processprotectionalso give rise to red tape. Kaufman(p. 58-59) notes"(h)adwe more trust in . . . our public officers,we would feel

less impelled to limit discretionby means of minutely detaileddirections and prescriptions."Kaufmanpoints out that muchred tape could be avoided were we willing to reduce thechecks and safeguards now imposed on government employ-ees. But he does not advocate doing away with the extensiverule-basedsafeguards,noting that were we to do away withred tape "we would be appalled by the resurgence of the evilsand follies it currently prevents."

In common usage, red tape has a strongly negative tenorand most laymen would, in all likelihood, be unable to make

much sense of the notion of beneficial red tape. In popularparlance,red tape has come to be an umbrella term coveringalmost all imagined ills of bureaucracy. As Goodsell (1987, 63)notes, red tape is not only one of the "mostenduring anduniversal rejectionsymbols in the English language,"but it is a"classic condensation' symbol in that in incorporatesa vastarray of subjectivelyheld feelings and expresses them succinctly."









Despite the widespread use of the term "redtape"as anepithet, many observershave noted that red tape (or, at least,the rules and proceduresthat some perceive as red tape) canconfer importantbenefits. Landau(1969)suggests an impor-tant rationale for rules and proceduresthat may seem, on the

surface, excessive. Accordingto Landau,duplicationandoverlap in some cases provide importantbenefits. Landau(1991,12) observes that "thedeliberateremoval of redundan-cies grinds an organizationdown to subsistence level, sorestricting ts repertoireof responses as to render it incapableof effective performance."While this is not a defense of redtape, one might, with a modest inferential eap, assume thatsimilarreasoningmight apply to organizationalrules andprocedures. As with other partsof the organization,rules andproceduresare fallibleand errorprone and some redundancyarguablymight be beneficial.

The empiricalquestion then is Under what circumstancesare extensive rules and proceduresred tape and under whatcircumstancesare they actually "whitetape"-providingbene-fits along with the delays and frustrations? Wintrobe1982).In this article,the approach(elaborated n subsequent sections)is to view red tape as an organizationalpathology, hopefullyavoiding the confusion inherentin most discussions of benefi-cial red tape. While accepting the point that extensive rulesand procedures can conferbenefits (white tape), it is arguedthat concepts such as formalizationbettercapture the notion ofextensive but potentiallybeneficialrules and procedures.

The empiricalresearchon red tape has tended to view itas an organizationalpathology. Red tape is described byBuchanan(1975)primarily in terms of excessive constraintsthat are largely structural n nature (e.g., proceduralregula-tions). Baldwin (1990)distinguishes between formalandinformalred tape. Formalred tape pertains to burdensomepersonnel procedures,whereas informalred tape concernsconstraintscreatedby such externalsources as the media,public opinion, and political parties. Perhapsthe closest topopular usage is Rosenfeld's(1984)definition of red tape as

the sum of governmentguidelines, procedures,and forms thatas are perceived as excessive, unwieldy, or pointless in relationto official decisions and policy.

Searching for a behaviorallyanchoredmeasure of redtape, researchers e.g. Kingsley and Bozeman 1992;Bozeman,Reed, and Scott 1992;Pandey and Bretschneider1992;LanandRainey 1992;Bozemanand Crow 1991)associated with theNational AdministrativeProceduresresearchprojecthaveoperationalizedred tape in terms of delays in the execution of








A Theory of Government "Red Tape"

organizations'core activities. This approach,which is guidedin large measureby operationalconvenience,makes no essen-tial distinctionbetween red tape and white tape since there isno assessment of the reasons for delays or whether the delaysare justified.

GOVERNMENTOWNERSHIPAND RED TAPE

Severalempiricalstudies have sought to determine therelationshipof red tape to governmentownership. The resultshave been mixed, due in part no doubt to the diversity ofmeasures employed. In one of the earliest empiricalstudies ofred tape, Buchanan's(1975)findings confounded usual expec-tations about greaterred tape in government. Buchanan'sresults indicated that private sector managersexpressed great-er adherence and commitment to rules than did their public

sector counterparts. By contrast,other studies (Rainey1979and 1983;Baldwin 1990;Lanand Rainey 1992;Kingsley andBozeman 1992)have shown higher levels of formalizationandperceived red tape among public managers,although thefindings were generally linked to externalconstraints(such asgovernment-wideoversight agencies). Higher levels of formal-ization and proceduralregularityalso have been reportedinpublic educational institutions(Holdaway et al. 1975;Chubband Moe 1990).

Using delays as a partialmeasure of red tape, Bozemanand colleagues (1992)found that government ownership is

associated with red tape, and privateorganizationswith stron-ger ties to government(in terms of resourcedependence andcommunications)exhibitedmore red tape. The study suggeststhat it is not governmentownership that is the chief causalagent; it is the exercise of externalpolitical authority.

Consistent with Kaufman's(1977) assertion that red tapeis integral to our political culture,Meyer (1979a,230) states:

"Thequantumshift in the scope of federalactivities whensuperimposed upon a decentralizedsystem of state and

local governmentcreated a host of intergovernmental ieswhere none had existed previously, and it gave rise toformal proceduresgoverning these relationships."

Meyer (1979a)also suggests that attempts to privatizepublic sector goods and services are anothersource of redtape. As with the red tape that flows from intergovernmentalrelationships, this form of red tape stems from the documenta-









tion and other administrativerequirementsthat are attachedtofederal funds as a means to ensure compliance with federalguidelines.

In sum, red tape may well be inextricablyrelated to the

characterof the political system, particularly he distributionofauthority. The fragmentationand dispersion of authoritycreatedby the U.S. Constitutionmay well have ensured exten-sive rules and procedures(white tape) and may in someinstancesgive rise to red tape as well.

TOWARD A THEORY OF RED TAPE:

CONCEPTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Given the current evel of theoreticalknowledge of redtape, an articulationof useful concepts is a most important

task (Jamesand Jones 1976). Beforepresentinga theory of itsorigins, two concepts of red tape and the assumptions attend-ing those concepts are presented here.

A Rules-Based Concept of Red Tape

It is assumed here that red tape pertainsto formalrules,regulations,and proceduresgeneratedby organizational mem-bers acting in their official capacities. While some (e.g.,Baldwin 1990)speak of "informal ed tape,"the concept em-ployed here begins with the assumption that red tape cannotbe based on informalactions or products. Further,not all

organizationalactivities and productsqualify, by the presentconcept, as red tape. In popular usage, several forms of per-ceived incompetence,maladministration,and delay qualify asred tape (Caiden 1991). By the more restrictedview takenhere, red tape originates only in formalrules, regulations,andprocedures. The argumentfor this more restrictivedefinitionis that it simply is not useful to use the term "redtape"forevery organizationalmalady;doing so dilutes the meaning ofthe concept to such a degree that it would not warrantorganization theorists'attention.

Red Tape as a BureaucraticPathology

As discussed in the previous section, one of the majorpoints of confusion in the formal literatureon red tape iswhether it is bad, neutral,or, at least in some instances,good.Since red tape is not a naturalphenomenon but a social con-struction,the issue is not what is its essence but what is itsmost useful conception.









The concept employed in the present theory assumes thatred tape is a "pathology." There are several reasons to takethis view. In the first place, it is clearly consonant with popu-lar usage. Citizens and organizational membersdiscussing redtape rarelyassume that it is positive. Popular usage is not a

sufficient criterion for development of a scientificconcept (e.g.,Hall 1963),but flauntingpopular usage at least requiresa goodreason. One possible good reason, suggested by Kaufman's(1977) work is that many proceduresand controls that seemvexing actually serve legitimateand importantsocial andorganizational purposes. That is a good reason to not view allprocedures and controls,even extensive ones, as red tape; it isnot a good reason to view red tape as beneficial.

A second good reason to view red tape as negative is thatthere is already a set of organizationalconcepts that deals

adequately with certainempiricalaspects of rules and proce-dures. The extensive literatureon formalizationconcerns itselfwith rules and procedures,without in most instances assumingany negative implicationsor impacts of rules and procedures(exceptionsinclude Michaels et al. 1988;Podsakoffet al. 1986who show harmful effects of formalization). Moreover,itseems useful to view formalizationas part of the "physiology"of the organizationand red tape as a pathological aspect ofthat physiology (see Bozemanand Scott 1992for an elaborationof the argument).

Another argument that might be advanced against a

negative or pathological concept of red tape relates to thesocial construction of reality. According to Waldo, "oneman'sred tape is another man's system." Kaufmanstated much thesame view: "Oneman's red tape is another'streasured proce-dural safeguard." This point, while certainly valid, is not astrong argument against red-tape-as-pathology. Rather, t is agood reason to note that red tape is best viewed as subjectdependent and that rules and procedureshave multiple im-pacts.

BUREAUCRATICPHYSIOLOGY:

FORMALIZATIONAND OTHER RULESCONCEPTS

One majorflaw in most concepts of red tape is that theconcept is too encompassing. Some authors make no distinc-tion between formalizationand red tape. Some take the viewthat most red tape is simply extensive rules and regulations.Such a concept of red tape leads us inexorably to unsatisfacto-ry and ultimatelyambiguous notions such as "good"red tape.By distinguishing carefully between formalizationand redtape, researchon each is facilitated. There have been few









studies of red tape, but studies of formalizationare abundant.One early work on formalization(Hage and Aiken 1967)takesa rules-basedapproachto formalizationand thus is especiallyuseful for currentpurposes. Hage and Aiken distinguishbetween formalizationand rule observation. The formerrefers

to the proportionof jobs that are codified, while the latterinvolves the range of variationtolerated with respect to therules thatdefine each job. In a similarway, Pugh and hiscolleagues (1968)define formalizationas the extent to whichrules, procedures,instructions,and communicationsare writ-ten, while standardizationrefersto the extent to which rulescover all circumstances. Walsh and Dewar (1987)note thatformalizationrefersmore to what the rules are intended todo--increasepredictability n organizationalbehaviorbydecreasing the variancein human performance--thano theirabsolute number.

Not all studies of formalizationare grounded in analysisof rules and procedures,but such a rules-basedconcept offormalization s useful here because it is the closest relative ofred tape. By distinguishing clearly between red tape and aclosely related concept, red tape comes more sharply intofocus. The definition presented below captures the rudimenta-ry meaning of formalizationas reflected in rules-basedformal-ization literature.

Formalization:"theextent to which rules, procedures,instructionsand communicationsare written."

(Pugh et al. 1968,75).

This familiardefinition of formalizationsuffices forpresent purposes, but it is important to note that it is not onlythe extent of written rules and proceduresbut also theirnumber that is important. Thus let us consider the enablingconcept presented below.

Rule sum: the total number of written rules, procedures,and regulations in force for an organization.

This is perhapseven closer to usual meanings of red tape.Note that the definition is for rules in force. Within an organi-zation, there often are rules and procedures that no one obeysbecause no one is aware of them.









It is often not the number f rules, regulations,and proce-dures that causes problems. The impactof rules cannot bedeterminedadequately without knowing something about theresourcesand energy requiredto comply with the rule (Fosterand Jones 1978;Foster1990).

Thus:

Compliance requirement total resources(time,people, money) requiredformally to complywith a rule (regulation,procedure).

Compliance burden: total resources(time, people, money)actually expended in complying with a rule.

"Ruledensity"relates to the complianceburden associatedwith a set of rules. The

definition provided below is not easilyoperationalized,but as an analytic distinction it is helpful insetting boundaries for the conceptualizationof red tape.

Rule density: total resourcesdevoted by the organizationto complying (i.e., complianceburden) with all itsrules, regulations, and procedures(i.e., its rule sum)as a percentage of total resourcesexpended by theorganization.

Using rule density and complianceburden concepts helpsin thinkingabout the implications of red tape for management

theory. Exhibit 1 depicts the relationshipsamong total organi-zational resourcesand total complianceburden with differingrule densities calculatedfrom a line dividing the X axis (totalresources) and Y axis (total complianceburden). If one takestotal resourcesas a reflection of the volume and energy oforganizationalactivities, one can consider the implications ofcombinations of total resources (energy level) and total compli-ance burden (bureaucratizationevel). The legend underExhibit 1 presents implicit hypotheses that high energy/lowbureaucratizationorganizationsare likely undercontrolledandlow energy/high bureaucratizationorganizationsare over-

controlled.

281/1-PART, July 1993








Exhibit 1. Rule Density Typology

Total (+)Resources (1) (2)

RuleDensity

' (5)

(3)' - - - - -- - - - - (4)

(0) (+)

1 = High Energy/LowBureaucratic Compliance

2 = High Energy/High Bureaucratic3 = Low Energy/Low Bureaucratic4 = Low Energy/High Bureaucratic5 = MediumEnergy/MediumBureaucratic

The number and types of persons affectedby a rule is afinal consideration. Important ssues are the amount of a taxand exactly who it affects. Rule incidence is a similar concept.

Rule incidence: the numberand types of persons affectedby a rule, regulation,or procedure.

Regardless of the potential importanceof propositionsabout under- and over-control,as reflectedin rule density, orcharacteristics f persons affected,as reflectedin rule inci-dence, these issues are not issues of red tape. As conceivedbelow, red tape pertains to the efficacy of rules and not to theirnumberor compliance burden.

BUREAUCRATIC PATHOLOGY: RED TAPE CONCEPTS

The above concepts help set boundaries;the two conceptsbelow are necessaryprecursorsfor a useful conceptualizationof red tape. One concept pertains to the purpose for which arule is apparentlycreated, the other to its effects.









Functional object (of a rule): the organizationallysanc-tioned purpose for which a rule is created, theproblemit seeks to solve, the opportunity it exploits.

Rule efficacy: the extent to which a given rule addresses

effectively the functionalobjectfor which it wasdesigned.

Red Tape Defined: "No Redeeming Social Value"

The theory developed here is based on two definitions ofred tape; one is a simplifying definition and the other takesinto account the subject-relevantnature of red tape.

Organizationalred tape: rules, regulations,and proce-dures that remain in force and entail a com-

pliance burden for the organizationbut have noefficacy for the rules' functionalobject.

This definition seems to be a good starting point forbuilding a theory of red tape. It is close enough to mostpopular usages to avoid adding much to the considerable

confusion already surroundingthe term "redtape". The con-cept has the important advantage of not viewing the numberof rules, procedures,and regulationsas identical to red tape.But there is one apparent problem with the concept that meritssome attention. As most public administrationscholars (Kauf-man 1977;Goodsell 1985)studying red tape have argued, redtape, at least by one conception,can be quite beneficial. If weview red tape as the sheer numberand scope of rules, regula-tions, and procedures,that same red tape can be beneficial inthose cases where it leads to greateraccountabilityand protec-tion of the public interestor, in general, acts as a constraint ongovernment's power over privatecitizens. While this point iswell taken, it is, from the standpointof theory building, thebest argument for taking a view of red tape as something morethan the sheer number of rules, regulations,and procedures.Otherwise, there is no value added for the red tape concept.Moreover,most treatmentsof red tape, and certainly most

popular usages, imply frustrationand vexation, usually overattendantinefficiency. Thus, the notion of good red tape,while certainlydefensible, seems to confuse more than toedify.

Clearly, most people view red tape as an organizationalpathology. Still, there is a need to recognize that organization-al administrativerules, regulations, and procedures are not--ineither numberor content--inherentlygood or bad, but onlygood or bad from the perspective of values posited and the









extent to which they seem to serve or thwart those values. Itseems sensible, then, to use one concept to denote the physiol-ogy of rules, regulations,and proceduresand another to de-note their pathology.

Red Tape Defined Again: As Subject-Dependent

Formost purposes the simple definition of red tape pro-vided above is adequate. However, it omits an importantelement of red tape, one capturedin Kaufman's(1977,4)notion that "[one person's red tape may be another'streasuredsafeguard"and Waldo's (1946,399) statement that "[one man'sred tape is another man's system." Any given rule or require-ment may be red tape (i.e., dysfunctional)in some respects,regardingsome values but not others. Similarly,a rule may bered tape for one stakeholderbut quite useful for another.

Thus a second definition of red tape is presented below:

Stakeholder red tape: organizationalrules, regulations,and proceduresthat remain in force and entail acomplianceburden, but serve no objectvalued byagiven stakeholderroup.

Forpurposes of clarification,we may call the first redtape definition "organizational ed tape"and the second "stake-holder red tape." Stakeholderred tape often will be usefulwhen analyzing organizationsin terms of coalitions of interestsor when the individual, ratherthan the organization, is the

unit of analysis. In other cases, however, organizationalredtape is likely to serve betterbecause it is simpler and requiresno detailed specifications.

In some respects, stakeholderred tape is a richerconcep-tualizationthan organizationalred tape. However, stakeholderred tape presentsenormous operationalproblems, the chief ofwhich is the potential number of stakeholders. In a govern-ment organization,one might expect at least the followingstakeholdertypes:

- Parent agency- Politicalsuperiors (e.g., Congress)- Centralmanagementagencies (e.g., Office of

Managementand Budget)- Interorganizationalpartners(both public and

private sector)- Clients and clientele groups- Intraorganizational coalitions









A rule that is red tape for one group may not be red tapefor anothergroup, even for one in the same category. Thusthe category "intraorganizationaloalitions"may include suchdiverse sets as the psychologists in the personnel department,the cohort of younger middle managers,and employees inter-

ested in innovation and change. Eachcoalition may haveunique sets of values and different functionalobjects to beserved (or not served) by the organization'srules and proce-dures. What this means, from the standpointof researchingred tape, is that comprehensiveand valid measurement of astakeholderconcept of red tape is inevitably a prodigious task,so much so that organizationalred tape may well be the betterhope for developing researchableconstructs.

In the next section of this article, the concepts developedabove are used as a starting point for understandingthe ori-

gins, evolution, and effects of red tape. The centralquestion,then, is what are the causes of pathologicalrules, regulations,and procedure? The first task in the development of a theoryof red tape requiresattention to its origins, thus an etiologicaltheory. After the presentationof a theory of origins, latersections of this articlewill address internalvs. external redtape and the differences between red tape in government andin privateorganizations.

THE ETIOLOGYOF RED TAPE:"RULESBORN BAD"VS. "GOODRULES GONE BAD"

None of the empiricalstudies of red tape, and only afew of the conceptual studies, gives much consideration to itsorigins or to the transformationof functionalrules, regulations,and procedures into red tape.

Rule-Inception Red Tape:"RulesBorn Bad"

It seems clear that some rules are ineffective at theirinception. It is assumed here that some rules are red tape attheir inceptionbecause they meet the requirementsspecifiedearlier--havinga compliance burden while not addressing a

functionalobject. The term "rule-inception ed tape" s usedfor rules that are dysfunctional at their origin. The question,though, is why would anyone promulgate a rule that neverserves a useful purpose? Thereare several reasons.









Sourcesof rule-inceptionred tape include:

1. Inadequatecomprehension2. Self-aggrandizementand illegitimate functions3. Negative sum compromise

4. Overcontrol5. Negative sum process (e.g., "youcan never

have too much democracy")

Inadequate comprehension. Many dysfunctionalruleshave theirorigins in the misunderstandingof the relationbetween means and ends. In a great many instances, thereason for the inefficacyof rules is simple--personsdesigningthe rules have insufficientunderstandingof the problem athand, the relationshipof the rule to the perceived problem,orothers' likely applicationor response to the rule. The problem

of inadequatecomprehensionis certainlyunderstandable.Implicitin the promulgation of every rule is a causal theory.For some rules the patternof causation may be relativelysimple, such as "ifwe change work hours for some employees,there will be less trafficcongestion." But in many instance theimplicit causality in a rule is extremely complicatedand inmany cases rules have spill-over effects and unanticipatedconsequences that go well beyond the functionalobject. Sinceevery rule promulgationinvolves essentially a forecastof theeffects of the rule on behavior, it should come as no surprisethat the problem of inadequatecomprehensionshould so oftenrearits ugly head; social forecasting s, after all, highly inexact.

Self-aggrandizement and illegitimate functions. Theconcept of red tape employed here assumes that rules shouldserve a legitimate,organizationallysanctioned functionalobject,either for the focal organization or for a legitimateexternalcontroller(such as a parentagency) of the organiza-tion. Thus a rule that is efficacious for an individual or groupbut which serves an illegitimate function, such as self-aggran-dizement, qualifies as red tape, even if the rule is very effec-tive for the illegitimate function. The reason is that there is acomplianceburden produced that is not redeemed in terms of

a legitimate functionalobject. Thus, if an employee in theaccountingdivision sets a rule requiringadditional reportingon travel reimbursement orms for the unsanctionedpurposeof expanding his or her knowledge base and organizationalpower, the result is by definition red tape.

Negative sum compromise. As is the case for mostorganizationaldecisions, decisions about rules often reflectcompromise. In some instances a rule may be established thatserves so many diverse functionalobjectivesthat the net result









is to produce a complianceburden but not enhance any of thefunctional objects it is designed to serve. This is related to theproblem of inadequatecomprehension. It may well be the casethat each rule-making party has an understanding of the ruleneeded to advance particular unctionalobjectsbut not of theimpact of a compromise rule. Often rule makers seek to dotoo much and end up doing nothing.

Overcontrol. Next to inadequate comprehension,over-control is, in all likelihood, the most common reason that rulesare "bornbad." Managerialcontrol is an important organiza-tional value and usually a legitimateone. However, it is also avalue especially likely to be overemphasized. Clearly,rulescannot cover every contingency; thus, the informalorganiza-tion is inevitably important. The informalorganization,undersome circumstances,can even "preserve he organizationfromthe self-destructionthat would result from literalobedience to

the formalpolicies, rules, regulationsand procedures" Dubin1951, 68). Butone of the most common responses to uncertain-ty and ambiguity is to seek control through formalization.This overcontrol is often a source of red tape.

Negative sum process. In many organizations,there issuch an unmitigatedfaith in participation hat organizationaldemocracybecomes a source of red tape. Not only is thereanattempt to make sure that all relevant parties participate,butthose who have nothing to add and who wish to be "disen-franchised"are required,throughformalrules and procedures,

to participate. Thus, rules which enhance process, includingbut not limited to participationprocesses, can begin by enhanc-ing a value but can take the value to such an extreme that itserves no purpose.

Rule-Evolved Red Tape: "Good Rules Gone Bad"

The question of why functional rules transmute intodysfunctionalred tape is important not only for the under-standing of bureaucraticpathology but also for the under-standing of organizational-environment elations and organiza-tional life cycles. Several factors may lead to the evolution ofrules into red tape, including:

(1) Rule drift(2) Rule entropy(3) Change in implementation(4) Change in the functional object(5) Change in the rule's efficacy(6) Rule strain(7) Accretion(8) Misapplication









Rule drift. Rule drift occurs when the meaning and spiritof the rule get lost in organizationalantiquity or when individ-uals inadvertentlychange the rule or its meaning. Sometimesindividuals enforce rules or comply with them without havingany idea why they are in place or what function they serve.

Perhapsthe need for the rule no longer exists. Rules may beobserved ritualisticallyand even may be veneratedwithoutanyone knowing what function they serve other than ritual.Rule drift is not always a matterof the length of time that haspassed since a rule's origins. Other factorsthat may be relatedto rule drift include personnel turnover(in the case of internalrules), changes in client composition (for externalrules), andthe reorganizationof organizations and programs.

Rule entropy. Rule entropy is a special case of rule drift;rule entropy occurs as rules get passed from one organizationto the next and one

personto

the next. The more organiza-tions, organizational evels, and jurisdictions nvolved in rulepromulgationand application, the more likely the meaningwill be lost through entropy and the more likely red tape willresult.

Change in implementation. Change in implementationoccurs if the rule itself stays essentially the same but individu-als begin to implement it in a differentmanner. Forexample,a rule may be applied with less discretion than in the past or itmay be interpretedmore or less stringently than in the past.

Change in the functional object. Sometimes the function-al object of the rule changes in ways that renderthe ruleobsolete or otherwise useless. Thus a rule requiring an annualreport of hiring needs is dysfunctional if there is a multiyearhiring freeze.

Change in the rule's efficacy. Even if the functionalobjectdoes not change, circumstanceswhich mitigate the rule'susefulness can occur. Forexample, a rule requiringcarboncopies of memorandamakes little sense if almost all communi-cation is via electronicmail on a computer-based ocal area

network. This example illustratesnot a change in the func-tional object itself but a change in the rule's efficiency for thefunctionalobject.

Rule strain. Organizationswith too high a rule densitylevel create strainand inefficient use of resources. Rules thatare good but are too abundantcan have a net negative effect.Five good rules may be within those capabilities; en good









rules may cause the organization or individual to interpretand

apply rules less effectively, simply because of limited compli-ance capability.

Accretion. Rules build one on top of another. If they are

inconsistent or at cross purposes their net effect may be dam-aging (even if particularrules remain effective with respect totheir functionalobjects). Accretion means that the rules havean impact that is more than the sum of their parts. Rationalityadded to rationalitymy sum to irrationality. This is not amatter of the volume or density of rules (as in rule strain)butof the compatibilityof rules.

Misapplication. Misapplicationof rules can occur for anyof a variety of reasons. Sometimes rules may be difficult tointerpret or apply because they have been written poorly andthus quicklyevolve into red tape. Sometimes the purpose of arule (perhapsa legitimate purpose and perhaps for an effica-cious rule) has never been clearly communicatedto the personcharged with its enforcement. Sometimesthe persons expectedto comply with the rule do not understandit or its purposes.

SOURCESOF RULES:INTERNALVS. EXTERNALRED TAPE

In determiningboth the cause and effect of red tape, oneof the most significant issues is the source of the rules thathave become red tape. Surprisingly,this issue has received

little attention, expect indirectly through concernsabout exter-nal control and accountability.

The internal-externaldistinction is importantfor a varietyof reasons. Froma managerialstandpoint,each suggestsdifferentred tape implications. The key to coping with inter-nally originating red tape may be simply to change the rules.Thatoption may or may not be open for externally imposedred tape. Similarly, nternalimpacts are likely to lead mostdirectly to ineffectivenessand loss of morale. External mpactsare likely to lead to customerdefection and client dissatisfac-

tion (with no direct and necessary internalimpact).

Exhibit2 depicts the interaction of the source of rules andits impact as red tape. It is important to note that externallyimposed rules may become internally imposed red tape. Thatis, the original source of rules is not necessarily the originalsource of red tape.

289/1-PART, July 1993








Forpresent purposes, however, the chief concern is withthe source of red tape and its impact. Exhibit2 provides agrid relatingsource of (organizational)red tape and its impact.Note that the perspective is that of the focal organizationratherthan of the stakeholder,the superiororganization,or the

client;a differentperspectivewould requirea differentmodel.

Exhibit 2. Typology Relating Origin and Impact of Red Tape

[Impact]

External

(I,E) (E,E)

Ordinary Pass-throughRed Tape Red Tape

Internal External

[Origin]

(L,D) (E,I)

Interorganizational ExternalControlRed Tape Red Tape

Internal

Eachquadrantof the grid relates a differentcombinationof red tape source and impact;a term is given for each type.

Red tape that originates inside the organizationand has exter-nal impact on clients or other organizationsis called ordinaryredtape. This term is used because it is the type of red tapethat is most familiarand receives the most attentionin boththe literatureand in populardiscussion. Red tape that origi-nates inside the organizationand has impacts inside the orga-nization is referredto as intraorganizationaledtape. This typered tape is familiarin the workplace. Rules, regulations,andadministrativeproceduresare developed inside the organiza-tion with some functionalobjectpertaining to the internal

290/J-PART,July 1993








management of the organization. Those rules that have a

compliance burden but no efficacy for any functional object of

the organization become intraorganizational red tape.

Red tape that originates externally but has internal organi-

zational impacts (from the standpoint of a given focal organi-zation) is also quite familiar. Usually it originates in a govern-mentally superior agency or in a parent firm's attempt to

maintain control of a subordinate entity. The term external

controlredtape s used here.

Pass-through ed tape s less obvious and probablylesscommon. It occurs wheni red tape originates from the outside

(e.g., the parent organization) and has its chief impact on the

client or customer of the focal organization, with the focal

organization not contributing to the red tape but simply pass-

ing it along as it implements the red tape.

The relevance of the internal-external distinction is revisit-

ed below in consideration of the differences between red tapein government and in private organizations.

PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIFFERENCES IN RED TAPE

Why do government organizations have more red tape

than do other organizations? Having introduced a rough

theory of the origins of red tape and having developed some

additional conceptual tools, we now apply these tools to the

question of government organizations' red tape.

A basic premise is that government organizations are not

inexorably destined to have more red tape than other organiza-

tion. There are only a few inherent attributes of government

organizations that cause red tape; there are many attributes

that cause red tape and are correlated to government ownership.

Correlated Causes of Government Red Tape

The primary correlated attributes that lead to more red

tape are: (1) external control; (2) homogeneity and number ofstakeholders. Another way to say this is that government

organizations and private organizations with the same levels of

external control and the same volume and diversity of stake-

holders would have the same level of red tape flowing from

those causes. But of course government organizations general-ly possess these attributes to a greater extent than do private

organizations (i.e., government ownership is correlated with

these attributes).

291J-PART, uly 1993








Exhibit 3 presents an external controlmodel of red tape,one as applicableto private as it is to government organiza-tions. The model takes the organizationas its focus and indi-cates facilitators +) and inhibitors(-) of red tape. The reason-ing behind the model is as follows:

Propositionposition 1.0: Organizationalred tape increas-es with numberof organizationalentities promulgatingrulesto be implementedby the focal organizationincreases ... .;

Proposition 1.1: ... And with the number of organization-al layers and jurisdictionalunits promulgatingrules;

Proposition 1.2:. . . Because,there is (a) increasedoppor-tunity for use of discretionin rule application (and increasedopportunityfor misapplication); 2) increasedopportunityfor

"entropy"n the communicationof rules and their results; (3)decreased "ownership" f the rules by the organizationalunitin charge of implementation.

Proposition2.0: Organizationalred tape decreases as afunction of the number,quality, and use of feedbackmecha-nisms by which those affected by rules communicatewiththose promulgatingand implementing the rules.

Exhibit 3. External Control and Generation of Red Tape.

| External |

W+) Entropy

(-)

OrganizationalFeedback

Discretion (-)

t (+) Entrophy

(-)

0~~~~

ClientFeedback ClientFeedback









The model in Exhibit 3 and the propositions above are asapplicableto private as to government organizations. Butthere are inherent attributesof government organizationthatexacerbatethe (generally)high degrees of external control thattend to be found in governmentorganizations.

Inherent Causes of Government Red Tape

Among the inherent attributesof government, two areparticularlyworthy of attentionin connectionwith red tape--(1) sovereign political authority,(2) breadthof policy missionand, relatedly, the natureof linkages among organizationspursuing transcendentpolicy missions. While political author-ity affects private organizationsand even can be exercised byprivate organizationsacting in proxy, sovereignty inheres ingovernment. This is indeed the only ineradicabledifferencebetween

governmentorganizationsand private organizationswith high degrees of publicness (Bozeman1987).In the UnitedStates and in other democraticgovernments, sovereigntycarrieswith it legitimatecoercive power of such force thatcitizens inevitably demand sharpconstraintson officialdomand safeguards,usually procedural,against abuse. This is achief point in Kaufman's(1977)analysis of red tape, and he isquite correctin noting that these proceduralsafeguardscreatea great many rules, regulations,and procedures--hisconcept ofred tape.

Using a red tape-as-pathologyconcept, a set of rules

protecting citizens from official abuse is not red tape. Howev-er, a set of rules devised to protectcitizens from official abuse,but not meeting that purpose or any other legitimate purpose,is indeed red tape. One of the reasons government has morered tape is that it has voluminous rules designed to protectcitizens from the illegitimateuses of the legitimate powers ofgovernment. Sometimes the rules simply do not work. Usingthe concepts developed to explain the etiology of red tape, wecan say that thereare certaincauses of red tape that are partic-ularly likely to arise in the case of proceduralsafeguards.First,there is a strong likelihood of accretion ecause procedur-

al safeguardsalmost invariablyinvolve cross-cuttinggoals-they affect the same officials and the same missions as dopolicy goals and produce a naturaltug-of-war. When officialsfind ways to reduce the efficacy of the proceduralsafeguards(but not to shunt aside the rules and complianceburden asso-ciated with the safeguards),the residue is red tape. Inadequatecomprehensions often a problembecause those interpretingorapplying proceduralsafeguardseasily can lose sight of thepurposes of the rule, focusing instead on mindless compliance.Perhapsmost important,however, is rulestrain. In many









instances the sheer number of proceduralsafeguards,many ofwhich are quite specific and detailed, produce an extensivecompliance burden and, for organizationswith limited resourc-es, a high rule density.

Anotherinherent attributeof government that leads to in-creased red tape is the nature of the policy mission. Generally,interorganization inkage is associated with red tape (as indi-cated above), but when the linkage is not just for the mutualcompetitive advantage of essentially autonomous organizationsbut to serve a broaderpolicy mission that transcendsall linkedgovernment organizations,the linkage is qualitativelydifferent.This qualitativedifference means that linkage mechanismsrequirea differentsort of interorganizational"glue" hat caneasily turn out to serve as the adhesive to red tape. In acompetitive market, the success of one firmat the expense of

anotherin the same industry is not only expected and tolerat-ed but is often seen as beneficial to the industry and the econ-omy as a whole. The competition between firms leads pre-sumably to betterproductsand strongerfirms. However, ifthe goal-attainmentsuccess of one government organizationcomes at the expense of anothergovernment organizationworking in the same "policy ndustry," here is no presumptionthat a higher good is served; instead, the presumption is thatthose organizations are working counterproductively. Whywould this inherentdifferencein government organizationslead to red tape? The answer is simple--working at cross-purposes is the presumed norm in competitive private firms,but it is the very definition of red tape in government organi-zations:complianceburden without social benefit.

Hypotheses about GovernmentRed Tape

We can now consider the propositions about the causalityof externalcontrol (correlatedred tape) and the inherent fea-tures of red tape in connection with the theory presentedabove. Table1 provides hypotheses about the implications ofgovernment ownership for various typesof red tape. Table2provides hypotheses about the implications of government

ownership to the imputed causesof red tape.

It is hypothesized that government ownership is positive-ly related to ordinaryred tape, externalcontrol red tape, andpass-throughred tape and is not related significantly to intra-organization edtape. Let us first consider nonrelatedred tape.There is no particularreason to believe that intraorganizationalred tape is related to government ownership since there is nonecessaryor even likely differencein the number of rules(rules sum), rule density, complianceburden, or numberof









actors and organizationspromulgatingrules. Similarly,thereis no reason to expect differences in feedbackmechanismsforintraorganizational ed tape-employees of government organi-zations are probablyno more or less likely than employees ofprivate organizationsto express their views about their organi-

zations' rules and red tape.

Table 1Summaryof Hypotheses About Relationship OfGovernment Ownership To Types Of Red Tape

Type of Red Tape Government Ownership

Ordinary red tape (+) due to less feedback

Intraorganization ed tape (n.r.)A

Externalcontrol red tape (+) due to greaternumber of externalcontrollers

Pass-throughred tape (+) due to less feedbackand greater numberofexternalcontrollers

An.r. = not related

Ordinary edtapeseems more likely in government organi-zations because there is less direct and meaningful feedback.This is one instance when the often-citedabsence of a bottomline or a clear marketsignal has a significanteffect. If privateorganizations,especially private firms with a broad customerbase, requiretheircustomers to suffer red tape, it is likely thatthe complianceburden will be reflected in reduced sales andmarketshare. In government, feedbackis more likely to beanecdotal and episodic, and thus ordinaryred tape is more

easily sustained.

There is every reason to believe that government organi-zations will in general be likely to promulgateexternal ontrolredtape. Typically, they have a large numberof externalcontrollersexerting legitimate influence and providing rules.If we make the above assumptions about the effects of numer-ous, diverse externalcontrollers,then government organiza-tions can be expected to have more externalcontrol red tapeand more pass-throughedtape.









Table 2 provides an extensive set of hypothesized relation-ships between red tape and government ownership. Eachrelationship s potentially amenableto test in researchcompar-ing public and private organizations.

Table 2SummaryOf Hypotheses About Relationship OfGovernment Ownership To Causes Of Red Tape

Cause of Red Tape Government Ownership

Inadequatecomprehension (n.r.)

Illegitimate (+) due to politicaluses of red tape and"sidepayments"

Negative sum compromise (+) because authoritymore diffuse

Overcontrol (+) due to limitedmanagerialtaskspecificity

Negative sum process (n.r.)

Rule drift (+) due to greaterturnover

Rule entropy (+) due to greaternumberof organizational

levelsChangeof implementation (n.r.)

Change functionalobject (n.r.)

Change rule efficacy (n.r.)

Rule strain (n.r.)

Accretion (+) due to cross-cutting

policy goals

Misapplication (+) due to greaterinstance of externalcontrol

It is worth noting that for many putative causes of redtape there is no expectationof a relationshipwith governmentownership. Forexample, there is no reason to believe thatgovernment organizationswould ceterisparibushave more of aan incomprehensionroblem. Similarly,change n the unctionalobjectof therule is no more likely to lead to red tape in govern-ment than in business. In other cases, however, there is an









expectation that governmentownership will be relateddirectlyto causes of red tape. Forexample, self-aggrandizementndillegitimateunctionsmight be expected to be often a cause ofred tape in government organizations. If there is any truth toeconomists' notion that "sidepayments" Demsetz 1967;Niska-

nen 1971) play a greaterrole in government due to the absenceof a profit motive, one might expect that this focus on nonpro-ductive, unsanctionedoutputs would be associated with redtape. In addition to the issue of side payments and the ab-sence of a profit focus, it is also possible that some governmentred tape occurs because of unsanctionedpolitical strategiesthat may or may not enhanceorganizationalgoals. Moreover,governmentemployees' use of red tape as a political andstrategictool can inhibit narrow technicalefficiency but insome cases can be politicallyrational. Forexample, if anagency is experiencinga series of anticipatedpersonnelcut-backs,officials may be able to use paperworkand

proceduraldelay to fight the cutbacks,perhaps with the hope that posi-tions will be restored. Similarly,the very slowness of procure-ment and billing sometimes provides government managerswith additionaldiscretionin the deployment of resources.And they can "getaway with it" because there is an expecta-tion of delays.

Perhapsaccretion s the most importantrelationshipofgovernment ownership to a cause of red tape. Since govern-ment organizations are almost always linked by policy mis-sions in a way that privateorganizations are not, the possibili-

ty for cross-cuttingpolicy goals, with attendantred tape fromresultantdysfunctionalrules and procedures, is inevitablygreaterwith governmentorganizations. Thus this inherentquality of government,one of the few characteristics hatprovides a qualitativeand necessarydifferencebetween gov-ernmentand private organizations, also entails red tape poten-tial.

CONCLUSIONS

To a drowning victim, any flotsam or jetsamwithin grasp

is more precious than knowledge of Archimedes'principleofbuoyancy. Extendingand compounding the metaphor,onewho is "drowning"n red tape understandablyhas little pa-tience with theorizing. However, the neglect of systematictheoreticalthinkingabout red tape has contributed n largemeasure to the ambiguity that surroundsthe topic.

In many instances,managerialprescriptionand manageri-al theory complementone another. But when organizationalconcepts are poorly developed and organizationalproblems









are acute, prescriptionoften drives out explanation (Bozeman1993). This seems to be exactly what has happened in the caseof red tape. Questions of cause are rarelyeven posed, muchless answered.

This articleattempted to step back from the everydayannoyanceof rules, procedures,and regulations to presentsome thoughts about the natureand causes of red tape. Thenext steps should entail furtherconceptualizationand, just asimportant, additional empirical research on red tape. Afterproviding a summaryof the chief points of the article, thisconcluding section considers briefly some researchquestionsthat seem to flow from the theory presented. (Implicationsofthe theory for managementand organizationdesign are notexamined here but are discussed elsewhere [Jonesand Boze-man forthcoming].)

Summary

A majorpoint argued here is that it is useful to distin-guish between extensive rules and procedures,on the onehand, and red tape, on the other. Those who have given themost attention to problemsof red tape (e.g., Kaufman1977)point out that red tape often confersbenefits. The concept"ruledensity"is presented here to describe the extensiveness ofrules and procedures,without regard to their merit. The term"redtape" s reserved for rules and proceduresserving nouseful organizationalor social-politicalfunction. Several

concepts were introduced--rulesum, complianceburden,ruleincidence, functionalobjectof a rule--eachof which was de-signed to distinguish between the extensiveness of rules andtheir impacts.

Anothercentralobjectiveof this article was to developsome propositionsas to how red tape emerges. If red tape isdefined, as it is here, as rules that serve no legitimate social ororganizationalfunction,the reasons for its occurrenceare notso obvious. A distinctionwas made between "rule nception"red tape (rules dysfunctionalat their very beginning) and

"rule-evolved" ed tape (rules which originally served a usefulfunction but became dysfunctional). Severalpossible causes ofrule inception and rule-evolved red tape were presented be-tween internaland externalred tape.

It is importantto distinguish between internaland exter-nal origins of red tape, and a model was presented attemptingto determinethe causes and interrelationsof each. The modelprovided red tape categories, ordinary,intraorganizational, nd"pass-through."

298/J-PART,July1993








Any theory of government red tape is implicitly a theoryof public-privatedifferences. Governmentis viewed widely ashaving more red tape-but why? While there might well bemany factors spuriously related to government organizations'higher levels of red tape, the two factors which seem inherent

pertain to sovereign politicalauthorityand government'sbroad, interconnectedmissions. A series of hypotheses aboutgovemment red tape was presented.

Research Implications

The hypotheses presented in this articlewere not fullyexplicit, but it would not appeardifficult to develop testablehypotheses from the sets of concepts and propositions present-ed here.

Much of the needed empiricalwork on red tape pertainsto boundary setting and verification of classifications andtaxonomies. Forexample, empiricalresearchers nterested inenhancingour understandingof red tape might wish to exam-ine the boundaries between formalizationand red tape. Arethereorganizationswith high formalizationand high ruledensity but with modest degrees of dysfunctionalrules (redtape)? Similarly,are there organizationswith low rule densitybut with a high proportionof red tape?

An even more daunting researchundertaking is verifica-tion of the causal mechanics of red tape, especially rule-

evolved red tape. Studies of rule-evolved red tape necessarilyrequirelongitudinaldesigns, preferablywith multiple cases.Since the time spans requiredfor evolution of functionalrulesinto red tape are in all likelihood often quite lengthy, thismight be a fruitful realm for historiographyor historicallyinformed research.

Previous empiricalresearchon red tape has tended to usesurvey research and aggregate data (e.g., Barrett1993; Baldwin1990;Bozeman et al. 1992), but much could be learned fromintensive case study analysis of single (broadimpact)rules or

sets of rules. Particularlywelcome would be an ethnomethod-olgical study of a rule or set of rules that focus in detail on therules' origins and diverse impacts on various stakeholders.Fromsuch a study it might be possible to learn a great dealabout the evolution of rules and the factorsaffecting thatevolution.









A particularlyuseful aggregate data analysis of rules andred tape would entail a focus on the composition of variousorganizations'reservoirsof rules. Kerwinand Furlong(1992)have charted the way in a highly informativestudy of rulesgeneratedby the U.S. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency.

However, many questions remainunanswered. How doorganizations differ with respect to the functionalobjectsofrules? What types of organizationstend to have higher com-pliance burdens for their rules? What determines the specifici-ty and standardizationof organizations'rules? How doesorganizationalrule making relate to organizationalcontrol?How do rules contributeto organizationaland managerialgoals?

A particularly horny problemfor researchers s the sort-ing out of differencesbetween objective (i.e.,behaviorally

anchored) red tape and perceived red tape. Clearlyeach isimportant,and in all likelihood there are reciprocaleffectsbetween the two. But perceptionsof red tape are almostcertainlybound up in such psychological complexities relatedto job satisfaction, ndividual views about authorityand itslegitimacy,and perhapseven alienation. It is always difficultto sort out the perceptualfrom the objective and to gauge theirrespective impacts, but it is especially problematicfor red tape.However, knowledge of the interplaybetween perceptions ofred tape and objectiveindicatorswould be extremely useful intheory development.

These few ideas are far from exhaustive;they do, rather,illustratesome of the topics that might be part of a red taperesearchagenda. Much conceptualwork remains,and thedifficult task of developing useful measures for red tape issufficient to occupy a sizable numberof empiricalresearchers.There are few if any organizationstudies topics that hold morepromise. Red tape is not the only remaining frontierfororganizationresearchers,but it is certainlyamong those mostworthy of exploration. If systematic,empiricalknowledge ofred tape begins to emerge, confidence-inspiringprescriptivetheory will likely follow closely.








A Theory of Government"Red Tape"

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