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RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: CHALLENGES AND MISSIONS

FOR MILITARY FORCES IN A POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO

Dr. Conrad C. Crane

and

Dr. W. Andrew Terrill

Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College

January 29, 2003

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ii

RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: CHALLENGES AND MISSIONSFOR MILITARY FORCES IN A POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO

Introduction.

By the time Germany surrendered in May 1945, detailed Allied planning for thepost-conflict phase of operations in that nation had been ongoing for 2 years.

1In contrast,

LTG John Yeosock, commander of Third Army in Operation DESERT STORM, could get nouseful staff support to assess and plan for post-conflict issues like hospital beds, prisoners,and refugees, complaining later that he was handed a “dripping bag of manure” that no oneelse wanted to deal with.

2Neither the Army nor Department of Defense had an adequate

plan for postwar operations to rebuild Kuwait, and civilian agencies were even moreunprepared. The situation was only salvaged by the adept improvisations of Army engineersand civil affairs personnel, and the dedicated efforts of Kuwaiti volunteers and the SaudiArabian government.

3

Some of the deficiencies in postwar planning for DESERT STORM can be attributed tothe fact that Third Army was the first American field army in combat since the Korean War.Post-conflict planning historically has been a function of headquarters at echelons abovecorps, and continuing problems with more recent operations are at least partly attributableto the generally small scale of American interventions. Also, U.S. Army leaders and plannerstend to focus on winning wars and not on the peacekeeping or nation-building that comesafterwards. But national objectives often can only be accomplished after the fighting hasceased, and it is possible to win a war and lose the peace.

With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to plan for its post-conflictreconstruction. To assist such planning, this study proposes a construct for identifying thepostwar missions to be accomplished following a victory over the Hussein regime andsuggests the time phasing for the accomplishment of specific tasks. The interagencyplanning for Haiti, which produced a detailed list of post-crisis tasks and responsibilitieswell in advance of any possible combat, was an excellent approach. Still, that operationeventually failed because civilian agencies proved incapable of completing the mission oncemilitary forces left, due to inadequate resources or inflated expectations. Recent experiencesin the Balkans and Afghanistan have demonstrated the potential assistance that can beprovided by international and non-governmental organizations, though coordination withthem can be difficult.

In Iraq it will also be important to lessen military involvement as expeditiously aspossible, so interagency planners must be sure that governmental, non-governmental, andinternational civilian organizations are ready to perform assigned tasks when required. Theprimary problem at the core of American deficiencies in providing post-conflict capabilities,resources, and commitment is a national aversion to nation-building. U.S. leaders mustaccept this mission as an essential part of our national security and better tailor and fund themilitary services and civilian governmental organizations to accomplish it. This will takeconsiderable manpower and money.

1

Challenges of a Military Occupation of Iraq.

The military occupation of Iraq will face a number of unique challenges rooted in thespecial circumstances and political culture of that country. If the war to defeat SaddamHussein is short with limited civilian casualties, that task will be easier. Nevertheless, theissue of Western domination is of serious concern in the Arab World and a prolongedoccupation of Iraq with U.S. forces may lead to especially acute problems with the Iraqipopulation as well as the wider Arab World. Moreover, the more detailed nuances of Iraqipolitical, ethnic, and culture activities are not well-understood by even the most informedU.S scholars, journalists, and officials.

Iraq political institutions have never been well-developed, and Iraq has a strong traditionof instability and violence in resolving political disputes. The instability was brought undercontrol and violence institutionalized only after Saddam Hussein achieved power andestablished a regime of unprecedented brutality. Pre-Saddam instability may emerge in theaftermath of the dictator’s removal. In particular, tensions among Iraqi religious, ethnic, andtribal communities are expected to complicate both the occupation and efforts to build aviable postwar government. Power-sharing among groups is a new and untested concept inIraq that could well be subverted by elite political instincts to struggle for power before rivalsachieve opportunities to consolidate their own gains. Also, while a struggle for powerbetween civilian and military elites is possible and could contribute to Iraqi fragmentation,the U.S. should recognize that the military is a national institution and one of the few forcesfor unity within the country.

Initial Iraqi gratitude for the destruction of the Saddam dictatorship is likely under mostcircumstances, but many Iraqis will nevertheless assume that the U.S. intervened for itsown purposes and not primarily to help them. U.S. forces therefore need to completeoccupation tasks as quickly as possible and must also help improve the daily life of ordinaryIraqis before popular goodwill dissipates. Even the most benevolent occupation will confrontincreasing Arab nationalist and religious concerns as time passes. The possibility ofterrorism being directed against occupation forces probably will increase over time, and evena small number of terrorists can be expected to create serious problems for an occupationforce. A popular uprising against U.S. troops is much less likely than a terrorist campaign,but is still possible if the occupation is poorly managed.

Successfully executing the postwar occupation of Iraq is consequently just as importantas winning the war. Preparing for the postwar occupation of the Iraqi political system willprobably be more difficult and complex than planning for combat.

A Mission Matrix for Iraq.

Based on relevant experience and an analysis of the current situation in Iraq, this studyproposes a list of essential missions that must be performed to maintain a viable state andchange the regime. The way such tasks fit in the overall campaign plan for possibleoperations in Iraq is illustrated by Figure 1.

4They will be performed during a period of

“Transition” that must begin while “Decisive Operations” are still ongoing. Transition willtake many years, and for purposes of this study has been divided into four distinct phases.The first will encompass those requirements necessary to provide “Security,” includingseparating factions and beginning the repair of vital infrastructure. Functions in this phase

2

will be almost solely the responsibility of coalition military forces, and it will take a fewmonths to move to the “Stabilize” phase. The timelines on the chart are approximate, anddifferent mission categories are likely to progress at varying rates.

The next phase for occupying forces will be to Stabilize the country. Security tasks willcontinue, but services will expand and begin to incorporate civilian agencies. Theirinvolvement should become at least equal to that of coalition military forces once they startto “Build Institutions,” where the basis of the new Iraq will be firmly established. Eventuallymilitary forces will “Handover” all duties to Iraqi and international agencies, and the newregime will be ready to resume its proper place in the world community.

In the past, no part of post-conflict operations has been more problematic for Americanmilitary forces than the handover to civilian agencies. Ideally, the allocation of effort andprocess of shifting responsibilities should proceed as depicted in Figure 2,

5but in reality it

normally looks more like Figure 3, where the handover is given directly to the localgovernment. To limit the potential for any regional backlash from a perceived prolongedAmerican military occupation, it is essential that civilian and international organizationsassume coalition military responsibilities as soon as possible.

3

• Secure the state

• Separate forces

• Stop the fighting

• Detain resistors

• Round up regime

• Provide emergency

services

• Repair vital infra-

structure

• provide humanitarian

assistance

• Establish public

relations

DETER/

ENGAGE

SEIZE

INITIATIVE

DECISIVE

OPNS

TRANSITION

Starts during

Decisive Opns

SECURITY STABILIZEBUILD

INSTITUTIONS

HANDOVER/

REDEPLOY

• Continue state

security

• Continue infrastructure

repair

• Continue HA

• Continue public svcs

• Assist NGO/IO,

interagency process

• Begin military

reorganization

• Destroy WMD

• Establish local gov’t

• Process detainees

• Repatriate refugees

• Continue C-M relations

• Establish State-wide

commo

• End sanctions

• Continue state security

• Assist NGO/IO

• Continue military

reorganization

• Complete destruction

of WMD

• Establish police force

• Establish higher

level gov’t

• Encourage investment

• Start jobs programs

• Institute educational

programs

• Handover svcs to

local authorities

• Handover gov’t

• supervision

• to int’l body

• Transition to host

• nation security

• forces

• Begin HN policing

• Begin local gov’t

control

• Redeploy coalition

forces

3-4 MonthsAll coalition military

6 months – 1 year¾ coalition military

2 years½ coalition military

1-2 years¼ coalition military

Intl.

Control

Figure 1.

• Secure the state

• Separate forces

• Stop the fighting

• Detain resistors

• Round up regime

• Provide emergency

services

• Repair vital infra-

structure

• provide humanitarian

assistance

• Establish public

relations

DETER/

ENGAGE

SEIZE

INITIATIVE

DECISIVE

OPNS

TRANSITION

Starts during

Decisive Opns


INSTITUTIONS

HANDOVER/

REDEPLOY

• Continue state

security


repair

• Continue HA


• Assist NGO/IO,

interagency process

• Begin military

reorganization

• Destroy WMD






commo

• End sanctions


• Assist NGO/IO


reorganization


of WMD



level gov’t




programs


local authorities


• supervision

• to int’l body


• nation security

• forces



control


forces





Intl.

Control

Figure 1.

DETER/

ENGAGE

SEIZE

INITIATIVE

DECISIVE

OPNS

TRANSITION

Starts during

Decisive Opns


INSTITUTIONS

HANDOVER/

REDEPLOY

• Continue state

security


repair

• Continue HA


• Assist NGO/IO,

interagency process

• Begin military

reorganization

• Destroy WMD






commo

• End sanctions


• Assist NGO/IO


reorganization


of WMD



level gov’t




programs


local authorities


• supervision

• to int’l body


• nation security

• forces



control


forces





Intl.

Control

Figure 1.

While recent experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan appear to indicate that civilianagencies are now better prepared to take over transition responsibilities from military forces,this should not be assumed for Iraq. Years of sanctions and neighbors with restrictive borderpolicies have severely reduced the number of non-governmental organizations andinternational agencies prepared or positioned to enter Iraq. To facilitate participation of suchgroups and speed the reintegration of Iraq into the international community, sanctions andassociated licensing requirements need to be removed as soon as possible, probably at thebeginning of “Stabilization.”

6

Additionally, the haphazard and ad-hoc nature of civil-military organization andplanning in Afghanistan has made many NGOs and IOs wary and hesitant to deal with theAmerican military again. Some have been especially critical of what they perceive as themanipulation of humanitarian aid for political advantage, and a blurring of roles betweenNGOs and military civil affairs or special operations forces. The civilian agencies feel that ifthey become identified with military agendas their utility will be lessened and theirpersonnel endangered.

Another factor that could further limit any civilian involvement in Iraq is the threat ofbiological or chemical weapons. No governmental, non-governmental, or internationalorganization is trained or equipped to operate in such an environment, and most will noteven go near an area where the use of such weapons is just rumored.

4

Ideal Vision of Transition

Time

Indigenous

Organizations

U.S. Civilian Organizations, IOsU.S. Military w/allies

Figure 2.

Ideal Vision of Transition

Time

Indigenous

Organizations

U.S. Civilian Organizations, IOsU.S. Military w/allies

Figure 2.

Indigenous Organizations

(very slow rise)

Realistic Vision of Transition

Time

U.S. Civilian Organizations, IOs

U.S. Military, w/allies

Figure 3.

Indigenous Organizations

(very slow rise)

Realistic Vision of Transition

Time

U.S. Civilian Organizations, IOs

U.S. Military, w/allies

Figure 3.

While some UN agencies and aid groups like CARE and the Jordan Red Crescent havebegun to anticipate future requirements, little money will be available until a crisis erupts.The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees received a 25 percent budget cut in2002, and has had great difficulty getting preliminary support or financial commitments forIraqi contingencies. Some donors who made pledges to Afghanistan have still not met thoseobligations, and the costs of reconstruction there were grossly underestimated. So, militaryplanners would be wise not to assume too much support from civilian agencies, especiallythose outside the U.S. government, for the early phases of Transition.

7The United States

should work to put together the broadest possible coalition to carry out combat operations,since that group will also inherit the immediate responsibility for Transition.

The Mission Matrix for Iraq (Appendix A) was constructed with these facts in mind.8

The135 essential tasks are grouped into 21 mission categories and arrayed across the fourphases of Transition described above. Each column lists those agencies that should beinvolved in performing that task during a specific phase. The focus is on outside U.S. andinternational organizations. While Iraqi participation is not specifically stated except in acouple cases of special emphasis, it should be understood that local Iraqis will be involved asmuch as possible in each activity. That is why quickly establishing an effective personnelvetting process is so important.

It should also be noted that each task will proceed on a different timeline, determined byindividual measures of success developed by planners. For instance, reestablishing the legalsystem in Category 3 might advance quickly into Stabilizing and Building Institutions, whilethe major security activities in Category 1 lag behind. Achievements might differ betweenregions, as well. Commanders and governors must be aware of the progress achieved in eachtask in each part of the country.

While the Mission Matrix appears complicated, the array of activities involved inrejuvenating Iraq and changing its regime will actually be even more complex. And leaders ofthe occupation must keep in mind the dangers of being too successful in supplying services.The final goal is to create an Iraqi state that can stand on its own, not one dependent onAmerican or international aid.

While all 135 tasks will have to be accomplished to fully reestablish an Iraqi state, theyare not all of primary concern for the commander of coalition military forces. Thirty-five areconsidered “critical.” If the commander of coalition military forces does not put immediateemphasis and resources on these activities he risks mission failure. The thirty-two“essential” tasks also require quick attention and resources from the commander of coalitionmilitary forces, though they are generally not as time sensitive as the critical tasks.However, failure in accomplishing them will have significant impact on the overall mission.The remaining sixty-eight “important” tasks must still be performed to create and maintaina viable state, but they are more important in later phases of transition and/or primarily theresponsibility of non-military agencies. The rating of these tasks is valid whether there is acivilian or military governor of Iraq. They will have to be accomplished no matter who is incharge. We now summarize each Mission Category in more detail, paying particularattention to military roles. The categories themselves are not prioritized.

5

Major Security Activities. Most coalition combat forces will be occupied with these tasksfor some time, though there will also be plenty to do for specialized units like Military Police.Considering the political aspects of an Iraqi occupation and the size of the forces required,military planners should not assume a major UN peacekeeping role. The U.S.-led coalitionmight be able to broaden its participation for tasks like training the new Iraqi Army, whicheventually must be able to assume these security responsibilities. Part of this trainingprogram should include bringing selected Iraqi officers to the United States for specialcourses on how an army should function in a more democratic state. A long-term solutionalso requires creating a trustworthy and transparent new Iraqi government that will live upto its international obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction and other issues.

Many long-term cautions should be considered in conducting these major securityactivities. In separating factions, coalition military forces must avoid the dangers ofunplanned and escalating alienation of ethnic and religious groups such as the Israelisexperienced during their occupation of Lebanon. That example also illustrates the pre-viously noted problems that will grow if an occupation begins to be perceived as permanent.

9

Military commanders and forces must be clear from the beginning that they intend to leaveas quickly as possible, they must demonstrate progress toward that end, and civilianorganizations that accept a handover of responsibilities in turn must be clear that they aimto return control to Iraqi institutions as soon as possible.

Public Administration. First priority in this mission category will be establishing viablelocal governments, relying as much as possible on existing institutions. Civil affairs unitswill be needed throughout the country to assist this process. Evaluating the trustworthinessand reliability of indigenous administrators will be important, and the effort should beginnow to gather a body of regional experts, Americans and trusted Iraqis, who can make suchjudgments. National government will be developed in later phases of Transition, and whilecivil affairs can help with this task, the responsibility primarily will be with other agencies.All troops need to be aware of the importance of preserving public records, and this must beemphasized from the beginning of actual military operations.

Legal. While coalition military forces will pick up missions in this category as security isbeing established, overall responsibility should be passed fairly quickly to other agencies.However, commanders should be prepared to provide support for war crimes tribunals for awhile, and depending on what system is decided upon for prosecution, military personnelmight be involved with the actual trials. In regard to quickly reestablishing civilian courts,judges and lawyers from the Arab League might be available, though coordination for suchaugmentation should begin early.

Public Finance. The coalition military commander must be prepared to take necessaryactions to keep the public finance system operating until civilian government agencies cantake responsibility. Again, civil affairs units will be instrumental.

Civil Information. Information will be a key tool in gaining and maintaining the supportof the Iraqi people. Coalition military forces will have to work promptly while security isbeing established to restore and maintain mass media to communicate around the nation,and to coordinate messages with whatever transition government exists. The initial priority

6

for restoring capabilities must be given to government systems with wide range andnewspapers with the largest circulation.

Historical, Cultural, Recreational Services. While it would be best to let the Iraqis controlaccess to historic and cultural sites, an occupying power assumes responsibility for securityof such places. Particular attention must be paid to religious and historic sites that havegreat importance; their damage or disruption could fan discontent or inspire violence, notjust within Iraq but around the region. At the same time public access must be assured,especially to religious sites. The coalition military commander will have to delicately balancethese competing requirements for security and access.

Public Safety. Coalition military forces will have to include a sufficient number ofmilitary police to perform law and order tasks until an international or trustworthyindigenous police force can be established in sufficient numbers. This may take some time.For example, it is estimated that training and deploying a new Afghan police force will takeat least 3 years.

10Iraq does not contain the same density of UN and NGO demining elements

as Afghanistan did, so coalition forces will also have to be prepared to do more of thosemissions. Requirements may be reduced if coalition military forces limit their own use ofmines and cluster bombs. The latter can be especially problematic. Human Rights Watchestimates that more than 12,000 unexploded bomblets remain on the ground in Afghanistan,and well over 100 civilians have been killed or maimed by them since October 2001.

11

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. This is another category that willrequire regional experts for vetting and evaluation of personnel. A system resembling theFragebogen questionnaires used in postwar Germany might be relevant for this process.

12

First priority for coalition military forces will be disarming groups and securing weapons.

Electoral Process for More Participatory Government. Many proposals are being discussedabout the future form of Iraq’s government. American-style democracy is probably not theideal model for a Middle Eastern state, but some system with increased popularparticipation should be adopted. This will not be a decision for the coalition militarycommander to make, but he will be involved in supporting elections, as well as theconstitutional convention and referendum to shape and legitimize the new government.

Disaster Preparedness and Response. Coalition military forces must be prepared toprovide these services until civil capacity can be restored. As with most other categories, theintensity of the conflict preceding Transition will have a great impact on the timeline leadingto Handover.

Public Works. Iraq’s infrastructure has deteriorated under sanctions, and coalitionmilitary engineers will have to begin repairing key facilities early in the Security phase. Thiswill be necessary to facilitate their use by the coalition as well as by the Iraqis. This missionwill be much easier if the coalition limits destruction with careful targeting during combatoperations.

Public Utilities. Special concerns for this mission category resemble those for the previousone. Restoring public utilities quickly will have a significant impact on public health andsanitation, and help avoid epidemics.

7

Telecommunications and Public Communications. Restoring communication links willhelp tie the country together. First priority should be given to broadcasting systems tofacilitate nationwide coalition information operations. Computer networks and Internetsites also are included in the telecommunications systems to be restored and maintained.

Education. Though this is primarily a category for civilian agencies, some engineer andcivil affairs effort should be dedicated to helping rejuvenate public schools. Iraqi educationhas seriously deteriorated under sanctions. Students in schools are off the streets and out oftrouble. It also will be important to quickly implement job training programs for the manyIraqi unemployed.

Public Health. This is a category where help from international and non-governmentalorganizations should be forthcoming fairly quickly, though the limitations mentioned earlierabout access and WMD might have significant impact. Iraqi medical personnel and facilitiesshould also be available, though sanctions again have had a deleterious effect. Coalitionmilitary support will be especially important early in the Transition to provide anddistribute health-related supplies. Many non-governmental organizations have alreadyvoiced concerns about the potential health and environmental disaster that war could bringto the whole region, and coalition military forces must contribute to preventing such anoutcome.

13

Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief. This will be another mission category of veryhigh international visibility.

14The coalition military commander and governing authorities

will need to work with UN agencies to exploit the resources and 46,000 distribution centersof the Oil for Food Program. Again there should be some responsive IO and NGO support forwhat could be a massive refugee problem. Caring for and controlling displaced populationswill require extensive and well-orchestrated civil-military cooperation that should havealready started.

Economics and Commerce. First priority in this category for coalition military forces willbe to secure, repair, and maintain oil facilities. If Saddam Hussein burns wells as he did inKuwait, military forces will have to provide assistance to fire-fighting organizations.Managing oil revenues will be very important in rebuilding Iraq and perhaps fundingoccupation costs, and coalition military forces will have to coordinate with many agencies onthis complicated issue. Iraqi technocrats should also be available for assistance, though somevetting will be necessary to insure their reliability.

Labor. This mission category should not be a concern for the coalition militarycommander.

Property Control. Though this category is also not directly a coalition military forceresponsibility, the military will be preserving the public records as mentioned under PublicAdministration. These will provide important documentation to establish ownershipsystems.

Food, Agriculture, Fisheries. During the Security phase, coalition military forces willhave some responsibility to insure the availability and flow of food and agriculture. To avoidfamine the coalition commander must be sensitive to the timing of the initial planting and

8

harvest, and might have to provide supporting resources to overcome any post-conflictdisruption.

Transportation. During the Security phase especially, coalition military forces will haveprimary responsibility for the operation of Iraqi transportation systems which will beessential for military as well as civilian organizations. These duties will require manyspecialized units which must be available from the beginning of any hostilities. Thesesystems have deteriorated under sanctions, but the Iraqi technocrats who have maintainedthem should be available to help operate them.

As is apparent from the matrix and discussion of mission categories, civil affairs,engineer, military police, and transportation units will be in high demand. Some of thesespecialties have been stretched thin by requirements for the war on terrorism.

15At the same

time a strong combat force will be essential, at least during the Security and Stabilizephases. It would be advisable for military leaders, and especially the Army, to perform adetailed analysis of the force requirements for Title X and other missions in a post-conflictIraq. The Army Staff could conduct this exercise at the Center for Strategic Leadership of theU.S. Army War College, which has already developed a concept for a wargame that willexamine such issues. It will involve all major service components, and possibly joint players,since the impact of requirements for occupying Iraq will have repercussions on forceproviders around the world.

While this study has focused specifically on Iraq, these insights will apply to anyimportant post-conflict operation. The U.S. Army has been organized and trained primarilyto fight and win the nation’s major wars. Nonetheless, the Service must prepare for victory inpeace as well.

ENDNOTES

1. For more on Operation ECLIPSE in Germany, see Kenneth O. McCreedy, “Planning the Peace: OperationEclipse and the Occupation of Germany,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. LXV, No. 3, July 2001, pp.713-739.

2. John J. Yeosock, remarks in “What We Should Have Done Differently,” Part II of In the Wake of the Storm:Gulf War Commanders Discuss Desert Storm, Wheaton, IL: Cantigny First Division Foundation, 2000, p. 25.

3. Ibid., p. 29; Janet A. McDonnell, After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait,Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1999.

4. This chart is primarily the product of COL Stephen Kidder of the U.S. Army War College.

5. This depiction was developed by Dr. Steven Metz of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army WarCollege.

6. These observations and those in the next two paragraphs came from NGO and IO participants at twoconferences, a Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Project on the Means of Intervention Ground OperationsWorkshop held at the Army-Navy Club in Washington, DC, on October 17-18, 2002; and an Institute forNational Security Studies/Naval Postgraduate School Workshop on “Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam’s Rule,”held at National Defense University in Washington, DC, on November 20-21, 2002.

9

7. Moni Basu, “Aid Groups Get Ready for War,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, December 23, 2002;James Bone, “UN Chief Issues Secret Orders for War in Iraq,” TimesOnLine, December 23, 2002,http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-522510,00.html; Mukesh Kapila and Karin Wermester, “TheAfghan Job is Bigger Than Expected,” International Herald Tribune, January 14, 2003.

8. For the completion of the Mission Matrix, the authors are indebted to the participants in the Post ConflictMilitary Missions Workshop held at Carlisle Barracks, PA, on December 10-11, 2002, and particularly toProfessor William Kiehl, of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute.

9. For further analysis of the Israeli experience in Lebanon, see W. Andrew Terrill, “Low Intensity Conflict in

Southern Lebanon: Lessons and Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi’ite War,” Conflict Quarterly, Vol. VII, No. 3, Sum-

mer 1987, pp. 22-35.

10. Chris Kraul, “In Afghanistan, Guns Hold Sway Over Law,” Los Angeles Times, December 27, 2002, p. 1.

11. Peter Slevin and Vernon Loeb, “Bush Urged to Limit Weapons in Iraq,” Washington Post, December 27,2002, p. 12.

12. For more on the use of the Fragebogen, see Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany,1944-1946, Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1975.

13. See, for example June Salvage, Collateral Damage: The Health and Environmental Costs of War on Iraq,London: Medact, 2002. Medact is the United Kingdom affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention ofNuclear War.

14. A number of organizations have already raised red flags about the impact of war in Iraq on the wholeregion due to refugee flows. See, for example, International Institute for Strategic Studies, “A New RefugeeCrisis in Iraq?” Strategic Comments, Vol. VIII, No. 8, November 12, 2002.

15. Military police have been in especially high demand. Harry Levins, “New Guard Call-Ups RenewQuestion of Troop Strength,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 21, 2002.

10

APPENDIX A

MISSION MATRIX FOR IRAQ

11

13

AP

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SIO

NM

AT

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AQ

C=

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ask,E

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ajo

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nspare

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1B

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and

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CM

FC

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F,Ira

qiA

rmy

IraqiA

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1C

-E

Tra

innew

IraqiA

rmy

CM

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MF

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F(b

roadened)

US

Arm

y

1D

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Round

Up

Regim

eC

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F,C

IA,D

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CM

F,C

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inate

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esis

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CM

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F

1F

-E

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inees/P

OW

sC

MF

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F,IA

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CM

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IraqiIn

stitu

tions

1G

-C

Secure

Bord

ers

CM

FC

MF

CM

F,Ira

qiA

rmy

IraqiA

rmy

1H

-C

Seiz

eand

Secure

Oil

Facili

ties

CM

FC

MF

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F,Ira

qiA

rmy

IraqiA

rmy

1I-

CP

lan

and

ConductC

onsequence

CM

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F,Ira

qiA

rmy

IraqiA

rmy

Managem

ent

1J

-C

Pla

nand

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heate

rC

MF

CM

FC

MF

,Ira

qiA

rmy

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rmy

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rmation

Opera

tions

1K

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Main

tain

Fre

edom

ofM

ovem

ent

CM

FC

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F,Ira

qiA

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rmy

1L

-E

Regula

teM

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Task

Bre

akd

ow

n:

35

CriticalT

asks

32

EssentialT

asks

68

Import

antT

asks

DEFINITION OF TASK CATEGORIES:

Critical – If the commander of coalition military forces does not put immediate emphasisand resources on these activities he risks mission failure.

Essential – These tasks also require quick attention and resources from the commander ofcoalition military forces, though they are generally not as time sensitive as the critical tasks.However, failure in accomplishing them will have significant impact on the overall mission.

Important – These tasks must still be performed to create and maintain a viable state, butthey are more important in later phases of transition and/or primarily the responsibility ofnon-military agencies.

ABBREVIATIONS

AID – U.S. Agency for International DevelopmentAID/OFDA- Office of Foreign Disaster AssistanceAID/OTI- Office of Transition Initiatives

AL – Arab LeagueAP – Arab Police AcademyAOUSC – Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

BBG – Broadcasting Board of Governors

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. intelligence organizationsCMF – Coalition Military Forces

DoC – U.S. Department of CommerceDoD – U.S. Department of DefenseDoJ – U.S. Department of JusticeDoL – U.S. Department of Labor

OSHA - Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Dept. of LaborDoS – U.S. Department of State

DoS/PRM - Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration AffairsDoS/ECA - Bureau of Educational & Cultural AffairsDoS/IIP - Office of International Information ProgramsDoS/INL - Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement AffairsDoS/DHL - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and LaborDoS/F – Future of Iraq ProjectDoS/G - Office of the U/S for Global AffairsDoS/R- Office of the U/S for Public Diplomacy and Public AffairsDoS/CA- Bureau of Consular AffairsDoS/DRL- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and LaborDoS/PM – Bureau of Political-Military AffairsDoS/S/WCI – Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues

DoE – U.S. Department of Energy

FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency

HHS – U.S. Department of Health and Human ServicesHHS/CDC – Centers for Disease Control

21

ILO – International Labor OrganizationIATA – International Air Transport AssociationIATF – Interagency Task ForceIPU – International Postal UnionICC – International Criminal CourtICM – United Nations International Civilian MonitorsICRC – International Committee of the Red CrossIMF – International Monetary FundIO – International OrganizationsIT – Iraqi Technocrats (Indigenous and Expatriate)

NED – National Endowment for DemocracyNGO – Non-governmental Organizations

OCHA – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Trsy – U.S. Department of the Treasury

USDA – U.S. Department of AgricultureUSDA/APHIS – Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

UN – United Nations OrganizationsUNDP – United Nations Development ProgramUNICEF – United Nations Children’s FundUNFAO – United Nations Food and Agriculture OrganizationUNMAS – United Nations Mine Action ServiceUNMOVIC – United Nations Moratorium Verification and Inspection CommissionUNP – United Nations PoliceUSED – U.S. Department of EducationUSG – U.S. GovernmentUNESCO – U.N. Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization

WFP – World Food ProgramWHO – World Health OrganizationWB- World Bank

22

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