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Recommendations for reforming the Iraqi SIV programSubmitted on behalf of practitioners and advocates
November 1st, 2010
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 2008, the Kennedy‐Lugar/Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act created a special immigrant visa
(SIV) for Iraqis employed by the United States government (USG) or a contracting affiliate.1
Despite this strong commitment, many problems have hampered the SIV program from the
outset. We propose the following reforms to help the USG make the SIV program for U.S.‐
affiliated Iraqis more effective and efficient. Our recommendations are compatible with the
important goal of preserving American security, while streamlining and making more
accountable the process by which our government fulfills its responsibility to these Iraqis.
General Recommendations: A faster and simpler SIV process will better serve endangered
Iraqis.
Clear the Backlog: Provide temporary staff, particularly at the Chief of
Mission (COM) approval stage, to clear the backlog of SIV applications.
Set Benchmarks: Require agencies and contractors, especially at the COM
approval stage, to process applications within a stated length of time.
Provide Caseworkers: Replicate the simplicity of the Direct Access (P2)
program by assigning a caseworker to assist the applicant in the SIV process.
Allow Representation: Allow applicants to designate a legal representative
to communicate with the USG on their behalves.
Expedite Urgent Cases: Create transparent and formal expedited processing.
Evacuate Life‐or‐Death Cases: Ensure that life‐or‐death cases are evacuated.
Create a Point Person: Designate an individual to handle serious problems
caused by action, inaction, or delay at all stages of the SIV process.
Produce Required Reports: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
the Department of State (DOS) should produce statutorily required and long
overdue reports on the SIV process.
Update and Improve the FAQs: As procedural requirements change, the DOS FAQs should be updated promptly on both the English and Arabic sites.
Provide SIVs to Iraqis Who Worked For U.S. NGOs Pursuant to Grants: Allow Iraqis who worked for U.S. NGOs operating in Iraq pursuant to a grant, as opposed to a direct contract, from the USG to qualify for a SIV.
COM Approval: Bureaucratic delays and onerous requirements above and beyond what the law
requires have made it difficult to obtain timely COM approval.
1 Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, Pub. L. No. 110‐181, 122 Stat. 396, § 1244.
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Keep Within the Legislation: Ensure that applicants do not face
requirements beyond the scope of the legislation (or generally applicable
immigration visa requirements).
Reform or Remove Employment Contract Requirement: Do not require
applicants to produce contracts between the USG and its contractors or its
contractors and their subcontractors; recognize that contractors may have
incomplete records, that the USG should be able to obtain copies of
contracts to which it is a party, and that requesting a contract may put an
applicant at risk.
Create a Contractor, Subcontractor, and Employee Database: As the law
requires, the USG should maintain a contractor, subcontractor and employee
database.2
Eliminate or Reform the HR Letter Requirement: This requirement provides
essentially the same information as the supervisor recommendation, is
onerous for applicants, produces lengthy delays, and is beyond the scope of
the legislation.
Allow Personal E‐mails from Recommenders: Recommenders may no longer
have official e‐mail addresses, but their identity and affiliation with the
applicant can be verified in other ways.
Remove Inconsistent or Formalistic Requirements: Forms and
recommendation letters and forms that fulfill all statutory requirements
should be accepted.
Assign One NVC Employee to Each Application: Having different NVC
employees work on the same application results in duplicative and
inconsistent requests.
Improve Accountability for Legal Decisions: NVC employees often reach
incorrect legal conclusions, and there is no established process to challenge
the validity of these determinations.
Assist with Locating Military and Other USG Supervisors: The government
should assist applicants in locating U.S. military and government supervisors
who have changed positions.
Allow for Review of Denials: Like refugee applicants, SIV applicants should
have the ability to request a review of a decision denying COM approval with
a clear, formal review process. These reviews would reduce error and
improve procedural consistency.
2 The employee database, if created, must be extremely secure so as not to endanger the employees.
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USCIS: USCIS adjudication of the I‐360 is a comparatively quick and efficient stage in the SIV
process, but at least one aspect presents a needless and significant challenge to some
applicants.
Do Not Require Original Signatures: Sending materials by Iraqi post is
unreliable, by overnight mail is expensive, through U.S. military mail is
burdensome, and in all cases can place applicants in possible danger.
NVC: Redundant or infeasible documentation requirements present challenges at the NVC
stage for some applicants.
Do Not Require Duplicative Documentation: Multiple requests for the same
document and requests for different documents containing identical
information needlessly delay the process.
Require Police Certificates Only Where Feasible: Many countries only
release police certificates to requestors in person, requiring additional travel
and delays.
Do Not Require Official Certified Translations: Finding an official, certified
translator in Iraq can be dangerous and expensive.
Embassy Interview, Security Clearance, & Departure: The administrative review process and
problems with passports can create serious difficulties for applicants.
Reform Administrative Review: Applicants receive no information regarding
the reason for the administrative review or whom to contact about their
application, and the review process can be quite lengthy (sometimes more
than one year).
Assist with Obtaining Passports: DOS should help approved applicants
obtain necessary passports, as required under the law; DOS should waive the
passport requirement for newborns and allow for use of refugee travel
papers.
Return Passports for Iraqis Outside of Iraq: Iraqis in foreign countries may
face serious problems and require ID; DOS should not hold onto passports
between the consular interview and visa issuance.
Expedite Security Advisory Opinions and Other Security Checks for
Applicants Under Serious Threat: Long (and often inexplicable) delays can
further endanger applicants.
Allow for Review of Denials: SIV applicants should have the ability to request
a review of a decision denying consular approval with a clear, formal review
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process. These reviews would reduce error and improve procedural
consistency.
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I. Introduction
Section 1244 of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act authorized SIVs for Iraqis who have
experienced an “ongoing serious threat” as a result of their employment “by or on behalf of the
United States Government in Iraq.” In doing so, the law recognized an American interest in
protecting Iraqis who have provided “faithful and valuable service” to the United States.
But the process to obtain an SIV is a bureaucratic labyrinth that can take years to
navigate, even for the small fraction of eligible Iraqis fortunate enough to have U.S. legal
counsel. As a result, the SIV program has fallen short of its ideal. Although the law provides for
5,000 SIVs per year for five years, as of June 30, 2010, the State Department had issued a total
of 2,347 visas under Section 1244 to principal applicants.3
Legal advocates for Iraqi refugees jointly propose the following pragmatic
recommendations to address to the current SIV gridlock, emphasizing actions that are readily
practicable and compatible with U.S. goals to safeguard national security while fulfilling its legal
responsibility to U.S.‐affiliated Iraqi nationals. We begin with general recommendations for the
SIV process and then address specific recommendations for different aspects of the process—
COM Approval, USCIS Processing, NVC Processing, Embassy Interview, Security Clearance, and
Departure.
II. General Recommendations
In recent cases, the USG has taken well over a year to process SIVs for Iraqis living in
grave danger. Furthermore, SIV applicants must meet high, sometimes impossible, burdens to
demonstrate their eligibility for this visa. To improve the SIV process, the U.S. should: clear the
backlog of current cases; set benchmarks for future cases; provide case workers; allow legal
representation; expedite urgent cases; evacuate life or death cases; create a point person for
the overall SIV process; produce required reports; improve FAQs for applicants; and amend
implementing regulations to allow US‐affiliated Iraqis who worked for U.S. grantee
organizations to be eligible for the SIV program.
Clear the Backlog
The SIV application process currently suffers from lengthy administrative delays during
the initial processing stage for COM approval. As of September 2010, the NVC was telling
3 Data as of June 30, 2010. State Department Fact Sheet available at http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/SQNumbers0610.pdf. The State Department had also issued 2,341 SIVs to dependents. This number does not count towards the 5,000 annual quota.
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applicants that the processing time for COM approval of a completed application was
approximately four months from the time that the applicant's application is “complete.” In
practice, the time to obtain COM approval has routinely exceeded a year—applicants may face
repeated delays of several months waiting to learn if their application is “complete,” only to
have NVC or COM request additional documentation.4 In order to clear this backlog, the USG
should provide temporary staff to eliminate the extended delays in the COM approval stage.
The United States has previously employed this option when it acknowledged a “serious
bottleneck to processing the SIV numbers . . . in 2009.”5 Temporary staff made great headway
and were able to “all but eliminate” an existing backlog by February 2009.6
Set Benchmarks
As highlighted above, COM processing alone can take over a year – an unacceptable
length of time for vulnerable Iraqis. The administration should look to overcome this inertia by
setting a deadline for processing each case. Goal setting—even if it can seem arbitrary—both
communicates the intention of the leadership clearly and fosters bottom‐up innovation. It has
4 See the “COM Approval” section and case summaries below, as well as attached Appendices. 5 Memorandum from Richard A. Albright to Patricia A. Butenis (November 4, 2008), in Department of State FOIA Records, Tranche 1 (April 26, 2010) (see appendix 2). 6 E‐mail from James Foley to Samuel M. Witten, et al. (Feb. 10, 2009), in Department of State FOIA Records, Tranche 1 (April 26, 2010) (see appendix 2).
FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE
An Iraqi started working for a USAID contractor in October 2008. As a result, she received a
threatening phone call stating that her son would be kidnapped if she did not leave her job. This was
not the first time she had been targeted—she had already been shot in the chest and driven out of
Baghdad for her work with the Iraqi and U.S. governments. She applied for COM approval in October
2009, submitting employment verification and recommendation letters confirming that she had
been employed for over a year. NVC sent her an email asking her to provide a detailed explanation
as to how she avoided service in the Iraqi military. She noted that, as a woman, she was not required
to serve in the Iraqi military. NVC then stated that she had not met the requirement for length of
employment, so she resubmitted her letters and provided contact information for the HR
department (which was already included in the HR verification letter). NVC asserted yet again that
she had not met the time requirement. Out of an abundance of caution, she submitted an updated
employment verification letter, dated March 2010, stating that she had been employed since
October 2008. Months later, NVC emailed the woman’s supervisor to verify information for a second
time. The woman was not notified of the second verification request and her application was
delayed while NVC waited for a response. She eventually learned of this and informed NVC that the
supervisor had recently left the company. She then had to submit a new recommendation letter.
This individual received COM approval in September 2010, eleven months after submitting her
application. By that time, she had already completed her IOM and DHS interviews in connection with
her USRAP application and was just waiting for the medical test.
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also been applied successfully to achieve similar ends, such as reducing the significant
citizenship application backlog.7 Moreover, an overall deadline already exists. When Congress
passed the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, they included a requirement in Section 1248 that the
President produce an annual report explaining the number of applications that were “pending
for longer than six months, [and] the reasons that such visas have not been expeditiously
processed.” Goals should be developed based on realistic estimations from COM and should be
regularly re‐evaluated. If a deadline cannot be met in a particular case, the applicant should be
informed of this, given an expected time frame for a decision and informed of the reason for
the delay.
Provide Caseworkers
The United States should replicate the efficiencies of the U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program (USRAP) Direct Access process in the SIV program by providing a caseworker for each
SIV application. An applicant initiates the Direct Access process by sending a brief e‐mail to the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) with his or her identifying information, a
description of his or her relevant employment with the USG, and his or her supervisor’s name.
An IOM caseworker then works with the applicant to obtain additional information or
documents, confers with the Refugee Processing Center (RPC) in Virginia to determine
employment eligibility, sets up an appointment to meet with the applicant, and fills out an
applicant’s 18‐part form to register for classification as a refugee (I‐590) that is submitted to
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) before an eligibility interview.
In contrast, an applicant initiates the SIV process by filling out and e‐mailing an 18‐part
form (DS‐157), obtaining signed letters from at least one supervisor and a human resources
department, and submitting evidence of an ongoing serious threat—the DOS Foreign Affairs
Manual recommends obtaining “statements from their employer, personal statements, or
statements from community leaders.” If successful at the first COM approval stage, an applicant
must then fill out an 11‐part form (I‐360) with 3 supporting documents and mail a hard copy to
USCIS in the United States. If successful at the second stage, the applicant must then complete
a 45‐part form (DS‐230), a 29‐part form (DS‐234) and e‐mail another 6 supporting documents
before being considered for an in‐person interview at a U.S. embassy. Because the Direct
Access process has been perceived as both easier and faster than the SIV process, eligible SIV
applicants have been applying to Direct Access or applying for both simultaneously.
To make the SIV program more accessible to eligible Iraqis, SIV applicants – like
applicants to the USRAP Direct Access program – should be able to initiate the application
process with an e‐mail containing basic information. Immediately thereafter, the applicant
should be assigned a caseworker to contact the applicant by e‐mail and phone, fill out the
7 Julia Preston, Goal Set for Reducing Backlog on Citizenship Applications, N.Y. Times (March 15, 2008).
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proper forms, help applicants obtain the necessary documentation, and liaise with the other
agencies in the SIV process. Having a single caseworker to shepherd the application through all
of the stages would greatly improve the efficiency of the process.
Because so many SIV applicants apply simultaneously to the Direct Access and are
already assigned to IOM case workers, providing assistance would not require a large increase
in personnel or resources. The caseworkers need not be in Iraq—U.S. lawyers and law students
currently provide this type of assistance to a small number of applicants via e‐mail and phone.
In fact, the USG has previously acknowledged that the vast majority of the SIV process can be
done outside of Baghdad.8
Every year, the USG provides more than 100,000 refugee applicants with case worker
assistance. SIV applicants, who have experienced an ongoing serious threat because of their
faithful and valuable service to the USG, deserve the same type of assistance. For the many SIV
applicants who are in danger in Iraq, assistance from a caseworker can save lives.
Allow Representation
Applying for an SIV is a complex process involving multiple application forms and a
number of different documents at different stages of the process. Legal assistance can have a
significant impact on an applicant’s ability to meet properly the requirements set forth in
Section 1244. Currently, however, COM and NVC do not consistently recognize or communicate
with designated legal representatives working on behalf of SIV applicants. Allowing applicants
to designate an accredited legal representative would not only provide accountability in all
phases of the SIV process, but also save USG adjudicators time when reviewing applications and
communicating requests for additional information.
Expedite Urgent Cases
The USG should establish transparent and formalized expedited processing procedures
for refugee and SIV applicants that would set a timeframe in which every step of processing
must be conducted. Expedited processing for emergency cases should not total longer than
two weeks. The expedited processing procedure should include a list of criteria or indicators to
determine what types of cases will be expedited. If an applicant’s demographic profile requires
a lengthy security check such as a Security Advisory Opinion (SAO), and PRM cannot ensure
processing within the aforementioned time frame, the applicant should be offered the
opportunity to be evacuated to a UNHCR Emergency Transit Center (ETC) pursuant to its
respective processing procedures and guidelines. When none of these options is practicable,
the Department of Homeland Security should initiate humanitarian parole into the United
States for at‐risk SIV applicants.
8 Albright Memorandum, supra note 3.
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Evacuate Life or Death Cases
Current SIV processing lacks a formal procedure to protect applicants who face
imminent danger. Section 1244(e) of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act states that:
“[t]he Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other
relevant Federal agencies, shall make a reasonable effort to
provide an alien described in this section who is applying for a
special immigrant visa with protection or the immediate removal
from Iraq, if possible, of such alien if the Secretary determines
after consultation that such alien is in imminent danger.”
The USG already attempts to facilitate evacuation into Jordan for SIV applicants inside
Iraq facing danger. While this effort is admirable, it is not an adequate solution for a number of
reasons. In particular, the process for facilitating an individual’s entry into Jordan can be a
lengthy one, and is often hindered by the Jordanian government’s unwillingness to admit Iraqi
men. Moreover, applicants are required to purchase their own plane ticket and support
themselves indefinitely while in Jordan, making this option prohibitively expensive for some
applicants. In accordance with the legislation, the Secretary of State must be prepared to take
appropriate measures for individual SIV applicants who are in danger of physical harm or death
due to their association with the United States.9
Establish a Point Person
The USG should establish a point person to handle serious case problems that may arise
at all stages of the SIV process. An SIV applicant must interact with multiple USG units (COM,
NVC, USCIS) and with their contractors who seem to lack any discretion in evaluating the
9 In the past, the U.S. has taken extra ordinary measures to protect particularly at risk groups. For example, in 1996, the United States airlifted 6,600 Kurdish Iraqis to Guam in response to Saddam Hussein’s attack on their safe haven.
THE NEED FOR SPEED
A brother of a former Iraqi interpreter for the U.S. military qualifies for P‐2 status under Sec.
1243(a)(3) as the sibling of an Iraqi employed by the U.S. in Iraq. While his sister successfully
navigated the SIV process, shortly after she left Iraq he began receiving death threats by telephone,
letter, and through neighbors, all accusing him of being a traitor like his sister. He asked the U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad how he could join his sister in safety and was told that the SIV process could
take over a year. When a man in his village who looked like him was murdered and it was widely
rumored that this individual was the intended target, he knew he could not survive a year waiting in
Baghdad and so fled to Thailand, through Iran. He continues to navigate the P‐2 process.
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adequacy of the information provided. Having a single point person would help make the
process more efficient, increase accountability, and provide a mechanism to prevent the types
of problems that are illustrated by the case examples provided with these recommendations.
Within USCIS, the CIS Ombudsman provides assistance for refugee case problems that involve
significant hardships caused by action, inaction, or delay. A similar model for the SIV program
would require minimal additional resources but would have the potential to greatly increase
the efficiency of the SIV process.
Produce Required Reports
Section 1248(b) of the 2008 Act requires the President to prepare an annual report
containing:
(1) an assessment of the financial, security, and personnel considerations and resources necessary to carry out the provisions [of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act]; (2) the number of [Iraqis who were or are employed by the United States Government, in Iraq]; (3) the number of such aliens who have applied for special immigrant visas; (4) the date of such applications; and (5) in the case of applications pending for longer than six months, the reasons that such visas have not been expeditiously processed.
Additionally, Section 1248(c) requires three reports by the executive branch relating to SIV
processing, as well as a report tracking the establishment of a database of USG contracts in Iraq
and of Iraqis employed on behalf of the U.S. mission. The reports are part of the “reasonable
effort” required of the Secretary of State under §1244 to ensure that the SIV process is
streamlined in recognition of the imminent danger faced by applicants. But FOIA requests
indicate that no agency has submitted any of the required reports to Congress.10
Update and Improve the FAQs
The more information provided to SIV applicants regarding the application
requirements, the better they and their advocates can submit applications which meet the
USG's needs. This would limit the number of incomplete applications, and allow for a more
efficient process. To that end, the DOS FAQs should be updated frequently on both the English
and Arabic sites as soon as any new procedural requirements take effect. DOS should also
include information in the FAQs to help applicants avoid frequently occurring problems with
applications.
10 For an example of DHS’ acknowledgment of the database requirement, see E‐mail from Ruth E. Tintary to Lori Scialabba, et al. (Mar. 12, 2008), in Department of State FOIA Records, Tranche 1 (April 26, 2010).
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Clarify the Foreign Affairs Manual Implementing Regulations Regarding Contractors vs.
Grantees
Currently, SIVs are only issued to U.S. affiliated Iraqis who worked for an entity that had
a direct contract or subcontract with the USG. This has created an anomaly by which Iraqis who
worked for one entity pursuant to a contract are eligible to receive a SIV while Iraqis who
worked for a different entity pursuant to a grant are not eligible for a SIV even though both
individuals performed similar or identical work for the USG and face similar threats. A modest
amendment to the implementing regulations that would permit Iraqi employees of U.S. grantee
organizations to receive SIVs would go a long way towards fulfilling the promise of the Refugee
Crisis in Iraq Act to protect Iraqis who have provided “faithful and valuable service” to the
United States. Such an amendment would still bar Iraqis who did not work for a U.S. entity
from receiving a SIV, while permitting a limited class of Iraqis who worked directly for a U.S.
NGO and who would otherwise be eligible for a SIV to receive one.
III. COM Approval
The Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act calls for an expedited and straightforward application
process, with the hope that the applications would quickly move from the COM to USCIS and
the NVC, and then back to Iraq. Unfortunately, applicants today face long delays, and the
application process, particularly at the COM stage, makes demands on the applicants far
beyond what Congress intended or the law requires. A number of reforms could quickly reduce
processing times without compromising security.
Align the Process with the Legislation
The Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act laid out specific requirements that an SIV applicant must
fulfill before his or her application is processed. These requirements balance security with
speed, responding to the pressing need to evacuate SIV applicants from Iraq. Unfortunately,
COM seems to treat these statutory requirements as a floor rather than a ceiling, as it has
imposed additional onerous requirements – outlined in detail below – on the SIV applicants. As
a result, COM excludes certain applicants that Congress sought to help, but that are not in a
position to obtain copies of the additional required documents.
The State Department also should clearly articulate in its SIV FAQs what requirements
may be waived.11 Eligible Iraqis, particularly the vast majority without legal representation, may
desist from the application process because they see that it requires documents they are
unable to obtain. Providing information on which document requirements are waivable, and
11 For example, the requirement to provide a copy of the military service record has been waived upon request, when the applicant cannot obtain a copy of the record.
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the criteria for being granted a waiver, would assist these individuals in accessing the SIV
program.
Reform or Remove The USG Contract Requirement
The NVC SIV Unit – which is tasked with processing applications at the COM approval
stage12 – sometimes require applicants to provide copies of the contracts between their
employer and the USG. Iraqi nationals, especially those in low‐level positions and without
outside assistance, face nearly insurmountable difficulties in acquiring these contracts.
Moreover, the SIV Unit has refused to accept a copy of the first page of a contract that
identifies the USG contract number and has insisted on the full contract. In many cases, a
company will not want to provide (or may be prohibited from providing) the full contract
because it contains confidential information. For direct contracts with the USG, the U.S. should
already have a copy of the contract to which they can refer, especially when the contract has
been identified. With respect to subcontracts, there may be some cases in which it is
reasonable to request that the applicant provide the contract. However, when the Iraqi
applicant is under threat or cannot easily obtain the contract, the USG is better placed to verify
12 In turn, the SIV Unit employs a support contractor, Serco, Inc., to process the SIV applications at the COM approval stage.
EXTRALEGAL REQUIREMENTS
An Iraqi worked for a USAID contractor from June to September 2005. Three weeks into his
employment, an Al‐Qaeda‐associated terrorist group attempted to kill him. His family had to flee
their neighborhood as a car carrying three gunmen chased after them. In January 2006, the Iraqi’s
wife was kidnapped as a result of his work for the USG. She was released only after considerable
negotiation and a ransom. The Iraqi found her lying on the side of the road, unconscious and
severely beaten. Only in October 2008 did he return to work for the USG. His application for COM
approval in November 2009 included employment verification from both employers, a letter of
recommendation from his supervisor, and a statement of the threats he had received as a result of
his work for the USG. NVC confirmed that his application was complete in February 2010. However,
eight months later, the U.S. Embassy said that the information regarding the threats against him was
insufficient because the threat statement submitted did not refer to the same time period as the
employment verification letter or letter of recommendation. Under Section 1244(b)(1)(D) of the
Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, an alien is eligible for an SIV if, among other things, the alien “has
experienced or is experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a consequence of the alien’s
employment by the United States Government.” There is no requirement under the statute that the
threat must have occurred during the alien’s employment with the USG or within the time period
described by the letter of recommendation. This individual and his family were clearly targeted
because of his work with the USG.
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the contract through its direct contractors.13 Congress recognized this reality when they
mandated the creation of a database of contracts in the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act. In fact, the
USG has previously admitted that to require employer contracts “might be setting the bar far
higher than many employees can realistically reach,” and indicated its intention to obtain such
contracts directly.14
Create a Contractor, Subcontractor and Employee Database
Copies of contracts are not required under the statute. If these contracts nevertheless
are deemed necessary, the USG should collect these documents itself. As a party to these
contracts, the USG is in a better position to locate and provide copies than the individual SIV
applicants. For subcontractors, the USG is better placed than individual applicants to keep track
of where its money is being spent and can require that its contractors provide information with
respect to all subcontractors being used, including a copy of the contracts with these
companies or individuals. The reporting requirements in Section 1248, supra, clearly indicate
that Congress intended the USG to bear this responsibility. Moreover, Congress intended the
13 In any event, the applicant should not be required to provide more than the first page of any contract, since the first page is generally sufficient to show the contract number and the duration of the contract. 14 E‐mail from Tressa Finerty to Elizabeth Harris (May 5, 2008); E‐mail from Tressa Finerty to Jennifer Rumbach, et al. (July 16, 2008); Memorandum to William P. Marriott, Request for Assistance in Verifying Employment of Iraqis (undated). All were contained in Department of State FOIA Records, Tranche 2 (May 3, 2010) (see appendix 2).
CONTRACT DELAYS
An IRAP client once worked for a major U.S. contractor in Iraq but came under serious threat. He
applied for COM approval in October 2009. Soon after, the NVC, operating on behalf of COM,
contacted this client and requested a copy of the “contract(s) which you or your employer was
awarded by or on behalf of the United States Government (USG).” This individual immediately sent
copies of the contracts between himself and the major U.S. contractor, which was operating in Iraq
on behalf of the USG. Several months later NVC contacted his supervisors and confirmed his faithful
and valuable service. Thereafter, however, NVC continued requesting a copy of a contract, at which
point it became clear that they wanted this individual, who remained under threat in Iraq, to
provide a copy of the contract between the USG and the contractor. After seeking out his
supervisors—to whom NVC had already spoken—he fortunately was able to obtain a copy of the
first page of the contract with the USG, which contained the USG contract number. After six months,
during which time IRAP and the individual were in continual contact with NVC, the NVC informed the
individual that it could not proceed without obtaining full text of the entire USG contract. IRAP is
working with the supervisor to obtain the full text of the contract. Meanwhile, IRAP has assisted him
with applying to USRAP Direct Access in Iraq, and he has already been scheduled for a second
interview with an IOM caseworker.
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database not only to cover contracts, but also to list the employees of direct contractors
themselves. This would particularly help resolve the complex question of whether an
organization received funding from the USG during an applicant's time of employment.15 Such a
database would make the COM approval process more efficient and more accurate while also
bringing the process into compliance with existing law.
Eliminate or Reform the HR Letter Requirement
Under Section 1244, SIV applicants must submit a letter of recommendation to COM
from a U.S. citizen supervisor or co‐signed by a higher‐ranking U.S. citizen responsible for the
contract. This requirement, while perhaps understandable, is particularly onerous for low‐level
employees who do not work directly with U.S. citizens. Yet on top of this already exceptional
burden, COM has requested letters from the HR departments of the direct USG contractors
with which the applicants are employed.16 Some contractors do not have HR departments,
making it difficult to fulfill the requirement. In fact, in 2008 U.S. officials recognized that this
type of “double verification” was “not realistic.”17
15 E‐mail from Tressa Finerty to Elizabeth Harris, et al. (May 5, 2008), in Department of State FOIA Records, Tranche 2 (May 3, 2010) (see appendix 2). 16 Specifically, Section 1244(b)(4) states that “Chief of Mission . . . . shall conduct a risk assessment of the alien and an independent review of records maintained by the USG or hiring organization or entity to confirm employment. . .“ If a letter from a company’s HR department is deemed necessary in order to conduct a risk assessment, the statute clearly places the burden of obtaining HR documents on the government and the company, not the applicant. 17 Email from Tressa Finerty to Sumitra Siram (June 3, 2008), in Department of State FOIA Records, Tranche 2 (May 3, 2010) (see Appendix 2).
THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT DATABASE
For over a year and a half, an Iraqi provided uninterrupted services to the U.S. military
pursuant to numerous overlapping short‐ and long‐term service contracts. The military allowed him
to maintain an office workshop at Baghdad International Airport to facilitate the provision of these
repair, maintenance, construction, and engineering services. As a result of his work, terrorists
kidnapped and murdered both his brother‐in‐law – who worked for him – and this individual’s son‐
in‐law. He received numerous death threats and was forced to flee to Jordan. His application for
COM approval was denied because the evidence that he had worked for the USG for at least a year
was supposedly inadequate. He provided copies of thirteen different contracts spanning a period of
more than one year. However, none of the contracts contained end dates, and the USG would not
independently verify the contracts or their duration. Even after the Iraqi provided additional
evidence regarding the duration of his work for the U.S. military, the embassy determined that the
information was insufficient to overturn the denial. A government database could have more
efficiently provided the embassy with the contract information it desired.
16
Nevertheless, the NVC SIV Unit has refused to accept anything but an HR department
letter, and went so far as to reject an employment verification that was submitted from a
company’s Chief Administrative Officer. On at least one occasion, the SIV Unit refused to accept
an HR verification letter from the same person who provided the letter of recommendation.
Additionally, in at least one case, a major U.S. contractor (L3/Titan) has had a policy of refusing
to issue such letters. While a practitioner working with SIVs recently stated that L3 is “finally”
being more cooperative due to changes in HR personnel, Iraqis should not need to depend on
individual, chance staffing practices of these contractors to obtain employment verification.
The recommendation letters signed by U.S. citizens are already required to attest to an
applicant’s length of service, duties, and faithful service. The USG should either take action to
encourage its contractors to issue letters or should stop requesting additional letters
altogether. When it is impossible to obtain an employment verification from the HR
department, the USG should be willing to accept the testimony of its service‐members as
accurate.
Allow Personal E‐mail Addresses for Letters of Recommendation
A supervisor must use an official e‐mail address when submitting a letter of
recommendation. This requirement is particularly problematic for contractors, who may no
longer be affiliated with their original organization. Many contractors will only be in Iraq on
one‐off contracts for limited periods of time. By the time an applicant applies for an SIV many
years later, oftentimes their previous supervisors no longer work for the companies that
employed them, and thus no longer have official e‐mail addresses. Especially for military
recommenders, whose identities can be easily verified, a personal e‐mail address should be
acceptable. In addition, all U.S. citizen recommenders could provide a unit number or other
CONFLICTS WITH CONTRACTORS AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Two Iraqis were employed by the U.S. as military interpreters and were gravely endangered by
recordkeeping mistakes made by Global Linguist Solutions (GLS), the HR agency for military
interpreters. In one case, an individual’s supervisors attested he worked for more than a year, but
GLS incorrectly insisted that he had not. COM refused to accept the supervisors’ statements.
Eventually, a GLS representative in Baghdad was able to find documents proving the individual had
been employed three months longer than GLS originally acknowledged and GLS admitted its records
were inaccurate. In another case, the individual worked as an interpreter in both Diyala and
Baghdad but GLS had no record of him working in Baghdad and so insisted he had worked for less
than a year. Fortunately, the Iraqi still had his identification badge and a letter of recommendation
from his Baghdad employment and GLS finally acquiesced to writing a new employment verification
letter. In both cases, GLS’s mistakes delayed these individuals’ SIV applications, extending the length
of time they were in danger.
17
identifying information that does not change when they leave their job. The use of a personal
email address does not make the recommendation letter less valuable if the identity can be
verified in other ways. Such a requirement can result in weeks or even months of delay—time
many SIV applicants simply do not have.18
Do Not Apply Inconsistent or Overly Formalistic Requirements
In many cases, the NVC SIV Unit has employed an overly rigid application of the format
for DS‐157s and the letters of recommendation. For example, applicants have had DS‐157s
returned simply because the COM application reviewer preferred the blank spaces in the form
to be filled with “None,” “N/A,” or just left blank. There is no standard request; various
reviewers have requested differing responses.
At other times, SIV Unit has rejected letters that contain all the necessary information
simply because they did not exactly parrot some preferred language not previously required. In
one case, a supervisor from USAID/Tatweer (the national capacity development program)
submitted a letter of recommendation stating that the Iraqi had “worked under my supervision
and I can attest that he is an employee in good standing.” The NVC’s SIV Unit said the letter
was deficient because the author did not indicate that he “had met and/or personally knew”
18 For an example of the delays this can cause, see E‐mail from Judith Wing to Iraq SIV Application (October 15, 2010) (see appendix 2).
PROBLEMS WITH PERSONAL E‐MAIL ADDRESSES
An Iraqi worked for over two years as an employee of several technology corporations, the
Projects and Contracting Office, and the United States Army Corp of Engineers Gulf Region Division.
As a result of his faithful service to the USG, he received numerous death threats and had to live in
hiding. An NGO assisted him with his SIV application and over the course of many months
exchanged emails with NVC, his former supervisors, and a human resources director. This was a
protracted process through no fault of the client – as could be expected, several of his supervisors as
well as the HR director were no longer employed by the same companies. The NGO had difficulty
tracking down his former HR director who was unemployed due to a disability. When they were
finally able to do so, NVC refused to accept communications from the HR director’s personal email
address, and instead insisted she correspond via a non‐existent company email address.
Frustratingly, the NGO also received emails from NVC employees who were unaware of previous
correspondence and documents. While the client ultimately satisfied all of the requirements and
received COM approval, he was in danger throughout this prolonged period. Without the assistance
of counsel, it is difficult to imagine how an applicant could have dealt with the questions and issues
presented, particularly in the face of grave danger.
18
the applicant. This same format has been used by USAID/Tatweer on many other occasions
without incident.
Additionally, NVC has arbitrarily changed or applied its policy regarding letters of
recommendation from non‐US citizen supervisors. In some instances, NVC has required a joint
letter from the non‐US citizen supervisor and the US citizen responsible for the contract; in
others they have accepted separate letters.
In light of these examples, COM should take a full‐picture view of the evidence
presented, rather than adhering to a narrow interpretation of the required format for the forms
and letters of recommendations. Delays that result from the idiosyncrasies and whims of
individual reviewers could be alleviated easily by accepting responses that fulfill the substantive
statutory requirements, especially in light of the serious ongoing threats facing SIV applicants.
In addition, the extent that COM has a preferred or required format for forms and/or letters of
recommendation, it should delineate and post those requirements, and then be consistent.
UNNECESSARY DELAYS AND FORMALITIES
An Iraqi spent eighteen months working in various capacities for two different companies with
construction contracts with the USG. This individual received repeated phone calls from Islamic
militants threatening to hurt her family, rape her, and kill her because she worked with the
Americans. When her colleague’s son was kidnapped because his father worked with Americans, she
fled for the United Arab Emirates. This Iraqi’s UAE work visa will expire shortly and she risks
deportation. She filed her application in April 2009 and despite the urgency of her situation and
repeated contacts with the State Department and UNHCR to speed her case, it remained unclear
why the case was not moving forward. We finally discovered that her application was delayed
simply because her supervisors wrote two separate letters rather than having one co‐signed letter.
19
Assign One NVC Employee to an Application
The NVC SIV Unit often fails to give clear requests or timely responses to applicants, and
the failure to have a single employee at the SIV Unit working on the case exacerbates the
situation. Applicants often receive repeated requests for documents that have already been
submitted, and they cannot tell whether those administering the case have overlooked the
submissions or whether what has been submitted is deficient in some way. Requests to clarify
such requests for information are never addressed, or addressed by a different employee and
in an exceedingly vague manner, often using rote language that a certain document is required
to complete the application. Because both the government and the client suffer from the delays
caused by the failure to clearly communicate issues with an application, implementing this
reform would result in a more efficient system with little additional resources.
FAILING TO LOOK AT ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
An Iraqi was hired to serve as a civil engineer and project manager for the U.S. Army. In
retaliation, insurgents murdered his father, forcing the individual to flee with his family. He applied
for COM approval in August 2009. The application included a letter from a U.S. Army Captain
verifying that this individual had been employed for 27 months. He also provided a letter of
recommendation from a lieutenant colonel, along with six supplementary letters from U.S. Army
personnel with whom he had worked. In September 2009, NVC requested a copy of the contract
covering his 27‐month period of employment. The individual did not have a copy and could not
obtain one. He had submitted a contract covering a 12‐month period, but NVC said it was
unacceptable. As a result, he decided to drop his SIV application in favor of his USRAP application,
which would get him out of Iraq faster.
20
Improve Accountability For Legal Decisions Reached By NVC Employees
Caseworkers at the NVC SIV Unit appear to have little immigration or legal expertise.
This has led to situations where decisions are being made that require knowledge of the law,
and in particular immigration law, by individuals without that necessary expertise. For example,
in one case the SIV Unit repeatedly asked for a copy of an Iraqi’s US visa, even though his
attorneys explained on numerous occasions that he did not have a visa because he had entered
the country through the Significant Public Benefit Parole program.19 Moreover, the current e‐
mail option for legal advice at the State Department, LegalNet, routinely fails to respond in a
timely fashion or at all. A single and responsive contact person willing and able to provide
immigration and legal expertise to SIV Unit caseworkers, and to respond to inquiries from
applicant’s legal representatives, would improve the overall accuracy and efficiency of the
process.
Create a System to Locate Military and Other USG Supervisors
Often it is difficult to locate an applicant’s supervisor, in particular if the applicant
worked for the military and his or her supervisor has been deployed elsewhere or has left the
military. At a minimum, the USG should assist in finding military supervisors serving in a new
location. DOD has taken the initiative to try to create a system to track down military
19 E‐mail from Iraq SIV Application to Shannon A. Graving (May 3, 2010) (see Appendix 2).
INCONSISTENT MESSAGES
As a consequence of his work as a translator for the U.S. military and several contractors, an
individual received multiple death threats and was shot at by insurgents. He applied for COM
approval in October 2009. He complied with an initial request for employment verification from an
NVC support contractor. Weeks later, a different NVC support contractor emailed the Iraqi,
questioning whether he met the twelve‐month time requirement. Weeks after his response, yet
another NVC support contractor requested proof that he had worked as a translator for over a year.
Over the next seven months, the Iraqi corresponded with three additional NVC support contractors.
These individuals requested a letter from a U.S. contractor’s HR department, confirmed that the
Iraqi’s file was complete and would be sent to the U.S. Embassy, subsequently asked for information
with more precise dates, confirmed that the file was complete yet again, and then requested an
additional letter of recommendation. As of October 2010, a year after the initial application, this
individual still has not received COM approval. If there had been a single person assigned to the case
who knew exactly what materials were required and what had been submitted, the Iraqi would have
received less conflicting information and fewer duplicative requests. The entire process could have
been shortened dramatically.
21
supervisors, and this initiative should be applauded. It is unclear, however, when this system
will be available to assist SIV applicants. Such a system should be implemented as soon as is
feasible.
Create A Review Process for Denied Applications
At present, an applicant who has been denied COM approval or a visa after his or her
consular interview has no way to request a review of that decision. The letters denying COM
approval or the visa do not contain sufficient information to understand the underlying basis
for the decision, which gives cover to denials based on simple processing errors, individual
misunderstanding, or an abuse of discretion by DOS. Applicants for SIVs have rendered faithful
service to the USG and are entitled to more than a summary dismissal without explanation.
One simple fix would be to ensure, regardless of where the denial took place, that every
applicant is provided with a concise letter, in Arabic, laying out the reasons for the decision.
Individuals whose refugee applications are denied by the US government already have the
ability to request review of their file where new information becomes available or a material
error has occurred. DOS and DHS should institute a similar review procedure whereby SIV
applicants can reopen their files by providing additional information or clarifying existing
information. This is an administrative policy within the discretion of either department. Finally,
when appropriate, applicants should be given an opportunity to explain unfavorable
information through an interview process before their request for COM approval is denied.
THE NEED FOR APPEALS
As a result of one Iraqi’s more than three years of service as an interpreter with the U.S. Marines, he
has a $20,000 bounty on his head, has been shot at, has had his family members shot and wounded,
and has had to live in hiding, unable to see his family, in both Baghdad and Kurdistan. This individual
submitted an SIV application in January 2009 with eight letters of recommendation from military
supervisors, having passed background checks with both Multi‐National Forces and Global Linguistic
Solutions. In June 2009, COM denied his application, refusing to explain why or offer a means of
appeal, but merely indicating in a very brief denial letter that there was “derogatory information.”
Since COM has not responded to any of the repeated inquiries made by this individual, an NGO, and
his military supervisor, he does not know what allegedly derogatory information exists and thus
cannot dispute or explain the information. DOS, DHS, USCIS, and the CIS Ombudsman’s office have
indicated that COM has sole discretion and COM is unwilling to respond to these requests. Further, a
FOIA request was denied due to consular immunity. This individual’s situation is particularly dire
because he can remain in the safe facility only temporarily.
22
IV. USCIS
Obtaining I‐360 approval is currently quicker and more efficient than the other stages of
the SIV process. However, there is at least one serious, ongoing issue affecting some applicants:
Do Not Require Original Signatures on the I‐360 Form
The requirement of original signatures on the I‐360, the petition for a Special Immigrant
Visa sent to the US Service Center in Nebraska, is particularly onerous for SIV applicants. It is
difficult, expensive and dangerous for Iraqis to send mail out of their country, particularly with
significantly reduced access to military mail as we close down U.S. bases in Iraq. Regulations
allow for the possibility of electronic submissions, and obtaining an electronic signature is not
nearly as difficult as an international mailing. Original documents could always be provided in‐
hand at a later stage of the application process, if necessary, such as at the Embassy interview.
At times, USCIS has dismissed complaints about original signatures by stating that the delivery
time in the mail is only several weeks at most. But this misses the point; it can be dangerous
and time‐consuming for an applicant who is under a serious threat simply to mail a document
internationally and several weeks is too long a delay for a person in imminent danger in any
event.
V. NVC
Once USCIS approval is obtained, the application is then forwarded to NVC for further
processing. At this NVC stage, difficult documentary requirements lead to significant delays for
many Iraqis. Simple changes to these requirements could help expedite processing at this stage.
Do Not Require Duplicative Documentation
At the NVC stage, the applicant must submit his or her family book, a birth certificate for
each applicant, a jensia (the Iraqi national ID card) for each applicant, a marriage certificate, any
DANGEROUS MAILINGS
Many NGO clients have had problems mailing documents. One individual is a civil engineer who was
working for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. He went into hiding after his team was shot at
because of their connection to the U.S. His SIV application took approximately one year to process,
with several months passing between each of the steps. Since he was in hiding, it was particularly
difficult for him to mail an original signature, as required, without jeopardizing his safety. He
ultimately had to sneak to the north of the country, with a friend’s help, to mail the document
safely. Other Iraqis have had problems with mailing documents in Syria. One such client expressed
grave concern about mailing the form back to us. She eventually agreed, mailed the form, and the
NGO received it after it had already clearly been opened and sifted through, presumably by the
Syrian government or someone affiliated with the postal service.
23
other civil documents, a passport (G or A series), and a jensia certificate. These documents are
used to show nationality and relationship, but nationality and relationship can all be shown
through the jensia or in some cases the passport. Obtaining the family book and birth
certificates can be very difficult; these documents can also be expensive due to the cost of
mailing through couriers and the unfortunate need to use bribes in order to obtain the
documents, among other obstacles. Unless there are other reasons for requiring such
documents, one piece of evidence confirming nationality and relationship should be sufficient.
Require Police Certificates Only Where Feasible
Until recently, a police certificate was required if the applicant lived in a country other
than Iraq for more than 6 months and was over 16 years of age at the time. For some countries,
the only way to get a police certificate is to physically go to that country (Jordan, UAE), and for
others (Lebanon), the U.S. Department of State website notes that while the documents can be
requested through an embassy, “applicants may experience extremely long waiting periods
before they receive the document, or may not receive them at all.” The implementation of this
requirement is also extremely inconsistent. In some cases, the police certificate requirement
has been waived, but many applicants would not be aware that waiver is an option.
Recently, applicants have been forced to provide police certificates for all individuals
over the age of 14, from not only those foreign countries in which they previously lived, but
also from Iraq. Obtaining a police certificate in Iraq is onerous and dangerous. In addition, it is
not clear what the basis is for this new, expanded requirement.
The NVC should automatically waive the police certificate requirement for those
countries that refuse to facilitate obtaining a certificate through their embassies, for those
where long delays may result, or those where seeking a police certificate would endanger the
applicant. In addition, the NVC should revert to the previous standard and not ask applicants
to put themselves in greater danger.
Do Not Require Official Certified Translations
It is now required that all documents in Arabic be accompanied by an official certified
translation, completed by a certified translator. Previously, the NVC accepted a translation that
contained a certification that the translator was qualified to do the translation. It can be
dangerous for individuals in Iraq to use a certified translator, who can easily figure out the
purpose for the translations and who can then inform on the applicant. As a consequence, NVC
should eliminate the requirement that only a certified translator may perform the necessary
document translations. If NVC is concerned about the quality of translations, they might hire
Arabic speakers to audit translations.
24
VI. Embassy Interview and Departure
Finally, there are occasional delays as a result of the Embassy interview and departure
process. For Iraqis who have waited significant amounts of time to depart to the United States,
it is imperative that these bottlenecks be reduced.
Reform Administrative Review
When an applicant is put into administrative review following the Embassy interview, a
final decision on the SIV application can take over a year. No information is provided regarding
the reason for the administrative review and there is no point of contact for inquiries or to
request status updates. The State Department should ensure that the administrative review
process is completed within a reasonable time frame, taking into account the ongoing serious
threats that applicants face. Additionally, the process should be made more transparent, so
that applicants understand the reason for the administrative review and can provide
information to help resolve any issues.
Assist With Obtaining Passports and Do Not Require Passports for Newborns
Currently, Iraqis can only travel to the United States with either A‐Series or G‐Series
passports. This requirement presents an additional obstacle to many SIV applicants, though it is
one the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act anticipated. Section 1244(d) requires the Secretary of State to
“make a reasonable effort to ensure that [Iraqis] who are issued special immigrant visas are
provided with the appropriate series Iraqi passport necessary to enter the United States.”
Creating procedures that ensure that SIV applicants can obtain an acceptable passport will
bring the State Department into compliance with this provision of the statute.
Though refugees can enter the United States without a passport as long as they have
refugee papers prepared by the USG, the SIV program requires all newborns to have passports,
or to be added to their mother’s passport. There is no ability to add a child to an A‐series
passport, however, and currently there are extreme delays in issuing new passports. This
means that, depending on when a child is born, some applicants cannot travel for many
months, or longer, after their visas have been issued. In many cases this means the visas will
expire before travel is possible, creating even further delays because the application must
undergo additional administrative processing when the visas are reissued. We understand that
pursuant to a January 13, 2010 Department of State memo, passports for newborns born after
the US Embassy interview are not required. Instead, they should be issued a travel letter and A‐
number at the port of entry. The State Department should ensure this mandate is
implemented for these newborns, and extend the mandate for newborns born prior to the US
Embassy interview where requiring a passport will entail significant delay in the applicant’s
ability to travel (for example, where the baby cannot be added to the mother’s passport).
25
Return Passports
When an applicant goes for a consular interview, the Embassy keeps the passport until
the visa is issued. This can create problems for an applicant who is in a foreign country, placing
him or her in potential danger or in trouble with local authorities who require proof of identity.
The Embassy should return the passport of all Iraqis interviewing outside of Iraq pending SIV
approval.
Conduct Security Checks, Including Security Advisory Opinions, Without Unnecessary Delays
The multi‐agency security clearance process can cause long delays for many applicants.
For those applicants who are facing serious threat in Iraq or elsewhere, those delays place them
in significant danger. The USG should take steps to ensure that at‐risk applicants have their
checks expedited. The government should also conduct security clearance processing for all
Iraqi refugee and SIV applicants without unnecessary delays. The National Security Council
should continue its review of the inter‐agency security clearance procedure required for
refugees and immigrants, and implement improvements promptly. Each agency involved in the
process should be provided the staffing it requires to complete checks accurately and without
unnecessary delays within a set period. In addition, a point person should be charged with the
authority to ensure that each case moves through the system in a timely manner.
CONCLUSION
Our experience suggests that Iraqi SIV applicants are vulnerable and frequently in grave
danger. Making improvements to the SIV process like those suggested above will enable us to
demonstrate our ongoing commitment to the Iraqi people who have made sacrifices to support
the USG in Iraq.
Appendix 1: pending cases in need of consideration
Internal Reference Number
Assisting Organization/Case Status
Case Description
1 IRAP Yale, Pending COM approval
Contract Delays See Above, Page 13
2 IRAP U. Penn, Pending P-‐2 Visa approval
The Need for Speed See Above, Page 9
3 The List Project (TLP)/Mayer Brown, COM Approval Received, pending
Failure to Communicate See Above, Page 6
4 TLP/Holland & Knight, pending COM Approval
Inconsistent Messages See Above, Page 18
5 IRAP, Berkeley, pending COM approval
Unnecessary Delays and Formalities See Above, Page 17
6 IRAP Berkeley, pending COM action and approval.
The Need for Appeals See Above, Page 20
7 TLP/Holland & Knight, Pending
Holland & Knight’s (H & K) client worked for L3 Communications, on assignments with the United States Department of State, Baghdad Provincial Reconstruction Team and the United States Department of Defense. As a result of his work, the Jaish Al Madi attacked him and his colleague, killing his colleague instantly. The client managed to escape, despite being shot at three times, but he and his family continued to receive threats even after they were transferred. One time, a car followed them and opened fire on their vehicle, destroying the car and injuring the client's 17 year-‐old and 14 year-‐old sisters, who were hospitalized for several days after the attack. As a result of his incredible work on behalf of the US, several members of the military sponsored him for Significant Public Benefit Parole (SPBP) and he lives with one of his supervisors in the US. H & K applied for COM for him in March 2010, explaining that he was in the US on SPBP rather than a visa. A month later H & K received an email requesting his visa, to which H & K again explained that he did not have a visa and provided his SPBP and travel documents. The client continued to receive emails requesting his visa. The
Appendix 1 Page 1
client’s file was finally transferred to the US Embassy in Iraq in May 2010. By mid-‐September, despite an urgent plea from H & K to the Embassy, he still had not received COM approval and was informed processing would take approximately four or more months rather than the weeks he was originally told. Thankfully, the client met someone in late September through his sponsor who had a connection with the US Embassy in Iraq and he received COM approval a few days later, over five months since H & K sent the first SPBP reply email.
8 TLP/Holland & Knight case, pending
Problems with Personal Email Addresses See Above, Page 16
9 TLP/Holland & Knight, pending
This client worked as a linguist (translator) for L3 Communications (previously Titan Corp, and subsequently GLS), doing work for the US Army, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Forward Operating Base in Kirkuk for more than 3 years. Several of his colleagues were assassinated by the insurgents due to their work with US Army and he received numerous threats. Fearing for their lives, he and his wife fled to Turkey. His former supervisor was contacted to verify certain information and replied by using his AOL account. NVC replied telling him he must provide the same information from a work or military email address, which fortunately he was able to do.
10 TLP/Holland & Knight, pending
Another client worked with the Titan/GLS starting from Sept 2008. He is eligible for the SIV program but does not have a second reference letter from his former supervisor. We have tried to reach out one of his former supervisors and after one month of research we found him, but he referred us to another person. This other person was overseas and although she was very supportive and willing to provide the letter, after dozens of emails we still did not receive it. Then we tried to reach out a third supervisor. This last one is cooperative too but due to his deployment in remote locations has been unable to provide the letter. The security situation is so bad and our client could not just wait for something bad to happen to him or his family thus he decided to apply for USRAP and has finished his DHS interview.
11 IRAP Berkeley, pending at COM
IRAP-‐Berkeley has been working with a client who, because of his service as a military interpreter, received a written death threat from the Al-‐Sadr Militia in 2007. Since then, the client has lived as a prisoner in his own
Appendix 1 Page 2
home: He is afraid that, if he is recognized in town, he will be killed like many of the interpreters with whom he has worked. We included a copy of his written threat in the client’s COM application, which we submitted in May 2010. We received a reply on June 18, 2010 that his application was complete and would be processed. The email did not mention a timeline for processing. We followed up on September 12 and received a reply stating that the client’s application was complete and that processing time would be about 4 months. Then, on Oct. 4, when the client had waited nearly 4 months, we received a new email stating that his statement of threats had to be written, signed, and dated by him. (The client’s previous statement had been written in the third person, not the first person, and the client had not signed or dated it, as we were not aware of that requirement.) We complied with this new request within 72 hours. On Oct. 15, we received a new email again stating that the client’s application was complete and that he could expect a 4-‐month waiting time. We are concerned that, even though the applicant has already waited more than 4 months for processing, his application has been pushed to the back of the pile because of a new requirement that had never before been published. It had also never been raised in any of the unit’s previous emails, which assured us that the client’s application was complete and would be processed in due course.
12 IRAP Berkeley, pending
IRAP Berkeley has been working with a client who lives in Damascus. After submitting her application for COM approval, they worked with the client to prepare the I-‐360. They asked her if she could mail the form to the US with the original signature, but she expressed serious reservations. She told us she was worried because she believed that all mail in Syria was opened, and she did not feel comfortable mailing immigration forms to the United States. (She had been quite cautious throughout the representation with sharing information in English over the phone, as she was nervous about the safety of her and her family.) IRAP then asked a number of trusted sources who lived in or are familiar with daily Syrian life. They suggested the best approach would be to use either FedEx or DHL, both of which have offices in Damascus. Our client agreed to use FedEx, and mailed out the form accordingly. IRAP received the package opened. IRAP Berkeley assumed that this is Syrian practice for outgoing mail, and were concerned about the
Appendix 1 Page 3
possibility of security threats to our client. 13 TLP/Mayer
Brown, Currently in the U.S. through USRAP
Failing to Look at all Available Evidence
See Above Page 17
14 TLP/Mayer Brown, Denied COM Approval
The Necessity of a Government Database See Above Page 14
15 TLP/Mayer Brown, pending COM approval
Mayer Brown’s client worked for the U.S. military over the course of three years, through a series of contracts. As a result of his work, our client and his father were kidnapped and the family fled to Jordan in 2006, where they currently reside. Our client applied for Chief of Mission approval on October 22, 2009, and his application has been stalled since March 2010 because he cannot provide the full copies of his contracts with the U.S. military – which he did not take with him when he fled Iraq. He has provided the first page of several contracts which show that he was employed by the U.S. military for more than one year. We have been unable to obtain copies of the full contracts, or copies of those contracts he does not have. Nevertheless, we have provided other documentation, including letters of recommendation, which show that our client was employed by the U.S. military for more than one year.
16 TLP/Mayer Brown, pending COM Approval
Extralegal Requirements See Above Page 12
17 IRAP UPenn, pending USCIS approval
Our client, an Iraqi refugee living in Amman, was employed by the United States Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) from mid-‐2003 through January 2005 and from July 2005 to July 2007. A June 2005 letter of appreciation from an AFOSI Commander commends Mr. Ali’s continuous service “since December 2003,”and a badge issued 5 June 2007 notes 2005-‐2007 service. A 2004 letter of praise from an AFOSI Security Advisor states Mr. Ali “endured great personal risk in providing…assistance,” and “demonstrated that he placed the interests of the U.S. Coalition Forces…before himself.” In 2005, the client fled Baghdadi militias on advice from AFOSI superiors, and in 2006 the Jaysh al’Mahdi killed his partner. The militias that identified Mr. Ali continue to operate in Iraq and pose a very serious threat should he be forced to return. The Client, his wife and young daughter first applied to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for refugee and SIV status on 30 July 2007.
Appendix 1 Page 4
However, he continues to be deferred for “further review” without explanation. The last deferral is dated 18 August 2010, and Mr. Ali claims his last interviewer told him delay resulted because the “president in the White House” had to approve his file. USCIS continues to defer his application without demonstrated cause.
18 IRAP Berkeley, pending
IRAP-‐Berkeley has been working with a client who served as a military interpreter for 19 months and who is now in serious danger: Insurgents have shot at him and thrown a live grenade in his family compound. We submitted the client’s COM application on Aug. 13, 2010 and received a return email from the SIV unit on Aug. 25, 2010. The email detailed a number of new requirements for the applicant. First, it required him to sign and date his statement of threats. Second, it said that the client’s letter of recommendation was unsatisfactory. The email required that the letter be written by the applicant’s “direct supervisor” and that the recommender describe himself as such in the letter. The SIV Unit cited Defense Authorization Act Sec. 1244 for this requirement. We had never heard of this requirement, and when we checked the act, it did not require an LOR from a “direct supervisor.” Instead, it requires a letter from a “senior” supervisor. We feel that our applicant’s letter meets this requirement: It was written by the captain of the military police unit with which the client worked. We also feel that the SIV Unit response was unfortunate because, in addition to the letter referenced above, we included a second LOR that met these requirements. Third, the SIV unit returned the client’s DS-‐157 as unsatisfactory. Question 12 of the form asks for the applicant’s last two employers. Our client has only had one job, which we listed and which directly followed his graduation from college, also listed on the form. The reply email relayed (contradictory) instructions that stated we could not use the words “not applicable” instead of the word “none” in certain spaces in the form. We have revised the DS-‐157 to meet these requirements, but we also believe this kind of nitpicking stymies legitimate applicants. No published information states that an applicant must sign his statement of threats, that only a “direct supervisor” can write a letter of recommendation, or that the word “none” is not a legitimate substitute for “not applicable” on the DS-‐157.
19 TLP/Mayer Brown, COM
Mayer Brown’s client was employed by KBR from July 14, 2003 through April 4, 2005, as a purchasing
Appendix 1 Page 5
Approval Denied; Request for Review pending with Office of Refugee and IDP Affairs, U.S. Embassy
consultant pursuant to a contract and five subcontracts. As a result of his work with KBR, our client was attacked in his parents’ home by men who threatened to kill him. He moved to another part of Baghdad, but was again threatened with death. He fled the country in 2006 and returned to Baghdad in 2009, moving into the house of his in-‐laws in another part of town in order to ensure his safety. Recently, however, neighbors of his parents have warned them that unknown men have been asking for our client’s whereabouts. Our client filed an application for Chief of Mission approval in January 2010. In conjunction with that application, he provided the full signed copy of his consulting agreement with KBR, and all five signed (and complete) copies of the subcontract change orders. The original contract was for the time period July 14, 2003 through January 14, 2004. Subcontract Change Order 1 extended that time period to May 28, 2004. Subcontract Change Order 4 further extended the period of performance “from the effective date of 14Jul03 to the expiration date of 28May04 to the effective date of 14Jul03 to the expiration date of 28May05.” We also submitted an employment verification letter from KBR which stated that our client had been employed from July 14, 2003 to April 4, 2005, and which provided the contract number under which he had been employed. On October 5, 2010, our client received a letter denying his application for Chief of Mission approval because he had “not provided evidence to demonstrate that [he had] met the program requirement of having worked for the U.S. Government in Iraq for not less than one year after March 20, 2003.” We requested clarification of the decision and were told the documentation submitted did not prove one year of work for the US Government. In particular, we were told that “[t]he contracts often changed monetary amounts but in adding up all the time covered, it was not more than 365 days.” We asked for a review of that decision, in particular pointing to Subcontract Change Order 4. In response, we were told that an in-‐depth review had been done of the evidence our client submitted and “it still does not appear that he is qualified for the program.” We have requested further review and clarification, which has been forwarded to the Office of Refugee & IDP Affairs at the US Embassy in Baghdad.
20 TLP/Mayer Mayer Brown’s client was employed by US Government
Appendix 1 Page 6
Brown, Currently in Sweden; Likely to be deported because of lack of COM approval
L-‐3 Communications and the Saudi Arabian Trading and Construction Company (SATCO), as a translator from September 2003 through August 2007. In August 2007, he was kidnapped and tortured by individuals identifying themselves as members of the Al Mahdi armyHe was eventually released, and then fled the country, ending up in SwedenHis application for Chief of Mission approval was denied because he could not provide a recommendation letter with an official email address. His U.S. citizen supervisor from SATCO, who provided the recommendation letter that was submitted as part of his application, was already retired and did not have a company email address. He explained in the recommendation letter, however, that his “mindspring” email address had been his “official” email address during this time of employment with SATCO – they had all used their personal email addresses – and was still valid. Our client was unable to locate any of his U.S. military supervisors. He is currently facing deportation back to Iraq.
21 TLP/Mayer Brown, pending Administrative Review Process
Mayer Brown’s client served as a translator for the U.S. Army. As a result, he received threats and was targeted for attack by insurgents. He fled the country in 2005, and is currently a refugee in Syria. Mayer Brown applied for Chief of Mission approval on behalf of our client in December 2008, and he was granted COM approval in February 2009. In August 2009 – following his visa interview at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus – we were informed that his case required further administrative processing and that, as a result, his visa application had been denied under INA 221(g). To date, more than a year later, the administrative review process has not been completed.
22 TLP/Mayer Brown, SIV Approved; Awaiting Newborn’s Passport for Travel
Mayer Brown’s client received his Special Immigrant Visa on April 8, 2010, but IOM would not arrange travel for his wife because of her pregnancy. He was informed that when the child was born – which happened occurred on June 15, 2010 – they would need to obtain a passport for the child in order to travel to the United States. The U.S. Embassy agreed to reissue the visas once, given his circumstances. However, they advised that this would not be immediate, as he would need to undergo additional administrative processing due to the reissuance. Our client has been given a date in February 2011 to appear at the Iraqi passport agency to provide all the
Appendix 1 Page 7
necessary information for his newborn son’s passport. After that, it will likely take a few more months for the passport to be issued, and then his case will need to undergo further administrative processing. Accordingly, it will be well over a year from when he received the visas until he and his family can travel to the United States. We asked that the passport requirement be waived, and we were told that the U.S. Embassy was not able to issue any travel documents for the baby unless he has a valid passport.
Appendix 1 Page 8
Appendix 2: example emails
Appendix 2
Document Pages Memorandum from Richard A. Albright to Patricia A. Butenis (November 4, 2008) 1‐6 E‐mails from James Foley to Samuel M. Witten, et al. (February 10, 2009) 7‐8 Emails from Jennifer Rikoski to J. Wally Bird and LegalNet (September 1, 2009) 9‐11 E‐mail from Ruth E. Tintary to Lori Scialabba, et al. (March 12, 2008) 12‐13 E‐mails between Tressa Finerty and Elizabeth Harris (May 5, 2008) 14‐15 E‐mail from Tressa Finerty to Jennifer Rumbach, et al. (July 16, 2008) 16 Memorandum to William P. Marriott, Request for Assistance in Verifying Employment of Iraqis (undated)
17‐18
E‐mails between Tressa Finerty and Sumitra Siram (June 3, 2008) 19‐20 E‐mails between Rachel S. Allport and Iraq SIV Application (August 9, 2010) 21‐26 E‐mails between Shannon A. Graving and Iraq SIV Application (May 3, 2010) 27‐29
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STATE-0026
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STATE-0027
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STATE-0028
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STATE-0029
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STATE-0030
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STATE-0031
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STATE-0057
Subject:
UNCLASSIFIED
Siram, Sumi!,a 11Z 5';;'Fr;;':om::':.. =';=::'::"--F-,-J--B--------RE...L...E""A..S....E....D"""I PART
aey. amesSent: Tuesday, February 10, 2009 5:00 PM B5To: Witten, Samuel M; Rusch. Tcny L; Bartlett, La'M'ence 1::; Heinlein. Simone G; Siram, Sumilta;
Sarkisova, Elina V; Pollack, Margaret JBaghdad SIVs and the refugee backlog
I had a good conversation with Tressa today on the SIV stale of play.
The good news is that the TOYers have made great headway and have alf but eliminated the backlog of SIV applications.They should be fully cutTent by next week. Meantime another backlog has fonned at the next stage: signature of theCOM letters, of which there are about 200 pending. Tressa will work through these herself over the next couple weeks.794 COM leners have been signed 10 dale.
As for off·shoring employment verification. a memorandum has now been signed with NVC and they are working out thekinks in the data base. April 1 is the transition date to NVC.
The six TOVers will remain at post through June and will focus on the retail effort to move applicants from the refugee tothe SIV queue. Moreover, post has decided to continue funding two TOVers indefinitely in support of SIVs, which isoutstanding news and w~1 enable this labor-intensive effort to continue.
As a practical matter, Tressa noted that there remains only a 3-4 month window to affect FY09 results. In other words.application packets with approved COM letters prepared after June would likely end up as FV20 10 arrivals.
Overall, SlY applications have remained steady at about 100 per week. In principle that would equate to the 5,000 annuallimit. but the reality is much different. These initial applications tend 10 be preliminary in nature, and are often not foHowedup. Tressa said that at least 30% ~disappear" (self-eliminate) and another percentage may be deemed ineligible for onereason or another. She estimated that perhaps half of the caseload would actually go forward and receive a COM lettermaybe in the neighborhood of 2500 cases per year (a very rough estimate). But not all of these applicants would choose10 forward the packet with COM letter 10 NVC immediately, again for various reasons.
The bottom line is that current demand for SIVs is well short of capacity - likely under 50% of the 5,000 limit (to saynothing of the FY08 canyover. which brings the ceiling close to 10,000). [n other words, there is an enormous need tofocus our minds on finding ways to move applicants 'rom the refugee to the SIV queue.
As mentioned, the TOY staff will soon be devoting time 10 examining refugee cases to identify the potential for switches.(Already there is an effort underway to persuade people to drop out of the refugee Queue once they have received asigned COM letter, which itself now contains such an exhortation.) This project is or will be hampered by the tact that therefugee and SIV data bases are not compatible (they can't be run together). Nonetheless Tressa felt it has real potential.
In fact, she and Richard believe there are relatively significant numbers of refugee applicants who would switch to the SIVr~ ,e war. 'bev .Ho",'. '0 do so i eu those emo'oyed bv USAID under gcants or coopera"ve agreements. \ IB5
Finally, I queried Tressa about the potential for processing more of Baghdad's refugee ap~icants in Amman. While ablanket communication to applicants to this effect would not be advisable, she thought there might be potential if theycould figure out a way how to pilCh this option on a case·by-case basis. However, the fact that applicants currently mustremain in Amman for both the OPE pre-screening and DHS interviews Is a big impediment. I offered to take this up withDHS.
UNITED S"J',\TE;S DErART~IJo:NT OF STATEREVIEW ,\UTIIORJTY: AI>OLPIIIl EISNERDATE/CASE 11): 27 APR 2010 200901707 UNCLASSIFIED
Appendix 2 Page 8
STATE-0058
Foley, James BThursday, February 12, 2009 2:55 PMDonahue, David TWillen, Samuel MSIV eligIbility for Iraqis
'>Fviey, James B
From:Sent:To:Cc:Subject:
UNCLASSIFIED
ReU~J\S~1)~?,;~TB5
PAGES MISSINGDavId,
I've been In discussIOn thIS week with Baghdad to assess how the SIV program is domg and where it is heading. Thegood news is that, thanks 10 the current deployment of TOY personnel and the upcoming transfer oflhe employmentverification function to NVC, the backlog of applications has been all but eliminated and there is every reason to believepost will be able to process SIVs in a timely and efficient manner from here on oul. Thanks to CA for the outstandingsupportr
The bad news, as it were, is that SIV demand is falling far short of capacity. Currently Bagb.gad is averaging about 100applications per week. However, many oflhese (approx. 30%) self-eliminate"§Jld a certain number are deemed inehgible.When all is said and done, it would seem Baghdad is on a course that would produce somewhat less than hair of the 5.000$IV cases per year authorized under the Kennedy legislation.
ThIs is not going 10 look good to Congress, when it finds out. In facl. it's going to look even worse given that (a) the actualFY09 SIV arrival numbers will be even lower given the stow slart, and (b) the FY09 ceiling In reality is almost 10,000, giventhe carryover of unused FY08 numbers. ~
Of course, one might say to Congress that it is not our fault If demand is relatively low. But there's a problem vllth thisargumenl demand is 100 h1sh - way too high for refugee processing in Baghdad. PRM has Just approved anolherexpansion oTOur Overseas recessing Entity (OPE) in Baghdad, but even with this increased capacity the backk>g ofapplications will continue 10 grow, There are simply fiOite limits to how much refugee processing we can do in-counlryunder prevailing Green Zone conditions.
Given that the pool of applicants for P·2 refugee and SIV programs is largely the same, our challenge is to try to persuadefolks 10 !QQ-'!'..~.ft.QmJhe..locg1efugeeline to the undersubscribed $IV queue_ It appears that refugee status IS preferred"bymost applicants because the case composition (family sIze) is larger than under SIVs. However, the long wait currentlyfacing refugee applicants ought to be an incentive for some to switch over to SIVs. Post is gOing to work on (his - It wIlllook closely at the refugee applicalJOn files and identify cases With the most SIV potential. This will be a labor-intensIveand tlme-consuming effort,
There is one thing we can do thaI would help move perhaps significant numbers off the refugee rolls and into the SIV,~~~~;,~,Jij<;~'v~~;billHliitviJilo;J;in~clu~d~ejl~ra;o;is;';;w~h~o~wo~r~k~ed~fo~r~u~sLu~n~d~e~r:;;;mra~n~l~s~a~n~d~c~o~o;o,e~ra~t~iv~ei:iao[rr~c~e~m;e~n~li5.]"-="""---'85
UNCLASSIFIED
Another factor to keep in mmd is that Congress likely will acl if we do nol. They look upon the two programs (refugees andSIVs) as helping 10 rescue an undifferentiated pool of IraqIS endangered because of their vaned and various associationswith Ihe USG. Once Congress learns of the imbalance belween demand for the two programs, they will want to make thIS
""S' ,,::.-p.-. ..... , .::..,..~-" .. '~",UNlTlm STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATEIlEVIEW AUTIIORITY: AOOLI'IIII EISNERDATE/CASE II); 27 API~ 2010 200')01707
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CIS-0049
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CIS-0050
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STATE-0242
Siram, Sumitra
From:Sent:To:Cc:SUbject:
Follow Up Flag:Flag Status:
UNCLASSIFIED
~2BEHarris, Elizabeth J RELEASED IN PARTMonday, May 05.2008 6:14 PMFinerty, Tressa R(Baghdad) B6Thayer, Yvonne F; Siram. Sumltra; Bartlett, Lawrence ERE: Thorny EV Question RE USG grant/cooperative agreement organizations
Follow upFlagged
I guess J am not thinking about needing this for big companies-or e'l.'en ddving too much into thedetails. If someone worked for KBR or L3 Titan, just move forward. (Since 1,3 Titan lost the DODcontract, any "new'" hires would be unde'r the new company anyway, so anyone who says theyworked for 13 Titan as an interpreter in Iraq is fine since 1,3 Titan wouldn't be able to hire anyonenew now that they have lost the contract.)
For the case in question, since your Embassy contact said that the company no longer receives usafunding, we have to look into it. But I am not suggesting adding this to your line of questioningunless we cannot find evidence of the USG funding.
Liz
From: Rnerty, Tressa R(Baghdad)sent: Monday, May 05,2008 9:17 AMTo: HarTis, Elizabeth JCc: Thayer, Yvonne F; Siram, Sumitra; Bartlett, Lawrence ESubject: RE: Thorny EV Question RE USG grant/cooperative agreement organizations
Liz: Maybe we can dlat aboul this laler tonight. 111 try you sometime between 8-10pm BGO lime.
Verifying that an employee worked during the lime lhe entity was receiving USG funding is realty, realty complex. Thisessentially means we'd have 10 get copies of grants/cooperative agreements for each company -- not 10 mention copies ofgrant extensions, etc. We might be setting the bar far higher than many employees can realisticalty reach, as it is verydoubtful that big companies (i.e., KBR or L3) are going to give employees copies of company contraclsfgrants whichmight be seen as proprietary corporate information.
let's chal.·r
Tressa Rae FinerryRcfugoe CCOITiinarorU.S. Embassy BaghdadPreskJenrial Pal&<;e 5-212
OSN. 239.8902Met: 914 360.5360
'n"""1---------B6
from:sent:To:CcSubject
Tressa,
HarTis, Blzabeth JMonday, May 05, 2008 3:31 PMFinerty, Tressa R(Baghdad)Thayer, Yvonne F; 'Kathleen Thompson'; 'Paula zakarian'; Siram, Surnltra; Bartlett, lawrence ERE: Thorny EV QuestIon RE USG granVcooperativeagf~ organizations
UNITED STATES m:PARTMENT OF STATERt-~VIE\V AUTHORITY: ADOLI'II II t-:ISNERnATE/CASE 10: 27 APR 2010 2110901707 UNCLASSIFIEDAppendix 2 Page 15
STATE-0243
UNCLASSIFIEDIt seems to me that if we can confirm that the FA worked for an organization that received USGfunding, and that he was an employee during this time, I don't think it matteTs if the organizationno longer receives funding. This would be similar to L3/Titan-they have lost the DOD interpretercontract but anyone who worked for them when they did have the DOD interpreter contract wouldstill be eligible. But I do think the key is to confIrm that he was employed at the time the entity wasreceiving USG funding.
Liz
From: Rnerty, Tressa R{Baghdad)sent: Monday, May OS, 2008 7:01 AMTo: HarriS, Elizabeth JCc: Thayer, Yvonne Fj 'Kathleen Thompson'; 'Paula Zakarian'; Sirarn, SumitlU; Bartlett, Lawrence ESUbject: Thorny f:II Question RE USG grant/cooperative agreement organizations
Liz: Per the email below, Iraq Media Network, had received USG money in some form or fashion in the past, but at themoment may not receive any USG money (PA is confirming this information).
So, this begs the complicated question - if an OI"ganization, such as Iraq Media Network. received USG media for year200X-200Y, but does not currently receive USG funding, does the P-2 applicant (1) not qualify since organization does nolreceive USG money at time of refugee application, (2) only qualify if they worked at the organization during the time USGfunds were received, or (3) qualify at any titl',le? (Maybe there are additional iterations, but you get the point.)
·Tressa
From:Sent:To:Subject:
Smith, Brian K(Baghdad)Monday, May as, 2008 12:41 PMRnerty, Tressa R(Baghdad)RE: Media COmpany Contacts - Employment Verification for Refugee ApplICants
Tressa.Still awaiting a response from people who would know for certain ... latest word is that we do not fund them at all right now.Regards,
Brian K. SmithMedia Analysis OfficerU.S. Embassy, BaghdadMel cell: 1-914-360-4558lraqna cell: +964-0790-232-7343English site: httD:Jlbaghdad.usembassy.govlArabic site: htlp:llbaghdad.usembassy.govlirag/arl
From: Rnerty, Tressa R(Baghdad)sent: Sunday, May 04, 2008 1:36 PMTo: Smith, Brian K (Baghdad)S.ubject: RE: Media Company Contacts -- Employment Verification for Refugee Applicants
The way the refugee legislation was written an Iraqi employed by an organization or entity closely association with the USMission in Iraq that has received USG funding through an official and documented contract, award, grant or cooperativeagreement would qualify to apply for the refugee program. So, can you confirm that the Iraq Media Network did getfunding via one of the listed mechanisms? If so, yes, please send contact info for the organization. Many thanks.
Tresso Rae FinertyRcfvgoc CootrfinarOl"U.s. Embassy BoghdadPresidential Palace 5-212
DSN: 239.8902Mel: 914.360.5360
2
UNCLASSIFIED
;
",
Appendix 2 Page 16
STATE-0236
UNCLASSIFIED
Siram, Sumitra
From:Sent:To:Cc:
Subject:
Finerty, Tressa R(Baghdad) RELEASED IN PARTWednesday, July 16, 2008 3:40 AM'RUMBACH Jennifer'; MURPHY Craig B6Albright, Richard A(Baghdad); Bartlett, Lawrence E; Sarkisova, Elina V; Siram, Sumifra;Harris, Elizabeth J; JOHN DavidMinor change to IZ application guidance
Craig/Jennifer: We need to make one more minor change to the lZ application guidance. Under #5 employmentverification, please add the text below (highlighted in red only for the purpose of this email):
The principal applicant must forward an email or PDF letter from their U.S. supervisor or company official or otheravailable employment documentation verifying their employment.
-This additional language allows those applicants who can not receive employment verification letlersJemails from theircompany to submit other documentation, such as their employment contract, etc. We still do need "good" EV information,including a supervisor name and emaiVphone number. as we don't currently have the staffing sufficient to do individual EVresearch. So, I'll ask that Baghdad Info Center continue to push applicants for detailed points of contact altheir employer;however, we n.eed to balance this knowing that there may be a few companies that will not provide actualletters/emaiJs ofemplo~entverification.
Thanks,~ Tressa
General Refugee General RefugeeProgram Il1Quir... Program Inqulr...
TrEssa Rae FinctryRefugee Ccordimlioru.s. EmbillJsy B<lgfnledProsl':1t'f!liifl Pafar;() S-2IOC
DSN: 239.8002 (from U.S. 703-343.8902)MCI: 914 J!iQ 53$0/!af:lllS;
----------'
UNITED STA"n:s DEPARTMENTOF STATEREVIEW AUTHORITY: ADOLPH II EISNERCLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIEDDATE/CASE: 10: 27 APR 2010 200901707
1
UNCLASSIFIED
B6
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STATE-0204
UNCLASSIFIED
A"" -"
UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN FULLUnited States Department of State
Washington, D. C. 10520
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. MARRIOTIEXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: Request for Assistance in Verifying Employment ofiraqis
The Department of State requests assistance from the Department ofDefense in establishing a procedure for verifying the employment of Iraqi nationalswho seek admission to the United States as refugees. The Bureau of Population,Refugees, and Migration (PRM) is designing a procedure whereby Iraqis whoclaim persecution based on association with the U.S. because of their dircct orcontract employment by the USG or U.S. contractors will be able to requestconsideration for admission to the United States as refugees. It wiJl be necessaryto verify this claimed employment before any decision can be made regardingfurther action to bc taken, including possible submission of cases to theDepanment of Homeland Security for refugee claim adjudication.
The Department of State (PRM) is prepared to contact U.S. contractorsdirectly to obtain this verification. The Department ofDefense is requested tosupport this exercise by:
• Providing a DOD point of contact (POC) for policy dccisions on all mattersrclating to the resettlement of Iraqi refugees;
• Providing a DOD POC for verifying the current or former employment by DODof any Iraqi citizens in Iraq;
• Providing a list of all U-S. contractors supporting DOD operations in Iraq whohave employed Iraqis since 2003, with a POC for each contractor;
• Informing those contractors that they should cooperate with the Department ofState by establishing POCs for the expeditious verification of their employmentof any Iraqis in Iraq;
• Providing an estimate of the number ofcurrent and former Iraqi employeesengaged directly by DOD and by each contractor supporting DOD operations inIraq; and
UNITED STATES IJEF'ARTl\1 ENT OF STATEREVIEW AUTHORITY: AOOI.I'IIII EISNERDATE/CASE 11): 03 MA y 2010 200901707
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UNCLASSIFIEDAppendix 2 Page 18
STATE-0205
UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED
-2-
• Providing the Deparnnent of State (PRM) and/or Department ofHomelandSccurity with access to any database of biometric data compiled on employees.
The Department of State appreciatcs your assistance. Point of Contact in PRM willbe Ms. Terry L. Rusch at 202-663-1047.
Harry K. Thomas, Jr.Executi ve Secretary
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDAppendix 2 Page 19
STATE-0239
UNCLASSIFIED
Siram, Sumitra
From:Sent:To:Subject:
Finerty, Tressa R(Baghdad)Wednesday, June 04, 2008 1:17 AMSiram, SumitraRE: EV • double \IS single verification
RELEASED IN PART86
Sure. my schedule is open next week. 9.30am (EDT) is my favorite time 10 do calls, bul it can be later if that works best.Pick the time/dale that works best for you and RPC...
Cheers,Tressa
TrGs.<;a R"f) FiflQrtyRcfu')C(J Coord;ntJloru.s. Em/:Y.Jssy Bag!l(iadp(£w}(Jrl/;al PJ/s!;c 8-212
DSN; 2JiI.8902 ((wm U.S, 703.343.8902)MCI: 914 36Jl53WImqrrajL- _ 86
from:5<"0To:Subject:
Siram, SumitraTuesday, June 03, 2008 10:14 PMAnerty, Tressa R(Baghdad)RE: EV - double vs sing~e verilication
I agree - I think the RPCs standards should be the same as well. I am still working w~h the RPC in figuring out what istheir role. my role and OPE's role. t think over the last couple of days we have been successful at conveying to RPC thatthey were trying to do too much and that we really need to shift a lot of the burden that RPC has taken on back to theOPE and the applicant themselves.
If you don't mind, I would like 10 propose to the RPC folks having that conference call between RPC and you and me.Maybe we could have it next week? .
from:Sent:To:Subject
Rnerty, Tressa R(Baghdac:l)Tuesday, JUIle 0], 2008 1: II PMSiram, SumitraRE: EV - double V5 single verification
It might be ·over the hill ft now... looks like the SIV program has realized that "double verification" not realistic.
Do know that for IZ refugee EV I'm only doing "single verification". I think it is important that RPC's standards are thesame.
-T
Tm:;sa Rao FlnfJr1yRDfufjcC Coordi:J<lforU.S. Embassy BfiglJdadPresidenll8l PalncG S·212
DSN: 239.8!i02 {(tom U S 703.343.80(2)Mel; 914.360 5360
IIOGnfJ·1 _ B6
UNITED STAn:s IlEPARTi\"lENTOF STATE:REVIEW AlJrI-lORITY: AIlOLPIl II EISNERDATE/CASE 10: 27 APR 2010 200901707
From: Siram, Somitra
1
UNCLASSIFIEDAppendix 2 Page 20
STATE-0240
sent:To:....- TuesClay, June 03, 2006 7:41 PM
Anerty, Tressa R(Baghdad)EV - doOOIe VS single verification
UNCLASSIFIED
I just realized that I don'l think anyone on. this end ever weighed in on the issue of verifying with the supervisor \IS.verifying with the supervisor and HR.
I wiU try to find out what I can from larry.
Sumitra SiramBureau of Population, Refugees, and MigrationU.S. Department of State202-663·1057
2
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Graving. Shannon A (WAS - X72584)
From:Sent:To:Cc:Subject:
Dear
Iraq, SIVApplication [[email protected]]Mnnnqv Mav 03.20102:23 PM
Graving, Shannon A (WAS - X72584)NVCSIV2010084004
We have received your email with attachments.
However, according to your DS157 , you are currently residing in the United States. Pleasesend a scanned copy of your visa and a brief explanation of how you entered the UnitedStates.
Please submit scanned copies of the missing documents to [email protected]. Uponour receipt of all of the items listed above, we can continue processing your' application.
Sincerely,VioletSIV UnitNational Visa CenterSerco IncSupport ContractorEmail: [email protected]: http://iraq.usembassy.gov/special_immigrant_visas.html
This email is Sensitive but Unclassified based on the definitions provided in 12 FAM 540.Any information in this transmission pertaining to the issuance or refusal of visas orpermits to enter the United States shall be considered confidential under Section 222(j) ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) [8 US C. Section 1202]. Access to and use of suchinformation must be solely for the formulation, amendment, administration, or' enforcement ofthe immigration, nationality, and other laws of the United states under INA 222(j) and asspecified in FAM guidance. If you have received such information in error, do not review,retransmit, disclose, disseminate, use, or take any action in reliance upon this information,and contact the sender as soon as possible.
Appendix 2 Page 28
x .. -
From:Sent:To:Cc:Subject:Attachments:
Dear Ma'am,
-,.. _...
Monday, May 03,20108:15 [email protected] Shannon A (WAS - X72584)Fw.
Thank you very much for your email. I wish you are doing well.
Regarding to my case I would like to inform you that I entered the United States as a Significant Public BenefitParolee. Attached are two documents evidencing my grant of Significant Public Benefit Parole and my approvalto travel to the US.
I have alternative office in DC represented by Miss Shanon who is helping me at the process. That alternativesent to SIV office in Baghdad full explanations about my situation.We got emails of Mr. Walter who asked us the same question and we sent to him the documents with briefing.
However,! forwarded to you the emails I got before from Mr. Walter and the alternative's answers.
I am really appreciate your helping and please be free to ask for any thing you need.
Sincerely
From: Graving, Shannon A (WAS - X72584)Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2010 11:28 AMTo: 'Iraq, SIVApplication'Subject: RE: NVCSIV2010084004
Dear Walter,I hope this email finds you well. _ _ entered the UnitedStates as a Significant Public Benefit Parolee. Attached are two documents evidencing his grant of SignificantPublic Benefit Parole and his approval to travel to the US. Please let me know if you have any otherquestions.
Thank you for all of your assistance. We greatly appreciate it.
Best regards,Shannon
Shannon A. Graving I Holland & KnightSenior Counsel I The List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies
2099 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 100 I Washington DC 20006
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Phone 202.419.2584 I Fax 202.955.5564
[email protected] I www.hklaw.com
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From: Iraq, SIVApplication [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 8:07 AMTo: Graving, Shannon A (WAS - X72584)Subject: RE: NVCSIV2010084004
Dear Shannon:
Th<mk you f()r your interest in the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Program.
According to your emaiL is currently residing in the United States. Please send a scanned copy ofvisa and a brief explanation of how you entered the United States.
Please submit scanned copies of the missing documents to IraqSIVapplication((i~state.gov. Upon ()lIr receipt ofall of the items listed above. we can continue processing your application.
Sincerely,
Walter
SIV Unit
National Visa Center
Serco IncSuppo11 Contractor
Email: [email protected]
Web: http://iraq.usembassy.gov/special_immigrant_visas.html
This email is Sensitive but Unclassified based on the definitionsprovided in 12 FAM 540.Any information in this transmission pertaining to the issuance or refusal of visas or permits to enter the United States shall be considered confidentialunder Section 222(j) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) f8 US C. Section 1202]. Access to and use of such information must be solely for theformulation, amendment, administration, or enforcement of the immigration, natiC'na/ity, and other laws of the United States under INA 222(j) and asspecified in FAM guidance. If you have received such information in error, do not review, retransmit, disclose, disseminate, us~~, or take any action inreliance upon this information, and contact the sender as soon as possible.
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