12-4-2015

RecommendationsforEnhancingBaltimoreCity’sPreparednessandResponsetoMassDemonstrationEvents

BasedonaReviewandAnalysisoftheEventsofApril2015

preparedby:

JonathanLinks,PhDProfessorofEnvironmentalHealthSciences,HealthPolicy&Management,Radiology,

EmergencyMedicine,PublicSafetyLeadership,CivilEngineering,andBusinessViceProvostandChiefRiskandComplianceOfficerDirector,CenterforPublicHealthPreparedness

DeputyDirector,OfficeofCriticalEventPreparednessandResponse

KatieO’ConorFellow,OfficeofCriticalEventPreparednessandResponse

LaurenSauer,MS

AssociateDirector,NationalCenterfortheStudyofPreparednessandCatastrophicEventResponse

ResearchAssociate,EmergencyMedicineandInternationalHealthSeniorAdvisor,OfficeofCriticalEventPreparednessandResponse

JohnsHopkinsUniversityBaltimore,Maryland

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INTRODUCTIONThisdocumentpresentsaseriesofrecommendations,andtherationaleforthoserecommendations,toenhanceBaltimoreCity’spreparednessforandresponsetomassdemonstrationevents.Therecommendationsareinformedbyanafter-actionanalysisofBaltimoreCity’sresponsetotheunrestintheaftermathofFreddieGray’sdeath,andtheassociatedfindingsthatcameoutofthatanalysis.ThisdocumentwaspreparedbyateamatJohnsHopkinsUniversityattherequestoftheCity.Thereportisbasedonpublicdocuments,mediacoverage,acity-wideafter-actionreviewmeetingonJune23,2015,andaseriesofin-depthinterviewswithcurrentandformerCityandStateofficialswhowereinvolvedintheincident’smanagement.Thegoalsofthisdocumentareto:

• identifygapsinBaltimoreCity’spreparednessformassdemonstrationevents• presentaroadmapforreform,includingaddressingthegaps• serveasasupplementtoothertrainingmaterialsformassdemonstrationmanagement

Ifimplementedfully,webelievetheserecommendationswillsubstantiallyimprovetheCity’spreparednessandcapacitytomanagemassdemonstrationsandwillmitigatetheriskofeventescalation.However,wedonotbelieve,withanysetofrecommendations,itispossibletocompletelyeliminatethepossibilityofariotinanymajorurbanenvironment.Ofmajorimportance,thescopeofthisdocumentiscity-wide.CityagencieshadvaryingdegreesofresponsibilityandcorrespondingactionsinresponsetotheunrestinApril2015,andwillcontinuetohavevaryingdegreesofinvolvementinthemanagementofanymassdemonstrationevent.Asmassdemonstrationshaveasignificantpublicsafetycomponent,manyofourrecommendationsfocusonaddressingopportunitieswithinpublicsafetyagencies,suchastheBaltimorePoliceDepartment(BPD).However,mostoftherecommendationshereinextendwellbeyondlawenforcement.Inordertoensureclearunderstandingoftheinteragencycollaborationrequired,wehaveexplicitlyidentifiedwhichofficesandagenciesweviewasthe“owners”ofeachrecommendation;theseofficesandagenciesacrosstheCityareinouropinionresponsiblefortheimplementationoftherecommendationstheyown.Inidentifying“owners”fortherecommendations,weareimplicitlymakingtwoimportantpoints:

1. Virtuallyeveryrecommendationhasmorethanoneprimaryowner,andmultiplesecondaryowners.Thisimpliesthatnorecommendationissoagency-specificthatonlyoneownerisnecessary.ThesuccessfulimplementationofallrecommendationsrequiresthattheMayor’sOfficeandmultipleCityagenciesactivelyworktogether.

2. WhilethefindingsthatinformedmanyoftherecommendationsidentifycircumstancesandeventsthatoccurredduringtheAprilunrest,therecommendationsthemselvesdependonpre-eventactivities(prevention,mitigation,andpreparednessactivities).

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Thisimpliesthatthemultipleownersmusteffectivelyworktogetheratalltimes,notjustduringamassdemonstrationeventitself.

AlthoughtherecommendationshereinfocusonareasforimprovementintheCity’spreparednessforandresponsetomassdemonstrations,itisimportanttoacknowledgethesignificantcontributionsinlateAprilandearlyMayofindividualsandagenciesacrosstheCityinrespondingtotheunrest,preventingfurtherescalation,andexpeditingrecovery.WhilewecannotcomprehensivelyacknowledgeeachofthepositivecontributionsfromtheCity’smanyagencies,allofwhomsignificantlyfacilitatedtheCity’sresponse,wewouldliketohighlightafewkeyexamples,withoutwhichtheCity’srecoverywouldbesignificantlydifferent:

• TheMayorandtheBaltimorePoliceCommissionerfacedunprecedentedchallengeswiththecity-wideunrest,managingissuesofmultilayeredcomplexityandlongevity.Theytookchargeoftheincident,ratherthancedingresponsibilitytoothers.

• BPDofficersrespondedwithcourageandrestraintamidachallengingandunfamiliardynamic.

• BaltimoreCityFireDepartment(BCFD)firefighterssuccessfullyrespondedtoeveryfirecallduringtheunrest,inenvironmentswheretheinherentfirefightingriskswerecompoundedbythreatsandactsofpropertydamageandpersonalinjurybyprotestors.

• TheMayor’sOfficeofEmergencyManagement(MOEM)supportedincidentcommand,andprovidedcross-agencyresourcesthroughouttheresponse.

• TheBaltimoreCityDepartmentofTransportation(DOT)remainedcommittedtoitsmissionofensuringsafeandclearfunctionalroadwaysandtransportationthroughoutthecity.

• TheBaltimoreCityHealthDepartment(BCHD)implementedanoperationalstrategyofresponsivenessandflexibility,withtacticssuchascoordinatingcommunicationsamonghealthcarefacilitiesacrossthecity,implementingcommunityresponseactivitieslikemedicationdeliveryandhotlines,andrespondingtoout-of-scoperequestsbyotheragencies.

• RecoveryeffortsandphysicalcleanupwerepromptduetotheresponsivenessandflexibilityoftheDepartmentofPublicWorks(DPW).Therapidphysicalrecoveryservedasapositivefactorinexpeditingsocialrecoveryandencouragingpeaceandresolutionofunrestinthecity.

• Multipleagencies,includingBCFD,DOT,andDPW,activatedandeffectivelymanagedtheirownseparatecommandcentersbasedonIncidentCommandSystem(ICS)principlestofacilitateagency-levelresponse.

• NeighboringjurisdictionsandStateagencieswerewillingtoprovidemutualaid,whichenhancedtheCity’scapacitytorespond.

Thisreportisorganizedasaseriesoffindingsandrecommendationsinthefollowingkeyareas:

• Strategy,Policy,andTactics• IncidentCommand

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• InformationandCommunications• Preparedness,ResourceManagement,Equipment,andTraining• Health,Safety,andMorale

Ofimportance,ourapproachisstronglyforward-looking.WhileourrecommendationsareinformedbyfindingsfromtheAprilevents,ourintentisthattherecommendationsareindependentlyvalid,basedonwell-supportedtenets,literature,andempiricalanalysisfromthefield,andcouldbeusedtoinformthedevelopmentofmassdemonstrationpoliciesandproceduresforanyjurisdiction.Inthisregard,wehopethisdocumenthelpstheCitybecomealeadingexampleofbestpractices.FINDINGSANDRECOMMENDATIONS1.STRATEGY,POLICY,ANDTACTICSFinding1.1:TheCityhadinadequatepolicyandguidelinesformassdemonstrationmanagement,andhadnotappropriatelyrecognizedtheextentofthestrategicandtacticaldistinctionbetweenroutineoperationsandmassdemonstrationmanagement.InternaldirectionandpubliccommunicationfromCityleadershipsuggestedadefactostrategyofnegotiatedmanagementandmassdemonstrationforcerestraint,butthisincompletestrategywasnotclearlydefinednoradequatelycommunicatedthroughouttheCity’sagencies,toprovideactionabletacticalguidancetoagencyheads,fieldpersonnel,orunitleaders.Recommendation1.1:TheCityshouldexplicitlydevelopwrittenpoliciesandguidelinesregardingmassdemonstrationmanagement,whichdefinetheoverallstrategicapproachaswellasthetacticalresponseframework.Thesepoliciesorguidelinesshouldbuildonthecurrentimplicitapproachofnegotiatedmanagement,situationde-escalationandproblem-solving,andforcerestraint,whilefurtherincorporatinglawenforcementbestpractices.Owners:Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor’sOfficeSecondary:BPD,MOEM,DOT,MarylandTransitAdministration(MTA),DPW,BCFD,BCHD,MarylandStatePolice(MSP),BaltimoreCitySchoolsPolice(BCSP),BaltimoreCitySheriff’sOffice(Sheriff),Mayor’sOfficeofCriminalJustice(MOCJ),MarylandDepartmentofPublicSafetyandCorrectionalServices(MDPSCS),Mayor’sOfficeofNeighborhoods(MON),mutualaidpartnersRationalefortheRecommendation:Themodernpolicingapproachtomassdemonstrationsandprotestsincludesmanagingrather

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thanrepressingdemonstrators,protectingtheFirstAmendmentrightsoffreespeechandpeaceableassembly,andguaranteeingdueprocess.Currentbestpracticesincludebeingwillingtolisten,negotiate,tolerateminorinfractions(withthegoalofpeacekeepingratherthanstrictenforcementofalllaws),andkeepalowprofile–usingtime,patienceandcommunicationtofacilitatelawfulprotestandobtainvoluntarycompliance.Savinglivesismoreimportantthanprotectingpropertyorsymbolsperse.Massdemonstrationsshouldhelpcreate,notundermine,politicalstability,throughthesupportedexercisingoffreespeech.Thismodernapproachrestson7ideals:

1. Policeareservantsofthelaw,nottheprivatearmyofwhomeverhappenstobeinpower.

2. Thelawandpolicyarebeingextendedtotacticsthathadoncebeenignoredandunregulated.

3. Thelawmustbeviewedflexiblyandabroadpragmaticviewofthelikelyconsequencesofpoliceactionneedstobetaken.

4. Theprimarygoalofpoliceinconventionalcrowdsituationsistomanagethemtoseethattheydonotgetoutofhand.

5. Thereisanemphasisonpreventionratherthanonrespondingafterthefact.6. Thereshouldbea“coproductionoforder”involvingadecentralizedanddelegated

relianceoncitizenstomobilizethelawandtocontrolthemselvesandothers.7. Thereisanemphasisonscienceandtechnologyinvolving(a)relativelydispassionate

intelligencegatheringandanalysisand(b)effortstoengineerphysicalandsocialenvironments.1

CrowdManagement:Massdemonstrationstypicallyconveneforthepurposeofpublicizingamessage,drawingattentiontoacause,andexpressingsupportforordissentagainstpublicpolicies,politicalissues,governmentorcorporateconduct,socialphenomena,andnumerousotherconcerns.TheFirstAmendmentexpresslyprotectstherightsoffreespeechandpeacefulassemblybyparticipants;lawenforcementpersonnelinvolvedinmassdemonstrationmanagementhavealegaldutytoprotecttheserights.Withinthislawfulframework,activitymaybehighlydynamicandinfluencedbytheobjectivesofindividualparticipants.Unlawfulbehaviormayoccurbyaselectfewinitiatorswithariskofescalatingtoincorporatethelargergroup.TheInternationalAssociationofChiefsofPolicerecommendsthatlawenforcementresponse“shallplaceonlythoselimitationsandrestrictionsondemonstrationsnecessarytomaintainpublicsafetyandorder.”2Ensuringthelegalprotectionsoflawfulparticipantswhileminimizingunlawfulactivityrequirescarefulbalance.TheCenterforDomesticPreparedness(CDP)trainingmanualforFieldForceOperations(“FFOManual”)providesguidelinesfornavigatingthesecomplexobjectives:Inconsideringmassdemonstrationmanagement,it’scriticaltoclearlydistinguishbetweenlawfulandunlawfulactivities.Althoughcrowdstendtobecategorizedaseitherlawfulorunlawful,theyareoftenablendofboth,andtheindividualsinvolvedcanengageinvarious

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behaviors.Insomecases,asmallgroupofunrulyprotesterscanstandoutfromthepeacefulmajority,oftencomprisedofonlookerswhojustwanttobetherealongwithinnocentbystandersaccidentallycaughtinthemelee.Thegoalforlawenforcementshouldbetoprotectlawfulactivitywhileidentifyingandisolatingunlawfulbehavior.3

Thefollowinggeneraldefinitionsaremergedconceptscompiledfromstatestatutesandlegalresources,includingBlack’sLawDictionary:

• Protest.Anorganized,publicdemonstrationofdisapprovalaboutasituation,suchassocialinjustice,achangeinlaws,agovernmentpolicy,oraninstitutionalaction.

• CivilDisobedience.Therefusaltoobeycivillawsinanefforttochangeingovernmentalpolicyorlegislation;characterizedbyusingpassiveresistanceofothernonviolentmeans.

• UnlawfulAssembly.Ameetingofnumerouspeoplewhointendeithertocommitaviolentcrimeortocarryoutsomeact,lawfulorunlawful,thatwillconstituteabreachofthepeace.

• CivilDisturbance.Groupactsofviolenceanddisorderprejudicialtopubliclawandorder.

• CivilDisorder.Anypublicdisturbanceinvolvingnumerouspeoplewhocommitviolentactsthatcauseimmediatedangerorinjurytopeopleorproperty.

• Riot.Anunlawfuldisturbanceofthepeacebyanassemblyofnumerouspeopleactingwithacommonpurposeinaviolentortumultuousmannerthatthreatensorterrorizesthepublic.3

TheCaliforniaCommissiononPeaceOfficerStandardsandTraining(“CAPOST”)recommendsusingatieredsetofinterventionandresponsestrategies,asasituationescalates,fromcrowdmanagementtocrowdinterventiontocrowdcontrol:

• CrowdManagement.Atthelowestlevelofresponse,lawenforcementrespondstoallformsofpublicassemblies,includingstrategiesandtacticsemployedbefore,during,andafteragatheringtomaintaintheevent’slawfulactivities.

• CrowdIntervention.Intheintermediatelevelofresponse,lawenforcementrespondstopre-plannedorspontaneousactivitiestoisolateunlawfulbehaviorthatimpactspublicsafetywhileallowingtheevent,activity,oroccurrencetocontinue.

• CrowdControl.Atthehighestlevelofresponse,lawenforcementrespondstopre-plannedorspontaneousactivitiesthathavebecomeunlawfulorviolentandmayrequirearrestsanddispersalofthecrowd.3,4

Inthisregard,westronglysupportBPD’scurrent(post-April)explicitdistinctionbetweenpeacefuldemonstrationsandprotestsversusriots.Wethinkthisdistinctioniscritical,becausetheCityhasanaffirmativeobligationtoprotectthehealthandsafetyofdemonstratorswhoarepeaceful,andanequalobligationtoprotectthehealthandsafetyofitscitizensduringariot.Inthisregard,itshouldbenotedthatmostmassdemonstrationsstartpeacefully;however,itis

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possibleforaspontaneousriottoemergeinresponsetoaninitiatingevent.Furthermore,multipleindependentriotsmayco-occurindifferentpartsoftheCity;plansmustaccountforthesepossibilities.EscalatedForcevs.NegotiatedManagement:Inthe1960sandearly1970s,protestpolicingwasbasedonthephilosophyofescalatedforce,inwhichincreasingdisruptionandviolenceonthepartofprotestorswasmetwithincreasingforceonthepartofthepolice.Becausethisapproachoftenresultedinviolencebybothprotestorsandthepolicethatwasdeemedunacceptablebythepublic,analternativeapproach–negotiatedmanagement–aroseinthelate1970sand1980s,gainingwidespreadacceptanceinthe1990s.Thetermnegotiatedmanagementisbasedonitscentraluseofdialoguebetweenprotestorsandthepolice,bothbeforeandduringanymassdemonstration.Theapproachisbasedonanunderlyingphilosophythatvaluesprotectionoffreespeechrights,toleranceforsomedisruption,de-escalation,andavoidanceofpoliceforceunlessabsolutelynecessary.Negotiatedmanagementisthecurrentprevailingphilosophicalapproachintheliterature,andwestronglyadvocatefortheCitytoincorporatetheseprinciplesintoitspolicies.ExplicitCity-wideStrategyandTacticsforMassDemonstrationManagement:Itisclearfromtheafter-actionreviewmeetingandsubsequentinterviewsthatnoformalCity-widepolicyregardingthehandlingofdemonstrationsandprotestsexists,norwasanysituation-specificpolicydisseminatedaheadoftheeventsonSaturdayandMonday(althoughtheBaltimoreCityFraternalOrderofPoliceLodge#3AfterActionReview(“FOPAAR”)statesthatofficerswereexplicitlyorderednottoengageprotestors5).Westronglyrecommendthatsuchapolicyorsetofguidelinesbedeveloped,vetted,disseminated(withinCitygovernment),andtrainedandexercised.Suchapolicywouldinclude(ataminimum)thefollowingconsiderations:

• ProtectionofFirstAmendmentrights–activefacilitationofdemonstrationsandprotests,andprotectionofsafetyandhealthofdemonstrators/protestors

• Escalatedforcevs.negotiatedmanagement–thebalancebetweentraditionalandmodernprotestpolicing

• Attireandgear–astrategytoresistdonningriotgearunlessofficersafetyisinjeopardy,becauseimagesofofficersinfullgearcanintimidateandescalatetension3,6

• Rulesofengagement/useofforce–theapplicationoftheagency’suse-of-forcecontinuumormodel,whichingeneralshouldnotbeadjustedormodifiedformassdemonstrationevents

Inthisregard,werecommendthefollowingguidelinesformassdemonstrationmanagement,whicharederivedfromcurrentbestpractices,after-actionreviews,lawenforcementresearch,andthemostrecentrecommendationsfromlawenforcementtrainingcenters.Ateachleveloftacticalresponse,theDepartment’stoppriorityshouldbetovalueandpreservehumanlife,

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withagoalofde-escalation,containment,andpreventionoffurtherescalation.Ourrecommendedguidelinesareasfollows:• Community-andcrowd-directedeffortstomaintainpeaceandminimizeandde-escalate

tensionsatsourceo communicationoflawenforcement’speacekeepingroletothecrowdand

expectationsforbehavioro collaborationwithcrowdleaderstoidentifyfreespeechareasandoptimalroutes

fortrafficflowo engagementwithcrowdleaderstoassessrisksandopportunitiesforde-escalationo avoidanceofmilitarizedpresentationindemonstrationphase,weapons/gearnot

visibleuntilneededo intelligence-drivenmonitoringforindividualsaimingtoexploitdemonstrationsfor

ulteriormotiveso designatedcommunitycontactstoleverageestablishedrelationshipsandmaintain

trustandrapport• Protectionofdemonstratorsandpublic

o provisionandprotectionofafreespeechzonetoprotectindividuals’legalrightstopeacefullyassemble,withadherencetoapplicableregulationsandcaselaw

o periodicassessmentofcrowdhealthandsafetyo provisionofpublicinformation(e.g.JointInformationCenter[JIC],community

impactphoneline/website)o protectionofcriticalinfrastructureasahighpriorityo monitoringofescalationofdemonstratorbehavioro useofrepeatedverbalwarningstolawviolatorsbeforeanylawenforcementactiono deploymentofforceinaccordancewithpolicytominimizeinjuryanddistress

• Protectionofallpersonnel/responders’health,safety,andmorale

o designatedpersonneltomanageschedules,food/water,exposure(weather,medical),fatigue,stress

o monitoringofresourceneedsandscalabilitytoproactivelymaintainpreparednessforescalation

o protectionofpersonnelfromphysicalinjuryandtraumao protectionofpersonnelfromlatentinjury(moraleinterventions,identityprotection)

• IncidentCommand:clearroles,chainofcommand,limitedspanofcontrol,appropriateintel

andcommunicationso identificationofincidentcommanderanddistinctindividualstoleadoperations,

planning,andlogisticso clearseparationbetweenCity-wideICSandBPDoperationscommando respectanddisciplinearoundICSrolesandreportingversusroutineprocedureso maintenanceofmanageablespanofcontrol,witheachsupervisordirectingupto8

personnel(5preferred)

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o adherencetounityofcommand,witheveryindividualhavingoneroleandonesupervisor

o attentiontobothinternalandexternalcommunications,witheffectiveJointInformationSystem

o effectiveintelligencegathering,verification,andsharingacrosstheICS• Clearcommunicationofstrategytofieldpersonnel

o clearlystatedcrowdcontrolstrategyandrapidcommunicationofchangeso communicationoftacticaldirectiontofieldpersonnelandtargetedmobilefield

force(MFF)platoonso clearchainofcommand,reportingstructure,andresponsibilitieso policiesandproceduresforuse-of-forceandarrests

• Use-of-forceandarrestdecisionsinadherencetopolicystandardsforjustification,safety,

documentationo useoftheminimumamountofforcenecessarytoachievetacticalobjectiveso minimizationofinjuryanddistress,andprotectionofthesafetyofdemonstrators,

bystanders,andpersonnelo forcedeploymentbasedonindividualandcrowdactionsandcompliancewithverbal

instructionso isolationofindividualactorswithoutcompromisingtherightsofthelargercrowdo less-lethalforceonlywhennecessary,adherenttostandardsforjustification,

authorization,andnoticeo limitedarreststargetedtolawviolatorswhoaredirectlythreateningthesafetyand

rightsofothers• Effectiveutilizationofverifiedinformation/intelligencebystrategicleaders(e.g.,Incident

Commander[IC])o maintainstaffforcollectinginformationviacommunitycontacts,socialmedia,etc.o intelligencepersonnelverifyinformationandrapidlycommunicatetotheICvia

securemethodso strategicleadersuseverifiedintelligencetoinformdecisionso rapiddisseminationofrelevantintelligenceacrosstheICS,fieldpersonnel,andother

appropriateparties• Coordinated,scalablecity-wideinteragencycollaborationandeffectivedeploymentof

mutualaidasneededo effectivecollaborationbetweencityleaders,publicagenciesrespondingtoevents,

andstakeholderso clearleadershipviaagreed-uponcommandstructureo assessmentandcommunicationofeventstatus,withpreparednessforrangeof

possibleescalationso effectivecommunicationwithpartneragenciestoidentifyresourceneedsand

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mobilizeeffectivelyInaddition,werecommendthefollowinggeneralprinciples:

• Allprotestsareassumedtostartaspeacefuldemonstrations.Insuchasetting,thepriorityoflawenforcementisprotectionofthehealthandsafetyoftheprotestors.

• Ifprotestordemonstrationactivityescalateswithincreasingthreattopublicsafetyandlife,progressivetacticalresponseisinitiated.

• Thetacticalresponseiscalibratedtotheactionsoftheprotestors/rioters,withescalationtriggersbasedonindividualandcrowdactionsandcompliancewith(orresistanceto)lawenforcementverbalinstructions.

• Ateachlevelofthetacticalresponse,theobjectivesarebasedontheCity’stopprioritytovalueandpreservehumanlife,withthegoalsofde-escalation,containment,andpreventionoffurtherescalation.

• Individualactorsmayengageinbehaviorthatdiffersfromthelargercrowdasawhole.Responsestothoseindividualsmaynecessitateelevatedtargetedresponse,whichshouldnotcompromisetherightsofthelargercrowd.

• Theconditionsdrivingagiventacticalresponsewilllikelyvarybyspecificlocationduringanyincident.Escalationofresponseisthustreatedinreal-timeasanon-scenelocaltacticaldecision.

• Ateachlevelofthetacticalresponse,theminimumamountofforcenecessarytoachievetacticalobjectivesshouldbeused.

• AllactionstakenbyBPDofficersshouldbeconsistentwiththeDepartment’sUse-of-ForcePolicy.

OperationalTacticsinaProtestorRiot:TheCitymustconsiderspecificmassdemonstrationtactics,becausemassdemonstration,protest,andriotpolicingissignificantlydifferent–bothstrategicallyandtactically–thanroutinepolicing.AccordingtothePoliceExecutiveResearchForum(PERF):

Policeformationssuchascolumns,skirmishlines,wedges,half-stepmovements,andcontrolledrushes,whenproperlyemployedagainstalargegathering,areamongthemostpracticalmethodsofcrowdcontrol.Formationsmaybeemployedtodisperse,contain,moveorblocklargenumbersofpeople.Theuseofformationsisparticularlyeffectivewhenattemptingtodispersecrowdsinurbanareasbecausetheyenablethepolicetosplitacrowdintosmallersegments…Oncethedeterminationhasbeenmadetodeploypoliceinformations,appropriatesupportmustbeinplacetoprovideasuitablemeasureofofficersafety.Sinceofficersintheformationwillbefocusedonthecrowdbeforethem,otherofficersmustbeinplacetoprotecttheformationlinefromanattackonablindside.7

Theuseofsuchformationsmustconsiderthestrategicgoal–forexample,defensiverather

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thanoffensivepurposes,containmentratherthandispersal–andthetacticsmustfollowaccordingly.CDPprovidesguidelinesfortacticalformationsinitsFFOManual,whichmaybeconsultedinstrategydevelopment.3Ingeneral,thestrategicgoalisde-escalation,containment,andpreventionoffurtherescalation.Thestrategicgoalsframeacriticalcompaniondocument–anoperationalortacticalplan.InNIMSparlance,suchaplaniscalledanIncidentActionPlan(IAP).Ofimportance,iftheCity’sphilosophicapproachtomassdemonstrationmanagementhadbeenmorefullyformedandmorewidelyunderstoodbeforeApril,moreextensiveandeffectiveoperationalplanningandimplementationcouldhavebeendone,includingthewiderutilizationofCityIAPsanddevelopmentofBPDIAPsduringthistimeperiod.ResponsePosture,Attire,andPersonnelProtectionConsiderations:Theprotectionofrespondersisparamountinamassdemonstrationscenario.However,theappearanceofheavilyprotectedofficersiscontroversialandsendsastrongmessagetomassdemonstrationparticipantsandthepublic.Historically,thiswasviewedtohaveadeterrenteffectandassistinmaintainingpublicconfidencethatpoliceareincontrol.However,increasingevidencefromeventanalysisandresearchsuggeststhatthisimagealsocanhaveanegativeeffectonprotestersandthegeneralpublic.Forexample,mediaaccountsofprotectedofficersfacingoffagainstpeacefuldemonstratorscanleadtoapublicperceptionthatthepolicearebeingheavy-handedandoverreacting.Assuch,thePresident’sTaskForceon21stCenturyPolicingReport(“21stCenturyPolicingReport”),theU.S.DepartmentofJustice(DOJ)OfficeofCommunity-OrientedPolicingServicesAfter-ActionAssessmentofthePoliceResponsetotheAugust2014DemonstrationsinFerguson,Missouri(“DOJCOPSReport”),CDP’sFFOManual,andPERFallstronglyrecommendagainstaninitialuseofriotresponsepostureandparamilitaryprotectivegear.3,6–8Thus,whilethedeploymentofprotectedofficersmaybeanecessarypartofthepoliceresponse,thetimingandnatureoftheirdeploymentshouldbecarefullybalancedagainstthepotentialnegativeeffectsofsuchaction.Ingeneral,theaboveconsiderationsimplythatBPDshouldhavean“attirecontinuum”analogoustoause-of-forcecontinuum.Suchacontinuumwouldstartwithstandarddailyattire,andprogresstotheuseofpersonalprotectiveequipmentandriotgearasappropriate.Thiscontinuumcouldbeimplementedbyhavingofficersdonadditionalgearasasituationescalates,orbyhavingpre-stagedteamsindifferentgearavailabletoenablerapidmobilizationanddemobilizationtomeettheneedsofthesituation.Atallpointsalongsuchanattirecontinuum,badgesandnametagsshouldbeprominentlyandconsistentlydisplayed.Utilizationofrobustmassdemonstrationstrategies,effectivecommunicationandtacticalimplementation,andcomprehensivepersonnelsupportmeasureswillultimatelyassistinriskmitigationandpersonnelprotection.Bestpractices,after-actionreviews,lawenforcementresearch,andthemostrecentguidelinesdevelopedbylawenforcementtrainingcentersshouldbeconsultedinthedevelopmentofCitypoliciesgoverningmassdemonstrationmanagement.

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Finding1.2:Anyeffectivemassdemonstrationstrategyincorporatingnegotiatedmanagementispredicatedonabaselinerelationshipofcommunitytrust,collaboration,andproceduraljustice,whicharecharacteristicsofmoderncommunitypolicing.BPD’sstrategicandtacticalapproachestocommunitypolicingareincomplete,andpriorinitiativesincommunitypolicinghavebeenincompletelyimplementedandsupportedbypriorBPDleadership.Asaresult,therelationshipbetweenBPDandtheCity’sresidentsiscomplexandvariable.ResidentslooktoBPDforneighborhoodprotectionandcrimereduction,whilealsoharboringfearofandconcernforinappropriateadministrationofauthorityandforce.Intheabsenceofaclear,comprehensive,andformalizeddepartment-wideapproachtocommunitypolicing,thesedynamicsare,atpresent,largelyshapedbyindividualofficers’personalitiesandpersonalapproaches(positiveornegative).BPD’scurrentleadershiphasrecommittedresourcestobuildingcommunitycollaborationandfootpatrolbestpractices,butdepartment-wideinitiativesinthisregardarenascent.Recommendation1.2:BPDshouldcontinuetobuildadepartment-widecultureandpracticeofproceduraljusticeandmoderncommunitypolicing,including(andperhapsespecially)footpatrolandrelationshipbuilding,explicitlydefiningtheattributesoftheorganizationalphilosophyandidentifyingclear,simple,actionableguidelinesforfieldpersonnel.Commendations,incentives,andpromotionsshouldreinforcethisphilosophy.TheCityshouldendorseandfacilitateBPD’srecommitmenttothesevalues.Owners:Primary:BPDSecondary:Mayor’sOffice,BCSP,MOCJ,MDPSCS,BaltimoreHousing(HABC),MONRationalefortheRecommendation:ProceduralJustice:The21stCenturyPolicingReportemphasizesthecentralimportanceofcommunitypolicing.8Insodoing,theTaskForceinvokedthecriticalroleofproceduraljustice.Procedurallyjustbehaviorconsistsofthefollowingfourelements:

• Treatingpeoplewithdignityandrespect• Givingindividuals“voice”duringencounters• Beingneutralandtransparentindecision-making• Conveyingtrustworthymotives8

InaPERFwhitepaperonthetopic,YalelawprofessorTomTylerlinksproceduraljusticewithlegitimacy:

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“Legitimacyreflectsthebeliefthatthepoliceoughttobeallowedtoexercisetheirauthoritytomaintainsocialorder,manageconflictsandsolveproblemsintheircommunities.Legitimacyisreflectedinthreejudgments.Thefirstispublictrustandconfidenceinthepolice.Suchconfidenceinvolvesthebeliefthatthepolicearehonest,thattheytrytodotheirjobswell,andthattheyaretryingtoprotectthecommunityagainstcrimeandviolence.Second,legitimacyreflectsthewillingnessofresidentstodefertothelawandtopoliceauthority,i.e.theirsenseofobligationandresponsibilitytoacceptpoliceauthority.Finally,legitimacyinvolvesthebeliefthatpoliceactionsaremorallyjustifiedandappropriatetothecircumstances.Proceduraljusticecanbeviewedasameanstoattaininglegitimacyandcanbedefinedintermsoffourissues.First,peoplewanttohaveanopportunitytoexplaintheirsituationortelltheirsideofthestorytoapoliceofficer.Thisopportunitytomakeargumentsandpresentevidenceshouldoccurbeforethepolicemakedecisionsaboutwhattodo.Peopleareinterestedinhavinganopportunitytotelltheirstoryorstatetheircase;thatis,theywanttohaveavoice.Thisistruebothwhenpoliciesarebeingdevelopedandwhenofficersimplementthemonthestreet.Second,peoplereacttoevidencethattheauthoritieswithwhomtheyaredealingareneutral.Thisinvolvesofficersmakingdecisionsbaseduponconsistentlyappliedlegalprinciplesandthefactsofanincident,notanofficer’spersonalopinionsandbiases.Transparencyandopennessaboutwhattherulesandproceduresareandhowdecisionsarebeingmadefacilitatesthebeliefthatdecision-makingproceduresareneutral.Thishelpsthepolicetobeseentobeactingneutrally.Third,peoplearesensitivetowhethertheyaretreatedwithdignityandpoliteness,andtowhethertheirrightsarerespected.Theissueofinterpersonaltreatmentconsistentlyemergesasakeyfactorinreactionstodealingswithlegalauthorities.Peoplebelievethattheyareentitledtotreatmentwithrespectandreactverynegativelytodismissiveordemeaninginterpersonaltreatment.Finally,peoplefocusoncuesthatcommunicateinformationabouttheintentionsandcharacterofthelegalauthoritieswithwhomtheyaredealing(their“trustworthiness”).Peoplereactfavorablywhentheybelievethattheauthoritieswithwhomtheyareinteractingarebenevolentandcaring,andaresincerelytryingtodowhatisbestforthepeoplewithwhomtheyaredealing.Authoritiescommunicatethistypeofconcernwhentheylistentopeople’saccountsandexplainorjustifytheiractionsinwaysthatshowanawarenessofandsensitivitytopeople’sneedsandconcerns.Researchhasshownthatwhenthepublicbelievesthatthepoliceexercisetheirauthorityintheseprocedurallyjustways,theyacceptthelegitimacyofthepoliceanddefertopoliceauthority,bothinparticularsituationsandthroughagenerallyincreasedlevelofcompliancewiththelawandcooperationwiththepolice.Ofparticularimportanceisthefindingthattheuseoffairproceduresencouragesvoluntaryacceptanceofpoliceandlegal

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authority,aswellasrespectforthebroaderjusticesystem.Thisisimportantbecauseitmeansthatpeoplearemorewillingtotakeresponsibilityontheirownforacceptingthelimitsontheirbehaviorspelledoutinthelaw.Absentsuchcommunitybuy-in,thepolicemustoftenrevisitproblematicpeopleandsituationsandtrytomotivateunwillingmembersofthecommunitytochangetheirbehavior.”9

ThepathtostrengthentherelationshipbetweentheCity,BPD,andthecommunityitservesiscomplexandrequiresongoingcommitmentandcollaboration.BPDshouldcontinueitsrecenteffortstoprioritizetherebuildingofcommunityrelationshipsandthepracticeofcommunityfootpatrolandproceduraljustice.Finding1.3:BPDpersonneldemonstratedinitialforcerestraintattheonsetoftheincidents,withminimal-to-nodeploymentofless-lethalforceandnodeploymentoflethalforce,despitenoclearpolicy,inconsistentcommunications,andanunclearstrategyonuse-of-forceinmassdemonstrations.Forcerestraintlikelypreventedfurtherescalationofcrowdactivityanddamagetocommunity,aswellaspreventinglonger-termdamagetoBPD-communityrelationships,althoughitalsoputfront-lineofficersatriskattimes.BPD’scurrentUse-of-ForcePolicydoesnotexplicitlydefinetheparametersofforceescalationandde-escalation,theuse-of-forcecontinuum,ortheconditionsandguidelinesfordeploymentofless-lethalandlethalinstruments.Furthermore,BPD’sStandardOperatingProcedureforResponsetoCrowdControlIncidentslackssufficientproceduralguidanceondirectpoliceaction,includinguse-of-force,duringmassdemonstrationevents.Recommendation1.3:BPDshouldcontinuetoendorseforcerestraintinmassdemonstrationmanagement,andexpanditsUse-of-ForcePolicytodefineparametersofforceescalationandde-escalation,andtheconditionsandguidelinesfordeploymentofless-lethalandlethalinstruments.BPDshouldalsoexpanditsstandardoperatingprocedures(SOP)tobemorecomprehensive,explicitanddirective,andshouldexplicitlyharmonizethePolicyandSOPdocuments.Owners:Primary:BPDSecondary:Mayor’sOffice,MSP,BCSP,Sheriff,BCHD,MDPSCS,lawenforcementmutualaidpartnersRationalefortheRecommendation:TheUse-of-ForcePolicymustdefineparametersfortheuseofallinstrumentsandmunitions,andshouldinclude:

• theconditionsrequiredtodeploytheinstrument• theauthoritydesignatedtomakethesedeterminationsfordeployment• thepersonnelauthorizedtocarryandphysicallydeploytheinstrument

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• thespecificproceduresofdeployment• therequirementsforprotectingthesafetyofpersonnelandpublic• thedocumentationrequired• referencestoanyrelevantlegalparameters• trainingrequirementsandprotocols

Less-lethalInstrumentsandDeadlyForceWeapons:Aclassofinstruments/weaponsparticularlyrelevanttodemonstrations,protests,andriotsareless-lethalinstruments(alsoreferredtoasless-than-lethalornon-deadlyweaponsormunitions,althoughtheyhavethepotentialforlethalconsequences).Thedeploymentofsuchinstrumentsshouldbeconsideredalast-resorttacticforcrowdmanagement,onlyafterpeaceablemethodsandsituationmanagementhavefailedtosubdueacrowdescalatinginviolence.3,6Therearetwocriticalquestionstoaskandanswerbeforedeployingsaidinstruments:Istheinstrumentbestsuitedtoremovethethreattofront-lineofficersandenablethemtomaintainorregaintheirobjectives?Isitsusereasonable,balanced,andproportionateinlightofthespecificcircumstances?Inthisregard,PERFrecommendsthefollowingguidelinesforthedeploymentanduseofless-lethaloptions:

• Theusemustbebalancedagainstthethreatfacedbyfront-lineofficersandthegoalofficersareattemptingtoaccomplish(e.g.,contain,makearrests,quelldisorder);

• Theoptionshouldbeusedonlyuntilthedesiredeffectisachieved;• Useshouldbefrequentlyreassessedtoensurecontinuedneedfordeployment;• Thedeploymentanduseshouldbeauthorizedattheagreedsupervisory/command

level;• Thedecisionandthecircumstancesleadingtotheuseshouldbedocumentedto

supportafter-actionreportingandanysubsequentinquiryorlitigation;• Theincidentcommander,operationalcommander,tacticalcommander,andpublic

informationofficermustbekeptaccuratelyinformedonusetoallowthemtoupdatemediaspokespersonsandtomaintainthemediainitiative;

• Theincidentcommander,operationalcommander,tacticalcommander,fieldofficersandsupervisorsmusthavedetailedknowledgeoftheeffectandlimitationsofeachoptiontoassistinauthorizinguse;and

• Officersdeployedinthefieldwithless-lethaloptionsmust,withoutexception:o Befullytrainedintheiruse,includingregularrefreshertrainingo Befullyawareofthecapabilitiesoftheoptiono Befullyawareofthelimitationsoftheoptiono Beempoweredtomakethefinaldecisiontouse,ornottouse,theoptionas

circumstancesdictate.10TheU.S.DepartmentofJustice(DOJ)OfficeofCommunity-OrientedPolicingServicesAfter-

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ActionAssessmentofthePoliceResponsetotheAugust2014DemonstrationsinFerguson,Missouri(“DOJCOPSReport”)hadseveralrecommendationsspecificallytogoverntheuseofteargas:

• Fortheverylimitedcircumstanceswhenteargasisused,lawenforcementmustdeployteargasonlywhenpeoplehaveameansofsafeegressandafterappropriatewarningsareclearlyannouncedandsufficienttimeisallowedforindividualstoleavethearea.

• Lawenforcementagenciesshoulddevelopanacceptedaudiorecordingofawarningthatless-lethalweapons,suchasteargas,areabouttobedeployedinadvanceofacriticalincident.Thiswarningcanbereplayedviathepublicaddresssystemtoensurethatcorrectandconsistentinformationisprovided.[Authors’note:Additionalconsiderationsshouldbemadetoensurecommunicationtoandsafetyofhearing-impairedindividualsandothersprotectedbytheAmericanswithDisabilitiesAct.]

• Lawenforcementagenciesshouldassessenvironmentalconditions(e.g.,weather,winddirection,proximitytodenselypopulatedarea,potentialimpactonthesafetyofcitizensaswellaslawenforcement)priortodeployinggastominimizecollateralimpactoninnocentparties.6

Bestpractices,after-actionreviews,lawenforcementresearch,andthemostrecentguidelinesdevelopedbylawenforcementtrainingcentersshouldbeconsultedinthedevelopmentofaUse-of-ForcePolicy.Lawenforcementapproachesarecontinuallyevolving,asexemplifiedbythesignificantchangesbetweenthe2007and2013versionsofCDP’sFFOManual.3Assuch,BPD’spoliciesshouldbereviewedandupdatedyearlytoensurealignmentwiththemostup-to-datebestpractices.ManagingPublicExpectations:Thepublicwillinevitablybeexposedtoanabundanceofmediacoverageofanydemonstrationorprotestthatturnsviolent.Thepublic’sperceptionswillbeprimarilyformedbythatcoverage.ItisthuscriticalthattheCityattempttoproactivelymanagepublicexpectations,withtransparentandtimelycommunicationsaboutbothpolicyandtactics,totheextentthelattercanbedisclosedwithoutcompromise(seeRecommendations3.5,3.6).Inthisregard,theCityneedstoconsiderdifferencesbetweenlawenforcementprofessionalsandthepublicwithrespecttothedrawingordeploymentofanyinstrumentorweapon,includingbothless-lethalanddeadlyweapons.Whilealawenforcementprofessionalmaynotconsideraninstrumentorweapondeployeduntilitisactuallyused,theimpactonthepublicandthetoneconveyedinthemediaoccurwhentheinstrumentisdrawn.Finding1.4:TheCityhadnowrittenpolicyandanunclearstrategyoncriticalinfrastructureprotection,whichresultedinunforeseenbutpredictableconsequences.Thedecisionsonwhethertodirectlysecurecriticalinfrastructureentitiessuchaspharmacies,healthclinics,andhospitals,aswellasthedecisionsonwhethertofacilitatefiredepartmentpersonnelsafetyinfire

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response,werelargelymadeonanadhocbasis,anddidnotalwaysappeartoreflectanawarenessofthedownstreamsignificanceofcriticalinfrastructureprotection.Forexample,individualBPDdecisionstonotsecurehealthclinicsandpharmaciesresultedinclosingoffacilities,physicaldestructionofneighborhoodpharmacies,threatstohealthandlifeofmedicallyvulnerableresidents,andapotentialsurgeofopioidnarcoticsintotheillicitmarket.Inaddition,theunclearCityapproachtoenforcementofthecurfewinthecontextofhealthcareprofessionalswasabarriertomaintaininghealthcarefacilitycontinuity-of-operationsthroughoutthecurfewperiod.Recommendation1.4:TheCityshouldhaveaclearpolicy(eitherseparateorwithinpoliciesonMassDemonstrationManagementandDisasterManagement)oncriticalinfrastructureprotection.Thispolicyshouldemphasizethephysicalsecurityofcriticalinfrastructure,aswellasprotectionofcontinuity-of-operationsofcriticalinfrastructuresectors.Thepolicyshouldprovideguidelinesonhowtoincorporatecriticalinfrastructureprotectionintotheprimaryresponsemissionduringacity-wideresponsetoamassdemonstrationorriot.Owners:Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor’sOffice,MOEMSecondary:BPD,DOT,MTA,Mayor’sOfficeofInformationTechnology(MOIT),DPW,BCFD,BCHD,HABC,MON,Sheriff,BCSP,MSP,criticalinfrastructuresectorentitiesRationalefortheRecommendation:TheCity’sabilitytorespondto,andrecoverfrom,amassdemonstrationorothercriticalincidentdependsontheprotectionofcriticalinfrastructureandcontinuityofoperationsduringresponse.“Criticalinfrastructureincludesthephysicalorvirtualassets,systems,andnetworksthataresovitalthattheirincapacitationordestructionwouldhaveadebilitatingimpactonsecurity,theeconomy,orpublichealthandsafety.”11Massdemonstrationsandothercriticalincidentscreateanincreasedrisktocriticalinfrastructurewhilealsodepletingtheresponseresourcesavailabletoprotectit.Giventheseinherentchallenges,theFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)recommendsacriticalinfrastructureprotectionprocessthatconsistsof:

• IdentifyingcriticalinfrastructuresthatmustremaincontinuouslyintactandoperationaltoaccomplishESS[emergencyservicessector]missions…

• Determiningthethreatbyallhazardsagainstthosecriticalinfrastructures.• Analyzingthevulnerabilitiesorweaknessesexistinginthethreatenedcritical

infrastructures.• Assessingriskofthedegradationorlossofcrediblythreatenedandvulnerablecritical

infrastructures.• Applyingprotectiveorresiliencymeasureswhereriskisunacceptabletopreventthe

threat,protectthecrediblythreatenedandvulnerablecriticalinfrastructures,orensuretherapidrestorationofcriticalinfrastructuresafteranall-hazardsattack.12

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Whilecriticalinfrastructureprotectionrequirescollaborationacrossagencies,theprivatesector,andmultiplelevelsofgovernment,theNationalStrategyforthePhysicalProtectionofCriticalInfrastructuresandKeyAssetsemphasizestheimperativefor“localgovernmentstoidentifyandsecurethecriticalinfrastructuresandkeyassetstheyownandoperatewithintheirjurisdictions”13inordertoensurepublicsafetyandcontinuity.Assuch,theCityshoulddeveloppolicesgoverningcriticalinfrastructureprotectionthatcaninformandguideCityagencies’strategicdecision-makingduringmassdemonstrationsandothercriticalincidents.Finding1.5:BPDhadnospecificpoliciesorproceduresforarrestsduringamassdemonstration.Thisresultedininconsistentconditionsforarrestsacrossdifferentscenarios,compromisestopublicsafetyduetofront-linepersonnelbeingdivertedwithoutreplacement,frustrationamonglawenforcementpersonnelregardingunclearpolicyandauthority,compromisedsafetyofindividualsincustodyduetoinadequatecorrectionalfacilitycapacity(compoundedbyinadequatecommunicationfromlawenforcementpersonneltocorrectionsdepartment),andnumerouscommunityandpressallegationsofinappropriatearrests.Recommendation1.5:BPDshoulddefineclearpolicyandproceduresforarrestsduringamassdemonstration,eitherwithinoverallarrestpoliciesordistinct.Ataminimum,thesemustdelineatebasicparametersandguidelinesfor:

• theconditionsrequiredtoarrestanindividual• theauthoritydesignatedtomakethesedeterminations• thepersonnelinvolvedinexecutinganarrest• theproceduresofexecutinganarrestduringamassdemonstration• therequirementsforprotectingthesafetyofindividualsincustody• thedocumentationrequired• referencestoanyrelevantlegalparameters

Owners:Primary:BPDSecondary:Mayor’sOffice,Sheriff,MOCJ,MDPSCS,BCSP,MSPRationalefortheRecommendation:Inmassdemonstrations,maintenanceofpublicorderisparamount.Theroleofarrestsduringamassdemonstrationiscomplex,ascompetingfactorsmustbebalanced.Isolationandremovalofindividualagitatorsmayhelptode-escalateasituation.However,asCDP’sFFOManualstates,“arrestsmayescalateoraggravatetheprotestsituation.Arrestsarealastresort,anddonewhennecessaryorwhenaseriouscriminaloffenseoccurs.”3Furthermore,“massarrestscandepleteyourresourcesasofficersgettiedupwithprocessingoffendersandpaperwork…

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Arrestscantakevaluableresourcesawayfromtheeventandlatercanresultinyearsoflitigation…Bylimitingpoliceactionandspecifyingwhenanarrestshouldbemade,thepolicearebetterabletofocusoncrowdcontrolandthepreventionofproblems.”3The21stCenturyPolicingReportrecommendsthat“lawenforcementagenciesshouldconsideradoptingpreferencesforseeking‘leastharm’resolutions,suchas…warningsandcitationsinlieuofarrestforminorinfractions.”8Inlightofthiscomplexity,clearpoliciesmustbeestablishedtoguidefieldpersonnelindeterminingtheconditionsforarrest,inordertoeffectivelymaintainpublicsafetyandpreventescalationoftheevent.ThePERFreportonbestpracticesrecommendsthatleadership“decideaheadoftimewhichbehaviorswillorwillnotbetolerated”and“allowofficerstoexercisediscretioninregardtoarrest.”14Becauseleadership“shouldalsoprovideclearguidelinesthatminimizeindividuallyapplieddiscretionaryenforcementdecisionsbyofficers,”theDOJCOPSReportemphasizesthatleadershipshould“clearlyconveyfactorsthatofficersshouldconsiderwhenexercisingtheirauthoritativediscretiontoarrest.”6Policiesmustalsobedevelopedtoclearlystatearrestproceduresthatwillminimizethedepletionoflawenforcementresources,minimizetheescalationofthescene,andensuredueprocesstothearrestee(s).Ataminimum,PERFstatesthat“ifanarrestismade,thearrestingofficerneedstobespecificanddocumentexactlywhythepersonwasarrested.”14CDP’sFFOManualdiscussesapproachesforarrestproceduresduringmassdemonstrationsthatareapplicabletoindividualandmassarrestscenes.Themanualprovidesextensiveguidelinesonarrestsincludingpre-arrestconsiderations,arrestauthorization,arrestteamrolesandresponsibilities,andarrestprocessdynamics.3TheCAPOSTGuidelinesdetailalistofelementsforconsiderationindevelopingamassarrestandbookingprotocol.4TheseguidelinesandconsiderationsshouldbeconsultedinthedevelopmentofaBPDmassdemonstrationarrestpolicy.3,4Extractionandtargetedarrestsshouldbeperformedefficientlyandeffectively,asquicklyaspossibleandinaslow-profileamanneraspossible.Attimes,theremaybenochoicebuttoengageinmassarrests.Inits2006reportonPoliceManagementofMassDemonstrations,PERFhasdocumentedthatpredictablechallengeswithmass-arrestoperationsinclude:

• Thequalityofevidenceavailabletopursueprosecutionagainsteachindividual• Thelogisticsoftransportingandhandlinglargenumbersofprisoners• Allowinglegalandmedicalaccess• Aninordinatedelayinarrangingforreleaseorbringingpersonstocourt• Notenoughpoliceondutytocopewiththeabove7

Giventhis,PERFrecommendsthat“massarrestsaregenerallyadvisableonlywhenallalternativetacticshaveeitherbeentriedunsuccessfullyorareunlikelytobeeffectiveunderspecificcircumstances.Ofcriticalimportance,whenmass-arresttacticsareused,evidenceagainsteachindividual[detainee]mustbeavailabletosupportthecharges.”7

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Theprotectionofindividualsincustody,throughoutboththeon-scenearrestaswellasuponarrivaltocorrectionalfacilities,isimperativeforpreservationofconstitutionalrightsandadministrationofjustice.Itisimportanttoestablishandendorsethisapolicyinadvance,as“Individualsarrestedduringacivildisordereventareaffordeddueprocess,whichmaybedifficultduringamassarrestsituationunlesspoliciesaredevelopedandrespondersaretrainedinastandardizedprocess.Furthermore,allindividualsregardlessofrace,creed,religion,ethnicity,socialstatus,etc.aretreatedthesame.”3Finding1.6:PlatoonswithinSpecialWeaponsandTacticsDivision(SWAT)weretrainedinfieldforceoperations.Onlytheseplatoonsandpossiblyotherselectedunitswereauthorizedtoexecutearrests,andpoliciesonthiswerenotclearandnotwell-communicated.AlthoughSWATteamswerehighlytrained,otherfieldpersonnelwerenotconsistentlyfamiliarwithSWATprotocolsorbestpracticesforfieldforceoperations.Thisresultedininsufficientcollaborationamonglawenforcementpersonnel,overrelianceonSWATforces(causingtacticalandpersonaldepletion),andineffectivearrestprocedures.Recommendation1.6:BPDstrategicpolicyforpersonneldeploymentduringamassdemonstrationshouldendorsetraininginfieldforceoperationsforallpersonnel,inordertostrengthenthecapacityforacoordinatedmassdemonstrationresponse.Thispolicyshouldincorporateoralignwiththearrestpolicyandprotocolrecommendedherein(seeRecommendation1.5).Owners:Primary:BPDSecondary:BCSP,MSP,SheriffRationalefortheRecommendation:Theabilitytoexecuteacoordinatedfieldresponsedependsoncoordinationandmutualunderstandingorintegrationofthecrowdmanagementandarrestfunctions.BPDshoulddeveloptacticalplansthatoutlinetherelationshipsbetweenthecrowdmanagementpersonnelandarrestpersonnelinfieldforceoperations.Effectiveimplementationofthispolicywillrequiretrainingatalllevels(seeRecommendation4.5).CDP’sFFOManualrecommendsthat“everyone,fromcommanderstoofficersservingonthefrontlines,mustbetrainedintheconceptofteamtacticsandthemobilefieldforceunit.“3Morebroadly,BPDshouldclarify(andwidelydisseminatewithintheDepartment)therolesandresponsibilitiesofofficers(“blueshirts”),SWAT/MobileFieldForceofficers,andleadership(“whiteshirts”)duringamassdemonstrationorriot.Suchclarityshouldbebasedonastrategicandtacticalplanthatoptimizestheuseofpersonnelandotherresourcesathand,andleveragesadditionaltrainingforbothleadershipandofficers(seeSection4).

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Inthisregard,particularattentionshouldbegiventotheroleofpatrolofficers,whomaybefirstonthescenetoanescalatingevent.Suchofficersandtheirsupervisorswillneedtobetrainedtomakeaninitialassessmentandultimatelyprovidetheinformationthatwillinformincidentmanagementdecisionsandensureanappropriateresponse.Furthermore,well-trainedpatrolofficersarefirst-linecontributorsinaneffectiveBPDresponse.2.INCIDENTCOMMANDFinding2.1:TheCitydidnotutilizeanappropriateandwell-understoodincidentcommandsystem(ICS)forthisBPD-ledincidentanddidnotfullyadheretoNIMSprinciples.Inaddition,BPDleadershipconflatedtheroleoftheCity-wideIncidentCommanderwiththeBPDOperationsChief.TheIncidentCommanderdidnotconsistentlyappeartohavefull(unambiguousanduncontested)authoritytomanagethecity-wideincident,andalsowasextensivelyinvolvedinBPDoperational-leveltacticaldecision-making.Recommendation2.1:TheCityshouldensurethataNIMS-compliantICSapproachisusedforthemanagementofallemergencies,includingthosethatareBPD-led,andthatallagenciesunderstandthespecificsofitsimplementationforpolice-ledincidents.BPDshouldensurethat,formajorincidents,twodifferentpersonsfilltherolesofcity-wideIncidentCommanderandBPDOperationsChief.TheIncidentCommandermustbeexpresslygivenfullauthoritytomanagetheincident.AuthoritytomanageBPDoperationsandrelateddecision-makingmustbedelegatedtotheBPDOperationsChief.Owners:Primary:BPD,MOEMSecondary:DOT,MTA,MOIT,DPW,BCFD,BCHD,HABC,MOCJ,MON,MDPSCS,BCSP,MSP,Sheriff,lawenforcementmutualaidpartnersFinding2.2:TheroleoftheEmergencyOperationsCenter(EOC),andthuswhowastoreporttoitandwhen,wasuncleartosomeparticipants,despitepoliciesdocumentedwithintheCityofBaltimoreEmergencyOperationsPlan(EOP).Inaddition,theEOCwasnotthelocationofcity-wideincidentcommand.Recommendation2.2:TheroleoftheEOC,andotherpolicieswithintheEOP,shouldbecommunicatedtoallnecessarypartieswithintheCityonaperiodicbasis.ExpectationsforCityagenciesshouldbecommunicatedandvalidatedtoensureallstakeholdersunderstandandcanparticipateinemergencyoperationsasneeded.TheCityshouldestablishahigh-qualityphysicalEOCthatbecomesthesingleunambiguousunifiedlocationforallemergencymanagementactivities,including(andespecially)incidentcommand.ThisEOCshouldbeinawell-suitedlocation,withsufficientspace(andflexibilityinthearrangementofthatspace),telecommunications,

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accessibility,parking,security,andothercriticalfunctionalrequirements.Inthemeantime,theCitymustidentifywhichexistingbuildingservesastheunambiguousEOConanevent-by-eventbasis.Owners:Primary:MOEMSecondary:Mayor’sOffice,MOITFinding2.3:RelatedtotheuncertaintyregardingtheroleoftheEOCandthelocationofIncidentCommandanddespitetheexistenceofadetailedEOP,multi-agencycommunicationandcollaborationwasad-hoc,variable,andnotconsistentwithNIMSprinciples.IndividualagencypreparednessandutilizationofICSandNIMSprincipleswasvariable,withsomeagencieshavinghighlevelsofpreparedness,utilizingICS/NIMSprinciples,andintegratingeffectivelyintotheoverallcommand(asitexisted),whileotheragenciesdidnothaveoptimalpreparedness,didnotutilizeICS/NIMSprinciples,anddidnotintegrateappropriatepersonnelintotheoverallcommand.AgencieshavinglessfamiliaritywithICSsentliaisonsofinsufficientrankordecision-makingauthoritytorepresenttheagencyattheEOCandBPDlocations.Bycomparison(andasexamples),BCFDandDOTutilizedeffectiveagency-specificincidentcommandstructuresfortheirownoperationsandalsohadrepresentativepersonnelattheEOCandBPDoperationslocations.Recommendation2.3:TheCityshouldworkwithMOEMandallagencyleadershiptoreinforcekeystrategiesandmoreeffectivelycommunicatedocumentedexpectationsformanagingmulti-agencyincidents.Thesepoliciesincludestipulationsdefiningtheselectionandresponsibilitiesofa“leadagency”foragivenincident,theselectionofandexpectationsfornon-leadagencypersonneltoreporttoacity-wideEOCandparticipateinacity-widecommandstructure,andtheconditionsforoperatingagency-specificcommandstructuresandoperationscenterincollaborationwithacity-wideincidentcommandstructure.AllCityagenciesshoulddeveloppreparednessplansandallpersonnelwithintheseagenciesshouldbetrainedinandfamiliarwithICS/NIMSprinciples(seeRecommendation4.5).Agency-specificpreparednessplansandtrainingshouldbedevelopedandcoordinatedthroughMOEM.ICS-specificresponsibilitiesandexpectationsshouldbedefinedandincludedwithinpersonnelpositiondescriptionsforallagenciesasappropriate.Owners:Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor'sOffice,MOEMSecondary:BPD,BCFD,DOT,MTA,MOIT,DPW,BCHD,HABC,MOCJ,MON,MDPSCS,Sheriff,MSP,BCSP,mutualaidpartners

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RationalefortheRecommendations:NIMS-compliantIncidentCommandSystem(ICS):TheNationalIncidentManagementSystem15isahighlystandardizedemergencymanagementstructure,developedaftertheeventsofSeptember11,2001,thatprovidesaconsistentnationwidetemplatetoenablefederal,state,tribal,andlocalgovernments,theprivatesector,andnon-governmentalorganizationstoworktogether(i.e.,achieveoptimuminteroperability)topreparefor,prevent,respondto,recoverfrom,andmitigatetheeffectsofincidentsregardlessofcause,size,locationorcomplexity,inordertoreducethelossoflifeandproperty,andharmtotheenvironment.NIMSaccomplishesthisviastandardizedorganizationalstructures,standardizedrequirementsforprocesses,procedures,andsystems.NIMSlaysoutthestructureandprocessesbywhichaNIMS-compliantICSoperates.Thatstructureincludesasingle,unambiguousIncidentCommander,whichintheCityisdefinedbytheleadagency.“TheIncidentCommandermusthavetheauthoritytomanagetheincidentandmustbebriefedfully.”16TheleadagencyfortheresponsetotheriotswastheBPD,andCommissionerBattswastheIncidentCommander.However,theFOPAARmakesitclearthatotherindividualswithnormally-highauthorityandinfluenceintheCityinsertedthemselvesinwaysthat,intentionallyorunintentionally,usurpedtheauthorityoftheIncidentCommander.Inaddition,thereisgeneralagreementthatLt.Col.HyattwastheOperationsChief,yetspecificoperationalmechanics(e.g.,arrests)requiredtheapprovalofanumberofotherindividualswithinBPD(andCity)leadership.TheIncidentCommandermusthavefulloperationalauthorityovertheincident,andtheremustbeexplicitdelegationofauthoritytopersonnelwithintheICSstructure,suchastheOperationsChief,toperformtheirroles.Westronglyrecommendclearunityofcommand,separationofresponsibilitiesbetweenIncidentCommanderandOperationsChiefconsonantwithICSprinciples,andtheauthorizationofon-scenecommandersandsupervisorstoexecuteclearandconsistentoperationaltacticswithouttheneedforextendedproceduresofadditionalapproval.Inthisregard,itiscriticalthattheentireoperationalteamclearlyunderstandwhoisIncidentCommander.The2007analysisoftheLosAngelesriotsisstronginitslanguageregardingthispoint:

Theroleofanincidentcommanderistomonitortheevent,providedirectionregardingtacticsanduseofresources.Intheeventthatanincidentcommanderisnotfulfillingtheirresponsibility,someoneofrankonscenemusttakecommand.Additionally,theIncidentCommandPostisresponsibleformonitoringradiobroadcasts.InthatcapacitytheIncidentCommandPostshouldrelayinformation,verifyreceiptandassisttheIncidentCommanderwithdeploymentofavailableresourcestothefield.ManyoftheissuesthataroseduringtheexecutionphaseofthiseventpertainedtotheareaofcommandandaninadequateIncidentCommandStructure.Knowingwhoisincommand

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duringanincidentisofutmostimportance.Thus,theDepartmentutilizestheconceptof“unityofcommand.”Thatis,“eachindividualinvolvedinincidentoperationsisassignedtoonlyonesupervisor,”sothattheindividualinchargeisclearlyidentifiedatalltimes.Theuseofunityofcommandbypublicsafetypersonnelisessentialforeffectivemanagementofanyspontaneousorpre-plannedevent.Theremustbeonepersonwhoistheoverallcommanderoftheevent,whounderstandstheobjectivesoftheplans,receivestacticalinformationandthenmakesdecisionswithacompleteunderstandingofallthatisoccurring.17

DistinctionbetweenICSandUnifiedCommand:AlthoughasingleIncidentCommandernormallyhandlesthecommandfunction,anICSmaybeexpandedintoaUnifiedCommand(UC).TheUCisastructurethatbringstogethertheIncidentCommandersofallmajororganizationsinvolvedintheincident,inordertocoordinateaneffectiveresponsewhileatthesametimecarryingouttheirownjurisdictional(ororganizational)responsibilities.UnderUC,thevariousjurisdictionsand/oragenciesandnon-governmentrespondersblendtogetherthroughouttheoperationtocreateanintegratedresponseteam.AUCmaybeusedwhenevermultipleorganizationsorjurisdictionsareinvolvedinaresponseeffort,where“jurisdiction/organization”couldmean:

• Geographicboundaries(e.g.,twostates)• Governmentallevels(local,state,federal)• Functionalresponsibilities(firefightingversuslawenforcement)

TheUCisresponsibleforoverallmanagementoftheincident.TheUCdirectsincidentactivities,includingdevelopmentandimplementationofoverallobjectivesandstrategies,andapprovesorderingandreleasingofresources.MembersoftheUC(i.e.,theIncidentCommanders)worktogethertodevelopacommonsetofincidentobjectivesandstrategies,shareinformation,maximizetheuseofavailableresources,andenhancetheefficiencyoftheindividualresponseorganizations.Ingeneral,BaltimoreCitydoesnotuseunifiedcommand,anddidnotdosoduringtheresponsetotheriots.However,thereisastrongspiritofcollegialitywhentheCityutilizesICSforweathereventsandotherincidentsthatdonotpresentalawenforcementthreat.Indeed,theatmospherewithintheEOCinsuchcasescanseemasthoughUCratherthanICSisinforce.Whileweunderstandandstronglysupportthecurrentincidentmanagement‘environment’intheCity,characterizedbythishighdegreeofcollegialityandpeer-to-peerinteraction,weadvocateforaclearICS,notUC,approach.Accordingly,theIncidentCommanderandICpersonnelforacity-wideeventinvolvingmultiagencyresponsemustfullyserveandmanagemultipleagencyobjectivesandleadacoordinatedresponse.EOC:AnEOCprovidesacentrallocationforallemergencymanagementactivities.Thephysicalco-

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locationofallagencyleadersanddecision-makersenablestherapidcollaborationandcoordinationofmultiagencyresponsenecessaryformassdemonstrationandemergencymanagement.UnderICSprinciples,“EOCsarethephysicallocationwheremultiagencyresponsecoordinationoccurs.ThecorefunctionsofanEOCincludecoordination,communication,resourceallocationandtrackingandinformationcollection,analysisanddissemination.”18TheEOCsupportstheon-sceneresponsebyrelievingtheIncidentCommanderoftheburdenofexternalcoordinationandsecuringadditionalresources.16TheEOCprovidesacentrallocationfromwhichgovernmentatanylevelcanprovideinteragencycoordinationandexecutivedecision-makinginsupportoftheincidentresponse.18,19AccordingtoFEMA’sFundamentalPrinciplesofEmergencyManagement,“theEOCshouldbelocatedawayfromvulnerable,high-riskareasbutaccessibletothelocalofficialswhowilluseit.TheadvantagesofasingleEOClocationinclude:

• Asingle,recognizablefocalpointforemergencyordisastermanagement.• Efficiency,becausecallsforassistancecanbemadetoasinglelocationwherekey

officialscanmeet,makedecisions,andcoordinateactivities.• Centralizedprioritysetting,decision-making,andresourcecoordination.• Simplifiedlong-termoperation.• Increasedcontinuity.• Betteraccesstoallavailableinformation.• Easierverificationofinformation.• Easieridentificationanddeploymentofavailableresources.”20

Finding2.4:TherewereunclearreportingstructuresamongBPDpersonneldeployedinthefield,withnoclearchainofcommandorunityofcommand.Supervisionanddirectionoftendefaultedtothehighestrankingormostforthcomingofficeronthescene,whichattimesvariedrapidlyfrommomenttomoment.Supervisorypersonneldidnothaveaclearspanofcontrolidentifyingwhichpersonneltheyweresupervising.Recommendation2.4:BPDpersonneldeploymentsduringmassdemonstrationandcriticalincidentresponseshouldutilizefundamentalICSprinciplesgoverningchainofcommand,includingspanofcontrolandunityofcommand.BPDshouldcontinuetoenhanceitsICScapabilitiesthroughmoretraining(seeRecommendation4.5)andthroughmorefrequentutilizationofICSprinciplesinroutineincidentmanagement.BPDshouldalsocontinuetodeveloptheICScapabilitiesofitsseniorleadershippersonnel.Owners:Primary:BPDSecondary:BCSP,MSP,Sheriff,lawenforcementmutualaidpartners,MOEM

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RationalefortheRecommendation:Whileincidentmanagementingeneralisnotaforteofpolicedepartments,ICSprinciplesandtrainingwouldfacilitateBPD’smanagementofmultiple-officerresponseincidentsonadailybasis.Notonlywoulditbeaneffective,systematicapproachforthoseincidents,thisdailypracticewillfamiliarizepersonnelwithICSconceptsandproceduresandstrengthenresponsecapacityandefficacyduringlargerevents.ICSidentifiesbestpracticesforchainofcommandthatenableaneffectiveresponsetomassdemonstrationsandotherhighlydynamicevents.ICSprinciplesclearlydictatethat“effectiveaccountabilityduringincidentoperationsisessential.16

Unityofcommandmeansthatallindividualshaveadesignatedsupervisortowhomtheyreportatthesceneoftheincident.Eachindividualwillbeassignedtoonlyonesupervisor.Theseprinciplesclarifyreportingrelationshipsandeliminatetheconfusioncausedbymultiple,conflictingdirectives.Incidentmanagersatalllevelsmustbeabletodirecttheactionsofallpersonnelundertheirsupervision.Spanofcontrolpertainstothenumberofindividualsorresourcesthatonesupervisorcanmanageeffectivelyduringanincident.Maintaininganeffectivespanofcontrolisimportantatincidentswheresafetyandaccountabilityareatoppriority.Thetypeofincident,natureofthetask,hazardsandsafetyfactors,anddistancesbetweenpersonnelandresourcesallinfluencespanofcontrolconsiderations.Effectivespanofcontrolonincidentsmayvaryfromthreetoseven,andaratioofonesupervisortofivesubordinatesisrecommended.SpanofControl:Supervisorsmustbeabletoadequatelysuperviseandcontroltheirsubordinates,aswellascommunicatewithandmanageallresourcesundertheirsupervision…Spanofcontroliskeytoeffectiveandefficientincidentmanagement.Supervisorsmustbeabletoadequatelysuperviseandcontroltheirsubordinates,aswellascommunicatewithandmanageallresourcesundertheirsupervision.InICS,thespanofcontrolofanyindividualwithincidentmanagementsupervisoryresponsibilityshouldrangefrom3to7subordinates,with5beingoptimal.Duringalarge-scalelawenforcementoperation,8to10subordinatesmaybeoptimal.Thetypeofincident,natureofthetask,hazardsandsafetyfactors,anddistancesbetweenpersonnelandresourcesallinfluencespan-of-controlconsiderations.16

Theseprinciplesregardingchainofcommandareimportantnotonlyforaneffectivecoordinationofresponse,butarealsoimperativeforensuringpersonnelsafetyandaccountabilityintheeventofrapidsituationescalationormasscasualty.16Finding2.5:TheCitydoesnothaveastandingcity-wideIncidentManagementTeam(IMT),whichcouldbeutilizedtomanagelarger-scaleincidentsinvolvingmultiagencyresponse.Furthermore,BPD,likemanypolicedepartmentsthroughoutthecountry,alsodoesnothaveafully-developedIMTorhighly-standardizedand“institutionalized”approachtodailylarger-scaleincident

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management,whichcanleadtothefailuretoformallyandeffectivelyestablishincidentmanagementorcommand,apointthathasbeenemphasizedinpriorreviewsofBPDcriticalincidentmanagement.Recommendation2.5:TheCityshouldleverageitspriorandcurrentexperiencewithmultiagencyeventmanagementtofurtheridentifysuccessfulstrategiesforleadershipandcollaborationamongkeyresponseagencies,includingthedevelopmentofacity-wideIMT.BPDinparticularshouldleverageitscurrentICStrainingandrecentexperiences,andcreateandroutinelyutilizeanIMTinitsmanagementofincidentsthatinvolvemulti-officerresponse,multipleexpectedoperationalperiods,and/ormultijurisdictionalresponse.OtherCityagenciesshouldbuildorfurtherdeveloptheirIMTsthroughadditionaltraining(seeRecommendation4.5).EachrolewithinanIMTshouldbetiedtopersonnelpositiondescriptionswithintheagency.Owners:Primary:MOEM,BPDSecondary:Mayor’sOffice,BCFD,DOT,MTA,MOIT,DPW,BCHD,HABC,MOCJ,MON,MDPSCS,Sheriff,BCSP,MSPRationalefortheRecommendation:RecommendationshereinemphasizetheneedforformalandconsistentadoptionofICS/NIMSprinciplesandpractices.Theseprinciplesandpracticescanandshouldalsobeusedonadailybasistomanagelarger-scaleevents,viaagency-specificandCityIncidentManagementTeams(IMTs).AnIMTwouldbeapermanententitywithineachagency,withpersonnelhavingpre-assignedrolesbutnotactive,inwhichtheyaretrainedonaregularbasis.EachrolewithintheIMTshouldbetiedtopersonnelpositiondescriptionswithintheagencyandtrainingshouldberequiredinaccordance(seeRecommendation4.5).Asagroup,theIMTcanbemobilizedintoactiononshortnotice,butduringroutineoperations,personnelareperformingtheirroutinepositionresponsibilities.3.INFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATIONSFinding3.1:DeficienciesintheCity’sintelligence-gatheringprocess,includingsourceverification,informationcorroboration,andchainofcommunication,resultedinuncorroborated,unverifiedinformationofasignificantpublicthreat(ofstillquestionablevalidity)beingdisseminatedpubliclyfromBPD.Specifically,reportsofa“partnership”amongmembersofcertaingangstoharmpoliceweredisseminatedfromtheMediaRelationsSectiontothemedia,requestingitbedisseminatedpubliclynationwide,ratherthancommunicatingthisinternallyviatheIntelligenceUnittoleadershipandinternally-affectedpersonnel.Thisresultedinunnecessarilyheightenedfearwithinthecommunityaswellaswithinlawenforcementpersonnel.RepresentativesfromthenamedgangsleveragedthisopportunitytouseamassmediaplatformtorefutetheBPDclaim,potentiallyunderminingthepublicperceptionofBPDcredibility.Subsequentpress

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inquiriesintointernalagencydocumentssuggestthattheoriginalthreatwasnon-credible.Thisquestionablereportanditsinappropriatedisseminationunderminedpubliccalm,senseofsecurity,andtrustinleadership.Additionaldeficienciesinintelligenceresultedininadequatepreparednessfor,mitigationof,andresponseagainstexternal,non-residentagents(e.g.,self-identified“anarchists”)whoinfiltratedthecrowdwiththepurposeofescalatingviolenceandpublicdissent.Recommendation3.1:TheCity’sintelligencegatheringanddisseminationprocessshouldbeclarifiedandreinforced,undertheleadershipofBPD,toensurethatchainofcommunicationissecure,informationisappropriatelyinvestigatedtoverifyandcorroborate,andvalidintelligenceiscommunicatedrapidlyandappropriatelyacrossrelevantCityagenciesforutilizationbynecessarypartiesininformeddecision-making.Owners:Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor’sOfficeSecondary:BPD,MOIT,MOCJ,MON,MDPSCS,BCSP,MSP,Sheriff,lawenforcementmutualaidpartnersFinding3.2:Criticalinformation,includingsensitiveintelligenceandbasicoperationaldataregardingtheexpected“Purge”atMondawminMall,wasnotcommunicatedinatimelyfashiontonecessarystakeholdersoutsideofBPD.ThissignificantlyimpairedtheabilityofotherCityagencies,includingtheDepartmentofTransportationandtheBaltimoreCityPublicSchoolstocollaborateonacoordinatedcity-wideeffortofpreventionormitigationofthisthreat.Recommendation3.2:Improvementstointelligenceoperations(seeRecommendation3.1)shouldalsoincludeprocessesforidentificationofkeyinternalandexternalstakeholdersandrapid,securedeliveryofsensitiveinformationtothosestakeholders.Atbaseline,agenciesshouldcollaborativelydefineanddocumentthemutualcommunicationneedsrequiredforbetterpreparednessandeventresponse.Owners:Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor’sOfficeSecondary:BPD,BCSP,MSP,Sheriff,MOEM,DOT,MTA,Mayor’sOfficeofInformationTechnology(MOIT),DPW,BCFD,BCHD,HABC,MOCJ,MON,MDPSCS,mutualaidpartnersRationalefortheRecommendations:Effectiveintelligencemanagementrequiresrobustandclearlydelineatedpoliciesandproceduresgoverningthecollection,analysis,anddisseminationofintelligencedata.Intelligencecollectionprocessesshouldincludesecuremethodsforindividualreportingandaggregateddata,sourceverification,andinformationcorroboration.Large-scalesurveillance

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dataandfusioncentersshouldalsobeleveragedforinformation,asnotedbytheDOJCOPSReport.6ThePERFreportonFutureTrendsinPolicingemphasizestheimportanceoftechnologically-currentintelligencecollectionmethods,beyondtraditionalsourcing,toincludecitizenreportingviatextmessageprotocolandsocialmediamonitoring.21“Theseplatformscanproviderelevantintelligencebothduringandintherun-uptoanevent”aseventsareofteninitiated,influenced,anddisseminatedbysocialmediacommunications.14Inamassdemonstration,thelargepopulationofparticipantsandbystanders,andoverallheightenedpublicattention,mayresultinhigherratesofbothvalidandinvalidintelligencedata.“Informationprocessingisanothercomponentofeffectiveplanning.Massdemonstrationmanagementdemandscarefulattentiontomanaginginformationbefore,during,andaftertheevent.Gatheringandthoroughlyanalyzinginformationorintelligenceabouttheactivitiesofdemonstratorscandramaticallystrengthenapolicedepartment’sdemonstrationmanagementplan.”7Intelligenceanalysisprocessesshouldincludetechnologicallycurrentsystemsanddedicatedpersonneltrainedintheappropriatemethodologytorigorouslyevaluateandinterpretalltypesofintelligencedata,includinglargesurveillancedata,socialmedia,andindividualreports.Theanalysisofsocialmediacommunicationsrequiresdifferentexpertiseandinterpretiveschemaandpotentiallydifferentprivacyandsecuritypoliciesthantraditionalforms.22AstheDOJexplainsinitsreportonIntelligence-LedPolicing,“withouttheexplicitperformanceofthisfunction[analysis],theintelligenceunitisnothingbutafileunit.”23Thenecessarycomponentsofanalysisinclude:“synthesizingdata,developinginferencesorconclusions,andmakingrecommendationsforactionbasedonthedataandinferences.”23Intelligencedataisonlyvaluablewheneffectivelycommunicatedtotherightpartiesattherighttime.23Acriticalrequirementofaneffectiveintelligenceprocessisthatdataarecommunicatedtointernalandexternalstakeholdersinatimelyfashiontoinformdecisions.Identificationofstakeholdersshouldbefinelycalibrated:theomissionofkeystakeholderspreventsbroadly-coordinatedprevention,mitigation,andresponse.Conversely,theexpediteddisseminationofincompletelyverifiedinformationcanresultininappropriateresponsestoinaccuratedata,increasedfearamongpersonnelandpublic,orconverselyaninsufficientestimationofcurrentrisks.24Inaddition,thebroaddisseminationofintelligencethroughunsecuremethodsortoinappropriatepartiescanresultinsecuritybreachesandcompromisetacticaloperationsand/orpublicsafety.Inamassdemonstrationscenario,acoordinatedmultiagencyresponseisneeded;involvedagencieswillhavetheexpertiseneededtoutilizeintelligencetoinformtheirownresponse.Lawenforcementpersonnelonthegroundneedaccesstoinformationaboutthepotentialfactionsparticipatinginthemassdemonstration,theiragendas,andthepossiblerisksofescalation.TheDOJCOPSReportreiteratesthisimportantneedforintelligencetobecommunicatedeffectivelybothtoleadershipanddeployedpersonnel.6

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InitsCriminalIntelligenceModelPolicy,theInternationalAssociationofChiefsofPolicerecommendsthatthesepoliciesandproceduresshouldfacilitatetheessentialrolethatintelligenceplaysinlawenforcementandshould,ataminimum,alignwiththeCommissiononAccreditationforLawEnforcementAgenciesstandardsforintelligencegatheringandallapplicableregulations,including28CFR,Part23.25Thedevelopmentofarobustintelligenceunitwithpoliciesderivedfrombestpracticescanensuretheoptimalcollection,analysis,andutilizationofintelligencetomanagecriticalincidentssuccessfully.23Finding3.3:DeficienciesincommunicationswithinBPDexacerbatedtheperceptionofunclearandinconsistentdirection,whichresultedinimpairedmoraleamongfieldpersonnelaswellassuboptimalutilizationofdeployedpersonnel.Recommendation3.3BPDleadershipshouldutilizeclearandconsistenttacticaldirectioninaccordancewithnewlydevelopedpolicies(seeRecommendations1.1and1.3),minimizingambiguitywhenpossible.Inscenariosrequiringflexibilityandjudgmentbyfieldcommanders,guidelinesshouldbecommunicatedclearlytoaiddecision-making.Inscenariosrequiringanystrategicchangethatcouldbeperceivedasinconsistentdirection,communicationshouldclearlyidentifythechangeindirectionandcorrespondingrationale.EffectivecommunicationduringBPDrollcallisessential.BPDrollcallshouldcoordinateandsynchronizewiththecity-wideICSOperationalPeriodandassociatedOperationalPeriodBriefing,whenappropriateandfeasible.Owners:Primary:BPDSecondary:BCSP,MSP,Sheriff,lawenforcementmutualaidpartnersRationalefortheRecommendation:“Clearcommunicationfromleadershipisvital,”notestheBPDFOPAARassessingthemassdemonstrationresponse.5Clearandconsistentcommunicationoftacticaldirectionisimperativeforensuringawell-coordinatedandeffectivelawenforcementresponse,giventhenumberofpersonnelactivelydeployedinacoordinatedresponsetoalarge-scaleevent.Clearcommunicationbeginsatbaseline,priortoanyevent.PERFrecommendsthat“pre-eventbriefingsofpersonnelshouldincludeadiscussionoftherulesofengagement;theuse-of-forcepolicy;andtheauthoritytodirecttheuse-of-force,specializedtools,andweapons.Itisrecommendedthatpotentialscenariosbediscussedandpracticedinadvanceofeachoperationtoensureauniformunderstandingofthelevelofforcetobeusedattheoutset.Thismustthenbecommunicatedtoallofficerslikelytobeinvolvedintheresponsetoaparticularscenario.Thispracticereducessomeofthelast-minuteplanningandcommunicationthatcaneasilyleadtoless-effectiveeventmanagement.”7Theprovisionbyleadershipof“clearguidelinesthatminimizeindividuallyapplieddiscretionaryenforcementdecisionsbyofficers”isanimportantpriority.6

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Buildingonthisstrongfoundationofcleartacticaldirection,leadershipandfieldpersonnelmustalsoretainflexibilityandagilityneededtorespondeffectivelytothehighlydynamicnatureofmassdemonstration.“Duringextraordinaryevents,lawenforcementagenciesshouldremainflexibletomodifyingpoliciesorsupplementalorderstoaddresscontingenciesencounteredand,ifmodificationoccurs,ensurethatofficersdeployedintheoperationreceivecleardirectionregardinganychanges…ClearandconsistentcommunicationfromtheICtosupervisorsandallofficersinvolvedisimperative.Asdirectiveschangethroughouttheincident,additionalandcontinuednotificationsofchangesmustbemade.”6Consistentleadershipcommunicationsenableaneffective,coordinatedresponsebyfieldpersonnel.Furthermore,thiscommunication,coordination,andclarityofresponseamongfieldpersonnelhassecondarycrowdmanagementimpact,inthatitmay“facilitatethetacticalresponsebycalmingfearsandmanagingexpectations.”24Demonstrators,bystanders,andcommunitymembers“whoknowwhattoexpectaremorelikelytofollowinstructionsandallowresponderstodotheirjobs.”24Finding3.4:DeficienciesinBPDcommunicationswereexacerbatedbyfragmentedandinconsistenttechnicalpractices.Operationsandtacticalcommunicationswereoccurringonmultipleradiochannelswithoutclearrulesofuse.Fieldpersonneloftenutilizedcellphonesforcommunicationsandbypassedanyprotocols,ifexistent,regardingradiocommunications.LawenforcementpersonnelfrommutualaidagencieswerenotconsistentlyabletocommunicatewithBPDradios,whichwasfurthercompoundedbytheuseofBPD-specificcodes,ratherthanNIMS-recommendedplainlanguage.Therewaslittletonocoordinationwithorcommunicationto911,EMS,orfireresponseregardingcriticalinformationavailabletoon-scenelawenforcementpersonnel.NecessarysituationalintelligenceinformationwasnotconsistentlycommunicatedtoIncidentCommandorotherleadership,whichaffectedoperationalandtacticaldecision-making.Recommendation3.4:BPDshouldcontinuetodevelopandutilizemorecomprehensivecommunicationsplansforcriticalincidentsandroutineincidentmanagement.Communicationsplansshouldbedevelopedwithinputfromtechnicalexperts,strategicandtacticaladvisors,fieldpersonnel,andleadership,withconsiderationforoptimizingefficiencyandeffectivenessinfieldandcommandcommunications.PositionsshouldbedesignatedwithinBPDtoserveasCommunicationsUnitLeaders,consonantwithICSprinciples.Plansshouldincludetheidentificationofallavailabletalkgroupsandtheirconditionsforuse.Dispatchshouldreinforcecommunicationplanpoliciesduringcriticalincidents,includingthedecision-makingregardingwhentotransitiontoadditionalchannelsandtalkgroupsduringrapidlyexpandingevents.AvailabletechnologyforinteroperablecommunicationswithfireandEMSpersonnelshouldbeclearlycommunicatedtoallpersonnel.PlainlanguageshouldbeusedinaccordancewithNIMS.Informationgatheringandresponseshouldbecoordinatedlocallyandintegrate911andallresponseagencies.Thiscoordinationshouldleveragepriorsuccessfulapproaches,suchas

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thoseusedduringtheStarSpangledSpectacular,includingtheestablishmentofgeographicalparameterswithinCADtocoordinateincoming911callswithresourcesandcommanddeployedforaspecialeventorincident.RationalefortheRecommendation:Theneedforeffectivecommunicationshasbeendiscussedextensivelyherein.Effectivecommunicationsarefundamentallydependentonthetechnicalcapacityofthesystemandthecapabilitiesofitsusers.TheInternationalAssociationofChiefsofPolicedescribedtheroleandrequirementsofvoicecommunications:“Anagency’svoicecommunicationssystemisakeypieceofequipmentinthepublicsafetybusiness.Whilepolicepersonnelarethekeycomponentsofemergencyresponse,theabilitytocommunicateisalsocritical.Communicationsandtheabilitytocommand,direct,overseeandtalkwithrespondersinthefieldhaveproventocutresponsetimeandsavelives.Theabsenceofviablecommunicationsfrustratesandcausesdelaysinoperationalresponses.”26CommunicationisafundamentalNIMSprinciple.“TheabilitytocommunicatewithintheICSisabsolutelycritical.Duringanincident,communicationsshouldusecommontermsorcleartext.Donotuseradiocodes,agency-specificcodes,acronyms,orjargon.Thegoalistopromoteunderstandingamongallpartiesinvolvedinmanaginganincident.”16NIMSfurtheroutlinesexpectationsandguidelinesforeffectivecommunicationsinamultiagencyresponse.27Theseguidelinesshouldbeutilizedinthedevelopmentofmorerobustcommunicationsplans.Finding3.5:TheCitydidnotutilizeJointInformationSystem(JIS)principlesoractivateaproperlyfunctioningJointInformationCenter(JIC).Asaresult,publiccommunicationsfromleadershipwereinfrequent,inconsistent,andinsufficienttorelaytimelyinformation,guidedecision-making,andmaintainpubliccalm.Communitystakeholdershadnoclearavenueforobtainingordisseminatingpublicinformation,andassuchoftenutilizedpersonalrelationshipsandsocialmedia,whichexacerbatedinconsistenciesandimpairedoverallcommand.TheCityhassuccessfullyutilizedaJISmodelforpreviousevents,includingtheGrandPrix,inwhichaJICwasactivatedandincludedaCommunityImpactCenter.ThismodelprovidedcoordinatedmultiagencypubliccommunicationsinlinewithICS/NIMSstandardsforaJIS,whileprovidingasingleunifiedgatheringpointforcommunityleaders,politicalleaders,faithcommunityrepresentatives,andotherkeystakeholderstogatherinformationfrom,answerquestionsfor,anddisseminateinformationtotheirconstituents.Recommendation3.5:TheCityshouldcontinuetodevelopandbetterutilizeawell-understoodandhighly-functioningJISandassociatedJIC.InlinewithprevioussuccessfulCityevents,thismodelshouldcoordinatemultiagencypubliccommunicationsinlinewithICS/NIMSstandardsforJIS,aswellasprovideasingleunifiedgatheringpointforcommunityleaders,politicalleaders,faithcommunityrepresentatives,andotherkeystakeholders.TheJICshouldbelocatedinanappropriatephysicalfacility,whichcouldeitherresidewithintheEOCrecommendedabove(see

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Recommendation2.2)oraseparatefacility,asappropriatetothespecificconditionsoftheevent.Owners:Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor'sOffice,MOEMSecondary:MOIT,BPD,DOT,MTA,DPW,BCFD,BCHD,HABC,MOCJ,MON,MDPSCS,Sheriff,MSP,BCSPFinding3.6:Infrequentandincompletepubliccommunicationsledtoongoingsignificantmisperceptions,includingaboutimportantissues,someofwhichpersisttothisday.Asakeyexample,therehasbeenwidespreadpublicuncertaintyregardingthedecisiontoalterbusandsubwayserviceattheMondawminstopduringtheafternoonofApril27,2015.Thisuncertaintyhasmanifestedintwoways:apublicuncertaintyaboutwhoorderedtheservicechanges,andbothpublicandprivatediscussionsabouttheappropriatenessofthechanges.Wefoundthefollowingfactsduringourreview.MTAPolicereportedanunexpectedlyhighvolumeofstudentsonbusesboundforMondawminatapproximately14:30.OneSchoolsPoliceofficerreportedaninstanceofrocksbeingthrownatapproximately14:45.GiventheinformationonthePurgeandthenewsituationalintelligence,BPD,BCSP,andMTAPoliceinincidentcommandjointlydecidedtodivertbusservicearoundMondawminandsecuretheentrancetotheMetrostationat14:54.ThedecisionwasinfluencedbyconcernsaroundensuringMTApersonnelsafetyandtheabilitytomaintaincontinuityofoperations.TherewasconcernthatbusescouldnotbesecuredandthatMTApersonnelwouldnotbesafetocontinueservingontheirroutes.BPDandMTAPolicewerealsoattemptingtominimizetheriskofeventescalationandrisktopassengers.Accordingly,busesenroutetoMondawminweredivertedaroundthearea,whilebusesawaitingdeparturefromMondawmindepartedasplanned.Aprimaryissueofmediaattentionhasbeenthepurporteduncertaintyregardingtheorderforthebusservice“shutdown.”However,busservicewasdivertedonlyaroundMondawminandassociatedareaswithescalatedactivityandnotsuspended,andthisdecisionwasmadeinincidentcommandincoordinationwiththeMTA.Therefore,ourfindingisthatdeficienciesincommunicationsandpublicinformationmanagementweremorecentralherethananypotentialdeficienciesinincidentcommandandthedecision-makingprocess(forthespecificMTAservicedecisionsconsideredhere).AsecondareaofpublicdiscussionhascenteredaroundtheconcernthathundredsofstudentswereleftwithoutadequatetransportationoptionstoreachtheirdestinationswhenbusesreleasedthematMondawminwithnooutboundservice.Ourfindingsareconsistentwiththatconcern.ThetimelineindicatesthatbusservicetowardMondawminwasdivertedat14:57andbusesthatwerealreadynearbyreleasedpassengersthere(approximately15:00)priortotheacceleratedescalationofunrestactivity(15:15),butaftertheinitialreportofisolatedviolentactivity(14:45).MultiplecompetingprioritiesofpublicsafetywerebeingmanagedatthistimeanditcannotbeconcludedthatregularbusserviceshouldhavebeenallowedtocontinuethroughMondawmintoprovidefortheegressofindividualsonthescene,giventheconditionsandavailabilityofresources.However,providingadditionalsecuredbusestoevacuatethe

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scenemayhavefacilitatedeventde-escalationandbettersupportedcommunityneeds.Regardless,thedataagainsuggestthatmorebroadlydisseminatedpublicinformationaswellasimprovedon-scenecommunicationswereneededtomitigatepublicdiscordandtocommunicatetothecrowdthatthelastdepartingbusesfromMondawminwereleavingandpartiesinterestedindepartingshouldutilizetheservice.Furthermore,themismanagementofpublicinformationandcommunicationregardingthediversionleftroomforactivistsandthemediatoportraythechangeasabus“shutdown”andtoinspirecrowdunrestinresponse.Fundamentally,thelackofaJIS/JICandthecorrespondinglackofoptimalpubliccommunicationssignificantlyexacerbatedthesituationbecauseinadequatecommunicationsfosteredpublicanxietyandmistrustinCitygovernment.Asanotherkeyexampleofthedeficienciesinpubliccommunication,thereisapersistentmisconceptionaboutthenumberoffiresduringtheunrest.Manyinthepublicbelievethathundredsofcarandbuildingfireswerestarted.Infact,accordingtoBCFDrecords,therewereatotalof33buildingfires,andonlytwoofthosewere3-alarmfires.Therewereatotalof55vehiclefires,22ofwhichwerealreadyextinguishedbythetimeofBCFDarrivalandtheremaining33ofwhichweresuccessfullyextinguishedbyBCFD.Recommendation3.6:AJIS/JICarrangementofthetypecalledforinRecommendation3.4iscriticaltoensurethatbothinternalandexternalcommunicationsarefacilitatedviaformalstructuresandprocesses.However,thatJIS/JICwillnotautomaticallyensureoptimalpubliccommunications,whichmustbeactivelyplannedandconsciouslyresponsivetopublicinterests.TheCitymustbothanticipateandrespondtokeyissuesandconcernsthatliveinthepublic’sconsciousness,andmustmonitormediacommunicationstoidentifysuchissuesandconcerns.Furthermore,theCitymuststrategicallyoptimizetheuseofpressconferencesandpressreleasesinaddressingtheseissues.Owners:Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor'sOffice,MOEMSecondary:MOIT,BPD,DOT,MTA,DPW,BCFD,BCHD,HABC,MOCJ,MON,MDPSCS,Sheriff,MSP,BCSPRationalefortheRecommendations:Publicinformationduringamassdemonstrationorothercriticalincidentisimperativetoensurepublicsafety.AsoutlinedbyNIMS,“publicinformationmissionduringanincidentistogetaccurate,understandableinformationtothepublicinatimelymannersopeoplecantakeactiontosavelivesandminimizedamagetoproperty.”19Publicneedforcommunicationishighduringamassdemonstration.“Publicinformationiscriticaltoensuringconfidencethatthegovernmentisdoingallitcantoprotectthepublicandcontrolthesituation.”20Individualsneedreassuranceonpublicsafetyandneedinformationandguidanceondecisionsandresponsesneeded,suchastravelplanningandfacilityclosing.Increasesincommunity

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uncertaintyalsoresultingreaterdemandonotheraspectsofthecivilinfrastructure.Asanexample,tobediscussedsubsequentlyherein(seeRecommendation3.8),increaseduncertaintymayresultinhighercallvolumeto911and311callcenterstosolicitinformation.21Thiscanbemitigatedwitheffectiveproactivepubliccommunication.UtilizingJIS(theconceptualsystem)andJIC(aphysicallocation)tocoordinatemessaging,individualauthorities(agencyheads,communityleaders)canavoidthedisseminationofconflictinginformation,whichmayprecipitateundesirablepublicresponseandincreasecommunityfearandagitation.Indiscussingkeyprinciplesofpublicinformationfromlawenforcement(thoughwithapplicabilitytoanyemergencyresponseagency),DOJCOPSemphasizesthatagenciesshould:

• understandtheimportanceofquicklyestablishingaJICandcommunicatetimelyandrelevantinformationtothepublic,

• establishapracticetoreleaseallinformationlawfullypermittedassoonaspossibleandonacontinuingbasis,unlessthereisacompellinginvestigatoryorpublicsafetyreasonnottoreleasetheinformation.A“compellingreason”shouldbenarrowlydefinedandlimitedinscope,

• haveadesignated,trainedpublicinformationofficer(PIO),whoengageswiththepubliconaroutinebasis,

• dedicatesufficientstafftocoverpublicinformationandmediarelationsneeds6FEMAprovidesextensiveguidelinesoneffectivecommunicationandutilizationofaJISandJIC,whichshouldinformtheCity’simplementationofthisconcept.6,19,24Finding3.7:BaselinerelationshipchallengesbetweentheMayorandGovernor,aswellasinsufficientevent-daycommunicationbetweentheMayorandGovernorandtheirteams,resultedinthepublicappearanceofdiscord,aswellasongoingstrugglesovertop-leveldecision-makingthroughouttheweek,includingissuesrelatedtotheenforcementofthecurfewandNationalGuarddeployment.Despitethisapparentdiscord,theMayorcontinuedtoexhibitprofessionalism,leadership,andadvocacyfortheCityandherconstituents.Recommendation3.7:TheMayorandGovernormustbuildandmaintainacollaborativerelationshipatbaseline,includingstrongcommunicationonmutualexpectationsandcommitments,inordertoeffectivelycollaborateonaresponseduringemergencyoperations.Owners:Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor'sOffice,MarylandOfficeoftheGovernorRationalefortheRecommendation:AfundamentalprincipleofNIMSisthateffectiveresponserequirespartnershipamongmultiple

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levelsofgovernment.28InamassdemonstrationorothercriticalincidentthatmayrequireajointresponsefromtheCityandtheState,acollaborationbetweencityandstateofficialsisimperative.Strongbaselinerelationshipsprovideafoundationforeffectivecollaborationduringanemergencymanagementscenario.Collaborationisafundamentalprincipleofemergencymanagement,asoutlinedbyFEMA.20Acoreresponsibilityofindividualsinanemergencymanagementroleisto“createandsustainbroadandsincererelationshipsamongindividualsandorganizationstoencouragetrust,advocateateamatmosphere,buildconsensus,andfacilitatecommunication.“20Finding3.8:TheCity’s911PublicSafetyAnsweringPoint(PSAP)wasoperatingunderaprotocolsuspensionpolicy,whereonly“time-lifepriority”calls(emergentlife-threateningconcerns)werefieldedanddispatched.Thiseffectivelyprioritizedtheutilizationofscarceresourcesforthemostcriticalneedsduringthecapacityshortage.Callvolumesremainedhigh,however,whichwaslikelyattributabletomultiplefactors,includingalackofwidespreadpublicawarenessofthecriticalincidents,converselyalackofpublicinformationoradesignatedcallcenterforcriticalincident-relatedinquiriesandconcerns,andabaselinepatternofutilizingthe911PSAPcallcenterfornon-emergentconcerns.Assuch,Cityresidentsreported911communicationsissues,includingbusysignalsandextendedwaittimesbeforereachinganoperator.TheMayor’sOfficeofNeighborhoodsliaisonsreportedservingassupplementaryresourcesforcommunityconstituentsduringthishighcallvolumeperiod,butthiswasvariablebyneighborhoodandnotwidelydisseminatedtoallCityresidents.Recommendation3.8:Policiesandprocedures,suchastheProtocolSuspensionPolicy,forhigh-volumesurgesandcriticalincidentdemandon911PSAPoperationsshouldcontinuetobewell-documentedandcommunicatedtoallfront-linepersonnel.911PSAPfunctionalcapacityshouldbescalabletoaccommodatehigh-volumesurgesandcriticalincidentdemand,andutilizecontingencyplanningforcapacity-shortagetriageanddiversionofnon-emergencycalls.Alternativetechnology,includingtextmessagingandinternet,shouldbeincorporatedintothedispatchprocess.Publiccommunicationsandalternativecallcenters,suchas311andaCommunityImpactresponselineattheJIC,shouldbeleveragedtoreducetherateofnon-emergencycallsduringcriticalincidents.Supplementaryresources,includingfromtheMayor’sOfficeofNeighborhoodsandcommunityorganizations,shouldbeidentifiedduringnon-emergencybaselineplanningandutilizedeffectivelyandconsistentlytoresolveconstituentneedsandconcerns.Owners:Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor'sOfficeSecondary:BPD,BCFD,MOIT,MON

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RationalefortheRecommendation:Thefundamentalrole911playsduringamassdemonstrationorothereventisoftenunder-recognized.29Massdemonstrationsandcriticalincidentsresultindemandsurgeson911callcentersandemergencyresponders.Highcallvolumeresultspotentiallyfrombothincreasedpublicdemandforinformationaswellasincreasedvolumeofincidentsneedingemergencyresponse.Demandplanningstrategiesareneededtoaddressdispatchcapacityaswellasresponsecapacity.Coreelementstoconsiderincludescalability,alternativetechnology,volumereduction,diversion,alternativeresponders,andcapacityshortagepolicies.DispatchCapacity:Scalability&AlternativeTechnology:Massdemonstrationsandcriticalincidentscanariseandescalatewithlimitedadvancenotice.Itisimperativethatthebaseline911PSAPinfrastructureandplansincludescalabilityforunexpectedsurgesincallvolumetomeetthebasic911requirementsofcallsbeingansweredandevaluatedbyadispatcher.Thisincludesbothhumanresourceplanningandtechnologicinfrastructureplanning.TheU.S.DepartmentofTransportation’sNextGeneration911Initiativehasdevelopedaframeworkforupdatingcurrent911systemsto“establishmoreflexible,secure,androbustPSAPoperationswithincreasedcapabilitiesforsharingdataandresources,andmoreefficientproceduresandstandardstoimproveemergencyresponse.”30Theseupdatesmay“incorporatebetterandmoreusefulformsofinformation(e.g.,real-timetext,images,video,andotherdata).”30Whilethesealternativemethodsofcommunicationmaypotentiallystreamlineresponse,theymayalsoincreaseoverallrequestvolume,andthusrequirewell-developedpolicies,implementationplans,andtrainingprocessesforcurrentandnewdispatchpersonnel.21Despitethesechallenges,thesealternativetechnologymethodsareimportantformaximizingtheCity’sabilitytorespondeffectivelytotheneedsofitsconstituents.21,30TheCityshouldcontinueitscurrentinitiatives,alreadyinprogress,tohireandtrainnewdispatchpersonnel,upgradesoftwareandhardwareinfrastructure,andincorporateNextGeneration911proceduresandstandards.TheCityshouldalsocontinuetobuildspecificprotocolsandpoliciessurroundingsurgecapacityandresponse,whichmayincludethetrainingandcertificationofreservedispatchersandleveragecertifiedcross-trainedpersonnelfromlawenforcement,fire,andmedicalresponseagencies.VolumeReduction,Diversion,andAlternativeResponders:Volumereductionstrategiesmayemphasizeclear,applicable,broadlydisseminatedpubliccommunication(seeRecommendations3.5,3.6).Thiscommunicationcouldincludeinstructiononscenariosappropriatefor911calls,aswellasidentificationofalternativesourcesofresolutionfornon-emergencycalls,including311,aCommunityImpactphonelineattheJIC,andleveragingofcommunityliaisonsandoutreachorganizations.

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CapacityShortageDispatchProtocols:Decision-makingandresourceallocationarecentralchallengesinacapacityshortage,suchasthatduringamassdemonstrationorcriticalincident.29,31–33911PSAPsarewell-servedbycapacity-shortagedispatchprotocolsbuilttoleverageexistingdispatchprotocols,bescaledtosituationalrespondercapacity,andprioritizelifepreservationandpublicsafety“toensurethatconstrainedmedicalresourcesaredirectedatachievingthegreatestgoodforthemostnumberofpeople“31whileadheringtoprinciplesfromASTM.34TheCity’s911PSAPshouldcontinuetoutilizeaProtocolSuspensionPolicyandensurethatalldispatchersarefamiliarwiththepolicy,procedures,andconditionsforuse.Thesepoliciesandproceduresshouldbemonitoredandevaluatedforefficacyandtestedinfunctionalexercisestoensureutilityandscalability.Guidelinesandprotocolstogovernmassdemonstrationandcriticalincidentscenarioscanaidinincreasingtheeffectiveresponsetolife-threateningemergenciesduringacapacityshortage,whileminimizingcitizenanddispatcherdistress.29–344.PREPAREDNESS,RESOURCEMANAGEMENT,EQUIPMENT,&TRAININGFinding4.1:TheCity’scoreagencieshavevaryingapproachesandlevelsofcommitmenttoemergencypreparedness,whichinvolvesplanning,training,resourcemanagement,collaborativeinteragencyrelationshipsacrossfunctions,andcollaborativerelationshipswithexternalagenciesofsimilarfunctionsformutualassistance.Organizationalpreparedness,agility,andflexibilitywerecitedaspositivefactorscontributingtorapidandeffectiveresponsesbymanyCityagencies,includingBCFD,BCHD,DPW,andDOT.Strongbaselinecollaborativerelationshipswithpartneragencieswerecitedasareasonforthestrongmutualaidpresenceinfireresponse.Lessstrongrelationshipsbetweenotheragencieswerecitedasareasonforinsufficientmutualaidpresenceinlawenforcement,co-deploymentchallenges,andmiscommunicationregardingresponsibilities,policies,andscopeofwork.Recommendation4.1:AllCityagenciesshouldcontinuetoaugmenttheirpreparednessby:

• Buildinganddocumentingall-hazardsemergencyplans,consistentacrossagenciesandcoordinatedthroughMOEM

• Havingpoliciesthatendorseagency-specificandinteragencytraining• Identifyingresourcescalabilityneeds,maintainingaccuratelogisticstracking,and

buildingsourcingplans• Buildinginteragencyrelationshipsduringnon-emergencyperiodsanddocumenting

commitments• Buildingrelationshipswithexternalagenciesofsimilarfunctionanddocumenting

commitmentsviamutualaidagreements

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Owners:Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor'sOffice,MOEMSecondary:BPD,BCFD,DOT,MTA,MOIT,DPW,BCHD,HABC,MOCJ,MON,MDPSCS,Sheriff,BCSP,MSP,mutualaidpartnersRationalefortheRecommendation:Massdemonstrations,andothercriticalincidents,mayariseand/orescalatewithlimitedadvancenotice,withthepotentialtojeopardizelifeandpublicsafety.PreparednessisessentialtotheCity’sabilitytonavigatethesescenarios.AsNIMSemphasizes,“effectiveandcoordinatedemergencymanagementandincidentresponserequirethatwecreateacultureofpreparedness…Preparationisacontinuouscycleofplanning,organizing,training,equipping,exercising,evaluating,andtakingcorrectiveaction.”27Lessonslearnedfromprioreventshaveshownthat“whenviolenceeruptsorthreatensacommunity,itistoolatetoplanregionalresponses,purchasenecessaryequipment,trainkeypersonnel,testcommunicationcapabilities,andbegintoorganizeforanextendedevent.”6Finding4.2:TheCityingeneral,andBPDinparticular,didnothavetherightequipment,intherightquantities,andinpropercondition,torespondtoamassdemonstration,protest,orriot.Recommendation4.2:TheCitymustpurchase,distribute,maintain,andappropriatelyusetherightequipmentformassdemonstrations,protests,andriots.Suchequipmentincludes:

• Personalprotection(e.g.,helmetswithfaceshields,bodyarmor,bodyshields,respiratoryprotection)

• Less-lethalinstruments(e.g.,batons/ASPs,personalsizeOC/pepperspray,conducted-energyweapons(Tasers))

• Less-lethalcrowdcontrolinstruments(e.g.,rubberbullets,beanbags,pepperballsandrespectivelaunchers,CSgas)

Owners:Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor'sOfficeSecondary:MOEM,BPD,BCFD,Sheriff,BCSP,MSP,lawenforcementmutualaidpartnersFinding4.3:InconsistentutilizationofBPD’slimitedresourcesinriotprotectionresultedinbothanoverlymilitarizedappearanceofforcesincertainscenarios,whichisinconsistentwithbestpracticesandmayhaveescalatedcrowdtensions,aswellasasentimentofunderprotectionbyfieldpersonnel,whichimpairedmorale.

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Recommendation4.3:TheCityandBPDshoulddevelopandadheretoagear-donningpolicyconsonantwith,orincorporatedinto,theUse-of-ForceandMassDemonstrationManagementpoliciesdescribedabove,whichshouldemphasizegearrestraintandrestrictdonningofparamilitarygeartospecificwell-definedscenarios.Toensurepersonnelmoraleandprotection,BPDmustcommunicatetherationaleforthesepoliciesinthecontextofmoreeffectivemassdemonstrationmanagementpolicies(seeRecommendation1.1),andmaintainsafetyofficersformonitoringpersonnelconditions.Owners:Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor'sOffice,BPDSecondary:BCSP,MSP,Sheriff,lawenforcementmutualaidpartnersRationalefortheRecommendations:Preparednessforall-hazardsscenariosmanagedwithintheCityandBPDjurisdictionjustifiestheacquisitionofprotectivegearandcrowdcontrolinstrumentstomaintainsafetyofpersonnelandpublic.Althoughnotendorsingparamilitarygear,theDOJCOPSReportrecommendsthat“everylawenforcementofficershouldbeprovidedwith…anti-ballisticvests.”6TheCDPFFOmanualandthe2015FederalInteragencyLawEnforcementEquipmentWorkingGroupproviderecommendationsontypes,uses,andconditionsforparamilitaryequipment.3,35Hand-in-handwiththeacquisitionofsuchparamilitarygearandinstrumentsmustbeitssafeandappropriateuse,governedbyclearpolicies.AstheDOJCOPSReportemphasizes,“simplyhavingtheavailabilityofresourcesdoesnotmeantheresourcesshouldbeused…Useofequipmentorweaponryshouldberestrictedtolimitedsituationsthatclearlyjustifytheiruse.Policiesandproceduresshouldclearlystatethelimitedsituationsfortheirdeployment.“6Initialresponsetoamassdemonstrationdoesnotwarrantpre-deploymentofparamilitarygear.The21stCenturyPolicingReport,DOJCOPSReport,CDPFFOManual,andPERFallwarnoftherisksassociatedwithmilitarizedlawenforcementpresence.3,6–8The21stCenturyPolicingReportcallsforpoliciesthat“minimizetheappearanceofamilitaryoperationandavoidusingprovocativetacticsandequipmentthatundermineciviliantrust.”8CDPrecommendsto“avoiddonningpolicehardgearasafirststep…avoidtheappearanceofmilitarizationoflawenforcement.”3Initialdeploymentofparamilitarygearandtacticsmayleadtoanescalationinmassdemonstrationactivities,ratherthande-escalation.“Whenofficerslineupinamilitaryformationwhilewearingfullprotectivegear,theirvisualappearancemayhaveadramaticinfluenceonhowthecrowdperceivesthemandhowtheeventends.”8PERFsuggeststhatlawenforcementshould“resistdonningriotgearunlessofficersafetyisinjeopardy.Mediaimagesofofficersinfullgearcanappearintimidating.Allagenciesparticipatinginademonstrationeventshouldberequiredtoagreetothiscondition.”7Inlessonslearnedfrompriorincidents,theDOJCOPSReportexplicitlywarnsthatanelevatedinitialresponseanddeployedtacticalunits“canangerandfrightencitizens,resultingingreateranimositytowardthepolice,whichinturnmayfuelmoreconflict.”6The21stCenturyReportalsoprovidessuggestionstobalancetheseconcernswiththeneedfornext-levelprotection:“Agenciesshouldconsideratieredapproachtopolicingpublicdemonstrations,beginningwith

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standardissueuniformsforpeacefuldemonstrationsandprogressingtodefensiveprotectiveequipmentforunrulycrowdsandultimatelytoatacticalapproachtoprotectlifeandpreservethepeaceshouldviolenceoccur.Officerswearingdefensiveandtacticalequipmentshouldbestagedoutofsightduringpeacefuldemonstrations…Whenofficersaredeployedwithanyformofdefensive,protectiveequipmentduringmassgatherings,lawenforcementagenciesshouldcommunicatetothepublicviasocialmediaandpublicinformationofficersthatofficerswillbewearingprotectiveequipmentfortheirpersonalsafety.”8Finding4.4:ThelimitedriotprotectionresourcesthatBPDhadwerenotadequatelystoredorinventoried.Gearandequipmentwasoutdatedandindisrepair.Additionalgearandequipmentwasobtained,oftenad-hocandatanindividuallevel,frommutualaidorganizationsandotherentitiesthroughunmonitoredprocesses.Recommendation4.4:BPDshouldhavedesignatedresourcemanagementprocessesandpersonnelresponsibleforgearandequipmentlogistics,whichincludesinventorymaintenance,qualitycontrol,andscalableplansandprocessesforcontingencysourcingandprocurement.ThesedesignatedpositionsshouldbedefinedwithinBPDtoserveroleswithintheLogisticsSectionofaBPDincidentmanagementteamandbepreparedtomanageresourcesduringeventsinconjunctionwiththeEOCandstagingareas.Owners:Primary:BPDSecondary:MOEM,MOITRationalefortheRecommendation:Inventorymanagement,qualitycontrol,andscalableplansandprocessesforcontingencysourcingandprocurementareessentialtoemergencypreparedness.InventorymanagementenablesBPDtobeawareoftheresourcesithasinordertorapidlysupplyfieldpersonnelandidentifyneedsforequipmentprocurementandreplenishment.Qualitycontrolprocessesensurethesafetyandefficacyoffieldoperationsbyidentifyingandrepairing,upgrading,orreplacingoutdatedandquality-control-failedequipment.Scalablecontingencysourcingandprocurementplansmustbedevelopedbeforeemergencyneedsoccur.Inmassdemonstrationorothercriticalincidents,equipmentdemandmayrapidlyescalateandexceedcapacity.Lawenforcementequipmentistypicallynotavailableadhoc,oftenmustbeindividuallyfitted,andisnoexceptiontothetypicalrisksofsupplyshortagesinlarge-scalecriticalincidents.Assuch,advanceplanningisneededandmayincludeelementssuchasidentifyingmultiplesuppliers,documentingcontingencyprocurementagreementsinadvance,andmaintainingpersonneldatanecessaryforoutfitting.NIMSelementsofresourcemanagementinclude“processesforidentifyingresourcerequirements,orderingandacquiringresources,mobilizinganddispatchingresources,tracking

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andreportingonresourcestatus,recoveringanddemobilizingresources,reimbursingforresources,andmaintainingaresourceinventory”16“NIMSdefinesstandardizedmechanismsandestablishestheresourcemanagementprocesstoidentifyrequirements,orderandacquire,mobilize,trackandreport,recoveranddemobilize,reimburse,andinventoryresources.”16TheseguidelinesshouldbeleveragedforthedevelopmentofrobustresourcemanagementpracticeswithinBPD.“Effectiveresourcemanagementensuresthatresponsepersonnelaresafeandincidentobjectivesareachieved.”16Finding4.5:Citypersonnelatalllevelsinseveralagenciesdidnothaveadequatetrainingregardingmassdemonstrationmanagement(strategyandtactics),negotiatedmanagement,communityfootpatrol,oruseofriotgear,less-lethalinstruments,andincidentcommand.BPDhassinceinitiatedlaw-enforcement-specificICStrainingforleadershiplevelpersonnel,whichhasbeenwellreceived.Recommendation4.5:TheCityshouldcontinuetodevelopitstrainingprogramsforallpersonnel.Trainingshouldinclude:

• massdemonstrationmanagement,fieldforceoperations,andthecorrespondingcivilliberties,consonantwithbestpractices,departmentalpolicy,andlegalparameters

• negotiatedmanagement,problemsolving,andsituationmanagementandde-escalation• ICS/NIMS,preferablyutilizingagency-specificcurricula,coordinatedthroughMOEM• theartandscienceofcommunityfootpatrol• hands-ongearandequipmenttraining,regardinggearandequipmentselectionand

donninganddoffing• useofforceandinstrumentdeployment,inaccordancewithdepartmentalpolicyand

bestpractices,includingforcelevelselectionfactors,operationaldetailsofinstrumentdeployment,anddocumentation,warning,andsafetyrequirementsforless-lethalandlethalforce

Additionalprinciplesthatshouldbeincorporatedinclude:

• Trainingshouldreinforceandoccurinthecontextofthedepartmentalmission.• Trainingshouldleveragethestrengthsoftheexistingcultureanditspersonnel,rather

thanportrayinganobjectiveofculturechange.• Trainingshouldinvolvehands-onfunctionalandtacticalexercisesforalllevels.• Trainingshouldincludeotheragenciesinexercises,whenappropriate(e.g.,mutualaid

partnersand/ornon-lawenforcementinmassdemonstrationevents).• Existingtrainingprograms,withinandoutsideofBPD,shouldbeleveragedand

expandedinordertomaximizeresourcesaswellasensureadherencetocurrentbestpractices.

• Trainingshouldbeendorsedandfacilitatedfromtheleadershipleveldown,through

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communications,dedicatedfunding,on-the-jobtime,andhigh-qualitytrainingfacilities.• Trainingshouldbedocumentedandkeptonfile,toreflectpersonnelaccomplishments.

Owners:Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor'sOffice,MOEMSecondary:BPD,BCFD,DOT,MTA,MOIT,DPW,BCHD,HABC,MOCJ,MON,MDPSCS,Sheriff,BCSP,MSP,mutualaidpartnersRationalefortheRecommendation:Trainingisfundamentallynecessaryforanorganizationtoachieveitsobjectivesandengageitspersonneleffectivelyandappropriately.Theabilitytoimplementtheherein-definedrecommendationsandsubsequentlydevelopedpoliciesdependsontheabilityofallagencypersonneltounderstandandutilizethem.AARsfromrecentmassdemonstrationsandcriticalincidentsconsistentlycitepersonneltrainingasakeyfactorineitherthesuccessorthelimitationsoftheeventinquestion.6,36–38The21stCenturyPolicingReportcitesthecentralroleoftraininginlawenforcement:

“Policeinterventionsmustbeimplementedwithstrongpoliciesandtraininginplace…Asournationbecomesmorepluralisticandthescopeoflawenforcement’sresponsibilitiesexpands,theneedformoreandbettertraininghasbecomecritical.Today’slineofficersandleadersmustmeetawidevarietyofchallengesincludinginternationalterrorism,evolvingtechnologies,risingimmigration,changinglaws,newculturalmores,andagrowingmentalhealthcrisis.AllstatesandterritoriesandtheDistrictofColumbiashouldestablishstandardsforhiring,training,andeducation...Theskillsandknowledgerequiredtoeffectivelydealwiththeseissuesrequiresahigherlevelofeducationaswellasextensiveandongoingtraininginspecificdisciplines.”8

BPD’sFOPAARcallsformoretrainingforitspersonnel.“TheBaltimorePoliceDepartmentshouldfullystafftheEducationandTrainingDivisionwithqualified/credentialedpersonnelandmaintainthesestaffingnumbersatalltimes.TheDepartmentshouldalsopartnerwithoutsideagencieswhohavegreaterexpertise,includingparticipationinjointexercises.”5CurriculatotrainBPDleadershipandfieldpersonnelonthesecoreprinciplesandstrategiesshouldbedevelopedfromcurrentbestpractices,policyrecommendations,lessonslearnedfrompriorevents’AARs,andfurthercustomizedtomeettheuniqueneedsofthelocalcommunities.PERFdelineatestheobligationofalawenforcementorganizationto:

• provideuniformpre-eventtrainingforallsupportagenciesandatalllevels—commandtosupervisorsandfront-lineofficers.

• ensureadequatespecializedtrainingofpoliceofficersbeforetheevent• [relatetraining]tothehostagencies’corevaluesand…alwaysreinforceethicalpolicing

practices,particularlythecommitmenttorespectandupholdcivilliberties.7

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“Trainingformanagingamassdemonstrationisessentialtosuccess.”7TrainingonNegotiatedManagement,SituationProblem-solving,andAppropriateUseofForceinFieldForceOperations:Toeffectivelyimplementtherecommendedpoliciesonmassdemonstrationmanagement,nuancedtrainingthatencompassesnegotiatedmanagement,situationproblem-solving,andappropriateuseofforceisrequired.The21stCenturyPolicingReportstatesthat“lawenforcementagenciesshouldhavecomprehensivepoliciesontheuseofforcethatincludetraining”andthatthesepolicies“shouldemphasizede-escalationandalternativestoarrestorsummonsinsituationswhereappropriate.”8FindingsfromtheDOJCOPSReportreiteratetheimportanceofthisnuancedapproach.“Lawenforcementagenciesmustensureoperationalandtacticaltrainingisbalancedwithtrainingthatprovidesofficerswithtoolstoevaluateandde-escalatelawenforcementencounterspriortoresortingtouseofforce…Trainingshouldreflectreasonableuseofforcealternativessoofficersarepreparedtoconsiderthetactics/forceoptionsavailable;Chewv.Gates,27F.3d1432,1443(9thCir.1994)…Priortotheuseofaparticularforceoption,officersshouldconsidertheavailabilityofless-intrusivemeasures;Young,655F.3dat1166;Bryanv.McPherson,630F.3d805,831(9thCir.2010).”6Elaboratingonthenuancedexpectationsforpersonnelinmassdemonstrationscenarios,PERFoutlinesseveralguidelines.“Demonstrationmanagementtraining—forpersonnelatalllevels—shouldincludethefollowing:

• Auniformunderstandingofrulesofengagement,use-of-forcepoliciesandmassarrestprocedures;

• Clearinstructionontheneedforself-control,teamworkandadherencetocommands;• Statedexpectationsforhighlydisciplinedbehavior,self-controlandrestraint;and• Astrongstatementthatanyofficer’sfailuretocomplycouldresultnotonlyinfailed

policetactics,butalsoemployeediscipline;andInstructiononde-escalationtechniques.”7

The2013versionoftheCDPFFOManualhasupdatedrecommendations,replacingthe2007version,whichoutlinekeystrategiesfornegotiatingwithdemonstrationorganizers,minimizingthemilitarizationoflawenforcement,andavoidingcrowdescalationbyusingaless-aggressiveapproach.3Themostcurrentguidelinesshouldbeleveragedforpersonneltraining.ThisisendorsedbyBPD’sFOPAAR,whichrecommendsthatthe“BaltimorePoliceDepartmentshouldprovideitsofficerswithadvancedrelevanttraininginsituationsofriotorcivilunrest.TrainingshouldconformtonationalbestpracticesthatmirrortheCenterforDomesticPreparedness.”5Allpersonnelshouldbeincludedinfieldforceoperationstraining,inordertostrengthenthe

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coordinatedresponse.ThoroughtrainingoncurrentbestpracticesmayimprovemoraleandbetterprepareBPDleadershipandfieldpersonnelforeffectivemassdemonstrationmanagement.Asdiscussedherein,trainingmustalsoaddresstechnicalmassdemonstrationaptitudesincludingcivillibertiesparameters,gearandinstrumentdeployment,arrestprocedures,andICS/NIMSprinciples.TrainingonCivilLiberties:Allpersonnelmustbeawareofthekeyregulationsandparametersforcivillibertiesspecifictothejurisdiction,inordertoprotectcitizens’rights,maintainproceduraljustice,andpreventimpairedpublictrustaswellaslegalconsequences.PERFstatesthattrainingshouldinclude“areviewandreinforcementofapplicablefederallaws,statestatutesanddepartmentpolicies”and“areviewofcivillibertiesissuesinherentinmassdemonstrationevents”7TheDOJCOPSReportrecommendsthat“agenciesshouldtrainallofficersonthenatureoftheFirstAmendmentandtheprotectionsitaffords,includingwhatisalawfulprotest,howlawenforcementshoulddealwithlawfulprotests,andwhatarebestpracticesforpolicingcrowds.”6TrainingonICS/NIMSPrinciples:CurriculaonICSandNIMStrainingshouldbeencouragedthroughouttheCity’sagencies.TheDOJandPERFhighlyemphasizethevalueofwell-trainedICSpracticeineventresponse.6,7,14,39BPDspecificallyshouldcontinuetoutilizeanddevelopthecurrentcurriculum,whichemployspolice-specificapplications.“Thereistremendousvalueforalllawenforcementagencies,regardlessofsize,tobefullytrained(includingexercises)inNIMSguidelines.”6Initsreport,MutualAid:MultijurisdictionalPartnershipsforMeetingRegionalThreats,theDOJ’sBureauofJusticeAssistancestated:

“Incidentmanagementorganizationsandpersonnelatalllevelsofgovernmentandwithintheprivatesectorandnongovernmentalorganizationsmustbeappropriatelytrainedtoimproveall-hazardsincidentmanagementcapabilitynationwide…Traininginvolvingstandardcoursesonincidentcommandandmanagement,incidentmanagementstructure,operationalcoordinationprocessesandsystems—togetherwithcoursesfocusedondiscipline-andagency-specificsubjectmatterexpertise—helpsensurethatpersonnelatalljurisdictionallevelsandacrossdisciplinescanfunctioneffectivelytogetherduringanincident.”39

TechnicalTrainingonGear,Instruments,andArrestProcedures:Trainingonspecificpoliciesandproceduresforgear,instrument,andarrestprotocolisimperativeforfundamentallawenforcementoperationsandmaintenanceofpublicsafety,duringmassdemonstrationsandbeyond.Incorrecttrainingongearandequipmentuseand

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conditionscompromisespersonnelprotectionandriskspersonalinjury.Furthermore,unclearpersonnelunderstandingofpoliciesandbestpracticescanresultincompromisedmoraleandperformance.BPD’sFOPAARnotedthat“officersshouldhavereceivedadequateinstructiononhowtoproperlyutilizeeachpieceofequipmenttheyweregiven.”5Geartrainingshouldincludegearselectionparametersinlinewithscenario-specificpolicies,donninganddoffingprotocols,andhands-onpracticewithfittestingasappropriate.3Useofforceandinstrumentdeploymenttraining,inaccordancewithdepartmentalpolicyandbestpractices,shouldincludeforce-levelselectionfactors,operationaldetailsofinstrumentdeployment,anddocumentation,warning,andsafetyrequirementsforless-lethalandlethalforce.3,4,6PERFrecommendsthat“trainingshouldincludebothareviewoftheuse-of-forcepolicyandahands-ondemonstrationofofficerproficiency.Specializedtoolssuchaslongbatonsandriotshieldswillrequireregulartrainingtoensureofficerproficiency,evenasthevalueofsuchtoolsisdebated.”7The21stCenturyPolicingReportrecommendsthat,“ataminimum,annualtrainingthatincludesshoot/don’tshootscenariosandtheuseof[less-lethal]technologies.”8ThecurrentCDPFFOManualtrainingguidelinesstatethat“personnelshouldreceiveinitialtrainingandannualtrainingonRCAs[riotcontrolagents]andLLM[less-lethalmunitions]deploymentbeforetheyareauthorizedtocarryorusethem.”3Themassdemonstrationarrestpoliciesandproceduresrecommendedhereinmustbecommunicatedthroughtrainingforfieldpersonnel,astheymaydiffersignificantlyfromdailyoperations.PERFpointsoutfurtherthat“trainingmustrecognizethedifferencebetweentwoarrestscenarios:[1]arresttacticswherepoliceareincontroloftheenvironmentandhavetimetoplanandimplementthearrestsordispersalinacontrolledmanner…and[2]arresttacticswherepolicedonotcontroltheenvironment(e.g.,whenpolicearetryingtore-establishcontroloftheenvironmentbyarrestingviolentdemonstrators).”7Inadequatetrainingonuseofforce,instrumentdeployment,andarrestproceduresleavespersonnelunpreparedfortherequirementsoftheirroles,putsunduejudgmentstressonpersonnelinthelineofduty,resultsinunpredictableindividualizeddecisionsamongpersonnel,andmostimportantlysignificantlyincreasestheriskofinappropriateuseofforceandinstrumentdeploymentandassociatedrisktothehealthandlifesafetyofpersonnelandthepublic.3,6,40Finding4.6:ProcessesforgeneratingmutualaidrequestsfrompartneringlawenforcementagenciesaswellasdeploymentofNationalGuardwereunclear.Leadership-leveldecision-makingandmanagementoftheseresourceswasstrainedandunclear.Incontrast,utilizationofMarylandStatePoliceandBaltimoreCitySchoolsPolicewasmoresuccessfullyimplemented,duetobaselinerelationshipsandfrequentcollaborationandco-deployment.Recommendation4.6:Processesforgeneratingmutualaidrequestsanddeploymentsfrompartneringagenciesshouldbebuiltincollaborationwiththoseagencies,documentedviaMemorandaofUnderstanding(MOUs),consonantwiththeEmergencyManagementAssistanceCompact

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(EMAC)whenapplicable,andfrequentlyrevisitedtoensurethefeasibilityofexecutingonthosecommitmentsduringanevent.Conditionsgoverningtherequestandutilizationofmutualaidresourcesshouldbewell-defined.PoliciesandproceduresforrequestanddeploymentofNationalGuardshouldbedocumented,shouldincorporatefederalandstate-levelregulatoryparameters,andshouldbewell-understoodbyCityleadership.SuccessfulcollaborationswithMarylandStatePoliceandBaltimoreCitySchoolsPoliceshouldbeleveragedandmodeledforotherco-deploymentmissions.Mutualaidrelationshipsmustincludejointtrainingandexercisesonpoliciesandprocedures.Owners:Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor'sOffice,MOEMSecondary:BPD,MSP,BCSP,BCFD,Sheriff,mutualaidpartnersRationalefortheRecommendation:Ideally,thepoliciesandproceduralimprovementsrecommendedhereinwouldminimizetheneedforutilizationofexternalmutualaidresources.ItispreferabletooptimallyutilizeCitypersonneltotheextentpossible,duetotheirfamiliaritywithjurisdictionalpoliciesandpracticewithinthecommunity(aswellaspracticalissuessuchasgeographicfamiliarity).Theoutcomesofamassdemonstrationeventareinfluencedbytherelationshipbetweenlawenforcementpersonnelanddemonstrators;thesuccessfulimplementationofCity’smassdemonstrationresponsepoliciesrequirespersonnelwell-trainedonthosepolicies.Intheeventofamutualaidneedinacriticalincident,therequestanddeploymentprocessshouldbefacilitatedbypreparationandstrongbaselinerelationships.FormalizeddocumentationviaMOUensuresthatbothpartieshaveclearandconsonantunderstandingofthecommitment.TheDOJCOPSReportrecommendsthat“lawenforcementagenciesshouldestablishaframeworkformutualresponsethatincludesnotonlyageneralmutualaidagreementbutalsoproceduresforimplementingandmanagingthemutualaidresponseandcleardistinctionregardingwhichagency’spolicieswillprevailwhenanagencyisoperatingoutsideofitsoriginaljurisdiction.”6Revisitingtheseagreementsperiodicallyonanon-emergentbasis,aswellasdirectlypriortoanypotentialforeseenneed,ensuresthatthemutualaidrespondingagencyisadequatelyreadyandcanmakeanynecessaryadaptiveadjustmentstofulfilltherequest.TheDOJCOPSReportrecommendsthat“agenciesshouldworktogetherinadvanceoftheneedforacoordinatedresponsesituationtoreviewpoliciesandtoensureanyissuesorsubstantialvariationsofinterpretationareresolved.”6UtilizationofNationalGuardisgovernedbyfederalandstateregulation.41Assuch,aprimaryresponsibilityofCityandagencyleadershipistobefamiliarwithsaidregulationsinordertoidentifytheappropriateconditions,policies,andproceduresforutilizingNationalGuardassistance.Beyondthisregulatoryminimum,andalthoughtheNationalGuardisdefinitivelypreparedatalltimesforaresponse,strongcommunicationandbaselinerelationshipswouldfurtherstrengthenthecollaborationwithanddeploymentofNationalGuardwhenutilized.

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Currentcollaborationandco-deploymentofMarylandStatePoliceandBaltimoreCitySchoolsPoliceiseffectiveduringnon-emergencyoperations,andtheseagenciesrepresentkeyresourcesforincreasedcapacityneedsinmassdemonstrationsandothercriticalincidents.Fortheseandotheragenciesinvolvedinmutualaidagreements,theCitymustincludetheseagenciesinrelevanttrainingforeventresponse.“Toensurethatseriousdifferencesofoperatingproceduresarenotencountered,eachparticipatingjurisdictionshouldfamiliarizeitselfwiththepoliciesandproceduresoftheotherparticipatingjurisdictions,particularlyastheyrelatetoissuesofcriticalimportancetomutualaid.”39“Considerationalsoshouldbegiventoconductingjointexerciseswithneighboringandoverlappingpolicejurisdictionstofamiliarizeeachotherwithcommonprotocolsandensureconsistentmethodologies.Preparationsforrecentmassdemonstrationsshowthistrainingisinvaluableinpreparingofficersfortheevent.Itprovidesanearlyopportunityforfamiliaritywitha‘singlerulebook’astouse-of-forceandmakingarrests.Moreover,wellinadvanceofcivilunrest,itallowsvariousprocessestobeworkedout,includingthedetailsofcommandandcontrolauthority,thepassingofcommandandcontrolinmultiplejurisdictionenvironments,andtheauthorityandprocessingofarrestsinotherjurisdictions.”7TheDOJCOPSReportreiteratestheserecommendations:

• lawenforcementagencieswithmutualaidrequestsmustconductregionalresponsetraining,toincluderegularregionaltabletopcriticalincidentoreventexercisesinvolvingmutualaidresponders,otherfirstresponders,andkeycommunityleaders;

• officersfromdifferentagenciesdesignatedtorespondshouldtraintogetherandsharecommonpolicingphilosophiesandprofessionalstandards.6

CDP’sFFOManualalsoendorsesthatmutualaidagenciesshouldreceivepropertrainingpriortodeploymenttothefield.”3TheDOJhaspublishedextensiveguidelinesonmutualaid,whichshouldbeconsultedandleveragedinthedevelopmentofmutualaidrelationshipsandtrainingprogramswithpartneragencies.39Finding4.7:Processesforrequestingresources,includingbutnotlimitedtomutualaidpersonnelasdiscussedinFinding4.6,werevariableandnotwell-documented,bypassedstandardprocedures,andresultedinconfusionduringtheresourcerequestandfulfillmentprocesses.Recommendation4.7:Althoughwecommendandendorsetheongoingcommitmenttobuildingandleveragingpersonalrelationships,wealsorecommendthattheresourcerequestprocessfollowstandardproceduresandbeaddressedthroughtheEOCandMOEMasasinglepointorderingsourcetomaximizeefficiency,optimizeneedfulfillmentspecificity,andadheretoregulatoryguidelinesandbestpractices.

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RationalefortheRecommendation:Resourcemanagement,asdiscussedherein,beginswithinindividualagencies.Optimizedpracticesforresourcemanagementinternaltoeachagencyareanecessaryfoundation,asoutlinedinRecommendation4.1.Onceinternalresourcesareexhaustedduringacriticalincident,asidentifiedbyLogistics,theCity’sEOCmustbeutilizedasthesolesourceforresourcerequests.“TheIncidentCommandidentifiesresourcerequirementsandcommunicatesneeds…tothelocalEmergencyOperationsCenter(EOC).ThelocalEOCfulfillstheneedorrequestsassistancethroughmutualaidagreementsandassistanceagreementswithprivate-sectorandnongovernmentalorganizations.Inmostincidents,localresourcesandlocalmutualaidandassistanceagreementswillprovidethefirstlineofemergencyresponseandincidentmanagement.”27NIMS/ICSandFEMAprovideextensiveguidelinesonresourcerequestandfulfillment,whichshouldinformtheCity’simplementationofthisconcept.20,27,42Finding4.8:Asnotedabove,interagencycollaborationwassuboptimalduringincidentmanagement,withleadingagenciesnotrecognizingtherolesorcommunicationneedsofsupportingagencies.Theleadershipofmultipleagenciesreportedthatinteragencycollaborationwouldbesignificantlyenhancedwithfunctionalandtabletoptrainingexercises.Recommendation4.8:TheCityshouldendorseandimplementopportunitiesandmechanismsformultiagencycommunicationandcollaboration.Agenciesshouldhaveclearunderstandinganddocumentationofroles,mutualexpectations,andcommitments.Theseexpectationsshouldbereviewedonaregular,structuredbasistoensureongoingagreementandfeasibility.High-yieldmultiagencyfunctionalandtabletoptrainingexercises,utilizingICSprinciples,shouldbeconductedonvarioushazardscenariosatleastyearly.ExercisesshouldaddresstheICS-specificresponsibilitiesandexpectationsdefinedandincludedwithinpersonnelpositiondescriptions(seeRecommendation2.3).Owners:Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor'sOfficeSecondary:MOEM,BPD,BCFD,DOT,MTA,MOIT,DPW,BCHD,HABC,MOCJ,MON,MDPSCS,Sheriff,MSP,BCSP,mutualaidpartnersRationalefortheRecommendation:Multiagencycollaborationandtrainingisessentialforacoordinatedresponsetomassdemonstrationandothercriticalincidents.36“Thiscanbewithinthecriminaljusticesystembutalsoacrossgovernments,nonprofits,andtheprivatesector,includingsocialservices,legalaid,businesses,communitycorrections,education,thecourts,mentalhealthorganizations,civicandreligiousorganizations,andothers.Whenpeoplecometogetherfromdifferentdisciplinesandbackgrounds,thereisacross-fertilizationofideasthatoftenleadstobettersolutions.”8“Multiagencytrainingforlarge-scaledemonstrations,however,isafairlynew,yetcritical

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componentofsuccessfuldemonstrationmanagement…Whenamultiagencyoperationisinitiated,everyoneinvolvedmustbeabletoperforminconcertanduptoexpectations.Trainingtogetheriswhatmakesthishappen.”7Althoughdocumentedplans,policies,andproceduresprovidegoodframeworksforemergencyresponse,agencies’abilitiestoeffectivelyimplementtheseplansarebestdevelopedwithactivetrainingexercises.AsPERFexplained,“asvitalasclassroomtrainingis,onlythroughpracticaltraining,tabletopexercisesandothersimulationeffortsdoestheagencycreateanopportunitytoactuallytestitscontingencyplans.TabletopIncidentManagementSystem(IMS)trainingexercisesareanexcellentandinexpensivetrainingtoolformassdemonstrationpreparedness.Thescenarioscanbedesignedtoincludepersonnelfromcommunications,jails,fire/EMSandemergencymanagementdepartments,publicworks,andothergovernmentagencies.Allarelikelytobeinvolvedinarealeventandshouldparticipateinthepre-eventpractice.”7PERFalsopointsouttheuniquevalueofteampracticenotonlyforinteragencyrelationship-building,butalsostrengtheningteamswithinthelawenforcementresponse.“This‘team-practice’approachfacilitatesproficiencyintacticalskills,establishesindividualandteamexpectations,helpspromoteuse-of-forceawarenessandpromotesteamworkoverpotentiallycounter-productiveindividualactions.Thisisespeciallyimportant,asmostpoliceofficersareaccustomedtoworkingaloneorinpairs,notinsquadsandlargerplatoons.”7TheDOJendorsesaNIMS-compliantframeworkfortrainingexercises.“Incidentmanagementorganizationsandpersonnelalsomustparticipateinrealisticexercises—includingmultidisciplinaryandmultijurisdictionaleventsandprivate-sectorandnongovernmentalorganizationinteraction—toimproveintegrationandinteroperability.”39“LawenforcementagenciesshouldnotonlyadopttheNIMSoperatingmodelandmeetcertificationstandardsbutalsoregularlytrainandexercisewithparticipatingagencies.”6Theseexercisesenablekeyagencypersonneltobecomefamiliarwiththeexecutionofcitywideemergencyplansandproceduresinavarietyofscenarios,practiceintheirassignedroles,developcollaborativeworkingexperiencewithpeersinotheragencies,andidentifystrengthsandissuestoinformtheiterativeimprovementofemergencyplans.PERFexplicitlyrecommendsto“establishrelationshipswiththeotherstakeholdersthroughtabletopsandotherpre-eventexercises.Thiswillhelpbuild…abilitytoworktogetherduringanevent…Practiceexerciseswithmajorstakeholdersandresourcesinadvanceofaneventcanbeveryhelpful.”14Indescribingfundamentalsofemergencymanagement,FEMAemphasizesthat“exercisesarecriticaltoasuccessfulresponse”andwillhelpto“improveinteragencycoordinationandcommunication.”20

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5.HEALTH,SAFETY,ANDMORALEFinding5.1:Therewasinsufficientmanagementofthebasichealthandsafetyneedsoffieldpersonnel,co-deployedmutualaid,NationalGuardmembers,andotherresponders.Hazardsincludedexcessiveshiftlengths,limitedtonoprovisionoffoodandwater,andexposuretophysicalinjury.TherewasnoformalICS-basedSafetyOfficer,LogisticsSection,orPlanningSectionattendingtothesehazards.Recommendation5.1:Duringmassdemonstrationmanagementandotheremergencyeventsettings,specificsafetypersonnelshouldbededicatedtomanagingdeploymentschedules,procuringfoodandwater,identifyingrestroomfacilitiesandsaferoutesofegress,andmitigatingpersonalinjuryrisksforallresponders,includinglawenforcement,fire,medical,andemergencydispatchandotherresponsepersonnel.Thisalsonecessitatesscalabilityandpreparednessinhumanandphysicalresourcemanagementforextendeddurationevents.Theseresponsibilitiesshouldbemanagedbypersonnelsolelydedicatedtothesefunctions,inlinewithICS/NIMSroledescriptionsforSafetyOfficers,LogisticsSection,andPlanningSectionpersonnel.BPDshouldutilizetheserolesduringroutineoperationsinordertoensurepreparednessforcriticalincidents.Finding5.2:Lawenforcementmutualaidorganizationsandauxiliaryforces(e.g.,theNationalGuard)reportedconcernaboutthesecurityoftheirstagingandbilletingareas.Recommendation5.2:Adequateshelterandsecuritymustbeprovidedforallresponders,includinglawenforcement,fire,medical,andemergencydispatchandotherresponsepersonnel,asappropriate.Venueswithadequatephysicalsecurityandaccommodationsforrestandsheltershouldbeutilizedforbilletingandstagingofmutualaidorganizationsandauxiliaryforces.Itmayalsobeadvisabletomakeuseofsuchaccommodationsforrestandrecuperationbreaksforlocalpersonnelinextendeddurationevents.TheCityshouldutilizeitsnewlysecuredfacilityforthesebilletingandstagingpurposes,intheinstanceofaDeclarationofaStateofEmergencyorothercriticalincidents,atthediscretionoftheIncidentCommander.Finding5.3:Lawenforcementpersonnelwithphysicalinjuriesdidnotfeelthattheyhadcleardirectionorsupportforwhereandhowtoseekmedicalcare.Recommendation5.3:Adequatehealthcaremustbefacilitatedandprovidedforallresponders,includinglawenforcement,fire,medical,andemergencydispatchandotherresponsepersonnel.Designatedsafetypersonnel(seeRecommendation5.1)shouldcommunicateamedicalcareplan,withclearandsimpleinstructionstoallpersonnel.Safetypersonnelshouldalsoberesponsiblefor

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coordinationofcare-seeking,whichmayincludeutilizingtacticalmedics,deployingextricationteams,andcommunicatingwithemergencymedicalservicesandhealthcarefacilities.Finding5.4:Leadershipfrommanycityagenciesidentifiedthattheirpersonnelwouldbenefitfromimprovedservicesforcriticalincidentstressmanagement,mentalwellness,andtrauma-specificcare.Recommendation5.4:Criticalincidentstressmanagement,mentalresilienceandwellness,andtrauma-specificcareservicesshouldbestrengthened,madeavailablecity-widetoanyself-reportingorreferredpersonnel,and,mostimportantly,endorsedbyagencyleadership.High-yieldtrauma-specificcaresessionsshouldbeutilizedasapreparednessactivityatbaseline.Duringanextendedincident,psychologicalfirstaidandcriticalincidentstressmanagementprovidersshouldbeavailabletoallpersonnel.Front-linepersonnelshouldbeinformedonidentificationofhigh-risksituationsandidentificationofemergencypsychologicalinterventionscenarios.Post-incident,criticalincidentstressmanagementdebriefingsshouldbeconductedforallpersonnel.Provisionofanonymousmechanismsforcertaincounselingandmentalwellnessservicesshouldbeexplored.Provisionofmentalwellnesssupportforallresponders,includinglawenforcement,fire,medical,andemergencydispatchandotherresponsepersonnelmustbeapriority.Agencyleadershipshouldendorseandde-stigmatizetheseservicesbydesignatingconfidential,protectedtimeforpreparednesstraininganddebriefing.Owners(forallrecommendationsabove):Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor'sOffice,MOEMSecondary:BPD,BCFD,DOT,MTA,MOIT,DPW,BCHD,HABC,MOCJ,MON,MDPSCS,Sheriff,MSP,BCSP,mutualaidpartnersRationalefortheRecommendations:TheCity’sabilitytoeffectivelymanagemassdemonstrationsandcriticalincidentsrestssignificantlyonthesafety,morale,engagement,andperformanceofitspersonnelatalllevelsofitsagenciesandsupportingorganizations.The21stCenturyPolicingReportidentifiespersonnelwellnessandsafetyasafundamentalprioritybydevotinganentirepillarofthereporttoitsdiscussion:

Alargeproportionofofficerinjuriesanddeathsarenottheresultofinteractionwithcriminaloffendersbuttheoutcomeofpoorphysicalhealthduetopoornutrition,lackofexercise,sleepdeprivation,andsubstanceabuse…Thewellnessandsafetyoflawenforcementofficersiscriticalnotonlytothemselves,theircolleagues,andtheiragenciesbutalsotopublicsafety.Anofficerwhosecapabilities,judgment,andbehaviorareadverselyaffectedbypoorphysicalorpsychologicalhealthnotonlymaybeoflittleusetothecommunityheorsheservesbutalsomaybeadangertothecommunityand

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tootherofficers…Supportforwellnessandsafetyshouldpermeateallpracticesandbeexpressedthroughchangesinprocedures,requirements,attitudes,andbehaviors.8

Thesafetyandwellnessofallpersonneliscritical.Basichumanneedsshouldbeaccommodatedfirst,includingadequatefoodandwater,safedeploymentshiftlengths,timeforrestandrecovery,safeshelterforextendeddeployments,adequateaccesstosanitation,andphysicalprotectionfromormitigationofpersonalinjury.Lawenforcementandemergencyresponsepersonnelinherentlyincurhigherriskofpersonalinjuryandpsychologicaltraumaasthefront-linedefendersofpublicsafety;nonetheless,strategiesmustbeutilizedtominimizethisinjury.Thisshouldincludepreventivemeasuresaswellasresponsemeasures.Preventivesafetymeasuresincludeadequateprotectivegearforhigh-risksituations,pre-deploymentofon-scenemedicalsupportpersonnel,advanceidentificationofsafeegressroutesforanypersonnelmobilization,andtraumaandstresstraining.Optimaldeploymentandmassdemonstrationstrategiesthatemphasizeeventde-escalationwillalsominimizeinjurytopersonnel.3Responsemeasuresincluderapidprovisionofon-scenemedicalcareorevacuation,demobilizationofpersonnelaccordingtoshiftlength,anddemobilizationofandcareforindividualsidentifiedbyselforothersasinneedofacutereliefofphysicalorstress-relatedconcerns,basedonpsychologicalfirstaidprinciples.Long-termpreventionandresponsemeasuresshouldincludecriticalincidentstressdebriefingandresiliencetrainingforallpersonnel.Personnelwell-trainedinresilienceandstressmanagementarebetterpreparedtosuccessfullynavigatethehighlydynamicstressassociatedwithcriticalincidentresponse,whichnotonlyensurespersonnelsafetyandwellness,butalsomitigatestheriskofharmtopublicsafetyandwellness.Massdemonstrationsposeauniquerisktoofficerwellness.TheDOJCOPSReportexplained:

Whileresearchshowsthatofficers’workexposurehasacumulativeeffectonstress,beingdeployedinacriticalsituation…cansignificantlyincreasethestressorsandtheireffects…Aprolongedsituation…canbestressfulandfatiguingforvariouslevelsofpersonnel,fromtheincidentcommandertotheofficer.Physicalwell-beingbecomesanissue.Officersondutycaneasilybecomedehydratedandtired,especiallywhenexposedtohightemperaturesduringtheday.Thisnotonlythreatensthehealthofanofficerbutalsoaffectstheofficer’sjudgmentandresponsesduringanincident.Underthesetypesofconditions,officersmaymakebadjudgmentsandengageinbehaviorthatisuncharacteristicfortheofficerbutwhichhasseriousimpact.Thatuncharacteristicbehavior[potentially]manifestsintheformofacarelessstatement,anoverreactiontoanevent,ortheexcessivethreatoractualuseofforce.6

PERF,theDOJCOPSReport,andBPD’sFOPAARendorsestrategiesforminimizingthesehealthriskstopersonnel,including:

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• “Whenrespondingtoamassgathering,lawenforcementshouldmaintainanisolatedlocationawayfromthedemonstrationareawherepersonnelcanrehydrateandeat.Officerswillalsohavepersonalneeds,suchascontactingfamilymembersthatwillrequirebreaktimefromduty.”6

• “Pre-stagematerialsandequipmentthatwillbeneededinanemergency(e.g.water,food,flashlights,batteries,firstaidequipment,gloves,vests,extraclothing,etc.)”14

• “Aplanformedicaltreatmentandinjuriesmustbeputinplacebeforeofficersaredeployedintoaneventofthismagnitude.”5

• “Agenciesshouldhaveahealthprofessionalpresentintherestareawhocanmonitorofficers,diagnosepotentialhealthissues,monitorbloodpressure,andprovideotherhealthservicesthatmayberequiredduringaprolongedincident.”6

• “Everylawenforcementofficershouldbeprovidedwithindividualtacticalfirstaidkitsandtraining.”6

The21stCenturyPolicingReporthighlightstheimportanceofshiftlengthandmitigationofpersonnelfatigue:

Ithasbeenestablishedbysignificantbodiesofresearchthatlongshiftscannotonlycausefatigue,stress,anddecreasedabilitytoconcentratebutalsoleadtoothermoreseriousconsequences…[Longshifts]canleadtopoormorale,poorjobperformance,irritability,anderrorsinjudgmentthatcanhaveserious,evendeadly,consequences…Administrativechangessuchasreducingworkshiftscanimproveofficer’sfeelingsofwell-being...Lawenforcementagenciesshouldensureofficersreceiveadequatetimeofftorestandrecover.8

Inadditiontowellnesspreservationandtherisksofthelawenforcementrole,PERFpointsoutthat“officersafetyisaninherentgoalofanymassdemonstrationevent.”7TheDOJCOPSReportprovidedseveralrecommendations:

• Agenciesshouldanticipateanincreaseinthreatsagainstpersonnelduringtimesofmassdemonstrationsandcivildisobedienceanddeveloppoliciesandprocedurestoreducetheimpactofthreatstophysicalsafety,fraudulentschemes,hacking,identitytheft,andsocialmediaattacksonofficersandtheirfamilies.

• Agenciesneedtoestablishprotocolsforrespondingtoofficerswhoreceiveextreme,immediate,andcrediblethreatstothemselvesandtheirfamilies.6

TheestablishmentofNIMS-basedICSfacilitatestheprotectionofofficersafetyandwellness.NIMSidentifiesseveralkeyrolestoachievetheseobjectives,includingSafetyOfficerandspecificresponsibilitieswithintheLogisticsandPlanningSections.ASafetyOfficer“monitorssafetyconditionsanddevelopsmeasuresforensuringthesafetyofallincidentpersonnel.”16TheResourceUnitwithinthePlanningSectionmonitorsthestatusofallincidentresources.TheLogisticsSectionhasdedicatedhealth-relatedresponsibilitiesincludingtheFoodUnitandtheMedicalUnit.TheFoodUnit“determinesfoodandwaterrequirements,plansmenus,orders

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food,providescookingfacilities,cooks,serves,maintainsfoodserviceareas,andmanagesfoodsecurityandsafetyconcerns.”16TheMedicalUnitis“responsiblefortheeffectiveandefficientprovisionofmedicalservicestoincidentpersonnel.”16Personnelsafetywillalwaysbeoneof“thehighestprioritiesandthefirstobjectivesintheIncidentActionPlan.”27Furthermore,theNationalResponseTeamdiscussesguidelinesandrecommendationsforassessmentandmitigationofriskfactorsduringemergencyoperations,whichinclude(1)workhoursandrestperiods,(2)siteconditions,(3)livingconditions,(4)natureofwork,(5)managementandadministrativesupport,and(6)emotionalstress.Theseguidelinesshouldbeconsultedandleveragedfordevelopingriskassessmentandmitigationstrategiestoprotectofficerhealthandsafety.43Ofgreatestimportance,andmostoftenoverlooked,istheprioritizationandfacilitationofpersonnelresilienceandmentalwellness.Intestimonyforthe21stCenturyPolicingReport,Dr.LaurenceMillerlamentedthatlawenforcementorganizations“paylittleattentiontothemaintenanceofwhatisallofficers’mostvaluableresource:theirbrains.”8Althoughtheremaybeincreasingacademicawarenessandconcernfortheriskofpsychologicalstress,post-traumaticstressdisorder,andsuicideinlawenforcementpersonnel,6,8,44–46thesetragicphenomenaarestillnotwellunderstoodorwidelyrecognized.Morestudyisrequiredtofullycharacterizetheuniquenatureofmentalhealthrisksinlawenforcementprofessionalsand“theimplementationofmentalhealthstrategiescanlessentheimpactofthestressandtrauma.”8The21stCenturyPolicingReportrecommendsthat“thechallengesandtreatmentsofmentalhealthissuesshouldbeviewedwithinthecontextoflawenforcement’suniquecultureandworkingenvironment.”8The21stCenturyPolicingandDOJCOPSReportsendorsethevalueofmakingsupportavailabletopersonnelforwellnessandsafety.“Becauseofficersareexposedtoawiderangeofstressorsonacontinuousbasisaspartoftheirdailyroutines,mentalandphysicalhealthcheck-upsshouldbeconducted.”8Massdemonstrationscanplacefurtherstrainonpersonnel,thustheDOJCOPSReportrecommendsthat:

Intimesofprolongedandstressfulduty,lawenforcementagenciesshouldcloselymonitorofficers’emotionalandphysicalwell-beinganddeveloparesiliencesupportprogramthatincludespeersupport…Inprolongedstressfulsituations,agenciesshouldconsiderdeployingatrainedpolicecounselororpsychologistwhocandiscussstressissueswithindividualofficersandoffersomestressmanagementorreductionstrategiesoradvice,aswellasprovidecrisisinterventionormakeappropriatereferralsforofficersandtheirfamilymembers.6

Moredetailedanalysisandvalidationisneededtoidentifyassessmenttoolsaswellasinterventionsthatareoptimallyeffectiveintheuniquepopulationoflawenforcementpersonnel.Asthesecontinuetobedeveloped,bestpracticesandcurrentrecommendationsincriticalincidentstressmanagementandresilienceshouldbeconsultedandleveragedtofostermentalwellnessinpersonnel.

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Althoughtheserecommendationsweredevelopedtoensurerelevancetolawenforcement(andBPDspecifically),itshouldbeemphasizedthattheserecommendationsforpersonnelsafety,wellness,andmoraleareimportantforallCityagenciesandorganizationsinvolvedinmassdemonstrationsandcriticalincidentresponse.Emergencymedicalserviceproviders,clinicians,anddispatchersarefront-lineresponderstocriticalinjuriesandhaveuniqueneedsforcriticalincidentstressdebriefing.Conversely,non-emergencypersonnelandcommunitymembersthroughouttheCitymaybelesslikelytohaveexperienceandtrainingtonavigatecriticalincidents.Existingresourceswithincityagenciesshouldbeexpandedandimprovedinaccordancewithbestpracticestomeettheneedsofthesepopulations.Providingmoreopportunitiesforanonymousorconfidentialservicesbyhighlyqualifiedproviderswhohaveline-of-duty-specificexperience(butwhoarenotcurrentlyactivewithinone’sownagencyoraleadershipposition)mayincreasenotonlytheutilizationbutalsotheefficacyofstressmanagementsupportforservicepersonnel.Generalcriticalincidentstressmanagementguidanceandresourcesshouldbemadewidelyavailabletothepublic.ResourcesshouldbefurtherdevelopedandprovidedtoensurearapidrecoveryfromcriticalincidenttraumaandfosterthesustainedmentalwellnessoftheCity.Finding5.5:Lackofconsistentstrategyandunclearcommunicationofpolicybylawenforcementleadership(asdiscussedinSection1)negativelyimpactedthemoraleoffieldpersonnel.Thisproblemwascompoundedbythefactthatevenwhenpolicywascommunicatedclearly(e.g.,thearrestpolicystatedatrollcall,ascitedintheFOPAAR),moralewasstillnegativelyimpactedbythischangefrombaselinepractices,withofficersfeeling“unabletodotheirjobs.”5Recommendation5.5:Becausethemassdemonstrationlawenforcementpoliciesandproceduresthatareconsistentwithlawenforcementbestpracticescannegativelyaffectmorale,itisimperativetoconceptuallyconnectthesepolicieswiththetraditionallawenforcementcultureandmissionofprotectingthepublic.Reinforcementshouldoccurthroughouttheorganization,includingtrainingonpolicyrationale,verballyinrollcalls,inwrittencommunicationslikeorganizationalnewsletters,andstructurally,withrelatedcommendationsandincentives.Finding5.6:BPDpersonnelreportedimpairedorganization-widemoraleatbaseline,whichwasfurtherexacerbatedbytheirexperienceduringtheriots,especiallygivenaperceptionofalackofsupportbyleadership.Recommendation5.6:Cityleadership’sapproachtoBPDleadership,andBPDleadership’sapproachtoBPDpersonnel,shouldendorsepersonneldevelopmentandrecognition,whichiswidelyknowntoimprovemorale,loyalty,andperformance.Personneldevelopmentisrecommendedincontrastto“culturechange,”whichlacksmeaningandfailstoacknowledgethesignificantcommitmentsmadebydedicatedcareerpersonnelservinginthelawenforcementprofession.Fundamentaltenetsofpersonneldevelopmentshouldincludeperformancerecognition,training

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opportunitiesforcareerdevelopment,accesstomentorshipbysupervisors,andinitialnon-punitivefeedbackonperformance.Owners(forthetworecommendationsabove):Primary:BaltimoreCityMayor'sOfficeSecondary:BPDRationalefortheRecommendations:Muchassuccessfulnegotiatedmanagementdependsonasolidbaselinerelationshipbetweenlawenforcementandthecommunity,personnelperformanceinacriticalincidentispredicatedonpersonnelmoraleandastrongbaselinerelationshipandtrustbetweenlawenforcementpersonnel,leadership,andtheoverallorganization.47,48Performancerecognitionenablespositivereinforcementofgoodpractices,conveyspersonnelappreciation,andbuildsmorale.48,49Trainingopportunitiesforcareerdevelopmentandaccesstomentorshipbysupervisorsstrengthenskillsofworkforcewhileimprovingloyaltyandcommitmenttotheorganization.48Initialnon-punitivefeedbackonperformance(e.g.,developmentalcoaching)isimperativeforcontinuingthetraininganddevelopmentofpersonnelinbestpractices.49Whenperformancefeedbackisonlynegativeorpunitive,thismaycultivatefearanddisengagement.“Anagencyworkenvironmentinwhichofficersdonotfeeltheyarerespected,supported,ortreatedfairlyisoneofthemostcommonsourcesofstress.Andresearchindicatesthatofficerswhofeelrespectedbytheirsupervisorsaremorelikelytoacceptandvoluntarilycomplywithdepartmentalpolicies.”8The21stCenturyPolicingReportprovidesdetailedrecommendationsontheimportanceandimplementationprioritiesofinternalorganizationaldevelopment:

Lawenforcementagenciesshouldpromotelegitimacyinternallywithintheorganizationbyapplyingtheprinciplesofproceduraljustice.Organizationalculturecreatedthroughemployeeinteractionwithmanagementcanbelinkedtoofficers’interactionwithcitizens.Whenanagencycreatesanenvironmentthatpromotesinternalproceduraljustice,itencouragesitsofficerstodemonstrateexternalproceduraljustice.Andjustasemployeesaremorelikelytotakedirectionfrommanagementwhentheybelievemanagement’sauthorityislegitimate,citizensaremorelikelytocooperatewiththepolicewhentheybelievetheofficers’authorityislegitimate…Internalproceduraljusticebeginswiththecleararticulationoforganizationalcorevaluesandthetransparentcreationandfairapplicationofanorganization’spolicies,protocols,anddecision-makingprocesses.Iftheworkforceisactivelyinvolvedinpolicydevelopment,workersaremorelikelytousethesesameprinciplesofexternalproceduraljusticeintheirinteractionswiththecommunity.Eventhoughtheapproachtoimplementingproceduraljusticeis“topdown,”themethodshouldincludeallemployeestobestreachasharedvisionandmission.Researchshowsthatagenciesshouldalsousetoolsthatencourageemployeeandsupervisorcollaborationandfosterstrongrelationshipsbetweensupervisorsandemployees.Amoreeffectiveagencywillresultfromareal

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partnershipbetweenthechiefandthestaffandasharedapproachtopublicsafety…Inordertoachieveinternallegitimacy,lawenforcementagenciesshouldinvolveemployeesintheprocessofdevelopingpoliciesandprocedures.Forexample,internaldepartmentsurveysshouldaskofficerswhattheythinkofpolicingstrategiesintermsofenhancingorhurtingtheirabilitytoconnectwiththepublic.Sometimestheleadershipisoutofstepwiththeirrankandfile,andasurveylikethiscanbeadiagnostictool—abenchmarkagainstwhichleadershipcanmeasureitseffectivenessandabilitytocreateaworkenvironmentwhereofficersfeelsafetodiscusstheirfeelingsaboutcertainaspectsofthejob…Lawenforcementagencyleadershipshouldexamineopportunitiestoincorporateproceduraljusticeintotheinternaldisciplineprocess,placingadditionalimportanceonvaluesadherenceratherthanadherencetorules.Unionleadershipshouldbepartnersinthisprocess.…Lawenforcementagenciesshouldprovideleadershiptrainingtoallpersonnelthroughouttheircareers.Standardsandprogramsneedtobeestablishedforeverylevelofleadershipfromthefirstlinetomiddlemanagementtoexecutiveleadership.Ifthereisgoodleadershipandproceduraljusticewithintheagency,theofficersaremorelikelytobehaveaccordingtothosestandardsinthecommunity.AsChiefEdwardFlynnoftheMilwaukeePoliceDepartmentnoted,‘Flexible,dynamic,insightful,ethicalleadersareneededtodeveloptheinformalsocialcontrolandsocialcapitalrequiredforacivilsocietytoflourish.’OneexampleofleadershiptrainingisLeadingPoliceOrganizations,aprogramdevelopedbytheIACPandmodeledaftertheWestPointLeadershipProgram,whichofferstrainingforalllevelsofagencymanagementinprogramsbasedonabehavioralscienceapproachtoleadingpeoplegroups,change,andorganizations,focusingontheconceptof“everyofficeraleader.8

FINALTHOUGHTSWehavepresentedaseriesoffindingsandassociatedrecommendations,alongwiththerationaleforthoserecommendations.Inmakingtherecommendations,wefocusedonevidence-andliterature-basedknowledgeandcurrentbestpractices.IndependentofanyspecificactionsorfindingsfromApril,ourintentistomakeBaltimoreamodelforthecountry.Weanticipatethatsomereadersmaywantustodeclare“whoisatfault.”Wedonotbelievethatanyoneortwoorthreeindividualsareatfault,orbythemselvesresponsibleforanyshortcomingsoftheCity’sresponseinApril.Rather,webelievethatthefindingshereinindicatesystem-widedeficienciesoflongstanding,notafailureinorofindividualleadership.Thereisonemajorthemethatunderpinsmanyofourrecommendations:relationships,relationship-building,andmutualrespect.ThisthemeapplieswithinanyCityagency,acrossCityagencies,andbetweenCitygovernmentandthecitizensofBaltimore.Inthisregard,

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perhapsourgreatestaspirationisthatthisreporthelpstohighlighttheimportanceoffurtherstrengtheningofallofthesecriticalrelationships.

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SUMMARYOFRECOMMENDATIONS1.STRATEGY,POLICY,ANDTACTICSRecommendation1.1:TheCityshouldexplicitlydevelopwrittenpoliciesandguidelinesregardingmassdemonstrationmanagement,whichdefinetheoverallstrategicapproachaswellasthetacticalresponseframework.Thesepoliciesorguidelinesshouldbuildonthecurrentimplicitapproachofnegotiatedmanagement,situationde-escalationandproblem-solving,andforcerestraint,whilefurtherincorporatinglawenforcementbestpractices.Recommendation1.2:BPDshouldcontinuetobuildadepartment-widecultureandpracticeofproceduraljusticeandmoderncommunitypolicing,including(andperhapsespecially)footpatrolandrelationshipbuilding,explicitlydefiningtheattributesoftheorganizationalphilosophyandidentifyingclear,simple,actionableguidelinesforfieldpersonnel.Commendations,incentives,andpromotionsshouldreinforcethisphilosophy.TheCityshouldendorseandfacilitateBPD’srecommitmenttothesevalues.Recommendation1.3:BPDshouldcontinuetoendorseforcerestraintinmassdemonstrationmanagement,andexpanditsUse-of-ForcePolicytodefineparametersofforceescalationandde-escalation,andtheconditionsandguidelinesfordeploymentofless-lethalandlethalinstruments.BPDshouldalsoexpanditsstandardoperatingprocedures(SOP)tobemorecomprehensive,explicitanddirective,andshouldexplicitlyharmonizethePolicyandSOPdocuments.Recommendation1.4:TheCityshouldhaveaclearpolicy(eitherseparateorwithinpoliciesonMassDemonstrationManagementandDisasterManagement)oncriticalinfrastructureprotection.Thispolicyshouldemphasizethephysicalsecurityofcriticalinfrastructure,aswellasprotectionofcontinuity-of-operationsofcriticalinfrastructuresectors.Thepolicyshouldprovideguidelinesonhowtoincorporatecriticalinfrastructureprotectionintotheprimaryresponsemissionduringacity-wideresponsetoamassdemonstrationorriot.Recommendation1.5:BPDshoulddefineclearpolicyandproceduresforarrestsduringamassdemonstration,eitherwithinoverallarrestpoliciesordistinct.Ataminimum,thesemustdelineatebasicparametersandguidelinesfor:

• theconditionsrequiredtoarrestanindividual• theauthoritydesignatedtomakethesedeterminations• thepersonnelinvolvedinexecutinganarrest• theproceduresofexecutinganarrestduringamassdemonstration• therequirementsforprotectingthesafetyofindividualsincustody

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• thedocumentationrequired• referencestoanyrelevantlegalparameters

Recommendation1.6:BPDstrategicpolicyforpersonneldeploymentduringamassdemonstrationshouldendorsetraininginfieldforceoperationsforallpersonnel,inordertostrengthenthecapacityforacoordinatedmassdemonstrationresponse.Thispolicyshouldincorporateoralignwiththearrestpolicyandprotocolrecommendedherein(seeRecommendation1.5).2.INCIDENTCOMMANDRecommendation2.1:TheCityshouldensurethataNIMS-compliantICSapproachisusedforthemanagementofallemergencies,includingthosethatareBPD-led,andthatallagenciesunderstandthespecificsofitsimplementationforpolice-ledincidents.BPDshouldensurethat,formajorincidents,twodifferentpersonsfilltherolesofcity-wideIncidentCommanderandBPDOperationsChief.TheIncidentCommandermustbeexpresslygivenfullauthoritytomanagetheincident.AuthoritytomanageBPDoperationsandrelateddecision-makingmustbedelegatedtotheBPDOperationsChief.Recommendation2.2:TheroleoftheEOC,andotherpolicieswithintheEOP,shouldbecommunicatedtoallnecessarypartieswithintheCityonaperiodicbasis.ExpectationsforCityagenciesshouldbecommunicatedandvalidatedtoensureallstakeholdersunderstandandcanparticipateinemergencyoperationsasneeded.TheCityshouldestablishahigh-qualityphysicalEOCthatbecomesthesingleunambiguousunifiedlocationforallemergencymanagementactivities,including(andespecially)incidentcommand.ThisEOCshouldbeinawell-suitedlocation,withsufficientspace(andflexibilityinthearrangementofthatspace),telecommunications,accessibility,parking,security,andothercriticalfunctionalrequirements.Inthemeantime,theCitymustidentifywhichexistingbuildingservesastheunambiguousEOConanevent-by-eventbasis.Recommendation2.3:TheCityshouldworkwithMOEMandallagencyleadershiptoreinforcekeystrategiesandmoreeffectivelycommunicatedocumentedexpectationsformanagingmulti-agencyincidents.Thesepoliciesincludestipulationsdefiningtheselectionandresponsibilitiesofa“leadagency”foragivenincident,theselectionofandexpectationsfornon-leadagencypersonneltoreporttoacity-wideEOCandparticipateinacity-widecommandstructure,andtheconditionsforoperatingagency-specificcommandstructuresandoperationscenterincollaborationwithacity-wideincidentcommandstructure.AllCityagenciesshoulddeveloppreparednessplansandallpersonnelwithintheseagenciesshouldbetrainedinandfamiliarwithICS/NIMSprinciples(seeRecommendation4.5).Agency-specificpreparednessplansandtrainingshouldbedevelopedandcoordinatedthroughMOEM.ICS-specificresponsibilitiesandexpectationsshouldbedefinedandincludedwithinpersonnelpositiondescriptionsforallagenciesas

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appropriate.Recommendation2.4:BPDpersonneldeploymentsduringmassdemonstrationandcriticalincidentresponseshouldutilizefundamentalICSprinciplesgoverningchainofcommand,includingspanofcontrolandunityofcommand.BPDshouldcontinuetoenhanceitsICScapabilitiesthroughmoretraining(seeRecommendation4.5)andthroughmorefrequentutilizationofICSprinciplesinroutineincidentmanagement.BPDshouldalsocontinuetodeveloptheICScapabilitiesofitsseniorleadershippersonnel.Recommendation2.5:TheCityshouldleverageitspriorandcurrentexperiencewithmultiagencyeventmanagementtofurtheridentifysuccessfulstrategiesforleadershipandcollaborationamongkeyresponseagencies,includingthedevelopmentofacity-wideIMT.BPDinparticularshouldleverageitscurrentICStrainingandrecentexperiences,andcreateandroutinelyutilizeanIMTinitsmanagementofincidentsthatinvolvemulti-officerresponse,multipleexpectedoperationalperiods,and/ormultijurisdictionalresponse.OtherCityagenciesshouldbuildorfurtherdeveloptheirIMTsthroughadditionaltraining(seeRecommendation4.5).EachrolewithinanIMTshouldbetiedtopersonnelpositiondescriptionswithintheagency.3.INFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATIONSRecommendation3.1:TheCity’sintelligencegatheringanddisseminationprocessshouldbeclarifiedandreinforced,undertheleadershipofBPD,toensurethatchainofcommunicationissecure,informationisappropriatelyinvestigatedtoverifyandcorroborate,andvalidintelligenceiscommunicatedrapidlyandappropriatelyacrossrelevantCityagenciesforutilizationbynecessarypartiesininformeddecision-making.Recommendation3.2:Improvementstointelligenceoperations(seeRecommendation3.1)shouldalsoincludeprocessesforidentificationofkeyinternalandexternalstakeholdersandrapid,securedeliveryofsensitiveinformationtothosestakeholders.Atbaseline,agenciesshouldcollaborativelydefineanddocumentthemutualcommunicationneedsrequiredforbetterpreparednessandeventresponse.Recommendation3.3BPDleadershipshouldutilizeclearandconsistenttacticaldirectioninaccordancewithnewlydevelopedpolicies(seeRecommendations1.1and1.3),minimizingambiguitywhenpossible.Inscenariosrequiringflexibilityandjudgmentbyfieldcommanders,guidelinesshouldbecommunicatedclearlytoaiddecision-making.Inscenariosrequiringanystrategicchangethatcouldbeperceivedasinconsistentdirection,communicationshouldclearlyidentifythechangeindirectionandcorrespondingrationale.EffectivecommunicationduringBPDrollcallisessential.BPDrollcallshouldcoordinateandsynchronizewiththecity-wideICSOperational

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PeriodandassociatedOperationalPeriodBriefing,whenappropriateandfeasible.Recommendation3.4:BPDshouldcontinuetodevelopandutilizemorecomprehensivecommunicationsplansforcriticalincidentsandroutineincidentmanagement.Communicationsplansshouldbedevelopedwithinputfromtechnicalexperts,strategicandtacticaladvisors,fieldpersonnel,andleadership,withconsiderationforoptimizingefficiencyandeffectivenessinfieldandcommandcommunications.PositionsshouldbedesignatedwithinBPDtoserveasCommunicationsUnitLeaders,consonantwithICSprinciples.Plansshouldincludetheidentificationofallavailabletalkgroupsandtheirconditionsforuse.Dispatchshouldreinforcecommunicationplanpoliciesduringcriticalincidents,includingthedecision-makingregardingwhentotransitiontoadditionalchannelsandtalkgroupsduringrapidlyexpandingevents.AvailabletechnologyforinteroperablecommunicationswithfireandEMSpersonnelshouldbeclearlycommunicatedtoallpersonnel.PlainlanguageshouldbeusedinaccordancewithNIMS.Informationgatheringandresponseshouldbecoordinatedlocallyandintegrate911andallresponseagencies.Thiscoordinationshouldleveragepriorsuccessfulapproaches,suchasthoseusedduringtheStarSpangledSpectacular,includingtheestablishmentofgeographicalparameterswithinCADtocoordinateincoming911callswithresourcesandcommanddeployedforaspecialeventorincident.Recommendation3.5:TheCityshouldcontinuetodevelopandbetterutilizeawell-understoodandhighly-functioningJISandassociatedJIC.InlinewithprevioussuccessfulCityevents,thismodelshouldcoordinatemultiagencypubliccommunicationsinlinewithNIMS/ICSstandardsforJIS,aswellasprovideasingleunifiedgatheringpointforcommunityleaders,politicalleaders,faithcommunityrepresentatives,andotherkeystakeholders.TheJICshouldbelocatedinanappropriatephysicalfacility,whichcouldeitherresidewithintheEOCrecommendedabove(seeRecommendation2.2)oraseparatefacility,asappropriatetothespecificconditionsoftheevent.Recommendation3.6:AJIS/JICarrangementofthetypecalledforinRecommendation3.4iscriticaltoensurethatbothinternalandexternalcommunicationsarefacilitatedviaformalstructuresandprocesses.However,thatJIS/JICwillnotautomaticallyensureoptimalpubliccommunications,whichmustbeactivelyplannedandconsciouslyresponsivetopublicinterests.TheCitymustbothanticipateandrespondtokeyissuesandconcernsthatliveinthepublic’sconsciousness,andmustmonitormediacommunicationstoidentifysuchissuesandconcerns.Furthermore,theCitymuststrategicallyoptimizetheuseofpressconferencesandpressreleasesinaddressingtheseissues.Recommendation3.7:TheMayorandGovernormustbuildandmaintainacollaborativerelationshipatbaseline,includingstrongcommunicationonmutualexpectationsandcommitments,inordertoeffectivelycollaborateonaresponseduringemergencyoperations.

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Recommendation3.8:Policiesandprocedures,suchastheProtocolSuspensionPolicy,forhigh-volumesurgesandcriticalincidentdemandon911PSAPoperationsshouldcontinuetobewell-documentedandcommunicatedtoallfront-linepersonnel.911PSAPfunctionalcapacityshouldbescalabletoaccommodatehigh-volumesurgesandcriticalincidentdemand,andutilizecontingencyplanningforcapacity-shortagetriageanddiversionofnon-emergencycalls.Alternativetechnology,includingtextmessagingandinternet,shouldbeincorporatedintothedispatchprocess.Publiccommunicationsandalternativecallcenters,suchas311andaCommunityImpactresponselineattheJIC,shouldbeleveragedtoreducetherateofnon-emergencycallsduringcriticalincidents.Supplementaryresources,includingfromtheMayor’sOfficeofNeighborhoodsandcommunityorganizations,shouldbeidentifiedduringnon-emergencybaselineplanningandutilizedeffectivelyandconsistentlytoresolveconstituentneedsandconcerns.4.PREPAREDNESS,RESOURCEMANAGEMENT,EQUIPMENT,&TRAININGRecommendation4.1:AllCityagenciesshouldcontinuetoaugmenttheirpreparednessby:

• Buildinganddocumentingall-hazardsemergencyplans,consistentacrossagenciesandcoordinatedthroughMOEM

• Havingpoliciesthatendorseagency-specificandinteragencytraining• Identifyingresourcescalabilityneeds,maintainingaccuratelogisticstracking,and

buildingsourcingplans• Buildinginteragencyrelationshipsduringnon-emergencyperiodsanddocumenting

commitments• Buildingrelationshipswithexternalagenciesofsimilarfunctionanddocumenting

commitmentsviamutualaidagreementsRecommendation4.2:TheCitymustpurchase,distribute,maintain,andappropriatelyusetherightequipmentformassdemonstrations,protests,andriots.Suchequipmentincludes:

• Personalprotection(e.g.,helmetswithfaceshields,bodyarmor,bodyshields,respiratoryprotection)

• Less-lethalinstruments(e.g.,batons/ASPs,personalsizeOC/pepperspray,conducted-energyweapons(Tasers))

• Less-lethalcrowdcontrolinstruments(e.g.,rubberbullets,beanbags,pepperballsandrespectivelaunchers,CSgas)

Recommendation4.3:

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TheCityandBPDshoulddevelopandadheretoagear-donningpolicyconsonantwith,orincorporatedinto,theUse-of-ForceandMassDemonstrationManagementpoliciesdescribedabove,whichshouldemphasizegearrestraintandrestrictdonningofparamilitarygeartospecificwell-definedscenarios.Toensurepersonnelmoraleandprotection,BPDmustcommunicatetherationaleforthesepoliciesinthecontextofmoreeffectivemassdemonstrationmanagementpolicies(seeRecommendation1.1),andmaintainsafetyofficersformonitoringpersonnelconditions.Recommendation4.4:BPDshouldhavedesignatedresourcemanagementprocessesandpersonnelresponsibleforgearandequipmentlogistics,whichincludesinventorymaintenance,qualitycontrol,andscalableplansandprocessesforcontingencysourcingandprocurement.ThesedesignatedpositionsshouldbedefinedwithinBPDtoserveroleswithintheLogisticsSectionofaBPDincidentmanagementteamandbepreparedtomanageresourcesduringeventsinconjunctionwiththeEOCandstagingareas.Recommendation4.5:TheCityshouldcontinuetodevelopitstrainingprogramsforallpersonnel.Trainingshouldinclude:

• massdemonstrationmanagement,fieldforceoperations,andthecorrespondingcivilliberties,consonantwithbestpractices,departmentalpolicy,andlegalparameters

• negotiatedmanagement,problemsolving,andsituationmanagementandde-escalation• ICS/NIMS,preferablyutilizingagency-specificcurricula,coordinatedthroughMOEM• theartandscienceofcommunityfootpatrol• hands-ongearandequipmenttraining,regardinggearandequipmentselectionand

donninganddoffing• useofforceandinstrumentdeployment,inaccordancewithdepartmentalpolicyand

bestpractices,includingforcelevelselectionfactors,operationaldetailsofinstrumentdeployment,anddocumentation,warning,andsafetyrequirementsforless-lethalandlethalforce

Additionalprinciplesthatshouldbeincorporatedinclude:

• Trainingshouldreinforceandoccurinthecontextofthedepartmentalmission.• Trainingshouldleveragethestrengthsoftheexistingcultureanditspersonnel,rather

thanportrayinganobjectiveofculturechange.• Trainingshouldinvolvehands-onfunctionalandtacticalexercisesforalllevels.• Trainingshouldincludeotheragenciesinexercises,whenappropriate(e.g.,mutualaid

partnersand/ornon-lawenforcementinmassdemonstrationevents).• Existingtrainingprograms,withinandoutsideofBPD,shouldbeleveragedand

expandedinordertomaximizeresourcesaswellasensureadherencetocurrentbestpractices.

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• Trainingshouldbeendorsedandfacilitatedfromtheleadershipleveldown,throughcommunications,dedicatedfunding,on-the-jobtime,andhigh-qualitytrainingfacilities.

• Trainingshouldbedocumentedandkeptonfile,toreflectpersonnelaccomplishments.Recommendation4.6:Processesforgeneratingmutualaidrequestsanddeploymentsfrompartneringagenciesshouldbebuiltincollaborationwiththoseagencies,documentedviaMemorandaofUnderstanding(MOUs),consonantwiththeEmergencyManagementAssistanceCompact(EMAC)whenapplicable,andfrequentlyrevisitedtoensurethefeasibilityofexecutingonthosecommitmentsduringanevent.Conditionsgoverningtherequestandutilizationofmutualaidresourcesshouldbewell-defined.PoliciesandproceduresforrequestanddeploymentofNationalGuardshouldbedocumented,shouldincorporatefederalandstate-levelregulatoryparameters,andshouldbewell-understoodbyCityleadership.SuccessfulcollaborationswithMarylandStatePoliceandBaltimoreCitySchoolsPoliceshouldbeleveragedandmodeledforotherco-deploymentmissions.Mutualaidrelationshipsmustincludejointtrainingandexercisesonpoliciesandprocedures.Recommendation4.7:Althoughwecommendandendorsetheongoingcommitmenttobuildingandleveragingpersonalrelationships,wealsorecommendthattheresourcerequestprocessfollowstandardproceduresandbeaddressedthroughtheEOCandMOEMasasinglepointorderingsourcetomaximizeefficiency,optimizeneedfulfillmentspecificity,andadheretoregulatoryguidelinesandbestpractices.Recommendation4.8:TheCityshouldendorseandimplementopportunitiesandmechanismsformultiagencycommunicationandcollaboration.Agenciesshouldhaveclearunderstandinganddocumentationofroles,mutualexpectations,andcommitments.Theseexpectationsshouldbereviewedonaregular,structuredbasistoensureongoingagreementandfeasibility.High-yieldmultiagencyfunctionalandtabletoptrainingexercises,utilizingICSprinciples,shouldbeconductedonvarioushazardscenariosatleastyearly.ExercisesshouldaddresstheICS-specificresponsibilitiesandexpectationsdefinedandincludedwithinpersonnelpositiondescriptions(seeRecommendation2.3).5.HEALTH,SAFETY,ANDMORALERecommendation5.1:Duringmassdemonstrationmanagementandotheremergencyeventsettings,specificsafetypersonnelshouldbededicatedtomanagingdeploymentschedules,procuringfoodandwater,identifyingrestroomfacilitiesandsaferoutesofegress,andmitigatingpersonalinjuryrisksforallresponders,includinglawenforcement,fire,medical,andemergencydispatchandotherresponsepersonnel.Thisalsonecessitatesscalabilityandpreparednessinhumanandphysicalresourcemanagementforextendeddurationevents.Theseresponsibilitiesshouldbemanagedbypersonnelsolelydedicatedtothesefunctions,inlinewithICS/NIMSroledescriptionsfor

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SafetyOfficers,LogisticsSection,andPlanningSectionpersonnel.BPDshouldutilizetheserolesduringroutineoperationsinordertoensurepreparednessforcriticalincidents.Recommendation5.2:Adequateshelterandsecuritymustbeprovidedforallresponders,includinglawenforcement,fire,medical,andemergencydispatchandotherresponsepersonnel,asappropriate.Venueswithadequatephysicalsecurityandaccommodationsforrestandsheltershouldbeutilizedforbilletingandstagingofmutualaidorganizationsandauxiliaryforces.Itmayalsobeadvisabletomakeuseofsuchaccommodationsforrestandrecuperationbreaksforlocalpersonnelinextendeddurationevents.TheCityshouldutilizeitsnewlysecuredfacilityforthesebilletingandstagingpurposes,intheinstanceofaDeclarationofaStateofEmergencyorothercriticalincidents,atthediscretionoftheIncidentCommander.Recommendation5.3:Adequatehealthcaremustbefacilitatedandprovidedforallresponders,includinglawenforcement,fire,medical,andemergencydispatchandotherresponsepersonnel.Designatedsafetypersonnel(seeRecommendation5.1)shouldcommunicateamedicalcareplan,withclearandsimpleinstructionstoallpersonnel.Safetypersonnelshouldalsoberesponsibleforcoordinationofcare-seeking,whichmayincludeutilizingtacticalmedics,deployingextricationteams,andcommunicatingwithemergencymedicalservicesandhealthcarefacilities.Recommendation5.4:Criticalincidentstressmanagement,mentalresilienceandwellness,andtrauma-specificcareservicesshouldbestrengthened,madeavailablecity-widetoanyself-reportingorreferredpersonnel,and,mostimportantly,endorsedbyagencyleadership.High-yieldtrauma-specificcaresessionsshouldbeutilizedasapreparednessactivityatbaseline.Duringanextendedincident,psychologicalfirstaidandcriticalincidentstressmanagementprovidersshouldbeavailabletoallpersonnel.Front-linepersonnelshouldbeinformedonidentificationofhigh-risksituationsandidentificationofemergencypsychologicalinterventionscenarios.Post-incident,criticalincidentstressmanagementdebriefingsshouldbeconductedforallpersonnel.Provisionofanonymousmechanismsforcertaincounselingandmentalwellnessservicesshouldbeexplored.Provisionofmentalwellnesssupportforallresponders,includinglawenforcement,fire,medical,andemergencydispatchandotherresponsepersonnelmustbeapriority.Agencyleadershipshouldendorseandde-stigmatizetheseservicesbydesignatingconfidential,protectedtimeforpreparednesstraininganddebriefing.Recommendation5.5:Becausethemassdemonstrationlawenforcementpoliciesandproceduresthatareconsistentwithlawenforcementbestpracticescannegativelyaffectmorale,itisimperativetoconceptuallyconnectthesepolicieswiththetraditionallawenforcementcultureandmissionofprotectingthepublic.Reinforcementshouldoccurthroughouttheorganization,includingtrainingonpolicyrationale,verballyinrollcalls,inwrittencommunicationslikeorganizationalnewsletters,andstructurally,withrelatedcommendationsandincentives.

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Recommendation5.6:Cityleadership’sapproachtoBPDleadership,andBPDleadership’sapproachtoBPDpersonnel,shouldendorsepersonneldevelopmentandrecognition,whichiswidelyknowntoimprovemorale,loyalty,andperformance.Personneldevelopmentisrecommendedincontrastto“culturechange,”whichlacksmeaningandfailstoacknowledgethesignificantcommitmentsmadebydedicatedcareerpersonnelservinginthelawenforcementprofession.Fundamentaltenetsofpersonneldevelopmentshouldincludeperformancerecognition,trainingopportunitiesforcareerdevelopment,accesstomentorshipbysupervisors,andinitialnon-punitivefeedbackonperformance.

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