rebuilding democratic advances in dark times · rebuilding democratic advances in dark times: ......
TRANSCRIPT
Rebuilding democratic advances in dark times:
How can secure democracies help renewal?
Patrick Dunleavy
Source: https://terri0729.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/dark-fantasy-19422711-900-600.jpg
Structure of my talk
1. Liberal democracy remains insecure
in world terms
2. The reversal of democratic advance
– five adverse external developments
3. Stress and stagnation within secure
liberal democracies - four signs
4. Rebuilding democratic advances
Economist Intelligence Unit’s ‘democracy index’ assessment, 2014
Type of regime
Scores Number of countries
% of countries
% of world population
Full democracies
10 to 8
24 14.4 12.5
Flawed democracies
7.9 to 6 52 31.1 35.5
All democracies
10 to 6 76 45.5 48.0
Hybrid regimes 5.9 to 4 39 23.4 14.4
Authoritarian regimes
3.9 or less
52 31.1 37.6
Norway 9.93
Sweden 9.73
Iceland 9.58
New Zealand 9.26
Denmark 9.11
Switzerland 9.09
Canada 9.08
Finland 9.03
Australia 9.01
Netherlands 8.92
Luxembourg 8.88
Ireland 8.72
Germany 8.64
Austria 8.54
Malta 8.39
United Kingdom 8.31
Uruguay 8.17
Mauritius 8.17
United States 8.11
Japan 8.08
South Korea 8.06
Spain 8.05
France 8.04
Costa Rica 8.03
Countries and scores for EIU’s ‘full democracies’, in 2014
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit
Czech Republic 7.94
Belgium 7.93
India 7.92
Botswana 7.87
Italy 7.85
South Africa 7.82
Cape Verde 7.81
Chile 7.8
Portugal 7.79
Estonia 7.74
Taiwan 7.65
Israel 7.63
Slovenia 7.57
Lithuania 7.54
Latvia 7.48
Poland 7.47
Greece 7.45
Cyprus 7.4
Jamaica 7.39
Brazil 7.38
Slovakia 7.35
Timor-Leste 7.24
Panama 7.08
Trinidad & Tobago 6.99
Indonesia 6.95
Croatia 6.93
Hungary 6.9
Argentina 6.84
Suriname 6.77
Philippines 6.77
Bulgaria 6.73
Serbia 6.71
Romania 6.68
Mexico 6.68
Dominican Republic 6.67
Lesotho 6.66
Mongolia 6.62
Colombia 6.55
Peru 6.54
El Salvador 6.53
Malaysia 6.49
Hong Kong 6.46
Zambia 6.39
Ghana 6.33
Moldova 6.32
Tunisia 6.31
Paraguay 6.26
Macedonia 6.25
Namibia 6.24
Senegal 6.15
Papua New Guinea
6.03
Singapore 6.03
Countries and scores for EIU’s ‘flawed democracies’, in 2014
Adverse external developments for liberal democracies I
• The rejection of democracy and human rights by Islamic jihadism
– radically increased societal polarization around Islamic fundamentalism and now jihadism
– re-strengthening support for anti-fundamentalist authoritarian regimes
Nigeria
Severe threats, creating substantial risk to life Serious but qualified threats
Also in Gulf
states
Kenya
Chad
Abrogations of or threats to democracy, civil liberties and human rights in countries from west Africa to Pakistan
Adverse external developments for liberal democracies II
• The rejection of democracy and human rights by Islamic jihadism
• The return to ‘power politics’ by Russia (plus only constrained ‘western’ responses)
– small beginnings in Moldova and Georgia
– fait accompli 2014 subversion of Crimea
– bloody civil war in east Ukraine since
Actual and potential sites of Russia interventions using Russian linguistic minority or historical territory pretexts
Adverse external developments for liberal democracies III
• The rejection of democracy and human rights by Islamic jihadism
• The return to ‘power politics’ by Russia
• The ebbing of American global dominance
– post 1945 strategic capability to fight 2 regional wars at once
– threatened by a possible reassertion of China’s historic suzerainty stance
The Qing Empire in China at maximum extent 1820-70
Source: "Qing Empire circa 1820 EN" by Philg88: Attribution Wikimedia Foundation, www.wikimedia.org - Own work Incorporates modified version of File:Empire of the Great Qing (orthographic projection).svg. Licensed under CC BY 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Qing_Empire_circa_1820_EN.svg#/media/File:Qing_Empire_circa_1820_EN.svg
Spratley Islands (China vs Philippines vs Malaysia)
Paracel Islands (China vs Vietnam)
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (China vs Japan)
Philippines
Current sites of potential Chinese maritime clashes with neighbouring states
Source: http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=otr-marketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide
Adverse external developments for liberal democracies IV
• The rejection of democracy and human rights by Islamic jihadism
• The return to ‘power politics’ by Russia
• The ebbing of American global dominance
– and possible reassertion of China suzerainty
• A conditionalization of support for liberal democracy in many industrializing countries
Yale University Press, March 2013
Most elites and rising middle class groups in industrializing countries wanted: - liberalization and security
of property - legal protections and free movement. They won’t now support: - genuine rights for trade
unions for workers (especially migrants)
- action on favelas/slums/ living conditions
Sao Paulo, Brazil, March 2015
Caracas, Venezuela, March 2014
Bangkok, Thailand, February 2014
‘Revolt of the middle class’ thesis strengthened by mass, de-stabilizing ‘bourgeois’ protests, often against newly elected governments & corruption
Adverse external developments for liberal democracies V
• The rejection of democracy and human rights by Islamic jihadism
• The return to ‘power politics’ by Russia • The ebbing of American global dominance
– and possible reassertion of China suzerainty
• A conditionalization of support for liberal democracy in many industrializing countries
• The collapse or weakening of democratic processes where previously progress seemed feasible
Stress and stagnation within secure liberal democracies I
• Public fall from grace
– especially the USA’s ‘city on the hill’ ideals tarnished by prisoner torture, redaction and imprisonment without trial, 2000s disdain for international law, invasion of Iraq on a pretext, drone assassinations of opponents, mass surveillance of citizens and allies
– all carried out outside rule of law – creating a modern apparatus of ‘imperial’ rule (despotic overseas and on state security, but democratic at home)
– also true in minor key of UK, as American ally
Stress and stagnation within secure liberal democracies II
• Public fall from grace
• Unchecked institutional malaise
– legacies of empire in long-run European countries, left-over pockets of ‘cross-party, elite bloc’ rule
– similar, larger legacies of recent fascist/ communist/authoritarian rule in all the post 1974 European democracies
– past cover-ups now exposed by the advent of an ‘open book’ governance era
Stress and stagnation within secure liberal democracies II
• Public fall from grace
• Unchecked institutional malaise
• Collapse of simplified political choices, partly reflecting populism – Duverger’s Law failed everywhere except in USA.
Modern voters want to express more nuanced views, as with UK, now a 5 or 6 party system everywhere
– European reaction against ‘foreigners’ and pro-EU elites backing immigration, plus now anti-Islamism
– US anti-state surge in Tea Party
Stress and stagnation within secure liberal democracies II
• Public fall from grace • Unchecked institutional malaise • Collapse of simplified political choices • Weakening of major parties stimulates more
unprincipled elite efforts to retain control – rancorous over-polarization in USA, leading to a
collapse of bi-partisan co-operation; e.g. Iran nuclear negotiations
– ‘stagnation of concern’ over democratic advances in UK (and perhaps Australia); e.g. maintaining plurality rule in the UK, and ignoring the age gap in voting
% difference in voting rates between people 55+ years old and 16-35 years old, in OECD countries, in 2012 or nearest election
Age
Gap
in (
per
cen
tage
po
ints
)
Britain =38%
OECD mean = 12%
Possible UK ‘age gap’ solutions
• Radical option - lower voting age to 16 – capture young people’s participation before leaving
for university, annual rental shifting, and ‘portfolio’ careers with many short term jobs)
– get MPs and candidates into schools and focused on young people’s issues
– 75% involvement of 110,000 voters aged 16-17 in Scotland referendum (and 97% would vote again)
• Modest option – modernize how we communicate local information for voting
• Both rejected – evident lack of concern
• re-defending human rights and civil liberties
• showing clear concern for neighbours and migrants
• respecting international law and legally run states’ autonomy
• operating majority rule in genuinely fair, frequent and inclusive elections, operated with commitment
• seeking widely distributed control of policymaking by the state, mostly achieving ‘consensus’ majorities
• democratizing other civil society organizations.
Re-committing to an ethic of democracy as fundamental for human development
Evangelizing appropriate liberal democracy
• Urgent need to better adapt and culturally contextualize liberal democratic theory for the modern, global world
• Academia and western governments need to actively support and ‘deep learn’ from intellectuals and civil society in non-democratic countries
• E.g. counteracting Islamic radicalization will require huge ideas-investment in evolving a morally compelling case for democracy and rights in an Islamic setting
• Generating workable (sometimes intermediate or transition) institutional solutions is vital
Restarting domestic democratic advance
• “All government is an ugly necessity” - G. K. Chesterton. In a modern world, states are effectively ‘immortal’, and need continuous improvement
• Root out elite-serving legacy practices and machinery • Simplify governance structures for the digital era – do
things once and do them right, first time • Strengthen citizen vigilance made feasible by digital
surveillance and social media • Increase NGOs’ and communities’ roles to build up
‘open source’ capacities to solve collective problems and develop co-production – e.g. the Democratic Dashboard
Twitter: @PJDunleavy
http://www.democraticaudit.com/
THANKS FOR LISTENING - AND SOME FURTHER RESOURCES
Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009