reason experience open howard peacock

7/29/2019 Reason Experience Open Howard Peacock

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2012 H Peacock Page 1

AS Philosophy: Reason

and Experience


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Week 1 Introduction to Philosophy and Philosophical Writing

What is Philosophy?

Philosophy is a subject that defies easy definition; but broadly speaking it is a subject that attempts to make

sense of:

the way the world is; our relationships, and obligations, to other people. our relationship to the world and our place in it;

As this list suggests, some parts of philosophy deal onlywith the way the world is, independently of human

beings; some parts of philosophy (for example political philosophy) deal onlywith the interactions between

human beings; and some parts of philosophy deal with the way human beings interact with the world. The

Reason and Experience topic falls into the last of these categories: it deals with the question of the origins

of, and justification for, our thoughts about the world.

Doing philosophy involves taking a reflective and critical attitude to claims made by other philosophers and

to your own beliefs: reflective because you will need to think more carefully, and for longer, about things

which you do not often have time to consider in everyday life; and critical because you need to develop the

ability to criticize other peoples arguments, and develop arguments of your own. (NB: argument in

philosophy means the same as it does in Critical Thinking: an organized set of reasons or premises

attempting to persuade you to believe a conclusion.)

Some Myths about Philosophy

1. Philosophy is all about the meaning of life. Not so: some philosophers have produced excellentwork about the meaning of life, but thats not all there is to philosophy. Most philosophers today

prefer to work on more specific questions, since its easier to get a definite answer if you can

formulate a definite question and whats the meaning of life? is about as imprecise and

generalized a question as you can get.

2. Philosophy is all a matter of opinion. This is really a kind of relativism: the view that there areonly competing opinions, with no underlying truth or fact of the matter to make one opinion

true and another opinion false. Strangely, although a lot of non-philosophers believe this about

philosophy, very few practising philosophers believe it. The sheer ferocity of arguments between

philosophers should leave you in no doubt that both sides in any given philosophical debate are

convinced that there is a single right answer to be found. (I have heard of one Oxford philosophytutorial that ended in a fist-fight in a stairwell, and a philosophy conference where one enraged

philosopher threw another into a swimming pool.) In any case, someone who believes that its

all a matter of opinion is hoist by her own petard: if its all a matter of opinion, then presumably

its a matter of opinion whether its all a matter of opinion, and my opinion is that it isnt all a

matter of opinion. So I dont need to listen to her.

3. Philosophy makes no difference to everyday life. One reason this seems initially plausible isthat people are not very good at recognizing philosophy when they encounter it; in fact

philosophical ideas form the basis of science, politics, medical ethics, and even some modern

art, even if many of the people specializing in these fields may be only dimly aware of the

philosophical foundations of their subject. And even if it were true that philosophy makes nodifference to everyday life, that is no reason to avoid studying it. Its a strange kind of arrogance


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which makes people believe that it is onlyworth doing that which helps them get what they

want, or enhances their standing in the eyes of other people; moreover, most people have some

natural philosophical curiosity, even if they do not always have the time to indulge it

systematically. Heres a helpful comment from the 19 th century Oxford philosopher, cat-hater

and firearms enthusiast F.H. Bradley1 which neatly sums up that point:

Is it possible to abstain from thought about the universe? ... I mean that, by various causes,

even the average man is compelled to wonder and reflect. To him the world, and his share in

it, is a natural object of thought, and seems likely to remain one... For the question (as things

are now) is not whether we are to reflect and ponder on ultimate truth for perhaps most of

us do that, and are not likely to cease. The question is merely as to the way in which this

should be done. And the claim of metaphysics2 is surely not unreasonable... it merely asserts

that, if the attempt is to be made, it should be done as thoroughly as our nature permits.

Alternatively, if Bradleys defence seems too verbose, we could appeal to one of the founders of the

subject, the Ancient Greek philosopher Socrates, for an uncompromising defence of philosophy:

The unexamined life is not worth living.

Exercise: listen to the Philosophy Bites podcast, What is Philosophy, which youll find at

http://www.tinyurl.com/whatisphilosophy . Make a note of any definitions you think are particularly

important; then discuss.

1 Bradley (so the story goes) not only had a firing range constructed above his rooms in Merton College, but also

used his gun collection to go cat hunting in the college grounds late at night.

2 Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy which deals with the way the world is independently of humans.
http://www.tinyurl.com/whatisphilosophyhttp://www.tinyurl.com/whatisphilosophyhttp://www.tinyurl.com/whatisphilosophy


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What is Philosophy A-level?

Philosophy A-level is an essay subject: there are no one-word or multiple-choice questions, no graphs or

illustrations to draw, and no comprehension questions. For each paper in the AS exams you answer on two

topics, and for each topic you answer one short question (roughly two paragraphs of writing) and one

essay question (for which you should have about half an hour in the exam).

The short questions are marked according to how well you:

show your knowledge of the material covered in the course explain that material, using examples where relevant.

Exam tip: one favourite phrase used by the examiners is explain and illustrate.... Remember that the

illustrate part means that you should use examples to fill out your explanation preferably the same

examples used by the philosopher(s) youre talking about.

The essay questions are marked according to how well you:

show your knowledge of the material covered in the course explain that material, using examples where relevant argue for and defend your own answer to the question that is being asked.

Philosophy is a subject that rewards people who can express themselves clearly and fluently in writing, so

you should always be thinking about ways to improve the quality of your written English. (Most people agree

that the key to good writing is a lot ofreading of high-quality authors).

Exam tip: based on recent experience of marking A-level scripts, I would say that candidates who dont do as

well as they could make one of three mistakes:

(i) they dont revise the material thoroughly, so they end up writing things which are confused or

even simply false;

or (ii) they dont read the question carefully enough, and answer a different question from the one

that has actually been set;

or (ii) they forget that they are supposed to argue for a conclusion of their own, producing an essay

that has a lot of factual material but does not actually make a philosophical point.

Avoid these three common errors, and you will be able to guarantee yourself the mark you deserve.


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The Course

Each week you will have to hand in a short question to one teacher, and an essay question to the other.

These must all be handwritten. There are two reasons for this: one is that you need to get as much practice

as possible at putting your thoughts down on paper in longhand so that this is not an unfamiliar experience

in the exam; the other is that there are many more things that can go wrong with homework in electronicdocument format lost USB stick, broken printer, computer virus etc. and its very much in your interest

that all your homework is handed in on time.

This text lays out the material you need for the Reason and Experience topic, arranged week by week.

Although many philosophers from the last 400 years are mentioned in it, you will not find much biographical

detail in the text; for information about individual philosophers you should consult the index philosophorum

at the end of the work.

Youll find your homework for this topic (plus our scheme of work for the term) overleaf.

Exercise: watch the first two sections of the programme on Descartes , which youll find at

http://tinyurl.com/mageedescartes. Answer these questions as you watch:

1. What question did Descartes become fascinated by after his military service?2. Descartes was convinced from the outset that certainty and truth are not the same thing.

What then is the difference between certainty and truth?

3. What is the point where the doubt stopped for Descartes?4. What, among the contents of Descartes consciousness, is able to lead outside himself and

establish the existence of the external world?
http://tinyurl.com/Macgeedescarteshttp://tinyurl.com/Macgeedescarteshttp://tinyurl.com/Macgeedescartes


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Week 2Knowledge, Concepts and Ideas.

Aims: to understand some basic philosophical terminology and distinctions; to understand the theory of

innate ideas

1. Knowledge

The verb know is used in several different ways in English, but what philosophers are mostly interested in

is propositional knowledge, or knowing that.

Important features of propositional knowledge:

The contentof what is known can always be stated in a that- clause or sentence, e.g. I knowthat philosophers are brainy.

This content is called the proposition, or the propositional content of the knowledge. Propositional knowledge is knowledge of truths or facts there is no such thing as false

knowledge (although people sometimes mistakenlyclaim to have knowledge of things which infact turn out to be false).

Propositional knowledge is never the result of a lucky guess; to know something you need tohave some kind of reason or justification for what you think.

Propositional knowledge is what a very large range of activities aim at getting for example, allkinds of science, mathematics, journalism, philosophy and even preparation for pub quizzes

involve trying to obtain knowledge of this kind.

We said that the content of propositional knowledge is a proposition; but what is a proposition?

Propositions can be stated using sentences, e.g. the proposition that philosophers are brainy, but

propositions arent the same as sentences, since one and the same proposition can be stated in different

sentences in any number of different languages. One popular suggestion is that propositions are made up of

concepts so the proposition that philosophers are brainy is made up of the concept philosopherand the

concept brainy, combined in some way.

Exercise:

For each of the following disciplines, suggest one piece of propositional knowledge that it might involve, and

say what concepts that proposition would be made up of.

Discipline

Mathematics

History

Physics

Biology

Cosmology

Geology

It is known that...

__________________________________

__________________________________

__________________________________

__________________________________

__________________________________

________________________________

Concepts involved

_____________________________________

_____________________________________

_____________________________________

_____________________________________

_____________________________________

___________________________________


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2. Concepts and ideas

What is a concept, then? While propositions are represented using complete sentences, or -that clauses, it

seems that concepts are represented by single words. But again, concepts are not the same as words,

because speakers of different languages can share the same concepts: the word God represents the same

concept that a French speaker would represent with the word dieu. One popular approach is to think of

concepts as a kind of representation or idea of something in your mind, so the concept God is a mental

representation or idea of God. In fact, many of the authors we read will use the word idea to mean the

same as concept: in the 16th and 17th centuries this was the standard way of talking for philosophers.

Important features of concepts:

Concepts are called ideas by early modern philosophers. Concepts are the building blocks of propositional knowledge: you cant know anything unless

you have the concepts involved in that knowledge.

Concepts are mental (they are in your mind) Concepts are representations of things. Concepts are shared between different people (e.g. we all share a concept of God).

3. Innateness

From the medieval period until the 18th century Enlightenment, it was commonly believed that humans have

some innate knowledge i.e. that we are all born knowing certain things. And because you cant have

knowledge without having the concepts that it involves, it was also believed that we have innate concepts,

or (in the terminology of the period) innate ideas. An innate idea is an idea you are born with and so do

not need to develop after birth from your experience of the world.

Some likely contenders for ideas which are innate:

The idea of God Mathematical concepts, e.g. numbers Geometrical concepts, e.g. trangularity, the idea of a straight line Moral concepts: the idea of good and bad actions Metaphysical concepts, e.g. existence and non-existence, sameness and difference, time.

Case study: Descartes on the idea of God

Read this excerpt from the Meditations (published 1641), and answer the questions that follow.

22. There only remains, therefore, the idea of God, in which I must consider whether there is anything that

cannot be supposed to originate with myself. By the name God, I understand a substance infinite, eternal,

immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, and every other thing that exists,

if any such there be, were created. But these properties are so great and excellent, that the more attentively

I consider them the less I feel persuaded that the idea I have of them owes its origin to myself alone. And

thus it is absolutely necessary to conclude, from all that I have before said, that God exists.

23. For though the idea of substance be in my mind owing to this, that I myself am a substance, I should not,

however, have the idea of an infinite substance, seeing I am a finite being, unless it were given me by somesubstance in reality infinite.


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24. And I must not imagine that I do not apprehend the infinite by a true idea, but only by the negation of

the finite, in the same way that I comprehend repose and darkness by the negation of motion and light:

since, on the contrary, I clearly perceive that there is more reality in the infinite substance than in the finite,

and therefore that in some way I possess the perception (notion) of the infinite before that of the finite, that

is, the perception of God before that of myself, for how could I know that I doubt, desire, or that something

is wanting to me, and that I am not wholly perfect, if I possessed no idea of a being more perfect than

myself, by comparison of which I knew the deficiencies of my nature ?

...

38. And, in truth, it is not to be wondered at that God, at my creation, implanted this idea in me, that it

might serve, as it were, for the mark of the workman impressed on his work; and it is not also necessary that

the mark should be something different from the work itself; but considering only that God is my creator, it

is highly probable that he in some way fashioned me after his own image and likeness, and that I perceive

this likeness, in which is contained the idea of God, by the same faculty by which I apprehend myself, in

other words, when I make myself the object of reflection, I not only find that I am an incomplete, imperfect

and dependent being, and one who unceasingly aspires after something better and greater than he is; but,

at the same time, I am assured likewise that he upon whom I am dependent possesses in himself all the

goods after which I aspire and the ideas of which I find in my mind, and that not merely indefinitely and

potentially, but infinitely and actually, and that he is thus God. And the whole force of the argument of

which I have here availed myself to establish the existence of God, consists in this, that I perceive I could not

possibly be of such a nature as I am, and yet have in my mind the idea of a God, if God did not in reality

exist

1. Descartes says that the idea of God must have come from God. What alternative account of theorigin of the idea does he consider in paragraph 22?

2. State (in your own words) the alternative suggestion about the origin of the idea of infinity thatDescartes considers and rejects in paragraph 24.

3. This passage is known as the Trademark Argument. What is the main conclusion of theTrademark Argument?

4. Can you suggest an alternative explanation of the origin of the idea of God that Descartes doesnot consider?


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Humes response to Descartes

The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Bei ng, arises from reflecting on

the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and

wisdom.

- Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 2

David Humes view is that we derive the idea of God from experience: specifically, our experience of our own

good qualities, augmented (increased) without limit.

For discussion: which of Hume and Descartes has the more plausible account of the origin of the idea

of God? Is there any part of Descartes argument which Hume does not deal with adequately?

The Philosophical Significance of the Doctrine of Innate Ideas

Why should we care about whether our mind is stocked with innate ideas before we are born? Part of the

motivation for believing in innate ideas was originally theological: if we believe that the idea of God is

derived from experience, this raises the possibility that this idea is a human invention and God does not infact exist, while if the idea of God is pre -programmed within us it may suggest that God himself must have

done the programming.

However, there are other reasons to be interested in whether any of our ideas (concepts) are innate. In

particular, it makes a difference to how we think of our relationship with the world around us. If all our

concepts are derived from experience, as Hume believes, then we can explain why and how our concepts

fit the world how it is that our ideas are exactly the ones we need to make sense of the world we live in.

If our concepts are innate, then we have to answer the puzzling question of whyour ideas turn out to fit the

world in this way: was it just a happy accident, or did a benevolent God intervene to ensure that we have

the concepts we need?

Yet another reason to care about innate ideas is a point we have met already: since you need to have

concepts to be able to have any knowledge in the first place, it seems that innate ideas are a precondition

of innate knowledge; as well see next time, the possibility of innate knowledge would solve some serious

problems about how we know truths of maths and geometry.


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Week 3 Innate Knowledge

Aims: to understand the nature of, motivations for, and problems with the view that the mind contains

innnate knowledge regarding the way the world is.

When philosophers talk about innate knowledge, they usually mean innate propositionalknowledge, i.e.the knowledge thatsuch and such is the case. And by innate knowledge, they usually mean knowledge that

is somehow already there within us when we are born it is knowledge that we are born with.

Some potential examples of innate knowledge:

truths of mathematics, e.g. 1+1=2 truths of logic, e.g. that contradictions can never be true. truths of morality, e.g. that we should not harm other humans without good reason truths of metaphysics, e.g. that every event has a cause, or that God exists.

Case study 1: Plato, Meno

Probably the best way to understand the theory of innate knowledge is to study some of the philosophers

who have defended it. Read this selection from Platos Meno. While you read, try to draw the three

diagrams that Socrates uses to teach the slave-Boy. Then answer the questions that follow.

Socrates: The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all

things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder

that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything;

for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say

learning, out of a single recollection -all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and

all learning is but recollection. And therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical argument about the

impossibility of enquiry: for it will make us idle; and is sweet only to the sluggard; but the other saying will

make us active and inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the nature of virtue.

Meno: Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, and that what we call learning is

only a process of recollection? Can you teach me how this is?

Soc: I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and now you ask whether I can teach you, when I am

saying that there is no teaching, but only recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve me in acontradiction.

Meno: Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I only asked the question from habit; but if

you can prove to me that what you say is true, I wish that you would.

Soc: It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you to the utmost of my power. Suppose that you call

one of your numerous attendants, that I may demonstrate on him.

Meno: Certainly. Come hither, Boy:

Soc: Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe whether he learns from me or only

remembers.

Meno: I will.Soc: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square?


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Boy: I do.

Soc: And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal?

Boy: Certainly.

Soc: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the square are also equal?

Boy: Yes.

Soc: A square may be of any size?

Boy: Certainly.

Soc: And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side be of two feet, how much will the whole

be? Let me explain: if in one direction the space was of two feet, and in other direction of one foot, the

whole would be of two feet taken once?

Boy: Yes.

Soc: But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two feet?

Boy: There are.Soc: Then the square is of twice two feet?

Boy: Yes.

Soc: And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me.

Boy: Four, Socrates.

Soc: And might there not be another square twice as large as this, and having like this the lines equal?

Boy: Yes.

Soc: And of how many feet will that be?

Boy: Of eight feet.

Soc: And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the side of that double square: this is two

feet-what will that be?

Boy: Clearly, Socrates, it will be double.

Soc: Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but only asking him questions; and now

he fancies that he knows how long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet; does

he not?

Meno: Yes.

Soc: And does he really know?

Meno: Certainly not.Soc: He only guesses that because the square is double, the line is double.

Meno: True.

Soc: Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (To the Boy:) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a

double space comes from a double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a figure

equal every way, and twice the size of this-that is to say of eight feet; and I want to know whether you still

say that a double square comes from double line?

Boy: Yes.

Soc: But does not this line become doubled if we add another such line here?

Boy: Certainly.


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Soc: And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet?

Boy: Yes.

Soc: Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that this is the figure of eight feet?

Boy: Yes.

Soc: And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of which is equal to the figure of four feet?

Boy: True.

Soc: And is not that four times four?

Boy: Certainly.

Soc: And four times is not double?

Boy: No, indeed.

Soc: But how much?

Boy: Four times as much.

Soc: Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice, but four times as much.Boy: True.

...

Soc: Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of recollection? He did not know at first,

and he does not know now, what is the side of a figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he knew, and

answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he has a difficulty, and neither knows nor

fancies that he knows.

...

Soc:Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask him, and not teach him, and he shall share the

enquiry with me: and do you watch and see if you find me telling or explaining anything to him, instead of

eliciting his opinion. Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet which I have drawn?

Boy: Yes.

Soc:And now I add another square equal to the former one?

Boy: Yes.

Soc:And a third, which is equal to either of them?

Boy: Yes.

Soc:Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner?

Boy: Very good.Soc:Here, then, there are four equal spaces?

Boy: Yes.

Soc:And how many times larger is this space than this other?

Boy: Four times.

Soc:But it ought to have been twice only, as you will remember.

Boy: True.

Soc:And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect each of these spaces?

Boy: Yes.Soc:And are there not here four equal lines which contain this space?


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Boy: There are.

Soc:Look and see how much this space is.

Boy: I do not understand.

Soc:Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces?

Boy: Yes.

Soc:And how many spaces are there in this section?

Boy: Four.

Soc:And how many in this?

Boy: Two.

Soc:And four is how many times two?

Boy: Twice.

Soc:And this space is of how many feet?

Boy: Of eight feet.Soc:And from what line do you get this figure?

Boy: From this.

Soc:That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of the figure of four feet?

Boy: Yes.

Soc:And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal. And if this is the proper name, then you, Meno's

slave, are prepared to affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal?

Boy: Certainly, Socrates.

Soc: What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all these answers given out of his own head?Meno: Yes, they were all his own.

....

Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for himself, if he is only asked questions?

Meno: Yes.

Soc: And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is recollection?

Meno: True.

Soc: And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have acquired or always possessed?

Meno: Yes.

Soc: But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always have known; or if he has acquired the

knowledge he could not have acquired it in this life, unless he has been taught geometry; for he may be

made to do the same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge. Now, has any one ever taught

him all this? You must know about him, if, as you say, he was born and bred in your house.

Meno: And I am certain that no one ever did teach him.

Soc: And yet he has the knowledge?

Meno: The fact, Socrates, is undeniable.

Soc: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he must have had and learned it at some other

time?Meno: Clearly he must.


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Soc: Which must have been the time when he was not a man?

Meno: Yes.

Soc: And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at the time when he was and was not a man,

which only need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always

possessed this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man?Meno: Obviously.

Soc: And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul, then the soul is immortal. Wherefore be of good

cheer, and try to recollect what you do not know, or rather what you do not remember.

Questions:

1. Why does Socrates think that the boy does not learn anything from him in the course of theirdiscussion?

2. Socrates term for the process of gaining knowledge through this kind of discussion is anamnesis.What English word is used for it by this translator?

3. Socrates seems to claim both (i) that the slave-boy did not know how to make a square with anarea of 8 units, and (ii) the slave-boy had known all along, since before he was born. Can you see

a way to defend this against the charge of contradiction?

4. Socrates says that the only explanation for the presence of this innate knowledge is that oursouls must have existed before we were born. Can you think of an alternative explanation?


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Case study 2: Leibniz

Leibniz (in his New Essays on Human Understanding) follows Platos method of presenting his thoughts in a

dialogue between Theophilus (beloved of God) and Philalethes (truth-lover). Theophilus here represents

Leibnitz own view very much in favour of innate knowledge while Philalethes presents objections for him

to answer. As before, read the passage and then answer the questions that follow.

Philalethes: I grant you that nothing is more commonly taken for granted than that certain principles are

universally agreed on by all mankind, and that people infer from this that thesethe so-called common

notionsmust have been impressed onto the minds of men when they came into existence. But even if it

were certain that there are principles on which all mankind agree, it wouldnt follow that they are innate if

the universal agreement about them could be explained in some other way, not involving innateness. And I

presume that that can be done. Anywayeven worse for the innatiststhis universal agreement is hardly to

be found, even with regard to the two famous principles Whatever is, is and It is impossible for something to

beand not be at the same time. No doubt youll take these two propositions to be necessary truths, and to

be axioms; but to a great part of mankind they arent even known.

Theophilus: I dont base the certainty of innate principles on universal consent; for I have already told you

that I think we should work to find ways of proving all axioms except primary or basic ones. I grant you also

that a very general but not universal agreement could come from somethings being passed on from person

to person throughout the whole of mankind; the practice of smoking tobacco has been adopted by nearly all

nations in less than a century. . . . Some able people. . . .have believed that knowledge of God came in that

way from a very old and very widespread word-of-mouth process; and Im willing to believe that knowledge

of God has indeed been confirmed and amended by teaching. But it seems that nature has helped to bring

men to it without anyone teaching them: the wonders of the universe have made them think of a higher

power. . . . You must admit, though, that our inclination to recognize the idea of God is part of our human

nature. Even if the first teaching of it came from revelation, still mens receptiveness to this doctrine comes

from the nature of their souls. I conclude that a principles being rather generally accepted among men is a

sign that it is innate, but not a proof that it is; and that the way for these principles to be rigorously and

conclusively proved is by its being shown that their certainty comes only from what is within us. As for your

point that not everyone accepts the two great speculative principles that are the best established of all: I can

reply that even if they werent known they would still be innate, because they are accepted as soon as they

have been heard. But anyway basically everyone does know them; we use the principle of contradiction (for

instance) all the time, without explicitly attending to it; and everyone, however uncivilized, is upset when

someone lyingly contradicts himself concerning something he cares about. Thus, we use these maxims

without having them explicitly in mind. ...

Phil: Im surprised by what you say about potential knowledge and about these inner suppressions. For it

seems to me almost a contradiction to say that there are truths imprinted on the soul that it doesnt

perceive.

Theo: If you have that prejudice, Im not surprised that you reject innate knowledge. But I am surprised that

it hasnt occurred to you that we know countless things that wearent aware of all the time, even when we

need them; its the job of memory to store them, and of recollection to put them before us again, which it

often does when there is need for it to do sooften but not always!. . . . Recollection needs some

assistance. Something must make us revive one rather than another of the multitude of items of our

knowledge, since it is impossible to think distinctly, all at once, about everything we know.Phil: I think youre right about that. My claim that we are always aware of all the truths that are in our soul is


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too broadI let it slip without having thought enough about it. But you wont find it quite so easy to deal

with this next point. Its that if one can maintain the innateness of any particular proposition, then by the

same reasoning one will be able to maintain that all propositions that are reasonable and that the mind will

ever be able to regard as such are already imprinted on the soul.

Theo: I grant you the point, as applied to pure ideas, which I contrast with images of sense, and as applied tonecessary truths or truths of reason, which I contrast with truths of fact. On this view, all the propositions of

arithmetic and geometry should be regarded as innate, and contained within us in a potential way, so that

we can find them within ourselves by attending carefully and methodically to what is already in our minds,

without employing any truth learned through experience or through word of mouth. Plato showed this, in a

dialogue where he had Socrates leading a child to abstruse truths just by asking questions, not telling him

anything. So one could construct the sciences of arithmetic and geometry in ones studywith ones eyes

closed, evenwithout learning any of the needed truths from sight or even from touch.

Some innate principles are common property, and come easily to everyone. Some theorems are also

discovered straight away; these constitute natural sciences, which are more extensive in some people than

in others. Finally, in a broad sense of innate (a sense that I approve of. . . .) we can describe as innate any

truths that are derivable from items of basic innate knowledge, because these too are fetched up by the

mind from its own depths, though often only with difficulty. But if anyone uses terms differently, I shant

argue about words.

...

Phil: But suppose that truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived by it: I dont

see how they can differ, so far as their origin is concerned, from ones that the understanding is merely

capable of coming to know.

Theo: The mind is capable not merely of knowing them but of finding them within itself. If all it had was the

mere capacity to receive those items of knowledgea passive power to do so, as indeterminate as the

power of wax to receive shapes or of an empty page to receive wordsit wouldnt be the source of

necessary truths, as I have just shown that it is. For it cant be denied that the senses are inadequate to show

the necessity of those truths, and that therefore the mind has an active disposition to draw them from its

own depths; though the senses are needed to prompt the mind to do this, to make the mind focus on doing

it, and to determine which necessary truths it draws up at a particular time. These people who hold a

different view, able though they are, have apparently failed to think through the implications of the

distinction between necessary or eternal truths and truths of experience. I said this before, and our entire

debate confirms it. The basic proof of necessary truths comes from the understanding alone, and other

truths come from experience or from observations of the senses. Our mind is capable of knowing truths ofboth sorts, but it is the source of the necessary ones. However often one experienced instances of a

universal truth, one could never know inductively that it would always hold unless one knew through reason

that it was necessary.

Phil: But if the words to be in the understanding have any positive content, dont they mean to be

perceived and comprehended by the understanding?

Theo: Thats not what they mean to me. For something to be in the understanding it suffices that it can be

found there. And the sources or basic proofs of the truths we are discussing can be found there, and only

there: the senses can hint at, justify and confirm these truths, but they cant demonstrate their infallible and

perpetual certainty.Phil: If you will take the trouble to reflect with a little attention on the operations of the understanding,


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youll find that the minds ready assent to some truths depends on the faculty of the human mind, meaning

that it is a fact about the mind rather than about those truths.

Theo: Yes indeed. But what makes the use of the faculty easy and natural so far as these truths are

concerned is a special affinity that the human mind has with them; and that is what makes us call them

innate. So it isnt a bare faculty, consisting in a mere possibility of understanding those truths; it is rather adisposition, an aptitude, a preformation, which determines our soul and brings it about that those truths are

derivable from it. Just as the shapes that someone chooses to give to a piece of marble differ from the

shapes that its veins already indicate or are disposed to indicate if the sculptor avails himself of them.

More on Leibniz Block of Marble:

Heres what Leibniz says in his Preface to the Essays:

I also used the comparison of a piece of veined marble rather than that of marble pure and simple,

or of clean tablets or tabula rasa [blank slate] as the philosophers say. If our minds were like tabulae

rasae, truth would be present in us just as the statue of Hercules is present in a piece of marble

which could in fact be given any shape. However, if the marble contained veins which outlined the

shape of Hercules better than other shapes, it would be determined to that shape and Hercules

could be said to be in some way innate in it. Work would still be needed, of course, to bring out

those veins, to clean them and to chip away all the excess marble which prevents the statue from

emerging. In the same way, ideas and truths are innate in us, as tendencies, dispositions, habits or

natural possibilities, but not as actions at this stage.

Study questions:

1. According to Leibniz, what can we (and cant we) conclude from the fact of universal assent - thateverybody agrees with a particular proposition or principle?

2. Leibniz here rejects the view that an innate truth is one you have always been aware of. What ishis alternative explanation of what an innate truth is?

3. Leibniz compares the human mind to a block of marble. Can you explain the point of thecomparison?


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Some Reasons for Believing in Innate Knowledge:

As Leibniz says, some principles command universal assent - for example, everybody agreeswith the principle of non-contradiction. The innate knowledge thesis explains why it is that

everyone knows these principles regardless of their experience in life.

Universal principles (principles that apply to everything), eternal principles (principles thatare always true) could not be established by experience, as no finite amount of experience could

demonstrate that a principle holds eternally or universally.

Knowledge of some truths does not seem to be derived from experience for example, simpletruths of logic or mathematics. Saying that these truths are innate helps to explain where we

get them from.

Experience isfallible: it can deceive us or let us make mistakes. So it seems that we can never beentirely sure of beliefs that we derive from experience, and perhaps this means that we cannot

know anything on the basis of experience alone. In contrast, innate knowledge is not derived

from experience, and so is immune to the kinds of doubt which arise for beliefs derived from

experience.

Exercise: in your own words, briefly restate each of these reasons for believing that we have innate

knowledge.

Some problems with the Innate Knowledge thesis:

The proposed examples of innate knowledge may all turn out to be merely relations of ideas:they tell us about how we think, not about how the world is. For example, the knowledge that

there can be no true contradictions may be merely a statement of a rule we follow when

thinking, not a fact about the world.

Theories of innate knowledge have to deal with the apparent absence of any knowledge aboutthe world shown by infants.

If the theory of innate knowledge defines it as knowledge that comes from within us, asLeibniz suggests, it is reasonable to ask whether some experience of the world is needed to draw

this knowledge out of us; in which case surely this knowledge depends on experience after all.

Are there really any principles that allhumans agree on? For example, some philosophers haveargued that we should follow slightly different logical laws, and mathematicians have developed

different non-Euclidian geometry that does not follow the standard rules.

If we really have innate knowledge, how did it get there? At one time God was a popular answerto this question; now it seems that evolution may offer an alternative explanation.

Exercise: choose one of these problems for the Innate Knowledge thesis; decide whether it is a serious

problem or not; and explain why.


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Case study 4: more experimental support for the Innate Knowledge Thesis

Depth perception is the ability to see three-dimensional space and to judge distances accurately.

Facial recognition is the ability to distinguish human faces from the rest of the visual field. Some

experimental work has suggested that both depth perception and facial recognition might be examples of

innate knowledge. However, again we have to ask whether knowledge is the appropriate term for these

abilities, especially seeing as they are abilities we share with many other animal species which we would not

usually consider capable of knowing anything.

Some psychologists (nativists) hold that depth perception is inborn. Others (the empiricists) view it as

learned. Most likely, depth perception is partly learned and partly innate ... tests have shown that human

depth perception consistently emerges at about 4 months of age (Aslin & Smith, 1988). And tests show that

babies first become aware of "3-D" designs at age 4 months. The nearly universal emergence of depth

perception at this time suggests that it depends more on brain development than it does on individual

learning. It is very likely that at least a basic level of depth perception is innate.

Dennis Coon, Introduction to Psychology, 1989

A study publishing in the recent issue ofCurrent Directions in Psychological Science reports that infants are

highly sensitive to the shape and structure of the human face from birth, but not the human body.

Recognition of the shape and structure of the human body does not occur until sometime in the second year

of life.

Science Daily, Jan 4 2005


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Week 4 The Mind as a Tabula Rasa

Aims: to understand what Rationalism and Empiricism are; to understand the claim that the mind at birth is a

tabula rasa; to understand Lockes arguments against innate ideas and innate knowledge.

Rationalism and Empiricism

Empirical investigation is the process of testing theories and beliefs through observation and experience.

Sciences such as physics, chemistry and biology are usually counted as empirical disciplines, since scientific

theories are tested by performing experiments and observing the results. However, maths, geometry and

logic do not seem to be empirical disciplines, since we do not test their results by making observations of

the world. (If you doubt this, just try to imagine what kind of experience could convince you that 1+1=2 is

false. Experience of the world does not seem to have the power to confirm or refute simple mathematical

truths.)

Empiricists believe that the empirical method of observation and experience is the only way of getting

knowledge about the world. Thus an empiricist rejects the claim that we have innate knowledge of the way

the world is, and also rejects the idea that it is possible to acquire new knowledge just by thinking

experience of some kind is always needed as well. As well see below, empiricists also reject the suggestion

that the mind comes pre-stocked with ideas (concepts) at birth; instead they suggest that the mind at birth

is a blank slate or tabula rasa.

Rationalists reject the empiricist claim that experience is the only way of getting knowledge about the

world; instead they argue that some of our knowledge about the world is innate, imprinted on our mind

from birth, or that our mind is powerful enough to establish truths about the way the world is just by

thinking.

We could summarize the difference between empiricism and rationalism in the following way, using mental

content as a shorthand for the knowledge, beliefs and concepts that make up the contents of your mind:

Empiricism Rationalism

All mental content comes through experience. Some mental content doesnt come through experience.

Notice that empiricism and rationalism are not precise mirror-images of each other: if you were asked what

is the opposite of the view that all mental content comes through experience, you would probably describe

it as the view that nomental content comes through experience; but this isnt what rationalists think. Almost

everyone accepts that some of our knowledge and concepts come from experience; the debate is between

those who believe that all of it comes from experience (empiricists) and those who believe that some comes

from another source (rationalists).

Well look at rationalism in more detail in coming weeks; now we should concentrate on one particular

empiricist claim, namely that the mind at birth is a tabula rasa or blank slate.


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The Mind as Tabula Rasa.

Empiricists who believe that the mind is a tabula rasa reject both innate ideas (concepts) and innate

knowledge. Their thesis is that the mind is completely empty of content at birth.

As weve said before, it seems reasonable to say that you already need to have concepts before you canhave propositional knowledge made up of those concepts, so defenders of the tabula rasa view of the mind

generally attack the innate ideas thesis first. If you can prove that there are no innate ideas, then it seems

reasonable to say that there cant be any innate knowledge either.

Case Study: Locke

The 17th century English empiricist philosopher John Locke was a supporter of the thesis that the mind at

birth is a tabula rasa, or, as he put it, blank paper. He offered a persuasive argument againstinnate ideas.

Lockes argument is this: if there were innate ideas, we should expect everyone to have such ideas, even if

they were children, or idiots, or inhabitants of remote and unusual civilizations. But in fact, no idea is such

that everyone has it, even the idea of God:If we will attentively consider new-born children, we shall have little reason to think that they bring

many ideas into the world with them. For, bating perhaps some faint ideas of hunger, and thirst, and

warmth, and some pains, which they may have felt in the womb, there is not the least appearance of

any settled ideas at all in them ... One may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, ideas come into

their minds; and that they get no more, nor other, than what experience, and the observation of

things that come in their way, furnish them with; which might be enough to satisfy us that they are

not original characters stamped on the mind. (Locke, EssayI.III.2)

... hath not navigation discovered, in these later ages, whole nations, at the bay of Soldania, in

Brazil, and in the Caribbee islands, &c., amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a God, noreligion? ... These are instances of nations where uncultivated nature has been left to itself, without

the help of letters and discipline, and the improvements of arts and sciences. But there are others to

be found who have enjoyed these in a very great measure, who yet, for want of a due application of

their thoughts this way, want [lack] the idea and knowledge of God. (Locke, EssayI.III.8)

Locke applies the same argument to innate principles: since there is no principle that is universally

believed, even by children and idiots, there is no such thing as an innate principle and so no such thing as

innate knowledge. Locke also uses the argument about the connection between knowledge of innate

principles and innate ideas that we outlined above: once we have rejected the notion of innate ideas or

concepts, there simply cannot be any innate principles: concepts are necessary for thought, so if we are bornwithout concepts we must be born without thoughts or beliefs of any kind whatsoever, and so cannot be

born believing principles of the kind he considers. Locke thinks that beliefs are made up of ideas from

which it follows that a creature that lacks ideas or concepts cannot have beliefs.

Lockes argument seems persuasive. After all, it is reasonable to suppose that any idea that is innate is one

that we have as soon as we are born, no matter who our parents are, or whether we are an idiot or

extremely clever. Moreover, scientific research into childrens development seems to support the idea that

our concepts are developed in the early years of our life rather than present at birth: in the last forty years

developmental psychologists have completed a great deal of research into the ages at which human infants

acquire basic concepts which are not present at birth. If our concepts are acquired in the course of ourdevelopment as infants, then obviously they are not innate!


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However, there are ways for the defender of innate ideas to respond to Lockes argument. One is to suggest

that Locke has misinterpreted, or misrepresented, the theory he is attacking. (This kind of mistake is known

as a Straw Man fallacy.) Locke assumes that the theory of innate ideas says this: innate ideas are ones we

are conscious of, or have access to from birth. Since it is plausible that there are no ideas of this kind, Locke

finds it easy to attack the theory. But perhaps there are ways of understanding a theory of innate ideas

which avoid this problem. Suppose we defined an innate idea differently: not as an idea we are conscious

of from birth, but one that we are born with in the sense that we are born with the ability to develop that

idea in the course of our development.

For example, human babies are not born with a concept of identity or sameness: experimental

psychologists have demonstrated that there is an age at which babies first begin to expect that an object

waved in front of them and then passed out of sight behind a curtain will be the same shape, colour and size

when it returns to view. Before that age, the baby does not expect the same object to come out of one side

of the curtain as the one that went in the other; it seems that they simply do not have the concept of the

same object yet. We are not born with an awareness of the concept of sameness; however, there is surely

a sense in which this concept is innate, since it is part of our genetic makeup that we will come to use thisconcept in the course of our early development.

Perhaps innate ideas are not those that we are aware of from birth, as Locke supposes, but instead are

those that we are genetically pre-programmed to develop in our early years. If that is what we mean by

innate, then it is no argument against innate ideas to point out that newborn babies show no awareness

of such ideas.

In fact, a similar point was made (in less scientific terms) by Leibniz (writing in response to Lockes work) in

the passages you studied last week: Leibniz says that to call concepts or items of knowledge innate is

simply to say that the mind is capable of finding them within itself and that innateness is a disposition, an

aptitude, a preformation, which determines our soul and brings it about that those truths are derivable from

it. If a concept can be called innate simply because the mind has a predetermined capacity to develop it,

given the right kind of experience as a trigger, then it is no surprise that there might be innate ideas

which not everyone has, since not everyone has been exposed to the experiences needed to trigger

development of that concept.

Locke does not directly consider this kind of objection, but he might have responded with a problem we

have met already: surely if we can only develop a pre-programmed idea after we have been in the world for

a while, this shows that such ideas are derived from experience, for we cannot develop them before we have

some experience of the world. And the point Locke is arguing for is precisely that all our ideas are derived

from experience. So if there are innate ideas that we are pre -programmed to develop in response toexperience, this does not contradict Lockes main claim, that all ideas come from experience. On the new

definition of innate ideas, innate ideas are just another kind of idea derived from experience which

shows that this definition of innateness cant be right.

Even so, there is a way to respond on behalf of the supporter of innate ideas: although experience is needed

to trigger the development of these ideas, it is not true that the content of the ideas is derived from

experience: the content of the ideas is already within us, although it is only developed when we encounter

the right kind of experience. Even if innate ideas are triggered by experience, they are not derived from

experienceand the empiricists claim was that all ideas are derivedfrom experience.

Exercise: Make a chart or diagram explaining the differences between Leibniz and Lockes vi ews on innate


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ideas and innate knowledge.


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Week 5 Sense Experience as the Source of all Ideas

Aims: to understand Lockes and Humes theories of the origins of ideas; to understand the claim that the

import of all ideas derives from and is determined bysense experience.

We said last week that empiricists think of the mind as a tabula rasa(clean slate) at birth, containing no

pre-determined ideas (such as the idea of God). Instead, they suggest that all ideas or concepts somehowenter the mind after birth, as the result of sense-experience.

Activity: Discuss: What do we mean by sense-experience? Make a list of the five senses. Does this cover

every kind of experience?

You should notice that the claim here is that all ideas come from sense -experience; this is what makes it

surprising and controversial. It also makes it easy to refute: all you would need to show that this claim is

false is one idea which does not come from sense-experience.

Notice also that what empiricists claim is not merely that ideas derive from sense-experience that the

mind gets its ideas from sense-experiencebut also that the content or import of ideas is determined by

sense experience, i.e. that what you can derive from sense-experience puts limits on what kind of ideas you

can form. There could not be an idea with a content that was in no way derivable from your own sense-

experience. For example, you might think that no-one reallyhas a concept or idea of infinity, as infinity is

something you could never encounter in your own experience.

Case Study: Locke

As we saw last week, Locke did a great deal to defend the conception of the mind as a tabula rasa; one of his

reasons for being so confident about this was that he had his own explanation of how we get our ideas from

experience:

All ideas come from sensation or reflection. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white

paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by

that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has pointed on it, with an almost endless

variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word,

from experience: in that, all our knowledge is funded; and from that it ultimately derives itself.

Essay I.1.2

The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet: and the mind by

degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to

them. Afterwards the mind proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use ofgeneral names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the

materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty: and the use of reason becomes daily more

visible, as these materials, that give it employment. Essay I.1.15

In these passages Locke suggests a picture of the mind as some kind of container a vast store or empty

cabinet, which is gradually filled with ideas let in by the senses, which are lodged in the memory. But

the mind is also able to abstract from particular ideas to form general ideas ideas which can apply to

more than one thing. For example, after meeting lots of different philosophers and so getting many

particular ideas of particular philosophers, you might be able to abstract from these particular ideas to

form a general ideaphilosopher which is capable of applying to many different people in the world.


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Criticisms of Locke:

Locke says that the senses let in ideas, and this suggests that ideas must be somehow out therein the world, waiting to be let in but how could the same kind of thing exist in the world, and then

exist in the mind? You might want to say that ideas represent the world they are not part of the

world out there that gets represented.

Locke suggests that ideas are lodged in the memory, and given names. But is this the right accountof how we associate words with their meanings? Is it really true that each word I use is associated

with memories of some sense experience?


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Case study 2: Hume (Enquiry, II)

Read this passage and answer the questions that follow.

Everyone will readily allow, that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind,

when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwardsrecalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties may mimic or copy

the perceptions of the senses; but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original

sentiment. The utmost we say of them, even when they operate with greatest vigour, is, that they represent

their object in so lively a manner, that we could almost say we feel or see it: But, except the mind be

disordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to render these

perceptions altogether undistinguishable. All the colours of poetry, however splendid, can never paint

natural objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for a real landskip. The most lively

thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation.

We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind. A man in a fit ofanger, is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that

any person is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a just conception of his situation; but never

can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion. When we reflect on our past

sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which

it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed. It

requires no nice discernment or metaphysical head to mark the distinction between them.

12. Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are

distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly

denominated Thoughts or Ideas. The other species want a name in our language, and in most others; Isuppose, because it was not requisite for any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general

term or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them Impressions; employing that word

in a sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively

perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are

distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect

on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.

13. Nothing, at first view, may seem more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only escapes all

human power and authority, but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form

monsters, and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the imagination no more trouble than toconceive the most natural and familiar objects. And while the body is confined to one planet, along which it

creeps with pain and difficulty; the thought can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the

universe; or even beyond the universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is supposed to lie in total

confusion. What never was seen, or heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is any thing beyond the power of

thought, except what implies an absolute contradiction.

But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination,

that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no

more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by

the senses and experience. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, gold,and mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous horse we can conceive; because, from


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our own feeling, we can conceive virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse, which is

an animal familiar to us. In short, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward

sentiment: the mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to express myself in

philosophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively

ones.

14. To prove this, the two following arguments will, I hope, be sufficient. First, when we analyze our

thoughts or ideas, however compounded or sublime, we always find that they resolve themselves into such

simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment. Even those ideas, which, at first view,

seem the most wide of this origin, are found, upon a nearer scrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of God,

as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our

own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. We may prosecute this

enquiry to what length we please; where we shall always find, that every idea which we examine is copied

from a similar impression. Those who would assert that this position is not universally true nor without

exception, have only one, and that an easy method of refuting it; by producing that idea, which, in their

opinion, is not derived from this source. It will then be incumbent on us, if we would maintain our doctrine,

to produce the impression, or lively perception, which corresponds to it.

15. Secondly. If it happen, from a defect of the organ, that a man is not susceptible of any species of

sensation, we always find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form no

notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. Restore either of them that sense in which he is deficient; by

opening this new inlet for his sensations, you also open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no difficulty in

conceiving these objects. The case is the same, if the object, proper for exciting any sensation, has never

been applied to the organ. A Laplander or Negro has no notion of the relish of wine. And though there are

few or no instances of a like deficiency in the mind, where a person has never felt or is wholly incapable of a

sentiment or passion that belongs to his species; yet we find the same observation to take place in a less

degree. A man of mild manners can form no idea of inveterate revenge or cruelty; nor can a selfish heart

easily conceive the heights of friendship and generosity. It is readily allowed, that other beings may possess

many senses of which we can have no conception; because the ideas of them have never been introduced to

us in the only manner by which an idea can have access to the mind, to wit, by the actual feeling and

sensation.

16. There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove that it is not absolutely impossible

for ideas to arise, independent of their correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed, that

the several distinct ideas of colour, which enter by the eye, or those of sound, which are conveyed by the

ear, are really different from each other; though, at the same time, resembling. Now if this be true of

different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour; and each shade produces

a distinct idea, independent of the rest. For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the continual gradation

of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it; and if you will not allow any of the

means to be different, you cannot, without absurdity, deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose,

therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly acquainted with

colours of all kinds except one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to

meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be placed before him,

descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain that he will perceive a blank, where that

shade is wanting, and will be sensible that there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguouscolours than in any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this


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deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to

him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can: and this may serve as a proof

that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions; though

this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we

should alter our general maxim.

17. Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only seems, in itself, simple and intelligible; but, if a proper

use were made of it, might render every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which has so

long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn disgrace upon them. All ideas, especially

abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure: the mind has but a slender hold of them: they are apt to be

confounded with other resembling ideas; and when we have often employed any term, though without a

distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea annexed to it. On the contrary, all

impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid: the limits between them

are more exactly determined: nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them. When we

entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is

but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be

impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we

may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality.

Study questions:

1. Explain what Hume means by Impressions, and what he means by Ideas. According to him,what is the most important difference between them?

2. Hume gives two specific examples of complex ideas in 13: what are they, and how, according tohim, are they formed?

3. All our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones(13): explain in your own words what Hume means by this.

4. Hume gives two reasons for believing the claim quoted in the previous question. Explain andillustrate both of these arguments (n.b. illustrate means give examples - preferably Humes

own examples!).

5. Hume explains an objection to his own proposal. This is known as the missing shade of blueproblem. What is it?

6. How does Hume attempt to get around the missing shade of blue? Is his response to thisproblem convincing? Give reasons for your answer.


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Applications of Humes Theory:

1. God

In the passage you have read, Hume suggests that the idea of a wise and perfect God arises from reflecting

on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and

wisdom. So the idea of God comes from experiences of our own good qualities, expanded without limit.

This contrasts with Descartes claim that the idea of God is the idea of an infinite being, and we could not

achieve the idea of such an infinity through finite (limited) experience; so the idea of God must be innate.

2. The Self

Previous philosophers, such as Descartes, had suggested that they could at least be certain of their own

existence, from their awareness that they were thinking; this is Descartes famous I think, therefore I am.

However, Hume argued that, although you can experience a multitude of thoughts and feelings, you never

experience yourself as one thing that is having those thoughts and feelings. In modern terms, you might put

this as the claim that you are aware of a stream of consciousness, but never aware of your selfor mind as

a single thing. Humes conclusion was that the pronoun I could not mean what Descartes and earlier

philosophers thought it had meant a single unified self which has thoughts and experiences but insteadwhen we use I we are simply talking about the stream of experiences we are aware of.

Notice the method Hume uses: he claims that, if I had an idea of a single thing which is my self, it must have

been possible to get that idea from some experience of combination of experiences. But since we can never

experience ourselves as a single thing, we cannot have any such idea; and so the word I cannot refer to the

self; it must mean something different:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some

particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I

never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the

perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am Iinsensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by

death, and coued I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my

body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a

perfect non-entity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection thinks he has a different

notion of himself, I must confess I call reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may

be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps,

perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no

such principle in me.

But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind,that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other

with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in

their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and

all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul,

which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where

several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an

infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor

identity in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and

identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions

only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenesare represented, or of the materials, of which it is composed. Hume, Treatise I.4.vi


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3. Causation

Our entire world-view is based on the idea that events have causes: in general, things dont just happen,

but have causes that make them happen. When my car breaks down, I try to find out what has caused this,

and if a war breaks out, historians enquire into the causes of the conflict. Hume suggests that the idea of a

cause seems to be the idea of a necessary connexion between effect and cause: when we say that the

brick hitting the window caused the window to break, we mean that the brick hitting the window

necessitated that the window would break; given the laws of physics, there was no other possible outcome

from that brick hitting that window in that way. The problem is that we cannotever observe a necessary

connexion in nature so we cant have got the idea of a necessary connection from experience so we

cant really have an idea of a necessary connexion after all.

Scholars continue to dispute what conclusion Hume meant to draw from this argument. Some say that Hume

believed that cause and effect do not exist. Others say that he was just arguing that causation is not really

a necessary connexion which we could never observebut instead is simply a regularity or constant

conjunction between causes of a certain kind and effects of another kind, for example between matches

being struck and flames being lit. On this interpretation, Hume does not believe that causes dont exist,

but only that the word cause means something different from what people take it to mean. You can make

up your own mind about Humes opinion:

If we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature of that evidence, which assures us

of matters of fact, we must enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect.

I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge

of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from

experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. Let

an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities; if that object beentirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to

discover any of its causes or effects. Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very

first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it

would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him. No object ever

discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the

effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any

inference concerning real existence and matter of fact. Hume, Enquiry IV.I

It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of

similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever besuggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is

nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be

exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit,

upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This

connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from

one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of

power or necessary connexion. Nothing farther is in the case. Contemplate the subject on all sides;

you will never find any other origin of that idea. This is the sole difference between one instance,

from which we can never receive the idea of connexion, and a number of similar instances, by which

it is suggested. The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of


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two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was connected: but only that it was

conjoined with the other. After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces

them to be connected. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of connexion?

Nothing but that he now feels these events to be connected in his imagination, and can readily

foretell the existence of one from the appearance of the other. When we say, therefore, that one

object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought,

and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: A conclusion

which is somewhat extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient evidence. Nor will its

evidence be weakened by any general diffidence of the understanding, or sceptical suspicion

concerning every conclusion which is new and extraordinary. No conclusions can be more agreeable

to scepticism than such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human

reason and capacity.

60. And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the

understanding than the present? For surely, if there be any relation among objects which it imports

to us to know perfectly, it is that of cause and effect. On this are founded all our reasonings

concerning matter of fact or existence. By means of it alone we attain any assurance concerning

objects which are removed from the present testimony of our memory and senses. The only

immediate utility of all sciences, is to teach us, how to control and regulate future events by their

causes. Our thoughts and enquiries are, therefore, every moment, employed about this relation: Yet

so imperfect are the ideas which we form concerning it, that it is impossible to give any just

definition of cause, except what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to it. Similar

objects are always conjoined with similar. Of this we have experience. Suitably to this experience,

therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects

similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or in other words where, if the firstobject had not been, the second never had existed. The appearance of a cause always conveys the

mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect. Of this also we have experience. We may,

therefore, suitably to this experience, form another definition of cause, and call it, an object

followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other. But though

both these definitions be drawn from circumstances foreign to the cause, we cannot remedy this

inconvenience, or attain any more perfect definition, which may point out that circumstance in the

cause, which gives it a connexion with its effect. We have no idea of this connexion, nor even any

distinct notion what it is we desire to know, when we endeavour at a conception of it. We say, for

instance, that the vibration of this string is the cause of this particular sound. But what do we mean

by that affirmation? We either mean that this vibration is followed by this sound, and that all similar

vibrations have been followed by similar sounds: Or, that this vibration is followed by this sound, and

that upon the appearance of one the mind anticipates the senses, and forms immediately an idea of

the other. We may consider the relation of cause and effect in either of these two lights; but beyond

these, we have no idea of it.16

61. To recapitulate, therefore, the reasonings of this section: Every idea is copied from some

preceding impression or s

reason experience open howard peacock

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