REALISM AND THAILAND'S FOREIGN POLICY

AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Thanit Sirichote

A sub-thesis submitted for the

degree o-f Master of Arts (International

Relations) in the Department of

International Relations,

Research School of Pacific Studies,

The Australian National University.

August 1986

Peelaration

This sub—thesis is my own original work. All sources used

have been cited.

J . M a e M t -

Thanit Sirichote

August 1986

A c k n o w l e d a e m e n t s

A t a 1 1 s1 Ei g e s o f w r i t i n g t. h i s b u h -• t. hi e s i s , ü r . Jo 1111

G i r 1 i n g , m y s u p e r v i s o r , h a d g i v e n m e e n c o u r a g e m e n t a n d

v a l u a b l e c o m m e n t s . M r s . B r i g i d B a l l a r d and M r s . F l o r e n c e

S i l v e r s t o n e h e l p e d i m p r o v e my E n g l i s h . My m o t h e r and my

o o u s i n s , K a r n a n d C h u r n p o r n 0 s a t h a i: n r d s h a r e d i n t h e t y p i 119 S

t. ii e y a l o n g w i t h N e i l Adams a n d Lhool: i a t Pan a s p or i ipi a s i t ,

a l s o g a v e me t h e i r u n f a i l i n g m o r a l s u p p o r t . Mie l o r d

F o u n d a t i o n g r a n t e d m e a s c h o 1 a r s h i p w h i c h rn a d e p o s s i b 1 e m y

s t u d y i n A u s t r a l i a . To a l l t h o s e n a m e d , I ow-, my g r a t e f u l

t h a n k s f o r h e : p g e n e r o u s 1 y g i v e r.. 1 h e i r !••• i ' "• d n e s s w 1 1 1 b «

r e m e m b e r e d , a l w a y s . H o w e v e r , r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a n y e r r o r s

i s e I " I t i r~ e 1 y rn i n e .

T h a n i t S i r i c h o t e

B a n g k o k

A u g u s t 1 9 8 6

Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter I : The Realist View of Foreign Policy

Chapter II : Thail an d 's F oreign Policy After

the Second World War

Chapter Ills Critique and Cone1usion

Bibliography

INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy is too i ntr i cate a topi c to suffer any total taboo. 1

George F - Kennan

Realism influences foreign policy of all states.

Nation s declare t hemse1ves f or high-sounding id e a 1s an d

profess their adherence to lofty moral and legal principles.

However, as history has shown, for survival or advantage,

all nations have learned to adjust their actions to

r ea 1 i t i es and i n t hat pr oc.ess d i sr egar ded ideals, mor a 1 i t y

and international law. A realistic foreign policy must, of

necessity,(and by definition) be flexible and able to adapt

t o changing conditions■A m o n g A s i a n n atio n s , Thailand has a re p u t a t i o n

for its realistic traditional diplomacy.2 In the latter

h a 1 f o f t h e n i n e t e e n t. h c e n t u r y , T h a i 1 a n d (a t t. h e time S i a rn)

was the only country in Southeast Asia which managed to

escape colonization. While the other Southeast Asian

nations were struggling in vain against the predatory

European colonial nations, Siam sought an accommodation with

Britain, the dominant power. Siam then endeavoured to use

Britain to counterbalance France's intimidation. I his

balance-of-power strategy was not always effective since

1 George F.Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs 64, no.2 (Winter 1985-1986),214.

2 See details in Li kbit Dhiraveguin, Siam andColonialism (1855-1909) (Bangkok: Thai Wattana PanichCo.Ltd, B.E. 2518).

the British wanted to avoid confrontation with the French.

F o r t h i s r e a s o n , B i a rn a c c o m m o d a t e d itself to F r a nee.

Si am ' s pol icy of accommodat i on i nvol ved

considerable territorial concessions to both the French and

the British 5 but it was partly because of this policy that

S i a m w a s a b 1 e t o rn a i n t a i n its independence a n d t h u s m i n i in i z e

external interference in its domestic system » 3 This policy

of accommodation was based on a realistic view of Siam's

position vis-a-vis the great powers : it is imprudent to

f i g h t over wh e 1 m i n g sup er i or enern i e s . Sur v i va 1 of a sma 1 1

c o u n t r y 1 i k e S i a rn d e p e n d e d upo n t h e a b i 1 i t y to m a k e t h e

necessary adjustments to outside pressures.

Has Thailand's foreign policy after the Second

World War been as realistic as its traditional diplomacy?

Or has it been an excessively realistic policy - merely a

cynical response to the external environment? The purpose

of this sub-thesis is to determine whether Thailand's

foreign policy after the Second World War has been faithful

to the realist view of foreign policy or not. I he sub —

thesis is divided into three chapters.

The first chapter will discuss in detail the

realist view of foreign policy: its basic assumptions, its

suggested methods by which foreign policy should be

conducted, its moral justifications and its distinctive

features.

3 Siam's geographical position played an equally important role in preserving the country's independence. It was in the interests of both the French and the British to keep Siam as a buffer zone between their spheres of :L n f 1 Lien c e » I b i d . , p . 78. and Ast r i Suh k re, " Sma 11 er -Nat i on Diplomacy: Thailand's Current Dilemmas." A s i a n Surrey XI ,no.5 (1971),429.

i i i

The second chapter will provide an account of

T hi a i 1 a n d ' s f o r e i g n p o 1 i c y a f t e r t h. e S ev .and Wor 1 d War. It

does not purport to represent the who I e picture ot t h e

policy; but the -focus will be on how Thailand has perceived

and reacted to its security threats, i he chapter will also

describe some aspects of Thai foreign policy wnich clarify

Thailand's attitudes toward power, morality, idealism and

i nt ernation a 1 1 a w „The third chapter will trace which aspects of Thai

foreign policy have been compatible with the realist view

o f f o r e i g n p o 1 icy a n d w hi i c hi a s p e c t s have not and give the

y~ 0 ££< ~q |-|<3 why« I hi s chapter will also estimate the

e f f e c 1 1 v e n ess o f its policy' a n d p o i n t out it s o u t s 1.. a n d i 11 g

characteristics during the 1ast forty y e a r s .

CHAPTER ITHE REALIST VIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY^

"God is with the powerful; beat or be beaten; might makes right." The worldly wisdom implicit m thesephrases is often thought to represent the realist view of ■foreign policy; in fact, there is a common tendency to place a stigma of utter ruthlessness and immorality on real ism in the context of international relations. This, however, is a blatant misreading of realism and its view of foreign policy. Realism is a bird of different feather. The purpose of this chapter is to describe accurately the realist view of foreign policy: its rationale, its guiding principles,its moral dimension and its character. This will be done by inferring from the writings of four primary exponents of realism in the field of international relations; namely; Niccolo Machiavaili, Thomas Hobbes, E.H. Carr and Hans

Morgenthan-1The realist view of foreign policy starts from the

assumption that "there is no good other than the acceptance and understanding of reality."= Repeatedly, these fourRealist thinkers warn that reality misinterpreted - or worse still ignored or scorned - will lead to national ruin and

< "it i~s important to stress at the outset that there are

^ ; ™ p r o a c L : 7 . ^same family of view. See Hedley Bull, "Martin Wight and the Theory o-f International Relations. British Journal <•I n t e r n a i i on a 1 St udi es , 2 , no. 2 (1976) , 101 --116.

E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis ^AnIntroduction to the Study of International Relation* ,.nü edition (London: Macmillan Press Ltd-, 19/4), P-^l-

0v 0n th0 co11 ap5e o f in tern ationa1 systems. What ev e r thegoals, wishes, or dreams of foreign-policy makers, they must

be brought into line with reality.What is "reality"? The Realists assert that

international relations take place in a state ofinternational anarchy3 - a main theme to which they return time and again. International anarchy is a situation marked with an absence of common government and social solidarity among states. In international anarchy, sovereign states co-exist without stable expectations regarding the use of power with respect to one another. Desire to limit damages of power-behaviour and fear of uncertainties might induce states to agree to some rules to regulate their interactions e „g „ conventions of war and the non-intervention principle.4 However, these rules will not always be effective since

3 ~ " This point is fully developed in Hedley Bull, "Society and Anarchy in International Relations," in Diplomatic Investigations? eds. Herbert Butterfield and Wl^ht (Cambridges Harvard University Press, 1966), pp- 35-5U. See also Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London s MacmillanPress, 1977) .4 Hobbes called these rules "the laws of nature"._ Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ed. C.B. Macpherson (Middlesex: Penguinn

chapter XIV, pp.189-190. See also Hedley International Anarchy," Social Research,Books Ltd.,1984),

Bull, "Hobbes and 48, No.4 (1981), must be rnent i oned i n t e r n a t i o n a 1 in the state

p .728. that

rel ations, of nature.

are j ustified t o d r aw situation of individuals t he ex t.er n a 1 situat i oni n t. e r n a t i o n a 1 inte r nationa1

As regards the works of Hobbes, it most of them do not deal with but with the life of individual men

However, as Bull pointed out, we an analogy between the domestic in a Hobbesian state of nature and of nations in the state of

anarchy. The state of nature and the state of anarchy are similar in the sense that both

are marked with an absence of government. See Bull, Ibid. , 720—721. Non et h e 1 ess , t. h er e ar e 1 i m i t at i on s ̂ of t h i s analogy - Hobbes himself mentioned the.',. See Bull, "Society and Anarchy in International Relations," pp.44-48 and P.John Vincent, "The Hobbesian Tradition in Twentieth Century International Thought," Millennium Journal of International Studies, 10, No.2 (1981), pp. 94-96.

t h e r 0 i 0 n o s u p r 0 m 0 a u t h o r i t y t o e n f o r c 0 t h 0 rn - I n a d d i t i o n , states will not obey the rules out of a sense of social consciousness: lacking in affinities and bond of community,they have no natural desire to contribute to an integrated and peaceful society.55 Like drivers in poorly-controlled traffic, states in international anarchy find themselves in a p r.ecar i ous and p er i 1 ous c 1 r cumst anc e .

As the concept of international anarchy is central to the realist view of foreign policy, it is necessary to be more specific about the consequences of an absence of common government and social solidarity in international anarchy.

According to t h e Realists, there are three major

c 0n s equences. In the first place, all nations ar e

inextricab1y 1oc ked i n the str ugg I e f 0r power. ** Th i s

phenomenon is c1osely connected with human nature. In

Morgenthau's vi ew , al1 men are driven by the a n i m u s

do m i n a d i ; t h e i n sat i ab 1 e 1 ust for p ower 5 7 so are n at ions, which are composed of men; and in fact the animus dominadi becomes magnified when transferred from individuals to nations.3 Despite their social, political and economic differences, all nations strive for power. "Power, however limited and qualified," Morgenthau commented, "is the value5 This is based on Hobbes' account of human nature.Hobbes' man -- unlike Hugo Grotius ' — lacks "sociableness"and "desire of living together." See Carl J. Friedrich, Inevitable Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1948), pp.127-128.6 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Strugglefor Power and Peace 5th edition (New York: Alfred A . Knopf,1973), p .27 and pp.34-36.7 H ans Morgen t hau, Scientific Man VS Power PoI itics(London: Latimer House, 1947), p.165.8 Ibid, p p . 168-172.

wh i ch i n t. e r n a t i o n a 1 p o I i t i c 5 recognize d as supreme. i i cy

Con s i d er at i ons of power bei ng t h e p r i rnar y ob j ec t i ve of a 11

n a t. i o n s , t h e s t r u g g I e f o r p o w e r e n s u e s a n d g o e s o n

r e J. e n t 'J. e s s 1 y . N e i t h e r e t h i c 5 n o r 1 a w s n o r o t h e r

i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n r e s t r a i n i t s d y n a rn i c s ~ t h i s • i s t bi e m a i n

thrust of Carr's argument in his The Twenty Years1 Crisis

i919 -i939.1° Th e imp1ication of power struggle ln

international anarchy is that small., weak and unarmed

nations will be "in a danger of becoming a passive ooject,

a hunting ground, a region of low political pressure, into

which the winds of power may blow from neighbouring

territories and cause a storm to get u p . " 11In the second place, nations in international

anarchy are confronted with the security dilemma,. ihey are

aware that they may be imperilled at any moment as there is

no central agency to provide absolute security for them.

9 Ibid, p.91.10 Carr, op.cit. For reviews of Carr's work, see Hedley Bull, "The Twenty Years' Crisis: Thirty Years On."I n t e r n a t i o n a i J o urn al , XXIV, N o . 4 (Autumn , 1969) , 5Roger Morgan, "E.H.Carr and the Study of InternationalRelations," in Essays in Honour of E.H. Carr e d . C.Abramsky (Lo n d o n : Macmi 11 a n , 1979) , p p .17 1~ 1S o ; and William I .R . t o x ,"E.H. Carr and Political Realism: Vision and Revision",Re v i e w o t Internat i o n a 1 S t u d its, 11, No .1 (1985) , 1 ~ 1 /.

11 Fr 1 ed r i c h M e inec k e , H a c h i a v e 11 i s m : T h e D c.> ctr in e o fRaison d'etat and its Place in Modern History traps, by Douglas Scott (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957),p .420.12 "Security dilemma" is a term coined by John Herz. See his Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study inTheories and Realities (Chicago: The University Press,1951),pp.4-6; it is closely related with Hobbes' thesis of the struggle of power (see below) . See also Arnold Wolf er, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: John Hopkins P r e s s ) ,1962, p.84 and David P. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan:T h e M o r a 1 a n d P o 1 i t i cal The o r y o f T h o mas hi o b be s (Oxford: C 1arendon P r e s s , 1968), p .208.

I~-\.J

"I"h i 5 r 0 ai j. z at :i. on w:i 11 cr eate f ear and a sense o f secun ty;

whic::h in turn compel nations to seek more power for the sake

of security. This is Hobbes' explanation of the struggle

•for power, which contrasts with Morgen than ' s animus dominadi

theory.13 Inevitably, the quest for power ~ though driven

by an instinct of self-preservation “ will appear to the

others as a menace to their existence, thereby provoke them

to follow suit. The result is pervasive competition and

rivalry, which ultimately leads to the greater insecurity of

a 1 i „ fience , i r on i c a 11 y and t r ag i c a 11 y , the mor e sec ur i t y

states seek by contending for more power, the less security

they will have; and yet the fear inherent in international

anarchy will commit them to "a perpetual 1 and restlesse

desire atter power that ceaseth one1y in DeathXn the third place, nations in international

anarchy live in the constant expectation of war.1“ Famous

for his conception of international anarchy as the state of

war, Hobbes provided a vivid account of how nations behave

in int er n ation a1 anarc hy:

...in all times, Kings and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, ure in

i.rannot assure the power and means to live well,which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.'1

* I j. rh-.n xi n 11. See also FriedrichHobbes, up.ciL», chap. a i , P - 1 x • ^ .op cit., pp» 126-127. Machiavelli also seemed to hold thisview: "... men do not believe themselves sure of what theyalready possess except by acquiring still mot* * e. NiccoloMachiavelli, The Discourses trans. by Luigi Ricci. The Prince and the Discourses ed. Max Lerner (New York: RandomHouse, 1940) , chap. V, p. 1̂ .4.

14 Hobbes, op.cit., chap XI, p.161.15 For Carr's view, see Carr, op-cit., p.luV; for Machiavelli's; Isaiah Berlin, "The Originality o+ Machiavelli," in Studies or,Machiavelli ed. Myron P. Gil more (Fireng e: G .C „ San soni,1972) , p .199.

6

continual 1 jealousies, and in the state andpasture of Gladiators? having their weapons pointing, and their eyes -fixed on one another? that i Forts, Garrison and Giuns upon theFrontiers of- their Kingdoms? and continual! Bpye~, upon their neighbours? which is a posture o. war .

Mo r g en t h a u r e st a t e d FIob b e s ' o p i n ion w in e n h e w r ote:

All history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing ■for, actually involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the for m of war ■

To the Realists, there can be periods of peace in

international anarchy? but peace is no more than an armed

armistice, a condition of stalemate or truce.1H War is

i mrnanent because it is structural 1 y-determi ned: granted

diversity in purpose of heterogeneous states, conflicts are

bound to occur; they are likely to escalate into war since

there is no supreme power to settle disputes peacefully. io

be more precise, Hobbes attributed the origin of war to

three causes; rivalry for material possessions, fear of

insecurity (this fear is not caused by misperception or

paranoia? but as mentioned above it is a rational fear

resulting from an absence of common government), and a drive

to promote doctrines.19 In this condition of universal war,

life in international anarchy will be intolerably dangerous,

for war will always threaten the survival of states.

16 H ^ b b S S T ^ i t T , chap. XIII, pp. 187-188.

17 Flor g en t hau , Po 1 i 11 c s Am on g N a t i <.> n , p . 4 u .

iQ Hobbe s , op.cit. , chap.X 111, P p - 185-1S6 . See a1 so Bu11 ,"Hobbes and International Anarchy," P-721.19 Hobbes, op - ci t .. , chap XIII, _ PP - iB5“ 188 and Bul 1 1 "Hobbes and International Anarchy, P- 7.̂.1 1

7

Xn sum , the rea 1 i ty of the Re a 1 i sts the pi ctur e of the way in which states and international systems -function - is primarily characterized by the perennial strugg 1 e f or power , the i rresol vab 1 e secur i ty di 1 emn.a and ubiquitous war. This is not the scene of the Armageddon between the evil and the virtuous; from which a happy world would emerge after the destruction of the evil.''120 But the hostile atmosphere and tension are a necessary concomitant of the structure of international anarchy. I hat is to say, they arise f r om a socia1 con dition. 11 is the Realistscontention that nations will not be able to escape this predicament precisely because men, who form nations, are not perfectible.31 Though the Realists do not hold that, men are exclusively selfish, egotistical or bellicose, they are convinced that these vicious qualities are inherent in men.223 Never can men transcend these traits; and these will forever operate as a counterforce against, the achievement of

20 Mörgenthau, for example, wrote: "For the light hearted assumption that what one's own nation aims at and does is morally good and that those who oppose that nation s policies are evil is morally indefensible and intellectually untenable...." Hans Morgenthau, "Another "Great Debate : The National Interest of the United States," The Amer nzan Political Science Review XL. VI , No. 4 (Dec.1952), p«X04.21 For Hobbes' view, see Gauthier, op.cit., p Marchiavelli's; John P1 amenatz , Man and SocietyLongman, 1963) , 1, p.6; for Car r s; Cat r, op.cit.and for Morgenthau's; Morgenthau, Politics Amongp .. 34.

.208; for (London :

,pp.95-97; Nations,

22 For Machiavelli's view, see Machiaveili, op.cit., chap.I, p .207 and chap.IX, p .139; for Hobbes's; Hobbes, op . c: it., ; chap . VI , pp . 118-130; f or Carr's; Car r , _op.cit. , p . 95; an d f or Mor g en thau's; Mor g ent h au , Sc ien t it i'­ll an V£ Power Po1itics, pp.163-168.

8

t h e '1 c o m rn u n i t y o f rn a n k i n cl'1 (3 r t h e '' p e r p e t u a 1 p e a c e “-- ̂

c o n c e p t s i n t h e i d e a I i s t t. r a d i t. i a n w h i c: h t h e R e a 1 i s t s w o u I d

r e q a r d a s u n r e a 1 i s t i c t o t h e p o i n t o f f a n t a s y - "1 h e y bei iev e

that nations might learn to cooperate with one another to

i m p r o v e t h e s i t u a t i o n i r~i i n t e r n a t i o n a 1 a n a r c h y 5 b u t t h i s

w i 11 n o t 1 e a d t o t h e e s t a b I i s h m ent o f internation a 1 s o c i e t y ,

in which ethics and laws could circumscribe sovereign

states' behaviour e.g. the struggle for power. Carr, far

i nstance , consi dered the so-called 11 i nternational harii.ony of

interests doctrine" as a fraud, pointing out that a

r e c r u d e s c e n c e o f d i s i n t e g r a t i v e forces will prevent n a t ion a

f rorn sett i ng up comprehensi ve supra-nat i anal communi t i e s .

In short, the Realists' conclusion is that nations are

doomed to live dangerously with the struggle for power,

s e c u r i t y d i 1 e m m a a n d w a r 1 n i n t e r r1 a t i (3 n a 1 anarch y .Th i s b£3i ng so, the Rea 1 i sts advocated thr ee basi c

/

guidelines for foreign policy: ra ison d'etat, policy of

national interests and the balance of power principle. By

conf or mi ng to these concep t s , nat i on s w:i 11 not on 1 y be ab 1 e

to safeguard their survival but also to provide a modicum ol

order in the situation of international anarchy. Narrowly

defined, r&isori d'etat, simply means justification of

immoral acts undertaken on behalf of states. However, in a

broader sense, it could expand to represent the highest norm

governing national conduct - most cogently expounded by

23 Concepts of Immanuel Kant, the major figure in theidealist school. See Bull, "Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations" p p .104- 105. For the Realistsaft acks on t he idea1ist d octrines see for example M o I'- g e n t hi a u , S c i e n t i f i c H a ri V S P o w e r P o 1 it ics , p p . 2 2 - 2 -3..

24 Carr, op.cit., pp.80-81 and p. 230.

9

M a c h i a v 011. i . 3 » R a i s o n d ' e t a t c a n b 0 u n d 0 r s t o o d t h r o u g h a c o r r 0 c t a p p r 0 c 1 a t i o n □ f t h 0 n a t u r 0 o f h 0 s t a t e i 10 e 1 f and

i t. s 0 n v i r o n rn 0 n t , t h a t. i s , a c a 1 c a 1 a t. i o n b a 0 0 d 0 n i n t. 0 r 0 s t. 0

and necessities of the state»26 While formulating raison

d ■' e t a t , 0 v 0 r y n a t i o n w i 11 l: a k 0 i n t o a c c o u n t. t h 0 d a n g 0 r 0 i n

t h e 0 i t u a t i o n o f i n 10 r n a t i o n a 1 a n a r c I "i y» F o r t h i 0 r 0 a 0 o n ,

the raison d'etat of all states encourages the pursuit of

t h e 1 n 10 r 0 s t s o f 01 a 10 s b y a 11 n 0 c e 0 s a r y m 0 a n 0 , 1 f n e e d b e

even the immoral means» (Machiavei1i '0 raison d at at is

v0r y 0 i m i 1 ar t o l-iob t) 00 ' n at ur a 1 r i g h t t h eory, wh i c h

postulates that in the state of war "every Commonwealth

has an absolute Libertie to doe what it shall judge ... most

conducing to their benefit") .:,r/ In other words, at the

heart of the raison d'etat of all nations lies the powerful

desire of self-preservation. (the Supremacy of States -

another component of raison d'etat — will be discussed later

on). Nevertheless, the character of the raison d'etat of

each nation will be unique for it is imprinted with a

particular nature of state and environment. 29 The character

of the raison d'etat must also be very adaptable as the

structure of states and their external environments are

subject to constant changes, although some aspects of the

structure of states i.e. geographical position will of

25 Mei necke , op »eit», p . i and pp» 2.5-2 8.

26 Ibid», p.2 .27 Hobbes, op.cit», chap»XXI, p.2 6 6» See also chap»XIV, p „ i 8 9.28 Me? i nec k 0 , op »c: i t » , p . 2 .D O oi~ 7 Ibid», p.1.

10

c o u r s e r e m a i n f i x e cl. 3 ° A n d n a t urai 1 y , r a i s o n d'etat, whic h

is supposed to reflect reality, will dictate that states

acquire sufficient power to protect their interests since

power is an indispensable means to achieve goals in

i n t e r n a t i o n a 1 a n a r c h y . 31

Par a 11e 1 with ra ison d'etat is Mar gen t h a n 's policy

of national interests. Having criticized the American

foreign policy for its legalistic - moralistic approach,

Morgenthan suggested that the one and only "guiding star" of

f or e i g n p o 1 icy must b e n at i on a 1 i n t er est s $ 322 other i n terest s

subnational, other—national or supranational — must not be

a 1 1 owed to usurp those of thie nat ion. 33 According to

Morgenthau , nat i ona 1 i n ter ests can be deter rni ned throuqh

ob j ec. t i ve an a 1 ysi s , c omp ar ab 1 e t o a sc i en t i f i c d i sc o ver y . 3^

The rational core of national interests is discernible with

reference to the physical, political and cultural aspects of

a nation.365 National interests provide the spring of action

for a nation: do whatever they require. The legitimacy of

the primary of national interests derives from the fact that

there is no other power to protect them.36 Morgenthan also

claimed that a policy of national interests - if adopted by

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., pp.2-3.

32 Hans Morgenthau, American Foreign Policy; A Critical Examination (London: Methuen, 1952), p.272 (In an American edition, this book is titled "In Defense of the NationalInterest")

33 Morgenthau, "Another "Great Debate":..., pp.973-977.

34 Ibid., p.977.

35 Ibid., p .972.

36 Ibid.

most s t a 10 s — will be conducive to mod er at ion in internation a I r eiations because i i ationa1 interest s - un1ike morals or ideology — can be the objects of bat' gaining, thus, nations will be amenable to reason and compromise.37 Similar to raison d'etat, a policy of national interests requires states to obtain power; for power is a meansnecessary to the pursuit of national interests. As Morgenthan wrote, "statesmen think and act in terms of

interest defined as power,..."30Morgenthau is also an important authority on the

Realists' third guideline tor foreign policy: the balance ofpower principle. He saw the balance of power as a"necessary" and "inevitable" outgrowth of the struggle for

p o w er, wh en he ex p1 ain ed:The aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying either to maintain oroverthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of power a n d p o 1 i c i e s t h a t. a i rn a t p reservation of i t . 3 cy

With an emphasis on the reign of power struggle in the stateof international anarchy, the balance of power principle (orpolicy in Morgenthan's words) calls on nations to be verysensitive to their power situation: always maintain orenhance one's power vis-a-vis that of others with allnecessary measures. In an anarchic system, the emergence ofa preponderant state will be mortally dangerous to theothers; without impunity, it will be in a position to harmthe interests of weaker states and break diplomatic rules

37 Ibid., p.978.3 8 M o r g e n t h a u , P o 11 1 i c s A m o n g N a t i o n s, p . 5 ,

39 Ibid., p.167.

a n d i n t. e r n a t. i o n a 1 1 a w f r 0 01 y a n d f la 11 y - I h is sc 0 n a r i o c a n

only be deterred by the balance of power p r inc ip le : the

presence of the balance of power w i l l represent a signal to

t h e p o t e n t i a 1 a g g r e s s o r s 1 n a d v a n c e t h a t t h e i r e x p a n s i o n o t

p o w e r w i 1 1 rn e e t. i m m e d i a t e a n d effec t i v e c o unterviolence.

Among the measures to uphold the balance o-f power w i l l be

bu i ld ing..up of one own forces, aligning oneself with any

others ir respect ive of p o l i t i c a l , economic, social or

ideological differences ~ the level of the i r power is the

dominant consideration, resorting to intervention, or i f

need be, going to war» Although these methods w i l l involve

the v io la t ion of moral and legal rules, they co la Id b e

ju s t i f i e d on the ground that the existence of the balance em­

power guarantees the independence of states and sustains the

i n t er n at i on a 1 or der . y+°

Judging from the Realists ' guiding pr inc ip les of

foreign pol icy - r a i s o n d 'e ta t , pol icy of national in terests

and the balance of power p r inc ip le - , i t is obvious that

idealism, morals and laws have been subordinated to the

in s t in c t of self-preservation and power. I he Realists

re jec t universal i s t doctrines, moral absolutes and

internat ional law as a primary c r i t e r ia of foreign policy»

Fr orn thei r poi n t of vi ew , 1 eader s who ar e ex cessi vel y

concerned with idea11sm, morals and 1 aws tend to depreciate

or, even worse, eliminate power from international p o l i t ic s ,

and then nai ve 1 y believe t hat ideal i srn , morals and laws

alone can serve as an e f fec t ive instrument of foreign

po licy; the extreme of th is posit ion is abso1ute pacifism.

4 0 I b i d . , p»202.

F o r t h 0 R e a 1 i 0t s , t h i 5 m i s t a k 0 n a 11 i t u d 0 is fa t a 1 M a c h i a v 01I i , f o r i n s t a n c 0 , w a r n 0 d a p r i n c 0 11 w h o w i s h 0 s t a mal<0 a profession of goad 11055 in every thing . among so many who are not. good«,.." that, he would not only fail to a c h i 0 v 0 a n y t h i. n g s i g n i f i c a n t b u t w a u 1 d also b 0 ravaged. 41 C a r r p o i. n 10 d o u t t h a t t h 0 c o n s 0 q u 0 n c 0 c cd la 1 d b 0 m u c h graver: a c c o r d i n g t. o h :i. rn , t h i s k i n d of id 0 a 1 i s t i c — rn o ralistic thinking was typical of the Utopians such as Norman Angel I , A r n cd 1 d T cd y n b 0 0 a n d A1 f r 0 d Z i rn m 0 r r d la r i n g t h 0 i n 10 r w a r y 0 a r s 5 it had led to policies which failed to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War - a global disaster.42 Hobbes would have agreed with Carr, for he wrote: "Covenants, without theSword, are but Words, and of not strength...." At thecdther ex trerne , the) pi tf a 11 of idealistic—mor all st i c influence is when it inspires foreign policy with41 Niccold Machiavel1i , The Prince trans. by Luigi Riggi.The Prince ana the Discour ses ed. Max Lerner (New York: Random House, 1940) chap.XV, p . 56 „42 Carr, op.cit., pp.38-40. Yet in the first edition of the Twenty Years' Crisis in 1939, Carr advocated concessions to the Nazi Germany. He wrote:

If the power relations of Europe in 1938 made it inevitab1e that Czecho-S1 ovakia shouId 1ose part of her territory, and eventually her independence, it was preferable (quite apart. from any question of j ust i c e or i n j List ice) that this sh ou Id c ome about. as the result of discussion round a table in Munich rather than as the result either of a war between the Great Powers or of a local war between Germany and Czecho-Slovakia.

<E‘. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An1ntroduction to the Study of In ternational Re 1 at 1 ons(London: Macmi11 an, 1939), p .278. cited in Fox, op.cit. ,p .4)This 1ine of thinking only served Hi tier's aggressive policies. Realizing this error of judgement, Carr deleted this passage from the second edition of the Twenty Year's Cr 1sis« See Ibid.43 Hobbes, op.cit„, chap.XVII, p .223.

14

f a n a t i c i b rn ; t h e n o t i o n o f la 11 i m a t e r i g h t a n cl w r o n g w i 11

rn a k e a n a t i o n o b 1 i v i o la b o f p r a d e n c. e a n d r e s t r a i n t S u e h a

n a t i o n w i 11 b e c o m e a f o r rn i d a b 1 e t h r e a t t o p e a c e a n d

i n 1e r n a t i o n a 1 o r d e r , a s M o r g e n t h a la n o t e d s

What is good for the crusading country is by definition good for ail mankind, and if the rest af man kind ref u ses t o accept suc h c1 aims to universal recognition, it must be converted with f i r e a n d s w o r d « 4 ̂

I n a n y c a s e , t h e R e a 1 i s t s a r g u e t h a t t h e r e a r e n o

s u c. h t h i n q s a s rn o r a 1 a b s o 1 la t e s o r la n i v e r s a 1 i s t doctrines in

i n t e r n a t i o n a 1 r e 1 a t. i o n s ; i f t h e y e x i s t , the y ar e o f a

rel ative character, sociai 1 y and historical 1y conditioned.

For examp 1 e , Car exposecl the a 11 eged 1 y uni versal ist doctr i ne

of harmony of interests as “merely a moral device invoked by

t l"i e p r iveleged g r o u p t o j u s t i f y a n d m a i n t a i n t h eir d o rn i n a n t

position."4® This relativity of morals and laws argument

rests on the assumption that morals and laws presuppose the

presence of a society in which there is a central authority

to issue and enforce laws and a social consensus to define

common ethical standards.46 As discussed earlier, in the

eyes of the Realists, the international society does not

exist or at best is barely emergent; therefore, it is

logically unsound to expect states to be morally bound like

h la rn a n b e i n g s in a civilized s o c i e t y .

44 Morg en t h au , /Im e r i can Fo r e i gn Po 1 i c y , p . 37 .

45 Carr, o p .cit. , p .80 (2nd edition)

48 In Hobbes' o p i n i o n : . b e f o r e the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there must be coercive Power, to compel! men equally to the Performance of their c oven ants,. . . “ Hob bes , op . c i t . , c h ap X V , p . 202. See a 1 soMorgenthan, American Foreign Policy, p .34,

T h e d :l r 0 c o n s 0 q u e n c e s o f b 01 n g i deal i s t i c: , mo r a I i s t :i. c a n d 1 a w—ab 1 d i n g i n t. h 0 s i t u ation o f i n t er n a t i on a I a n a r c h y , t h 0 0 x t r 0 m i t i 0 b of t h 0 idealistic -- m o r a 1 i s t i ca p p r o a c h t o f o r 0 i g n p o 1 i cy an d t h 0 r 01 a t i v i t y o f i deal is m , morals and laws -- all those hoi p the Realists justify their disrogard of idealism, morals and laws. Thoir coup de

grace, however, lies in the theory of the Supremacy of States. This idea is akin to tho conception of states attributed to Hegel; which stipulates that states are the ultimate source of morality.47. The value of states is unsurpassed: they make it possible for a group of men tolive thoir lives according to their wishes and to maintain their own cultural uniqueness. Sit at es being a moral end in t hemse 1 ves , po 1 i c i es t o p r eser ve st at es> -- r a i son d ' e t a t ,,

policy of national interests and the balance of power principle - are ipso facto morally worthy enterprises.40 Putting it differently, the Realists have created another set of moralities which might be termed "public" or "social" morality; the ultimate evaluative standard is the degree ofsuccess in promoting the good of states. So as to realizethe greatness and glory of Florence or of Italy,

Machiavel1i advised a prince to adopt public morality, a 11 h oug h t his rn i g h t. contradict p r i vat e or Ch r i st i an

moralities. The prince will be able to purify his soul if he insists on being charitable, merciful, sacrificial and

47 Carr, op.cit.. , p.153. This is in fact a misinterpreta­tion of Hegel's thoughts. See T.M. Knox, trans. Hegel's Ph 1 1 o s o ph y ’ o t R 1 gh t (Ox fords OOP , 1949), pp . 156 , 279 ’, 364and 365.48 See for example Morgenthan, Politics Among Nations,p . 10.

religious; but a powerful and radiant, state will be beyond

h i s r each . <:>> For t hi e sa k e of t hi e Fat h er 1 an d , one mus t 1 ear n

to be ruthless, assertive and cruel; these types of

b e h a v i o u r a r e n o t t o b e p e r c e i v e d a s m o r a 1 1 y a b hi o r r e n t f o r

they are inspired and directed by an end as sacred as the

p u r i f i c a t i o n s o f a n i n d i v i d u a 1 s o u 1 : t hi e e x i s t e n c e o f

states.. “‘,0T hi e S u p r e m a c y o f s t a t e s , n o t w i t hi s t a n d i n g , t h e

Realists do not deny the place of morals, laws and idealism

in the conduct of foreign policy. Iheir message is not

"anything is permissible — anywhere, anytime." Even

M a c h i a v e 11 i , t h e m o s t t r e n c hi a n t s p okesman of realism, in h i s

most sinful and scandalous chapter of the Prince (chapter

18) which advises a prince to "act as a beast," still

stressed that he should "not. deviate from what, is good, if

possible, but be able to do evil if constrained."ai Why is

this so, after all? The principal reason is that the

Realists want to ameliorate the terrible situation of

international anarchy; none of them relish instability and

the practice of violence for its own sake.0-2 They

acknowledge that morals and laws — though fragile and

• r el at i ve •- c an c on t r i b ut e t o a d eg r ee of predictability,

and thus give a semblance of order to international

49 Machiavelli, The Prince, chap.XV, pp.56-57 and Berlin, op.cit., 179-183.

50 Machiavelli, The Discourse, chap.XLI, pp.527-528.

51 Mac h l ave H i , Th e Pr i n c e , c h ap .XVIII, p . 65.

52 For Flobbes' posit ion, see Bull, Hobbes and International Anarchy; p.729; for Machiavel1i ' s; The Prince, chap.VIII, pp.31-35.

17

a n a r c h y . 853 1 f states i gnore a 11 mora 1 constraints as the

cynics advocate (i.e. eat or be eaten), they will suffer to

t h e f u 11 t h e c on se quen c es o f uncert a i n t i es t h at c on st^n 1.1 y

t h r e a t e n t h e i r e x i s t e n c e » T h ee R e a 1 i s t s a 1 s o r ec.ogni z e t h a t

expediency - a conspicuous ingredient of raison d'etat,

p o i i c. y o f n a t ion a 1 i n t e r e s t s a n d t h e b a 1 a n c e o f P o w e r

principles - cannot justify all sorts of foreign policy at

all times: when defending their interests other than

n at i ona 1 sur vi va 1 , f or ei gn-po 1 i cy maker s ar e ex pec t ed t u

base their decisions on some ethical standards more

objective than that of success.“ 4 A reputation for moral

integrity is complementary both to a sense' of national

identity and self-respect and to the political status and

i n f 1 u e n c e o f a n a t i o n .. M a c h i a v e H i was well aware o f thispoint when he reminded a prince that it is essential to

"seem merciful, faithful, humane, sincere, religious....,

because as Carr rightly observed: "mankind will in the long

run revolt against naked p o w e r ."06 With regard to idealism,

it will benefit foreign-policy making by tempering cynical

acceptance of the status quo, by resisting defeatist

tendencies, and by initiating an animating idea. Carr

appreciated this role of idealism; for he recognized that

"pure" or "consistent" realism lacks "a finite gockl , an

emotional approach", “the right of moral judgement", and "a

53" For Hobbes' view ,see Murray Forsyth, "1homas Hobbesand the External Relations of State," Br1t1sh Journal ol1nternation a 1 Studies N o .3 (1979), p p .203-204

54 See for examp1e Morgenthau, Po1 it 1 cs Among Nations, pp.203-4.55 Machiavelli, The Princ e , chap.XVIII, p .65.

Carr, op.cit. , p - 235-236.56

18

g r o la n d o f actio n ", a 11 o f w h i c h a r e n e c e s 5 a r y f o r a n y

effective thinking about policy.07 In brief, the Realists

r e a I i z e t. h a t t h e i r v i e w o f f o r e i g n p o 1 i c y w o u id in fact be

unrealistic if it tried to ignore the pnils and constraints

of mor a 1 i st i c--i dea 1 i st i c f orces.N o n e 1: h el ess , t h e R & a 1 i s t s m a k e it abundantly cl e a r

t h a t m o r als, la w s a n d i d e a 1 i s rn m u s t. t a k e a s e c o n d p lace to

national survival. Buch considerations are not applicable

to a situation where the existence of states is at stake.

Nations must not follow morals, laws and idealism without

considering consequences (as mentioned above)5 rationality

and prudence must serve as the basis of political

deci si o n s »H a v i n g d i s c u s s e d t h e R e a 1 i s t s ' p o s i t i o n o n s e 1 f --

preservation and power on the one hand and their opinion on

mor a 1 s , laws and ideal i sm on t h e ot h er , we are n ow ab 1 e t o

surnmar i z e t.he char ac t er i st i cs of thei r f oreiqn p o 1 i c y . 11s

f i r s t f e a t u r e i s o f c o u r s e a p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h p o w e r ,

s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s a n d n a t i o n a I s u r v i v a 1 . i o t h e if e a 1 i s t s ,

f o r e i g n p o 1 i c y i s i n a s e n s e a n i n s t r u m e n t t o m a n a g e t h e

pI-ob 1 ern of power i n i nternat i ona 1 anarchy f or the sake of

the existence of states. Power alone can restrain power

effectively. In Morgenthau's word, "a foreign policy, to be

successful, must be commensurate with power to carry it

o u t . " *** As shown above, t h e Rea lists' three guiding

principles of foreign policy — raison d'etat, policy of

57 Ibid”. , p . 89.

58 Margent h a u , Po Iitics Amon g Nations, p p .10-11.

59 Morgen t hi au , Am e r i c a n Fo r e i gn Po 1 i c y , p .. 1 17.

19

nat i ona 1 i n t er est s and t h0 balanc0 of pow0r ~ all

unashamedly manifest the triumph of power and survival over

rn o r als, 1 a w s a n d i d e a 1 i s m »

A s r e g a r d s t h 0 s e c. o n d f 0 a t u r 0 , t h 0 R 0 a 1 i s t s assertthe freedom of action in their foreign policy. I heir ideal

foreign policy must be continually in a process of weighing,

choosing, balancing and blending, so that policy will always

reflect reality5 it is imperative to adjust national aims to

limitations of national power; to be willing to accept a

second-best choice if necessary; and most impor Laut! •/, to

adapt oneself to changing environments. In other words,

nations must avoid rigid positions and the application Oi

■f i x e d s o 1 la t i o n s t o w i d e 1 y d i f f e r e n t c. o n t e x t s . Carr', f o r

example, emphasized that in the conduct of foreign policy

a 11 n a t i o n s rn u s t r e c o g n i z e t h e n e e d o f t h e 11 p r o c e s s of- g i v e -

an d -t a k e , 11 an a 1 og ous to t h at of bar g a i n i n g i n d onies 11 c

industry.60 In the same vein, Machiavelli advised foreign

p q 1 i c y—m a k e r" s t o b e malleabl e , w h e n h e w r o t e ü

L e t no stat e beiieve that it a1w ay s follows a s afe po 1 i c y , r at h er 1 et i t t h i n k t h at a 1 1 ar e doub t f u 1 .T h i s i s f o u n d i n t h e n a t u r e o f t h i n g s t h a t o n enever tries to avoid one difficulty without r unn 1 ng i nto anoth0r , but prud0rice consists i n being able to know the nature of the difficulties, and taking the least harmful as good.61

I n c o n c 1 u s i o n , the r e a .1 is t view of fore i g n p o 1 i. c y

i s g r o u n d 0 d i n t h e R 0 a 1 i s t s ‘ e s t i rn a t e of what -> i t a t i o 11

st ates actua.13. y -f- i nd them1 s01 ves in. Their desc 1 i pt i on o 1

i n -t e r n a t i o n a 1 r e 1 a t i o n s i s t. h e p i c t u r 0 o f 1 n t e r n a t i o n a 1

anarchy where states are left alone to face the elemental

60 ~ Carr, op.cit. , p . 169 and pp .236-237.61 Machiavelli, The Prince, chap.XXI, pp.84—85 ,

20

■forces of the struggle for power, the security dilemma and war-.. Wi th thii s concepti on of i nternationa 1 anarchy in min(.1 ,the Realists indicate the methods by which foreign policy should be conducted and provide justifications for them.R a i s o t, d ' et a t , policy o f n a t i o n a 1 i n t e rest s and the b a 1 a n c e of power principle are effective policies because they deal with tangible facts and the forces which actually move in t ern ationa1 r e1 ations. Basically, these guidelines ailowwhatever measures that are rationally judged necessary to achieve the objective of self-preservation. Nevertheless, this by no means suggests that the realist view of foreign policy is amoral and pessimistic. The Realists dounderstand both social and spiritual values of morals, laws and idealism; but they insist that states must not act according to morals, laws and idealism regardless of consequences: moral decisions in foreign policy must ofnecessity involve self-preservation. In view of thecorruption of human nature and the imperfect world, a nation has to accept less than the ideal in the conduct of foreign policy. The realist view of foreign policy does not promise an international utopia: the cost of realizing -uch ami 11ienniurn world would be exceedingly high. Vet, therealist view of foreign policy is not without goals and a vision of a better futures it strives not only to protect the survival of states but also to provide a semblance of order in international anarchy. Its character i**

d i s t i n g u l sh ed b y c 1 ar i t y , r at i on a 1 i t y , f I ex i b 1 11 1 y ,

p r u d e n c e a n d a s e n s e o T p r o p o r t i o 1> *

CHAPTER II

THAILAND'S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

We know that our Siamese neighbours are the champions of the world in the business ofpolitical tacking and of changing alliances and that they are absolutely unbeatable in the art of making their ship sail in the direction of thep r e v a i 1 i n g w i n d „ 1 2

Prince Norodom Sihanouk

The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the

course of Thailand's foreign policy after the Second World

War. The account will concentrate on how Thailand has

viewed and responded to external events, especially those

which might threaten its security and some aspects of

foreign poll cy t h at t hr ow 1 i g h t. on Thailand's posi t i on on

power, morality, idealism and international law. This

account will serve as the basis for the critique and

analysis to be made in the following chapter.

Beacon of Asian Independence VS Bastion of Western DefenseBy 1950, the Thai military leaders saw many

c ha 11 enges t hr eat en i ng t he secur i t y of t hiel r country. The

military-dominated government led by Marshal Pibul Songkram

(1948-1957) was certai n that Communi st. Chi na - * strong and

revolutionary - was bent on expanding its influence in

Southeast Asi a. 32 The growing, communist-led insurrections

in Thailand's neighbouring areas of Burma, Malaya and

1 Realite cambodgiennes , July 6,1962, cited in MichaelLeifer, Cambodia: The Search for Security (Londons Pall Mall Pr e s s ,1967 > ,p p .91-92.

2 Dona 1 d E . Nuechit er 1 ei n , Tha i 1 an d ar, d t he St ru gg 1 e f o rS o u t h e a s t /I $ i a ( 11 h a c a s C o r n e 11 U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965) , p . 10 3.

Indochina heightened the government’s sense of insecurity.In particular, F'ibun feared that China would exert its communist influence through a substantial ethnic Chinese community in Thailand - a minority group which F’ibul had

tried to repress.3However, though his anti-communist inclination was

evident, Pibul was careful not to antagonize China and the communist Viet-Minh in Indochina. in 1949, when thePhilippines government approached I hail and to foi m an anti communist alliance along with South Korea and Taiwan, Pibul declined. In his view, it was unwise for Thailand to participate in an anti-communist alliance, at least until the United States - the dominant power in Asia after the defeat of imperial Japan - made its view known.- Pibul didnot have to wait long. In 1950, the United States expressed its concern over the repercussions of the Chinese communist victory on the future of Southeast Alia. To deal with the prospect of the spread of communism in Asia, the United States called a conference of all American ambassadors in the Far East in February in 1950 in Bangkok. Concurrently, the Truman administration deemed it essential that ‘all practical measure be taken to prevent further communist expansion in Southeast Asia."« The Cold War had come to---- — les E _ Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies orSurvival (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, ? ,

p.114.4 Nuechter lein , op . ci t . , pp - 10->— 1 Uu.^ K1Qp / 4 Hated Feb. 27, 1950: text in The PentagonSparst ' 77,2Defer,s*°Bo= ton-^Beacon Press"/ 1971) , Vol . 1 ,pp ,361-362, ci ted in John T . S Girling, Thailand.- Society and Politics (Ithaca:Cornel 1 Uni versi ty Press , 1981) ., p - -

d o iti i n a t e t h e A m e r i c: a n o u t1 g o k :i n A s i a. 0 n I y af t e r t h eU n i t e d S t a t e s g a v e e v e r y i n d i c a t i o n t h a t. it r e s o 1 v e d t o d 0f e n d S o u t h e a s t A s i a a g a i n s t C h i n e s e i rn p e r i a 1 i s rn did P i b u 1 cn a k e a d e c i s i v e c o m rn i t. m 0 n t t o a n a n t i - c o m (n u n i s t a 1 i g n m e n t - T h a i 1 a n d t h 0 n r 0 c o g n i z 0 d t h e B a o Dai g o v 0 r n m 0 n t i n V ietna m , dispatched 4,000 Thai soldiers to serve in the Korean war and concluded military and economic agreements with the U n i t e d S t a t. es.6

Pibul's American-oriented policy produced a Chinese response. China started operating a clandestine radio station beaming broadcast hostile to the Pibul regime. And in 1953, Peking announced the establishment of a Thai autonomous government in Yunnan ; this plan unnerved Pibul as it represented a direct threat to the legitimacy of his government.7' At the same time, Thailand was alarmed when the Viet—Minh forces succeeded in penetrating into Laos and Cambodia during 1953— 54.® The growth of communistmovements in Indochina increasingly became a vital concern to Thailand. It was feared that the communist domination of Indochina would rob Thailand of a buffer zone against a combined threat from North Vietnam and China. From the Thai

6 Morrison, op.cit.,p.!14 and Frank C. Daring, Thailand and The United States (Washington: Public Affairs Press,1965) p .73.7 Peking also implied that the alternative government would be under the leadership of Pridi Phanomyond. (Pridi was the first Thai civilian Prime minister after the end of the Second World war 5 he was forced into exile in Peking when the military staged a coup in 1947). This even made the threat more real to the the Thai military leaders. Nuechterlein, op.cit. ,pp.112-113,and Marri son, op.cit. ,p .114 and p.312.

8 Nuechterlein, op. cit ., p .113.

24

5 1 a n d p d i n t , a c o rn m o n b o r d e r w 11 h c o rn rn u n i s t n e i g h b o u r s w o u 1 d

b e a ma j o r g e o p o 1 i t i c a l d i c a s t e r

As a react :L on to the per cept i on of i ncreased

u n c e r t a i n t y a n d c o rn m u n i s t d a n g e r in t h e r e g i o n , P i b u 1 so u g h t

s u c c e s e f u :i 3. y t o s e c u r e a s t. r o n g e r c o m m i t m e n t from t h e U n i t e d

States.. In the aftermath of the Korean War and the French

def eat i n I ndochii na , Washi ngton bel i eved that i t. was argent

to con tai n communi s rn :i. n Boutineast Asi a thr ough a def ensi ve

a 11 i ance , as 1 1 had done i n West er n Elur ope by se11 i ng up t he

IM o r t h A 1 1 a n t i c T r e a t y 0 r g a n i z a t i o n .. H ence in S e p t e m b e r

1954, the Manila Pact was signed and under its aegis the

South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATÜ) was

established. Signatories to the Manila Pact were Thailand,

the United S t a t e s , Bri t a i n , F r a n c e , the P h i 1ippines and

Pakistan. In the Thai view, SEATO would serve to deter

external aggression against Thailand and prevent the spread

of co rn rn u n ism i n I n d o c h i n a .c>>It was apparent that Thailand's fear of communism

was intense and its security needs were made a priority.

For example, in negotiating with the United States over the

nature of SEATO commitment to Thailand, Pibul's foreign

Minister, Prince Wan Waitayakorn demanded "as strong a pact

as possible" and "a commitment which in substance, is as

near as possible to that of N A T O " 10 - that is a

spontaneous, collective and immediate response to an

aggressor in the event of an attack on Thailand. Prince Wan

9 Ibid., p .114.

10 Secretariat of the Manila C o n f ere n c e , The S i g n i n g ofthe S o u th east C a 11e c t i r e Defense Treaty (Manila, Sep tember8, 1954), p .37, cited in ibid., p .115

/*•;, ura — v -j

a I b o p r e s 5e d f o r t h e 0 01 ab 1 :i 0h m0n t o f a SE AT Ü m i l i t a r y

command i n T h a i l a n d and t h e d 0p ! o y m e n t o f SEATO f o r c e s i n

t h e t r e a t y a r e a . i h a i l and w a s n o t a b l e t o o b t a i n h h i e t y p e

o f c o m m i t m e n t b e c a u s e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a t t h e t i m e w a s n o t

p r e p a r e d t o s t a t i o n i t s t r o o p s i n m a i n l a n d S o u t h e a s t A s i a

and i t w a n t e d t o k e e p i t s o p t i o n o f i n t e r v e n t i o n i n

3 q q t h 0 a s t A (s i a o p e n .. 1 x T hi e U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d o n 1 y o f 4 0 r

j h a i 1 a n d t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s o -f S E A T 0 , n o t a c o m m a n d 1 r 1

B a n g k a k ; a p e r i o d i c m i 1 i t a r y e x e r c i s e i n t h e t r e a t y ar e a 5

and a t r e a t y c l a u s e t h a t o b l i g a t e s member s t a t e s t o a c t “t o

m 0 e t a c o m m o n d a n g 0 r i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h 0 a c h m e m b e 1 s

c o n s t i t u t i o n a 1 p r o c e s s e s . " 3 =* D e s p i 10 t h i s e v 1 d 111

u n w i l l i n g n e s s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o f u l l y c o m m i t i t s e l f t o

T h a i l a n d ' s d e f e n s e , t h e P i b u l g o v e r n m e n t d e c i d e d t h a t an

u n e q u i v o c a l a l i g n m e n t w i t h SEATO w o u l d b e t h e m o s t e f f e c t i v e

i n s t r u m e n t t o p r o v i d e f o r I h a i l a n d ' s s e c u r i t y i n t h e f a c e o f

s e r i D u s e x t e r n a 1 m e n a c e s .

In l i g h t o f t h e u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n I n d o c h i n a and an

a c u t e p e r c e p t i o n o f t h r e a t , t h e P i bun g o v e r n m e n t d i d n o t

b e l i e v e t h a t a n e u t r a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y w o u l d b e a v i a b l e

c h o i c e f o r T h a i 1 a n d . *3 In a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n , T h a i l a n d w a s

n o t p r e p a r e d t o s t a n d t h e t e s t and a p p l i c a t i o n o f I n d i a s

p a n c h a S h i l a ( t h e f i v e p r i n c i p l e s o f p e a c e f u l c o - e x i s t e n c e s

( 1) m u t u a l r e s p e c t f o r e a c h o t h e r ' s t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y

and s o v e r e i g n t y ; ( 2 ) n o n - a g g r e s s i o n ; ( 3 ) n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n

e a c h o t h e r ' s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s ; ( 4 ) e q u a l i t y and m u t u a l

11 M o r r i s o n , o p » e i t « , p . l i b a n d L e i f e r , o p . c i t » , p . 3 8 .

12 N u e c h t e r 1 e i n , o p . c i t . , p . 1 1 6 .

13 I b i d . , p p . 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 .

26

benefits; and (b) peaceful co-existence). Following India's

n e u t r a 1 for e i g n p o 1 i c y m e a n t t h a t I hi ail and s security would

depend on the Communists' assurance of their peaceful

in t e n tion s - Whi1e man y n ew in d ep en d en t st a t e s a f ter World

War'll praised India for its prestigious concept of non-

a 1 i gnrnen t i n t h e CoI d War , Thai I an d regardsd I n d i a as a

nation too weak and too poor to contribute anything to

Thai I and . 1 ̂ By c on t r a s t , t h ough BEATG did not mat c hi t he

f o r m a 1 conte )■' t o f N A T 0 as I h a i 1 a n d had desi r ed ̂ it

r epr esented a comrni t rnent of suf f i c lent substance to create a

Thai-American special friendship. Apart from satisfying

s e c u r i t y n e e d s , t h e c 1 o s e a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

w o u 1 d a 1 s o p r o v i d e e c o n o m i c. a n d m i 1 itary a s s i s t a n c e t o t. hi e

country. For these r e a s o n s , fhailand Weis iiot receptive to

the idea of fashioning itself as a beacon of Asian

independence by staying neutral in the Cold War. Hence when

backed by the United States - the nation endowed with

e c o n o r n i c , m i 1 i t a r y a n d p o 1 i 1 1 c a 1 power beyond o t h e r s - t hi e

pi bu 1 gover nrnen t. chose t o beeorne “ t he basti on of West er 11

d e f e n s e i n B o u t hi e a s t A s i a . " 10Natur a 11 y , the i nter nat i ona 1 or i ent ation of

Thailand under Pi bun did not produce a warm response from

c o rn rn u n i s t a n d n o n -- a 1 i g n e d c o u n t ries. i h e c o rn m uni s t. n ci t i o n s

branded the Pi bun government as a the puppet regime of the

Americans; and the aligned nature of hai foreign policy

made it difficult for Thailand to be welcomed in the non-

aligned movement at peak of its post—col onial nationalism.

TÄ George ModelskT, ed., SEATO: Six Studies (Melbournes 1962), p p . 128-129.

15 Ibid., p.88.

T h e ‘3 e a d v 0 r 0 0 r 0 a c t i o n s m a y h a v 0 w o r r i 0 d t h 0 P i b u n

g o v 0 r n m 0 n t , b u t t h e y ci :i. d n a t c a u s 0 t h 0 T h a i m i 1 i t a r y I 0 a d e r s

to change t h e i r mind about membership in SEATO. These

i e a d e r s h i a d a c 1 0 a r o r d e r o f p r i o r i t :i. e s f o r ri a t i o n a 1

s e c u r i t y and, in t h e i r op in io n , on ly the a l l i a n c e w i th the

U n i t e d S t a i 0 s ~ n o t t h e 1 o f t y p r i n c i p 1 e s o f n e u t r a 1 i s m

could meet these re q u i re m e n ts .16 In f a c t , the Thais seemed

to have committed themselves to the b e l i e f th a t the more

T h a i 1 a n d d e m o n s t r a t e d i t. s a 1 1 e g i a n c e t o t in e W e s t. e r n a 11 i a n c e

and to SEATÜ, the more ready the United S tates would be to

p r o i: e c t T h a i i n t e r e s t s - 1 '

Th a i la n d 's P o l ic y toward the Lao t ian C r i s i s I960—196210

Like the dec is ion to j o i n SEAT'D, T h a i la n d 's p o l i c y

t o w a r d t h e l... a o t i a n c :i. v i 1 w a r d u r i n g 1960— 1962 r e f 1 0 c t e d t. h e

c o u n t r y ' s great fea r of communism Since the end of the

G e n e v a c o n f e r e n c e i n I n d o c h i n a i n 1962, B a n g k o k h a d bee n

apprehensive about the prospect of a communist se izu re of

power in Laos- In T h a i la n d 's v iew, Laos under communist

r u le would become a seed-bed f o r communist subvers ion . I t

was feared th a t a communist Laos could e a s i l y e x p lo i t e thn ic

a f f i n i t i e s b e t w e e n t. In e p e o p 1 e s o f n o r t h e a s t T h a i 1 a n d at n d

L. ci o s -

D u r i n g t h e L a o t i a n c i v :i. 1 w a r p e r i o d o f 1961 —62 ,

the Thai m i l i t a r y regime led by F ie ld Marshal S a r i t Thanarat

( 19 S 8 6 3) w a s e x t r e m e 1 y c o n c: e r n e d t h a t L a o s w a s a b o u t t o

f at .1. 1 i n t o t hi e In a n J s o f t In e c o m m u n 1 a, a. m o v 0 m e n t , t In e P a t h e t

16 ” i b i d - p - 128 - ’

17 Neue Inter 1 ei n , op - c i t - , p - 119 -

18 For t h i s su b je c t , se e d e t a i l s in i b i d . , chap-5, 6 and 7-

28

L a D . S a r i t g a v e s t r o n g s u p p o r t t o t. h e r i g h t w i n g , p r o - T h a i ,

government under the leadership of General Phoumi Nosavan -

the on 1 y group which Sar i t. be1 i eved to be capab 1 e o f

protec t i ng Thai 1 and's nat i ona 1 i nterests f r om the communist

threat- The Laotian neutralist leader Prince Souvannaphouma

w o n n o s y m pat h y f r o rn Thai 1 a n d - T h o u g h Souvannapho u rn a was

committed to a non-aligned foreign policy while he was in

power and showed no intention to move Laos into the

communist camp, Sarit strongly disapproved of his dealings

with the Pathet Lao and his visits to Hanoi and Peking.

These overtures of friendship to communist powers were seen

as a threat to Thailand's security; and as Muechterlein

noted, "to the pragmatic Thai mind, friendship with both

c ommunist an d anti-communist neighhour s was basically

dishonest. 1,19 Sarit indicated his displeasure with

Souvannaphouma's policy by imposing an economic blockage of

V i e n t i a n e w h e n t h e n e u t r a 1 i s t s c o n t rolled t. he c i t y in 1960;

this led Souvannaphouma to seek material assistance from the

USSR.

F r o m t h e a n s e t o f t h e L a o t i a n crisis, Sarit m a d e

B e v e r a 1 i rn p a s sione d b u t u n p r o d u c t i ve plea s f o r S E A T 0 ' s

s 1 1'“ o n g a n d c o n c e r t e d a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e c o m rn u nist Pat he t

Lao. The British and the French were against SEATÜ

intervention in Lao, arguing that the establishment of a

coalition government between the rightists, the communists

and the neutralists would be a more feasible solution.

Bar i t was ex t r erne 1 y ex asp er at ed at t h e Eir i t i sh and the

French stands their opposition to intervention in effect

19 Ibid., p . 139.

< y

b 1 o c k e d B E A T 0 a c t i o n , a n d :i. n h i s v :i. 0 w , t h e i r b u g g e s t i o n o t

c d a 1 i t.1 o n g o v 0 r n rn 0 n t i n c I la ü :i. n g t h 0 P a t i"101 L.. a o w 0 u 1 d s la r e 1 ym o v 0 I.... a o b a 1 o n g t h 0 r 0 a d 0 f c o m rn u n :i. z a t i 0 n -

S t i 11 , S a r :i. t 0 x p e c t e d th a t t h 0 U n i t e d S t a 10 s ,g i v 0 n :i. t s d 010 r m i n a t. i 0 r 1 10 r 0 b 1 b t c 0 m rn la n i b rn , m i g h t. c h o 0 b 0 10

intervene in Laos. To pressure the US into such action,

S a I'- i t t h r 0 a 10 n 0 d 10 i n 10 r v 0 n 0 la n :i. 1 a 10 r a 11 y 10 s a v 0 t h 0

c r la rn ta I :i. n q rn i 1 :l l: a r y p 0 s i t i o n 0 f t h0 r 1 g h t i s t b . S a r i t la r g 0 d

the Thai public to act with resolution and make a sacrifice

+ a r t h 0 d 0 f 0 n s 0 o f T h a :i. n a t. i 0 n a I :i. n 10 r 0 s t b i 1 "1 L. a 0 bTo regard ourselves as having little power, so that, i f there is no one to help us, wewolaI d . . . 1 save the nat i on i n danger , i b i mpossi b 1 0 , because if we do not fight against the danger that corn es to our country, we shall have to die in the end. Let lab die -fightings let las die like aman. .......

As it turned out, the Th«a. public had no chance to

prove their “heroism". In March, 1961, the Kennedy

a d rn i n i s t r a t i o n a n n o la n c 0 d 11 "1 a t t h 0 U n i 10 d S t a 10 s w 0 u. 1 d n 01 s 0 n d i t b t r o o p s i n t. 0 L a o s b u t w 0 la 1 d s 0 0 k a n A3 g 01 i a t e d solution to the Laotian problem with the USSR, who had been

s la p p o r t i. n g t h 0 n 0 u t r a 1 i s t s a n d t h 0 P a t h 01 L a o . F e a r o f

r i s k y c 0 n f r o n t a t i 0 r i w i. t h t h 0 U S S R a n d p r 0 0 c c u p a t i 0 n w i t h

issues of more immediate concern -- the Berlin and Cuban

crises -- accounted for the United States' decision not to

i n t. 0 r v e n e i n L a o s .

I n t l "i e a t:i s 0 n c 0 0 f A m 0 r i c a n 0 n c 0 u r a g e rn 0 n t. , S a r i t ,

d 0 s p i 10 h i s r h 01 o r i c a r 1 d s a b r 0 r a 11:1 i n g , c h cj b 0 n 01 t o c a r r y

out his threat. Eventually, at. the Geneva Conference on

Laos in June 1961, Thailand reluctantly agreed to accept the

20 Bar i t ' s sp eec I \ , quot ed i n i b j. d P' . 11 : > .

30

L a g 1 1 a n 1r i p a t i t e c g a I :L t i o n with the com m unis t

r epr esent at i on .. The F- orei gn Minister, I hanat hhoman ,

explained that Thailand had no choice but to defer to the

w i s h e s g f p g w e r f u 1 n a t i o n s - the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t hi e U S S E E

- to support the coaltion governments "we were . .. compelled

to acquiesce ».« because we are a small country. We can

hardly withstand the pressure from the great powers."21

The United S t a t e s ' decision not to take strong

a ctio n a g a i n s t t h e c o m m u n i s t s i n l .. a os dealt a g r e a t

p s y c h o logical bio w t o T h a i 1 a n d . A s t hi e U nite d States s hi owe d

i t s e 1 f u n w i 11 i n g t o h a 11 t h e c o m m u n ist a d v a n c e i n L a o s ,

there were serious doubts about the degree of backing

Thailand could expect from the United States in the event of

a communist attack. The 1 hi a i leaders began to feel that the

11 spec i a 1 " rei at i on sh ip w i t h t h e Un i t ed St at es was

unr ewar d i nq $ thi i s d i si 11 usi onmen t 1 ed t.o d i scussi ons on a

r e a p p r i sal o f T hi a i f o r e i g n p o 1 i c y in the direction of n o n -

alignment. H o w e v e r , the United States, aware of I hail and s

s t r a t e g i c v a 1 u es t o i t s c o n t a i n m e n t p o 1 i c y i n A s i a , was quick

to reassure the Thai leaders of its commitment to Thai

defense. In i962 the United States and Fhailand signed une

Thanat—Rusk communique, which in essence affirmed that the

United States would defend Thailand individually, without

necessarily awaiting the agreement of other SEATG allies, as

lts SEATO ob1igations were individual as well as collective.

The United States' straight-forward recognition of its

individual obligations effectively resolved Thailand's

21 foreign ~7\7f a i r s B u 11 e tin (Thailand - hereafter calledFAB) V o 1.Ill, N o . 1, (August - September 1963), p.13, cited i n Mor r i s o n , o p . ,c i t „ p .22.

31

c: r i s i s o f c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e c r e d i b i 1 i t y o f 5 E A TO; i t m e a n t

that. Thai land would no longer have to worry about the use of

the unanim ity r u le by o ther SEATG members to block American

in te r v e n t io n in case of communist aggression against

Tha i land. Obviously pleased w i th the American demonstrat ion

of p o l i t i c a l w i l l t o p ro te c t Tha i land , S a r i t commented:" . . .

i t i s not so easy to f i n d such a s ince re f r i e n d who i s

concerned about our own being as the United S ta tes . "

Having rece ived t h i s s u b s ta n t ia l reassurance from i t s

powerfu1 p a t r o n , T ha i1 and regained conf idence to act as a

f r ee- wor1d b a s t io n in t he Cold War.

The Temple of Pra Vi hear Case

1n the e a r1y 1960's , I h a i1 and ' s t r o u b 1 es w i th

ne ighbour ing c o u n t r ie s were not con f ined to Laos. Mutual

d i s t r u s t between Thai land and Cambodia under Pr ince Norodom

Sihanouk was deep, based on a long h i s t o r y of an im os i ty and

c o n t ra s t in g responses to the Cold War. 2,5 Sihanouk had been

i n t e n s e 1 y s u s p i c i o u s o f T h a i 1 a n d ' s d e s i re t o a s s e r t hi e g e m o n y

0 ver Camb od i a , as e v i d e n c e d b y Th a i 1 an d ' s an n ex at i on of t h e

C a rn h o d i a n n o r t h w e s t e r n p r o v i n c es in 1941. S i h a n ouk a ls o

ac cused Th a:i 3. an d of c o 11 ud i ng w i t h t h e Un i t ed St at es i n

1 n t e r f e r i n g i n C a fi i b o d i a n i n t e r n a 1 a f f a i r s i n o r cl e r t o

d e s t r o y C a rn b o d i a ' s n e u t r a 1 i t y . F r o rn t h e I h a i s i d e ,

S i h a n o u k ' s p r a c t i c e o f a n o n - a 1 i g n e d f o r e i g n p o 1 i c y ,

p a r t i c u 1 a r 1 y h i s o v e r t u r e s t o P e k i n g , c: o u 1 d o n 1 y s e r v e

c o rn rn u n i s t i n t e r e s t s i n I n d o c hi i n a a n d t hi u s e n danger e c3

T hi a i 1 a n d ' s s e c u r i t y .

_ ~ - - (“ “ b r u _ y jvj a r c p 1962), p p . 7 - 9 , c i ted i n

N u e c hi t e r l e i n , o p . c i t . , p .. 232.

23 See de ta i 1 s :i. n Lei f er , op .c i t , pp . 94-93.

T O

ReI at i ons be t ween t hie t wo c oun t r i es r eached

.breaking point as a consequence of a dispute over the ruins

o f t h e T e rn p 1 e o f P r e a h V i h ear- T h is t e rn pie was on a

c o n t e s t e d 7' h a i — C a rn b o d i a n b o r d er in the' Dong r e k m o u n t aims.

I n the Thai vi e w , the Temple site was on the Thai side of

t h e common border as determined by Thai-French border

treaties in 1904 and 1907- However, since Cambodian

i n vd e p e n d e n c e f r o m F r a n c e , S i h a n o u k h a d contended t hat the

Tempie belonged to Cambodia and protested the presence of

Thai troops in the area. After futile negotiations with

Thai 1 and , Si hanouk brought the ma11er to the Internationa'l

Court of Justice in 1959. Sihanouk's initiative and the

subsequent charges and countercharges between the two

countries led to a break in diplomatic relations in October

1961.In June 1962, the Court ruled that Cambodia, not

Thailand, had sovereignty over the Temple of Preah Vi h e a r .

Thai nationa1ism was aroused in an unprecedented way because

of the great sentimental value the Thai public had attached

to the Temple, and so the Court, decision caused a widespread

uproar. Anti—Cambodian fee1ings ran so high that some Thai1ead er s ad voc ated t he disregar d of t he C o u r t 's r uling and a

resort to military protection of the Temple. However, Sarit

was awar e that Thail a n d 's f a i 1ure to respect internationa1

I a w c a u 1 d h a v e g r a v e c o n s & q u ence s f o r its in t er national

standi ng .. He therefore dec i ded to accept the Court 's order

and referred to the advice of the Monarchy to urge restraint

o I "! t h e T h a i p u b 1 1 c

24 See details in Nuechter 1e in , op.c it - , p .249—252-

Thailand's Role in the Vietnam War: The Domino TheoryXn the ea r 1y 1960's , whlie 1hai1 and was fighting a

1 eqal bat11 e wi thi Cambodi a , the armed conf 1 i ct bet.ween the

S cd u t h V i e t n a rn g o v e r n m e n t a n cJ com m u n i s t insu r gene y

int en sified and t h e Unit ed Stat e s ' involvement in Vietnam

become more extensive. When the United States started

bombing Worth Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in

'August 1964, Thanat K h o m a n , Thailand's Foreign Minister,

c cd m rn e n t e d t h a t h i s c o u n t. r y was "heartened" by the strong

r e t a 1iatory American action against North Vietnam; he went

on to describe the state of Bang k ok--Wash i ngton ties as

"better than any time in history. "2Ki From this time on,

Thai 1 and act i vel y i n vol ved i tsel f i n the massi ve Amer i cart

i n t e r v e n t i o n i n 1 n d o china. i h e I hi a n o m —P r a p a t m i 1 i car y

regime allowed the United States to develop and use a "war

infrastructure" in Thailand — "airfields, logistical camps,

communication system and intelligence o p e r a t i o n . I n

addition, Thailand sent a division - financed by the United

States -• to fight in Vietnam and permitted the United States

to recruit "Thai volunteers" for its mi 1itary-backed

c 1 a n d e s t i n e o p erati o n s a g a i n s t t h e com mi unis t s i n L a o s .

The American intervention in Indochina was

i nsp i r ed by i ts deter rni nat i on to keep communism i n check i n

an on g cd i n g wor 1 d w i d e con t e s t . I n t he Thai v i ew , the

Amer i can i nter vent i cdn served Thai 1 and ' s security interests

because the communist takeover of Souvh Vietnam would lead

1 nevi t ab 1 y to the comrnun i s t domi nat i cdn of the rest of

2 5 F A B Vol . IV , N o . 1 (A u g u s t - S e p t e rn hi e r 1964), p p . 729-730.

26 Girling, o p . c i t . , pp.237-238.

34

So latheast Asi a » Thai 1 and ' s sec lar i ty d 0pended on the success

of the United States' efforts to prevent the spread of

c o rn m la n i. s m i n I n d o c h i n a a n d , t h la s , t. h e Americans d e served

Thai 1 and ' s s lapp o r t . I n other words, Thai 1 and subscribed to

the American domino theory which was expounded by' the

Nationa1 Security Council (N S C ) in these t e r m s 2

The loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to communist aggression ... would have critical psychological, political and economicconsequences- In the absence of effective and timely counteraction, the loss of any single country would probably lead to swift submission to or an alignment with communism by remaining conntr i es of thi s group . 27r

Although reluctant to suggest that Thailand might

become a domino, Thanat shared the United States' view of

the prospect of advancing communism- He even stated that if

Thailand and the United States "give in to them (the

Communists) in South Vietnam, we shall have to give in to

them in Laos, in Cambodia and perhaps in the whole of

Boutheast Asi a . " a 13Thailand's support for the United States

i ntervent i on i n Indochi na drew a strong reacti on form Noi'111

V i e t n a rn a n d C h i n a . 1 n t h e middle of 196 0 ' s , Han o i a n d

Pe k i n g d ec 1 ar ed t h e i r in c r eased sup p or t. f or dornest i c

insurgency in Thai1 a n d - The Thai leaders themselves were

also aware that Thailand's permission for the United States

to use the air bases for bombing raids in Indochina could

provoke an enemy air action. These threats and the risk of

27 NSC T 2 4 / 2 7 ~"Statement of Policy", June 25, 1952: textin Pentagon Paper s, vol .. 1 , pp.384-39u, cited in ibid. ,p.234.20 Address of January 27,1967, in Collected Statements of Foreign Minister Thanat Khorn an 1966-1967 (Bangkok: Ministryof; Foreign Affaire) , p - 10.

3 b

r e t a 1 i a t i o n a 1 a r m e d t h e T h a i 1 e a d e r s ; b u t i n s t e a d o f a11e ring their po1icy t□wa r d the Americ an interv en tion in V i. 0 1 n a m , t h e y a 11 e m p t e d t o m i n i rn i z e t h e d a n g e r b y c on sD 1 i d a 1 i n g rn i 1 i t ar y c o op er a t i o n w i t h t h e Ün i t e d St at es and pressed Washington to take a stronger action against N o r t h V i e t n a rn . c>> T h e Th a i Fore i g n Minist e r , T hana t, proved to be one of the most ardent advocates of continued American esca1 ation in Vietnam- He drew a parallel between the communists in Asia with the Nazi Germans in the late 1930's, arguing that "the only cause that is worthwhile and valid is to stand up, resist and repel the aggressors"30 because the lessons from Munich make it plain that "appeasement is still the surest way of losing peace."31

The United States emphasis on its vital interests in t. h e out c ome of the c on f 1 i c t i n V i et n am , und er pinned by the massive scale of its involvement, encouraged the Thai military leaders to involve Thailand more deeply in theVietnam War. So sure was Thailand of the American

d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o w i n t h e Vi et n am war t hat it scarcelyconsidered the possibi1ity that the United States might 1ose its political will to continue fighting„ Therefore, when the United States announced the plan to negotiate an end to the Indochina War in 1968, Thailand was caught off guard.

At the very first significant sign of a weakening

i n American r e s o l v e , t h e realistic Th an at recognized the

29 Mor r i son , op . c :l t 1 PP- 120-121.

30 Ibid., p . 11.31 C o 1 l e c t e d P a p e r s a n d S t a t e m e n t s o f F o r e i g n M i n i s t e rThan at Khoman 1964-1965 (Bangkok: Ministry of ForeignAffairs), p .42.

36

n 0 0 d t o m o d i f y t h 0 d 0 f .i. a n t a n t i - c o m m u n i. s m o f T h a i 3. a n d ' s f o r e i g n p o I i c y - H 0 n c e , T h a n a t , w h o h a d c o n s :i 010 n t1 y la r g 0 d

t h 0 T h a i n a t i a n t o f i g h t a g a i n s t t h 0 c 0 m m u n i s t t h r 0 a t

11 man I y " , and i f ne0d be "si ng 1 y " ,352 n0w as00r 10d that

Thai 1 and wa0 n0t 1 ‘ant i -comrnuni 01 " and hi0 0v0n 00ught to op0n a d i a 1 0 g la 0 w 11 h P 0 k i n g ; T h a n a t n 0 w 0 m p h a 0 i z 0 cl t h a t t h 0

presence of American troops in Thailand was "temporary“ and

t h a t t h 0 11 m a i n p r i n c i p 1 0 0 f t hi e f 0 r 0 i g n policy 0 f T hi ail and " w a s ‘1 a p 01 i c y 0 f i n d 0 pen d 0 rice. 113 3 H owe v e r , T h a n a t cl i d n 01 pi 1 an 10 c: hi an ge t hie c our 00 0f Thi ai 1 and '5 f 0r e i g n p 01 i c y t ood r a s t i c a 11 y.. PI 0 w a 0 w 011 a w a r e t hi a t t hi 0 U n i 10 d S t a t e 0 w 0 u 1 cl con t i nlae 10 b0 Thai 1 and ' s mai n 00lar c0 of ec0nomi c and

m i 1 i t ar y a00 i st an c 0 , ev0n t h 0lag hi Th a i 1 an d cou 1 d n 0 1 0n g err 01 y o n t hi 0 U n i t e d S t a 10 0 for p r o 10 c t o n . Ideally, T hi a n a t

want e d 10 000 k 0 0me 0ort of recon ci1iation with Asian

communists while retaining American military assistance and

promoting closer ties with Southeast Asian nations.34Thanat. ' 0 attempt to increase Thailand's diplomatic

f1 exibiIity met opposition from the Thai military leaders.

They agreed that Thailand had to reduce tension with China;

but they argued for a limited response. The military

leaders feared that Thanat's policy would undermine the

alliance with the United States, which in their eyes

remained vital to Thailand's security. The Thai military

were also concerned that Thanat's hasty overtures to Peking

3 2 C o 11 e c t e d S t a t e m e n t s 19 6 6 - 6 7 r p . 17.33 Collected Interviews of Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman Vo1.111 (1969) (Bang k 0 k); Minist r y 0f F 0r eign Aftairs) ,p. 40»34 Mor r i son , op cit. , p . 125.

coal d i n c i t e p r o -- C h i n e 5 e f e e 1 i n g s a m o n g t h e Chinese

mi nor i t y . As a r esu 11 of d i sag r eemen t s over Thalian d ' s ■future relations with China, Than at lost his job, when the cabinet was reshuff1ed in November, 1971, and the process of r e a d j u s t m e n t i n T h a i 1 a n d ' s f o r e i g n p a 1 :i. c y was delayed u n t i 1 t h e T h a n o m - P r a p a t r e g i m e w a s o v e r t h r o w n i n 0 c t o b e r 19 7 3. Regional Cooperation

Thanat saw r eg i ona 1 cooper at i on as of pr ac t i ca 1 va 1 ue i n the deve 1 opment o f c 1 oser t i es among non-communist Southeast Asian nations, A common stance with theseneighbouring countries, which Thanat termed "collective p o11 1ic a1 d e fen se11 , cou1d enab1e T h ai1 an d to avoid t h e danger of being isolated from other Asian countries because of its involvement in Vietnam; and also the danger of being u n d e r v a 1 u e d b y i. t s f r lends, 3 n

Hence, despite his preoccupation with the turmoil in In d ochina and t he alliance wit h the United States, Ih an at p 1 ay ed a p r om i n on t role in pr omot i n g r eg i on a 1 c oop er at. i on . In 1961, Thanat endorsed the proposal of Malaysia and the Philippines to establish the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA); this organization, however, suffered a serioussetback as a consequence of the Malaysian-Phi1ippinesdispute over Sabah during 1963— 1966. fhanat found himself a peace-maker between the two countries and he also mediated between Malaysia and Indonesia during the Konfrontasi in the same period. His services were wel1-appreciated and, it was

35 Ibid., p . 133 and Far Eastern Economic Review: ASIAYearbook 1966, p.337.

38

tD his credit t h a t , Ma1 aysia and Indonesi a came to tr ust

T hi a i 1 a n d ' s n e u t r a 1 i t y a n d i m p a r t i a I i t y . 3 ̂

After the lessening of tension in the region,

T h a n a t w a s i n s t r u rn e n t a 1 i n t r a n s f o r m i n g ASA into t h e

A s s o c i a t i o n o f S o u t hi E a s t A s i a n N a t ions (A S E A N ) i n A u g u s t

1967; at the outset thii s organ i zati on comprised Indo n e s i a ,

M a 1 a y s i. a , S i n g a p ore, T h a i 1 a n d a n d t hi e P h i 1 i p p i n es. (w i t h

Brunei joining in 1984.) In the ASEAN or Bangkok Declaration

0 f A u g u s t 8 , 1 967 , t h e f i v e o r i g i n a 1 m e m b e r s stat e d t hi e a i m s

a n d p la r pose s o f t h e (3 r g a n i z a t i o n a s foil o w s s

To accelerate the economic growth, social progress a n d c u 11 li r a J. d e v e 1 o p m e n t i n t. h e region t h roug h joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnershi p i n order to strengthien the f oundation f or a prosperous and peac:ef u 1 cornmuni ty of South East Asian nations ... and ... to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the r u 1e of 1 aw ln the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the p r i n c i p 1 e s o f t hi e U n i t e d N a t i o n s C h a r t e r . 3 v

The ASEAN countries also specified fields of their active

coll ab or at i on s s g reat er ut i 1 :i. z at i on of agr icul t ur e and

1 ndus1 1-y expansi on of trade, i rnprovement of transportati on

a n d c o m rn u n i c a t i o n f a c i 1 i t i e s , a n d o f 1 i v i n g s t a n d a r d s . 3 0 T hi a n a t a 1 s o e x p e c t e d t h a t A S E A N w o la I d i m p r o v e t he bargaini n g

pos 1 1 i on of rnernber states wi th the great powers.39

However, despite his keen interest in regional

c oop er a t i o n , Thanat r e a 1iz ed t h at ThaiI an d c ou1d not conn t

on ASEAN as a reliable source of protection. He was quite

c og n i z an t t hi at t h e f or c es of d i s i n t eg r at i on still ex i st ed

36 Far Eastern Economic Review : AS 1A Year book 1965 f p .287.37 F A B V o l . V I I , N o . 1 (August - September 1967), pp.74-75.

38 Ibid.39 Nor rison, op.c i t . , p .269.

39

a m d n g t h e A S E A N c o u n tries - 1 a t e n t terri t o r 1 a .1 Disput e s ,

mutual suspicion, and considerable cultural and racial

differences. Even if ASEAN solidarity were a reality, these

nations were militarily too weak to come to Thailand's aid

in time of danger. Thanat saw that peace and stability in

Southeast Asia still depended to a large extent on the

attitudes of the great powers and Thailand had no choice but

to accep t this rea1ity.*°After Thanat's dismissal, Thai 1 and became 1 ess

enthusiastic a b o u t A S Er. A N . A1 though in 1971 Thai land had

signed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, whi ch aimed at the

realiz ation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

(ZOPFAN), the Thai military leaders never made any secret

that they were not ready to accept the neutralization of

Southeast Asia. They feared that the ZOPFAN plan might

hasten Western withdrawal from the region while China would

continue to support insurgencies in Thailand.'41

Policies of Accommodation and EquidistanceThe American debac1e in Indochina in 1975 heraided

an era when Thai1 and had to re1y on its own resources for its security. The decline of American influence in mainland

Southeast Asia and the communist conquest of Indochina had

been critical moments in Thailand's foreign policy: Thailand

had lost both superpower protection and the protecting

shield of buffer states to insulate it from communist

pressure. The Thai civilian government led by M.R. Kukri t

40”. jT lT s . Girling, "Thailand's New Course" Pacific Air air*XLI I, No.3 <Fal1 1969) , 349— 350.

41 Morrison, op.cit„,_ p.274 and Far Eastern Economic R e i e w A 61 A Y e a r h o o k 1 9 / ? p . •->- • 1 »

40

p r a rn o j v i 0 w e d T h a i 1 a n d ' s p o s i t i o n i n t h i 0 e n 11 r e .1 y n e w B i t u a t i 0 n w i t h 0 x t r e rn e c o n c. 0 r n . T h i 0 r e a c 11 o n w a s r e 11 e c 10 d in the government's speedy adjustment to the new realities.

After the fall of Saigon in 1975, it became apparent to the Kukrit government that Thailand must now make realistic adjustments in policies both in relation to the Indochinese communist countries and to the great power». The prospect -for ensuring Thai security lay in seeking an accommodation with North Vietnam. Hanoi had insisted that the chief obstacle to the establishment of diplomatic relations between North Vietnam and Thailand was thepresence of American forces in Thailand. To make a positive g esture to North Vietnam, Kukrit set 2U Ju1y 19 76 as thedate for the withdrawal of American troops from Thailand. At the beginning, Hanoi responded quite favourably to Kukrit's move. In May 1975 the North Vietnamese DeputyPrime Minister Phan Hien visited Bangkok and showed willingness to normalize relations with Thailand. Thisinterest was derived in part from the worsening relations between Vietnam and China and also the Vietnamese priority of reconstruction.42 However, Thai-Vietnamese relations did not progress very far as Vietnam doubted the 1 eal ity of the Amer i can wi thdr awa 1 f rom ! hai 1 and , and Thailand s f e -1 r s of Vietnamese expansionism and Hanoi's influence in supporting communist insurgency still lingered on particularly among the military. Kukrit also moved to develop relations with

42 and X 11

Leszek BÜszyunski, “SEATOs Why It Survived until 1977 w h y 11 w a s A boll s h e d *1 J o urn al o ~f S o at he as t A s i an b t u d le* No. 2, (September 1981) , z.9u.

th0 c:: ommun i st K.hmer Rouge r eg i me i n Cambod i a an d a11 empt ed t o m e n d r e 1 a t i o n s w i t h c. o m rn u n i s t - r la led Laos.

C o n c u r r 0 n t1 y , K u k r i t s o la g h t 10 rn a i n t a :i. n a b a 1 a n c. 00 f a s so L7. i a t i 0n w i t h t h 0 g r 0 a t p 0 wers, a s t r a t e g y w h i c h

F 0 r 0 i g n M i n i b 10 r C h a r t c: h a i C h la. n hi a w a n c a 1 1 0 d t h 0 "equidista n t p 011 c y 11 0n 19 Mar c: h 1978 , Kukr i t 0n lan c i a10d his f 0r 0 i gnp 01 i c:: y i n r 01 a t i 0 n 10 C h i n a , t h 0 g r 0 a t p 0 w e r w i t h the m 0 s t

1 rn m 0 Li i a 10 i rn p a c t 0 n T h a i 1 a n d , a b f 01 J. 0 w b :» . . i n 0 r d 0 r 10 c r 0 a t e a b a 1 a n c 0 i n t h 0 r 01 a t i 0 n s Ls)i l;hi thi0 b i g powers, th i. b gavernm0nt wi 1 1 tak0b 10 p b -f o i'- t h 0 r e 0 0 g n i t i 0 n a n d 0 b t a b 1 i s hi m 0 n t o f n 0 r rn a 1 d i p l 0 m a t i c r 01 a t i 0 n b hi i p w i t h t h 0 F‘ e 0 pie's Republic of China ...

Kukrit's overtures to China met a positive response from the

Chinese leaders who were already concerned with the growth

0 f R la s s i a n i n f 1 u 0 n c 0 in Vi ee t n a m . T h us, a watershed in

Thailand's foreign policy was reached when the Kukrit

government established diplomatic relations with China in

1976, ending nearly three decades of enmity between the two

nations. However, in normalizing relations with China,

Thailand had to make a significant concession to the Chinese

leaders. Peking refused to renounce its support for the

Communist party of Thailand, insisting that Thailand had to

accept the distinctions between party-to-party and

government-to—government relations. Thailand gave way to

China on this issue for the sake of a larger national

interest - friendship with China could induce it to act as

ä countervai1ing power against a resurgent Vietnam.

43 FAB Vol.XV, No.1 (January - March 1975), p.23.44 Sarasin Viaphol, Direction in Thailand Foreign Policy(S i n g a p 0 res 1 n s t i t u 10 o f S 0 u t h 0 a s t A s i a s n S t la d i e s ,0 c c a s i o n a 1 P a p 0 r r 10 „ 40 , 1976), p .. 2 3 .

42

A s -f a r a s r e 1 a t i o n s w i t h t h e Ü n i t e d States were

concer ned , t hough Kukr i t a11.empt ed t o 1 essen Th ai 1 and ' s

a 11 a c h rn e n t t o t h e A m e r leans s o a s t o f a c i 11 täte t h e

d e v e 1 o p m e n t o f b r a a d e r rela t i o n s w i t. h the co m munist

c o u n t r i e s , he 1n no way wanted to initiate a total break in

r e 1 at i on s w i t h t h e IJn i t ed St at e s . As Ku k r i t st at ed :

W i t h t hi e U n i t e d S t a t e s w e hi a v e s h a r e d m a n y objectives and embarked upon many ventures t a g e t h e r i n t h e p a s t . T h e s e c u r i t y post u r e o f T h a 1 1 a n d d u r i n g the past 25 y e a r s - a n d e v e n into the present - has been clearly tied to the United St a t e s A n d c oop er at i on i n t.he p ast wi 11 continue into the -future, of this 1 have no doubt. But our common interests need no 1onger be dominated by o n e t y p e o f a c t i v i t i e s a 1 o n e . ̂

T h. u s , t h o u g h T h a i 1 a n d a 1 o n g w i t h t h e P hill p p i. n e s a greed t o

phase out SEAT'D - the symbol of anti-communism in Southeast

Asia -- "to make it accord with the new realities in the

r e q i o n '' 'A , K u k r i t s t ill p r e s e r v e d t h e I j a n i 1 a Pact with t h e

U n i t e d 31 a t e s .There was also a move to improve relations with

the USSR who in K u k r i t 's view had "a great potential" to

"pi ay a significant r o 1e that w o u 1d be consonant with the

interests of the regional powers"47 -- meaning in practice

that Thailand would like to see Moscow restrain the

c o »1 m u n i s t V i e t n a m e s e . K u k r i t 's o v e r t u r es to w a r d the US S R

were also intended to balance the new relationship with

C h i n a .Kukrit's s u c c essor, Seni P r a m o j , continued

Thailand's policies of accommodation and equidistance. The

45 FAB Vol.XV, No.3 (July - September 1975), p.43.

46 Ibid., p.73.

47 L o c ,c i t .

43

S 0 n x g ex v e r n rn e n t c o i n p I 0 1 e d l: h e p r o c 0 s 0 o f t h 0 w i t h d r a w a 1 o f

A m 0 1'" 1 c a n l: r o o p s f r o m T h a 3. I a n d . F 0 r 0 :i. g n M i n i s 1 0 r B h :i. c h a i

R a t 1 a k u 1 0 n c o u r a g 0 d T hi a :i. J. a n d ' s p o 3. i c y o f c: o n c i ]. i a t i o n a s t h 0

m o st e f f e c t i v e way o f c o p i n g w i t h t h e communi s t r e g i m e s o f

1 11 d o c h j. n a a n d 1 10 a n n o u r 1 c 0 d t h 2 t. 1 h a i 3. a n d w o u I d 11 d o

0 v 0 r y t h x n g p o s s i b 1 0 11 m t o i rn p r a v 0 r 0 1 a t i a n s w i t hi t hi e s 0

c o u n t r :i. 0 s « I n A u g u s i: 1 9 7 6 , B h i c h a x a c h i 0 v 0 d a n a t a b 1 os

c:i i p 3. o rn a t i c s u c: c 0 s s b y e s t a b 1 i s hi i n g T h a i -• V i 0 t n a rn 0 s 0

d i p 1 ornat i c: r 0 1 a t i o n s

D n I'- i 1 "1 g b o t h t hi 0 K u. k r :i. t a n d 8 0 n j. g o v os r n rn 0 n t s ,

T h a i I a n d a s w os 3. J. a s o t hi 0 r A 8 E A N c o u n t r x os s a p p a r 0 n t 1 y

b t x m u I a 1 0 d b y t hi 0 c o rn rn u n i s t s u c: c 0 s s x n I n d o c h i n a , b 0 c a rn e

rn u c h rn o r os :i. n 1 0 r 0 s 1 0 d i n p r o m o t :i. n g r 0 g j. o n a 3. c o o p 0 r a t :i. o n

p a r t x c 1.11 a r 1 y t h 0 c o a r d i n a t i o n o f p o 1 i c i 0 s t o w a r d I n d o c hi x n a .

U n c e r t a i n a b o u t t h e i m p a c t o f t h e d e c l i n e i n A m e r ic a n

1 n f 1 u 0 n c 0 o r 1 t h e r es g i o n t h e A S E A N c o u n t r i e s n o w r 0 c o g n i 2 0 d

t h e n 0 c: 0 s s i t y t o s t. r e n q t h os n t h 0 i r u n x t y a n d e x p a n d t h 0 i r

<::: o ex p os r a t x o n „ 1 n F os b r u a r y 1 9 7 6 t hi es f i r s t A S E A N s u m rn i t

c o n f e r e n c e w as h e l d i n B a l i ; an d t h e T r e a t y o f A m i t y and

C o o n e r a t x on w as s i g n e d - A c c o r d i m : t o A r t i c l e 2 o f t h i s

t r e a t y , thus f i v e m em b ers s t a t e s a g r e e d t h a t i n o r d e r t o

p r o m o t os p os a c os f u 1 c o - e x x s t os n c 0 i n S o u t h cs a s t A s i a e v 0 r y

r" e g 3. o n a 1 n a t j. o n s h* o u 3. d c: o n d u c t i. t s p o 1 i c y t o w eo r d os? a c h o t h e r

a c c o r d x n g t es t h e f o 1 1 o w i n g p r i n c i p 1 e s s ( 1 ) rn u t. u a 1 r es s p os c t f o r

t h os j. n d es p os n d 0 n c 0 s o v 0 r 0 i g n os q ex a 3. i t y , t es r r :i. t o r i a 1 i n 1 0 g r i l: y ,

a n d n a t i o n a 1 i d 0 n t: i t y o f a 1 3. n a t i o n s ; ( 2 ) t h 0 r i g h t ex i e v e r y

s t a t e 1 0 1 0 a cl 3. t s n a t i o n a 3. os x 3. s 1 0 n c 0 f i,_ es es f r o m 0 x 1 0 r n a 3.

x n 1 0 r f 0 r 0 n c 0 , s u b v 0 r s i ex n a n d c o os r c i ex n ( 3 ) n ex n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n

4 8 * f 7 1 B Vo 1 7 X9 1 ~ N o .. 2 ( 3 u 1 y 8 0 p 1 0 mb0 r 1 9 7 6 ) , p . 1

4 4

t h e i n t e r n a 1 a t f a i r s o f o n e a n o t h e r ; ( 4 ) s e t 1 1 e m e n t o f

d i f f e r e n c e s o r d i s p u t e s by p e a c e f u l m e a n s ; ( 5 ) r e n u n c i a t i o n

o f t h e t h r e a t o r u s e o f f o r c e a n d e f f e c t i v e c o o p e r a t i o n

among t h e m s e 1 v e s - *** T h e y a 1 s o c a 11 e d f o r t h e i mp 1 emen t a t i on

o f 2 0 PFAN. T h a i 1 and now p 1 a c e d g r e a t e r i m p o r t a n c e on ASEAN

an d pu b 1 i c 1 y e n d o r s e d t h e i d e a o f 2 0 PFAN. Howev e r , 1h a i

P r i m e M i n i s t e r S e n i s t i l l r e g a r d e d t h e p r e s e n c e o f g r e a t

p o w e r s i n t h e r e g i o n a s " u n a v o i d a b l e 1 and t h u s e m p h a s i e d

T h a i l a n d ' s n e e d t o m a i n t a i n t h e p o l i c y o f e q u i d i s t a n c e w i t h

g r e a t p o w e r s » “5 °

T h a i l a n d ' s c o n c i l i a t o r y a t t i t u d e t o w a r d t h e

In d o c h i n e s e c o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s wa s d i s r u p t e d wh e n t h e

m i 1 i t a r y s t a g e d a c o u p and i n s t a l l s d t h e s t a u n c h l y a n t ]. —

c o m m u n i s t T h a n i n K r a i v i c h i e n a s P r i m e M i n i s t e r i n O c t o b e r

1 9 7 6 - T a k i n g an a l a r m i s t v i e w o f V i e t n a m ' s i n t e n t i o n s ,

T h a n i n a c c u s e d H a n o i o f i n s t i g a t i n g u n r e s t i n B a n g k o k and

- h a r b o u r i n g e x p a n s i o n i s t d e s i r e s . To c o m b a t t h e m e n a c e o f

c. o m m u n i s m , T h a n i n 1 o o k e d t o t h e r e v i v a l o f I h a i — A met' i c a n

a 1 1 i a n c e and r e g i o n a 1 s o l i d a r i t y . H o w e v e r , t h e I h a n i n

g o v e r n m e n t l a s t e d o n l y o n e y e a r , i t w a s t o p p l e d b y G e n e r a l

K r i a n q s a k Chamanand i n a c o u p i n O c t o b e r 1 9 7 7 . E v e n s o ,

T h a n i n ' s v i o 1 e n t a n t i - communi s t ca (npa i gn a t home and h i s

u n c o m p r o m i s i n g a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d c o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s c a u s e d a

s t r a i n i n S i n o - T h a i r e l a t i o n s and e x a c e r b a t e d T h a i l a n d ' s

r e l a t i o n s w i t h V i e t n a m , L a o s and C a m b o d i a .

4 9 C iT e d i"n~ M i c h a e i L e i f e r , "The I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f K a mp u c h e a " i n ‘J o u t h&dist As i sr/ A f f a i r se d . Huynh Kim Khonh ( S i n g a p o r e : H e i n e m a n n A s i a , 1 9 8 2 ) , p . 5 6 .

5 0 FAG V o l . X X I , N o . 2 ( A p r i l ~ J u n e 1 9 7 6 ) , p . 3 9 .

45

Under these circumstancta, llr: |..r i uiiq.-i.aI.government sought to reduce tension with the Indochinese states: Thailand lifted its blockade on imports in Laos andreached an agreement to exchange ambassadors with Vietnam and Cambodia. Kriangsak also moved to improve relation»with China. During his visit to China in March 1978, the Chinese leaders, who were hoping to entice ASEAN countries to join its efforts to forestall the growth of .jo.ict influence in Southeast Asia, commended ASEAN cooperation and showed their approval of the neutralization proposal.«1

Kriangsak's policies toward Indochinese countries and China indicated that he was prepared to come to terms with the realities of the post-Vietnam war: Thailand couldno longer count on the protection of the United States and China had an important role to play in stabilizing the situation in Southeast Asia.»* Kriangsak; therefore, wanted to restore Thailand's policy of equidistance with the great powers. He stated in his foreign policy address of 1 December 1977 that his government would "pursue anin d ependen t for eig n p o1 icy.

Prior to 1 ate 1978, Thai 1 and under Kriangsakseemed to have regained confidence in mastering its external environment after the traumatic period of the communist

‘ takeover in Indochina. Evidently, the situation which had always been Thailand's greatest fear - a monolithic

iff--News Buiiet in (Thai Foreign Affairs Ministry) 3, (March- Apr i 1 1978) , pp - - 2— •52 Girling, Thailand: Society arid Politics, pp. 244~_4u.

53 Hems Bulletin, 14, (November - December 1977),pp.15-16.

46

co cd muni st Indochina backed by China - did not materialise.

I n S' t e a d , t h e r e w e r e c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e t w e e n C h i n a arid Cam b o d i a

on the one hand and Vietnam on the other. Rivalry among

t Inese c ornmun ist coun t r i es st emmed f r orn clashes of nat i on a 1

i n t er est s t er r i t or i a 1 d i sp ut es , h i st or i c a 1 f ear ai i d f i ei ce

n a 1 1 on a 1 i srn.. 0* Chi i n a an d V i et. n am had eac h b een t r y l n g t o

cu1tivate r e 1 ations with !h a i 1 and in order to dr aw the 1hais

to i ts si de or ensure Bangkok s neutral i ty i ri the conflict.

Under these conditia n s , Thai 1 a n d 's security benefited from

divisions in the communist camp as long as it could manage

t o rem ain neut r a 1 an d avoid b ec omin g entangled in any

i n t en s i f i ed c on f 1 i c t » Dur i n g t h is p er i od , I h a i 1 and had b eer i

optimistic about peaceful co-existence in Southeast Asia”'-'

and the Kr i angsak government pr omi sed to contr i but.e act i ve 1 y

to the establishment of 2ÜPFAN.Confrontation with Vietnam: The Frontline State— 1978-1986

Subsequent events in 1 ate 197S and 1979 made it

impossible for Thailand to isolate itself from the Sino-

V i e t n a m e s e—K a rn puc h e a n c o n flic: t is a n d m a n y policies i h a i 1 «=*. n d

a d o p t. e d + r o m t h i s t i rn e o n s t i 11 h o 1 d t r u e t o d ay, e i g h t y e a r s

later. In January 1979, Vietnam - with. Soviet connivance

and assistance — invaded Kampuchea and set up the pro—Hanoi

5 4 F o r t h e b a c k g r o u n d t o t h e s e con f 1 i c: t s see J - L . s .Girling, "Indochina", in Conflict and Intervention in theThird World? ed. Mohammed Ayoob (Canberra: AustralianNation a 1 University Press, 1980 ) p p - 12-37.5 5 l< a r 1 D . J a c k s o n , " U . S . P o 1 icy, A S E A N a n d t h e K a m p u c h e aCr i s i s>", in £ c o ?v o in i c r Po 1 i 11 cal a n o >;■ e u r i l y 1 -■> a e ̂ i n Southeasi Asia in the i?& 0's e d . Roher t A . Sc alapino an d Jusuf Wanandi (Berkeley : Institute of East Asian Studies,Ur. i ver s i t y of Cali f or n i a , 1982) , p p . 127 -128.

56 Ne ns Bu 11 e t i n , 14 (Novemb er - Dec emb er 1977), p . 15.

47

Heng Sam rin government, in Phnom P e h n . 557 A month later China

launched an attack on the Vietnamese border and str ongly

b ac k ed t h e oust ed Khi mer Roug e r eg i rne i n a g uer r i 11a war

a g a i n s t t h e V i e t n a m e s e t r o o p s „

T h i s n ew u pheava1 in 1nd o c hin a b rought a b o u t a

d r a s t i c d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f s e c: u r i t y c o n d i t i o n i n S o u t h e a s t.

Asia and, as a result, caused a -fundamental change in

Thailand's external outlook. The Soviet support for the

Vi etnamese occupat i on of Kampuchea has entrenched Si.no-

Soviet rivalry in Southeast Asia and spoiled the prospect of

stable balance of power in the region. Most threatening to

the Thai was the emergence of the Vietnamese preponderance

in Indochina. This has revived Thailand's traditional fear

of the Vietnamese expansionist desire. The Vietnamese

occupation of Kampuchea brought the Thai troops face to face

with the Vietnamese forces. The danger for Thailand has

been that the fighting in Kampuchea has frequently spilled

over into Thailand and the consequent influx of refugees has

been a considerable burden. Even more ominous has been the

p oss i b i 1 i t. y of esc a 1 at i on , c r eat i n g a h i g h tens i on a 1 on g t h e

border. As a consequence, Thailand now thinks of itself as

a "frontline" state.®3 This stance reflects Thailand's

57 Hanoi s i g n e d a treaty of friendship and cooperationwith Moscow in November 1978. The ASEAN nations interpreted this as a move to neutralize the danger of Chinese I'-eta 1 i at i on and so made possi b 1 e a Vietnamese invasion of K a m p u c h e a . K » K . N a i r , A S E A N --I n a o c h i n a R e 1 a t i o n s S' i ri c e 19 7 5 : The Politics of Accommodation., Canberra papers on Strategy a n d D e f e n s e N o . 3 0 (C a n b o r r a : T h e S t r a t e g i c a n d D e f e n s eS t u d i e s C e n t r e , T h e A u s t r alia n N a t i o n a 1 U n iversity, 1984) p . 129.

58 See Rober t D . Ti 1 man , 7 he En em y Ge yon d z Ext er n a 17 h r eat P e r c e p t i o n i r> t h e A S E A N R e g i o n , Researc h N o t es and Discussions Paper N o .42. (Singapores Ins1 1 tute of Southeast Asian Studie s , 1984), p .17.

48

v la 1 n e r a b i I i t y 1o t h e V i e t n a m e s e t h r e a t - B a n g k 0 k ' 0 p r i n c i p a 1 a i m 0 i n c e 1978 h a 0 b 0 e n t o p r 0 0 0 u r e V i 01 n a rn 10 0 i 11 i d r a 0 110

troops from Kamp 1.1c h 0a and to 1-0 store this war--torn country a s a n i n d 0 p e n d 0 n t b u f f0 r 0t a 10 i::) 010 0 0 n T h a i i a n d a n d V i 01 n a m .

Thai 1 and ' s r 00pons0 to th0 Kampuch0an crisi 0 ha0

included a variety of tactics. The main strategy has been to coordinate its policy with China - the only great power that is willing and able to put pressure on Hanoief f ect i ve 1 y .. Speci f i ca 11 y , Tha 11 and -- deepite publie den i a 1

has allowed China to supply arms to the Khmer Rouge through Thai territory. 09 In return, the Chinese have pledged to retaliate against Vietnam in the event of an attack on Thailand.60 Thailand thus counts on China as a strategic deterrent against Vietnam, and in effect Bangkok's policy of equidistance with great powers has been terminated. However, despite close association with China, Thailand has been anxious to avoid direct involvement in the f i g h t i n g .

In ad dition, t h e Kriangsak gov 0 r nmen t request ed the United States to reaffirm its commitment to Thai defense under the Manila Pact in the event that Thailand's security was threatened. Thailand has also encouraged the United States to uphold the balance of power with the USSR in the region by maintaining a naval presence.61 The United States itself, particularly the Reagan Administration, has

59 See F EE R , 16 February 1979, p„29„60 See FEER, 18 May 1979, p.14.61 Char 1 es E . Mar r i son , Japan , the tin 1 ted States an dChanging Southeast Asia (New York: University Press ofAmeric a , Inc. 1985) , p .33.

49

r e s p o n d e d q u i t e f a v o u r a b 1 y t o T h a i 1 a n d ' s r e q u e s t f o r

i n c r e a s e d m i 1 i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e a n d c o o p 0 r a t i o n . n o t a b 1 y t h 0A m e r i c a n d 0 c. i s i. o n t o s 011 h i g h - p 0 r f o r m a n c. 0 F -16 A aircraft

t o T h a i 1 a n d ^ a n d Was h i n g 10 n ' s w i 11 i n g n 0 s s 10 discus s t h 0

plan t. 0 set. up a war ammunition reserve in i hai. 1 and»T h a i 1 a n d h a s a 1 s 0 w o r k 0 d c 1 0 s 01 y w i t h A S E A N i n

d 0 n y i n g i n t0 r n a t i 0 n a 1 r 0 c 0 g n i 11 0 n 10 t h 0 V i 01 n a m 0 s 0 subjugation of Kampuchea« Over the past eight years, A3LAN has won support. in the Ü.N., Assembly tor the retention of

I- h 0 01'- 0 q 0 pi t i a 1 s 0 f t h e I) 0 m 0 c. r a t i. c K a (n p u (_. h e a« I 101 0 0 v 0 r ,A S E A M h a is d 0 v i s 0 d a n d p r 0 p 0 s e d s 01 u t i 0 n s to e n d t h e

Kampuchean problem. Basically, ASEAN demands the withdrawal

0f f 0rei gn tr 00ps fr0m Kampuch0a , a UN~supervi secl f r 00

election and Kampuchea's neutrality. It is hoped that an

independent and neutral Kampuchea would not threaten the

security o-f other countries. Nevertheless, the demands have

not so far met with positive response from Vietnam, who is

st i 1 1 determined to consolidate its hold on Kampuchea. I n

this regard, despits difTerences among ASEAN countries on

the approach to t h e Kampuchean crisis, the opinions of

Thailand - the frontline state - has been given priority in

the ASEAN deci si on-rnaki ng process. ̂

I n f 0 11owin g China's policy of supporting the

Khmer Rouge regime, Thailand has found itself in both

62 See details in Far Eastern Ec0 n0 mic Revi e w; A S I AYearbook 1985, p.259.63 See details in F E E R , 24 April 1986, pp.44-46.

64 Malaysia and Indonesia want to keep Vietnam stable andstrong so that it could act as a counterweight to China. Thus, they showed more conciliatory attitudes toward Vietnam than does Thailand. On this point, see an analysis by S u k h u rn b h a n d P a riba t r a , F E E R M ay 10, 19 S 4 , p p . 3 2 - 4.

50

p o 1 i t i c a 1 a n d rn o r a I d i 1 e m m a s .. F o r o n e t h i n g , w h i I e 7 hi a i 1 a n d

a n d A B E A N s e e k t h e V i e 1 n a m e s e w i t h d r a w a 1 t r o m K a rn p u c h e a ,

t h e y d o n □ t w a n t t cd s e e t h e K h rn e r R o u g e r e t u r n t o p o w e r ; a s t h i s w o u 1. d 0 n a b 1 e C h i n a t o s e c u r e a s t r cd n g f o o t h o 1 d i n

S o u t h b a b t A b i a .. T h a i 1 a n ci ' b c 1 o s e a s b o c i a t i o n w i t h C h i n a

a 1 b o c o n t r i b u t e b t o t h b p o 1 a r i b a t i o n i n t h e r e g i o n s

Thailand,, ASEAN and China stand on one side and Vietnam and

the USSR on the other. This development will only serve to

p r e c: 1 u d e t hi e n e u t r a 1 i z a t i cd n o f t h e whole r e g i on, w h i c h is i n

T h a i 1 a n d ' s 1 o n g ~ t e r m i n t e r e s t b . <£*!S F u r t h e r rn ore, t h e K h m e r

Rcduge , wh i ch i s wi de 1 y be 1 i eved to be responsibl e f or thie

d e a t h o f m or e t h a n a m i 11 i cd n K a rn puc hi e an s d u r i n g its reign,

c a n n o t hi e p r o rn o t e d as a p romis i n g an d p alatable a 11 e r n ativ e

to the pro-Hanai Heng Samrin regi rne»

Despite these long-term implications, Thailand has

c h o s e n t o s u p p a r t t h e K h m e r R a u g e b o t. h d i p 1 o rn atically and

militarily because it is the most, powerful group to resist

t he Vi et namese tr oops. But Hanoi was qui ck t cd ex p 1 oi t

T h a i 1 a n d ' s d i 1 e m rn a „ T h e V i e t n a m e s e argued that t h e i r

i n t e r v e n t i o n i n K a m p u c h e a has done a great service -for the

Kampuchiean people by eliminating tiie murderous Khmer Rouge

r e g i rn e ;; t h e r e f o r e , it s a c t i cd n w a s j u s t. i Tied a n d t h e H eng

S a rn r i n g o v e r n m e n t s h o u 1 d b e g r a n ted l n ternationa 3.

65 On the long-term implications o-f Thailand's policy toward the Kampuchean problem, see details in Sukhurnbhand Par i bat r a , Su Chom Nga i 11 a i ? : ASEAN~Vi e tn am Kap Pan Har n K a m p u c h a ( 7" o w a r d a N e w S o 1 at i o n ? : A S E A N - V ietri am a ti d the Kampuchea Problem) Research paper no.2 (Bangkoks Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Chulalongkorn Universit y ) ,p p „27-38.

r e c o g n i t i o n » ̂ ** Thai 1 and and ASEAN rejected t.he Vietnam eseproposition, pointing out that their support f or the Khmer

Rouge was based on the princip1e of non -intervention and to

recognize the Vietnarnbacked Heng Samr i n government wou 1 d be

t a n t a rn o u n t to r e w a r d i n g t h e V i e t n a m n e s e a c t of aggression.67

To improve its diplomatic position on this issue,

A S E A N h a d bee n i n s t r u rn e n t a 1 i n incorporating t h e K h mer Rouge

in a military coalition with non-communist leaders - Prince

Norodom Sihanouk and Son Sann - in 19B2. This -formula has

allowed ASEAN to demonstrate to the world that the

withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops does not necessarily

mean the restoration of the Khmer Rouge. Nonetheless,to

Thail a n d 's disappoin t m e n t , some Wester n countries, including

Br i t.ai n , Fr ance and Austr a 1 i a , r e f used to grant d i p 1 omatic

recognition to the Khmer coalition government because of

thiei r repugnance agai nst the Khmer Ro lag e . Thai For ei gn

66 Se e f or exa m p1e United N a tion s , G e neral Assemb1y , 35t hSession, Gen er a.I Assembly Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3 51 h II e e t i n g , N e w Y o r k , 14 □ c t o b e r 1980 (A / 3 5 / P v 3 5) , p .. 5 2 . Cited in Leiter, "International Representation ofKampuchea...", p.52.6 7 A t t hi e a n n u a 1 rn e e t i n g o f t h e A S E A N F ore i g n M i n i sters i nM a n i 1 a i n J u n e 19 S 1 , t h e A S E A N c o la n t r i e s e m p h a s i z e d t. h a t :

.„ „the grou n d s for t heir sup por t for t he credentia1s of Democratic Kampuchea were based on t hi e f un d amen t a 1 p r i n c i p 1 es t hi at f or e i g nintervention must be opposed and that any change i ri the recogni t i on of Democr at i c Kampuchea ' sc I- e d e ri t i a 1 s w o u 1 d b e t ant a rn o unt t o cond cd n i n g Viet n a rn ' s m i 1 i t a r y i ri v a s i o n and occupation of K a m p u c: h e a . 7 h e y s a w a b s o .1 u t e 1 y n o j u s t i f i cat i o nf o r other states to overthrow the legitimate go vernment of another state as such actionviolated the internationally recognized principies governing inter state re 1 ations as enshrined in the United Nations Char ter. (1 1a 1ics mine 1

The ASEAN Joint Communique, Manila ,June 1981, cited in ibid, p » 57.

e r '•”!

Mi n :L ster Si ddh i Savetsi 1 a comp 1 ai ned that th 0se Wester n

c: o u n t r i e s w e r 0 u n d u 1 y m o r a .L i s t i c i n t heir j u d g 0 m 0 n t o f the

Khmer Rouge and in that process overlooked the ev il

consequences of the Vietnam0sie ac:t:ion :

Unfortunately, when some people ta lk about the Kampuchean prob1em, th 0y ta 1k a 1ot about how bad po 1 pot <the Khrner Rouge's leader) was. They want. the elim ination of Pol Pot as the solution of Kampuchean issue. They don't ta lk about much about m il i ta ry occupation of Kampuchea and rapid V i e t n a rn i z a t. i o n o f K a m p u c h e a. ^ 0

At the time of th is w r it in g , the s itua tion in

Kampuchea is s t i l l in an impasse. Hanoi has launched many

o f fen sives ag ain st t h e Kh mer r es is t ance g r oups but has

f a i 1 e d to w i p 0 t h 0 m o u t .. T h 0 K h m e r g u e r i 11 as themselves are

not powerful enough to force Hanoi to seek a negotiated

solution to the c o n f l ic t , le t alone to drive the Vietnamese

troops out. Any future settlement w i l l depend very much on

the outcome of the fighting and the attitude of Chi 11a and

the USSR. In the meantime, Thailand in an e f fo r t to repair

i t s sec u r i t y en v i r on ment c ontinues t o op pose t he Vietnamese

occupation of Kampuchea by supporting China s policy of

pressur i ng Vi etnam , by strengthening rni 11 tary cooper at i on

with the United States, and by re ly ing on ASEAN moral and

po1i t i c a1 so1id a r i t y .

6 8 Foreign Af fa irs New sletter ( T h a i 1 a n d ) 5 ( May 1 9 85 ) ,

p p . . 7 - 8 .

CHAPTER III

CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSION

Thai 1 and ' s t r ad i 1 1 ona 1 d i p 1 omacy hi as been

I"emar kab 3. e f or i ts pr agmat i b m and f 1 ex i bi I i t y . 1 I f

M ac: h i a ve 11 i , Hob bes, Mor g en t. h au , an d Carr wer e t o c h oose an

A b i an ex amp 1 e to i 11 ustr ate thei r view of toreign policy,

T h a i 1 a n d ' s t. r a d i t i o n a 3. d i p 1 o m a c y c o u 1 d very well serve t h e i r

purpose» But would the Realists approve of I hail and s

f orei gn polic.y a f ter the Second Wor 3. d War'? To answer thi s

questi on , this chapter wi 11 se 1 ect. major components of

Thai 1 and ' s f or ei gn p o 3. i cy f r om t he acco lant. i n chapter I I and

examine whether they have corresponded to the realist view

of foreign policy or not. 1 he chapter will also discuss

t h e i r p e r f o r rn a n c es a n d g e n e r a 3. i z e t h e c h a r act eristics of

Thai1 a n d 's foreign poIicy during the last forty y e a r s .

Alliance with the United States 1950— 1975

For more than two decades, as we have seen, Thai

foreign policy had been geared toward consolidating a

special relationship with the United States. I he successive

military regimes of Pibul , Sarit and 3 hanom~Pr apat regarded

the alliance with the United States as the most effective

i n s t r la rn e n t t o e n s la r e T h a i 1 a n d ' s s e c u r i t y . T h e Thai military

1 e a d e r s d i d d i s c u s s t h e o p t i o n o f p u r s u i n g a n e u t r a 1 p o 1 i c y

after Washington hesitated to respond to Thailand's security

needs i n the L.aot i an or i si s of 1961 ~ 1963. Nonethel ess , i n

gen e r a l , the confidence of the Thai military in the will and

a b i 1 1 1 y o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o p r o v i d e f o r Thailand's

1 See detai 1 s i n Dhi raveglai n , Si av) and Co 1 on i a1 i sm ( 11-1>t>- 19 09 , (f o o t n o t e n o » 1 i n I n t r o d la c t i o n )

54

security remained at a very high level. This was evident•from the pattern of Thailand's reaction to the perceivedthreat. Confronted with unfavourable changes in thesecurity environment, the Thai military always pressed forstronger commitment from their powerful ally. Ihailand s

✓membership in SEATO, the Rusk-Thanat communique and other military assistance agreements concluded during the American intervention in Indochina were vivid examples.

At one level, it could be argued that Ihailand s decision to make alliance with the United States was in accordance with the Realists' policy of the balance of power. In the Thai military's view, China and North Vietnam were expansionist by nature and inherently ideologically hostile to Thailand. The preponderance of their influence in Southeast Asia would be detrimental to Thailand'ssecurity; therefore, Thailand had to rely on the great power of the United States as a counterbalance to potential aggressors. Without allies, Thailand understood well the Realists' emphasis on the danger of a small and weak country facing an overwhelming enemy.2 In fact, Thailand had just suffered this danger during the Second World War when it hctd to succumb to the invading Japanese army in 1941 afterseveral unsuccessful appeals for help from the British and the Americans. This traumatic experience influenced thethinking of the Thai military and caused them to seeksecurity through a close alliance with the United States.32 chapter I, p-4-T Model ski , SEATOs Six Studies, pp.88-89. (See footnote no. 14, chapter II) and Donald Nuechterlein, " Small Statesi n AI 1 i ances: Icel and , Thai I and , Austral i a. " Or b i i- XIIIno.2 (1969), 601-602.

I n i t i a 11 y , T h a i 1 a n d h a d b e n e f i t e d c o n s i d e r a b 1 y

•from this strategic. connection. Prior to the m i d - 1960 s,

T h a i 1 a n d h a r d 1 y p a i d a n y p r i c e f o r A m e r i c a n p r o t e c 1.. i o i i

while the United States was under an obligation to corne tu

T h a i 1 a n d ' s a s s i s t a n c e T h a i 1 a n d h a d n o d u t y t o help t h e

United States in the event of a t t a c k .4 As far as the Thai

m i 111 a I'- y w a s> c o ncerned , t. h e a 11 i a n ce w i t h t hi e U n i t e d S t a t e s

was the easiest solution f or saf eguarding Thai 1 a n d 's

secur i t y .. By depend i ng upon the A .ner i can securi t y umbr e 11a,

they could free themselves from having to make a hard

d e c i s i o n :: h o w b e s t to d e a 1 w i t h t h e c o mmunis t c o u ntries and

the volatile situation in Indochina. Should Thailand adopt a

conciliatory attitude toward China, North Vietnam and the

I n d o c h i n e s e c o m rn u n i s t m o v e m e n t s ? W hi e n ? H o w V W o u 1 d i ..

promote better understanding or would it even encourage the

c omrnun i st s t o b e mor e agg r ess i ve'? As V irap h o 1 p o 1 n t ecl o u t ,

b y k e e p i n g i n s t e p w i t h t hi e i r rn i g h t y A m e r i c a n p a t r o n , t h e

Thai military "... did not need to initiate anything of

t hiei r own whieh mi egh t r esuit i n amb i gui t y and un cer t.ai r11.y

.... " ss pio r e q v 0 r i d o rn e s t i c a 11 y , t h e m i 1 i t a r y g a i n e d pres 1.. i g e

•f rorn bei ng a 1 1 i ed wi th the most powerf u 1 nati on 5 thi s pi us

mass i ve Am er i c an m 11 i t ar y ass i st an c e h e 1 p ed t h. e rn i 111 ar y

c o n s o 1 i cl a t e t l"i e i r i n f 1 u e n c e i n I In a j. p o 1 i t i s . ̂ I h a i 1 arid s

4 M odelski ,p .104.5 Vi rap hoi Direction in Thai 1- or e i gn Policy, p- 1-̂-" ^s e e f u o t n o t e n o . 4 4 , c h a p t e 1- 11. )6 S e e i b j. d . , a n d M o r r i s o n , S t r a t e g i e s o t S u r v i u a 1 pp , i 12-113. (see footnote no. , chapter 11)

56

e c o n o m i c d e v e 1 o p rn e n t a 1 s o p r o f i t e d f r o m A rn e r i c a ' s

s u b s t a n t i a I e c o n o rn i c a i d a n d in i 1 i t a r y s p e n d i n g - 7r

However, by the late 1 9 6 0 's, the advantages of the

c 1 o s e a 1 1 i a n c e w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a h a r p 1 y cl e c. 1 i n e d - T h e

r e v e r s a 1 o f A m e r i c a n p o 1 i c y i n V i e t n a m i n 1968 t r u. 1 y s h o c k e d

t h e T h a i 1 e a d e r s - H a v i n g a n t a g o n i z e d C h i n a a n d N o r t h

V i e t n a m w i t h i t s a c: t i v e p a r t. :i. c i p a t i o n i n t h e V i e t n a m W a r ,

T h a i 1 a n d n o w f a c e d t h e p r o s p e c t o f c o n f r o n t i n g c. a rn rn la n i s t

h a s till t y w i t h g u t. t h e b a c k i n g o f t h e ü n i t e d S tat es . T h e

f a c t t h a t T h a i 1 a n d w a s s u d d e n 1 y 1 e f t o u t o n a 1 i m b r e f 1 e c t e d

a p r i n c i p a 1 f 1 a w i n T h a i p o 1 i c: y o f a 11 i a n c e w i t h t. h e U n i t e d

81 a t e s s i n 1 e a n i n g h e a v i 1 y o n W a s hi i n g t o n , T h a i 1 a n d h a d i n

the process closed other options and lost its freedom of

ac t i o n . When a drastic change took place, Thai1 and could not

not readily switch to other alternatives. The result was a

dis arra y in T hai f or eign policy.

To make this point clearer, it would be helpful to

compare Thai foreign policy with that of Cambodia under

Princ e Norod om Sih an o n k . Lik e t h e T\«ai military, Sihanouk

was apprehensive about China and the Viet-Minh; he had

originally been very anxious to join SEATO as a guarantee

a g a i n s t t. he? c o rn m u n i s-> t a g g ress i o n . ö H o w e v e r , as it t u r n e d

out, Sihanouk opted for a neutral policy befriending with

the East and the West in the Cold war. There were three

main reasons for C a m b o d i a 's choice of neutra1i t y . F i r s t ,

u n 1 i k e t h e T hi a i m i 1 i t ary, S i h a n o u k did n o t p e rceive t h e

c o mm u nist c o unt rie s as absolut e 1y ev i 1 and imp1 a c a b 1y

7 V i r a p hi o 1 , o p . c i t , p p . 12 — 13.

8 L e i f e r , C a m h o d i a . . . , p p . 56--57. (s e e f o o t n o t e no.1,chapter II)

5 7

h osti1e t d ot he r n ation s of dif fer ent ideologies. 0n t h e

c o n t r a r y , i n h i 5 o p i n i o n , f r i e n cl s h i p w i t h C h i n a c o u I d

enhance Cambodia's security; for China was able to restrain

the Vi et-Mi nh acti vi ties agai nst Cambodia.,y Theref ore ,

Sihanouk declined to be a full member of SEATO lest it might

p r o v o k e C h i n a , t h e r e b y c o m p r o m i s i n g C a m b o d i a ' s s e c u r i t y

interests- 1° China itse1f made it c1ear to Sihanouk that itwould be benevolent toward Cambodia as long as he did not

associate his country with the United States.11 Second,

S i h a n o u k , a g a i n l n c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e T h a i m i 1 i t a r y , d o u b t e d

the the Americans wou1d sucneed in containing the commun i st

inf1uence in Indochina. T h u s , he thought it p o 1itic to

a d a p t a n e u t r a 1 f o r e i g n p o 1 i c y s o t h a t C a m bodia c: o u 1 d 1 i v e

peacefully with the communist countries in the event of an

American f a i 1u r e - 13 Th i r d , Si hanouk r ea 1 i zed that SEAT0

c o u 1 d n o t h e 1 p C a m b o d i a c o p e w i t h a 1 1 t h e t h r e a t s i t w a s

f a c i n g . 13 SEAT0 co u 1d serve as a powerfu1 deterrent against

an open comrnuni st aggressi on .. But i t wou 1 d be i nef f ective

against an ext erna11y-dir ected int er n a 1 threat - Besides,

Cambodia was threatened not only by the communists but also

b y it s t r adition a 1 enemies, Th a 1 1 an d and South Viet n a m -

Both of them were America's close allies. Should Cambodia

9 ..~l"bi~d pp~] 59-63.

10 SEATO offered Cambodia its protection against open aggression . This commitment entailed no correspondingob 1 i gat i on f r orn Cambodi a . Si hanouk was contented with this g r at. u i t ous of f er b ut he did not ac c ep t it p ub 1 i c 1 y f or f ear that it might invoke Chinese hostility. Ibid-,p p .58-59 and p„ 63.

11 Ibid., p - 63.

12 I bid- , p. 153.

13 Ibid-, p - 60 and p - 81 -

58

h a v 0 d i s p u 10 s w i t h i h 0 s 0 t w o c o u n t r i e s , S i h a n 0 la k w a b

convinced that the United States would side with them not

w i t h C a rn b o d i a „ 1 ̂ C o n v e r s 0 1 y , i n s la c hi a n 0 v 0 n t , C hi i n a a n d

t h e c o rn m la n i s t b .1 o c w o u 1 d b e s y rn p a t h e t i c t o C a rn b o d i a p r o v 1 d 0 d

t h i a t i t d i cJ n o t j o i n S E A T 0 -I n t h 0 f a c 0 o t m u 11 i p 1 0 rn 0 n aces, S i h a n o la k f o u n d i t

n 0 c: 0 s s a r y t o p r 0 s 0 r v e C a rn b o d i a ' s f r 0 0 d o m o f a c: t i o n ..

F 1 e x i b i 1 i t y i n f o r 0 i g n p o 1 i c y w o u 1 d rn a k 0 i t p o s s i b 1 e f o r

Cambodia to combat each threat to its survival in the most

s u i t a b 1 0 rn a n n 0 r - A s S i h a n o la k s t. a 10 d 2I f C a rn b o d i a w 0 r 0 t h 0 o b . j 0 c t o f an at t a c k by t h 0 yi01-Minh and th0 Chin0se P0op10's R0publie, itc o u 1 d d 0 rn a n d t h e s u p p o r t o f t h 0 F ree W o r 1 d a n cJ t h 0U n i 10 d S t a 10 s , a n d , i f t h e a 11 a c: k c a rn 0 -fromThailand or South Vietnam, it is certain that it would demand the aid of the Communist bloc in p a r t i c u 1 a r t hi 0 C h i n 0 s 0 P 0 o p 1 0 ' s R 0 p u b 1 i c . 1

S i h a n o la k 1 n o t hi 0 r w o r d s atte m p 10 d t o rn a i n t. a in a b a 1 a n c 0 dposture between China and the United States in the hope that

he would be able to secure support from either of them in

t i rn0 of dang0r . To pu.t i t d i f f 0r 0n 1 1 y , Si hanouk was play i ng

t h e b a J. a n c e—o f — pi o w 0 r g a rn 0 , m a n i |o la 1 a t i n g C hi i n a a n d t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e ei t o c o u n t e r b a 1 a n c 0 e a c h o t h 0 r i n C a m bodi a s interests.

Gi ven th at f 1 ex i b i 1 i t y i s an out st an d i ng

c hi a I'“ a c 10 r i s t ics o f t hi 0 r e a 1 i s t v i 0 w o f f o r 0 i g n p o 1 icy ,Si h an ouk ' s p o ]. i. c y was 0v i den t 'J. y mor 0 r 0a 1 i s11 c t h an that of

t hi 0 T h a i rn i 1 j. t a r y „ S 1 hi a n o u k ' s p o 1 icy to create a balance o f

p o w e r r e flee t e ci t h 0 R 0 a 1 i s t s' conception of the i d 0 a 1

•f o r 0 i g n pi o 1 i c y 2 i t i n v o 1 v e d c: o n t i n u o u s i n 10 r n a t i o n a 1

i n t e i'- c h a n g 0 a n d d e f t h a n d i n g o f r 0 1 a t. i uns wit h t h e rn a j o r

i 4 1 b i d . , p . 8 1 .15 I bid. ,p .83 .

59

p o w e r s „ 1 ̂ E< y c o ri t r a s t , T h a i 1 and 's p o 1 i c y t o m a i n t a i n a

balance of power by complete dependence on the United States

w a s s i rn p 1 i s t i c a n d i n e 1 a s t i c - W h i 1 e C a rn b o d i a c o u 1 d r e s p o n d

t o a n y d r a m a t i c c h a n g e s in circ u m s t a n c e s r e a d i 1 y , T h a i 1 a n d

could not»It is true that by early 1970 Sihanouk's policy

h a ci e n c o u n t e r e d s e r i o u s d i f f i c u 1t i e s . I h e? Vie t n a m e s e

c o rn m Li n i s t s hi a d s o u g h t s a n c t u a r i e s a 1 o n g t hi e C a rn b o d i a r i

borders and the Americans often came to attack these

c o rn rn u n i s t p o s i t i o n s . S i h a n o u k c o u J. d d o n o t h i n g b u t t o

t o 1 e I'" a t e t h e v :i. o 1 a t i o n o f C a m b o d i a ' s n e u t r a 1 i t y b y b o t hi

sides.. Actually, Sihanouk was in favour of limited American

st r i I-:; es ag a i n st t i"i e cornmun i st s » Howe ver , he r ea 1 i z ed t hi at a

f Li 1 1 s c a 1 e A rn e r i c a n i n t e r v e n t i o n i n C a rn bod i a w o u 1 d d i r ect 1 y

i nvo 1 ve the count.r y i n the war ., 1 y Ther ef ore, Si hanouI-::

c ar ef u 11y avoid ed c 1ose mi 1it ar y r e 1 ation ship wit h t h e

United States and continued to maintain good relations with

t h e c o rn rn u n i s t c o u n t r i e s . T h i s p o 1 i c y enabled Si h a n o u k t o

p r e s e r v e C a rn b o d i a ' s f r a g i 1 e n e u t r a 1 i t y a n d k e e p i t out o f

t h e V i e t n a rn W a r » C a m b o d i. a ' s n e u t r a 1 p o 1 i c. y w as aba n d o n e d

w h e I "I G e n e r a 1 L o n N o 1 o v e r t h r e w S i n h a n o u k s g o v e r n rn ent i n

March 1970» Lon Mol pursued an anti-communist policy and

ca 1 1 ed i n Amer i can massi ve rni 1 i t ar y assi st ance. I h i s i

effect made Cambodia an active belligerent in the Vietnam

War and the country was engulfed in the war with disastrous

c:onsequences» 1 e 1t cou 1 d be argued that if Lon No 1 had

16 Chapter 1, p-19-

17 W i 1 1 i a rn S h a w c r o s s „ S i d e s h o w . (N e w Y o r k : P o c k e t Boo k s , 1979), p »70 and 94.

18 See det ai 1 s i n I b i d .

60

c o n t i n u e d S i h a n o u k ' s p o I i c y , C a m b o d i a could h a v e b e e n saved

i n v o 1 v e m e n t i n t h e w a r -R i g i d i t y i n T h a i f o r e i g n policy w a s p r i rn a r i 1 y a

resu11 of the Thai military's phobia against communism and

their overcon fidenee i n the United Sta t e s as a patr o n -

□ bsessed wi t h t he t wi n spec t r es of- commun i st. ex pansi on i sm

and rn o n o 1 i t bi i c c o rn m u n i s m , t h e T h a i mil i t a r y fir m 1 y believed

t h a t o n 1 y a h a r d 1 i n e p o 1 i c y t o w a r d the comm u n i s t. c o u n t r i e s

could neutralize the communist threat to Thailand. They

fa i 1ed to realize that a more f1 exib1e attitude toward China

and North Vietnam might have lessened their animosity and

thus i mproved Thai 1 and secur i ty condi tions. 1 ,y 0n this

point, Thailand forgot the Realists' warning that ideology

shou 1 d n ever domi nat e t he rnak i ng of f or ei gn policy. =2°

W h i1e on e c an j u stifiab1y criticize the T hai

military for their blind anti-communism, it might be unfair

to blame them for aligning Thailand with the United States.

After the Second World War, the United States emerged as the

superpower with economic, political and military power

beyo n d o t h e r n a t i o n s ; it m u s t h a v e o c c u r r e d to the T h a i

m i 1 i. t a r y t hi a t t h e m o s t r e alls t i c policy was to f o r m a n

a 11iance with the strongest nation. In addition, u n 1ike the

c a s e o f C a m b o d i a , t h e t h r e a t t o T In a i 1 a n d was s i m pie and

19 Virapho1 pointecJ out that paradoxically the moreThailand depended on the United States, the more the threat a g a i n s t T hi a i 1 a n d g r e w . W h e n T hail a n d decided t o participat e in the Vietnam War, Peking retaliated by publicly endorsing the people's war against. Thailand in 1965. Sarasin Viraphol,‘1 Natio n a 1 Thr e at Per cep t i o n : Ex p 1 aining t h e Thai C a s e . “ in 7h r e a i t o Se c u r i t y i n Ea s t - As i a P a c i f i c . ed * Ch ar 1 es E . ivlorr i son „ (Hawai i ; D . C . Hea 11h and Company , 1983), pp . 145~146.

20 Ch apt er I , p p „ 10-~ 1 1 .

61

u n a rn b i g la a u s; c o m m u n :i. s t e x p ansio n . T h e U n i 10 d S t a t e b shared

t hib b ame c on c er n an d was ab1e t o fully satisfy Ih ai1 a n d 's

b e c la r i t y n e e d s. T h e r e w e r e n o com p e 11 i n g r e a sons for t h e

Tha1 mi1ita ry t o k0 0p ot h 0r aption s op en. And f or 1wo

decades, the Thai military's foreign policy, though rigid

an d i d 0 o 1 o g i c a 1 , h a d wor k ed w 011 and did help preserv 0

Th ai 1 an d ' s i nd 0pen d0nc e S i mi 1 ar 1 y , Th ai 1 and 's fat 0f u 1

d0cision to participate in th0 Vi01nam War was based on the

assumption that the United States, the most powerful nation

on 0arth, was wi11ing to make every sacrifice to achieve its

goals,,21 In the 1960's, it was difficult to foresee that

the United States would ever lose a a smal1 war in Vietnam.

On I y w i t h t h 0 b enef i t of t h e h i n d si g h t c ou I d on 0 c ommen t

t h a t t h 0 T h a i m i I i t a r y w a s la n r e a 1 i s t i c i n p lacing c o m p 1 e t e

r 01 i a n c 0 o n t h e U n i 10 d 81 a t. e sThailand's Policies of Accommodation and Equidistance:

Flexibility and Readjustment1975 s a w t w o d r a rn a t i c s h i f t s i n T h a i f oreig n

policy., One shift meant moving away from a total dependence

on the United States to a more balanced relationship with

Peking, Moscow and Washington. The second shift had been a

rnovi ng away f r om enrni ty towar ci r econcil i a11 on wi th the

c omrnun i st r eg i rn 0 s i n I n d oc h i n a. G i ven the f ac t t h at

Th ai1 and had maint ain0d its st ric t , US-suppor t e d an ti-

communist posture for more than two decades, these

21 A f ter a 11 , w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h 0 A rn e r i c a n i n v o 1 v 0 rr1 e n t i n V i e t n a rn , P r 0 s i d 0 n t K e n nedy h i m s e 1 f d 0 cl a r e d t h a t A meric a "would bear any burden, pay any price...." Sited in William R. Kinter, " Thailand Faces the Future." Or bis 19, no. 4(1975) ,p. 1127.

r e a cl j u 51 rn e n t s man x f es ted t hi e Kukrit gove r n m e n t 'b

ex t r a or d :i. n ar y f I ex i b i J. i t y ..K u k r i t ' b d e 0 x s i o n t o c h a r t a n e w c: o u r b e f o r T h a i

f o r e i g n policy w a s o b v i o u s 1 y i n 1 i n e w i t h t h e R e a 1 i s t b ' c a r d x n a 1 r u J. e , t hi a t i b , a n a t i o n m lx b t be wxllx n g to a c c: e p t and ad ap t i t se 1 -f t.o a c.hang i ng b i t uat x on . 332 By t he ear 1 y 1970's , Th e Sin o-American detent e had made in v a1id t h e

Ar a i son a ' e tr e o f SEAT0 s the contai nment of Chineseexpansionism« In the same manner, the American plan to disengage -from Indochina proved that the existing American commitment to the Thai defense has lost much of itscredibx1ity« Thai1 and cou1d no 1 onger expect the UnitedStates to fight its war 5 Thailand must bear the main burden of combat itself« Both Thailand's membership in SEATÜ and its close alliance with the United States had becomean ac h ronistic.

Conditions had changed. The Kukrit government

fully understood that Thai foreign policy had to change too.

Wit hout t he p r ot ec tin g shie1d o f t h e Unit ed States, Th a i 1 an d

could no longer afford to antagonize the communist

countries. This line of thinking was the rationale of

Thailand's insistence on the American withdrawal, the

e s t a b 1 i s h rn e n t o f d i p 1 o m a t i c r e 1 a t i o n s w i t h Chin a a n d

f r i end 1 y over tur es toward the I. ndoch i nese commun i st

governments.

A b a g a i n s t K u k 1“ x t ' s

rni 1 1 1 ar y leader s c 1 un g t o

realistic r easonin g , t he Th a i

t h e C o 1d War ment a 1it y .23

22 Chapt er I , p p . 18-19«

23 9 irapho1, Direc tion u . . ,p « 5 1 «

63

U n r e a I i s t i c a 1 I y , t h e y y e a r n e d f o r t h e c e r t a i n t i e s a n d

b t a b i 1 i t y a f f a r d e d b y t h e A m e r i c a n s d la r i n g t h e C o 1 d W a r .

Unable to r i d themselves of the concepts of the Cold War •••-

c o n t a i n rn e n t , c o m m u n i s t e x p a n s i o n i s rn e t c . , t h e T h a i m i 1 i t a r y

]. e a d e r s s t i 11 f e 11 a n a c u t e n e e d f o r A rn e r i c a n p r o t. e c t i o n

a g a i n s t t h e c: o rn rn u. n i s t t h r e a t „ ^ ̂ H e n c e , t h e y o b j e cted t o

!< u k r i t ' s i n s i s t e n c: e o n c o m p 1 e t e A rn e r i c a n w i t h d rawal .. T h e y

wanted the Uni ted S tates to r e ta i n the Ramasoon e 1 ect.roni c

sur vei 11 ance f aci 1 i 1 i es i n r e tu rn f or co n t i nued Airier i can

p ro v is io n of mi1i t a r y equipment and t r a i n i n g . *•ö The Thai

m i l i t a r y leaders were a lso c r i t i c a l of K u k r i t ' s c u l t i v a t i n g

be t t er re 1 at.i ons wi th the cammuni s t c o u n t r ie s . In the i r

o p in io n , i t was dangerous to t r u s t a f r i e n d s h ip w i th the

communist c o u n t r ie s : K u k r i t ' s p o l i c y would jeop ard ize

T h a i la n d 's s e c u r i t y . 26 In b r i e f , the Thai m i l i t a r y leaders

s t i l l be l ieved Tha i land could and should r e l y on m i l i t a r y

means r a t h er than d i p 1omatic means in managin g i t s sec u r i t y

probi eins.

A11hough the opposing views of the Thai m i l i t a r y

were voca l , they had no e f f e c t on the K u k r i t government's

de te rm ina t ion to go on w i th readjustments in Thai fo re ig n

p o1ic y . The Kuk r i t g overnmgnt was convinced t h a t the

p r ospec t s of Th a i 1 and ' s s e c u r i t y a f t e r the V ie t nam war

depended on the success of these readjus tments . I t was

24 Tbid7~

25 J .L .S . G i r l i n g , " Thailands C o n f l i c t (Jr Consensus." ThePior 1 d 7 o d ay 32 , (February , 1976) , p . 52.

26 L o c . c i t . , and Barasin V i ra p h o l , " Thai-American R e la t ion s in the post-1975 Per iod" in A C e n t u r y a n d H a l f o f T h a i - A m e r i c a n Re 1 a t i o n s . eds . Wiwat Mung kandee and Wi11iam Warr en (Bang k o ks Chu1 a1 ong kor n Pr e s s ,1902) , p .129.

64

therefore necessary to make every effort in order to

f ac i I i t at e t hi e proc ess of c hi an g e .. I r i an a 1t emp t t o men d

r e 1 at i ons wi th the commun i st count.r i e s , Kukr i t announced i n

hi i s f o r e i g n p o 1 i c y a d d r e s s t o t hi e T hi a i P a r i i a m e n t t hi a t hi i s

g o V e r n rn e n t w o u 1 d r e v e r s e T h a i 1 a n d ' s a n t i - c o m m u n i s t £ t a n c e a n d c: o n d u c t f a r e i g n r e 1 a t i o n s 1 ‘ i r r e s p e c t i v e o f d i f f e r e n c e s

i n i d e o 1 o g i e s o r p o 1 i t i c a 1 s y s t e m s . H e n c e , t h e

t e r m i n a t i o n o f t hi e c 1 o s e a 11 i a n c e w 1 1 h W a s h i n g t o n a n d S E A T 0

More sig nifican 1 1 y , the Kukrit gov ern m e n t , in opening

diplomatic relations with China, agreed to go along with

p e k i n g ' s i n s i s t e n c e t hi a t i t w o u 1 d c: o n t i n u e t o m a i n t a i n ties

w i t hi t hi e Commun i s t Par t y of T hi a i 1 an d . Ku k r i t was p r ep ar ed t o

m a k e t hi i s c o n c e s s i o n t o C h i n a b e c a u s e h e s a w t hi a t C h i n a

c o u 1 d a c t a s a c o u n t e r b a 1 a n c e a g a i n s t a r e s u r g e n t V i e t n a m .

Kukrit in other words a11empted t o w o r k for the ba1 ance of

power by playing communists against communists. The Realists

w o u 1 d h a v e a p p r o v e d o f K u k r it ' s p o 1 i c y n regard.' ! hey h ave

emphasized that states should determine their practical

i n t er est s an d sep ar at e t hem from ideological over tones. 220

ASEAN; A Realistic Calculation or A Romantic Grand DesignWhen ASEAN was founded in 1967, most observers

doubted its longevity and viability. indeed, there was no

legitimate reason to be optimistic about this regional

organization. Its five original members were vastly

different in size, population, religion, language and ethnic

composition; their relations after the Second World War were

27 Po1icy Address to the House of Representative, 19 March1975 (Bang koks Prime Minister's Office,!975) Cited inV i r a pi h o 1 , D i r & c 1 1 o n . . . , p . 1.

28 Chap ter I,p . 10-11.

m a r k e d w i t h d i s t r la s t a n d c o n f 1 i c t s; a f t e r t h e e s t a b 1 i s h m 0 n t o f ASEAN , m 1.11 ua 1 r 0s0n t rn0n t st i 11 r an d 00p . Toclay , how0ver,

ASEAN stands as the most effective and by far the most

s u c. c 0 s s f u 1 r 0 g i o n a 1 g r o u p a m o n g d 0 v 01 o p 1 n g s t a 10 s . --< y N i n e 10 0 n y 0 a r s aft 0 r i t s i n a la g u r a l: i o n , A S E A N h a s n o t o n I. y

become a credible regional body that has clearly made a

si 1 g n if ic a n t i m p a c t o n d 0 v 01 o p m e n t s in So u t hi e a s t Asia; b la t it

has also been accepted by the great powers as a relatively

cohesi ve b3. ock to b0 tak0n seri ous 1 y in political and

0 c o n o rn i c n 0 g o t i a t i o n s .

As a founder of ASEAN, Thailand's foreign

minister, Thanat Khoman deserved to be praised for his

■f r Li i t f la 1 i n i t i at i ve i n p r omot i n g r eg i on a 1 coop er at i on .

However, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, it is

evident that Thanat's idea was based on the perception of

c 1 0 a r a n d t a n g i b 1 e a d v a n t a g 0 s o f regional g r o la p i n g w h 1 c h

rn i ghit accrli0 to 0ach i ndividua 1 colantr y ; i t was not inspired

by a romantic grand design which aimed at melting the states

o f S o la t h 0 a s t A s i a i n t o a n 0 w i d 0 n t i t y - T h a n a t h i m s e 1 fa d rn i 11. e d t h a t s

. „ . t h e rn o tivations w h i c h h a ve p r o m p 10 d rn e to pus h the idea of regional cooperation were less lofty and idealistic but stemmed from practical and realistic considerations, among them the fact that Southeast Asian nations are comparatively weak and small.... Separately, they represent little, if any, significance in world affairs. ... To correct the sitLAation, the erstwhile colonial aloofness and isolation must be overcome and a new sense of

29 To be sure, the performance of ASEAN has fallen short of expectations in some areas, particularly i ntr a-econorni c cooperation ,and there still remain many obstacles to closer association. See Hans Indorf, Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast AsianStudies,19S2). However, most observers agree that ASEAN is an outstand i ng ac:h 1 evement.

r eg i □na 1 so1idarit y an d partnership wouId have t o be forged b o as to bring those nations together in a movernent toward r eg i ona 1 cohesi verieb s and c. o 11 a b o r a t i o n . I f s u c h a n o b j e c t i v e c a n b er e a c In e d t hi e i r i n d i v i d u a 1 w e a k nesses and i m p o t e n c e will gradually be replaced by a greater combined strength and their voices will be heard and weight, noted on the international forum.. These were the a i rn s t h a t t h e f o u n d e r s o f A S A and A S E A N s e t. f o rthemselves. .. .. 30

Thanat was correct to avoid subscribing to ASEAN

any m o 1 1 ve of supranationa1isms the individua1 sovereign

posi t.i on o f eac:In rnernber was not to be subordi nated to the

o r g a n i z a 1 1 o n ' s a u t h o r i t y . In v i e w o f rn any divisive e 1 e m e n t s

a rn o n g t h e A B E A N c o u n t r les, i t i s m ore r e a 1 i s t ic to limit t h e

aims and activities of ASEAN to a manageable scale and allow

sorne t i me f or rnember st at es t o get ac quai n t ed w l1 h one

another bef or e ernbar ki ng on gr and joint pro j ec t s . this

exp1 ains why at t h e inc ep tion of A S E A N , political

cooperation was not set as a major goal.Though Thanat and most of the lhai leaders

a 11 a c h e d g r e a t i rn p cd r t a n c e to A S E A N , t h e y h a d a realistic

ex p ec t at i on of wh at b en ef i t s Th ail an d cou Id derive f r on.

A S EAN. Th ai 1 and c o la1 d c o lant on ASEAN t o pr ov i de mor a 1 and

p cd 1 :i t i c a 1 s la p p o r t „ T h i s h a s e n a b 1 e d T h a i 1 a n d t o cope w e 11

wi th r adi ca 1 changes i n :i. ts exter-na 1 envi r onment e . g . tIne

A rn e r i c a n w i t h d r a w a .1. f r o rn S cd u t l "i e a s t A s i a a n cJ 11' ie Viet n a m e s e

i n v a s i o n o f i< a rn p u c h e a „ B y coor d i n a t i n g its p o 1 1 c i e s wit h

the other ASEAN countries, Thailand has been able to

30 " The ASEANs Problems and Prospects in a ChangingUJor 1 d , 11 i n Sar asi n V i r apho 1 , et a 1 . , 7'he ASEAN ; Pr oh lems and Prospects in a Changing Uorld (Bangkoks Chulalongkorn university,1976) ,p .4. Cited in M o r r i s o n , Stratagies for Survival,p ,265.

1 n C I'" 0 S 3 0 i t 3 b a g a i n :i. n q p o w 0 r w i t h 3. a r q 0 r s t a t e s . 3

H 0 w 0 v 0 r ,, T h a :i. 3. a n d r e a 1 i z 0 cJ t h a t A S IE A N w a 15 :i. n c a p a I;.) 3. 0 o f

p r d v :i. d i n q 0f f 0 c t. :i. v 0 rn :i. j. 11 a r y a s s :i. s t a n c: 0 :i. n t j. m 0 o f d a n q e r »

F a c: 0 d w :i. t h s 0 r :i. o u s 0 x 1 0 r n a 1 t h r 0 a t s , I h a :i. 1 a n d 1 o o k 0 d t o s a rn 0

3 01- 1 d f c: a 1 ]. a b 0 r a t i 0 n w i t h t h 0 q r 0 a t p 0 w 0 r s t 0 0 n h a n c 0 i t s

security,. As fa r as the main ton a nee of m il i ta ry security is

<:: 0 n c 0 r n 0 d T h a :i. 1 a n d h a s n 0 v 0 r 0 v. z r 0s t i m a 1 0 d A S E A N ' s

potent i a I

T h i s a 1 1 i t u d 0 a 1 s 0 0 x p 1 a i n s w h y T h a i 1 a n d h a s n 01

b 0 0 n v 0 r y 0 n t h u s :i. a s t i c a b 0 u t A S E A N ' s Z 0 P F A N i d 0 a F r 0 rn t h e

Thai standpoint,, ASEAN is not strong enough to shape the

f u t u r 0 0 f S o u 11 " 10 a s t A s i a s i n g 1 0 - h a n d 0 d J. y - P 0 a c 0 a n d

s t a b i 1 i t y i n t h 0 r 0 g i o n i s s t i 1 I c 0 n t i g 0 n t 0 n t h 0 p 01 i c i e s

of the great powers- The neutra liza tion of Southeast Asia

i s a n :i. d 0 a 1 p 1 a n b u t t h 0 T h a i a r 0 a w a r e t h a t t h 0 U n i t e d

S t a 1 0 s ,, t h 0 S o v i e t U n 1 o n a n d C h i n a c a n n 01 s i m p J. y b e w i s h e d

a w a y f r 0 n 1 t h 0 r 0 g i 0 n a 1 p 0 w 0 r 0 q u a t i 0 n - F 0 r t hi 0 s a k 0 o f

T hi a :i. 1 a n d ' s s e c la r i t y i n 1 0 r 0 s t s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y 1 0 w 0 r k w i t hi

the great powers fo r the balance of power even though th is

m i g 111 0 n c o u r a g 0 t h 0 g r 0 w t hi o f t h 0 g r 0 a t p o w e r s ' 1 n f J. la 0 n c 0

a 1 "1 d p o s t p o n 0 t h 0 r 0 a 1 i z a t i o n o f Z 0 P F A N - T h a i 1 a n d i n 0t h 0 r

words followed the Realis ts ' advice tha\ a fiat ion should not

s la b 0 r d i n a 1 0 i t s n a t :i. o n a 1. i n 1 0 r 0 s t s 1.0 o t h 0 r i n 1 0 v 0 s t s ,

r 0 g :i. o n a 1 0 r i n t. 0 r n a t :i. 0 n a 3. . 3 'z

Though at present the idea of ZOF:‘FrAN remains

u n a 1 1 a i n a b 3. 0 ,, t h 0 A S E A N c 0 la n t r :i. 0 s n a v 0 c 0 n t r i b u 1 0 d t a

s t a b i 1 i t y 3. n t h 0 r 0 g i 01 \ b / a g r 0 0 i n g t o s 01 1 1 0 t h 0 i r

Z- 3. (J n 1 1 10 b 0 n 0 f i t s A S E A N p r o v i d 0 s f 0 r i t s :i r i cl i v i d la a 1m 0 rn b e r s , s 0 0 :i. b i d , p p .. 2 7 3 2 7 5 -

3 2 Chapiter I , pi» 1 0 «

68

bi i ater a 1 d i sputes peacef u 1 I y .. For t he past n i neteen year s ,

A S E A N h a s b e e n a b 1 e t o c o n t a i n f r i c t i o n s a m o n g m e m b e r s t a t e s

w h i c h c o u I d o t h e r w i s e h a v e e s c a 1 a t e d i n t o m a j o r conflict s

and provi ded cdpportu.n i t i es f or ex ternal i nterveid1 1 on i n the

r 0 g i cd n .. A rn o n g t h e s e p r oblems a r e t. h e u n resolved d i s p u t e

over 8ab ah b et ween Ma1 aysia an d t he Philippines, bor der

pr ob 1 cdms b et ween Th a i 1 an d and lia 1 ay s i a an d a c on f r on t at i on

b e t w e e n li a 1 a y s i a a n d I n d □ n e s i a . T h e success of ABE A N i n

this regard is highly beneficial to Thailand- Had there

stil 1 remai ned serious bic kering among the ASEAN conntri e s ,

T h a i 1 a n d w o u 1 d hi a v e f a r rn o r e d i f f i c u 1t i e s i n s a f e g u a r ding

11s security -

Thailand's decision to establish ASEAN must be

c o n s i d e r e d a p r o m i n e n t d i p J. o m a t i c a c h i e v e m e n t .. 11

demonstrated that Thai1 and recognized the need to cooperate

wi t h ot hEDr n at i an s i n or der t cd pr ornot e and a 1 1 -r ound gain s

i n s e c u r i t y a n d s t a b i 1 i t y .. H a cl T h a i 1 a n cl b e e n c y n i c a 1 a n d

placed excessive emphasis on competition to further its

i n t er est s , i t cou 1 d have i nc r eased t ensi on i n t he reg i on ,

t h u s rn a k j. n g i t rn o r e d i f f i c u 11 t o p u r sue its own i n t e r e s t s -

In a word, Thailand's enthusiasm for ASEAN stemmed from its

s e 1 f -■ e n 1 i g h t e n e d i n t e rest s ..Thailand's Policy toward the Kampuchean Problem 1978-1986.

T h e e x p e r i e n c e o f o v e r d e p e n d ed n c e o n t h e U n i t e dStates t aug ht T h ai1 and an import ant 1esson s a close a11ian c ew i t h g r e a t p o w e r s i s n cd t t o b e s e e n a s a n u n q u a 1 i f i e db 1 e s s i n g - T h e g r e a t p o w e r s c a n c h a n g e t h e i r p o 1 i c y wit hlittle regard to their small ally and leave the latter in a v e r y v u 1 n e r a b 1 e p o s i t i o n - W 1 1 h t h i s 1 e s s o n i n rn i n d , t h eT hi a i g cd v e r n m e n t s d u r i n g 1 7 5 — 1979 (e x c e p t f o r t hi e 1 hanin

69

r eg i m e ) c ar ef u 1 I y avoi. ded rig i d assoc i at ion w i t h any si n g 1 e

coi.intr y . Nonethe 1 ess , t he Viet namese i n vasi on o f Karrpnchean

i n 3. a t e 1978 c o m p e 11 e d T h a i 1 a n d t o a □ a n d o n i t s p o I i c y o f

e q u i d i s t a n t p o 1 i c y a n d b e c o rn e C h i n a ' s d e f a c t o a 11 y . F' e k i n g

and Bangkok now share a common interest, in pressuring Hanoi

t o w i t hi d r a w i t s t r o o p s f r o m K a m p u c h e a .

W hi e t h e r T h ai I and ' s policy t o ward t h e K a in puche a n

question is realistic or not is debatable. During the last

e i g h t y e a r s , V j. e t n a m h a s c o n s i s t e n 1 1 y c 1 a i ni e d t h a t t h e

s i t u a t i o n i n K a m p u c hi e a i s i r r e v e r s i b 1 e . A n d i t has given

e v e r y i ndic. a t i o n t h at it is p r e p a r e d t o rn a k e e v e r y s a c r i f i c e

t o k e e p K a m p la c h e a u n d e r i t s s p h e r e o -f in f luence. Hanoi

s i m p 1 y r e g a r d s i t s d o m i nance o v e r K a rn p u chea as absolut e 1 y

vital to its security.33 Hanoi should have accepted ASEAN's

so 1 ution tcj the prob 1 ern. A nelatra 1 Kampuchea could not pose

any t hir eat t o Vi et nam. Yet the tr ut h o f the ma11 er i s that

ASEAN lacks a means to guarantee that the pro-Peking Khmer

Rouge regime will not be allowed to resume power after the

V i e t n a m e s e w i t hi d r a w a 1 » 1 n t h is light, Vi e t. n a m i s e x p e c t e d t o

insist on the control of Kampuchea. Judging from its record

i n t hi e f i g h t a g a i n s t t |-“i e A m e r i c a n s , i t i s d o u b t f u 1 t h a t

C h i n a a n d 7 hi a i 1 a n d w i 1 1 s la c c e e d i n b r e a k i n g V i e t n a m ' s

r e c a 1 c j. t r a n t w i 3. 1 . T h i. s i s p a r t i c u 1 a r 1 y t r u e w h e n o n e t a k e s

i n t o c on s i d er at i on t hi e f ac t t h a t t h e rn i 1 i t ar y op er ation of

t. h e? K h n I e r r e s i s t a n c e c o a 3. :l t i o n h a s s o f a r f a i 1 e d t o r a i s e

33 For Vietnam's attitude toward Thailand and the K a m p la c hi e a n p ir- o b 1 e rn s e e G a r e t h P o r t e r , "Vi e t n a rn ' s E v o 1 v i n g P ca 1 i c y t o w a r d T l"i a i 3. a n d s I m p 1 i c a t i o n f o r t h e F la t u r e 1' i n C o n f r o n t a t i o n o r C o e x i s t e r> c e . T h e F a t u r e o f A S E A N - V i e i n a m R e 1 a i i o Ti s , W i 3. 1 i a rn T u ir-1 e y e d „ (B a n g k o k : t h e 1 n s t i t u t e o fS e c u r i t y a n d 3‘. n t e r n a t i o n a 1 S t u d i e s , C h la 1 a 1 o n g k o r n University,1985.

7 0

the cost of the Vietnamese occupat ion of Kampuchea

s u b s t a n t i a 11 y B e s i d e s , i t i s u n 1 i k e 1 y t h a t C h i n a w i 11 t a k e

d e c: i s i v e m i 1 i t a r y a c t :i. o n a g a i n s t V i e t n a rni. B u c h a n a c t i o n

m i g h t w e 1 I p r o v o k e S o v i e t r e t a 1 i a t i o n -

B y a 11 a o c o u n t s , t h e l < a rn p u c h e a n c r i s i s w i 11 r e m a i n

p ro t rac ted» The problem fo r I h a i l and i s th a t it. has to

con t inue to pay a high p r i c e f o r r e s i s t i n g the Vietnamese

o c c u p a t i o n » I n c o o p e r a t i n g w i t h C h i n a , f h a i 1 a n d r i s k s

becoming too dependent on China and in the process w i l l y —

ni 11 y he 1 ps t.he 1 a11er expand i t s in f lu e n c e in Boutheast

A s ia » As discussed in the p rev ious chap te r , the growth of

Chinese presence in the reg ion i s l i k e l y to generate adverse

e f f e c t s on T h a i la n d 's long- te rm in te re s ts the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n

of Bout heast Asi a » Mor e i rnp or t an 11 y , wh i 1 e Ch i n a c an

m ain ta in pressure on Vietnam w i th ou t fea r of r e t a l i a t i o n ,

T h a i 1 a n d c a n n o t . 1 n a w o r d , t. h e m ore s e c u r i t y T h a i 1 a n d

s e eks by r e s i s t i n g t he Vietnamese oc c u p a t io n , t h e less

s e c u r i t y i t w i11 have. Given the seemingly i mp1acab1e

s i t u a t i o n and se r iou s im p l i c a t io n s , w i l l i t be more

r ea1i s t i c fo r Th a i 1 an d to adopt a more ac c ornmod a t i n g

a 11 i t u d e t o w a r d V i e t. n a m ? 3 '*

I t i s not easy to answer "yes" to the above

quest ion and the re i s a good case f o r Thai f o r e ig n - p o l i c y

makers to argue th a t the present course of Thai p o l i c y i s

r e a l i s t i c enoug h . Th a i 1 and i s n ow fac in g a m i l i t a r i l y

powerful Vietnam at i t s doorsteps; th e re fo re , i t must do

34 F o r a g o o d c r i t i q u e o f T hi a i 1 a n d ' s fo r e i g n p o 1 i c y to war d K a rn p u c h e a , s e e S la k h u m b h a n d P a r :i b a t r a , " W i I 1 T h a i la n dB e c o rn e a V i c t i rn s o f 0 u r 0 w n S u c c e s s ? 11 I S1 S B a I J e t i n ,( I n s t i t u t e o f I n t e r n a t i o n a 1 a n d S e c u r i t y S t la d i e s ,C h u1 a1ongkor n Unive r s i t y , Ban gko k ) v o1 3, n o . 1 (J an u ar y , 1984) ,p» 6»

71

what it can to maintain its position vis-a-vis Vietnam. In

line with the Realists' balance.of-power principle, Thailand

rnust r esi st the Vi etnamese supr emacy over I ndochi n a . 3 A

dominant Vietnam would be in a position to coerce Thailand

• j n t o c o m p 1 y i n g w i t h i t s d e rn a n d s . I n s u c h a c a s e , t hi a i 1 a n d s

freedom of action would be restricted in managing both its

;j n 1 0 r n a 1 a n d e x t e r n a 1 a f f a i r s . T h o u g h C h l n a m i g h t b e c o m e a

threat to Thailand in the long run, Thailand has no choice

but to work with it in order to cope with Vietnam which is

the immediate threat. As Machiavelli advocated, it is

i n c u rn b e n t o n t h e r e a 1 i s tic p o 1 i c y rn a k e r s t o c h o o s e 11 \ e

1 ess er evi 1 ..Moreover, the Thai leaders can contend that their

p o 1 i c y t o w a r d t h e K a rn p u c h e a n p r o b 1 e m i s r e a 1 i s t i c b e c a u s e

the cost of opposing the Vietnamese occupation has so far-

been acceptable. Thailand has enjoyed and will continue to

enjoy at least in the foreseeable future the support from

C h i n a , t. h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d A S E A N . Thailand i t sei f h a s

been handling the border situation carefully in order not

to provoke Vietnam into an open conflict. As long a_̂

Thailand can manage to avoid a catastrophic war with

Vietnam, it is realistic to continue its maintain pressure

on Vietnam. Should Thailand persevere in its efforts,

Vietnam might find it necessary to modify its policy.

.According to this line of thinking, the time has not arrived

"T•J W

36

Ch apter I ,p .11-12.

Chapter I,p.i9.

■f o r T h a i 1 a n d t a c o n s i d e r a c c: o m m o d a t i o n w i t h Vie t n a m - The

present po.1 i cy i s correct. 3 'In a d d i t i o n , as a ma11er of princip1e , Thai1 and

niust chal lenge 'the Vietnamese viol a Li or i of Kampuchea s

sovereignty. Without such a challenge, a precedent tor the

se1 1 1ement of disputes by force in Southeast Asia wo u 1d be

estab1 ished•33 11 is in a 11 AS£AN c o u n t r i e s ' intsrests to

ensure that sovereignty of every regional state and the

principle of non-intervention are strictly observed. Unless

all Southeast Asian nations agree that each of them should

be i mmune f r om ex ter na 1 i nter f er ence and f r ee to ar r ange its

i n t e r n a 1 a f f a i r s a s i t s g o v e r n rn e n t s e e f i t , p e a c e f u 1 c o -

e xist en c e is pra c tic a 11y impossib1e . As evident +r om

Article 2 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, ASEAN

a 11 a c I "I e s s u p r e m e i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e r e s p e c t f o v s o v e r e i g n t y

and the pr i nc i p 1 e of non — i nter vent i on .What is u n d ou b t e d1y re a1istic ab out 1h ai1 and's

policy toward the Kampuchean problem is its support for the Khmer Rouge regime despite its atrocious historical recoi d.

Though the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea was not

motivated by humanit arian reasons, it was undeniable that

Hanoi had liberated the Kampucheans •from one of t h e most

— or 0,, amp i 0 ̂ j,:; i sh or e lvlahbuban i , 1 ‘ The Kamp uc h eaProblem: A Southeast Asian Perception," Foreign Affairs 62,no.2 (1983),pp.406-429.38 Michael Leiter claimed that the ASEAN countries considered the Vietnamese intervention as a demonstratioh of the princip1e of 1imited sovereignty pioneered with success by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe in August 1968. Thus, t o r e o o g n i z e t h e H a n ci i — b a c e d H e n g S a m r i n r e g i ff i e would b e tantamount to endorsing that perverse principle for Southeast A s i a . Lei f e r , 11 The Xnter nationa1 Representatlon of Kampuchea", p. 56. (see footnote no. 47 ,chapter I I)

b a r b a r o la s q o v e r n m e n t. b i n r e c e n t h i s t. o r y .. I n t h i s 1 i g 11 t , t h e

i n t 0 r n a t i o n a 1 c o rn in la n i t y w a b in o r a .1. 1 y b o u n d t o a p p 1 a u d u. 110

Vietnamese action™ Given the Khmer Rouge's odious record on

h Li rn a n r i g h t , i t a p p e a r s m o r a 1 i y w r o n q ■ t o s t i c k t o t h e n o n —

intervention p r inc ip le in th is case. ? From a moi ui point

of view, the Khmer Rouge deserved to be wiped out. And yet,

•f or the sake o f i ts secur i ty i nterests , Thai 1 and suppressed

i t s moral repulsion against the Khmer Rouge and act ive ly

backed i t against the Vietnamese troops. This is t ru ly in

the rea1is t view of foreign po1icy which urges s ta tes to

subordinate mora1 concerns to survival»4° As the saying

goes," desperate cases reqLAire desperate remedies."

On the whole, Thailand's foreign policy after the

Second Wor1d War has accorded with the re a l i s t view of

foreign policy. Thailand understood well the rule that

f o r e i g n p o 1 i c y rn la s t b e i n t u n e wit h r ealit i .es. In the case

of Thailand, these r e a l i t ie s are i t s unstable external

e n v iro n m e n t « G e o g r a p h i c a 11 y s i t la a t e d next to Indochina, t h e

r egion whic h has b een c on t in uaJ 1y b een c on f 1i c t - r id d en,

Thai1 and c ou1d not av oid being implicated in sec u r i t y

p i'- q QI 0 (fi 0 u (__i L-4 i i~i g to i t s stra teg ic location in Southeast

Asia, Thailand could not avoid being caught in con f l ic t ing

t bi de presslar es , ei ther . In conf orrni ty with t.hese

r e a1i t i e s , Thai1 and's foreign po1icy has been pr imari ly

concerned with security issues. there is no need for tSie

Realists to remind Thailand to give p r io r i t y to security and

39 On the question whether there are circumstances in which intervention might be morally permissible, see Chai 1 es R „ Beit z , P o 1 i t i c a 1 T h e o r y a n d 1 n t e r n a t i o ti a 1 R e l a t i o n s . (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1979),pp.67-92.

40 Chapter I , p.iS.

74

s u r v i v a 1 . T h a i 1 a n d a 1 s o r e a 1 i z e d t he impo r t a nee o f power i n

i n t e r n a t i o n a 1 p o I i t i cs; it w a s n e v e r u n □ e r the ill u s ion t h a t

i t cou 1 d escape power poi i t i cs . In ensur i ng i t s secur i ty ,

T h a i I a n d s o u g h t t o m a n i p u 1 a t e p o w e r r e 1 a t i o n s t o i t s

advantange» Thai land, in line with the Realists advil e ,

r e c: o q n i z e d t hi e n e c e s s i t y t o rn a i n t a i n t h e b a 1 a n c: e o f p o w e r -

Ideals and morals were not allowed to obstruct its efforts

t o p r o rn o t e a d e s i r a b 1 e b a 1 a n c e o f pi o w e r . I n a d d i t i o n ,

T h a i 1 a n d h a s b e e n v e r y c o n s c i o u s o f c o s t - b e n e f i t a n a 1 y s i s

b e f o r e i m p 1 e rn e n t i n g i t s p o 1 i c i e s « "I h e r e i s a s e n s i h 1 e

r 0 1 a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n i t s. u n d e r t a k i n g s a n d i t s r e a 1

c a p a b i 1 i t i e s . W h e n t h e c o s t o -f a g i v e n poll c y o u t w e i g h e d

its benefits, Thailand abandoned that policy« \ I hail and s

d e c 1 a r e d p o 1 i c y o f u n i 1 a t e r a 1 i n t e r v e n t i o n i n L a o s i n 19 6 2

is the best example.) It is noteworthy that during the last

forty years, Thailand has never embarked on adventurous

p o 1 i c i. e s » I n t h e s e r e s p e c t s , t h e ft e a 1 i s t s w o u I d have

c o rn rn e n d e d T h a i 1 a n d ' s f o r e i g n p o I i c y f o r i t s r a t i o n a 1 i t y ,

p r la d e n c e a n d s e n s e o f p r o p o r t ion.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKSBeitz , Cha ries. Po1itica1 7heory and Interna1iona 1

Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1978.

Carr, E„H. 7he Tuenty Years ' Crisis 1919-1939. 2nd. ed.L. o n d o n : M a c m i 11 a n , 1974.

Darling, Frank C. Thailand and the United States. New Jer sey: Pub 1 i c Af f ai r s Press , 1965.

D h i r a v e g u i n , L i k h i t . S i a m a n d C o 1 o n i a 1i _• m (1S 5 5 ~ 19 09 ) .Bangkok: Thai Wattana Panich Co.,Ltd., B.E.2518(1975)

F r i ed r i c h , Car 1 J oac h i m . Inewitabl e Pe a c e . Carnb r i dge:H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1948.

G a la t h i e r , D a v id P „ T h e L o g i c 0 f Lei' i at ha n . 0 x f o r c:l:C1 a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1969.

(3 i r 1 i n g , Jo h n L . 8. 7" h a i 1 a n d z S o c i e t y a n d P o 1 i t i c s . It h a c a :C o r n e 11 U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 19 81 .

Herz, John. Po1itica 1 Rea 1ism and Po1itical Idea 1ism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.

Indorf, Hans. Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia. Si ngapore: Inst i tLite of Sout.heast As i an Studi es , 1982.

Kn c:)x , T . M . t r an s . He ge 1 ' s Ph i 1 o s o p h y o f R i ght . 0x f or d ;OUP, 1949.

Leif er , Michae1. Cambodia. Lon d on: Pa 11 Ma 11 Press, 1967................... The Foreign Relations of the New States.

H o n g K o n g : L o n g rn a n , A u s t r a 1 i a , 1974 .Mac:hi avel 1 i H Niccolo. The Pr i n ce an d The Di scourses. Luigi

Ricci trans. New York, 1940„Mei necke , Fr i edr i c:hi. Hachiawe 11 i sm . tr ans. Douglas Sco11.

L o n d o n s Routledge an d Keg an P au1, 1957 .Models ki , Geor g e „ ed. S EAT0 z Six Studies. Melbourne: F .W .

C h e s hire, 1962Morgenthan, Hans. American Foreign Pol icyz A Critical

E x a m i. a n a t i o n . L o n don: M e t h u e n , 1952....... Politics Among Nations. 5th ed. New

Y o r k : R a n d o m H o u s e , 197 4.. Scientific Han ws Powar Politics.

L o n d o n : L a 1 1 rn er, 1947.MoI'-r i scan , Char 1 es. Jap an ? t he Un i t ed S t a t es an d a Chan gi n g

76

Southeast Asia. New York: University Press of America,Inc., 198b.............. and Astri Suhrke. Strategies ofSurvival. St. Lucia: University of Queensland, 1976.

Nai r K . K . ASEAN—1 n do china Relati on s Since 1975: The ’ p01 i tics o f Ac c o mmod at i on . Canberra: The Strategic unDefense Studies Center, The Australian National Un i ver s i t. y , 1984.

Nuechterlein, Donald Southeast Asia. 1965.

E. Thailand and The Struggle for Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

Paribatra, Sukhumbhand. Su Chom Hgai Mai:panhan Kampucha (Toward a New Solution: AoEAN Vietna and The Kampuchean Problem). Research Paper no.*-. Bangkok: Institute of Strategic and InternationalStudies, Chulalongkorn University, 1985.

PI amenatz, John. Han and Society, vol 1- London: Longman,1963.

Shaweross, William. Sideshow. New York: Pocket Books,1979.

Til man, Robert 0. The Enemy Beyond: External Thre^tPerception in the ASEAN Region. Singapore: Instituteof Southeast Asian Studies, Research Note and Discussions Paper No. 42 1984.

Viraphol, Sarasin. Direction in Thai Forelgn Policy. Occasional paper no. 40. Singapore: Institute oSoutheast Asian Studies, 1976.

Wolfer, Arnold. Discord and Collaboration. Baltimore: JohnHopkins University Press, 1962.

ARTICLESBerlin, Isaiah. " The Originality of Machiavelli."

Studies on Machiavelli. td. Myron P. Gilmore. Sansoni S.P.A., 1972, pp. 147-^06.

InG. C.

Bull Hedley. " Hobbes and the International Anarchy. Social Research 48, no.4 (1981), 716-7.J-9.

............. » Martin Wight and the Theory of"international Relations." British Journal of International Studies 2, no.2 (1976), 101-116.

» The Twenty Years' Crisis Thirty Years On." International Journal XXIV, no.4 (1964), 625-6.38.

» Society and Anarchy in International Relations." In Diplomatic Investigation. Eds. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight. Cambrigde: Harvard

77

Un i ver si ty Pr ess , 1966 , pp . 35—50 -Buszynski , Les. " Thailand and the Manila Pact." The Nor Id

Today 36 (February 1980), 45-51«.........«... . " Thailand : The Erosion of a E<alanced

Foreign Policy." As i art Survey XXII, no. 11 (1982) ,1037-1055.

.......... . " SEATO: Why It Survived Until 1977 and WhyIt Was Abolished." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies XII, no.2 91981),287-296

Forsyth, Murray. " Thomas Hobbes and the ExternalRelations." British Journal of International Studies.5, no.3 (1979), 196-209.

Fox, William T.R. " E.H. Carr and Political Realism: Visionand Revision." Review of International Studies 11, no. 1 (1985),1-17.

Girling, J.L.S. " Thailand: Conflict or Consensus." TheNo rid Today 32, (Feb r uary 197 6) , 49-59.

............... " Indochina." In Conflict andIntervention in the the Third Nor Id. Ed. Mohammed Ayoob (Canberra; Australian National University Press, 1980, pp.12-37.

............... " Interests and Roles of Regional States."In Regional Security: Development and Stability in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of SoutheastAsian Studies, 1980, pp. 56-58.

............... " Thailand's New Course." Pacific AffairsXLI I no. 3(1969), 346-359.

Jackson, Karl D. " U.S. Policy, ASEAN and the Kampuchean Crisis." In Economic,Pol itical and Security in the 1980's. Eds. Robert A. Scalapino and Jusuf Wanandi. Berkeley: California, pp.125-139.

Kennan, George F. " Morality and Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs 64, no.2 (1985-1986), 206—218.

«inter, William. " Thailand Faces the Future." Orbis 19, no.4 (1975), 1126-1140

Khoman, Thanat. " American Military Withdrawal fromThailand." In Southeast Asian Affairs 1976 Ed. Kernial Sandhu Singapore: Institute of Southeast AsianStudies 1976, pp. 394-397........ " Thailand in the Midst of Changes." In

Trends in Thailand. Eds. M. Rajaretnam and Lim So Jean. Singapore: Institute of Southeast AsianStudies, 1973, pp.97-121.

Leifer, Michael. " Kampuchea and Laos : Critical Issue for

78

ASEAN . " In Ec o n o m i c , Po 1 i t ical a n d Se cur i t y i n t h e 1980's. Eds- Robert A. Scalapino and Jusuf Wanandi- Berkeleys California ,1980, pp.13-22.

................ " The International Representation ofKampuchea." In Southeast Asian Affairs 19S2 Singapore:Heinemann Asia,1982, pp.47-59.

Nahbubani, Kishore, " The Kampuchean Problems A Southeast Asian Per cep tion," Foreign Affairs 62, n o.2 (1983) , pp.406—429.

Morgan, Roger. " E.H. Carr and the Study o-f International Relations." In Essays in Honour of E.H. Carr. Ed.C. Abramsky. London: Macmi11 an,1974, 171-180.

Morgenthau, Hans. " Another "Great Debate" : The NationalInterest of the United States." The American Political Science Review XLVI , no.4.(1952),961-979.

Nuechter1ein, Donald. " Small States in Alliances: IcelandThailand, Australia." Orbis XIII, no.2 (1969),600-629

Paribatra, Sukhumbhand. " Will Thailand Became A Victim o-f Its Own Success?" ISIS Bulletin ( Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Bangkok: Chula-longkorn University), vol 3, no. 1 (January,1984),p.4.

Suhrke, Astri . " ASEAN: Adjustment to New RegionalAlignment." ASIA Pacific Community no.12 (Spring 1981), 11-33.

.............. " Thailand: Trapped in the Bamboo Image."Australian Outlook 22 ,no. 2 (1968), 334—346.

.... ......... " S'mal I er-Nat i on Diplomacy: Thailand'sCurrent Dilemmas." /Isiarv Survey XI, 5 (1979), 429-444

Vincent, R.J. " The Hobbesian Tradition in The Twentieth Century International Thought." Hi 11 ini urn 10, no.2 (1981), 91-101.

Viraphol, Sarasin. " National Threat Perceptions:Explaining the Thai Case." In Threats to Security in East Asia-Pacific. Ed. Charles E. NOrrison Hawaii: D.C. Heath and Company, 1983, pp.145-153.

................... " Thai - American Relations in the Post1975 Period." In A Century and a Half of Thai-America Relations. Eds. Wiwat Mungkandee and William Warren Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, pp.115-150.

Official Document

Collected Interviews of Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman.vol.2, Bangkok: Department of Information, Ministry of

79

Foreign Affairs, I960.Collected Interviews of His Excellency Dr. T han at Khoman.

vo1 3, Bangkok: Department of Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs., 1969

Collected Papers and Statements of Foreign Hin is ter Than at Khoman. (July 1964-November 1965) Bangkok: Departmentof Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Collected Statements of Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman. vol.3 (November - October 1967) Bangkok:Department of Information, Ministry of Foreign Af f ai r s.

Foreign Affairs Bui let in(FAB). Bangkok: Ministry of ForeignA f f airs, Thailand.

Hews Bulletin. Bangkok: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Thai 1 and.

News Letter. Bangkok: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Thai 1 and.

PeriodicalsFar Eastern Economic Review (FEER)

YearbookFar Eastern Ec o n o m i c Review: Asia Ye ar b o <.< k