rapid deployment as a response to an active shooter incident

Rapid Deploymentas a response to an

Active ShooterIncident

Illinois State PoliceAcademy

2003

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Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The T actic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The Inc idents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The Findings & Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

The Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

The Recommend ations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Rapid Deployment in a post 9-11 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

The Experts’ Opinions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Synopsis o f Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

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Introduction

In less than 33 years, the U.S. law enforcement

commu nity has experienced two watershe d events

which shaped our respo nse to incidents involving an

active shooter. The first rude awakening was

perpetrated by Charles Whitman from the clock tower

at the University of Texas at Austin. In a sniper

incident lasting 90 minutes, Whitman killed 15 and

wounded 31 victims. Whitman's training in the U.S.

Marine Corps apparently prepared him well for dealing

with targets as distant as 500 yards from his perch on

the 30th floor obse rvation dec k.

Many regard this incid ent as the impetus of d ramatic

change in police training and response. Some agencies

issued long-range rifles and trained their officers in the

role of counter-sn iper, while other agencies formed

more comprehensive para-military teams with even

greater capabilities. The genesis of what would become

Special Weapons and Tactics teams (SWAT)

undoub tedly began at 1 1:48 a.m . on August 1 , 1966 in

the form of Charles Whitman's murderous spree.

Notably, Whitman was finally stopped that day by two

police office rs and an arm ed citizen wh o teamed up to

attack his sniper perch and kill him.

The evolution of SWAT teams in U.S. police agencies

followed a rather hopscotch pattern around the nation.

Most large cities had very well equipped and trained

teams, while some suburban and rural areas basically

ignored the conce pt or deve loped m utual-aid

agreements with neighboring tea ms. Outside of major

metropo litan areas, few age ncies expe cted incide nts

requiring a SWAT -type response. Another important

consideration is the fact that SWAT teams are

expensive and time consuming.

Most agencies developed policies setting clear

guidelines for the activation of a SWAT team. Patrol

officers in these agencies were gener ally trained to wait

for SWAT when an incident justified deployment of the

special team. Patro l officers were ex pected to

"Contain, Isolate and Negotiate” until SWAT arrived.

During this same time, the primary mission of most

SWAT teams was evolving. Originally, most SWAT

teams were structured for scenarios involving snipers

(or other barricaded gunmen) and hostag e incidents. In

actuality, active shooters, barricaded gunmen and

hostage incidents are infrequent. So, many SWAT

teams trained heavily but rarely deployed.

Administrators looking for w ays to justify their

investment in these units realized that the entry team

component of SWA T units was perfectly suited to

conduct high-risk raids for the service of arrest or

search warrants. Many SWAT teams now spend as

much as 80 per cent of their time conducti ng pre-

planned raids, not eme rgency response missions.

What does this brief history of SWAT have to do with

a study of Rapid Deployment - Immediate Action

tactics for patrol officers? More than 32 years after

Charles Whitma n's rampage , two teenage rs in Colorado

logged a similar death and injury toll at another school

... this time a high scho ol.

Within 13 minutes of the first police call to the April

20, 1999 inc ident at Colu mbine H igh Schoo l, Dylan

Klebold and Eric Harris killed 13 and wounded 24.

Unlike Whitman's sniper incident, the Columbine event

was planned around explosives. Klebo ld and H arris

had set a large impro vised bom b in the schoo l cafeteria

with a timer set to go off when the lunch crow d would

provide nearly 500 victims. The killers planned to

shoot any fleeing students from positions they w ould

take up in the parking lot. Only when their bomb failed

to detonate did Klebold and Harris enter the scho ol to

kill who they co uld with firearm s.

In researching the Whit man shooting in A ustin, little

criticism of the police response could be found.

Anyone who left cover within Whitman's field of fire

was shot down. Indeed, one police officer was among

the dead that day in Austin. No one on that day had

heard of S WAT , a concep t which came later.

At the Columbine incident, however, the police were

loudly criticized. Even other police agencies have

joined in the condemnation of the police response to the

attack perpetrated by Klebold and Harris. At

Columbine, numerous SWAT units deployed as quick ly

as possible an d made e ntry into the school within 45

minutes of the first call. In fact, the shooters committed

suicide at about the same time the first SWAT team was

entering the o ther side of the m assive schoo l.

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The current movement to train patrol officers to

respond using Rapid D eploymen t tactics began in

earnest in the aftermath of the Columbine shooting.

Response strategies like Rapid Deployment have been

around for a while in several forms, but emotions

surrounding the Columbine incident caused many

officers to insist they would “never again wait for

SWAT ” at the scene of an active shooter.

Like so many things in the law enforce ment com munity,

we have come full circle; from Rapid D eploymen t -

through the evolution of SW AT - bac k to Rapid

Deployment in just over 32 years. The resolution of the

Texas Tower incident was a Rapid D eploymen t,

unorganized as it was, by those police officers and the

armed citize n.

Our research into these incidents has uncovered other

instances where an im mediate, unorganized response by

arriving police officers probably saved lives. There is

no question: R apid De ployment tac tics can save live s in

some circumstances. However, the driving force

behind this research project is the understanding that

Rapid Deploym ent tactics carry w ith them a substantial

risk to the responding officers and the possibility that

these tactics could a ctually make some situations worse.

The concern m any express for the use of Ra pid

Deployment falls into the theory...“a little bit of

knowledge is dangerous.” One SWAT team

commander in Illinois put it this way: “In SWAT,

making an entry is always our last option, for w hen all

other methods of resolution have failed ... but, with

Rapid Deployment, we’re telling minimally trained

patrol officer s to use SWA T’s last option as the ir first

option. I wonder if we ’ve really thought this thing

through?”

It is quite easy for two police officers to pencil out a

scenario where Rapid Deployment tactics are the

obvious answer. In looking at 44 active shooter

incidents from the real world, the practicality of R apid

Deploym ent is not so clea r cut.

Our mission in this research was to first identify any

patterns inherent in active shooting incidents, if indeed

any such patterns exist. By better understanding how

these events unfold , we hoped to determine when and

where Ra pid Dep loyment is app ropriate.

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The Tactic

What is Rapid Deployment? Rapid Deployment is a

response strategy utilizing a small team of patrol

officers to assault and neutralize an active criminal

shooter. The theory behind Rapid Deployment is; we

can’t afford to wait for the arrival of a SWAT unit when

a killer is actively shooting victims. The Columbine

school shooting is the example most often pointed to by

Rapid Deployment proponents. Detractors feel the use

of Rapid Deployment tactics at Columbine would have

done no good and possibly made the situation even

worse.

There are several variations of this technique, but most

are quite similar. The names given to this technique

include: Rapid D eploymen t, Immediate Action, H all

Boss training, Active Shooter Response, Violent

Intruder - Police and Educators Response (VIPER) and

Quick Action Deployment (QUAD). We’ve

undoub tedly missed a few acronyms for this technique,

but for the sake of simp licity, we’ll call it Rapid

Deploym ent.

With Rapid Deploym ent, a team of patrol officers,

preferably armed with shotguns or carbines, will enter

the “Kill Zone” and mov e rapidly to make contact with

the shooter. Standard SWAT entry tactics, such as the

systematic clearing of all rooms, a re not used during

Rapid Deploym ent. The contact team’s job is to move

rapidly through an area to find and neutralize the active

shooter...to e ssentially run to the so und of gunfire .

Depending upon the circumstances, the contact team

may bypass downed victims and proceed past obvious

hazards, such as explosive devices. Two types of teams

are generally developed. T he first is the Contact Team

whose mission is to find a nd neutralize the active

shooter. Following the contact team will be one or

more Rescue Teams who will deal with any victims

bypassed by the contact team.

Most agencies training Rapid Deployment develop a

companion policy in their Standard Operating

Procedures outlining the criteria for response and the

type of incidents appropriate for its use. As an

example, most agenc ies specify that Rapid Deployment

is not appro priate for eve nts involving a gunman that

has barricade d in a fixed loc ation or is known to be

holding hostages. Commanders theorize that in such

circumstances, the risk to patrol officers and h ostages is

simply too great. For situations where immediate action

is not deemed appropriate, the Rapid Deployment

team(s) would be used as an inner perimeter to control

the suspect’s movement while a fully trained S W AT

team is assembled.

Most agencies set a minimum size for the Contact Team

at four officers, tho ugh some will send in a team with

only two officers. Most agencies dictate the use of long

guns for the Con tact Team, while others will utilize

only the officers’ sidearms. Some departments issue

ballistic shields and Kevlar© helmets to their patrol

officers for use during a rapid de ployment. A few

agencies require one or more members of their SWAT

team to be on-duty around the clock. These SWAT-

trained officers will assess an active shooter situation

and lead the Rapid Deployment team when they

determine the tactic is appropriate.

Even the training fo r this technique v aries widely.

Many agencies set up elaborate training exercises for

patrol officers using live role-players as suspects and

victims. Combined with a stressful setting and the use

of specialized training weap onry (like Simunitions©),

these sessions can b uild the requisite skills for this high-

risk course of action. However, some locales have

mandated Rapid Deployment training, but deliver it in

a short classro om-only form at.

No matter how agencies train initially, the question of

continuity of training for these perishable skills remains

unresolved. If this tactic is to be maintained long-term,

it must be a part of an agency’s in-service refresher

program.

Clearly, many agencies ad opted R apid Deployment as

an emotional response to the Columbine incident and

have not fully developed their policies for use of the

technique or the circum stances for wh ich it is

appropriate. The mo st importa nt aspect of this policy

development may be the supervisory decision making

process for approving the entry of a Rapid Deployment

team.

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The Incidents

History teaches us not to make a major change in police

practice based on a single incident, no matter how

dramatic the incident. Instead, we should base our

changes on a demonstrated pattern of criminal activity.

We began by o utlining the catastrophic University of

Texas and Colu mbine H igh Schoo l incidents , but we

must remember that they were separated by nearly 33

years.

How frequently do U.S. police agencies face such

overwhelming firefights? Are we justified in spending

precious time and money in preparin g for the unlikely

event that our jurisdiction will ever face such a threat?

On the other hand, we train extensively with firearms

even though we know very few police officers will ever

fire a single shot in the line of duty during their career.

Training for an event w e may never face is clear ly

justified if the potential consequences are seriou s.

By searching various sources, we were able to iden tify

nearly 80 active shooter incidents in the United States

dating back to the 1966 incident in Austin, Texas. As

we tried to debrief these incidents, many proved to not

fit within our parameters of an active shooter and some

were simply too old to allow us to obtain worthwhile

information .

Ultimately, we obtained detailed information about the

police response to 44 incidents. Undoubtedly, a

number of incidents went undiscovered, but the number

of active shooter incidents in an average year from 1966

through 20 01 could easily be cou nted on o ne hand.

Though these incidents are quite rare, they can be very

deadly for those involved. In the 44 incidents we

debriefed, 152 people were killed and 214 were

wounded. These numbers average out to 3.5 killed and

4.8 wounded per incident. Truly, these are serious

events.

For compar ison purpo ses, we also analyzed a 45 th

incident where the Los Angeles (California) Police

Department used Rapid Deployment tactics in an

attempt to rescue a downed officer from a location

controlled by a barricaded gunman. This incident was

included in our discussion for two reasons. First,

LAPD officers use this incident as an example in a

Rapid Deployment training program they have

delivered across the co untry. Secondly, the incident in

question points out ho w Rapid Deployment tactics can

actually make a bad incident worse, when used in the

wrong situation.

After these inciden ts were deb riefed and a nalyzed, a

summit was held to gather input from a number of

experts with extensive expe rience in resp onding to

critical incidents. This report is a compilation of the

discussions and reco mmend ations gener ated during this

meeting held in November of 2001. Each of the experts

helped edit this final docu ment and c ontribute their

personal opinions at the end.

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The Findings and Patterns

We always seem to have a compulsion to define the

“average” of any series of events being measured. The

following average active shooter incident is based on

our analysis o f 44 events.

A single, white male shooter, age d 30, will enter a well

populated location and open fire without warning. This

shooting spree will probably be over in two to three

minutes, usually long befor e even a single police officer

can arrive. The suspect will almost certain ly be familiar

with the locale and will initially target specific people,

but is very likely to fire rando mly before h e stops. Th is

shooter will probably be armed with more than one

firearm and will fire about 25 rounds, killing th ree to

four victims and wounding an additional five people.

After the shooting spree, the suspect is likely to end up

dead, probab ly by comm itting suicide. The incid ent is

almost guaranteed to take place during daylight hours

and will probably occur inside a building.

Surprisingly, many of the incidents we debriefed closely

fit the average we have outlined above. Incidents like

the Texas tower and Columbine are truly exceptional

and far outside the norm.

Victims:

As mentioned before, these incidents resulte d in 152

deaths and 214 people wounded . The largest death to ll,

23, was at the Luby’s Restaurant shooting in Killeen,

Texas in 1991 and the largest number of wounded, 25,

was at the Thurston High School in Springfield, Oregon

in 1998.

Suspects:

Only two incidents involved multiple shooters, with a

maximum of two suspe cts in any single incident. Of the

46 shooters, only two were females. The age range of

shooters ran from 11 to 70. Tw enty of the suspec ts died

at the scene; four were killed by police and 16

committed suicide.

Shots Fired:

Suspects in these 44 incidents fired from one to 188

shots. The 188 shot incident was Columbine High

School. Police fired during nine of these incidents,

ranging from two to more than 500 shots. More than

500 shots were fired by seven police officers in an

incident that started at a Cal-Trans maintenance yard

near Orange, California.

Respond er Casualties:

Responders were killed or injured in four of the 44

incidents.

A police officer was wound ed in an exchange of gunfire

at the end of a p ursuit of a suspect who killed four and

wounded six firefighters in a wo rkplace sho oting in

Jackson, Mississippi in 1996.

A New Hampshire Troo per was killed and a second

Trooper was wounded during a traffic stop/ambush at

the onset of a five hour shooting spree near Colebrook,

New Hampshire in 1997. In a subsequent ambush set

by the rifle-armed suspect, four additional officers were

wounded before the suspect was killed.

A police officer was wounded in a 500 round shootout

following the pursuit of an active shooting suspect from

a Cal-Trans maintenance yard near Ora nge, Californ ia

in 1997.

A security guard was killed and two police officers

were wounded by a man who had entered the library of

the Salt Lake City Latter Day Saints church and opened

fire in 1999. This 70 ye ar old man was ultimately killed

by police.

Response Strategy:

A true Rapid Deployment response, by an agency which

had previously trained in this tactic, was only u sed in

three of the 44 active shooter incidents we debriefed.

In two of the Rapid Deployment responses, the use of

these tactics affected the outcome of the incident in a

positive way. In the remaining Rapid Deployment use,

the incident was over before the team was ab le to make

entry into the scho ol.

In the opinion of the writer, Rapid Deployment either

did or might have resulted in a positive effect on the

outcome of the incident in 11 of the 44 incidents (25

percent). In the incidents where Rapid Deployment

would have made no difference in the ultimate outcome,

there was no longer an active shooter to engage by the

time a team could have made entry into the location. In

three of these incidents the shooter had already

barricaded himself, with hostages, in a fixed location.

Environment of Incident:

The majority of the incidents in our study oc curred at a

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school or workplace. Over 95 percent of these

incidents took place during daylight hours. About two-

thirds of the incidents took place within a b uilding. The

other one-third of the incidents involved some shooting

in an outdo or environ ment.

Weap ons:

More than one-half of the incidents involved su spects

armed with one or m ore hand guns. Near ly one-fourth

of the suspects used both handguns and long guns

(rifles and/or shotguns). Four of these incidents (nine

percent) involved the use of impro vised explo sive

devices.

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The Conclusions

There were four general categories o f response

identified in these 44 incidents:

• Immedia te - unorganized response by

personnel on the scene when the incident

began (police, security or citizens).

• Immedia te - unorganized response by

arriving police officers.

• Immedia te - organized response by

ar r iv in g p o l i c e o ff i c e r s ( R a p id

Deployment).

• Arriving police officers contained the

incident and waited for the arrival of

SWA T assets.

Except in the rarest of incidents, like the shootings at

the University of Texas and Colum bine High School,

only the most imme diate respo nse will have a chan ce to

reduce the number of innocent victims likely to be

killed or injured b y an active sho oter. Even a rapid

response by a team of officers using R apid Deployment

tactics will likely find the incident over by the time they

enter the shoo ting area.

Immedia te action taken by personne l who are on -site

when the sho oting starts is the mo st effective way to

stop the killing. In five of the incidents, the suspect was

forcibly detained by citizens at the shooting site (often

at great risk to themselves). In two of these incidents,

the suspect was taken into custody by on-scene police

officers (both at a school).

The need for im mediate ac tion by whomever is there

when the incident begins was born out by the actions of

passengers on Flight 93 on September 11, 2001 and

subsequent flights where dangerous activity has been

encountered. These events happen in seconds and,

unless they are quick ly ended b y someon e already on

scene, the criminals will likely kill until they choose to

stop. The police simply cannot be everywhere violence

may occur and are un likely to arrive before the violence

ends.

A parallel example of on-scene personnel minimizing

death and destruction has been seen recently in Isra el.

Terrorist shooting and bombing attacks have taken a

huge toll in Israel, but some events have surprisingly

low death tallies when you consider the weaponry

brought to the scene by the terrorists. The low body

count is generally attribute d to the terrorist being shot

by military or police p ersonnel. Other reports suggest

many of these terrorists are being sh ot by armed Israeli

citizens who happened to be on the scene or arrived

before military or police units.

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The Recommendations

Based on our analysis of 44 high profile, active

shooting incidents, some general recommendations

were developed by our panel of experts.

• Effective command and control must

begin immediately at the onset of the

incident and must take place independent

of the use of Rapid Deployment tactics.

The on-scene commander must not

become personally involved in the

response. The incid ent comm ander mu st,

instead, conduct a n initial problem

assessment, coordina te the arriving

resources, and ensure commun ication is

established between all responding units.

• The single greatest problem facing the

on-scene commander will be the

threat/risk assessment (intelligence

gathering). Analysis of the incidents

suggests the following problems can be

e x p e c t e d : confusin g informatio n

describing multiple location s and multiple

suspects, a breakdown in nearly all forms

of technological and inter-personal

communication, being inundated by

fleeing inhabitants and rapidly arriving

resources and unfam iliarity with the

incident site.

• All officers should have access to single-

projectile shoulder-f ired weapons,

preferably a carbine chambered for a

cartridge capable of penetrating soft body

armor. Such weapons w ill greatly

increase the effectiveness of contact and

rescue teams, as well as allowing some

incidents to be terminate d quickly by the

first arriving officers.

• The training provided by an age ncy must

include force-on-force sessions in which

officers move as a team, encountering

high-stress complications and liv e

adversaries. The training must include

tactics for team movement in both indoor

and outdoor se ttings.

• The training must be refreshed on a

periodic basis (at least annually) and

should involve all jurisdictions who might

respond to a given location.

• The incident commander must consider a

“response in depth,” an d contem plate

delaying the insertion of a contact team

until a backup team can be asse mbled, in

the most threatening incidents.

• A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)

must be develo ped to cover the use of

Rapid Deploym ent and the overall

management of the incident. This SOP

should include the minimum requirements

for manpower, equipment and training for

the use of Rapid Deployment teams. The

SOP should also address complicating

issues, such as: explosive devices;

ambush survival; and p rocedur es to

follow in the event a team takes

casualties.

• Agencies should pre-plan high-risk

locations. These plans should include

floor plans, initial perimeter points and

command post and resource staging

locations.

Based upon this analysis, we recommend police

agencies develop procedures for three levels of

response to active shooter incidents. Ou r experts have

drawn up recom mendatio ns for specific tra ining and

equipment needs for each of these response strategies,

which will be o utlined in deta il.

The first level of response would be an Instant

Response by personnel who are on-scene when the

shooting starts. This would include police officers

regularly assigned to patrol schools, business or public

areas where large numbers of people congregate. In

some instances, this could include a n immedia te

response by the first arriving patrol officer.

The second level of response would be a structured and

coordinated response by team(s) of arriving officers -

Rapid Deployment. To be most effective, these teams

need to be better equipped and more fully trained than

the level at which most agencies currently operate. The

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on-scene commander must have already assumed

command and cond ucted a pre liminary “threat/risk

assessment.” The on-scene comman der must also

begin to establish an inner perimeter prior to giving

authorization for entry of any “contact” team s.

The third level o f response would be a Traditional

SWAT Response of highly-trained and fully-equipped

officers. In some situations, the SWA T eleme nts would

be the second wave to enter a shooting location. Upon

arrival of the SWAT entry team, the Rapid Deployment

team(s) would switch from the ro le of “Pathfind er” to

rescue team, working behind the SWAT elements.

However, some shooting situations may require Rapid

Deployment teams to me rely provide c ontainmen t until

SWAT assets arrive on-scene.

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Instant Response:

This response strategy appears to have the best chance

for successfully stopping an active shooter. However,

this type of respo nse also carr ies with it the highest

degree of risk to the officer. In the case of a school

shooting, this response would be handled by a School

Resource Officer (SRO) or possibly a D.A.R .E.©

Officer who might be on-site when the shooting starts.

In jurisdictions where manpower limitations are severe,

a single patrol officer might be duty bound to seek out

and engage the active shooter without assistance. In the

private sector, properly se lected and trained secu rity

officers can prov ide instant resp onse to an a ctive

shooter.

In the past, we have not necessarily chosen an SRO or

DARE officer based upon their ability as a “warrio r.”

While is it still highly unlikely any particular SRO or

DARE officer will need to confront an active shooter,

we must now factor that possibility into our selection

process.

Clearly, all officers assigned to re gularly patrol a high-

risk location must be armed with at least a duty-grade

sidearm, a flashlight and clearly recognizable police

identification. Though the circumstances may require

these officers to respond to an active shooter with the

equipment they have on their person, we should

consider w ays to make a dditional eq uipment av ailable

to them. Protective gear, like a ballistic helmet and

tactical vest will enhance the ir survivability. A single-

projectile shoulder-fired weapon will allow these

officers to deliver much more precise deadly force and

penetrate ligh t intervening co ver, like soft body armor.

Positioning such equipment in a secure loc ation at a

school or other sensitive facility will require some

imagination. These officers must also have the ab ility

to comm unicate with arriv ing police re sources.

Officers likely to make an “instant response” must take

part in high-stress training scenarios on a regular basis.

These are the officers who will have the be st chance to

“run to the sound of the guns” and thereby save

innocent lives ... but at extrem e risk. In the event these

officers are unable to neutralize the active shooter, they

will serve as a “pathfinder” for arriving resources. The

instant respond er must link up with a Rapid

Deployment or SWAT team and prov ide their intimate

knowledge of the surroundings. The training provided

to these officers must address the following issues:

• individual movement and danger areas

(hallways, corners, rooms, stairs, etc.);

• when to use covert, as o pposed to overt,

movem ent;

• intelligence gathering/reporting and risk

assessment;

• communications with arriving resources;

and,

• f o r c e - o n - fo r c e scenar ios us in g

simunition© type weapons.

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Rapid Deploym ent:

This response strategy is a viable alternative to waiting

for a fully-trained SWAT team, in some circumstances.

In the opinion of ou r panel of ex perts, few Ra pid

Deployment training progra ms are ade quate .

Additiona lly, some situatio ns are beyond the

capabilities of a Rapid Deployment response. While a

policy may outline “safety stops” to help determine

when we should wait for SWAT, we know from vehicle

pursuits there will be some hard charging officers who

may exceed the bounds of prudence.

In a perfect world, every police officer would be trained

in Rapid De ployment tac tics and wou ld be men tally

prepared to succeed . Realistically, some officers are

not physically or m entally equipped for specialty teams,

like SWAT. Likewise, some of our officers may not be

approp riate for assignment to a Rapid Deployment

team. In fact, some officers want no part of this type of

police response. Forcing such officers to train for and

respond with Rapid Deployment tactics is probably not

a good idea. W e can assign re luctant officers to

perimeter points and other less dangerous assignments,

but most agencies are already hard pressed to assemble

sufficient manpower for an effective Rapid Deployment

response. If an agency chooses not to train a ll its

officers for Rapid Deployment, they should devise a

system for quickly ide ntifying those trained. Some

agencies are issuing a special pin or patch to denote a

Rapid Deployment trained officer.

A Rapid Dep loyment response team should have acc ess

to single-proje ctile shoulder -fired weapons equipped

with a practical sling . Weap on-moun ted light sources

are highly recom mended . Protective gear, like ballistic

helmets and bullet-resistant shields will enhance an

officer’s survivability. The team should hav e a well

equipped “traum a” kit and simple breaching to ols.

No officers without a uniform or b old “Police” garment

should ever enter the Kill Zone or man the inner

perimeter. Traffic safety ve sts can easily fulfill this

requirement for plainclothes o fficers.

Initial Rapid Deployment training should consist of not

less than eight hours of instruction, with at least 75

percent of that being practical training under high-stress

conditions. The initial training should include

minimum performance standards, with tests. The

training must follow the established SOP, w hich should

be coordinated with other agencies that might respond

to an inciden t.

The training must addre ss the following issues:

• team command and comm unication;

• intelligence gathering/reporting and risk

assessment;

• team movement indoors (diamond, wedge

or “T” formations, etc.);

• team movement outdoors (bounding

overwatch, etc.);

• improvised explosive devices (find

another way? ... step over and proceed?);

• dealing with downed victims;

• lifting and rescue techniques;

• evacuation and control of innocents; and,

• “failure drills,” in the event a team takes

casualties without neutralizing the active

shooter(s).

Based upon an on-scene problem assessment, the

incident commander may put seve ral “safety stops” in

effect. If one of these “s tops” is enco untered, the R apid

Deployment team must stop hunting the active shooters

and shift to a static mode and maintain a tight inner

perimeter. The team ’s goals in a static m ode are to

limit the movement of the suspect(s), keep innoc ents

from wandering into the kill zone and relay information

to the incident commander and arriving SWAT assets.

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A Rapid D eploymen t team should shift to an inner

perimeter mode if there is probable cause to believe one

or more o f the following co nditions exist:

• multiple active shooters;

• booby t raps or other ambush

preparations;

• active shooter(s) barricaded in a

defensible location;

• hostages being held in a fixed location or

being used as human shields;

• suspect is communicating dem ands;

and/or,

• the incident involves the release of

hazardous materials (H azMat) or the use

or threat of a Weap on of Mass

Destruction (WMD - biological, nuclear,

incendiary, chemical or lar ge-scale

explosive weapon).

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Traditional SWAT Response:

Some agencies ha ve chosen to concen trate on Ra pid

Deployment tactics to the exclusion of traditional

SWA T respo nse tactics. Our pan el of experts c ame to

realize two important aspects of an active shooter

incident which point to the need to maintain SWAT

assets.

First, few incidents in the real world resemble our

image where a team can assemble rapidly, run to the

sound of the guns and quickly neutralize an active

shooter. Most incid ents will be ove r before a R apid

Deployment team has a chance to gather and confusion

at the scene will generally prevent a clear picture of the

events until long after the shooting is over.

Second, Rapid Deployment teams are only trained and

equipped to deal with relatively simple problems. Few

agencies train their Rapid Deployment teams to deal

with taking casu alties. Wha t is the rate of “acceptab le

loss” for Rapid Deploym ent teams? W hat if multiple

shooters have laid an ambush for the first Rapid

Deployment team or have positioned explosive devices

along likely response routes?

Such complica ted criminal e vents are extr emely rare,

but could devastate a Rapid Deployment team. If you

have committed the bulk of your resources to a single

team, the failure of that team could lead to disaster. An

active shooter is a terr ible event. However, sacrificing

a number of officers in a noble, but unsuccessful

response is likely to make the situation worse , not

better. Some situations still dictate the use of patrol

officers for containment while waiting for a S W AT

team to arrive.

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Rapid Deployment in a post 9-11 Environment

As we were completing the research phase o f this

project, the United States was struck with the most

horrific terrorist attack yet experienced. When we

consider the very real thre at of continued terrorist

attacks, parallels can be dra wn to the use o f Rapid

Deployment tactics. Both federal agencies and U.S.

military assets are gearing up to deal with terrorist

attacks, but we all know that local police agencies will

be the first to respond to an unexpected strike. And,

we will be facing terrorists willing to die as a part of

their plan.

As a profession, law enforcement has a lot to learn

about responding to critical incidents. Our brothers and

sisters in the fire service have much more experience at

responding as a team and organizing themselves upon

arrival. Still, the highest price paid by first responders

at the World Trade Center was paid by the New York

City Fire Department. Fire administrators across the

nation have made a tough decision in the aftermath of

September 11 th. Fire Departments will now make a

reasoned risk assessment before sendin g their peop le

into the hostile environment of a terrorist attack . We

have trained for several years to expect terrorist groups

to utilize “secondary devices” with an eye toward

killing arriving eme rgency responders. The most

effective secondary device in history was the second

airliner crashing into the second tower in New York

City. We m ust assume the terrorists expected fire and

police responders to rush the site of the first “crash,”

thereby adding to the tally of victims killed by the

second airliner. The te rrorists app arently didn’t

anticipate the collapse of the Twin Towers, but we must

always consider a worst case scenario. While our goal

is always to save as many innocent lives a s possible, to

accomplish this we must stay alive ourselves.

Some in the intelligence community are predicting

terrorist attacks like the Israelis have experienced for

several years. The Israeli attacks are committed by

individuals or small groups who attack with small arms

and/or explosive devices. The label of “suicide

bomber” is accurate, since these terrorists ex pect to die

in the commission of their strike. Like Israel, we must

be prepare d to engag e these attacke rs quickly and

effectively, lest they succeed in spreading terror. W e

must also consider the possibility of a coordinated

effort by multiple terrorists intended to lure in and

eliminate our first responders, clearing the way for the

terrorists to kill without interference.

The recommendations of this report seem to hold up

even when compared to attacks like those faced by

Israel: the best chance for neutralizing the attacker is an

instant response b y someon e who is there when the

shooting starts (or when the bomber is recognized).

Similarly, most of these incidents will be over before

even a sma ll team can be assembled . If the incident is

still ongoing as a team arrives, there is a distinct

possibility they could b e facing multip le terrorists who

have planned and organized their actions. We must not

underestim ate the terrorists; their p lan will proba bly

include preparations for our response. Sending a team

to their death in a well meaning, but futile gesture will

do nothing to eithe r neutralize the active shooters or

save innocent lives. M ost police comm anders wo uld

never consider sending unprotected officers into the

“hot zone” of a chemical atta ck, but expect their

officers to run without h esitation into the “k ill zone” of

an active shooter.

Our worst fear is a terrorist attack using a weapon of

mass destruction (W MD) . We no w know that th e

response to a biolog ical attack will pro bably com e in

the form of an investigation, such as people suffering

from unexplained respiratory problems at a sporting

event. Should an attack involve chemical, radiological

or large-scale explosive weapon s, our response must be

slowed still further. The initial response will require a

risk assessment prior to any deplo yment of resources.

Only a handful of police agencies have the specialized

training and equip ment to resp ond to the sc ene of a

WMD attack, though these capabilities are being

upgraded at emergen cy speed. In Illinois, State

Weapon of Mass Destruction Teams were in training

prior to September 11 th. These teams include members

of several emergency response disciplines, with the core

of each team being T actical Response officers from the

Illinois State Police. Thes e S W AT teams a re fully

trained and equipped to respond to terrorist thre ats

involving a WMD , but their response time is measured

in hours, not m inutes. Local p atrol officers will alw ays

be the first to respond, and the first to die if not

adequately trained and effectively led.

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The Expert’s Opinions

Lieutenant C. W. Black, Littleton (Colorado) Police Department

Lt. C.W. "Bill" Black is with the Littleton, Colorado Police Department and was Commander of their SWAT T eam

during the Columbine High School Inc ident. H e wa s ask ed b y the Inc ident Comm and er fr om J effe rson Co unty She riff's

Department to deploy the arriving SWAT teams and organize the rescue of students during that incident. Lieutenant

Black has been with Littleton Police Department for 23 years and is a Guest Instructor at Thunder Ranch.

Lieutenant B lack’s Comm ents:

“At last we have some empirical data that supports my view, and that of others, that Active Shooter Response is risky

and should only be attempted when no other approach is possible. I still think it is the exception and not the rule.

Unfortuna tely, our profession seems to make the exception the rule when it reacts to a horrendous event in law

enforcem ent.

This study supports the need for BAS IC training in sho oting, movin g and com municating a s an appro ach to any rap id

deployment scenario-no t some mag ic "footba ll play." Law enforc ement's strategy is that w e will respond to any "Active

Shooter" situation, wherever it may occur. Our tactics are what we do once we arrive. These tactics should include

sound, proven, patrol and SWAT tactics as well as stopping the killing where ap propriate . Our tactics should not make

things worse. But, without officers who have the will, the skill and some basic equip ment, chanc es of success a re slim.”

Mr. Richard E. Fairburn, Illinois State Police Academy

Mr. Fairburn has over 20 years of law enforcement experience in both Illinois and Wyoming. Mr. Fairburn’s experience

has included assignments in patrol, investigations, administration and training, including a stint as a municipal police

chief. Mr. Fairb urn has bee n with the Illinois Sta te Police sinc e 1996 , serving in the C riminal Intell igence Bureau,

Critical Incident Re sponse C omman d and T raining Aca demy. Dick developed th e Illinois State P olice Acad emy’s

Critical Incident Response training program and those duties served as the impetus for this research project. Mr. Fairburn

holds a B.S. degree in Law Enforcement Administration from Western Illinois University and has authored more than

100 articles on police equipment and training issues and a book on police rifle training.

Mr. Fa irburn’s Co mments:

“As the primary author of this report, my comments are already well represented. My goal when proposing this research

project was to more clearly define the mission and practicality of Rapid Deployment. In many respects, the proliferation

of Rapid Deployment training is little more than an emotional response to the Columbine High School shooting. As

professionals, we must not give in to an emotional response at a horrific incident. The citizens have a right to expect

from us an effective and measured response.

I feel that Rapid Deploym ent training is bo th practical and worthwhile. Sta tistically, however , active shoo ter incidents

are very rare and this research illustrates that almost all of them will be over long before even the quickest teams can hope

to make contact with the shooter. What we can do, is to better train and equip all police officer s for “immed iate

response” in the event they are very close when the shooting starts. In a few of these incidents, including the Columbine

High School incident, had the first arriving officer been armed with a rifle, and well trained it its use, the active shooter(s)

might have b een neutralize d almost imm ediately.

In my opinion , the single most im portant asp ect of the use o f Rapid Deploym ent tactics by pa trol officers is the ro le of

on-scene supervisory personnel. The commander on the scene must take immediate control of the responding assets and

conduct a threat/risk assess ment. The comm ander must set the response priorities, including the essential requirement

to set perimeters to minimize the number of potential victims in the “Kill Zone” and to ensure the shooter cannot escape

to endang er other are as. Before deploying a Rapid Deployment team, the commander has an obligation to ensure the

team has a re asonable chance for success.”

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Mr. Thomas T. Gillespie, Criminal Justice Training & Consulting Services

Mr. Gillespie began his law enforcement career in 1970 in Detroit, Michigan. He has served as a police sergeant,

municipal police chief, city manager, State of New Mexico law enforcement training director and Director of the New

Mexico Attorney G eneral’s Investigations Division. Since 1990, Mr. Gillespie has conducted over 400 Critical Incident

Management programs to more than 6,000 law enforcement supervisors and commanders throughout the United States

and abroad. He has authored a textbook on the police use of force and provides expert witness case review, evaluation

and testimony in crim inal and civil actions involving police training, supervision and use of force. Mr. Gillespie has

authored numerous articles in the field of critical incident management and use of force.

Mr. G illespie’s Comments:

“I have had the distinct honor of training thousands of police supe rvisors and comm anders in critical incident response

and mana gement ov er the past 12 years and the invitation to participate in the Rapid Deploym ent Summ it was greatly

appreciated. The perspective I was able to bring to the table was an awareness of the wide variety and types of

instruction being offered by police agencies in the area of “Rapid Deployment (RD)” training throughout the United

States.

The participants were dedicated police commanders, trainers and tactical leaders attempting to determine the standard

protoco ls to effectively respond to active shooter events. Most were surprised at the various levels of training being

offered to police officers nationwide in the response to and handling of active shooter incidents. As mentioned in the

report, many “Rapid Deployment” training programs mere ly offer classroom instruction. There was unanimous

agreement that RD training must include realistic, hands-on skill building exercises. The failure to conduct practical and

realistic ‘team’ exercises would be similar to atte mpting to train an officer to fire a w eapon fo r accuracy w ith only

‘classroom’ instruction on sight alignment and trigger squeeze.

The RD protocols recommended in this report are simply minimum standards of training for officers facing — potentially

— the most dangerous and high-risk event they may ever deal with in their careers. Tactical officers understand the need

for on-going, rigorous and demanding training for the high -risk incidents they a re expecte d to “handle.” We must not

use shortcuts in preparing patrol officers to deal with the exact same type of incidents for which tactical officers are

training on a regular basis.

Lastly, the need to provide p roper comm and and control at these types of even ts must not be ig nored. First responding

supervisors are the key to effective and successful resolution of the incident. They mus t take charge a nd assume the role

of the COACH, not the PLAY ER. Risk and/or threat assessment, identification of the “kill zone” and establishing a

perimeter must be initiated by the on-scene commander prior to authorizing any type of tactical deployment for

resolution.

It is my hope tha t this effort will attract criticism and comment. It is only through disagreement and discussion of the

issues that clarity and agreement can occur. It is only those supervisors that have nev er experien ced a po lice officer’s

injury or death at the scene of a critical incident that casually comment, “that’s what we get paid to do, it’s a dangerous

job!” We ow e our polic e officers and their families only the best training when confronte d with these type s of life

threatening incidents.”

Mr. Larry Glick, Executive Director, National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA)

Mr. Glick has over 28 years experience in the criminal justice field. Mr. Glick spent seven years as a special response

team member for the Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear W eapons Complex. Four of those years were at the DOE

Central Training Academy as a tactics and firearms instructor and Safeguards and Security Training Departm ent Chief.

Larry completed four years as a Regional Director with the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Contractor Support

Program. After the retirem ent of John K olman in 19 93, Mr . Glick became the Executive Director of the NTOA.

Currently he oversees the operations of the NTOA including the NTOA's Information Resources, Regional Seminar and

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Training Program , Tactical U nit and Incident Review Program as well as the publication of The Tactical E dge journ al.

Mr. Glick has lectured nationally to school and police audiences regarding school and police response to active shooters

in schools and public buildings. He testified before the Colorado Governor's Commission on the Columbine High School

tragedy concerning po lice training and response to violent active sho oter situations.

Mr. La rry Glick’s Co mments:

“I want to commend your group on the resea rch and rep ort you pro duced o n Rapid D eploymen t. I have read through

the report twice and the information contained in the report is very informative.

I would add nothing.”

Associate Professor David A. Klinger, Univer sity of M issouri-St. L ouis

David A. Klinger is Associate Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Missou ri-St. Louis.

He also has held positions as A ssistant Profess or (199 2-1998 ) and Asso ciate Professor of Sociology (1998-1999) at the

University of Houston. Prior to pursuing his graduate degrees, he worked for three and one-half years as a patrol officer

for the Los Angeles and Redmond (WA) Police Depa rtments. He has held research positions at the Police Foundation

in W ash ingt on, D.C .; the Uni ver sity o f W ash ingt on, Sea ttle; the W ash ingt on S tate 's Atto rney's Office; and the Seattle

Police Department. He has written num erous scholarly articles, book chap ters, and encyclopedia en tries that address

topics such as arrest p ractices, the use of force, and how features of comm unities affect the actions of patrol officers.

He has recently completed a research project on officer-involved shootings and is currently nearing completion of a study

of police special we apons an d tactics (SW AT) tea ms. He rec eived his Ph .D. in Socio logy from the U niversity of

Washington in 1992.

Professor K linger’s Comm ents:

“I take issue with the argument that officers who aren’t keen o n the idea shouldn’t be trained in rap id response tactics.

Since when doe s a line officer get to tell the chief to buzz off and select w hat parts of the d epartmen t mission s/he will

and wil l not do? I f the boss says “My officers will have rapid response training and they will rapidly respond to active

shooting situations” and some officer doesn’t like it, that’s too ba d. S/he can a lways find ano ther job. A s far as I’m

concerned, an officer has n o more a right to recuse h im or herself from rapid respo nse training that s/he d oes from b asic

firearms, tactics, em ergency veh icle opera tion, report w riting, or any othe r aspect of the job.”

Sergeant Patrick Kreis, Winnetka (Illinois) Police Department

Patrick Kreis is a Sergeant with the Winnetka Police Department where he manages a comprehensive Use of Force

training program . He has sixteen years combined law enforcement and military instructional experience and is certified

as a Master Firearms Instructor by the Illinois Po lice Training Institute. Sergea nt Kreis is state b oard cer tified to teach

numerous police subjects including Less Lethal Weapons , Tactical Team Operations, Patrol Tactics, Scenario Based

Training, Use of Force Policy, and Critical Incident Response. He is a primary instructor for the Rapid Deployment

Instructor training offered by Mobile Training Unit #3. Sergeant Kreis is a former SWAT (NIPAS EST) Team Leader

and an active me mber of the Illinois Tactic al Officer’s Association . He is a graduate of Northwestern University School

of Police Staff and Command and holds a Bachelors degree in Criminal Justice Science. Sergeant Kreis served eleven

years in the U.S. Army Reserve with qualifications in Special Forces and Military Intelligence.

Sergeant K reis’ Commen ts:

“We will have to disagree on the issue of perimeter establishment. I feel strongly that deploying the 10-15 initial officers

(5-10 minute response in the urban environment) on scene should be as follows: They are going to be much more

effective at protecting life if they deploy in contact teams to stop the active killing. They are going to be less effective

trying to control a perimeter that in many cases will be a square city block. My town's high school has 27 different

doorway entry points. T he first respon ders are the o fficers that I have the most confidence in. They work together and

train together. They have the same radios and are most familiar with the terrain. The second and third wave of

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responders will be capable of establishing inner and outer perimeters, but less prepared to make entry. What good is a

perimeter outside the b uilding when th e bad guy is inside actively killing multiple victims? This philosophy is even more

essential in the rural communities that can't even count on a 10-15 officer response within a 30 minute response time.

It’s just not practical to tell them to set a perim eter before deciding to make entry. Regardless of when Klebold and

Harris chose to stop killing their victims, the fact of the matter is that those two killers were still seen on video walking

around with guns down without an apparent care in the world. Clearly they were not being pursued or engaged by the

Police, even 37 minutes after the killing started. Just how is a perimeter going to shorten the amount of killing

opportunity time?

Recently, we had an example of victims being their best self-protection in Skokie, Illinois. A student brought a loaded

gun to school and showed it to a friend. The suspect stated that he was going to kill a particular girl then get to the

cafeteria to do mass murder before suicide. Another kid spotted the gun in the would-be shooter’s bag. The second

student calmly told a girl nearby, who used a ruse to leave class and inform the Dean. Then the hero slid the bag away

from the bad-guy when he wasn’t looking. The second student turned the bag over to the Dean and the suspect was

arrested witho ut incident.”

Sergeant Edward F. Mohn II, Libertyville (Illinois) Police Department

Sergeant Edward F. Mohn II is a 12-year veteran of the Libertyville (Illinois) Police Department, a suburb of Chicago

Illinois. He has been a member of the Northern Illinois Police Alarm Systems Emergency Services Team (NIPAS-EST)

for 11 years were he currently serves as the Entry Team Leader. Sergeant Mohn has participated in the successful

resolution of numerous critical incidents, felony fugitive apprehensions and high risk w arrant service operation s. He is

an Illinois State certified instructor in a wide variety of tactical and firearms related disciplines and is the lead instructor

for the NIPAS-EST 96 hour b asic SW AT co urse. Sergea nt Mohn serves on the Board of Directo rs for the Illinois

Tactical Officers Asso ciation (IT OA) and is the lead instructo r for the ITO A's Rapid D eploymen t program . He has

personally trained over a thousand officers in Rapid Deployment technique and tactics. A Grad uate of Na tional-Louis

University, Sergeant Mo hn served six years in the US Army as an infantryman prior to starting his law enforcement

career.

Sergeant E dward F. Mo hn’s Comm ents:

"Train Hard ..............For The Day Will Come. This motto has become the driving force behind the training and

preparation that I have dedicated my team, my fellow officers and myself too. While the panel of experts p resented in

this docume nt do not ag ree on all asp ects of this proj ect, we all strongly agreed and are committed to improving the

training police officers are, or should be receiving in rega rds to the response and mana gement of c ritical incidents. W hile

active shooter type incidents occur infrequently, they present a unique set of challenges and problems that many officers

and agencies are not prepared to face. The traditional response of "Contain, Wait and Negotiate" has served us well and

should still be implemented in 99.9% of the critical incidents that occur. But, when an offender is actively murdering

innocent civilians how can police officers who are sworn to protect and serve our community and it's citizens stand by

and wait? I always ask my students during Rapid Deployment Training "W hat if that was your child, your mother, your

wife or husban d inside that b uilding"? W hat would yo u do? It is, and shall always be d ebated as to how Rapid

Deployment would of made a difference in many of the active shooter situations that have occurred. It is my belief that

the immediate deploym ent of law enforcement resourc es against the active shooter can and does save lives. One mu st

only take a look a t the situation in Israe l and see that live s are saved when polic e officers arriv e quickly and deploy

against armed offenders. Is this a dangero us endeavor?.… ..Yes. Do these techniques and tactics place officers in greater

danger than the tradition al "contain a nd wait" utilized in the past?........Y es. But, if not Rapid Deploym ent, then what?

We continually ask and search for a better solution from those who say Rapid Deployment is not the answer..........but

none have been presented. As long as there are those in the world who will prey upon and murder innocent people, then

there must be those of us who are trained, willing, ab le and ded icated to see king them ou t and stopp ing their dead ly

behavior . To do less is inconceiv able .

Train Hard...........For The Day Will Come".

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Commander Richard A. Ryan, Decatur (Illinois) Police Department

Commander Ryan is a twenty-nine year police veteran. He holds a BA from Eastern Illinois University and served four

years with the USMC, including one tour with an infantry rifle company in Viet Nam. He is a graduate of the FBI

National Academy. Command er Ryan’s police experience includes operational service with both patrol and

investigations functions. He has served as coordinator of the K-9 Unit and as Commander of the Professional Standards

and Investiga tions Division s of the Dec atur Police Departm ent.

Commander Ryan is currently Commander of the Patrol Division of the Dec atur Police Departm ent. He was r esponsib le

for the development of the Decatur Police Department's Emergency Response Team and is Commander of the ERT.

Commander Ryan was the on-scene Commander for all major events related to the five years of turmoil experienced by

the City of Decatur resulting from three maj or labor disputes, a major K lu Klux K lan rally and turmoil during November

1999 involving Jesse Jackson's Rainbow-Push Coalition and white supremacist organizations. The Decatur Police

Departm ent’s Emergency Response Team has served in excess of five h undred h igh-risk search w arrants and has been

involved in the resolution of both hostage and barricaded suspect incidents, including incidents where deadly force was

used.

Commander Ryan is a member of the Nat ional T acti cal O ffice r's A ssociat ion (NT OA ), the Ill ino is T acti cal O ffice r's

Association (ITOA), is a fo rme r me mbe r of t he B oar d of Dir ecto rs o f the ITO A an d is c urre ntly C hair of th e IT OA 's

Legislative Committee. He is the owner of Ryan Crisis Management Consulting, Inc. He has presented at State and

National conferences and has provided training throughout the State for topics related to Tactical Team Operations,

Managing Labor Disputes and Interest Group Events, High Risk Strategy and Tactics for Patrol Operations, Developing

School Crisis Response Plans and Patro l Rapid R esponse T actics for Activ e Shoote r Incidents. He is Coordinator for

Law Enforcement Programming and an adjunct faculty member at Richland Community College in Decatur and an

adjunct faculty member an d Advisory Bo ard member a t the Police Training Institute of the University of Illinois.

Comma nder Rya n’s Comme nts:

“As is often the case in law enforcement, the development of active shooter policies and training were a reaction to an

incident. We have reacted by training operators (first responding officers), hopefully well and to the standards indicated

above. However, we as administrators too often feel that we have done what is expected of us by providing some training

in the area of concern to the oper ators. In a pro fessional law en forcemen t environme nt, it is essential that administration

set clear (and high) standards for the agency in terms of the outcomes expected if the "active shooter" situation develops

in its jurisdiction. Having done so, the administration has the obligation to the officers to provide the policy, training

and equip ment nece ssary to succe ssfully achieve that o utcome.

Second ly, it is important to understand that crisis situations involve much more than the first responder's response. Once

containment and isolation have been accomplished, the real work of the administration begins... mana ging whateve r is

left. That may include managing a hostage or barricade situation (in the traditional fashion), managing a major criminal

investigation and crime scene, victim a ssistance, family reu nification, facility man agement, relief of security teams, etc.

It is critical that our administrators know, understand and be ready to implement a comprehensive Incident Command

Center to ensure that the whole incident is managed professionally--not just the crisis response.

Further, it is critical for the responding officers to understand that there are NO EXCU SES if an active shooter situation

develops. Whether administration has provided the policy, equipment and training or not, those we are sworn to protect

rightfully expect us to be there for them. No matter how many officers we have to respond with, we must be prepared

to get the job done. That means that each individual officer has the moral and professional obligation to have the heart

to respond, to be tactically proficient in terms of both skill development and the wisdom to know when to apply the

approp riate tactics, and must be physically able to perform. It sim ply isn't acceptab le to sit back an d comp lain that the

Departm ent, for whatev er reason, d idn't give me eve rything I need. G ood pe ople, using go od tactics will p revail.”

Master Sergeant John Simonton, Illinois State Police - Critical Incident Response Command

Master Sergeant John Simonton is a 20-year law enforcement veteran, beginning his career with the Boone County

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Sheriffs Department and moving on to the Illinois State Police in 198 4. John has been a member of the Tactical

Response Team program since 1986 and is currently the Team Leader for one of three full-time Tactical Response Teams

with the Illinois State Police. Master Sergeant Simonton is a certified instructor in close quarter battle, Critical Incident

Response and operational planning and management. He holds a bachelors degree in law enforcement administration

and has atten ded num erous supe rvisory training c lasses through out his caree r.

Master Sergea nt John Simonton’s Commen ts:

“While I certainly don’t consider myself an expert in this subject, I d id apprec iate the invitation to discuss the R apid

Deploym ent issues with this diverse and educated panel. W e in law enforc ement nee d to do a better job of critiquing

high-risk incidents and, most importantly, sharing that information with other law enforcement organizations. This

“commu nication gap ” has caused many negativ es in law enforc ement such as:

1. Inconsistent training for high-risk incidents;

2. No basis for decision m aking by new or inexperien ced supervisors facing similar incidents;

3. Repeated improper tactics; and,

4. Improper assessment of high risk factors leading to delayed or disastrous decision-making.

It is incumbent upon us, the trainers, to communicate our thoughts and experiences in handling critical incidents to those

preparing for them. We would not be here today discussing this issue if we had not created our own luck by exhaustive

prepara tions for the ultima te challenge.

A few years ago, a few team members and I started teaching an eight hour room clearing / building entry class for patrol

officers. This training was created for several reaso ns:

1. Requests by patrol officers assisting investigations with other than high risk (SWAT criteria) search and

arrest warrants;

2. a trend was beginning with departments buying equipment for officers, but not budgeting for adequate and

consistent training; and,

3. to prepare as many officers as possible in not only the physical art of room clearing, but the mental aspect

of risk assessm ent when co nfronted with a n active shoo ter incident that m ay require im mediate ac tion.

This type of training has been well received and has been made cost effective through the M obile Te am Tra ining Units

throughout Illinois. The training has been cond ucted now for app roximately three years, with several repeat officers and

agencies attending. Realistic “win” scenarios are utilized and made progressively more difficult, using Simunition© and

incorpo rating decisio n-making am ong peer s in a “stressful” training environme nt.”

-22-

SynopsisActive Shooter Incidents

Case#

Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured

Times RDused?

RD make aDifference?*

Narrative

001 Tampa, FL -RadissonHotel

Workplace

1 maleaged 36

9mm and .38handguns. Many shotsfired (unsure#).

5 15+ 1500 hours. 4+ officerson scenewithin 5minutes

NO NO

Gone on arrival

Suspect shot specific co-workers at hotel,except last victim (a women killed during acarjacking 2 miles from scene). Suspectsurrendered after vehicle pursuit. Suspect hadfled the scene before police arrived.

002 Tampa, FL -Fireman’sFundInsurancebuilding

Workplace

1 malemid-30's

9mm handgun. Many shotsfired (unsure#). Probablereload.

3 2 1100 hours. 4+ officerson the scenewithin 5minutes.

NO NO

Gone on arrival

Suspect entered workplace and targeted specificco-workers. Suspect fled the scene beforeofficers arrived and was later found dead, froma self-inflicted wound, at a nea rby golf course.

003 Anaheim,CA -Hospital

Rampageaftermotherdied inthishospital

1 maleaged 43

2 revolvers. 7shots fired. Probablereload.

2 1 1040 hours. 4+ officerson scenewithin 6minutes.

NO NO

Already in custody

Suspect entered the hosp ital where his motherhad recently died and shot random targets. Shot3 people, reloaded revolver and was grabbedand detained by hospital staff before policearrived. First arriving officer set-up aCommand Post and implemented ICS. 15-20minutes before police entered the building andtook suspect in to custody.

004 Olivehurst,CA - HighSchool

School 1 maleaged 19

12 gaugeshotgun and.22 rimfirerifle. Estimated 15-20 shots fired,most were 3inch #4 shotloads.

4 10 1405 hours. 4+ officerson scenewithin 5minutes. SWAT entrywithin 10minutes.

NO -

BUTveryrapidresponsebySWATtrainedofficers

NO

Suspect hadalready barricadedwith hostages

Former student entered school and killed theteacher that had flunked out this student theprevious year. Remaining gunshot victims weremore random in nature. Suspect then barricadedhimself into the upstairs library with 80+hostages. Two of first arriving officers wereSWAT, who entered as a two man team withlong guns, but no other SWAT gear. This teamwithdrew with a victim. Upon re-entering, theSWAT duo met a student who had been sentfrom the library to announce that hostages werebeing held. The suspect surrendered throughnegotiations after about 8 hours.

Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative

-23-

005 Pelham, AL- multiplebusinesslocations

Workplace

1 maleaged 33

.40 handgun. 9-10 roundsfired (6-7 atfirst scene/2killed, 3 atsecond scene/1killed).


NO NO

Gone on arrival atboth scenes

Suspect shot specific targets at each of twobusiness locations about 6 miles apart. Suspectallowed some potential targets to leaveunharmed from each location. Suspect had fledboth scenes before police could arrive. Policeknew suspect’s name and description after thefirst shooting incident. Suspect was taken intocustody shortly after the second shooting in afelony traffic stop.

006 Jonesboro,AR -MiddleSchool

School 2 males,aged 11and 13

Each suspecthad 5 guns,including(used): .44Carbine, .30Carbine,scoped .30-06,.357 revolver. 26 shots fired,over 400rounds inpossession.

5 10 1220 hours. 4+ officerson scene inless than 5minutes. 15-20 officerson scenewithin 10minutes.

NO NO

Shooting was overby the time officersarrived

Suspects used the fire alarm to draw victimsfrom the school gymnasi um and fired wi th riflesfrom a woodline 93 yards away. The .357handgun was fired at a construction worker inthe distance. A Deputy Sheriff located thesuspects as they attempted to flee their shootingposition and took them into cust ody.

007 Conyers,GA - HighSchool


.22 rimfire rifle(stock cut-down for betterconcealment)and .357revolver. Fired12 shots (11from .22 atvictims and 1at school from.357).

0 6 - allwoundswerebelowthewaist

0759 hours. 4th officerarrived in 7minutes. Incidentover in 12minutes.

NO NO


Suspect got off the school bus (with weapons),walked into the “commons” area and beganshooting with the .22 rifle. Suspect fired the.357 revolver over his shoulder back towardsschool as he fled on foot. Suspect dropped therifle in the school as he fled. Suspect wasconfronted by an assistant principle (student hadthe .357 in his mouth) and surrendered therevolver to the principle when ordered to do so.First officer to arrive was dealing with victims.Second arriving officer placed suspect intocustody.


-24-

008 Sheridan,WY -MiddleSchool


9mm handgun. Fired 15-20rounds (unsure)with reload.

0 4 1100 hours. First officerarrivedwithin 3minutes andthird officerarrivedwithin 4minutes.

NO NO

Suspect commi ttedsuicide as theofficers arrived

Suspect walked onto middle school playgroundand opened fire on a group of 20-25 students.All victims had been shot prior to the firstofficer’s arrival. As the arriving officersapproached the playground area, the suspectcommitted suicide with the handgun.

009 Newington,CT - StateLotteryHeadquarters.

Workplace

1 maleaged 35.

9mm handgun,large huntingknife. 20 shotsfired (18 beforepolice arrivedand 2 afterpolice arrived).

4 - (3killedbygunfire and1killedbygunfire andknife.)

0 0844 hours. Four+officersarrived at0846. Incidentresolved at0846.

NO NO

Suspect commi ttedsuicide as theofficers arrived

Suspect killed co-workers at the Lotterybuilding. 2 shots were reported fired afterpolice arrived. Suspect committed suicide uponarrival of the first officers.

010 Wakefield,MA - Officecomplex

Workplace

1 maleaged 43

Shotgun,handgun,AK47 typerifle. At least 7shots fired,most from AK,some fromshotgun.

7 0 Timesunsure:reported thata 3 officerteam enteredthe buildingin from 5-10minutes. 10officers inthe buildingby the timeof arrest.

NO -

BUTveryrapidresponseby patrolofficers

NO


Suspect entered a business in a huge multi-business complex and shot employees in hisformer employer’s personnel office. The firstthree officers found a victim and then found thesuspect a few feet away from that victim. Thesuspect had put down his weapons, was almostin a trance, and offered no resistance to arrest.


-25-

011 GreatBarrington,MA -PreparatorySchool


AR15. Manyshots fired at 3differentlocationsaround thecampus.

2 4 2230 hours. The firstofficerarrivedwithin 5minutes. 4+officers onscene within20 minutes. Incidentresolved atabout 2300hours.

NO NO


Suspect, a student at this exclusive school, firstshot a security guard at the gate, then shot aprofessor in his car. From there the suspectwalked to the library and a dorm, shootingrandom targets. Suspect barricaded himself inthe cafeteria and called 911. An officer at 911center convinc ed the suspect to surrender. Attime of surrender 7 officers were on the sceneand had just completed setting on-sceneperimeters. SWAT team had been called butwas 1-2 hours out. Shooting was apparentlyover by the time offic ers arrived on scene.

012 Royal Oak,MI - PostOffice

Workplace

1 male in30's.

Rifle andhandgun. Unknownnumber ofshots fired.

5 4 0800 hours. First officerarrivedwithin 2minutes. 3officersentered thebuilding inless than 5minutes. 4-5officers inthe buildingby the timethey foundthe deadsuspect.

NO -


NO

Shooting was overby the time officersmade contact

Suspect, a suspended postal employee andformer Marine, entered the central post officeand targeted former supervisors and co-workers.Suspect was found inside dead from a self-inflicted gunshot wound.


-26-

013 LincolnPark , MI -SeniorCitizens’ResidentialHigh Rise

Rampageafterargument.

1 maleaged 55.

.22 rimfirerifle. 20-30shots fired bothinside buildingand out ofwindow atarrivingofficers.

3 1(elderlymanshovedoveragainstwatercoolerassuspectfledshootingscene).

1145 hours. First officerarrived in 2minutes. 6officers onscene within5 minutes. Officersentered thebuilding in 6minutes. Suspect incustody -about 3hours.

NO NO

Suspect hadbarricaded by thetime officersarrived

Resident of high rise went to his apa rtment afteran argument at a meeting and returned with a.22 rifle. Suspect shot managers of theresidential complex and returned to hisapartment on the 14th floor. Arriving officersfound victims, but no active shooter. At thatpoint the suspect opened fire on arriving policeunits from the window of his apartment. Thesuspect called his son and c laimed to be holdinghostages (did not actually have any hostages).The son relayed this info to police. Police heardman snoring on open phone line after he hadtaken medications. SWAT entered and tooksuspect into custody.

014 Dearborn,MI - PostOffice

Workplace

1 malemid 50's.

Handgun. 25-30 roundsfired, withreloads. Someshots werefired after thepolice arrived.

3 0 1000 hours. First officerarrivedwithin oneminute. 4-5officers onscene in 3minutes. Entry madeabout 20-30minutes intoincident.

NO POSITIVE

A RapidDeployment teammight have beenable to makecontact withshooter before hecommitted su icide.

Suspect entered central post office and beganshooting co-workers and supervisors. The firstofficers that arrived heard shots from inside thebuilding after their arrival. Policy in effectrequired containment, so immediate entry wasnot made. Negotiators attempted to makecontact by bullhorn. SWAT made a hasty entry20-30 minutes into the incident and found thesuspect dead from a self-inflicted wound.Though unsure of the time sequence of shots, allvictims were probably shot before an RD teamcould have made contact. However, the remotepossibility remains that one or more lives couldhave been saved by immediate action.


-27-

015 MelrosePark, IL -NaviStarplant

Workplace

1 maleaged 66.

Handgun, SKS(7.62x39) used;12Ga and .30-30 not used. 17 shots fired,most from theSKS.

4 4 0944 hours. First officerarrived inone minute. 4+ officerson scenewithin 5minutes. Officersmadeimmediateentry as theyarrived.

NO -


NO


Suspect, a former employee, entered factory andfired randomly at workers in the section of theplant where he was most familiar. Arrivingofficers “followed the trail of bodies.” Officersfound the suspect, dead from a self-in flictedwound, within 10-15 minutes of the call.Extremely high noise level of the factoryprevented officers from hearing gunshots, if anyshots were fired after their arrival. Suspect hadprobably already killed him self before theofficers arrived at the plant.

016 Topeka, KS- FederalCourthouse

Courthouse

1 male Handgun(s),pipe bombs,several shotsfired.

2 2 1100 hours. First officerarrivedwithin 1-2minutes and4+ officerswere onscene within4 minutes.

NO -


POSITIVE

Rapid entryprobably forcedsuspect away fromadditional victims

Suspect had previously detonated a car bomb inanother county as a diversionary device prior toentering the federal building for this incident.The suspect was due to be sentenced on drugrelated charges the next day. Upon arrival onthe 4th (court) floor, the suspect shot the securityguard and proceeded to the court clerk’s office,firing at random targets along the way. A pipebomb hanging on the suspect’s clothingdetonated, severely wounding the suspect.Arriving officers pulled the dead security guardoff the floor and quickly returned to search forthe suspect. The severely injured susp ect fireda suicide shot as the officers returned to the 4 th

floor. Topeka PD felt their immediate actionpushed the suspect into a room where wasunable to make contact with additional victims.


-28-

017 Southfield,MI -Psychiatrist’s Officeshooting

Doctor’soffice

1 male inhis 40's

.45 caliberhandgun,emptied 2magazines, 10+shots fired.

2 2 1700 hours. First twoofficersarrivedwithin 2minutes (1officer wasSWATarmed withMP5). RDTeam madeentry intothe buildingwithin 5minutes.

YES POSITIVE

Rapid entryprobably forcedsuspect away fromadditional victims

Suspect entered his psychiatrists’ o ffice andbegan shooting members of his counselinggroup. Suspect had brought a handgun to ameeting on a previous occasion. Arrivingofficers organized a RD response and ent eredthe building within 5 minutes of the call.Shooting was on the 12th floor of a 26 storybuilding. RD team was made aware of activeshooting, a good location description and toldof severely injured (but still alive) victims.FD/Paramedics and building security wereincorporated into the RD response. RD teamarrived on the 12th floor as the suspect fired ashot. The suspect ran back into the doctor’soffice and fired another shot (suicide shot).This PD is convinced that RD saved lives in thisincident.

018 Jackson,MS - FireDepartment

Workplace

1 maleaged 32

.25/9mm and

.357 handgunsand smallpropanecontainers. Many shotsfired (reloadedTEC9 at leasttwice). Suspect fired atsmall propanetanks, but didnot cause themto explode.

4 6 1200 hours. First officerarrivedwithin 2minutes. Suspect hadfled beforeadditionalofficersarrived atFD.

NO NO

Suspect wasleaving as officersarrived

(Counts as Goneon arrival)

Suspect/fir efighter entered a FD staff meetingand shot/killed all 10 personnel in the meeting.Suspect deployed small propane containers, butcould not get them to explode. A firefighter inthe meeting had a safety device which opened amicrophone on FD channel and audio of almostthe entire incident was broadcast and recorded.Suspect fled the scene and was fired at by anarson investigator (not hit). After a pursuit, anofficer from a neighbori ng agency engaged thesuspect and both were hit/wounded. Suspecthad fled the initial shooting scene before anyresponse was possi ble.

019 Jackson,MS - HighSchool

School 1 femalein 30's

Handgun,unsure ofnumber of shots fired (7?).

0 0 Timesunsure.

NO -

BUTveryrapidresponseby SRO

NO

Already in custody

Mother was called to school to meet with sonand school counselor. Son was accused ofselling drugs at the school. Mother arrived andopened fire on the son, landing no hits. Motherran from the school and was tackled by a SchoolResource Officer that was on campus and ran tothe report of gunfire.


-29-

020 Lynnville,TN (GilesCountyS.O.) - HighSchool

Schoolshooting

1 maleaged 17

.22 rimfirerifle, 3-4 shotsfired.

1 2 0800 hours. First officerwas alreadyat school(DAREofficer) , 4+officers onscene with12 minutes.

NO NO

Already in custody

Suspect entered school intending to shootspecific teachers. Student shot/killed oneteacher and then shot another in t he head(survived). As suspect moved through theschool, he fired at anot her teacher, bu t missedand hit a student in the neck (survived). DAREofficer in the grade school wing was unarmed(by policy at that time), ran to his vehicle toretrieve his sidearm and got to the shootinglocation just as 2 teachers and a studentwrestled the suspect to the ground. DAREofficer handcuffed the suspect and radioed toresponding officers that the suspect was incustody. Suspect reported that he had intend edto execute a traffic deputy normally stationed infront of the school and then to later use thepolice car to escape. The traffic deputy was offthat day. Incident was over before RD teamcould have arrived/deployed.

021 Reno, NV randomhighwayshooting.

RandomshootingonInterstate(I-80).

1 maleaged 19

.22 rimfirerifle, 20+ shotsfired. Onevictimwounded byglass shards inface, anotherwounded bysmall bulletfragments inarm.

0 2 0815 hours. First officeron scene0838, 4+officers onscene by0845.

NO NO

Gone on arrival

Suspect fired at random vehicles t ravel ing on I-80 near Reno, NV with a .22 rimfire rifle.Victims first thought their vehicles were beinghit by rocks and did not call police for at least15 minutes. Incoming calls gave multiplelocations and shooting location was verydifficult to pin down. SWAT units and airassets arrived and searched the area (veryrugged and difficult terrain) until 1300 hourswithout locating suspect. The suspect had fledthe scene several minutes before police arrived.Suspect was later apprehended when NHPofficers saw a rifle in the back of his vehicleduring a traffic stop.


-30-

022 Colebrook,NewHampshire,ambushes.

Shootingspree andambushaftershootingtwoTroopersat trafficstop.

1 maleaged 62.

AR15 withAimpoint sight,9mm handgun(not used), 75+shots total. 43shots fired atfirst incident(traffic stop). Some .223rounds wereM855 “greentip” penetratorcartridges. Suspect waswearing levelIII body armorat ambushes.

2 4 1330 hours. First twoofficersinitiated atraffic stopon suspect.

NO -

BUTveryrapidresponseby patrolandSWATtrainedofficers

POSITIVE

However,this situationrequired fire &maneuver tactics,not a diamondformation

Suspect, with long history of violent threats,was stopped by NHSP Trooper. Suspect exitedhis vehicle with an AR15 and shot the firstTrooper (survived). The second arrivingTrooper was shot/k illed through the windshieldof his vehicle, being unable to return fire or exitthe kill zone (43 rounds fired by suspect at thisscene). Suspect then drove one of the policecars to Colebrook where he killed specifictargets (judge that was fleeing her la w officeand a newspaper editor that wrestled the suspectdown). The suspect drove to his home, cha ngedclothes, gathered more ammunition and donnedlevel III soft body armor. The suspect drove thepolice car to a remote location and set it up asambush “bait.” The suspect took up a high-ground position overlooking the stolen policecar. When a Fish & Game officer located thestolen police car, he was shot at several times,including a .223 hit that fragmented on hisbadge. Fish & Game officer was able to driveout of the kill zone. As many other policeagencies arrived, they saw th e “bait” policevehicle, but did not approach it. As officersmoved through the heavily wooded area, a K9alerted and in a subsequent gunfight, 3 officerswere wounded and the suspect was killed.


-31-

023 Aiken, SC,factory.

Workplace

1 male inlate 30's.

Armed with 2handguns(semi-autos),more than 50shots fired.

6 6 1530 hours. 15 officerson scenewithin 4minutes.

NO -


POSITIVE

Teams probablyforced suspectaway fromadditional victims

Suspect was fired employee of engine partsplant. Shot security guard at gate and thenentered building and killed the plant man agerand other specific targets. Arriving officersformed two hasty t eams, lead by on-dut y SWATpersonnel (5-man team in front and 6-man teamin back). The entry teams moved through thebuilding, advancing toward the sound ofgunshots. After several minutes, they heard nomore gunshots and relied on workers in theplant to direct them toward the suspect. Teamsbypassed the dead and wounded and called inadditional officers to deal with the victims.About 15-20 minutes after entry, the teamsrealized the suspect was in a fixed location, sothey set an inner perimeter around the suspectand waited for SWAT to arrive and clear thearea. The suspect tried to commit suicide bydrinking a poisonous liquid. SWAT officersfound him unconscious. Department’s RDpolicy/training was developed around thedetails of this incident, so their response nowwould be the same as they used in this event.

024 Pearl, MS,HighSchool.

School 1 maleaged 16.

Armed withMarlin .30-30lever actionrifle. Fired 6-7rounds - andreloaded. Had30 more roundsin pocket whencaptured.

2 7 0800 hours. 3 officers onscene within4 minutes,11 officerson scenewithin 6minutes. Suspect incustodywithin 3minutes offirst call topolice.

NO NO

Already in custody

Suspect killed his moth er earlier that da y, thenentered school and killed two specific students.He sought a third specific student, but whenunable to locate that t arget, he began firingrandomly. First two students were killed withhead/neck shots. One wounded studentreceived a torso shot, others were minor woundsfrom bullet/concrete fragments from missedshots. A teacher (National Guard Captain) ranto his vehicle and retrieved his Beretta servicepistol. As the suspect attempted to drive fromthe scene, the teacher detained him at gunpoint.The first arriving officer took the suspect intocustody. Suspect was one of 5 studentsconspiring to conduct a large-scale execution-style shooting event, but the other studentsbacked out of the plan. Suspect was detainedby armed teacher before police arrived.


-32-

025 Blackville,SC, HighSchool.


Armed withstolen H&R .32revolver with 4rounds. 4 shotsfired.

1 1 0837 hours. First officerarrived at0839. 4+officers onthe scenewithin 10minutes.

NO NO


Student had been expelled p revious day, andwas part of a 3 student conspiracy to kill theprinciple. The other students backed out of theplan. Student entered the school and shot/killedthe bandleader and a teacher. A third shot hit awall (possibly a missed shot at someone). Thestudent then used his fourth, and last shot tocommit suicide. Suspect had along history ofjuvenile arrests. Incident was over before policearrived on scene.

026 Lewistown,MT, HighSchool


Armed with a.41 Magnumrevolver. Suspect fired 5shots.

1 3 Morningevent. Twoofficers inthe school ata ball game,but severalminuteselapsedbefore they werenotified ofthe shooting.

NO NO

Gone on arrival

Student intended to shoot a teacher that wasflunking him. He walked into the classroomand shot the teacher in the back of the headbefore realizing it was a substitute teacher. Thisteacher was killed. Suspect then walkedthrough hallway and shot the vice principal inthe chest. Ast the vice principal was on thefloor, the suspect fired a head shot at closerange, but missed (vice principal survived). Asthe suspect ran from the school, he fired twoadditional rounds at students he thought werepursuing him and they received minor woundsfrom fragments. The student was captured lat erat home. The time line of this event wasestimated to be less than 2 minutes from thefirst shot to the suspect leaving the building.Two Police officers were on-duty in the schoolgymnasium at a basketball tournament, but werenot aware of the shooting for several minutesand were the first to arrive on the shootingscene.

027 Sandy, UT,hotel/restaurantshooting.

Randomshootingspree afteranargument.

1 maleaged 21

Armed with a.38 caliberhandgun, 6shots fired.

2 3 2100 hours. Four+officersarrivedaboutsimultaneously within 4minutes.

NO NO

Gone on arrival

Suspect shot his girlfriend in a hotel after aargument. Suspect then fled to a nearbyrestaurant and shot the man ager and a waiter.He then ran to the parking lot and attempted tocarjack a vehicle, shooting the driver. Suspectthen ran to a gas station and attempted tocarjack another vehicle, eventually fleeing onfoot. The suspect was captured the followingday. The suspect had fled the scene beforepolice officers arrived.


-33-

028 Killeen, TX,Luby’sRestaurant.

Randomshootingspree.

1 male inlate 20's.

Armed withtwo 9mmhandguns(Glock andRuger). Suspect fired atleast 50 shots,with severalreloads.

23 20 1230 hours. First officerarrivedwithin 5minutes and4+officerson the scenewithin 10-15minutes. Event wasover within20 minutesfrom firstcall.

NO -


POSITIVE

Actions of officersforced suspectaway fromadditional victims

Suspect drove his truck through the frontwindows of a Luby’s restaurant and beganrandomly shooting patrons. Responding policeofficers entered through the crash site andimmediately engaged the suspect, hitting himseveral times (non-life threatening wounds).The suspect was driven through the building,and attempted to b arricade himself in thewomen’s restroom, but a patron held the doorclosed. As police officers closed on hisposition, the suspect committed suicide. Mostof his shots were directed at women and wereclose-range execution-style shots. Majority ofthe wounded were from glass fragments andtrampling as the crowd escaped.

029 Salt LakeCity, UT,LDSChurchlibrary.


1 maleaged 70.

Armed with a.22 rimfiresemi-autohandgun, 25-30rounds fired,includingmultiplereloads of asinglemagazine.

2 3 1031 hours. More than 4officers wereon the scenewithin 3minutes.

NO -


POSITIVE

Actions of officersforced suspectaway fromadditional victims

Suspect was schizophrenic Russian immigrantwho thought he was being pursued by the KGB.Suspect entered the library of the downtownLatter Days Saints (Mormon) church and beganshooting random targets. An unarmed churchsecurity guard was killed. Responding officerswere dragging shooting victims out to safetywhile being fired upon by the suspect. Thesuspect fled to a nearby hallway, where he u sedcover to continue fi ring at police. He reloadedthe single magazine of the pistol multiple times.Police officers eventually were able to get 2shots at the suspect, a .223 rifle shot that missedand a .45 caliber pisto l shot that hi t and killedthe suspect.

030 Salt LakeCity, UT,KSL-TVstation.


1 femaleaged 25.

Armed with aTaurus 9mmhandgun. 14rounds fired,with a reload.

1 1 1515 hours. More than 4officers onthe scenewithin 4minutes.

NO -


NO

Already in custody

Schizophrenic female had a history of stalkingand threatening media personalities. Suspectentered the KSL-TV station and began firing inthe reception area, but did not hit anyone there.Suspect went up to the 2 nd floor and shotthrough a door she could not open. Suspectthen went up to the 3 rd floor, offices of AT&T,where she killed one person and woundedanother before being wrestled to the ground anddetained by workers in the offic e. Shooting wasover before police arrived.


-34-

031 Williamsport, PA,parochialschool.

School 1 femaleaged 14.

.22 rimfirerevolver. 1 shotfired.

0 1 1203 hours. Four-manRD teammade entryat 1207,suspect incustody at1208.

YES NO

Already in custody

Female student used a .22 revolver to shoot aspecific fellow student in the cafeteria. Thatstudent survived. After firing the shot, the girlpointed the revolver at others and then threw theweapon down. A teacher escorted the student tothe assistant p rincipal’s off ice where she washeld until police arrived. Williamsport PD hadfully trained their personnel in RD tactics and a4-man RD team entered the school in a diamondformation within 3 minutes of receiving the callof this incident. The team moved quicklythrough the building, was directed to theprincipal’s office and took the suspect intocustody at that location. Shooting was overbefore the police a rrived on the scen e.

032 Edmond,OK, PostOffice.

Workplace

1 maleaged 30's.

2 - .45 calib ersemi-autohandguns. 20+shots fired, atleast 1 reload.

15 3 0730 hours. No entryuntil SWATarrived. 4+officers onscene within5 minutes.

NO NO


Suspect had been reprimanded by his supervisorat the Post Office the previous day. Suspectwas a OK National Guard competitive shooter.Suspect entered the post office and shot hissupervisor and then shot random co-workers.Arriving police supervisor made the decisionnot to enter the post office until SWAT arrived.Reports indicate that the last shots were fired atabout the same time that officers arrived on thescene (suicide shot).


-35-

033 Edmond,OK, randomshooting.


1 maleaged 40's.

M1, Garand,.30-06. 8 shotsfired. Reloaded andwas preparingto shoot againwhen killed.

1 1 1730 hours. See narrativefor responsedata.

NO POSITIVE

However,this situationrequired fire &maneuver tactics,not a diamondformation

Suspect’s son called police to report that hisfather had shot his computer with a rifle andwas wandering the neighborhood. Severalofficers (5?) Had responded to the area to findthe suspect. About 10 minutes after the initialcall, the suspect fired at a man in his backyard,killing the victim. Nearby, the suspect fired ata man near a backyard pool, wounding thatvictim. An officer in the area heard the shots,saw the suspect running and fired 2 shots at him(.45 handgun - 1 hit @ 73 yards). When hit inthe buttocks, the suspect went down andcrawled under a bush. The suspect reloaded hisrifle and was rising to fire when two otherofficers fired (1 with AR15, 1 shot, 1 hit – 1with 9mm, 2 shots, 0 hits). The suspect waskilled by the AR15 hit.

034 Bethel, AK,HighSchool.


12 gaugeshotgun loadedwith birdshot. 6+ shots fired.

2 2+ 0849 hours. 3 officers onscene andmade entrywithin 4minutes. Suspect incustodywithin 7minutes.

YES POSITIVE

Rapid police actionalmost certainlysaved lives -caused thesurrender

Suspect walked into high school with shotgunhidden under a trench coat. He enteredprincipal’s office and argued for the return ofconfiscated property, then sh ot & killed theprincipal. While walking from the office, thesuspect shot a specific student he wan ted to kill.2 other students had taken part in a pre-eventconspiracy to kill people in the school, but theothers did not participate in the actual shooting.The suspect fired shots at lockers that producedminor wounds to at least 2 other students. Thisschool is built on high supports because ofsurrounding tundra. Several students wereinjured when they jumped from 1s t floorwindows to exit the school (1-2 story drop from“first” floor windows). The suspect walked upthe stairway to the 2n d floor of the school andwas part way up the stairs when the 3-manpolice team made entry in to the lobby/stairwayarea. The suspect fired two shots at the arrivingofficers. One officer returned fire with 2 - 12gauge slugs that narrowly missed the suspect.At that point the suspect threw down hisweapon and was taken into custody.


-36-

035 Fort Worth,TX,Wedgewood BaptistChurch.

Church 1 maleaged 47.

.380 and 9mmhandguns and apipe bomb. 63shots fired, stillhad 96 roundson his person.

7 7 1851 hours. First twoofficersarrivedsimultaneously within 2minutes. More than 4officers onthe scenewithin 3minutes.

NO -


NO


Suspect walked into a crowded church gatheringand opened fire with handguns. An off-dutyofficer that lived across the street arrived at thesame time as the firs t on-duty officer and theymade immediate entry to find the shooter. Thearriving officers heard a single shot after theyarrived (which was the suspect committingsuicide). A pipe bomb the suspect had hangingon his clothing exploded during the event,severely injuring the suspect, but no one else.The suspect was already dead when the officersmade ent ry into the sanctu ary.

036 Littleton,CO,ColumbineHighSchool.

School 2 malesaged 17and 18.

9mm handgun(TEC9), 9mmcarbine and 2 -sawed off 12gashotguns. 188shots fired(most werefrom 9mmcarbine). 76explosivedevices at thescene, 30devices wereused by thesuspects.

13 24 1119 hours. First officeron scenewithin 2minutes.more than 4officers onthe scenewithin 5minutes.

NO NO

Victims were allshot before officerscould have madecontact

Suspects had a detailed plan to use explosivesand guns to kill hundreds of students at theirhigh school. Incident began with a diversionaryexplosion some distance from the school. Whena large explosive device they had secreted in thecafeteria failed to explode, t he suspects walk edfrom the parking lot toward the school, shootingsome students outside the building beforeentering. Most of the victims were shot in theupstairs library area. The first arriving officer(the school resource offi cer - SRO) was pinn eddown by gunfire as he attempted to exit hisvehicle. The SRO returned fire, but did not hitthe suspects (using a handgun @ 60 yards). Thesuspects fired at officers and rescuers at severalpoints during the in cident. SWAT officerspoured a high volume of fire into the librarywindows at one point to cover the rescue ofdowned students below the library. Thesuspects comm itted suicide in the library about47 minutes int o the inciden t; About the sametime that the first SWAT officers were makingentry on the opposite side of the school. All ofthe victims in this incident were shot within thefirst 13 minutes.


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037 ThurstonHighSchool,Springfield,OR.


Ruger 10/22.22 rimfire riflewith a 50 roundmagazine,Glock 9mmpistol andRuger .22rimfire, semi-auto pistol (notfired at school)and knives. Fired 51rounds, 50from rifle and 1from Glock. Had 500+additionalrounds onperson whendetained.

2 25 0754 hours. First officeron the scenewithin 2minutes. Four+officers onscene within5 minutes.

NO NO

Already in custody

Student had been arrested previous day forpossession of handgun at school (expelled).That evening he killed both paren ts at home.The next morning, t he suspect walked ontocampus and started shooting randomly atstudents along a breeze way with a Ruger .22rimfire semi-auto rifle with a 50 roundmagazine. He then entered the busy cafeteriaand began randomly shooting students with therifle. As he attempted to reload the rifle (all 50rounds had been fired), he was rushed by astudent he had already shot in the torso. Thesuspect was able to draw the Glock pistol froma holster and fire one round, wounding a studentin the hand, before being overpowered byseveral students. Suspect was being held downby students when the first officer arrived andrushed directly into the cafeteria, taking thesuspect into custody. It took about 15-20minutes to clarify that the incident involved thesingle shooter tha t was already in cus tody.

038 FrontierMiddleSchool,MosesLake, WA.


.30-30 leveraction rifle, 5shots fired.


NO NO

Suspect hadalready barricadedwith hostagesbefore officersarrived

Suspect (student) called in sick then walked intohis algebra class and opened fire on the first 3students near the doorway. When the teacher inthe class yelled at the student, he turned andshot the teacher. A teacher from a neighboringclass ran into the room and the studen t pointedthe rifle at the second teacher. At that point thesuspect held the remainder of the studentshostage in the classroom , but allowed the singlewounded individual to be dragged out into thehallway. Police entered the building and sawthe wounded student in the hallway. After astand-off of 10-15 minu tes, the second teacherwas able to wrestle the gun from the suspect andcall in police to ta ke the boy i nto cust ody.


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039 USEmbroidery,Sante FeSprings,CA.

Workplace

1 maleaged 37.

.38 revolver, 8shots fired.

1 1 1050 hours. First officeron scenewithin 3minutes. 4+officers onscene within6 minutes.

NO -

BUTveryrapidresponseby patrolofficersusingballisticshield

NO


Suspect walked into place of business and shothis business partner and the receptionist. Thesuspect fled to another business in a nearbybuilding. As the people in the second businessran from that building, they heard a shot firedinside and reported that to arriving officers.Arriving police officers made immediate entryinto the second location, using a ballistic shield.As soon as they entered the second building,they saw the suspect , dead from a self-i nflictedwound.

040 OmniPlastics,Sante FeSprings,CA.

Workplace

1 maleaged 38.

9mm Berettahandgun. 25-30 shots fired,with reloads.

2 3 0955 hours. First officerarrivedwithin 2minutes. 4+officers onscene within4 minutes.

NO NO

Gone on arrival

Suspect walked into the plastics plant and beganshooting random co-workers. Suspect fired 25-30 rounds in rapid succession, then fled thescene. The suspect’s weapon was either emptyor had malfunctioned, as he attempted to shootother victims outside the building as he fled.Arriving officers were told the suspect wasalready gone and were p rovided with a d etailedsuspect and vehicle description. About 1 hourlater the suspect committed suicide inneighboring Los Angeles.

041 SantanaHighSchool,Santee, C A.


.22 rimfirerevolver, 15shots fired.

2 13 0921 hours. SRO andoff-duty SanDiego PDofficer wereon campuswhenincidentstarted. 4+officers onscene within4 minutes.

NO -

BUTveryrapidresponseby SRO,off-dutyandpatrolofficers

POSITIVE

Rapid response byofficersundoubtedlycontained thesuspect and causedhim to surrend er

Suspect walked onto campus and began firingfrom a restroom entran ce under a breeze waycanopy. After firing at several random andspecific targets, the suspect retreated into therestroom, popping in and out. The schoolResource Office and an off-duty officerresponded towards the shots and were joi ned bytwo arriving patrol officers by the time theymade contact with the suspect. When thesuspect saw the arriving officers, he present edthe gun by grabbing th e barrel and surr enderedto the police. Suspect made no attempt to pointthe gun or fire the gun at arriving officers.


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042 GraniteHills HighSchool, SanDiego, CA.


20 gaugeshotgun withbirdshot,several roundsfired.

0 5 Morning(timeunsure). 2officersalready onthe scenehandledimmedia tely.

NO -

BUTveryrapidresponseby SROandpatrolofficer

POSITIVE

Rapid actions byon-scene officersneutralized theactive shooter

Suspect arrived in front of the school and beganfiring a shotgun from the street at both specificand random targets. A SRO and another policeofficer (on campus for an unrelated call)responded immediately to the sound of gunshotsand engaged the suspect. One officer fired(unsure how many rounds fired), hitting thesuspect twice (one in the buttocks and one inthe cheek). Suspect was in custody before anyother officers had arrived.

043 Cal-Transmaintenance yard,Orange, CA

Workplace

1 maleaged 35

AK47 typerifle, shotgunand handgun.Handgun notused. Dozensof shots firedwith AK, 3shots fired withshotgun.

4 0 1509 hours. First officeron scenewithin 1minute. 4+officers onscene within3 minutes.

NO NO

Ongoinggunfight/chasefrom the arrival ofthe first officer.

Suspect had been fired from Cal-Transsometime before this incident. Suspect drove tomaintenance yard and shot his first victim witha shotgun while the victim was still in hisvehicle. The suspect then walked into themaintenance yard and fired dozens of roundsfrom an AK-type weapon randomly at peopleand blindly into buildings. The first arrivingofficer saw the shooter firi ng and exchan gedrounds with the suspect, but neither of them washit. Suspect got into his vehicle and fled thescene with arriving officers in pursuit. A shortdistance from the maintenance yard, the suspectgot stuck in an intersection and a large gunfightensued. Seven police officers fired more than500 rounds from handguns, eventually killingthe suspect. One officer was wounded by thesuspect dur ing this exchange.

044 JewishChild CareCenter, LosAngeles,CA


unsure 1 5 Morning,time unsure. 4+ officerson scenewithin 5minutes.

NO


NO

Gone on arrival

Suspect entered a child care center and open edfire with an unspecified firearm, wounding 5.Responding patrol officers made immediateentry into the center to find that the suspect hadalready fled the scene. While driving awayfrom the first shooting site, the susp ect stoppedand shot/killed a postal worker he encountered.It took nearly two hours to determine that thesetwo shooting incidents were related. Thesuspect eventually fled to Las Vegas, NV,where he surrend ered to the FBI.


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XXX Commercialwarehouse,LosAngeles,CA

AttemptedOfficerRescue

NOT ANACTIVESHOOTER EVENT- BUTRAPIDDEPLOYMENTTACTICSWEREUSED

1 male 9mm handgun 1 2 YES NEGATIVE Two Glendale PD officers entered warehouse toinvestigate the attempted murder of thesuspect’s common-law wife. When themanager escorted them into the warehouse area,the suspect opened fire with a 9mm pistol froman elevated position. The lead detect ive wentdown immediately with a head wound and thesecond detective exited the warehouse andcalled for assistance. Officers rolled a flashlightin the doorway of the warehouse in an attemptto locate the downed officer and the suspectshot the lens of the flashlight. A 7 man rescueteam was formed and entered the warehouseusing suppressive fire directed at the last knownlocation of the suspect. Two LAPD officers onthe rescue team were wounded by the suspect.Additional officers laid down cover fire whilethe 2 wounded offi cers were extr acted. K9“Saber” was sent into the warehouse 2 times,drawing fire both times but not being hit.SWAT officers then en tered the warehouse,deploying several diversionary devices, andextricated the downed detective, taking firefrom the suspect, but suffering no casualties.The SWAT officers returned fire during therescue. Attempts to negotiate with the suspectmet with no success. Chemical agents wereintroduced into the warehou se, but produced noresults. SWAT re-entered the warehouse and,after a lengthy search, found the suspect - deadfrom a self-inflicted wound.

About School Safety Partners

School Safety Partners (www.SchoolSafetyPartners.org) is dedicated to creating long‐term funding partnerships to support school safety best practices. We are a facilitator of joint research projects, reaching out to the general public as well as stakeholders in the public, private, non‐profit, and academic sectors. Since our start in January, 2008, our projects have addressed the legislative, training, compliance, funding, and public awareness sides of school safety. Here are some highlights:

1. We created a reference library documenting all aspects of Colorado Senate Bill 08‐181, a first‐of‐its‐kind measure introduced by Senator Tom Wiens to modernize emergency planning in schools, so students, teachers, and first responders can act fast in an emergency.

2. For the 10th anniversary of the Columbine High School tragedy, we produced the national media event, "Colorado Rising," focusing on the future of school safety in America, and our guests and speakers were covered by NBC‐TV, CNN, NPR, FOX, Oprah Radio, Channel One News, Associated Press, Reuters, the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Los Angeles Times, German Public Radio, the Guardian, and dozens of other news sources.

3. We assisted in the 2008 Symposium and the 2009 Symposium on the Prevention of School Violence at Johnson & Wales University, and in the tabletop exercises on interoperable communications conducted for these events by one of our partners, SchoolSAFE Communications (www.SchoolSAFEcom.org).

4. We produced over 4 hours of video footage, with 2 video crews, covering a full‐scale active shooter and multi‐hazard school exercise that involved 18 agencies and over 1,200 persons, and tested interoperable communications in several school‐related settings.

5. We co‐created the School Response Framework Fund in support of the National Incident Managment System (NIMS) and to help Colorado schools become NIMS‐compliant as quickly as possible.

6. We also developed a virtual campus that schools can use as an online training site for their safety teams, and as an action center where schools can build strong relationships with community partners, or local responders.

7. We have developed with ABC‐TV a nationwide community awareness campaign, giving recognition to educators as first responders, and calling for the creation of public‐private partnerships to make school safety sustainable in communities across America.

8. We have also developed with the creators of the feature motion picture, "April Showers," the educational and school safety materials to accompany the film as it is released to the worldwide educational market.

9. Other states have shown an interest in what we have done in Colorado about school crisis response, and for them we have designed webinars and information kits about improving school safety legislation and finding long‐term funding solutions.

We hope that you find our information useful and our contacts productive. We invite you to explore all parts of our website, and also share with us your views, experiences, lessons learned, best practices, and innovations. Please visit us at www.SchoolSafetyPartners.org and register online in order to access all of our sections. Registration is free.

rapid deployment as a response to an active shooter incident

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