ramanuja (1017-1137 ad) commentary on the vedanta sutras (shri-bhashya)
TRANSCRIPT
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Ramanuja(1017-1137 AD)
Commentary on the Vedanta Sutras
(Shri-Bhashya)
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General outline of the text
A critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism (non-dualism) (177-181)
A critique of Shankara’s metaphysical idealism (182-186)
A critique of Shankara’s theory of the Self (186-190)
A critique of Shankara’s theory of ignorance (190-196)
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The Classical PhilosophicalSystems of India
The orthodox schools
Samkhya & Yoga
Nyaya & Vaisheshika
Mimamsa & Vedanta
The unorthodox schools
Buddhism
Jainism
Carvaka
(See Text, 150, fn 1)
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Shankara vs. Ramanuja
Non-Dualism (Advaita)
Brahman alone is real.
Brahman & Atman are identical (one & the same).
The phenomenal world is an appearance of Brahman caused by ignorance (avidya) & illusion (maya).
Qualified Non-Dualism (Vishishadvaita)
Brahman alone is ultimately & independently real, but
in Brahman there are many individual material beings & many individual conscious selves.
Material things & conscious selves are real, but not independently or ultimately so. They exist only in & in relation to Brahman.
See fn 2 on p. 177 & fn 3 on p. 177-8
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Detailed outline of the text
A critique of S’s metaphysical monism - Brahman, Pure Being, alone is real; distinctions & differences are unreal (177-181).
– Metaphysical monism is unprovable (177).– Knowing requires objects that are distinct & different from each
other (177).– Acts of consciousness reveal metaphysical distinctions (178).
– Speech implies metaphysical distinctions (178-9).
– Perception reveals metaphysical distinctions (179-180).
– The process of inference implies metaphysical distinctions (180).
– There is no perception of Pure Being (180).
– Impermanent things are not necessarily unreal (contrary to S’s view that only that which is permanent is real) (181).
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Detailed outline, cont’d
A critique of S’s metaphysical idealism (182-6)
– Being & consciousness are not one & the same (182).
– Consciousness can be an object of consciousness (182-3).
– Consciousness is not eternal (although the Self is) (183-5).
– There is no consciousness without an object (185-6).
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Detailed outline, cont’d
Consciousness is an attribute of a permanent Self; Self & consciousness are not one & the same (186-188).
The basic differences between Ramanuja & Shankara on the nature of the Self (Editor’s
Comment, 188-9).
The individual conscious subject (the “I-Self”) persists in the state of release & is the true Atman-Self (189-190).
A critique of S’s theory of the Self (186-190 )
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A critique of S’s theory of ignorance (190-196)
S’s theory of beginningless ignorance (avidya), which can neither “be” nor “not be” (190-191)
Ramanuja’s critique:– What is the ground of beginningless ignorance?
(191-2)
– How can beginningless ignorance neither be nor not-be? (192-4)
– How can Brahman be affected by ignorance? (194-6)
Detailed outline, cont’d
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Even more detailed analysis of the text
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Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism
Shankara’s monism: Brahman, Pure Being, alone is real; distinctions & differences are unreal (177). Individual entities are impermanent (& therefore unreal) appearances of Pure Being. Pure Being alone is “really real.” The differences & distinctions between individual entities are unreal (like the entities themselves) (178).
Preliminary criticisms:– Metaphysical monism cannot be proved true [but it can be
proved false] (177).– Knowing requires objects that are distinct & different from each
other (177). Why?Extra-Credit Essay
(Follow instructions in Course Syllabus)
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Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism
Acts of consciousness reveal metaphysical distinctions (178):1 “I see this.” “I” distinct & different from “this” & vice
versa.2 Consciousness itself has various (& different)
attributes (permanence, oneness, etc.).3 Philosophical disputation presupposes differences
between opposing philosophical views.
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Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism
Speech implies metaphysical distinctions (178-9):1 A word is a combination of root & suffix - two
different linguistic elements.2 The plurality of words is based on a plurality of
meanings (each different from the others).3 A sentence is a series of words expressing a
number of different meanings.
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Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism
This is true of both “determinate” and “non-determinate” perception (i.e., perception that recognizes class membership & generic differences & perception that does not include such recognition).
They both include recognition of differences & distinctions.
Even in “non-determinate” perception, there is recognition of the difference between substance and attribute in the structure of the object perceived (for the 1st time).
Perception reveals metaphysical distinctions (179-180)
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Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism
The process of inference implies
metaphysical distinctions (180)
Perception reveals a world marked by difference.
2 Inference is a process of reasoning based upon perception.
3 Inference must also reveal a world marked by difference.
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Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism
Shankara claims that the true object of perception is Being-Itself (Pure Being) (see 180).
Ramanuja claims that there is no perception of Pure Being (180): All objects of perception are things distinguished from other things
in various ways.
2 There is a difference between substance & attribute in all objects of perception.
3 If the only true object of perception is Pure Being, then all judgments referring to different objects are meaningless & false.
4 If perceived differences & distinctions are unreal, then a man searching for horse should be satisfied with finding a buffalo.
5 None of the senses (sight, touch, hearing, etc.) have Pure Being for their object.
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Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism
Another argument for monism by Shankara:
Brahman is permanent. Individual entities are
impermanent. The permanent is real, &
the impermanent is unreal.
Brahman alone is real.
R’s response: Impermanent things are not necessarily unreal - sublation & persistence (see Text, 181).
(Text, 181)
(Is R’s response here a relevant
reply to S’s argument? Why or
why not?) Extra-Credit Essay
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Even more detail, cont’d
A critique of S’s metaphysical idealism (182-6)
– Being & consciousness are not one & the same (182).
– Consciousness can be an object of consciousness (182-3).
– Consciousness is not eternal (although the Self is) (183-5).
– There is no consciousness without an object (185-6).
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Shankara’s argument for metaphysical idealism
(according to Ramanuja)
All differences & distinctions are unreal (metaphysical monism).
Being & consciousness are both (obviously) real.
There are no differences or distinctions between Being and consciousness. They must be one and the same (metaphysical idealism).
(Text, 182)
Again, R appeals to perception to counter the 1st premise of this
argument: Perception (he claims) shows that there is a real distinction
& relationship between consciousness & its objects (185-6).
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Consciousness can be an object of consciousness (182-3)
Shankara claims that consciousness cannot be an object of consciousness (182). (Why is this important to him? Is it a part of metaphysical idealism?)
Ramanuja claims that there are at least two situations in which consciousness is an object of consciousness:– Consciousness of the
consciousness of others– Consciousness of one’s
own past states of consciousness
Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical idealism
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Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical idealism
(continued)
Shankara argues that consciousness is eternal on the
ground that the “antecedent non-existence of consciousness” cannot
be proved.
(See Text, 183)
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reacts to Shankara’s argument by
trying to show that
the “antecedent non-existence of consciousness” can be known
(by consciousness itself).
(See Text, 184-5)
Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical idealism (continued)
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Ramanuja also argues that
there is no consciousness without an object (no pure, undifferentiated
consciousness).
(See Text, 185-6)
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Even more detail, cont’d
Consciousness is an attribute of a permanent Self; Self & consciousness are not one & the same (186-8).
The basic differences between Ramanuja & Shankara on the nature of the Self (Editor’s Comment, 188-9).
The individual conscious subject (the “I-Self”) persists in the state of release & is the true Atman-Self (189-190).
A critique of S’s theory of the Self (186-190 )
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A critique of S’s theory of ignorance (190-196)
S’s theory of beginningless ignorance (avidya), which can neither “be” nor “not be” (190-191)
Ramanuja’s critique:– What is the ground of beginningless ignorance?
(191-2)
– How can beginningless ignorance neither be nor not-be? (192-4)
– How can Brahman be affected by ignorance? (194-6)
Even more detail, cont’d