rakas v. illinois, 439 u.s. 128 (1979)

8/17/2019 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1979)

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439 U.S. 128

99 S.Ct. 421

58 L.Ed.2d 387

RAKAS et al.

v.

ILLINOIS.

No. 77-5781.

Argued Oct. 3, 1978.

Decided Dec. 5, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 15, 1979.

See 439 U.S. 1122, 99 S.Ct. 1035.

Syllabus

After receiving a robbery report, police stopped the suspected getaway

car, which the owner was driving and in which petitioners were

passengers. Upon searching the car, the police found a box of rifle shellsin the glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger

seat and arrested petitioners. Subsequently, petitioners were convicted in

an Illinois court of armed robbery at a trial in which the rifle and shells

were admitted as evidence. Before trial petitioners had moved to suppress

the rifle and shells on Fourth Amendment grounds, but the trial court

denied the motion on the ground that petitioners lacked standing to object

to the lawfulness of the search of the car because they concededly did not

own either the car or the rifle and shells. The Illinois Appellate Courtaffirmed. Held :

1. "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be

vicariously asserted," Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89

S.Ct. 961, 966, 22 L.Ed.2d 176, and a person aggrieved by an illegal

search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence

secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had

any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. The rule of standing to

raise vicarious Fourth Amendment claims should not be extended by a so-

called "target" theory whereby any criminal defendant at whom a search

was "directed" would have standing to contest the legality of that search


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and object to the admission at trial of evidence obtained as a result of the

search. Pp. 133-138.

2. In any event, the better analysis of the principle that Fourth

Amendment rights are personal rights that may not be asserted vicariously

should focus on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under that

Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate but invariablyintertwined concept of standing. Pp. 138-140.

3. The phrase "legitimately on premises" coined in Jones v. United States,

362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, creates "too broad a gauge" for

measurement of Fourth Amendment rights. The holding in Jones can best

be explained by the fact that Jones had a legitimate expectation of privacy

in the premises he was using and therefore could claim the protection of

the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 140-148. 4. Petitioners, who asserted neither a

property nor a possessory interest in the automobile searched nor an

interest in the property seized and who failed to show that they had any

legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under

the seat of the car in which they were merely passengers, were not entitled

to challenge a search of those areas. Jones v. United States, supra ; Katz v.

United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, distinguished.

Pp. 148-149.

46 Ill.App.3d 569, 4 Ill.Dec. 877, 360 N.E.2d 1252, affirmed.

G. Joseph Weller, Ottawa, Ill., for petitioners.

Donald B. Mackay, Chicago, Ill., for respondent.

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

1 Petitioners were convicted of armed robbery in the Circuit Court of Kankakee

County, Ill., and their convictions were affirmed on appeal. At their trial, the

prosecution offered into evidence a sawed-off rifle and rifle shells that had been

seized by police during a search of an automobile in which petitioners had been

passengers. Neither petitioner is the owner of the automobile and neither has

ever asserted that he owned the rifle or shells seized. The Illinois Appellate

Court held that petitioners lacked standing to object to the allegedly unlawful

search and seizure and denied their motion to suppress the evidence. Wegranted certiorari in light of the obvious importance of the issues raised to the

administration of criminal justice, 435 U.S. 922, 98 S.Ct. 1483, 55 L.Ed.2d 515

(1978), and now affirm.


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II

2 * Because we are not here concerned with the issue of probable cause, a brief

description of the events leading to the search of the automobile will suffice. A

police officer on a routine patrol received a radio call notifying him of a

robbery of a clothing store in Bourbonnais, Ill., and describing the getaway car.

Shortly thereafter, the officer spotted an automobile which he thought might be

the getaway car. After following the car for some time and after the arrival of

assistance, he and several other officers stopped the vehicle. The occupants of the automobile, petitioners and two female companions, were ordered out of the

car and, after the occupants had left the car, two officers searched the interior

of the vehicle. They discovered a box of rifle shells in the glove compartment,

which had been locked, and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat.

App. 10-11. After discovering the rifle and the shells, the officers took

petitioners to the station and placed them under arrest.

3 Before trial petitioners moved to suppress the rifle and shells seized from thecar on the ground that the search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments. They conceded that they did not own the automobile and were

simply passengers; the owner of the car had been the driver of the vehicle at

the time of the search. Nor did they assert that they owned the rifle or the shells

seized.1 The prosecutor challenged petitioners' standing to object to the

lawfulness of the search of the car because neither the car, the shells nor the

rifle belonged to them. The trial court agreed that petitioners lacked standing

and denied the motion to suppress the evidence. App. 23-24. In view of thisholding, the court did not determine whether there was probable cause for the

search and seizure. On appeal after petitioners' conviction, the Appellate Court

of Illinois, Third Judicial District, affirmed the trial court's denial of petitioners'

motion to suppress because it held that "without a proprietary or other similar

interest in an automobile, a mere passenger therein lacks standing to challenge

the legality of the search of the vehicle." 46 Ill.App.3d 569, 571, 4 Ill.Dec. 877,

878, 360 N.E.2d 1252, 1253 (1977). The court stated:

4 "We believe that defendants failed to establish any prejudice to their own

constitutional rights because they were not persons aggrieved by the unlawful

search and seizure. . . . They wrongly seek to establish prejudice only through

the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search and seizure directed

at someone else and fail to prove an invasion of their own privacy. ( Alderman v.

United States (1969), 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176)." Id., at 571-

572, 4 Ill.Dec., at 879, 360 N.E.2d, at 1254.

5 The Illinois Supreme Court denied petitioners leave to appeal.


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966. And since the exclusionary rule is an attempt to effectuate the guarantees

of the Fourth Amendment, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94

S.Ct. 613, 619, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), it is proper to permit only defendants

whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the rule's

protections.3 See Simmons v. United States, supra, 390 U.S., at 389, 88 S.Ct., at

973. There is no reason to think that a party whose rights have been infringed

will not, if evidence is used against him, have ample motivation to move tosuppress it. Alderman, supra, 394 U.S., at 174, 89 S.Ct., at 966. Even if such a

person is not a defendant in the action, he may be able to recover damages for

the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.

167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), or seek redress under state law for

invasion of privacy or trespass.

9 In support of their target theory, petitioners rely on the following quotation

from Jones :

10 "In order to qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure'

one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the

search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only

through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure

directed at someone else." 362 U.S., at 261, 80 S.Ct., at 731 (emphasis added).

11 They also rely on Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, n. 11, 88 S.Ct.

1788, 1791, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968), and United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,

72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951).

12 The above-quoted statement from Jones suggests that the italicized language

was meant merely as a parenthetical equivalent of the previous phrase "a victim

of a search or seizure." To the extent that the language might be read more

broadly, it is dictum which was impliedly repudiated in Alderman v. United

States, supra, and which we now expressly reject. In Jones, the Court set forth

two alternative holdings: It established a rule of "automatic" standing to contest

an allegedly illegal search where the same possession needed to establish

standing is an essential element of the offense charged;4 and second, it stated

that "anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its

legality by way of a motion to suppress." 362 U.S., at 264, 267, 80 S.Ct., at

732, 734. See Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227 n. 4, 92 S.Ct. 2284,

2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 308 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 n. 5, 88

S.Ct. 2120, 2123, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968); Simmons v. United States, supra,

390 U.S., at 390, 88 S.Ct., at 974. Had the Court intended to adopt the target

theory now put forth by petitioners, neither of the above two holdings would

have been necessary since Jones was the "target" of the police search in that


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case.5 Nor does United States v. Jeffers, supra, or Bumper v. North Carolina,

supra, support the target theory. Standing in Jeffers was based on Jeffers'

possessory interest in both the premises searched and the property seized. 342

U.S., at 49-50, 54, 72 S.Ct., at 94-95, 96; see Mancusi v. DeForte, supra, 392

U.S., at 367-368, 88 S.Ct., at 2123-2124; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,

301, 87 S.Ct. 408, 413, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S.

139, 143, and n. 10, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 1221, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962). Similarly, in Bumper, the defendant had a substantial possessory interest in both the house

searched and the rifle seized. 391 U.S., at 548 n. 11, 88 S.Ct., at 1791.

13 In Alderman v. United States, Mr. Justice Fortas, in a concurring and dissenting

opinion, argued that the Court should "include within the category of those

who may object to the introduction of illegal evidence 'one against whom the

search was directed.' " 394 U.S., at 206-209, 89 S.Ct., at 985. The Court did not

directly comment on Mr. Justice Fortas' suggestion, but it left no doubt that itrejected this theory by holding that persons who were not parties to unlawfully

overheard conversations or who did not own the premises on which such

conversations took place did not have standing to contest the legality of the

surveillance, regardless of whether or not they were the "targets" of the

surveillance. Id., at 176, 89 S.Ct., at 968. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring and

dissenting, did squarely address Mr. Justice Fortas' arguments and declined to

accept them. Id., at 188-189, n. 1, 89 S.Ct., at 974. He identified administrative

problems posed by the target theory:

14 "[T]he [target] rule would entail very substantial administrative difficulties. In

the majority of cases, I would imagine that the police plant a bug with the

expectation that it may well produce leads to a large number of crimes. A

lengthy hearing would, then, appear to be necessary in order to determine

whether the police knew of an accused's criminal activity at the time the bug

was planted and whether the police decision to plant a bug was motivated by an

effort to obtain information against the accused or some other individual. I donot believe that this administrative burden is justified in any substantial degree

by the hypothesized marginal increase in Fourth Amendment protection." Ibid .

15 When we are urged to grant standing to a criminal defendant to assert a

violation, not of his own constitutional rights but of someone else's, we cannot

but give weight to practical difficulties such as those foreseen by Mr. Justice

Harlan in the quoted language.

16 Conferring standing to raise vicarious Fourth Amendment claims would

necessarily mean a more widespread invocation of the exclusionary rule during

criminal trials. The Court's opinion in Alderman counseled against such an


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B

extension of the exclusionary rule:

17 "The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the

police have violated have been considered sufficient to justify the suppression

of probative evidence even though the case against the defendant is weakened

or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But we are not convinced that the

additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those

accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the

evidence which exposes the truth." Id., at 174-175, 89 S.Ct., at 967.

18 Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for

the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is

kept from the trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected. See

United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 275, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 1059, 55 L.Ed.2d

268 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-490, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3050, 49

L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S., at 348-352, 94

S.Ct., at 620-622. Since our cases generally have held that one whose Fourth

Amendment rights are violated may successfully suppress evidence obtained in

the course of an illegal search and seizure, misgivings as to the benefit of

enlarging the class of persons who may invoke that rule are properly

considered when deciding whether to expand standing to assert Fourth

Amendment violations.6

19 Had we accepted petitioners' request to allow persons other than those whose

own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a challenged search and

seizure to suppress evidence obtained in the course of such police activity, it

would be appropriate to retain Jones' use of standing in Fourth Amendment

analysis. Under petitioners' target theory, a court could determine that adefendant had standing to invoke the exclusionary rule without having to

inquire into the substantive question of whether the challenged search or

seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of that particular defendant.

However, having rejected petitioners' target theory and reaffirmed the principle

that the "rights assured by the Fourth Amendment are personal rights, [which] .

. . may be enforced by exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose

own protection was infringed by the search and seizure," Simmons v. United

States, 390 U.S., at 389, 88 S.Ct., at 974, the question necessarily ariseswhether it serves any useful analytical purpose to consider this principle a

matter of standing, distinct from the merits of a defendant's Fourth Amendment

claim. We can think of no decided cases of this Court that would have come out


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differently had we concluded, as we do now, that the type of standing

requirement discussed in Jones and reaffirmed today is more properly

subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine. Rigorous application

of the principle that the rights secured by this Amendment are personal, in

place of a notion of "standing," will produce no additional situations in which

evidence must be excluded. The inquiry under either approach is the same.7 But

we think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any

theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing. The Court

in Jones also may have been aware that there was a certain artificiality in

analyzing this question in terms of standing because in at least three separate

places in its opinion the Court placed that term within quotation marks. 362

U.S., at 261, 263, 265, 80 S.Ct., at 731, 732, 733.

20 It should be emphasized that nothing we say here casts the least doubt on caseswhich recognize that, as a general proposition, the issue of standing involves

two inquiries: first, whether the proponent of a particular legal right has alleged

"injury in fact," and, second, whether the proponent is asserting his own legal

rights and interests rather than basing his claim for relief upon the rights of

third parties. See, e. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2868,

2873, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct.

2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397

U.S. 150, 152-153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829-830, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970). But thisCourt's long history of insistence that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in

nature has already answered many of these traditional standing inquiries, and

we think that definition of those rights is more properly placed within the

purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing. Cf.

id., at 153, and n. 1, 90 S.Ct., at 829; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 256 n.

4, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 1035, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-

70, 26 S.Ct. 370, 376-377, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906).8

21 Analyzed in these terms, the question is whether the challenged search or

seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who

seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it. That inquiry in turn requires a

determination of whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an

interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.

We are under no illusion that by dispensing with the rubric of standing used

in Jones we have rendered any simpler the determination of whether the

proponent of a motion to suppress is entitled to contest the legality of a searchand seizure. But by frankly recognizing that this aspect of the analysis belongs

more properly under the heading of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine

than under the heading of standing, we think the decision of this issue will rest


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C

on sounder logical footing.

22 Here petitioners, who were passengers occupying a car which they neither

owned nor leased, seek to analogize their position to that of the defendant in

Jones v. United States. In Jones, petitioner was present at the time of the searchof an apartment which was owned by a friend. The friend had given Jones

permission to use the apartment and a key to it, with which Jones had admitted

himself on the day of the search. He had a suit and shirt at the apartment and

had slept there "maybe a night," but his home was elsewhere. At the time of the

search, Jones was the only occupant of the apartment because the lessee was

away for a period of several days. 362 U.S., at 259, 80 S.Ct., at 730. Under

these circumstances, this Court stated that while one wrongfully on the

premises could not move to suppress evidence obtained as a result of searchingthem,9 "anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge

its legality." Id., at 267, 80 S.Ct., at 734. Petitioners argue that their occupancy

of the automobile in question was comparable to that of Jones in the apartment

and that they therefore have standing to contest the legality of the search—or as

we have rephrased the inquiry, that they, like Jones, had their Fourth

Amendment rights violated by the search.

23 We do not question the conclusion in Jones that the defendant in that casesuffered a violation of his personal Fourth Amendment rights if the search in

question was unlawful. Nonetheless, we believe that the phrase "legitimately on

premises" coined in Jones creates too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth

Amendment rights.10 For example, applied literally, this statement would

permit a casual visitor who has never seen, or been permitted to visit, the

basement of another's house to object to a search of the basement if the visitor

happened to be in the kitchen of the house at the time of the search. Likewise, a

casual visitor who walks into a house one minute before a search of the housecommences and leaves one minute after the search ends would be able to

contest the legality of the search. The first visitor would have absolutely no

interest or legitimate expectation of privacy in the basement, the second would

have none in the house, and it advances no purpose served by the Fourth

Amendment to permit either of them to object to the lawfulness of the search.11

24 We think that Jones on its facts merely stands for the unremarkable proposition

that a person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his ownhome so that the Fourth Amendment protects him from unreasonable

governmental intrusion into that place. See 362 U.S., at 263, 265, 80 S.Ct., at

732, 733. In defining the scope of that interest, we adhere to the view expressed


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in Jones and echoed in later cases that arcane distinctions developed in property

and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to

control. Id., at 266, 80 S.Ct., at 733; see Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 88

S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct.

1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81

S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961). But the Jones statement that a person need

only be "legitimately on premises" in order to challenge the validity of thesearch of a dwelling place cannot be taken in its full sweep beyond the facts of

that case.

25 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967),

provides guidance in defining the scope of the interest protected by the Fourth

Amendment. In the course of repudiating the doctrine derived from Olmstead v.

United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928), and Goldman

v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct. 993, 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942), that if police officers had not been guilty of a common-law trespass they were not

prohibited by the Fourth Amendment from eavesdropping, the Court in Katz

held that capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends

not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who

claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy

in the invaded place. 389 U.S., at 353, 88 S.Ct., at 512; see United States v.

Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2481, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977); United

States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 1126, 28 L.Ed.2d 453(1971). Viewed in this manner, the holding in Jones can best be explained by

the fact that Jones had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises he

was using and therefore could claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment

with respect to a governmental invasion of those premises, even though his

"interest" in those premises might not have been a recognized property interest

at common law.12 See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S., at 261, 80 S.Ct., at 731.

26 Our Brother WHITE in dissent expresses the view that by rejecting the phrase"legitimately on [the] premises" as the appropriate measure of Fourth

Amendment rights, we are abandoning a thoroughly workable, "bright line" test

in favor of a less certain analysis of whether the facts of a particular case give

rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy. Post, at 168. If "legitimately on

premises" were the successful litmus test of Fourth Amendment rights that he

assumes it is, his approach would have at least the merit of easy application,

whatever it lacked in fidelity to the history and purposes of the Fourth

Amendment. But a reading of lower court cases that have applied the phrase"legitimately on premises," and of the dissent itself, reveals that this expression

is not a shorthand summary for a bright-line rule which somehow encapsulates

the "core" of the Fourth Amendment's protections.13


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27The dissent itself shows that the facile consistency it is striving for is illusory.

The dissenters concede that "there comes a point when use of an area is shared

with so many that one simply cannot reasonably expect seclusion." Post, at

164. But surely the "point" referred to is not one demarcating a line which is

black on one side and white on another; it is inevitably a point which separates

one shade of gray from another. We are likewise told by the dissent that a

person "legitimately on private premises . . . , though his privacy is not absolute, is entitled to expect that he is sharing it only with those persons

[allowed there] and that governmental officials will intrude only with consent or

by complying with the Fourth Amendment." Ibid. (emphasis added). This

single sentence describing the contours of the supposedly easily applied rule

virtually abounds with unanswered questions: What are "private" premises?

Indeed, what are the "premises?" It may be easy to describe the "premises"

when one is confronted with a 1-room apartment, but what of the case of a 10-

room house, or of a house with an attached garage that is searched? Also, if one's privacy is not absolute, how is it bounded? If he risks governmental

intrusion "with consent," who may give that consent?

28 Again, we are told by the dissent that the Fourth Amendment assures that

" some expectations of privacy are justified and will be protected from official

intrusion." Post , at 166 (emphasis added). But we are not told which of many

possible expectations of privacy are embraced within this sentence. And our

dissenting Brethren concede that "perhaps the Constitution provides somedegree less protection for the personal freedom from unreasonable

governmental intrusion when one does not have a possessory interest in the

invaded private place." But how much "less" protection is available when one

does not have such a possessory interest?

29 Our disagreement with the dissent is not that it leaves these questions

unanswered, or that the questions are necessarily irrelevant in the context of the

analysis contained in this opinion. Our disagreement is rather with the dissent's bland and self-refuting assumption that there will not be fine lines to be drawn

in Fourth Amendment cases as in other areas of the law, and that its rubric,

rather than a meaningful exegesis of Fourth Amendment doctrine, is more

desirable or more easily resolves Fourth Amendment cases.14 In abandoning

"legitimately on premises" for the doctrine that we announce today, we are not

forsaking a time-tested and workable rule, which has produced consistent

results when applied, solely for the sake of fidelity to the values underlying the

Fourth Amendment. Rather, we are rejecting blind adherence to a phrase whichat most has superficial clarity and which conceals underneath that thin veneer

all of the problems of line drawing which must be faced in any conscientious

effort to apply the Fourth Amendment. Where the factual premises for a rule


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D

are so generally prevalent that little would be lost and much would be gained by

abandoning case-by-case analysis, we have not hesitated to do so. See United

States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 476, 38 L.Ed.2d 427

(1973). But the phrase "legitimately on premises" has not been shown to be an

easily applicable measure of Fourth Amendment rights so much as it has proved

to be simply a label placed by the courts on results which have not been

subjected to careful analysis. We would not wish to be understood as sayingthat legitimate presence on the premises is irrelevant to one's expectation of

privacy, but it cannot be deemed controlling.

30 Judged by the foregoing analysis, petitioners' claims must fail. They asserted

neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interest in

the property seized. And as we have previously indicated, the fact that theywere "legitimately on [the] premises" in the sense that they were in the car with

the permission of its owner is not determinative of whether they had a

legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile

searched. It is unnecessary for us to decide here whether the same expectations

of privacy are warranted in a car as would be justified in a dwelling place in

analogous circumstances. We have on numerous occasions pointed out that cars

are not to be treated identically with houses or Apartments for Fourth

Amendment purposes. See United States v. Chadwick , 433 U.S., at 12, 97 S.Ct.,at 2484; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 96 S.Ct. 3074,

3084, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 94 S.Ct.

2464, 2469, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (plurality opinion).15 But here petitioners'

claim is one which would fail even in an analogous situation in a dwelling

place, since they made no showing that they had any legitimate expectation of

privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which

they were merely passengers. Like the trunk of an automobile, these are areas

in which a passenger qua passenger simply would not normally have alegitimate expectation of privacy. Supra, at 142.

31 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) and

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967),

involved significantly different factual circumstances. Jones not only had

permission to use the apartment of his friend, but also had a key to the

apartment with which he admitted himself on the day of the search and kept

possessions in the apartment. Except with respect to his friend, Jones hadcomplete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others

from it. Likewise in Katz , the defendant occupied the telephone booth, shut the

door behind him to exclude all others and paid the toll, which "entitled [him] to


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III

assume that the words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece [would] not be

broadcast to the world." Id., at 352, 88 S.Ct., at 512.16 Katz and Jones could

legitimately expect privacy in the areas which were the subject of the search

and seizure each sought to contest. No such showing was made by these

petitioners with respect to those portions of the automobile which were

searched and from which incriminating evidence was seized.17

32 The Illinois courts were therefore correct in concluding that it was unnecessary

to decide whether the search of the car might have violated the rights secured to

someone else by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. Since it did not violate any rights of these petitioners, their

judgment of conviction is

33 Affirmed .

34 Mr. Justice POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring.

35 I concur in the opinion of the Court, and add these thoughts. I do not believe my

dissenting Brethren correctly characterize the rationale of the Court's opinion

when they assert that it ties "the application of the Fourth Amendment . . . to

property law concepts." Post , at 156-157. On the contrary, I read the Court's

opinion as focusing on whether there was a legitimate expectation of privacy

protected by the Fourth Amendment.

36 The petitioners do not challenge the constitutionality of the police action in

stopping the automobile in which they were riding; nor do they complain of

being made to get out of the vehicle. Rather, petitioners assert that their

constitutionally protected interest in privacy was violated when the police, after stopping the automobile and making them get out, searched the vehicle's

interior, where they discovered a sawed-off rifle under the front seat and rifle

shells in the locked glove compartment. The question before the Court,

therefore, is a narrow one: Did the search of their friend's automobile after they

had left it violate any Fourth Amendment right of the petitioners?

37 The dissenting opinion urges the Court to answer this question by considering

only the talisman of legitimate presence on the premises. To be sure, one of thetwo alternative reasons given by the Court for its ruling in Jones v. United

States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), was that the

defendant had been legitimately on the premises searched. Since Jones,


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however, the view that mere legitimate presence is enough to create a Fourth

Amendment right has been questioned. See ante, at 147 n. 14. There also has

been a signal absence of uniformity in the application of this theory. See ante,

at 145-146 n. 13.

38 This Court's decisions since Jones have emphasized a sounder standard for

determining the scope of a person's Fourth Amendment rights: Only legitimateexpectations of privacy are protected by the Constitution. In Katz v. United

States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the Court rejected

the notion that the Fourth Amendment protects places or property, ruling that

the scope of the Amendment must be determined by the scope of privacy that a

free people legitimately may expect. See id ., at 353, 88 S.Ct., at 512. As Mr.

Justice Harlan pointed out in his concurrence, however, it is not enough that an

individual desired or anticipated that he would be free from governmental

intrusion. Rather, for an expectation to deserve the protection of the FourthAmendment, it must "be one that society is prepared to recognize as

'reasonable.' " See id ., at 361, 88 S.Ct., at 516.

39 The ultimate question, therefore, is whether one's claim to privacy from

government intrusion is reasonable in light of all the surrounding

circumstances. As the dissenting opinion states, this standard "will not provide

law enforcement officials with a bright line between the protected and the

unprotected." See post , at 168. Whatever the application of this standard maylack in ready administration, it is more faithful to the purposes of the Fourth

Amendment than a test focusing solely or primarily on whether the defendant

was legitimately present during the search.1

40 In considering the reasonableness of asserted privacy expectations, the Court

has recognized that no single factor invariably will be determinative. Thus, the

Court has examined whether a person invoking the protection of the Fourth

Amendment took normal precautions to maintain his privacy—that is,

precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy. See, e. g., United

States v. Chadwick , 433 U.S. 1, 11, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2483, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977)

("By placing personal effects inside a doublelocked footlocker, respondents

manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public

examination"); Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S., at 352, 88 S.Ct., at 511

("One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays

the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the

words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world").Similarly, the Court has looked to the way a person has used a location, to

determine whether the Fourth Amendment should protect his expectations of

privacy. In Jones v. United States, supra, for example, the Court found that the


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defendant had a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in an apartment in which

he had slept and in which he kept his clothing. The Court on occasion also has

looked to history to discern whether certain types of government intrusion were

perceived to be objectionable by the Framers of the Fourth Amendment. See

United States v. Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S., at 7-9, 97 S.Ct., at 2481-2482.

And, as the Court states today, property rights reflect society's explicit

recognition of a person's authority to act as he wishes in certain areas, andtherefore should be considered in determining whether an individual's

expectations of privacy are reasonable. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.

165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969).

41 The Court correctly points out that petitioners cannot invoke decisions such as

Alderman in support of their Fourth Amendment claim, as they had no property

interest in the automobile in which they were riding. But this determination is

only part of the inquiry required under Katz. The petitioners' FourthAmendment rights were not abridged here because none of the factors relied

upon by this Court on prior occasions supports petitioners' claim that their

alleged expectation of privacy from government intrusion was reasonable.

42 We are concerned here with an automobile search. Nothing is better established

in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence than the distinction between one's

expectation of privacy in an automobile and one's expectation when in other

locations.2 We have repeatedly recognized that this expectation in "anautomobile . . . [is] significantly different from the traditional expectation of

privacy and freedom in one's residence." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428

U.S. 543, 561, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3084, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). In United States

v. Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S., at 12, 97 S.Ct., at 2484, the distinction was

stated more broadly:

43 "[T]his Court has recognized significant differences between motor vehicles

and other property which permit warrantless searches of automobiles in

circumstances in which warrantless searches would not be reasonable in other

contexts. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543

(1925); Preston v. United States, [376 U.S. 364,] 366-367, 84 S.Ct. [881], at

882-883 [11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964)]; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct.

1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). See also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.

364, 367, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)."3

44 In Chadwick , the Court recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy with

respect to one's locked footlocker, and rejected the Government's argument that

luggage always should be equated with motor vehicles for Fourth Amendment

purposes. 433 U.S., at 13, 97 S.Ct., at 2484.


16/35

45 A distinction also properly may be made in some circumstances between the

Fourth Amendment rights of passengers and the rights of an individual who has

exclusive control of an automobile or of its locked compartments. In South

Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), for

example, we considered "the citizen's interest in the privacy of the contents of

his automobile" where its doors were locked and windows rolled up. See id ., at

379, 96 S.Ct., at 3102 (POWELL, J., concurring). Here there were three passengers and a driver in the automobile searched. None of the passengers is

said to have had control of the vehicle or the keys. It is unrealistic—as the

shared experience of us all bears witness—to suggest that these passengers had

any reasonable expectation that the car in which they had been riding would not

be searched after they were lawfully stopped and made to get out. The minimal

privacy that existed simply is not comparable to that, for example, of an

individual in his place of abode, see Jones v. United States, supra; of one who

secludes himself in a telephone booth, Katz v. United States, supra; or of thetraveler who secures his belongings in a locked suitcase or footlocker. See

United States v. Chadwick, supra.4

46 This is not an area of the law in which any "bright line" rule would safeguard

both Fourth Amendment rights and the public interest in a fair and effective

criminal justice system. The range of variables in the fact situations of search

and seizure is almost infinite. Rather than seek facile solutions, it is best to

apply principles broadly faithful to Fourth Amendment purposes. I believe theCourt has identified these principles.5

47 Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN, Mr. Justice

MARSHALL, and Mr. Justice STEVENS join, dissenting.

48 The Court today holds that the Fourth Amendment protects property, not

people, and specifically that a legitimate occupant of an automobile may not

invoke the exclusionary rule and challenge a search of that vehicle unless he

happens to own or have a possessory interest in it.1 Though professing to

acknowledge that the primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition

of unreasonable searches is the protection of privacy not property—the Court

nonetheless effectively ties the application of the Fourth Amendment and the

exclusionary rule in this situation to property law concepts. Insofar as

passengers are concerned, the Court's opinion today declares an "open season"

on automobiles. However unlawful stopping and searching a car may be, absent

a possessory or ownership interest, no "mere" passenger may object, regardlessof his relationship to the owner. Because the majority's conclusion has no

support in the Court's controlling decisions, in the logic of the Fourth

Amendment, or in common sense, I must respectfully dissent. If the Court is


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troubled by the practical impact of the exclusionary rule, it should face the

issue of that rule's continued validity squarely instead of distorting other

doctrines in an attempt to reach what are perceived as the correct results in

specific cases. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3071, 49

L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting).

49 * Two intersecting doctrines long established in this Court's opinions controlhere. The first is the recognition of some cognizable level of privacy in the

interior of an automobile. Though the reasonableness of the expectation of

privacy in a vehicle may be somewhat weaker than that in a home, see United

States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484-2485, 53 L.Ed.2d

538 (1977), "[a] search even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of

privacy. To protect that privacy from official arbitrariness, the Court always has

regarded probable cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search."

United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 2588, 45 L.Ed.2d 623(1975) (footnote omitted). So far, the Court has not strayed from this

application of the Fourth Amendment.2

50 The second tenet is that when a person is legitimately present in a private place,

his right to privacy is protected from unreasonable governmental interference

even if he does not own the premises. Just a few years ago, THE CHIEF

JUSTICE, for a unanimous Court, wrote that the "[p]resence of the defendant at

the search and seizure was held, in Jones, to be a sufficient source of standingin itself." Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 227 n. 2, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1568,

36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973); accord, id., at 229, 93 S.Ct., at 1569 (one basis for

Fourth Amendment protection is presence "on the premises at the time of the

contested search and seizure"); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct.

725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) (individual legitimately present in friend's apartment

may object to search of apartment). Brown was not the first time we had

recognized that Jones established the rights of one legitimately in a private area

against unreasonable governmental intrusion. E. g., Combs v. United States,408 U.S. 224, 227, and n. 4, 92 S.Ct. 2284, 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 308 (1972);

Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 2123, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154

and n. 5 (1968); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390, 88 S.Ct. 967,

974, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). The Court in Jones itself was unanimous in this

regard, and its holding is not the less binding because it was an alternative one.

See Combs v. United States, supra, 408 U.S. at 227 n. 4, 92 S.Ct. at 2286.

51 These two fundamental aspects of Fourth Amendment law demand that petitioners be permitted to challenge the search and seizure of the automobile in

this case. It is of no significance that a car is different for Fourth Amendment

purposes from a house, for if there is some protection for the privacy of an


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II

III

automobile then the only relevant analogy is between a person legitimately in

someone else's vehicle and a person legitimately in someone else's home. If

both strands of the Fourth Amendment doctrine adumbrated above are valid,

the Court must reach a different result. Instead, it chooses to eviscerate the

Jones principle, an action in which I am unwilling to participate.

52 Though we had reserved the very issue over 50 years ago, see Carroll v. United

States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), and never

expressly dealt with it again until today, many of our opinions have assumed

that a mere passenger in an automobile is entitled to protection against

unreasonable searches occurring in his presence. In decisions upholding the

validity of automobile searches, we have gone directly to the merits even

though some of the petitioners did not own or possess the vehicles in question. E. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854

(1973) (sole petitioner was not owner; in fact, owner was not in the automobile

at all); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419

(1970) (sole petitioner was not owner); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 51

S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629 (1931). In Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391

U.S. 216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538 (1968), the Court, with seven

Members agreeing, upset the admission of evidence against three petitioners

though only one owned the vehicle. See id., at 221-222, 88 S.Ct., at 1475-1476.Similarly, in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d

777 (1964), the Court unanimously overturned a search though the single

petitioner was not the owner of the automobile. The Court's silence on this

issue in light of its actions can only mean that, until now, we, like most lower

courts,3 had assumed that Jones foreclosed the answer now supplied by the

majority. That assumption was perfectly understandable, since all private

premises would seem to be the same for the purposes of the analysis set out in

Jones.

53 The logic of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence compels the result reached by

the above decisions. Our starting point is "[t]he established principle . . . that

suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be

successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself

. . ." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-172, 89 S.Ct. 961, 965, 22L.Ed.2d 176 (1969).4 Though the Amendment protects one's liberty and

property interests against unreasonable seizures of self 5 and effects,6 "the

primary object of the Fourth Amendment [is] . . . the protection of privacy."


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Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2469, 41 L.Ed.2d 325

(1974) (plurality opinion).7 And privacy is the interest asserted here,8 so the

first step is to ascertain whether the premises searched "fall within a protected

zone of privacy." United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440, 96 S.Ct. 1619,

1623, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976). My Brethren in the majority assertedly do not

deny that automobiles warrant at least some protection from official

interference with privacy. Thus, the next step is to decide who is entitled, vis-a-vis the State, to enjoy that privacy. The answer to that question must be found

by determining "whether petitioner had an interest in connection with the

searched premises that gave rise to 'a reasonable expectation [on his part] of

freedom from governmental intrusion' upon those premises." Combs v. United

States, 408 U.S., at 227, 92 S.Ct., at 2286, quoting Mancusi v. DeForte, 392

U.S., at 368, 88 S.Ct., at 2123 (bracketed material in original).

54 Not only does Combs supply the relevant inquiry, it also directs us to the proper answer. We recognized there that Jones had held that one of those protected

interests is created by legitimate presence on the searched premises, even

absent any possessory interest. 408 U.S., at 227 n. 4, 92 S.Ct., at 2286. This

makes unquestionable sense. We have concluded on numerous occasions that

the entitlement to an expectation of privacy does not hinge on ownership:

55 "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or

office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he seeksto preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be

constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-352, 88

S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

56 In Alderman v. United States, supra, 394 U.S., at 196, 89 S.Ct., at 978, Mr.

Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, noted that "our own

past decisions . . . have decisively rejected the notion that the accused must

necessarily have a possessory interest in the premises before he may assert a

Fourth Amendment claim." That rejection should not have been surprising in

light of our conclusion as early as 1960 that "it is unnecessary and ill-advised to

import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined

by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more

than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose

validity is largely historical." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S., at 266, 80 S.Ct.,

at 733.9 The proposition today overruled was stated most directly in Mancusi v. DeForte, supra, 392 U.S., at 368, 88 S.Ct., at 2124: "[T]he protection of the

Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon

whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of


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freedom from governmental intrusion."

57Prior to Jones, the lower federal courts had based Fourth Amendment rights

upon possession or ownership of the items seized or the premises searched.10

But Jones was foreshadowed by Mr. Justice Jackson's remark in 1948 that

"even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal

intrusion." McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 461, 69 S.Ct. 191, 196, 93L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., concurring). Indeed,

the decision today is contrary to Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v.

United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928),

expressing a view of the Fourth Amendment thought to have been vindicated

by Katz. The majority in Olmstead found the Fourth Amendment inapplicable

absent a trespass on property rights. 277 U.S., at 466, 48 S.Ct., at 568. That is

exactly what the Court holds in this case; but Mr. Justice Brandeis asserted 50

years ago that more than mere property rights are involved, and the Court'sopinion in Katz reemphasized that " '[t]he premise that property interests

control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.' "

389 U.S., at 353, 88 S.Ct., at 512, quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,

304, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 1648, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). That logic led us inescapably

to the conclusion that "[n]o less than an individual in a business office, in a

friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon

the protection of the Fourth Amendment." 389 U.S., at 352, 88 S.Ct., at 511

(footnotes omitted). And if all of those situations are protected, surely a personriding in an automobile next to his friend the owner, or a child or wife with the

father or spouse, must have some protection as well.

58 The same result is reached by tracing other lines of our Fourth Amendment

decisions. If a nonowner may consent to a search merely because he is a joint

user or occupant of a "premises," Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct.

1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969),11 then that same nonowner must have a

protected privacy interest. The scope of the authority sufficient to grant a validconsent can hardly be broader than the contours of protected privacy.12 And

why should the owner of a vehicle be entitled to challenge the seizure from it of

evidence even if he is absent at the time of the search, see Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), while a

nonowner enjoying in person, and with the owner's permission, the privacy of

an automobile is not so entitled?

59 In sum, one consistent theme in our decisions under the Fourth Amendment has been, until now, that "the Amendment does not shield only those who have title

to the searched premises." Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S., at 367, 88 S.Ct., at

2123. Though there comes a point when use of an area is shared with so many


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that one simply cannot reasonably expect seclusion, see id ., at 377, 88 S.Ct., at

2128 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa

Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865, 94 S.Ct. 2114, 2115, 40 L.Ed.2d 607 (1974), short of

that limit a person legitimately on private premises knows the others allowed

there and, though his privacy is not absolute, is entitled to expect that he is

sharing it only with those persons and that governmental officials will intrude

only with consent or by complying with the Fourth Amendment. See Mancusiv. DeForte, supra, at 369-370, 88 S.Ct., at 2124-2125.13

60 It is true that the Court asserts that it is not limiting the Fourth Amendment bar

against unreasonable searches to the protection of property rights, but in reality

it is doing exactly that.14 Petitioners were in a private place with the permission

of the owner, but the Court states that that is not sufficient to establish

entitlement to a legitimate expectation of privacy. Ante, at 148. But if that is not

sufficient, what would be? We are not told, and it is hard to imagine anythingshort of a property interest that would satisfy the majority. Insofar as the

Court's rationale is concerned, no passenger in an automobile, without an

ownership or possessory interest and regardless of his relationship to the owner,

may claim Fourth Amendment protection against illegal stops and searches of

the automobile in which he is rightfully present. The Court approves the result

in Jones, but it fails to give any explanation why the facts in Jones differ, in a

fashion material to the Fourth Amendment, from the facts here.15 More

importantly, how is the Court able to avoid answering the question why presence in a private place with the owner's permission is insufficient? If it is

"tautological to fall back on the notion that those expectations of privacy which

are legitimate depend primarily on cases deciding exclusionary rule issues in

criminal cases," ante, at 144 n. 12, then it surely must be tautological to decide

that issue simply by unadorned fiat.

61 As a control on governmental power, the Fourth Amendment assures that some

expectations of privacy are justified and will be protected from officialintrusion. That should be true in this instance, for if protected zones of privacy

can only be purchased or obtained by possession of property, then much of our

daily lives will be unshielded from unreasonable governmental prying, and the

reach of the Fourth Amendment will have been narrowed to protect chiefly

those with possessory interests in real or personal property. I had thought that

Katz firmly established that the Fourth Amendment was intended as more than

simply a trespass law applicable to the government. Katz had no possessory

interest in the public telephone booth, at least no more than petitioners had intheir friend's car; Katz was simply legitimately present. And the decision in

Katz was based not on property rights, but on the theory that it was essential to

securing "conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness"16 that the


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IV

expectation of privacy in question be recognized.17

62 At most, one could say that perhaps the Constitution provides some degree less

protection for the personal freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusion

when one does not have a possessory interest in the invaded private place. But

that would only change the extent of the protection; it would not free police to

do the unreasonable, as does the decision today. And since the accused should be entitled to litigate the application of the Fourth Amendment where his

privacy interest is merely arguable,18 the failure to allow such litigation here is

the more incomprehensible.

63 The Court's holding is contrary not only to our past decisions and the logic of

the Fourth Amendment but also to the everyday expectations of privacy that weall share. Because of that, it is unworkable in all the various situations that arise

in real life. If the owner of the car had not only invited petitioners to join her but

had said to them, "I give you a temporary possessory interest in my vehicle so

that you will share the right to privacy that the Supreme Court says that I own,"

then apparently the majority would reverse. But people seldom say such things,

though they may mean their invitation to encompass them if only they had

thought of the problem.19 If the nonowner were the spouse or child of the

owner,20 would the Court recognize a sufficient interest? If so, would distantrelatives somehow have more of an expectation of privacy than close friends?

What if the nonowner were driving with the owner's permission? Would

nonowning drivers have more of an expectation of privacy than mere

passengers? What about a passenger in a taxicab? Katz expressly recognized

protection for such passengers. Why should Fourth Amendment rights be

present when one pays a cabdriver for a ride but be absent when one is given a

ride by a friend?

64 The distinctions the Court would draw are based on relationships between

private parties, but the Fourth Amendment is concerned with the relationship of

one of those parties to the government. Divorced as it is from the purpose of

the Fourth Amendment, the Court's essentially property-based rationale can

satisfactorily answer none of the questions posed above. That is reason enough

to reject it. The Jones rule is relatively easily applied by police and courts; the

rule announced today will not provide law enforcement officials with a bright

line between the protected and the unprotected.21 Only rarely will police knowwhether one private party has or has not been granted a sufficient possessory or

other interest by another private party. Surely in this case the officers had no

such knowledge. The Court's rule will ensnare defendants and police in


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Petitioners claim that they were never asked whether they owned the rifle or

shells seized during the search and, citing Combs v. United States, 408 U.S.

224, 92 S.Ct. 2284, 33 L.Ed.2d 308 (1972), argue that if the Court determines

that a property interest in the items seized is an adequate ground for standing to

object to their seizure, the Court should remand the case for further

proceedings on the question whether petitioners owned the seized rifle or

needless litigation over factors that should not be determinative of Fourth

Amendment rights.22

65More importantly, the ruling today undercuts the force of the exclusionary rule

in the one area in which its use is most certainly justified—the deterrence of

bad-faith violations of the Fourth Amendment. See Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S.,

at 536-542, 96 S.Ct., at 3072-3074 (WHITE, J., dissenting). This decisioninvites police to engage in patently unreasonable searches every time an

automobile contains more than one occupant. Should something be found, only

the owner of the vehicle, or of the item, will have standing to seek suppression,

and the evidence will presumably be usable against the other occupants.23 The

danger of such bad faith is especially high in cases such as this one where the

officers are only after the passengers and can usually infer accurately that the

driver is the owner. The suppression remedy for those owners in whose

vehicles something is found and who are charged with crime is smallconsolation for all those owners and occupants whose privacy will be

needlessly invaded by officers following mistaken hunches not rising to the

level of probable cause but operated on in the knowledge that someone in a

crowded car will probably be unprotected if contraband or incriminating

evidence happens to be found. After this decision, police will have little to lose

by unreasonably searching vehicles occupied by more than one person.

66 Of course, most police officers will decline the Court's invitation and willcontinue to do their jobs as best they can in accord with the Fourth

Amendment. But the very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to answer the

justified fear that governmental agents cannot be left totally to their own

devices, and the Bill of Rights is enforceable in the courts because human

experience teaches that not all such officials will otherwise adhere to the stated

precepts. Some policemen simply do act in bad faith, even if for understandable

ends, and some deterrent is needed. In the rush to limit the applicability of the

exclusionary rule somewhere, anywhere, the Court ignores precedent, logic,and common sense to exclude the rule's operation from situations in which,

paradoxically, it is justified and needed.

1


24/35

shells. Reply Brief for Petitioners 4 n. 2. Petitioners do not now assert that they

own the rifle or the shells.

We reject petitioners' suggestion. The proponent of a motion to suppress has the

burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by

the challenged search or seizure. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,

389-390, 88 S.Ct. 967, 973-974, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261, 80 S.Ct. 725, 731, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). The

prosecutor argued that petitioners lacked standing to challenge the search

because they did not own the rifle, the shells or the automobile. Petitioners did

not contest the factual predicates of the prosecutor's argument and instead,

simply stated that they were not required to prove ownership to object to the

search. App. 23. The prosecutor's argument gave petitioners notice that they

were to be put to their proof on any issue as to which they had the burden, and

because of their failure to assert ownership, we must assume, for purposes of our review, that petitioners do not own the rifle or the shells. Combs v. United

States, supra, was quite different. In Combs, the Government had not

challenged Combs' standing at the suppression hearing and the issue of

standing was not raised until the appellate level, where the Government

conceded that its warrant was not based on probable cause. Because the record

was "virtually barren of the facts necessary to determine" Combs' right to

contest the search and seizure, the Court remanded the case for further

proceedings. 408 U.S., at 227, 92 S.Ct., at 2286. The Government had

requested the Court to remand for further proceedings on this issue. Brief for

the United States in Combs v. United States, O.T. 1971, No. 71-517, pp. 40-41.

Although Jones v. United States was based upon an interpretation of Fed.Rule

Crim.Proc. 41(e), the Court stated in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,

173 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 961, 966, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969), that Rule 41(e) conforms to

the general standard and is no broader than the constitutional rule. See United

States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348-349, n. 6, 94 S.Ct. 613, 620-621, 38

L.Ed.2d 561 (1974).

There is an aspect of traditional standing doctrine that was not considered in

Jones and which we do not question. It is the proposition that a party seeking

relief must allege such a personal stake or interest in the outcome of the

controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which Art. III requires. See,

e. g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493, 94 S.Ct. 669, 674, 38 L.Ed.2d 674

(1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 20 L.Ed.2d 947

(1968); Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663(1962). Thus, a person whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a

search or seizure, but who is not a defendant in a criminal action in which the

illegally seized evidence is sought to be introduced, would not have standing to

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invoke the exclusionary rule to prevent use of that evidence in that action. See

Calandra, supra, 414 U.S. at 352 n. 8, 94 S.Ct. at 622.

The necessity for a showing of a violation of personal rights is not obviated by

recognizing the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, Alderman v. United

States, supra, 394 U.S., at 174, 89 S.Ct., at 966. Despite the deterrent aim of

the exclusionary rule, we never have held that unlawfully seized evidence isinadmissible in all proceedings or against all persons. See, e. g., United States v.

Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 275, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 1059, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978);

Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 465, 486, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067

(1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S., at 348, 94 S.Ct., at 620. "[T]he

application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial

objectives are thought most efficaciously served." Ibid.

We have not yet had occasion to decide whether the automatic-standing rule of

Jones survives our decision in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct.

967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 228-

229, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1568-1569, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973). Such a rule is, of

course, one which may allow a defendant to assert the Fourth Amendment

rights of another.

The search of the apartment in Jones was pursuant to a search warrant naming

Jones and another woman as occupants of the apartment. The affidavit

submitted in support of the search warrant alleged that Jones and the womanwere involved in illicit narcotics traffic and kept a supply of heroin and

narcotics paraphernalia in the apartment. 362 U.S., at 267-269, 80 S.Ct., at 734-

735, and n. 2; App. in Jones v. United States, O.T. 1959, No. 69, p. 1.

For these same prudential reasons, the Court in Alderman v. United States

rejected the argument that any defendant should be enabled to apprise the court

of unconstitutional searches and seizures and to exclude all such unlawfully

seized evidence from trial, regardless of whether his Fourth Amendment rightswere violated by the search or whether he was the "target" of the search. This

expansive reading of the Fourth Amendment also was advanced by the

petitioner in Jones v. United States and implicitly rejected by the Court. Brief

for Petitioner in Jones v. United States, O.T. 1959, No. 69, pp. 21-25.

So, for example, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511,

19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the Court focused on substantive Fourth Amendment

law, concluded that a person in a telephone booth "may rely upon the protectionof the Fourth Amendment," and then proceeded to determine whether the

search was "unreasonable." In Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct.

2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968), on the other hand, the Court concentrated on

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the issue of standing, decided that the defendant possessed it, and with barely

any mention of the threshold substantive question of whether the search

violated DeForte's own Fourth Amendment rights, went on to decide whether

the search was "unreasonable." In both cases, however, the first inquiry was

much the same.

This approach is consonant with that which the Court already has taken withrespect to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which also

is a purely personal right. See, e. g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90,

94 S.Ct. 2179, 2183-2184, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409

U.S. 322, 327-328, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-616, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973); United

States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542

(1944).

The Court in Jones was quite careful to note that "wrongful" presence at the

scene of a search would not enable a defendant to object to the legality of the

search. 362 U.S., at 267, 80 S.Ct., at 734. The Court stated: "No just interest of

the Government in the effective and rigorous enforcement of the criminal law

will be hampered by recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a

search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when

its fruits are proposed to be used against him. This would of course not avail

those who, by virtue of their wrongful presence, cannot invoke the privacy of

the premises searched." Ibid. (emphasis added). Despite this clear statement in

Jones, several lower courts inexplicably have held that a person present in a

stolen automobile at the time of a search may object to the lawfulness of the

search of the automobile. See, e. g., Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385

(CA9 1967); Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (CA10 1965).

The Court in Mancusi v. DeForte, supra, also must have been unsatisfied with

the "legitimately on premises" statement in Jones. DeForte was legitimately in

his office at the time of the search and if the Mancusi Court had literally

applied the statement from Jones, DeForte's standing to object to the searchshould have been obvious. Instead, to determine whether DeForte possessed

standing to object to the search, the Court inquired into whether DeForte's

office was an area "in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom

from governmental intrusion." 392 U.S., at 368, 88 S.Ct., at 2124; see id., at

376, 88 S.Ct., at 2127 (Black, J., dissenting).

Unfortunately, with few exceptions, lower courts have literally applied this

language from Jones and have held that anyone legitimately on premises at thetime of the search may contest its legality. See, e. g., Garza-Fuentes v. United

States, 400 F.2d 219 (CA5 1968); State v. Bresolin, 13 Wash.App. 386, 534

P.2d 1394 (1975).

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This is not to say that such visitors could not contest the lawfulness of the

seizure of evidence or the search if their own property were seized during the

search.

Obviously, however, a "legitimate" expectation of privacy by definition means

more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered. A burglar plying

his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may

have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one

which the law recognizes as "legitimate." His presence, in the words of Jones,

362 U.S., at 267, 80 S.Ct., at 734, is "wrongful"; his expectation is not "one

that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " Katz v. United States, 389

U.S., at 361, 88 S.Ct., at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring). And it would, of course,

be merely tautological to fall back on the notion that those expectations of

privacy which are legitimate depend primarily on cases deciding exclusionary-

rule issues in criminal cases. Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law

must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to

concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are

recognized and permitted by society. One of the main rights attaching to

property is the right to exclude others, see W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book

2, ch. 1, and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all

likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to

exclude. Expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, of

course, need not be based on a common-law interest in real or personal

property, or on the invasion of such an interest. These ideas were rejected both

in Jones, supra, and Katz, supra. But by focusing on legitimate expectations of

privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether

abandoned use of property concepts in determining the presence or absence of

the privacy interests protected by that Amendment. No better demonstration of

this proposition exists than the decision in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.

165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969), where the Court held that an

individual's property interest in his own home was so great as to allow him toobject to electronic surveillance of conversations emanating from his home,

even though he himself was not a party to the conversations. On the other hand,

even a property interest in premises may not be sufficient to establish a

legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular items located on the

premises or activity conducted thereon. See Katz, supra, 389 U.S., at 351, 88

S.Ct., at 511; Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427, 17

L.Ed.2d 312 (1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563, 47 S.Ct. 746, 748,

71 L.Ed. 1202 (1927); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59, 44 S.Ct.445, 446, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924).

An examination of lower court decisions shows that use of this purported

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"bright line" test has led to widely varying results. For example, compare

United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F.Supp. 690 (EDNY 1977)

(defendant has standing to object to search of codefendant's person at airport

because defendant was lawfully present at time of search), with Sumrall v.

United States, 382 F.2d 651 (CA10 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1055, 88 S.Ct.

806, 19 L.Ed.2d 853 (1968) (defendant did not have standing to object to search

of codefendant's purse even though defendant present at time of search).Compare Holloway v. Wolff, 482 F.2d 110 (CA8 1973) (defendant has standing

to object to search of bedroom in house of third person because lawfully in

house at time of search even though no showing that defendant had ever been

given permission to use, or had ever been in, bedroom), with Northern v.

United States, 455 F.2d 427 (CA9 1972) (defendant lacked standing to object to

search of apartment-mate's bedroom even though present in apartment at time

of search since no showing that defendant had permission to enter or use

roommate's bedroom), and United States v. Miller, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 449F.2d 974 (1971) (defendant lawfully present in third person's office has

standing to object to police entry into office since lawfully present but lacks

standing to object to search of drawer of third person's desk since no showing

that he had permission to open or use drawer). Compare United States v.

Tussell, 441 F.Supp. 1092 (MD Pa.1977) (lessee does not have standing

because not present at time of search), with United States v. Potter, 419 F.Supp.

1151 (ND Ill.1976) (lessee has standing even though not present when premises

searched). Compare United States v. Fernandez, 430 F.Supp. 794 (NDCal.1976) (defendant with authorized access to apartment has standing even

though not present at time of search), with United States v. Potter, supra

(defendants with authorized access to premises lack standing because not

present at the time of the search). Compare United States v. Delguyd, 542 F.2d

346 (CA6 1976) (defendant stopped by police in parking lot of apartment house

which he intended to visit lacks standing to object to subsequent search of

apartment since not present in apartment at time of search), with United States

ex rel. Eastman v. Fay, 225 F.Supp. 677 (SDNY 1963), rev'd on other grounds,

333 F.2d 28 (CA2 1964) (defendant-invitee stopped in hallway of apartment

building has standing to object to search of apartment he intended to visit).

Commentators have expressed similar dissatisfaction with reliance on

"legitimate presence" to resolve Fourth Amendment questions. Trager &

Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 41 Brooklyn

L.Rev. 421, 448 (1975); White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and

Seizure, 118 U.Pa.L.Rev. 333, 344-345 (1970). And, as we earlier noted, supra,

at 142 n. 10, the Court in Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968), also implicitly recognized that the phrase "legitimately

on premises" simply does not answer the question whether the search violated a

defendant's "reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion."

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See id., at 368, 88 S.Ct., at 2123.

As we noted in Martinez-Fuerte, "one's expectation of privacy in an automobile

and of freedom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional

expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence." 428 U.S., at 561, 96

S.Ct., at 3084.

The dissent states that Katz v. United States expressly recognized protection for

passengers of taxicabs and asks why that protection should not also extend to

these petitioners. Katz relied on Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 80 S.Ct.

1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688 (1960), as support for that proposition. The question of

Rios' right to contest the search was not presented to or addressed by the Court

and the property seized appears to have belonged to Rios. See United States v.

Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951). Additionally, the facts of

that case are quite different from those of the present case. Rios had hired the

cab and occupied the rear passenger section. When police stopped the cab, he

placed a package he had been holding on the floor of the rear section. The

police saw the package and seized it after defendant was removed from the cab.

For reasons which they do not explain, our dissenting Brethren repeatedly

criticize our "holding" that unless one has a common-law property interest in

the premises searched, one cannot object to the search. We have rendered no

such "holding," however. To the contrary, we have taken pains to reaffirm the

statements in Jones and Katz that "arcane distinctions developed in property . . .law . . . ought not to control." Supra, at 143, and n. 12. In a similar vein, the

dissenters repeatedly state or imply that we now "hold" that a passenger

lawfully in an automobile "may not invoke the exclusionary rule and challenge

a search of that vehicle unless he happens to own or have a possessory interest

in it." Post , at 156, 158-159, 163, 165, 168, 168-169. It is not without

significance that these statements of today's "holding" come from the dissenting

opinion, and not from the Court's opinion. The case before us involves the

search of and seizure of property from the glove compartment and area under the seat of a car in which petitioners were riding as passengers. Petitioners

claimed only that they were "legitimately on [the] premises" and did not claim

that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas of the car which

were searched. We cannot, therefore, agree with the dissenters' insistence that

our decision will encourage the police to violate the Fourth Amendment. Post ,

at 168-169.

Allowing anyone who is legitimately on the premises searched to invoke theexclusionary rule extends the rule far beyond the proper scope of Fourth

Amendment protections, as not all who are legitimately present invariably have

a reasonable expectation of privacy. And, as the Court points out, the dissenters'

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standard lacks even the advantage of easy application. See ante, at 145-146.

I do not share the dissenters' concern that the Court's ruling will "invit[e] police

to engage in patently unreasonable searches every time an automobile contains

more than one occupant." See post , at 168. A police officer observing an

automobile carrying several passengers will not know the circumstances

surrounding each occupant's presence in the automobile, and certainly will notknow whether an occupant will be able to establish that he had a reasonable

expectation of privacy. Thus, there will continue to be a significant incentive

for the police to comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, lest

otherwise valid prosecutions be voided. Moreover, any marginal diminution in

this incentive that might result from the Court's decision today is more than

justified by society's interest in restricting the scope of the exclusionary rule to

those cases where in fact there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.

There are sound reasons for this distinction: Automobiles operate on public

streets; they are serviced in public places; they stop frequently; they are usually

parked in public places; their interiors are highly visible; and they are subject to

extensive regulation and inspection. The rationale of the automobile distinction

does not apply, of course, to objects on the person of an occupant.

Six Members of the Court joined THE CHIEF JUSTICE in Chadwick , and the

two Justices who dissented in Chadwick did not disagree with the automobile

distinction.

The sawed-off rifle in this case was merely pushed beneath the front seat,

presumably by one of the petitioners. In that position, it could have slipped into

full or partial view in the event of an accident, or indeed upon any sudden stop.

As the rifle shells were in the locked glove compartment, this might have

presented a closer case if it had been shown that one of the petitioner

rakas v. illinois, 439 u.s. 128 (1979)

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