quindell plc: a country club built on quicksand

7/22/2019 Quindell PLC: A Country Club Built On Quicksand

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GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH LLC www.gothamcityresearch.com [email protected]

GOTH M CITY RESE RCH LLC

Quindell PLC: A Country Club Built On Quicksand

“The Group [Quindell] is a Portfolio Of established Ethical, Industry Trusted, Expert Technology and

Business Process Service companies.” – Quindell CEO, Robert Terry

“Founder Rob Terry invested £ 12m personally“ – Quindell Investor Teach-in 2013

Question: Did he really?



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Table of Contents

I. Disclaimer

II. Summary

III. Introduction

IV. Quindell’s Anomalous EBITDA MarginsV. CEO Robert Terry Spent £12 million to Build a Country Club

VI. Quindell’s Largest 2009/2010 Customer is Itself (ClickUs4.com)

VII. 41% of 2011 Revenues Comes from an Undisclosed Customer

VIII. Quindell’s Phantom Acquisitions (2011-Present)

IX. Telematics Accounting Issues & Related Party Transactions

X. The Dark Side of Quindell Legal Services

XI. Additional Accounting and Oversight Issues

XII. Valuation: Worth No More Than 3p per share

XIII. End Notes



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GOTH M CITY RESE RCH LLC

aSUMMARY

• 42%-80% of Quindell’s profits are suspect, as we are

unable to reconcile the whole with the sum of the parts.

• Quindell was little more than a country club until

2008/2009, yet QPP somehow began reporting

Microsoft/Google-esque profit margins in 2010/2011.

• 26%-43% of Quindell’s 2009 and 2010 revenues came from

Clickus4.com, a subsidiary owned by CEO Robert Terry.

• 41% of Quindell’s 2011 revenues came from an

undisclosed related party (controlled by a QPP executive).

• 10+ acquisitions lack economic substance. Several of the

acquired companies are little more than paper companies.• QPP’s largest telematics customer is itself (via subsidiaries

Himex & Ingenie), accounting for 61% of 2013 revenue.

• 99% & 80% of Himex’s 2012 and 2013 balance sheets are

seriously deficient (Himex is QPP’s largest acquisition).

• Former executives allege Himex/Navseeker lied to them

about its financial state and that in effect they were

operating a Ponzi-style scheme.

• 2011-2013 accounts receivable are between 86%-231% of

revenue, while deferred revenue only 1%-2% of revenue.

• Nearly all of CEO Terry’s £11 mm personal investment intoQuiindell was used to build Quindell the country club.

• No free cash flow and negative operating cash flow.

• Quindell fails to explain how its personal injury business

complies with Lord Jackson’s reforms & referral fee ban.

• The Chairman of the Transport Select Committee, Louise

Ellman recently initiated a probe to determine whether

ABSs are used to side-step the Jackson reforms.

• 3 auditors in 3 years, since 2011.

• Quindell’s shares are worth no more than 3p/share.

• QPP shares would qualify for a de-listing if the shares were

trading in US markets.

• When asked, Quindell refuses to answer simple questions

about its business.

Company: Quindell PLC

CEO: Robert Terry

Ticker: QPP

Exchange: London’s AIM

Price Target: 3.00p/share

Share price: 39.00p/share

(as of the 18th of April)

Market cap: £2.41B

52-week high: 45.50p

52-week low: 5.40p

Shares outstanding: 6.19B

Avg. Daily Vol: 72.09M

2013 Revenue: £380M

2013 Net income: £83M

2013 OCF: -£9M

2013 FCF: -£65M

2013 Receivables: £328M

Tangible book: £376M

Price/Tangible Book: 6.4x

FYE: Dec. 31

Auditors: KPMG, RSM

Tenon



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INTRODUCTION

GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH first heard about Quindell when the company entered the UK public markets

via reverse merger in 2011. Many low quality companies and outright frauds have historically entered

the public markets via reverse merger. Quindell’s story and its accounting did not make much sense to

us at the time, but we did not examine it more carefully until recently. On the one hand, Quindell

appears to be an exceptionally good company, with Google/Microsoft-esque net profit margins1:

On the other hand, QPP appears to be an exceptionally poor company, bleeding cash and issuing shares2:

Gotham City Research has not seen such conflicting qualities in a company since Sino-Forest. We have

come to believe that Quindell is, indeed, an exceptional company – for all the wrong reasons. We were

unable to reconcile 42%-80% of Quindell’s EBITDA, and believe the following findings best explain why:

• Quindell was little more than a country club (that CEO Robert Terry personally invested £12million to build) until 2008-2009. The company started reporting exceptional margins and

magical revenue growth by 2010/2011, just in time for its public listing.

• 26%-43% of Quindell’s 2009-2011 revenues are of suspect quality as they are explained by sales

to related parties owned and operated by Terry himself or his former associates3.

• 80%-99% of Himex’s balance sheet – Quindell’s Telematics crown jewel, and its largest ever

acquisition – does not add up. Quindell claims that 61% of its 2013 telematics revenue came

from itself, via its Himex and Ingenie subsidiaries4.

• 10+ acquisitions appear to lack economic substance. For example, several acquisitions were

incorporated the same day they were purportedly acquired.5

• Quindell’s New York office does not seem to exist. The receptionist told us he’s never heard of

Quindell, and that no technology company occupies the 9th floor. Also, Quindell New York’s

listed phone number is not a New York phone number (it’s a Florida phone number).

• Quindell claims its legal services/personal injury business is booming due to increased volumes

and market share gains, yet Quindell also makes the competing claim that it successfully reduces

fraudulent claims (which would reduce volumes).6

2010 2011 2012 2013 AVERAGE

Google 29.0% 25.7% 21.4% 21.6% 24.4%

Microsoft 30.0% 33.1% 23.0% 28.1% 28.6%

Quindell 32.1% 30.3% 23.2% 21.8% 26.9%

in mill ions of £s, or units 2010 2011 2012 2013

Revenue £4.15 £13.71 £137.56 £380.13

Net Profits £1.33 £4.16 £31.90 £82.70

Free Cash Flow £0.00 £1.34 -£59.15 -£64.64

Receivables Growth £1.00 £30.47 £170.67 £125.53

Shares Issued 0.0 2.4 91.0 200.4

Shares Outstanding 108 1,989 3,309 5,670



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Quindell’s Anomalous EBITDA Margins

Quindell’s Anomalous EBITDA Margins: Abnormally High Relative to its Peers

Quindell’s CEO, Robert Terry imploded his last business (Innovation Group), and started Quindell Limited,

as a golf resort/country club. He personally invested £12 million into Quindell the country club (NOT into

a software/technology concern, which we discuss in the next section) and Terry (largely) remained in

obscurity, until 2011 when he re-entered the public share markets, via a reverse merger transaction on

London’s AIM exchange (the AIM exchange is similar to the US OTC/Pink Sheets).

Terry would have you believe Quindell’s 2013 net profit margins not only compete with the likes of

Google/Microsoft, its 2013 EBITDA margins also handily outperform its outsourcing company peers1:

Guidewire mentions Innovation Group but doesn’t mention QPP in their 10K filings as a comparable

company.

Quindell’s Overall EBITDA Margins Do Not Reconcile with the Sum of its Parts

Although improbable, it’s conceivable that Quindell is actually an exceptionally great business, handily

outperforming its competitors and earning Google/Microsoft-like profit margins. It’s also improbable,

but conceivable, that Quindell magically transformed itself overnight from a country club into a highlyprofitable software/consulting company.

These possibilities seem far less likely, once one compares Ai Claims Solution and Mobile Doctor’s razor-

thin EBITDA margins against Quindell’s overall reported 30+% EBITDA margins. After all, Ai Claims

Solution and Mobile Doctors represent nearly 40% of Quindell’s 2013 revenue2:

Quindell vs. Peers'

2013 EBITDA Margins

Quindell 30.7%Exlservice Holdings 19.3%

Genpact 18.1%

Accenture 17.3%

WNS Holdings 15.5%

Capita 13.3%

Innovation Group 12.9%

Computer Sciences 11.8%

Xchanging 11.3%

Guidewire Software 7.2%

Serco 5.8%



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Yet they have historically generated little more than 4%-6% EBITDA margins. This implies 60% of other

Quindell businesses must yield EBITDA margins that substantially exceed Microsoft/Google’s margins.

We Cannot Reconcile ~80% of Quindell’s 2012 EBITDA

We sought to reconcile Quindell’s reported results with the sum of its parts. We were unable to

reconcile/explain ~80% of Quindell’s reported 2012 EBITDA3:

We are confident that Quindell’s “core” businesses, i.e. ‘Brand extensions’ and ‘Telecoms’ do not explain

this 80% variance. Quindell’s total reported 2011 revenue and EBITDA were ~ £14 million and ~£5

million respectively.

As we show later, 30%-40% of these revenues are of questionable quality as they originate from related

parties. Assuming this core £14 million in revenue were completely reliable, it would have had to grow

year over year by over 4x-8x in 2012 to explain this £32 million variance in EBITDA.

We highly doubt this is the case, especially given the patterns of questionable behavior we’ve found in

Quindell’s brand extensions & telecoms related business, as discussed later in this report.

Mobile Doctors and Ai Claims Margins are Razor Thin

in milli ons of £s, except for %s Revenue EBITDA Margin

Mobile Doctors £27.9 £1.6 5.7%

Ai Claims £117.6 £5.7 4.9%

Mobile Docs + Ai Claims £145.5 £7.3 5.0%

Quindell Total £380.1 £116.5 30.7%

Other Quindell £234.63 £109.18 46.5%

Quindell 2012 Unexplained EBITDA

Acquisition EBITDA

Ai Claims £3.8

Mobile Doctors £1.6

Silverbeck Rymer £0.6

IT Freedom £1.8

Compensation Lawyers £0.1

Business Advisory Service £0.2

Metaskil Group Limited -£0.0

Other acquisitions £0.1

Calculated Total 2012 EBITDA £8.1

Reported Total 2012 EBITDA £39.6

Unexplained Variance -£31.5

% Variance (79.5%)

Sources: Annual Reports, DueDil, GCR Estimates

in millions of £s, except for %s



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Similarly, we were unable to reconcile ~42% of Quindell’s 2013 EBITDA4:

Note that our 2013 assumptions were rather generous to Quindell:

• We assumed that Quindell’s acquired personal injury law firms and related companies

experienced no revenue or margin deterioration, despite the Jackson reforms, referral ban, etc.

• We do believe Quindell’s personal injury related and legal services businesses were not immune

to the reforms’ effects, but again, we are being generous.

• Quindell and CEO Terry refused to disclose how profitable the £40 million of telematics revenue

is; we assume 50% EBITDA margins. In the spirit of generosity, we also assume that revenue

quality is not an issue (despite the fact 61% of QPP’s telematics revenues originate from its

subsidiaries as customers!).

• The other acquired companies are too small to explain the variance.

• As described along with the 2012 EBITDA variance, Quindell’s “Core business” does not explain

these variances.

• It would be unsurprising to us if the actual 2013 EBITDA variance was closer to 50%-60%.

Quindell 2013 Unexplained EBITDA

Acquisition EBITDA

Compass Cost Consultants £2.0

React and Recover Medical Group Limited £2.0Ai Claims £5.7

Telematics - Ingenie + Himex + Other £20.0

Silverbeck Rymer £6.8

Mobile Doctors £1.6

Abstract Legal Holdings £5.1

PT Health £5.0

Crusader Assistance Group £0.7

Compensation Lawyers £0.7

IT Freedom £2.8

Quintica Holdings Limited £0.7Overland Limited £2.2

ITer8 £4.5

360GlobalNet/Quindell Property Services £5.0

Other acquisitions £3.0

Calculated Total 2013 EBITDA £67.8

Reported Total 2013 EBITDA £116.5

Unexplained Variance -£48.7

% Variance (41.8%)

Sources: Annual Reports, DueDil, GCR Estimates

in mill ions of £s, except for %s



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Quindell’s Balance Sheet Does Not Resemble a True Software/Saas Company’s Balance Sheet

We find that not only are Quindell’s 2012 & 2013 reported EBITDAs suspect, its balance sheets are

suspect as well. Specifically, we find the balance sheets do not resemble a true Software/Cloud/SaaS

company’s balance sheet.

On one hand, Quindell makes the following SaaSy claims5:

However, Quindell’s balance sheet does not support the above claims, as the company’s deferred

revenue are too low relative to total revenue, to resemble a true cloud/SaaS business6:

Moreover, Quindell’s cash flow from operating activities was quite negative in 2013, and its receivables

were anomalously high. These, too, are not consistent with true Cloud/SaaS companies, as they tend to

receive payment upfront (i.e. cash), and then earn their revenue over time. Autonomy plc’s balance

sheet shared similar qualities, as described by John Hempton of Bronte Capital7:

Autonomy’s Sales were $870 million. Receiveables were $330 million - which is four and a half

months of receiveables. Deferred revenue is $177 million - just over half of receiveables. This is

really perverse for a software company . Software companies sell stuff that is barely tangible -

they sell it up front and for cash. They have very few receiveables. They do however have an

obligation to service that software for a long time after they sell it - so the unearned income is

relatively large (usually a multiple of receiveables). Autonomy was booking as income lots of

cash it had not received (which is why the receiveables were large) and not booking any

obligation to provide future services for that income.

Deferred Income Too Low for a True SaaS/Cloud Company

in millions of £s, except fo r %s 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Revenue £3.6 £4.1 £13.7 £137.6 £380.1

Receivables £0.2 £1.2 £31.7 £177.9 £327.9

as % of revenue 5.7% 28.9% 231.1% 129.3% 86.3%

Deferred income £0.0 £0.0 £0.4 £2.2 £5.0

as % of revenue 0.0% 0.0% 2.7% 1.6% 1.3%



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CEO Robert Terry Spent £12 million to Build a Country Club

CEO Rob Terry and his supporters have been claiming (for years) that Terry personally invested £12

million into Quindell’s technology/software1:

“Innovation [Group] was a lossmaking business at the top of the dotcom boom. This time he’s

[Terry] invested £12m of his own money.”

“Rob Terry has invested £12m building the consultancy proposition and technology platform.”

"Rob Terry set up Quindell with £12 million of his own cash to build an eye-catching insurance

claims outsourcing business that could dominate the supply chain with its own IP-technology and

a swathe of industry contacts."

Gotham City Research finds that while Terry’s claims may be literally true, they are in substance false,

for the following reasons:

• Terry invested £ 11.5 million into Quindell Limited between 2001-2005, and Quindell Limited

spent £ 11.5 million on building a golf and country club between 2001-2008.

• Quindell Limited’s principal activity (between 2001-2007, and likely through 2009) was, “the

operation of corporate entertainment facilities at Quob Park and the operation and

development of facilities for Quindell Golf and Country Club”

• There is no mention of software, technology, insurance, personal injury, or telematics in

Quindell Limited’s annual reports between 2001-2007.

• Quindell Limited’s 2008 annual report vaguely starts claiming that its principal activities include

telecom/technology related activities, even though archived versions of its website do notvalidate these claims.

It is evident that the financial media, brokerage analysts, and investors give their vote of confidence

to CEO Robert Terry, in part, because they trusted that he had personally invested £ 12 million to build

an insurance/software/technology concern. Their faith in Quindell and its CEO Terry is misplaced.



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Quindell Limited’s Annual Reports Clearly Show Terry Invested in Building a Country Club

Quindell Limited’s ‘Notes to the Accounts’ (specifically the ‘Tangible Fixed Assets’ section) from 2001-

2008 clearly show that Quindell cumulatively invested £ 11.6 million in additions to Tangible Fixed Assets

(mostly ‘Freehold land and buildings’), not Research and Development, not Software, and nothing

Technology-related2

:

Quindell Began as a Country Club and Remained One Until Relatively Recently

Quindell Limited was a country club / golf course from its inception through 2008/2009, as evidenced

also by how the company describes itself in its annual reports under ‘Principal Activity’:3

Quindell Limited’s description of its principal activity noticeably changes in 2008 (recall that Quindell

conveniently discontinued filing its annual reports after 2005, & only submitted its 2006 and 2007 filings

in 2009 when it was threatened with discharge). It’s only in 2008’s annual report Quindell starts using

vague and superficial business-speak, such as “consumer lifestyle solutions” and “business solutions”.

The 2008 annual report was not signed off until March 2010. Coupled with Quindell’s bizarre related

party transactions with ClickUs2.com, SMI Telecoms, and others between 2009-2011 (as we describe in

the next two sections), we believe Rob Terry had plenty of means and motivation to exaggerate

Quindell’s business activities between 2008-2011 leading up to its public listing. We think there’s a good

chance Quindell remained little more than a country club through 2010/2011.

CEO Robert Terry's ~12 million Investment into Building Quindell the Country Club

in millions of £s, except for %s 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Rob Terry Total Invested Capital £3.6 £5.4 £6.7 £10.9 £11.5 £11.5 £11.5 £11.5

Terry's Incremental Investment £1.8 £1.3 £4.2 £0.6 £0.0 £0.0 £0.0

Additions to Freehold land & buildings, etc. £4.2 £1.5 £1.1 £1.9 £0.3 £0.7 £0.7 £1.3

Cumulative Investment in land, etc. £5.6 £6.7 £8.6 £8.9 £9.6 £10.3 £11.6

Year: Principal Activity (as described in each respective Annual Report)

2001 The company's principal activity is the operation of corporate entertainment facil ities.

2002 The company's principal activity is the operation of corporate entertainment facil ities.

2003 The company's principal activity is the operation of corporate entertainment facilities and a golf course.

2004 The company's principal activity is the operation of corporate entertainment facilities at Quob Park

and the operation and development of facilities for Quindell Golf and Country Club.

2005 The company's principal activity is the operation and development of facilities for Quindell Golf and

Country Club and the operation of corporate entertainment services at Quob Park. In addition,

based from Quob Park, the Compoany has continued to leverage the experience and

investment strategy of its Board to generate other mgmt services income, with focus on the

leisure industry or technology companies with the potential for future public listings.

2006 The company's principal activity during 2006 has continued to be the operation and developmentof freehold facilities owned by Quindell for the Leisure Industry.

2007 The company's principal activity during 2006 has continued to be the operation and development

of freehold facilities owned by Quindell for the Leisure Industry.

2008 The company's principal activity during 2008 have continued to be within both the leisure industry,

where activities relate to providing solutions to both consumers lifestyle solutions and businesses

business solutions, and within telecommunications and technology led industries.



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Archived Records of Quindell’s Website Verify It was a Country Club

As they say, sometimes pictures are worth a thousand words:

Quindell.com on December 11, 20044

Quindell.com on January 31, 2008 and July 8th, 2008

Notice how the 2008 archived versions of Quindell’s website shown above are not consistent with

Quindell’s portrayal of the business in the 2008 Annual Report (filed in 2010; this is no coincidence).



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Quindell.com on March 12th, 2009

July 15, 2009



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December 16, 2009

By December 2009, Quindell’s website at least resembles the principle activities as described in the

company’s 2008 annual report. Notice how there is no mention of insurance, and that the ‘Quindell

Telecoms’ and ‘Technology Solutions’ as described (if you hover over them) sounds like nothing more

than the SMI Technologies / SMI Telecom’s business (which implies Quindell itself had little to no

telecoms operations; more on this later). The ‘Business Solutions’ sounds vague & low-tech:

`



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Quindell’s 2008 Annual Report Signed Off By Louise Terry (Robert Terry’s Spouse), “Finance Director”5

So CEO Robert Terry had his wife, Louise Tracey Terry, Quindell’s “Finance Director” sign off on

Quindell’s 2008 filings on 24 March 2010, just a year before filing to go public? It turns out, this is merely

a symptom of far more peculiar and funny activities that occurred between 2009-2011.



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Quindell’s Largest 2009/2010 Customer is Itself (ClickUs4.com)

Quindell’s Largest Customer in 2009 and 2010 was Itself (via ClickUs4.com)

In the 2 years preceding Robert Terry’s return to the public markets as CEO of Quindell, Quindell

recognized ClickUs4.com, an entity owned by Robert Terry (and his relatives), as its largest customer1:

We question the economic substance of these revenues for the following reasons:

• Clickus4.com magically increased its sales from £0.0 million to £2.6 million, between 2008 and

2009, despite the fact that Clickus4.com revenue never exceeded £0.3 million prior to 2009.

• 26%-43% of Quindell’s 2009-2010 revenue come from ClickUs4.com. The economic merit of

these sales is questionable, as Robert Terry and family own and/or controls both entities.

• ClickUs4.com (and Quindell’s) phenomenal revenue growth in 2009 coincides with the time

period in which Quindell and Clickus4 stopped filing annual reports. Quindell’s 2009 annual

report was filed on May 31, 2011, just in time for its public listing.

• Quindell and its CEO Robert Terry purchase/sell Clickus4.com with each other, several times,

between 2008-2010. These transactions seem to lack economic substance, as Terry is the

ultimate owner of both entities.• Quindell’s average monthly number of employees actually declined from 46 employees to 34

employees between 2008 and 2009, even as Quindell’s revenue more than doubled.

• In order to stave dissolution, Robert Terry filed Quindell’s 2006 and 2007’s filings in 2009. That

is, between 2006 and 2009 did not files its financial statements.

• The Board of Quindell Limited found evidence of theft of stock and fraud in 2010.

• Clickus4.com’s website re-directs to Quindell.com today.

• ClickUs4.com’s auditor in 2008 differs from that in 2010 (Deloitte in 2008 and then CJ Goodhead

in 2010).

Robert Terry Enjoys His Country Club Life, Stops Filing Financial Statements for Quindell

After Robert Terry fell from grace at Innovation Group (which incidentally was a roll-up as well) in 2003,

it seems he devoted most of his time to running a golf and country club (a.k.a. Quindell Limited), along

with a restaurant/wine bar, as explained in the prior section. For reasons unknown, Quindell Limited

ceased filing financial statements after 2005.

ClickUs4.com was Quindell's Largest Customer in 2009 - 2010

in mill ions of £s, except for %s 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Quindell Total Revenue £1.09 £1.38 £1.71 £3.55 £4.15

Revenue from ClickUs4 £1.53 £1.07

as % of Quindell Revenue 43.2% 25.9%

Clickus4.com Revenue £0.27 £0.14 £0.00 £2.62 £1.76



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Quindell Limited was to be dissolved in 2009, for failing to produce financial statements since 20052:

In order to prevent dissolution, Robert Terry filed Quindell’s 2006 and 2007’s filings in 2009. Said

differently, Quindell was not filing its financial statements between 2006 and 20093:

We are concerned that the accuracy and reliability of Quindell’s financial statements are (at best)

questionable during this time period, as they were signed off much later.

Quindell Limited’s 2009 annual report provides a reasonably long description of its activities, yet there is

no mention of ‘insurance’ or ‘insurance software’. In fact, the language is laughably vague4:

Quindell Limited - Late Filings2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Year End: 12/30/2006 12/30/2007 12/30/2008 12/30/2009 12/30/2010

Auditor Signed off: 4/30/2009 4/30/2009 3/24/2010 2/28/2011 3/11/2011

Days after Year End: 852 487 449 425 71



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Quindell, Robert Terry, and ClickUs.com History of Ownership: This is Quindell’s Largest Customer?

Seeing that Robert Terry (and/or his wife and family members) own/control ClickUs4.com, and Robert

Terry owns Quindell, it seems strange that ownership of Clickus4.com exchanged hands at least a few

times. These transactions seem to lack economic merit:

• June 30th 2005 – Clickus4.com 100% owned by Quindell Limited5

• February 28th, 2009 – Quindell Limited sold 100% of ClickUs4.com to Robert Terry

• July 29th, 2009 – Quindell Limited purchased ~50% of ClickUs4.com shares from Terry

• November 31st, 2009 – Quindell acquired the remaining shares of ClickUs4.com

According to Quindell’s 2009 Annual Report,

• ClickUs4.com was acquired for £3.6 million.

• Quindell paid for this by transferring assets to ClickUs4 and settling an intercompany loan.

• On the 30th of December 2009, Quindell’s wrote off its ClickUs4.com investment and wrote off

an addition £0.32 million it contributed to ClickUs4.com.

• On July 1st, 2010 Quindell sold ClickUs4.com to Robert Terry for £188,695.

Quindell Board Found Evidence of Theft of Stock and Fraud

Gotham City Research does not understand this claim in the Quindell prospectus6:

How can the Board of Quindell Limited (that is, Robert Terry and the Terry Clan) find evidence of theft of

stock and fraud in ClickUs4.com, which too is a Terry business?



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ClickUs4.com’s Auditor in 2008 differs from that in 2010

ClickUs4.com’s 2008 auditor7:

ClickUs4.com’s 2010 auditor (maybe Deloitte was having difficulty believing Quindell’s 2009 revenue,

and did not want to sign the 2010’s):



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Quindell’s average monthly number of employees materially declined in 2009, even though reported

revenue doubled8:

Clickus4.com’s “CEO” is Robert Terry’s Lackey

A young man name Rod Cameron was named CEO of ClickUs4.com on the 1st of April 2011,9

Rod Cameron is currently Robert Terry’s personal executive assistant.10



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Strangely, the archived version of Clickus4.com for November 5 th, 2007 (as does the December 2nd, 2008

version) shows Quindell11:

The archived version of Clickus4.com as of July 8th, 2009 shows the following (just time for Quindell to

“sell” goods and services to clickus4.com)12:



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41% of 2011 Revenues Comes from an Undisclosed Customer

Quindell’s 2011 Reported Figures Look Exceptionally Good – What was Quindell’s Secret Recipe?

Quindell was little more than a country club/golf club through 2008/2009, and a large percentage of its

2009/2010 sales came from itself (via Terry-controlled ClickUs4.com). Despite a huge reported loss in

2009, the company began magically generating Google/Microsoft-like margins along with triple digit

revenue growth in 2010 and 20111:

Gotham City Research does not see signs of excellence or competitive advantage in Quindell’s

2010/2011 business or service/product offerings. Rather, we see that Quindell’s relationship with SMI

Telecom (customer/distribution partner/subsidiary) in 2010-2012 eerily resembles its relationship with

ClickUs4.com in 2009/2010. 40%+ of Quindell’s 2011 revenues seem questionable, as:

• Quindell’s largest 2011 customer/distribution partner = 41% of QPP’s total revenue.

• This entity is unnamed (deliberately, we think), but the evidence points to SMI Telecoms.

• Quindell owned SMI Telecoms in 2011; strangely Quindell owned it in 2010 as well, under a

different name (i.e. Quindell issued shares in 2010, sold its interests, and then bought again via

shares in 2011).

• Phil Brooks was concurrently CEO of SMI Telecoms & a C-level executive of Quindell in 2011. Phil

Brooks reminds us of Fumitake Nishi of Tile Shop (for those familiar with our Tile Shop report).

• Phil Brooks has deep-rooted ties to CEO Terry, Richard King, and the Innovation Group clan.

• Phil Brooks’ Turing SMI liquidated in 2008; Turing was only marginally profitable in 2006 & 2007.

• ‘Quindell New York’ and ‘Quindell India’ contact information as of today (address, phone

number) are identical to SMI Telecom’s New York and India contact information from 2011.

• Just as it did with ClickUs4.com in 2009-2010, questionable exchanges of ownership/acquisition

correspond with Quindell recognizing anomalous revenue growth derived from the

acquired/sold entity.

Why ClickUs4.com and SMI Telecoms Matter Today

Recall that Gotham City Research is unable to reconcile Quindell’s 2012 and 2013 EBITDA with the sumof the subsidiary parts. We think the primary reason is that Quindell’s “core business” (before acquiring

all the personal injury/legal entities) was never quite what Terry and Quindell portrayed it to be.

Our ClickUs4.com and SMI Telecoms findings lead us to believe that Quindell’s 2009-2012 reported

revenues are highly questionable. In fact, we believe SMI Telecoms plays a critical role in

understanding why we are unable to reconcile ~80% of Quindell’s 2012 EBITDA.

2010 2011 2012 2013 AVERAGE

Google 29.0% 25.7% 21.4% 21.6% 24.4%

Microsoft 30.0% 33.1% 23.0% 28.1% 28.6%

Quindell 32.1% 30.3% 23.2% 21.8% 26.9%



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Quindell’s Largest Unnamed Customer/Distributor in 2011 is SMI Telecoms

Quindell cryptically mentions its largest customer and distribution partner in 20112:

Quindell does not name this entity, but all the evidence points to SMI Telecoms (which it owned) – It is

the only distribution entity mentioned in the entire 2011 annual report:

Quindell Briefly Owned SMI Telecoms in 2010 when it Was Known As SMI Technologies3

SMI Technologies operated briefly under the name Quindell Enterprise Solutions, while under the brief

ownership of Quindell. After it was sold, the company was renamed to SMI Telecoms on April 1st 20114:

SMI Technologies LLC and SMI Technologies Limited are no longer trading as Quindell Enterprise

Solutions, rather they have been rebranded and are now trading as SMI Telecoms. As part of

the rebranding these two legal entities are being renamed as SMI Telecoms LLC and SMI

Telecoms Limited respectively.

In Late 2011, Quindell Re-Acquired SMI Telecoms

After buying and then selling SMI in 2010, Quindell bought it back yet again in 2011. This pattern of

behavior bears an eerie resemblance to the ClickUs4.com behaviors we outlined a few pages ago5:



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Quindell and SMI Telecoms’ Concurrent India Claims

SMI Telecoms’ website (via the wayback machine archives of the site) lists an India office in 20116:

Quindell’s 2011 annual report states7:

The manner in which Quindell phrases its India presence further supports our belief that SMI Telecoms

is the largest customer/distribution partner.

Quindell Extends Ties with SMI Telecoms in 2012, Increasing its Stake

According to Quindell’s 2012 Annual Report (signed off on 7 May 2013), Quindell and SMI Telecom’s

relationship strengthen in May 20128:

Concurrently, Quindell’s largest 2012 customer/distribution partner continues to be the same unnamedentity as in 2011:

No other distribution entities are named in the 2012 annual report.



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SMI Telecoms is Never Ever Mentioned Again

We are unable to find SMI-related press release, RNS, etc. after the news that Quinded extended ties

with SMI Telecoms. In fact, the SMI Telecoms website redirects to Quindell as of April 2013, a month

before Quindell’s 2012 Annual Report was signed off (the wayback machine has no record of the SMI

website between December 1, 2012 and April 10, 2013)9

:

We find this highly strange for the following reasons:

• Quindell does not explain whatever happened to SMI Telecoms. We are not told whether it was

disposed or whether the remaining shares were purchased.

• SMI Telecoms’ website seems lacking in updates after this good news.

• Quindell and SMI had a track record of updating the public on latest developments in their

relationships.

• The last announcement regarding the extension of their partnership sounds very bullish.

Quindell and CEO Terry have a demonstrated track record of promoting and milking good

news (and even mediocre news). Why stay silent?

• If SMI Telecoms and/or Quindell’s Telecom’s business revenue is growing 5x-10x, and its

EBITDA margins are 50%-100%, why does Quindell remain quiet about one of its best (if not its

best) businesses?

SMI Telecoms LLC Was Dissolved 3 Months After the Release of Quindell’s 2012 Annual Report

Quindell’s 2012 Annual Report was signed off on 7 May 2013, and publicly released on the 7th

of June 201310:

According to Florida records, SMI Telecoms LLC was dissolved on the 27 th of September, 201311:



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“Failure to file an annual report by the 3rd Friday of September will result in the administrative

dissolution or revocation of the business entity on our records at the close of business on the 4th

Friday of September.”12

SMI Telecoms LLC’s listed registered agent is listed as Phil Brooks, which is odd, because a registered

agent must be a Florida resident. It’s unclear how Brooks was a Florida resident while

simultaneously a Quindell executive in 2011.

SMI Telecoms Ltd Stops Filing Annual Reports, Will be Dissolved in 3 Months

SMI Telecoms LLC’s UK counterpart, SMI Telecoms Ltd (which is fully owned SMI Telecoms LLC) will bedissolved in 3 months according to an April 8th 2014 filing13:



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The Strange Case of SMI Telecoms Distribution Ltd, Incorporated by Robert Terry

SMI Telecoms Distribution Limited was incorporated on 8 th of March 2012 (just 2 months before the

announcement that SMI Telecoms and Quindell extended its partnership agreement):14

it’s unclear why SMI Telecoms Distribution Ltd was ever incorporated:

• Robert Terry and Laurence Moorse are listed as directors.

• As of incorporation, Quindell Limited is the sole shareholder. As of March 2014, Quindell

Technologies Limited is listed as the sole shareholder.

•

The company has never filed an annual report and looks like it will be dissolved soon perCompanies House.

Phil Brooks Was a C-Level Executive of Both Quindell and SMI Telecoms in 2011

Quindell’s prospectus (dated April 2011) states Philip Brooks is Quindell’s Chief Revenue Officer (and

more) and a shareholder15:

Various press releases, archived versions of the SMI Telecoms website, and other documents prove Phil

Brooks was CEO of SMI Telecoms at the same time16:

"NetBoss monitors networks, and when they find something that's not working, they call us,"

Phil Brooks, chief executive officer of SMI, said Tuesday – $169K grant could help SMI Telecoms

add jobs in Indian River County dated July 5th

, 2011



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Phil Brooks does not mention SMI Telecoms/SMI Technologies in his Linked profile17

Phil Brooks Remains with Quindell Today, Though His Exact Role and SMI Telecoms’ Fate is Ambiguous

Phil Brooks, as evidenced by his Linkedin profile, as well as Quindell’s press releases/RNS, appears to

remain with Quindell. The problem is it is very unclear what he does exactly18:

• “Phil Brooks, Chief Executive of Quindell Telecoms” – according to a Quindell press release

dated November 18th

, 2013

Vs.

• “Chief of Quindell Solutions” - according to a Quindell press release dated October 23rd, 2013

(see the next section for more on Quindell Solutions, as it is a phantom acquisition)

Phil Brooks and Ties That Blind – the Turing SMI Connection

Phil Brooks, Gary Brooks (Phil and Gary appear to be family members), Richard King (CEO of Quindell

subsidiary Ingenie, and former Innovation Group senior member), Quindell Limited (and therefore

Robert Terry), Laurence Moorse (Quindell’s CFO) were all directors of Turing SMI19:



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Gary Brooks signed off on some of the SMI financial statements, and he lists himself as CTO of SMI

Telecoms on linkedin currently:20

SMI Telecom’s Listed New York & India Offices are Quindell’s Listed New York & India Offices Today

Quindell’s current New York and India office information, as listed in the ‘contacts’ section of the

quindell website, are the exact same as SMI Telecom’s in 2011. We contacted and visited the New York

offices and the office receptionist told us he’s never heard of a Quindell (more on this later).



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Quindell’s Phantom Acquisitions (2011-Present)

We find Quindell engaging in further questionable, uneconomic behavior with the following subsidiaries:

We saw the following pattern at work with ClickUs4.com and SMI Telecoms:

• Acquiring companies & utilizing them as significant customers. Quindell’s recorded revenue

from these transactions appear to lack economic substance & a reasonable arm’s-length process

In this section, we cover companies that exhibit the following 2 behavioral patterns:

• Purchasing of companies that lack economic substance from related parties. The companies do

not appear genuine (nominal assets, incorporated same day of acquisition, etc).

• Acquiring companies Quindell already fully-owned.

Quindell’s “Brand Extension”, Quindell’s ‘Core’ Businesses Look Odd

We were informed that when an investor recently asked CEO Terry and management for a breakdown

of its revenue, the company refused1. They pointed instead to the split provided in a Cenkos note.

According to the Cenkos note, Quindell’s “Brand Extension” related businesses are highly profitable

(QPP apparently claimed this were utility-like services)2:

It’s quite convenient that a company that was mostly a country club and golf club through 2008/2009,

and derived 25%-50% of revenues from its subsidiaries in 2009-2011, magically reports

Microsoft/Google-like profit margins just in time for its 2011 IPO. It’s equally convenient that some of

these profits are derived from a highly vague ‘brand extensions’ business, that Quindell never explains.

We think we know why.

QUINDELL'S PECULIAR ACQUISITIONS

SUBSIDIARY NAME DESCRIPTION

Brand Extension (UK) Limited Incorporated same day Quindell claimed to acquire. 100% owned by Mark Ford 7 months later.

Quindell Brand Extension Services Limited Quindell li sts as subsidiary, but it is also 100% owned by Mark Ford.

UK Sun Limited Only had £100 in total assets, and was given notice it would be dissolve d 2 months after Quindell acquired it.

Simon Hall Associates Limited Richard Oliver Incorporated 1 month before Quindell claimed to acquire. Only has £1 in total assets.

Quindell Enterprise Solutions Limited Incorporated same day Quindell claimed to acquire, with Matt Whiting as sole shareholder.

Quintica Holdings Limited Quindell claimed to have acquired it, but already owned it.

Quindell Property Services Quindell already fully owned i t from incorporation a few months before it claimed to have acquired it.

ACH Manchester and associated companies According to Companies House there is not, and has never been, a UK company called ACH Manchester.

Clickus4.com QPP subsidiary (& owned by Terry) & 30-35% customer. Allegations of fraud. See Cl ickUs4.com section for more.

SMI Telecoms Distribution LLC QPP subsidiary (& owned by a Quindell e xecutive), simultaneously l argest 2011 Quindell customer. See SMI section.

Quindell Solutions Limited It seems like Terry used this vehicle to move cash from Quindell to himself (Quob Park, which he owns). An undisclosed related party transaction.

Quindell Brand Extension Economics, According to Cenkos

in milli ons of £s, except for %s 2011 2012 2013

Brand Extension / Broking £6.8 £11.1 £12.9

QPP Brand Extension £6.5 £18.5 £20.0

Total Brand Extension Revenue £13.3 £29.6 £32.9

Brand Extension / Broking £5.9 £8.5 £11.0

Total Brand Extension EBITDA £2.2 £8.0 £8.6

Total Brand Extension EBITDA £8.1 £16.5 £19.6

Brand Extension / Broking 86.8% 76.6% 85.3%

Total Brand Extension EBITDA 33.8% 43.2% 43.0%Total Brand Extension EBITDA Margin 60.9% 55.7% 59.6%



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Quindell Brand Extension Services Limited

There is a company listed at Companies House, by the name of Quindell Brand Extension Services, listed

as a subsidiary of Quindell in its 2012 annual report3:

The problem is that Quindell Brand Extension Services is wholly owned by Mark Ford, not Quindell4.

Who is Mark Ford?

Mark Ford's business, TMC (Southern) Limited owned 7.4% of Quindell when it publicly listed on the AIM

exchange. Strangely, Mark Ford’s TMC (Southern) Limited disclosed a short position of 0.7% on

November 25th, 20115. In addition, TMC did business with Quindell. The following is a series of non-cash

and other transaction between the two entities as disclosed in Quindell’s Prospectus6:



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Brand Extension (UK) Limited

Not to be confused with Quindell Brand Extension Services Limited, there is also a company called Brand

Extension (UK) Limited that QPP claimed to acquire in 20127:

As a matter of fact, Quindell did not. Mark Ford incorporated the business that same day8

As of April 2013, Mark Ford remained the sole owner of Brand Extension (UK) Limited9:

Is This What Quindell Means When it Refers to “Brand Extension”?10



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The above image would additionally explain why the company is opaque when it comes to describing

‘brand extensions’ and why it refuses to provide meaningful disclosures of the different businesses it

owns and operates. The numbers simply do not add up.

Quindell Solutions Limited

Quindell claims to have acquired Quindell Solutions Limited (“QSL”) sometime in September 2011.

Quindell’s 2011 Annual Report and a QSL filing/Companies House disagree on the exact date11:

Here’s the thing: QSL was once a subsidiary of Quindell Limited, before Quindell Limited reverse merged

into Mission Capital.

QSL looks like it was nothing more than a shell company. Its filings show that QSL had negligible assets in

2009 and 2010 (actually a negative book value). In 2010, revenue, costs and cashflow were all zero. 12

Quindell sold QSL to CEO Rob Terry in 2009 for £1 (coincidentally, QSL’s book value).

In 2011 Quindell re-acquired QSL for £251,000 in cash. At the time QSL was fully owned by Quob Park

Limited, an entity wholly-owned by Rob Terry13:



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In short, Quindell appears to have made an undisclosed payment to CEO Rob Terry in the amount of

£251,000 for a shell company that Quindell had sold to the same Rob Terry 2.5 years prior for £1.

Despite all this, the transaction was not disclosed as a related party transaction.

Matt Whiting (who we discuss in greater detail shortly) is listed as a director of 201214:

Phil Brooks and Quindell Solutions

Note that a RNS/press release dated 23 October 2013 states15:

Phil Brooks, Chief Executive of Quindell Solutions said: "This contract reinforces Quindell's market

leading approaches and solution offerings to enhance service management capabilities across a range of

industries."



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Simon Hall Associates

Simon Hall Associates (“SHA”) appears to be yet another shell company. SHA was incorporated on April

26th 2012(~2 weeks before Quindell claimed to acquire it) with 1 share and £1 in capital. Quindell’s 2012

Annual Report shows QPP paid £1 million cash for SHA16:

Simon Hall Associates 2012 balance sheet shows only £1 in total assets, with no trace of the £1,000,000

invested in it (supposedly) on May 11:

The plot thickens further, as Quindell’s press release announcing the SHA acquisition on 14.5.12 claims a

“targeted profit after tax of £500,000”, despite the fact we find Simon Hall has no apparent operations

and was incorporated few weeks before it was acquired17:

The Group also announces today that Simon Hall Associates Limited has been acquired via a

newly incorporated entity, Quindell Motor Services Limited ("QMS") by the Group at a valuation

of up to £2.5 million to be satisfied by the initial issue of 10,000,000 Quindell Shares ("New

Shares"), and up to a further 15,000,000 Quindell Shares ("Further Shares"). This valuation has

been calculated on a multiple of five times QMS's targeted profit after tax of £500,000 ("Target



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Profit") within a continuous twelve month period ending prior to 31 December 2013 ("Target

Profit Period"). The New Shares will be issued prior to the start of the Target Profit Period and

the Further Shares may be issued over the next nine months and used to acquire the businesses

of other industry leading talent, not currently working with the Group, in order to assist in

meeting this Target Profit.

The New Shares will be issued at a price of 10 pence per share, representing a premium of circa

45% on yesterday's closing price. The shares are subject to lock in of between 12 and 36 months

from the date of issue. In the event that QMS misses its Target Profit, the Group will receive

compensation from the vendors in the form of cash equal to 5x the shortfall.

Who is Richard Oliver?

Richard Oliver’s ties to Quindell and CEO Robert Terry appear to be very long and deep (Innovation

Group, Lava Group), per Linkedin18:

It gets stranger. The ‘author’ of Quindell’s 2011 and 2012 Annual Reports is shown as Richard Oliver19:



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UK Sun Limited

Quindell claimed to have acquired UK Sun Limited (and issued it shares) on December 2nd, 201120:

Yet the company was warned it would be dissolved just ~2 months later21:

UK Sun Limited does not look like a genuine company, in substance, with only £100 in total assets (no

trace of proceeds from Quindell shares issued to it)22:



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Quindell Enterprise Solutions Limited

On 13 October 2011 Quindell claims it paid £750,000 in cash for Quindell Enterprise Solutions Limited

(“QESL”)23:

Companies House shows QESL was incorporated that same day (Matt Whiting as the sole shareholder)24:

It gets stranger, as there’s no trace of the £750,000 in cash Quindell supposedly paid it25:



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About Matt Whiting and LearnED

Matt Whiting’s ties to Quindell run far deeper than the QESL acquisition detailed in the prior page26:

• In February 1996, he joined SCS Consulting Limited as Chief Technology Officer (Rob Terry

founds Consulting in 1990).

• In April 1999, he joined New Planet Solutions ("NPS") where his role involved delivering

insurance solutions to customers of The Innovation Group. NPS was apparently founded by

Hassan Sadiq, CEO of Himex (more on Sadiq later).

• Matt joined Robert Terry’s The Innovation Group in November 1999 as Chief Technology Officer,

and was appointed to the Board in July 2000. Matt left The Innovation Group in 2002 at which

time he was one of four global technology officers reporting to Robert Terry the then Chairman

and Chief Executive.

• In 2002, Matt founded LearnED Limited and was appointed Chief Executive. LearnEd was formed

to develop and resell Business Process Management technologies with an initial focus on the

insurance industry.

Quindell Fully Acquires LearnEd in July 2011, only to dispose of it a Few Months Later at a Profit

Quindell’s 2011 annual report claims the company fully acquired LearnED in July (Matt Whiting was

appointed Quindell’s Chief Technology Officer in April 2011), but it also discloses that LearnED was sold

three months later on 30th September 2011, for £500,000, “having acquired and transferred selected

assets and business activities from the company at an arms length value”27:



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The economic substance of the Quindell/LearnED transactions is unclear, as Quindell recognized a gain

on its disposal of LearnED according to Quindell’s 2011 Annual Report:

Other Strange Quindell/LearnED Activity

• Quindell lent LearnED £972,000 which was covered by a fixed and floating charge over all

LearnED’s assets and Intellectual Property Rights. We were unable to verify that LearnED paidQuindell back pre acquisition.28

• “The Directors believe that the combination of Intellectual Property Rights held in the two

companies will allow for a significant increase in activity for Quindell in the Insurance sector in

2011 and beyond.”

• Quindell recognized revenues from LearnED in 2011



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Quindell Property Services

The Company claims to have acquired Quindell Property Services on the 3rd of May 2013 but they had

already fully owned it at incorporation a few months earlier29:

Contrasted against Quindell’s claims in its 2013 press release and 2013 PRE:

The consideration for the acquisition, which was announced on 3rd May 2013, comprised an immediateissue of 65,978,572 new shares and provided for up to 190,000,000 further consideration shares to be

issued related to performance during 2013-2015.



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Quintica Holdings Limited

Quindell claims to have acquired Quintica Holdings Limited on the 18th of September, 201230:

Quindell already owned Quintica Holdings Limited at incorporation (both 2012 and 2013pre filings make

clear that Quintica Holdings Limited is the entity acquired)31:



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ACH Manchester and associated companies

On 14th January 2014, Quindell announced it had acquired “ACH Manchester and associated companies”

for £5 million in cash and 117.8m Quindell shares. According to Companies House, there is no ACH

Manchester. There is also no record of any company that was ever named ACH Manchester32. This

transaction looks strange for a few additional reasons:

• Did Quindell mean that it acquired Accident Claims Helpline/ACH Group Management Limited?

It seems Quindell meant ACH Group Management Limited, a company that operates the

Accident Claims Helpline website, accidentclaimshelpline.org.

• ACH Group Management’s filings show that it lost about £0.5 million in 2013 and had de

minimis net assets (a slightly negative net asset value), yet Quindell paid £5 million in cash and

117.8m Quindell shares.

• The 2013 annual report for ACH was signed off on 6th February 2014.33 Although Quindell

reported the acquisition on the 14th

of January the annual report does not mention any

change of ownership or control or any material, post balance sheet events.

Andrew O’Dua, Quayside, and ACH Group Management

ACH’s Annual Report shows that it is owned by Quayside (2801) Holdings. Quayside was incorporated in

June 2013 and wholly owned by Andrew O’Dua. ACH was incorporated in 2009 and was also wholly

owned by Andrew O’Dua. In July 2013 Andrew O’Dua sold 1 ACH share to Quayside in exchange for 6

million Quayside shares. The economic substance of this transaction is questionable for the following

reasons:

• One ACH share appears to equal 100% ownership of ACH (there is only one share in issue

according to the 2013 annual report).• ACH’s full list of shareholders as of the 14th of July 2009 shows 100 shares in issue. ACH’s

incorporation filing also shows 100 shares.

• Both ACH and Quayside seem to have been wholly owned by Andrew O’Dua the entire time.

ACH appears to have been an insurance claim lead generator company (via cold calls), and irritated quite

a few people as evidenced by the complaints listed here http://whocallsme.com/Phone-

Number.aspx/01457778260/2.

ACH’s use of an .org domain for its website seems misleading, as .org has historically only been available

for non-profits. In fairness, ACH does (economically speaking) look like a non-profit (though Quindell will

surely find some way to magically enhance its own profits through its acquisition of ACH).



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Telematics Accounting Issues & Related Party Transactions

Clear Pattern of Related Party Transactions, Accounting Irregularities, and More

Rather than finding evidence of great products, business acumen, or competitive advantage, we have so

far found a disturbing pattern of the following in Quindell’s business activities:

• Transactions that lack apparent economic substance.

• Recording revenue from transactions that lack a reasonable arm’s-length process.

• Transactions/sales to subsidiary, related party, affiliated party, joint venture, etc.

• Boomerang (two-way) transactions to nontraditional buyers.

• Accounting irregularities, and unexplained errors.

• Receivables (especially long-term and unbilled) growing much faster than sales.

Some may concede that our findings up to this point are concerning and valid, but that Quindell’s future

lies with telematics. Unfortunately, Quindell’s telematics crown jewels Himex and Ingenie, exhibit thesame symptoms described above. The following particularly concern us:

• 99% of Himex’s 2012 balance sheet does not mathematically reconcile.

• Himex is Quindell’s largest acquisition (in its history).

• Quindell’s 2013 filing claims Himex is a customer, yet it’s also a subsidiary.

• Himex itself is a roll-up entity consisting of Himex, eeGeo, Navseeker, and Mileage Management.

• Former executives allege Himex/Navseeker lied to them about its financial state and that in

effect they were operating a Ponzi-style scheme.

• Hassan Sadiq – a former Innovation Group executive, under then Innovation CEO Robert Terry –

is the CEO and Chairman of Himex. Ingenie’s CEO Richard King is also tied to both Sadiq & Terry.• Hassan Sadiq does not mention Himex in his Linkedin profile. We find this puzzling given Himex’s

purported recent success.

• Himex’s 2012 revenue is immaterial – £45,646 (administrative expenses is nearly identical,

£45,089) and a – £545,432 loss in 2013.

• Ingenie’s CEO claims “annual revenues of £80 million”, but Ingenie’s actual revenues are likely

closer to 1/10th of that.

• Quindell’s reported 2013 sales to Ingenie exceed our estimate of Ingenie’s total sales by over 2x

“If a seller and a customer are also affiliated in some other way, the seller’s quality of revenue on sales

may be suspect. For example, a sale to a vendor, a relative, a corporate director, a majority owner, or a

business partner raises doubt as to whether the terms of the transaction were negotiated at arm’s length.

That is, most related-party transactions that lack an arm’s-length exchange produce inflated, and

often phony, revenue.” – Financial Shenanigans, Howard Schilit



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Quindell’s Largest 2013 Telematics Customer is Itself

For 2013 Quindell reported telematics revenue of around £40.0 million. £24.5 million of this was sales to

its associates Ingenie and Himex1:

We find the quality of the £40.0 million revenue suspect, for the following reasons (in addition to the

concerns discussed in the remainder of this section):

• Quindell makes no mention of any inter-company transactions, eliminations, or related party

transactions, despite the fact the purported sales to Ingenie and Himex fit the bill.

• Quindell has a demonstrated history of recognizing subsidiaries as large customers, and

recording substantial revenue from them.• CEO Rob Terry, Himex’s CEO Hassan Sadiq, and Ingenie’s CEO King ties run deep, to the

Innovation Group days.

Himex’s Funny Balance Sheet

Himex’s 2012 financial statements appear materially incorrect, as the Himex statement of cash flows

claim a £12,000,000 capital expenditure (an outflow of cash), despite financing of only £9,250 and a net

cash inflow from operating activities of £19,1902:

There was no cash on the balance sheet to finance the above capital expenditure:



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And Himex 2012 revenues and profits were de minimis:

Himex’s 2013 financial statements are materially inaccurate as well, as a result of 2012 accounting

irregularities identified in the prior page3:



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Himex Discloses Less Information in its 2013 Annual Report vs. its 2012 Annual Report

In 2012, Himex disclosed an income statement, balance sheet, and statement of cash flows (despite

being a rather small company). Seeing that Himex grew in 2013 (as claimed by Quindell), it is strange

that Himex elected to disclose less information in 20134:

Himex’s 2013 annual report omits an income statement and statement of cash flows. It’s not obvious tous that Himex is qualified to do so5:

• Himex’s reported balance sheet total (whether it’s real or not) exceeds £2.8 million

• According to Himex’s linkedin profile, the company has 51-200 employees6

It’s possible that Himex had less than 50 employees at the time. We still find their opacity suspicious,

given the company provided more information, greater transparency when it was smaller.



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In February 2014, when Quindell increased its stake in Himex to 85%, it stated that it expected the

acquisition to enhance earnings in 2014. The acquisition valued Himex at £240 million – implying a

valuation close to 100x historic revenue, and 20x revenue if their monthly revenue run rate of £2 million

is correct.7

The 19% stake acquired 7 months earlier valued Himex at £46 million, 1/6th

the 2014 valuation. Octo, atelematics market leader, was sold for EUR 405 million the same month, at 4x revenue.

Himex’s Strange Acquisitions, and Allegations of Fraud

Himex appears stranger, the closer we look. It purchases a few companies for a £1 each, and former

executives accuse it of fraud:

Navseeker and Allegations of Fraud - Himex’s 2013 annual report shows that in April 2012 Himex

signed an agreement to acquire Navseeker Inc. Himex’s 2013 annual report discloses that 80% of

Navseeker was acquired for £18.

After Himex purchased Navseeker for £1, several former Navseeker executives sued the company in the

United States. They alleged:

• Navseeker deceived them into investing hundreds of thousands of dollars into the company.9

• Navseeker’s founders lied to them about the financial condition and future prospects of the

company.

• The company’s telematics platform was incomplete and not functional contrary to claims

otherwise.

• Navseeker’s founders were effectively operating a Ponzi-style operation to recover their own

initial investment in the business.

Evogi Group is Navseeker

Himex’s website claims it acquired The Evogi Group in 2012 (yet Himex’s filings do not mention Evogi),

and Himex’s website fails to mention Navseeker10:



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Evogi is Navseeker, per court filings11:

Evogi’s website does not appear fully functional, as links to its management team is dead12:

Evogi received a notice of pending revocation (oddly, it was issued well after Himex acquired them)13:



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These are hardly signs of a successful and thriving operation.

Mileage Management Limited – Himex’s 2013 annual report shows that Himex acquired Mileage

Management Limited for £1 from Ingelby in February 2013. Mileage Management’s 2012 reported

revenue was £1.4 million, slightly up from £1.3 million in 2012, and operating at a small loss.14

Strangely, Himex also acquired Mileage’s former parent Ingelby on 9th July 2013. Ingelby’s 2012 annual

report clearly shows a highly unprofitable company whose going concern is in question, and it is

pursuing a sale of the company.

eeGeO – eeGeo is the only company that Himex seems to have acquired for more than £1. Himex

purchased eeGeo for £1.15 million. The income statement for eeGeO is not available, but its limited

accounts (available via UK filings) show losses increasing, cash decreasing, intangible and tangible assets

decreasing.15

In short, it’s unclear what’s so special about Himex (as the sum of Evogi, Mileage Management, Ingelby,

and eeGeo).

QPP CEO Rob Terry and Himex CEO Hassan Sadiq Cosy Ties Extend Back to Innovation Days

We find the peculiar business dealings between Rob Terry’s Quindell and Hassan Sadiq’s Himex to

resemble the dealings between Innovation Group and Cosy. It’s unclear why Mr. Sadiq does not list

Himex in his linked profile16:



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Ingenie’s Confusing and Inconsistent Claims

Ingenie’s Founder and CEO, Richard King (a co-founder of Innovation Group, i.e. one of Robert Terry’s

former business associates) claims Ingenie has established itself as one of the leaders in telematics

insurance for young drivers with annual revenues of £80 million17:

In a press release dated 19th September 2013, Quindell CEO Rob Terry said,18

"With ingenie significantly profitable already and approaching a run rate of £50 million of gross written

premium “

Unless Ingenie has magically increased its own revenue to £80 million since, we believe King’s claim in

his Linkedin profile is highly misleading for the following reasons:

• Ingenie is not an insurer, it is an intermediary service provider (a middleman).

• “Gross Written Premium” (“GWP”) is highly technical jargon insurers use.

• Gross Written Premiums (in insurance parlance) sold through Ingenie as a broker are not

equivalent to Ingenie’s revenues.

• Ingenie’s revenues are a fraction of GWP.

Ingenie’s principal activity according to Ingenie19:



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Ingenie’s 2012 revenue barely exceeded £1 million in revenue:

Quindell’s 2013 Sales to Ingenie Exceed Our Estimate of Ingenie’s Total Revenue

Recall Quindell reported sales to Ingenie of £9.4 million in 201320:

We estimate Ingenie’s 2013 total revenue to be no more than £5.0 million. An investor who spoke with

Quindell about Ingenie says, based on that conversation, he thinks Ingenie revenue may simply be 10%

of GWP of £50 million, or £5.0 million. Gotham City Research has reason to believe Ingenie’s 2013 total

revenue was closer to £2.5-3.0 million, but no matter; Ingenie’s 2013 total revenue is far less than the

£9.4 million it paid to Quindell, which looks very odd.



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Getting facts straight

This Quindell slide claims Quindell invested in Ingenie in Winter 201022:

The 2011 Quindell Annual Report claims otherwise23:



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The Dark Side of Quindell Legal Services

Judging by Quindell’s accounting, earnings quality, and related party transactions, would you trust that

the company’s personal injury-related businesses are scrupulously complying with the Legal Aid,

Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act (“LASPO” or the Jackson Reforms)?

Introduction to the UK’s Personal Injury Problem

"People who make false whiplash claims need to realise they are genuinely ripping off their neighbour."1

Britain is referred to as the “whiplash capital of Europe” (whiplash, as in the neck injury) with 1,500

insurance claims a day, many of which are spurious, adding £90 to the cost of car cover.2

• Whiplash accounts for 78% of all personal injury claims in the UK, compared with just 3% in

France. Europe-wide research conducted in 2004 showed that the UK had twice the average

percentage of whiplash claims as a proportion of personal injury claims compared with the

European average. The Association of British Insurers says little has changed since then.

• An estimated 30% of whiplash claims are exaggerated3

• Personal injury claims over the past few years have remained steady but there’s been a

dramatic rise in insurance premiums – in spite of a fall in accident rates.

• Many believe that a “compensation culture” emerged as a result of aggressive advertising/tv

commercials by claims management companies (such as the ones Quindell owns), referral fees

paid by claimant solicitors, and skewed incentives.

• Insurance premiums are up ~80% since October 2008 with personal injury claims accounting for

the majority of this increase.

• The proliferation of claims management companies and lawyers working on a “no-win, no-fee”

basis encouraged motorists to pursue spurious personal injury cases with little perceived

financial risk to themselves, not realising the impact such cases have had on insurance costs4.

Enter the LASPO/Jackson Reforms aimed at reducing spurious personal injury claims5:

• Referral fees are banned in personal injury cases. No win no fee CFAs remain available in civil

cases, but the additional costs involved (success fee and insurance premiums) are no longer

payable by the losing side.

• No win no fee DBAs are available in civil litigation for the first time.

• The lawyer's 'success fee' in CFAs, or 'payment' in DBAs - is capped at 25% of the damages

recovered, excluding damages for future care and loss

Unclear How Quindell Remains Untouched Post-Jackson

Before and after the Jackson reforms, Quindell went on an acquisition spree and bought many personal

injury law firms and claims companies – the very companies one would (correctly) expect to suffer post

Jackson. The companies Quindell purchased were profitable pre-acquisition (some barely, some



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decently) but the Jackson reforms made their business models redundant. On their own they would

probably still not exist, or at best be shells of their former selves.

Quindell set up an Alternative Business Structure (“ABS”) in order to survive post-Jackson. We question

the viability and propriety of this structure, and Quindell’s personal injury-related businesses for the

following reasons:

• Quindell refuses to explain how its legal services/personal injury business complies with the

referral fee ban and overall Jackson reforms.

• Legal Futures has repeatedly asked Quindell how it complies with the referral fee ban, but it has

not returned any calls.6

• Unclear (at best) how exactly Quindell “ethically lowers the total cost of claims” when it claims

to currently pays £800 in “cost of acquisition” per case.7

• Quindell refuses to disclose profit margins for its personal injury-related subsidiaries since it

acquired them (e.g. Silverbeck Rymer, Ai Claims, Mobile Doctors, Pinto Potts, etc).

•

20-25% EBITDA margins for its personal injury / legal services-related business seem a stretch. AiClaims and Mobile Doctors historically reported 4%-6% EBITDA margins. Silverbeck Rymer’s

2010 EBITDA margin was 23%, but that’s Pre-Jackson reforms.

• Quindell’s claim that it seeks to “stamp down the total cost of claims” seems inconsistent with

its Microsoft/Google-like reported EBITDA margins.

• Quindell’s claim that it reduces spurious/fraudulent personal injury claims seems inconsistent

with attributing its financial success to gaining volumes and favorable operating leverage.

• The Chairman of the Transport Select Committee, Louise Ellman recently initiated a probe to

determine whether ABSs are used to side-step the referral fee ban8.

• Accidents on downtrend, injury claims on the increase. This is a dynamic that is likely to pressure

the personal injury industry.

Quindell and the £800 per case referral fee

Quindell specifically states in its 2013 preliminary results that the company pays a £800 referral fee per

case. We find this highly noteworthy as:

• Quindell does not bother to pretend it complies with the spirit of LASPO/Jackson

• Unclear how such an explicit fee structure complies with the letter of the law

• This is the same cost per lead as they claimed was standard Pre-Jackson, which means high

margins should be more difficult to achieve as a law firm’s revenue per claim decreases post-

Jackson.

Quindell Claims to be Ethical, Yet is Noticeably Opaque

Judging by Quindell’s actions (rather than its or its CEO’s words), Quindell seems fearful of the

consequences that transparency will bring to its personal injury businesses. This would explain why



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Quindell remains opaque, refusing to provide basic personal injury/legal services financial information.

Quindell initiated an “investor teach-in” campaign last year (in order to calm nervous investors when its

stocks had plummeted). The company unsurprisingly answers few question in their presentations, as we

show:

Ai Claims Solutions, is a very large % of Quindell’s revenue yet Quindell refuses to provide current detailsin its investor teach-in June 2013 (Quindell discloses stale 2011 figures in its 2013 teach-ins)9:

More of the same Opacity with Silverbeck Rymer, as it discloses 2010 figures in 2013:



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Mobile Doctors – More stale 2010 financial results

Despite its blatant refusal to provide very basic financial information, Quindell claims:

We largely trust Quindell’s Legal services business subsidiaries’ historical reported numbers (the long

documented history of margin data helps), but this is pre Jackson – and many of these subsidiaries were

low margin businesses pre Jackson – we don’t think they’re magically higher margin now.

Some Believe The ABS is Used to Circumvent the Referral Fee Ban

There are already lawmakers and others who have expressed concern that the ABS is being used to

circumvent the LASPO/Jackson reforms10:

Former DLG head of bodily injury Geoff Leeks, maintained that ABSs were being used to

circumvent the ban “fuelled in some instances by a desire to maximise profit”

Leeks added: “There are many ways in which you can circumvent the ban that avoid an exchangeof a referral fee. You can have all sorts of processes that mean both the insurer and the lawyer

make a profit from the arrangement.”

Leeks said he would welcome an investigation into these practices. “They are not sustainable

and suit only those looking for short term gain,” he added.



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Additional Accounting and Oversight Issues

A Certified Fraud Examiner’s Dream Come True

What particularly amazes us is that the deeper we dig into Quindell, the more we find. It seems as if

there exists an infinite & growing supply of Quindell red flags. We are simply in awe of the fact that a

company this size (with a market value between $4-$5 billion recently) has so many qualities companies

1/100th of its size possess. For example:

• We visited the address Quindell claims as its New York office. The receptionist told us he’s never

heard of a Quindell occupying the 9th floor. Quindell lists a Florida phone number as its New

York phone number.

• We called Quindell’s India office on several different occasions, and no one picks up.

• Quindell has had 3 auditors in 3 years as a publicly-traded company.

• QPP went public via the backdoor reverse merger, just as many frauds in the past have.

• Questionable corporate governance practices.

• Use of bank overdraft as a source of financing.

• Robert Terry’s credibility is questionable. Terry actively promoted QPP’s stock on Twitter; other

executives in the United States have been fired for lesser offenses.

• Press releases and RNS that resemble penny stock pump and dump promotions.

• Quindell’s recent news titled, “POTENTIAL FOR LARGEST TELEMATICS ROLLOUT GLOBALLY“ was

released Monday 07 April 2014, but it was created 12 March 2014, according to Quindell.com

Quindell New York Due Diligence Check

We visited 280 Madison Avenue, New York NY 10016

1

:

The building is not exactly an A-grade office building (to put it kindly). It’s certainly not a building an up-

and-coming business would occupy. We asked the front desk receptionist that we wanted to visit



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Quindell on the 9th floor. The receptionist gave us a confused look, asking, “Who?” We asked again, and

he said he’s never heard of a Quindell. We then asked him if there were any technology/software

businesses on the 9th floor. He definitely said no.

We called Quindell’s listed phone number several times. No one ever picks up; the call goes to voice mail

after several rings. The funny thing is that the telephone number +1 772 245 7648 is a Florida phonenumber.

Quindell New York is SMI Telecoms’ New York Office as Listed in 2011

The New York address is exactly the same address we found in a 2011 archived version of smi-t.com’s

website (although the phone number looks strange, as it too, is not a New York area code)2:

Quindell India Due Diligence Check

An India location is mentioned in 2011 Quindell annual report, but no more mentions afterwards3:

But Quindell’s website mentions an India office:



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We called the listed India office few times, but no response. There’s not even a voice message. It turns

out, the Quindell India address and phone number information are identical to SMI Telecoms’ as of 2011

(per archived versions of its website, just like Quindell New York):

The company’s excessive use of [email protected] as its contact email raises questions as well.

3 auditors in 3 years

We understand that companies occasionally need to switch auditors for valid reasons. That said,

Quindell has had 3 auditors in 3 years. We’ve never seen valid reasons for such high turnover. When

QPP was a private company, its auditor was Deloitte4:



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Quindell changed auditors to a much lower-tier RSM Tenon (which filed for bankruptcy):

Then on 3, October 2013, Quindell announced it changed yet again, to KPMG:

Quindell Portfolio Plc (AIM: QPP.L), the provider of sector leading expertise in software,

consultancy and technology enabled outsourcing in its key markets, being Insurance,

Telecommunications and their related sectors is pleased to announce the appointment of KPMGLLP (“KPMG”) as auditor of the Company as a further step in preparation for the Group’s

proposed full listing. Baker Tilly Audit Limited (formerly known as RSM Tenon Audit Limited) has

resigned as auditor of the Company with immediate effect and has confirmed to the Company

that there are no circumstances in connection with its resignation which it considers need to be

brought to the attention of the Company's shareholders or creditors.

Questionable Corporate Governance Practices

Quindell’s website has a section dedicated to ‘corporate governance’ but it provides very little

information (e.g. it does not provide the members of each committee on the website)5:



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Lawrence Moorse, who has deep ties to Terry since their Innovation Group days, and is the Company’s

CFO (“Group Finance Director”) is on the Board. We find it troubling that a man with such close ties to

CEO Terry, and who oversees the company’s financial statements, is on the Board.

Stephen Scott, who was with Terry at Innovation Group, is on the Board. He and Terry participated in an

unusual transaction back in the TiG days6

:

However, the other event that cast a little doubt on TiG’s prospects here at Citywire, was a

somewhat unusual contract taken out by chief executive Rob Terry and finance Stephen Scott in

December.

The pair bought a contract from the broker UBS to hedge against the company’s share price

falling. They hedged 1.8 million and 535,714 shares respectively, representing 4.5% of Terry's

stake and 20% of Scott's. They didn't comment at the time and were unavailable today.

It’s concerning to see Scott, who was involved with IT-Freedom (a QPP subsidiary) on the Board and the

Audit Committee7

:

Jason Cale was on the audit committee. We find this unusual given his Ubiquity Capital was a major

shareholder via shares earned by helping Quindell obtain a reverse merger shell8. Cale’s ties to Overland

and Mobile Doctors, both Quindell subsidiaries, are notable.

Anthony Bowers is the chair of the audit committee. While he was with Deloitte, he worked closely with

Robert Terry and Stephen Scott since the Innovation Group days. As a result we find his independence

questionable9:

Recall from earlier sections, that CEO Terry’s wife signed off on the 2008 filings. There’s a clear pattern

of questionable corporate governance practices.



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Bank Overdraft

Despite Terry’s promotional language and gusto, it seems Quindell would’ve run out of cash if it weren’t

for the £200 million it raised in Q4 last year10:

If you remove the £200 million raised, cash is zero, but bank overdraft and borrowings are up

considerably, year-over-year.

CEO Rob Terry’s Twitter Activities

CEO Robert Terry (evidently) used to tweet frequently about Quindell and its share price, under his

former account https://twitter.com/RobTQuindell . Unfortunately, his account no longer exists. We can

imagine, however, how promotional he might’ve been, by looking at Richard King’s account (CEO of

Ingenie and long-time friend/colleague of Terry’s since Innovation)11:

The above King tweet is particularly concerning given Quindell’s dire straits in 2013, but for its significant

£200 million capital raise.

Here is what those who used to observe Terry’s tweets (when he was active) had to say12:

“ In Terry's case, it extended to tweeting comments about share prices and trading - altogether

out of order, far too time-consuming for a serious manager, especially one faced with the

challenge of integrating an rush of acquisitions. And what about this business of treating all

shareholders equally when many of us never go near the twitter-sphere?”

“Known for his active use of Twitter to engage with investors, Terry is keen to transfer Quindell

to a full stock exchange listing by the autumn and is eyeing possible inclusion in the FTSE 250.”



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Robert Terry’s Overall Credibility

Longer term, serious concerns:

• Terry aggressively grew a roll-up called Innovation Group, whose share price never recovered

since the 2000s. He was let go of Innovation Group in 2003.

• Terry ran Quindell, a country club, through 2009.

• CEO Terry and Quindell’s reported financial success between 2009-2011 derived largely from

sales to itself/subsidiaries.

• Terry has gained the trust of many by claiming he personally invested £12 million into Quindell’s

technology platform

Recent examples of “over-promise, under-deliver”13

:

• Quindell missed targets. Quindell is some £80m short of previous analyst targets for revenue of

£460m for 2013.

• The company has also missed Mr. Terry’s own 3p earnings-per-share target. Adjusted earningsper share came in at 2.54p for 2013. And operating cash flow is very negative.

• In Quindell’s stock market results statement, the words “proof” and “validated” are mentioned

on no fewer than six and four occasions respectively with regards to the strategy and results.

Promotional and Misleading RNS/Press Releases

“We delivered on our goal of significantly exceeding market expectations with 168% Growth in

technology solutions revenue, our highest margin and most cash generative segment.” – Rob Terry

claims in the 2013 pre annual report.

Actually, Quindell was very cash flow negative in 201314:

A few weeks ago, the company announced “ZURICH CANADA CHOOSES QUINDELL SOLUTIONS

TECHNOLOGY”, but Zurich has been a customer for some time (this is archived from 2010) 15:



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Zurich Insurance was also an Iter8 customer according to this older 2013 Quindell press release.16

Of course it’s possible they are taking on extra software....and that it is 'news'

Recent RAC Telematics Contract Press Release Was Created 3 Weeks Before its Release

On Monday the 7th of April, 2014 (few weeks ago), Quindell conveniently released an RNS (after its

shares exhibited some weakness post earnings) titled, “POTENTIAL FOR LARGEST TELEMATICS ROLLOUT

GLOBALLY “. Shares rose significantly (QPP shares closed the prior Friday at ~38 pence/share) and closed

that day at ~43 pence/share. The strange thing is, Quindell.com shows this press release was already

created several weeks before (we found this by accident, while searching for something else entirely)17:



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CEO Bob Terry Has Been Talking About a Main Exchange Listing Since 2012

Quindell has been talking about listing on the main London Stock Exchange (and also dual-listing in

North America) for quite some time. We believe if QPP were to succeed, it would come to haunt them,

as all the company’s misdeeds would be exposed.

16th of October 2012:18 “Quindell also plans to move to the main list from Aim next year –

probably in the second half. This will make it a strong candidate for entry into the FTSE 250.”

21st of October 2013: “Quindell looks to full listing in March 2014 - Quindell Portfolio, an

insurance claims processor, has confirmed it is seeking a full listing on the London Stock

Exchange next March, with a potential dual listing in Canada.”

Mr. Terry now says the company will be moving to the main market in early June of this year.



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Valuation: Worth No More Than 3p per share

Is Quindell a Good Business?

What CEO Robert Terry will not reveal:

• Quindell has not generated lasting free cash flow, and cash flow has worsened with time

• Earnings quality is very low, as earnings and free cash flow tell very different stories1

• We estimate Quindell would’ve ran out of cash in 2013 but for its capital raise

• Quindell’s equity is at risk of going to zero, if it is found to be in violation of the Jackson reforms.

If found to be compliant, the businesses still face serious risks that its underlying industry will

shrink. There are many ways for speculators to lose.

• We find 40%-80% of Quindell’s EBITDA suspect.

• Management credibility and track record are highly questionable.

QPP shares worth no more than 3p per share

We believe QPP shares worth 3p per share (though we think they are uninvest-able until the

concerns identified in this report are fully addressed):

• We find 2013’s economic earnings lie somewhere between its reported net profits and free cash

flow. We take the average, and arrive at 2013 economic earnings of £9 million. We apply a 10x-

20x earnings multiple, and arrive at a valuation of only 1.5-3.0 pence per share, implying more

than 92% downside.

• Tangible book value is 6.1 pence per share, but that is before discounting suspect receivables.

• Quindell’s dividend is negligible and meaningless because the amount of capital raised vastly

exceeds the declared dividends.

• We arrive at a 3p per share valuation by combining the above approaches.

in millions of £s, or units 2010 2011 2012 2013

Revenue £4.15 £13.71 £137.56 £380.13

Net Profits £1.33 £4.16 £31.90 £82.70

Free Cash Flow £0.00 £1.34 -£59.15 -£64.64

Receivables Growth £1.00 £30.47 £170.67 £125.53

Shares Issued 0.0 2.4 91.0 200.4

Shares Outstanding 108 1,989 3,309 5,670



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Quindell’s Q1 2014 Results Compared Against Nationwide Accident Repair Services’ Results

Quindell claimed adjusted EBITDA margin (which means EBITDA as they see fit) of over 40% in Q1 20142:

Yet a company it acquired last year (22% stake), NARS reported razor thin (and declining) margins3:



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End Notes

Introduction

1. Google, Microsoft 10Ks, Quindell Annual Reports

2. Quindell Annual Reports

3. Companies House, DueDil, Various Quindell and subsidiary filings

4. Himex Annual Reports, Quindell 2013 Preliminary

5. Companies House; see the Phantom Acquisitions section for more details.

6. Quindell presentations.

Quindell’s Anomalous EBITDA Margins

1. Various company filings

2. Mobile Doctors, Ai Claims, and Quindell Annual Reports; Duedil

3. Quindell and its subsidiaries’ annual reports, Duedil, Companies House

4. “”

5. Quindell Investor Teach-In Presentation

6. Quindell Annual Reports

7. http://brontecapital.blogspot.com/2012/11/hewlett-packard-and-autonomy-notes-from.html

CEO Robert Terry Spent £12 million to Build a Country Club

1. Various articles and presentationsa. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a4fb0432-b800-11e2-9f1a-00144feabdc0.html ,

b. http://www.postonline.co.uk/post/interview/2189103/interview-rob-terry-tackling-

the-problems

c. http://www.sharesmagazine.co.uk/articles/quindell-sets-sights-high#.U1SqxPldUrU

d. Quindell Annual Report 2011

e. Quindell Investor Teach-in

2. Quindell Limited Annual Reports 2001-2008

3. “”

4. http://archive.org/web/archive of quindell.com for each respective date

5. Quindell Limited 2008, andhttp://www.investegate.co.uk/article.aspx?id=201110191056444561Q



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Quindell’s Largest 2009/2010 Customer is Itself (ClickUs4.com)

1. Quindell Limited and ClickUs4.com Annual Reports

2. Companies House, Quindell Limited filings

3. “”

4. Quindell Limited Annual Report 20095. Quindell Limited and ClickUs4.com filings

6. Quindell Prospectus

7. ClickUs4.com 2009 and 2010 Annual Reports

8. Quindell Limited Annual Report 2009

9. ClickUs4.com 2009, 2010 Annual Reports

10. Rod Cameron https://www.linkedin.com/pub/rod-cameron/21/5b9/86a

11. http://web.archive.org/web/20081202060803/http://www.ekmpowershop4.com/ekmps/shops

/quindell/index.asp

12. http://web.archive.org/web/20090708013157/http://www.ekmpowershop4.com/ekmps/shops

/quindell/index.asp

41% of 2011 Revenues Comes from an Undisclosed Customer

1. Google, Microsoft 10Ks, Quindell Annual Reports

2. Quindell Annual Report 2011

3. Quindell Limited 2010

4. http://archive.org/web/archive of smi-t.com for 2011, click ‘news’


6. http://archive.org/web/archive of smi-t.com for 2011



9. http://archive.org/web/archive of smi-t.com as of April 2013


11. http://search.sunbiz.org/Inquiry/CorporationSearch/SearchResultDetail/EntityName/flal-

l11000050314-4191aab4-58a2-4626-97d8-b1d802ec0480/smi%20telecoms/Page1

12. https://efile.sunbiz.org/sbs_ar_instr.html

13. SMI Telecoms Ltd gazette filing, Companies House

14. SMI Telecoms Distribution Limited incorporation filing, Companies House


16. http://www.floridarc.com/index.php?src=news&srctype=detail&category=Floridas%20Research

%20Coast%20News&refno=200

17. https://www.linkedin.com/pub/phil-brooks/17/5b9/65b

18. Quindell RNS dated November 18 and October 23, 2013

19. Turing SMI Shareholder Agreement, Revised

20. http://uk.linkedin.com/pub/gary-brooks/5/490/abb



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Quindell’s Phantom Acquisitions (2011-Present)

1. Investor meeting with Quindell management

2. Cenkos note on Quindell dated 31.3.14


4. Quindell Brand Extension Services Ar01 as of 09.02.20145. Mark ford short position http://www.lse.co.uk/share-regulatory-

news.asp?shareprice=QPP&ArticleCode=uw5l3hoh&ArticleHeadline=TMC_Southern_Ltd__Form

_83__Quindell

6. TMC Significant non cash transactions from Quindell Prospectus


8. Companies House, Brand Extension (UK) Limited incorporation filing

9. Brand Extension (UK) Limited Ar01

10. http://archive.org/web/archive of ClickUs4.com

11. Quindell Annual Report 2011, Companies House Ar01 filing for Quindell Solutions Limited

12. Quindell Solutions Limited Annual Report and other filings13. Quindell Solutions Limited Ar01 filings

14. “

15. Quindell RNS/Press release dated October 23 2013

16. Simon Hall Associates Annual Report 2012, Ar01, and Quindell 2011 Annual Report

17. http://www.quindell.com/images/uploads/irdownloads2012/20120514-appointment-of-simon-

hall-as-chief-executive-officer-of-quindell-motor-services-and-acquisition-of-simon-hall-

associates-limited.pdf

18. Richard oliver linkedin profile https://www.linkedin.com/pub/richard-oliver/18/409/2b3

19. View ‘Properties’ for the Quindell 2011 and 2012 Report PDFs

20. Quindell Annual Report 201121. UK Sun Limited Gaz filing

22. UK Sun Limited Annual Report 2012


24. Quindell Enterprise Solutions Limited incorporation filing

25. Quindell Enterprise Solutions Limited Annual Report 2012

26. http://www.quindell.com/images/uploads/irdownloads2011/20110421-198-quindell-appoint-

new-chief-technology-officer.pdf


28. Quindell Prospectus, LearnED Annual Report 2009, Quindell Annual Report 2011

29. Quindell Property Services incorporation filing vs. http://www.quindell.com/Press-Releases-

RNS/expansion-into-property-claims-with-major-uk-listed-insurer


31. Quintica Holdings Limited incorporation filing.

32. Companies House

33. ACH Group Management Limited Annual Report 2013, Quayside (2801) Holdings filings



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Telematics Accounting Issues & Related Party Transactions

1. Quindell 2013 PRE

2. Himex Annual Report 2012


4. “”5. Companies Act

6. https://www.linkedin.com/company/himex

7. Quindell RNS February 2014


9. Holleran vs Navseeker, Williamson vs Navseeker, Weber vs. Evogi

10. Himex.com

11. Weber vs. Evogi

12. Evogi.com

13. http://starpas.azcc.gov/scripts/cgiip.exe/WService=wsbroker1/names-detail.p?name-

id=F16679834&type=CORPORATION14. Himex, Mileage Management, and Ingleby Annual Reports

15. eeGeO limited annual reports

16. Hassan Sadiq https://www.linkedin.com/pub/hassan-sadiq/28/5b2/977

17. https://www.linkedin.com/pub/richard-king/2a/542/89a

18. http://www.quindell.com/Press-Releases-RNS/further-investment-into-ingenie-for-rapid-

expansion

19. Ingenie Limited Annual Report 2012


21. Quindell Annual Report 2011, Quindell September 2013 and February 2014 Ingenie press

release22. Quindell Investor Teach-in


The Dark Side of Quindell Legal Services

1. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/insurance/10185382/Why-Britain-is-the-

whiplash-capital-of-Europe.html

2. “”

3. Claims Standards Council4. Canaccord Genuity Initation Report, July 25 2013

5. https://www.justice.gov.uk/civil-justice-reforms

6. http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/quindell-spending-150m-year-upfront-case-

acquisition




8. http://www.postonline.co.uk/post/news/2338828/firms-deny-dodging-referral-fee-ban-as-

select-committee-prepares-abs-report

9. Quindell Investor Teach-in

10. http://www.postonline.co.uk/post/news/2338828/firms-deny-dodging-referral-fee-ban-as-

select-committee-prepares-abs-report

11. 2013 Quindell Pre vs. 2012 Annual Report

Additional Accounting and Oversight Issues

1. http://www.quindell.com/Contact/north-america

2. http://archive.org/web/archive of smi-t.com for each respective date

3. Quindell Annual Reports, http://www.quindell.com/asia-pacific

4. Quindell 2010, Quindell 2012, and Quindell October 2013 press release

5. http://www.quindell.com/Corporate-Governance/corporate-governance

6. http://citywire.co.uk/money/innovation-group-has-strong-start-to-year/a235004

7. Quindell 2012 Annual Report




11. @ingenie_Richard on twitter.com

12. Terry twitter activity quotes

a. http://www.michaelwalters.com/stories/news.phtml?num=4028

b. http://www.cityam.com/article/quindell-shares-crash-following-analyst-scrutiny

13. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/questor/10735291/Questor-share-tip-Quindells-

high-octane-growth.html

14. Quindell 2013 pre

15. http://www.quindell.com/Press-Releases-RNS/entry-to-north-american-insurance-market

16. http://archive.org/web/archive of iter8.com website from 2010

17. http://www.quindell.com/Search?searchphrase=all&searchword=potential%20for%20larges

18. Quindell listing quotes

a. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/questor/9610020/Questor-share-tip-

Time-for-investors-to-grab-a-slice-of-Quindells-cost-cutting-expertise.html

b. Quindell looks to full listing in March 2014 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ca0659de-

3a5a-11e3-b234-00144feab7de.html#axzz2xf4vGpvN

quindell plc: a country club built on quicksand

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