quick decisive victory the search for the holy grail

7/23/2019 Quick Decisive Victory the Search for the Holy Grail

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/quick-decisive-victory-the-search-for-the-holy-grail 1/57

Quick Decisive Victory:

The Search For The Holy Grail

Monograph

by

Major Marc I. Alderman

Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies

United States

~~ Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

\ Second Term

AY

92-93

Approved for Publlc Release; Dhtrtbullon

Is

Unllmlled



D Number: ADA274047

ubject Categories: MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS

orporate Author: ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH

CHOOLF ADVANCED MIL ITARY STUDIES

tle: Quick Decisive Victory: The Search for the Holy Grail.

escriptive Note: Monograph,

ersonal Authors: Alderman, Marc I.

eport Date: 15 MAY 93

ages: 56 PAGES

onitor Acronym: XA

onitor Series: USACGSC/SAMS

escriptors: *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *MILITARY STRATEGY, *DECISION MAKING,NALYSTS,

ENEFITS, COLD WAR, DOCUMENTS, ENVIRONMENTS, FRANCE, GLOBAL, MODEMS,

OWER,

ISK, VIABILITY, MILITARY FORCE LEVELS, COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, SHORT RANG

IME).

entifiers: Decisive victory, Decisive force, *Quick decisive victory.

bstract: The monograph evaluates the viability of quick decisive victory as a

inciple of U.S. military strategy. Modern concepts of quick decisive victoryrm the cornerstone of present U.S. military strategy. These concepts

iginated from the Weinberger Doctrine, but the principle of decisive force in

e 1992 National Military Strategy Document, now establishes the framework for

uick decisive victory. Today the U.S. military is using quick decisive victory

provide a clear focus while moving from a grand strategy based on a Cold War

obal context to a grand strategy based on a Post-Cold War regional context.

lthough the idea of quick decisive victory has strong support within the

ilitary services some political-military analysts claim ;it too narrowly

fines-the limits of U.S. military power in a monopolar strategic environment.herefore, this monograph examines the suitability of quick decisive victory as

defining element of U.S. military strategy. To accomplish this examination,

e monograph first conducts a historical analysis of two decisive victories:

e Ulm-Austerlitz campaign of 1805; and the 1940 campaign for France. This

alysis identifies the strategic and operational conditions supporting quick

cisive victory. Secondly, the monograph assesses the present strategic

vironment and compares present conditions with the historical analysis.



nally, the monograph evaluates the comparative assessment to determine

ossible benefits and risks for codifying quick decisive victory in U.S.

ilitary strategy.

mitation Code: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

ource Code: 416090



ABSTRACT

The monograph evaluates the viability of quick decisive victory as a

principie of U.S. military strategy. Modem concepts of quick decisive

victory form the cornerstone of present U.S. military strategy. These

concepts originated from the Weinberger Doctrine, but the principle of

decisive force in the

1992

National Miliiry Strategy Document, now

establishes the framework for quick decisive victory. Today the U.S.

military is using quick decisive victory to provide a clear focus while

moving from a grand strategy based on a Cold War global context to a

grand strategy based on a Post-Cold War regional context. Although the

idea of quick decisive victory has strong support withir: the military services

some political-military analvsrs claim it too narrowly definesthe limits of

U military power in a mono-polar strategic environment. Therefore. :his

t~lonographexamines the suitability of quick decisive victory as a defining

element of US. military strategy.

To accomplish this examination, the monograph first conducts a

historical analysis of tw decisive victories: the Ulm-Austerlitz campaign of

1805:

and the

1940

camoaian for France. This analvsis identifies Me

strategic and operatiOnai conditions supporting quick decisive victory.

Secondly, the monograph assesses the oresent strategic environment ana

compares present conditions with the historical analysis. Finally. the

monograph evaluates the comparative assessment to determine possible

benefits and risks for codifying quick decisive victory in U.S. military

strategy.

The monograph concludes that the concepts of quick decisive

victory should remain part of U.S. military strategy. However. U.S. military

strategy must also integrate ideas for employment of limited military force

in operations other than war. and for employment of military force during

protracted conflicts. Incorporating hese concepts will produce a balanced

and viable military strategy.



Page

.

introduction

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II

.

Strategy Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Il l

.

Historical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

iV

Present Conditions

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

V

Comparative Anaiysis

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

VI

Conclusions

. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 43

Endnotes

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

Bibliography

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51



iNTRODUCTlQN

After defeating the rogue barons and uniting all of Britain, King Arthur and

his Knights of the Round Table faced an uncertain future. Peace was at hand.

but

it

was an uneasy peace. The direct conflict against the rebellious barons had

given way

to

a subtle struggle for pow r within King Atthuf's court. The

chivalrous Knights of Cametot were prepared to confront this indirect

subterfuge. As a result, King Arthur searched for a means to provide direction

and continurty for his military organization. Arthur decided that a great quest

would insure that his Knights kept their fighting spirit and commitment to their

code of chivalry. He decided his knights would seek the Holy Grail. The search

for the Holy Grail was undeniably a great and noble quest. Although noble in

intent, the quest for the Grail became an obsession. It took Arthur's Knights on a

perilous journey away from their King and leaving Camelot undefended.

Originally intended to give the knights of Camelot a clear purpose during a time of

peace. the quest for the unattainable ideal led instead to their destruction.

Today, the U.S. military is also in a period of transition. The United States

witnessed the destruction of the evil Soviet Empire and

so

the U.S. military

searches for a new purpose. Now. the clarion call for the U.S. military is quick

decisive victory. Like Arthuts quest for the Holy Grail, the U.S. military seems

grasping at quick decisive victory as a means to provide clear direction during a

period of transition. Quick decisive victory like the quest for the Grail is

undeniably a noble endeavor. Soldiers from the beginning of

recorded

history

have sought quick decisive victories but. like the search for the Holy Grail, it has



been an illusive goal.

Modem concepts of quick decisive victory originated from the Weinberger

Doctrine. During the Reagan Administration, this doctrine became the

cornerstone of U.S. military strategy. The four major tenets of the doctrine

articulated by Casper Weinberger

( Secretaty

of Defense from

1980

until

1987

are:

snly use military force to secure vital national interests

-establish clear and obtainable military objectives

-use ovewnelming force

-ensure the operation has public support

Although

the

'Neinberger Doctrine helped to shape the intervention ~f

U.S.

military in Grenaaa. Panama, and South West Asia, the strategic environment

has since radically changed. The end of the cold war reduced the threat of super

power confrontation, giving the U.S. greater strategic latitude and allows the

U.S.

to use military force more freely. This was reflected by President George Bush's

comments during a speech at the

U.S.

Military Academy where he stated that

military power could be used to secure important rather than only vital interests.

There

IS

also a perception within the military that the extremely low casualty rates

experienced dunng the most recent operations have influenced the expectations

of the American people. The changes n the strategic environment forced the

idea of quick decisive victory to evolve, yet it remains a fowl point of US. military

strategy.:

The

1992

National Military Strategy Document mantfests rhese chanqes to

quick decisive victory within the principle of decisive force. This key document



descnbes the principle of decisive force in the following manner:

Once a decision for military action has been made, half measures

and confused objectives extract a severe price in the form of

protracted conflict which causes needless waste of human lives

material resources. a divided nation at home and defeat.

Therefore, one of the essential elements of our national military

str tegy is the ability to rapidly assemble the forces we

nee

to

win-the concept of applying decisive force to overwhelm our

adversaries and thereby terminate conflicts swiftly with minimum

loss of life.2

The principle of decisive force, therefore, redefines quick decisive victory with the

following conditions:

Glear and attainable m~litary bjectives

-overwhelming force (achieved through rapid power projection)

-swift conflict termination

-minimum loss of life

Although the idea of quick decisive victory has strong support within the

military services, some political analysts are extremely critical. Edward Luttwak

claims mat the model too narrowly defines the limit of military power in a

monopolar strategic environment. Other critics. such as retired Admiral B R

Inman, question the ability of a post-industrial U.S. to maintain the technoiogical

edge to ensure quick. decisive, vict0ry.j The purpose o i his monograph

s

to

explore this question: Should quick decisive victory be a principle of U.S. military

strategy? Or is the U.S. military on a quest for the Holy Grail?

This monograph explores this question by conducting a historical analvsis

of several quick decisive victories. The purpose of the analysis is to identii the

conditions that allow these victories to be quick and decisive. Secondly.

the

monograph assesses the present conditions and compares them with the results

from

the historical analysis.

To conduct the analvsis, a definition of quick decisive victory is also



necessary. Developmg a clear and concise definition of quick decisive vctory is

diicult Neither the National Security Strategy Document, the National Military

Strategy Document. nor any military service doctrines attempt to specifically

define the terms quicknand decisive. For the purposeso this monograph.

Operation

esert

Stom ( the Offensive Campaign of the GulfWar provides the

model for such victory.

OperationDesert Storm

began

in October 1990 when U.S. Central

Command (CENTCOM) initiated the offensive operational campaign planning4.

This planning process produced Operat~onOesert Storm. Desert Storm

concluded six months later after achieving all operational objectives and suffering

less than 700 allied casualties( compared to over 100,000 Iraqi casualtiesf.

Therefore, the model for quick decisive victory is:

a. quick: a campaign executed within six months

b. decisive: the campaign achieved the operational objectives

c. minimum causalities ( when compared to enemy loses)

This model establishes the template for selecting the historical examples and the

strategy process will provide the method for analyzing each example.

o conduct a consistent historical analysis, a standard analytical

framework

is

necessary.

In

this monograph, the strategy process forms the basis

of the historical analysis. This process is the foundation of national security and

has rive sequential elements: identifying national objectives, formulating grand

strategy, developing military strategy, orchestrating operational strategy, and



executina battlefield strategy (or tactics). a

IdenMying national objectives is the first and crucial step in the strategy

process. National objectives drive the strategy process. They form the hub

around which the remaining elements revolve. There are two types of national

objectives: internal and external. External objectives come from a nation s global

posture. Internal objectives come from a nation s political and economic

Level or intensity of interest establishes a priority among the national

objectives. Donald Nuechtertein, in his book, -Over ** explains

these different levels of interest. Nuechterlein states a nation s willingness to

expend resources to secure an objective comes from the intensity of interest

associated with the objective. Nuechterlein identifies four levels of intensity of

interest: survival, vital, major, and peripheral.ll

Objectives with the highest levels of intensity are those involving national

survival.

A

national objective, such as U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence.

guarantees the physical existence of the nation.

s a matter of survival, the US

was willing to expend virtually unlimited quantities of resources to secure

strategic nuclear deterrence. The immense national resources expended to

develop the nuclear Mad (land based missiles, submarine launched missiles, and

bombers) reflect the intensity of interest the U.S. has in securing this objective.

With the end of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear destruction has diminished

yet deterring nuclear attack remains the

U.S.

most important national objective.

Not directly related to national survival, vital interests are critical national

objectives. Vital interests are national objectives involving the risk of serious



harm.

TWO istinctive traits identify vital national interests: (1) the

unwillingness to compromise, whatever the circumstance, and (2) the willingness

to use military force if necessary to protect or secure the objective.13 President

Jimmy Carter identified the unrestricted flow of oil from the Persian Gulf as a v~tal

interest of the U.S.14. An interruption of the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf would

seriously disrupt the U.S. economy and the economies of its major trading

pamers. The effort expended by the U.S. during the Persian Gulf War proved

the intensity of U.S. interest in this region. Major interests are less intense but

effect political, social, or economic well betng for the nation. Peripheral interests

are least important because they do not affect the nation as a whole.15 The

remainder of the strategy process orchestrates the ways and means to protect

and secure national objectives.

National objectives are the points of focus or targets for all subsequent

elements of the pmcess.16 The clearer the target, the e sier it is to hit. Likewise.

the more clearly defined the national objectives, the more coherent the strategy

because it will e easier to relate the means to the ends. This is the purpose of

grand strategy to relate the ends (national objectives) to the ways(methods) and

means(resources) at the national level.

Grand strategy creates the ways and means for attaining or maintaining

national objectives. To accomplish this. grand strategy must develop and

integrate the elements of national power. It also must balance the nations

commitments with the nation s power and resources. Generally, state policies

and doctrines articulate this element of strategy. These policies reflect the level



of national interest and establish the parameters for the application of national

power (political. economic, mPtary. and geographic) with respect to national

objectives. Grand strategy integrates me efforts of the highest levels of

government (diplomatic, economic and military institutions). In relation to these

institutions. italso describes the forms and use of military power. s a result.

grand strategy outlines the context and conditions for using military forces which

in turn establishes the basis for the development of military strategy.

Military strategy coordinates the development, deployment, and

employment of military forces to secure national objectives. The force

development aspects of military strategy focus on force structure, weapon

systems. training, and sustainment. Ideas of force deployment define the

national requirements and capabilities to project military power. The probable

region.and hreat define the methods of employment. However, the critical task

for military strategy. ist coordinate and integrate each subordinate element.18

Establishing broad ideas of force development, deployment, and employment. for

the roles and missions assigned within

the

grand strategy balances military ends,

ways. and means. This is the essence of military strategy.

Operational strategy provides a narrower focus for the employment of

military forces. It is the art and science of designing, organizing, and conducting

campaigns and major operations to secure strategic objectives.lWperationai

Strategy is the critical link between national objectives and the military forces in

battle. The concepts of operational design forge this link by creating the structure

far conducting campaigns. The essentialelements of operational design are:



centers

of

gravity, lines of operation. decisive points, and culminati~n.~hese

concepts form the threads of continuity belween the military ways and means,

and the appmpriate political ends. They establish the threads of continuity by

tying the abstract political ends to physical military objectives. Tracing the

operational concepts will therefore, identify operational conditions leading to

quick, decisive victories; however, further explanation is necessary to use them

as a standard for analysis.

Clausewit2 defined center of gravity as the hub of all power. The source

where the enemy and friendly force draws its respective physical strength.

flexibility, or will to fight. Theoretically. centers of gravity exist at each level of war

(strategic, operational, and tactical). At the operational level, centers of gravity

have a physical nature.

A

national capitol, command and control systems, the

army, an alliance system, or lines of communication are some examples of

opposing centers of gravity.

2 An

effective operational strategy will integrate and

,focus all campaign activities against the enemy's center of gravity while

simultaneously protecting ones own. Therefore, the relative effectiveness of an

operational strategy may largely depend on proper identification of both friendly

and enemy centers of gravity. Lines of operation are the paths that eventually

lead to centers of gravity.

Lines of operation are another important idea of operational design. Lines

of operation

. .

define the directional orientation of the force. The directional

orientation has three dimensions: in time. space, and

in relation to the enemy.

They emanate from the baseof operations thmugh the force to its objectives.



There are two basic schemes for lines of operation. interior and exrerior lines.

Operational strategy employs interior lines when the lines of operation radiate

from a single base of operation but are often divergent. Interior lines facilitate

moving forces laterally within a theater of operation faster than the enemy. This

method supports the rapid shifting of effort and therefore, is advantageous for

smaller or weaker forces. Exterior lines emanate from multiple bases of

operation and converge on the enemy or a single objective. Although exterior

lines require larger forces, they generally promote battles of annihilation. Lines of

operation are the conduits through which operational strategy transmits and

directs the destructive power of tactical elements and supporting operations.

Lines of operation often focus toward decisive points.

Decisive points are physical objectives that provide significant leverage

against the enemy and define the course of a campaign. They are usually

geographic in nature, such as a hill, a town, or a base of operations but could

also include other physical elements such as command posts, a critical boundary,

airspace, or a communication node. = Decisive points are the pressure points

exposing the enemy center of gravlty to.attack by increasing friendly operational

flexibility. Like a catapult, decisive points enhance and accelerate the projection

of combat power against the enemy.

Combat is a destructive process which erodes the physical and moral

strength of an army. The process of erosion drives an army to the point where it

can no longer attack or defend. Therefore, relative combat power between an

attacker and defender creates the basis for the concept of culmination. An



attacking force has culminated when its combat power no longer exceeds the

defending force. At this point the attacking force is vulnerable to counterattack

and risks destruction if

it

presses the attack. A defending force has culminated if,

can no longer counterattack or continue to conduct a credible defense.24

Controlling and adjusting the operational tempo to balance logistical demands

with the conduct of combat opeations is essential to prevent culmination. An

effective operational strategy must consider the finite resources available for the

campaign and the rate of supply. This is necessary for proper resource allocation

which helps drive the enemy force to culmination while preventing one's own.

These operational concepts establish the framework for conducting the

campaign and give substance to the operational strategy. They (within the

strucnim of the campaign) define where and when to fight and

set

conditions for

battle. Battles create the conditions for the next level of the strategy process.

battlefield strategy. Bafflefield strategy or tactics is the art and science of winning

battles. Battles consist of a series of related engagements. Engagements are

short fights between small forces (division or smaller). Battles are larger in

scope; they are of longer duration and en&mpass larger forces. The outcomes

decide the course of campaigns and ultimately decide the success or failure of

the operational strategy. Effective tactics integrate and synchronize maneuver

firepower, protection. and leadership to secure v i~ to r y .~actics direct the

employment of forces on the battlefield. while grand. military, and operational

strategies have chosen the battlefield and allocated forces for the fight.

The strategy process establishes an outline for analyzing the historikl



and contemporary strategic environments and assessing the conditions at each

ievel supporting quick decisive victory. The outline is as follows:

A Identify and evaluate national objectives.

B. Define the grand strategy and evaluate its effectiveness in providing

the appropriate ways, and means to achieve the national objectives.

C

Determine if the

NMS

developed, deployed, and employed an

appmpriate military for e structure.

D

Assess

the effectiveness of the Operational Strategy through campaign

design.

E

Evaluate tactics employed based on allocated resources and force

structure.

This standard method of assessment provides a consistent comparison of the

historical examples and the contemporary strategic environment.

This section of the monograph examines two historical examples of quick

decisive victory and uses the strategy process to identify conditions which made

this form of warfare possible. The two historical examples selected for analyses

are: Napoleon s victory at Ulm-Austeriitz; and Germany s victory in France in

1940. They are amoung the great military victories of modem history. Each of

these examples fits the monograph s definition of quick decisive victory. They

were quick

-

a single campaign completed within six months. Each was decisive

-

the campaign achieved all operational objectives. All were cheap in terms of

human lives

-

the victors took significantly fewer casualties, then their opponents.

Therefore, these are appmpriate examples of quickdecisive victory and suitable

for analysis.

Ulm-Austenitz s a definitive example of quick decisive victory. In one

hundred days. Napoleon s Grand Armee marched from the English Channel to



heart of eastern Europe. In its wake. the Grande

Arrnee

left the fragments of the

Austrian-Russian armies and the desiccated corpse of the Third Coalition. The

events mat resulted in the battles of Ulm-Austerlitz began in the summer of

1

80 Las

During that Summer, the rande Ann. camped along the English

Channel preparing to invade England. Napoleon Bonaparte became Emperor of

France. He also and pronounced himself King of ltaly and assimilated Genoa

into the French Empire.27 These actions regarding ltaly were contrary to the

terms of the Treaty of Luneville and threatened the Ausman Emperor's

aspirations to reestablish dominion over ltaly and southern Bavaria. As a result.

Great Britain seized this opportunity to forge a coalition between Great Britain.

Austria-Hungry, and Russia. This was the third coalition formed to oppose

Napoleon. England, was unable to compete on the continent at this time with

ground forces. but guaranteed financial support to Russia and Austria-Hungry.2g

The conflict began when the Austrian Army split into two major commanas.

One under Arch Duke Charles composed of approximately

96,000

troops and

another under Arch Duke Ferdinand composed of approximately

44.000

troops.

In early September. Charles' army moved south across the Alps to seize Milan

and restore the prestige of Austria; Ferdinand's army moved into Bavaria.

Alexander. the Tsar of Russia mobilized an army of approximately

75.000

and

marched to linkup with Fenlinand in Ba~aria.~' he Austrians and Russians

expected Napoleon to reinforce ltaly (as he did in previous campaign) exposing

the flanks of his army to the combined Austrian and Russian armies.



In August

1805.

Napoleon began to deploy the

Grand e m e

from the

Channel coast to the Rhine River. Karl Mack was Ferdinand s chief of staff and

the *de facto* commander of the Austrian army in Bavaria. Mack was energetic

and

experienced

but failed to comprehend the power and speed of the French

army. Mack did not believe Napoleon could cross the Rhine with more than

70 000

men.

As

a result, Mack moved into Bavaria on

2

September.P

On

17

September Napoleon issued orders to his marshals to move the

Grande

Anne e across the Rhine and march to the Danube. Napoleon

outlined his concept of operat~onn his initial directive to his corps commanders.

he Grande

rmdein September I8 5

Marshal Jean-Baptist ernadette

17 737

I1

Marshal A.F.L.V. Marmont 20 758

Marshal L.N. Davout

17 452

IV

Marshal Nicolas J. Soult 41.358

v

Marshal Jean Lannes

17 788

VI

Marshal Michel Ney

24 409

VII

Marshal

P F

Augereau 14.850

CAV Marshal Joachim Murat

23 415

Guard

Marshal J.B. Bessieres

6 278

Reserve Artillery General E.A.C. Dommartin

5.000

Reserve Corps (Bavarians. Wurttemberaers.

.

76

QQQ

Total

225 045

He framed his intent for his commanders by providing corps mutes of march and

objectives. Davout. Soult, Ney. and Lannes were to marcn through Baden.

Wurtemburg, and Bavaria. Davout was to move his corps to Nora Lingen by

10

October. Soult to Aalen by 9 Octooer, Lannes to Ulm by 9 October, and Ney to

the high ground overlooking Ulm by

7

October. Bernadette and Marimont to

depart Wurzberg and get within a days march of Donauaworth by

9

October.



Mutat was to move acmss the Rhine and conduct a series of demonstrations in

the Black Forest to focus me attention of the Austrians to the east.

By the 19 September, lead elements of the Austrian army enter Ulm (on

the Danube) and Minmengen along the Mu. This placed the Austrian army in

excellent positions to defend against an aftack from the east through the Black

Forest

but

exposed the army's northern flank et Mack ignored this threat

fixating on Murat's demonstration and ordered fortifications built to defend against

an attack from the east.

The

G r a n d e Arme e

cmssed the Rhine North of Ulm with 200.000

soldiers on 26 September. Beween 30 September and

9

October the French

vice continued to tighten around the Austrian army: but. Mack could not tear his

attention from the wily Murat and by 9 October 150,000 French soldiers were

astride the Austrian lines of communication. The Austrians made several

attempts to breakout and avoid capture but on 19 October Mack surrendered his

army to the inevitable. Napoleon wmte to Josephine. I have achieved

my

objective; have destroyed the Austrian Army by sheer marching.

4

For the next five days. Napoleon worked feverishly to refit the G r a n d e

Armge He Was preparing to fight the Russian Army that had been marching to

link up with the Austrians at Ulm. The

G r a n d e nnee

moved against the

Russian army on 26 October 1805. Tsar Alexander nominally commanded the

Russian army, but Kutusov. Alexander's Chief of Staff. was truly in charge.

Kutusov was more cunning then Mack and

refuse

decisive engagement. He

instead fought a series of delaying actions west acmss the tributaries of the



Danube. Through a combination of Kutusov s skillful maneuvers and good

fortune the Russran army slipped from Napoleon s grasp east of Vienna. 5 By the

end of November, the weather was bad, the French soldiers were growing weary,

and the Prussian and southern Austrian army was threatening the flanks of

G r a n d e A rm d e Napoleon needed to destroy the Russian army quickly

before sending

the

French Amy to winter quarters.

To accomplish this, Napoleon developed a brilliant deception to draw the

Russians into a decisive battle. The battlefield he chose was the Praetzen plain

between Brunn and Austerlilz. Through an elaborate deception, Napoleon

convinced the Tsar Alexander that the G r a n d e A r md e Was ripe for conquest.

As

a result, Alexander, against the strong protests of Kutusov. ordered the

Russians to attack the French on the Praetzen plain. where Napoleon laid in wait.

In the resulting battle, Napoleon annihilated the Russian army. 7

Using the strategy process to analyze this conflict, the conditions that

su~ported uick decisive victory at Ulm-Austerlitz become apparent. Napoleon s

(and hence France s) national objectives were clear and vital, accelerating the

military response. The Emperof s grand strategy established policies which

provided for the coordination of political, economic. and military power. France s

national military strategy provided the means. the best army in all Europe.

Through an unsurpassed ability for integrating and applying military ways and

means to achieve national oojectives. Napoleon s operational strategy formea the

foundation for victory. Finaily, the G r a n d e Arm e possessed the tactical

skills to take advantage of the opportunities provided by Napoleon s operational



strategy and won on the bafflefield.

When the Third Coalition moved armies into Italy and Bavaria,

t

threatened the tenitory and soveregnty of France. The threat to France s

physical existence (at least as an Empire).was a clear and present danger to

Napoleon and defined his national strategic objective: the destruction of the Third

Coalition. So.

it

was easy for Napoleon to temporarily abandon his plans to

invade England and focus his military and political power to destroy the alliance

between Austria and Russia. Destroying the Third Coalition also supported

Napoleon s ultimate objective of French domination of Continental Europe.

Napoleon s grand strategy balanced on two pillars of French policy. The

first

was Po secure a defensible eastern border for the French Empire and the

second was to eliminate

ail

threats to French Continental hegemony. The

Ulrn-Austerlitz campaign supported both these objectives. In accordance with his

grand strategy, Napoleon strove to politically isolate the Third Coalition from the

other Continental powers (specifically Prussia and Bavaria) and then destroy it.

He moved rapidly in both directions. Napoleon sent emissaries to secure

Prussian neutrality by providing assurances of Napoleon s respect for Prussian

sovereignty and offering the state Hanover to sweeten the bargain. These

political actions successfully neutralized Prussia and negated Prussian previous

commitments to support Austria by blocking French troop movements through

Prussia. Simultaneously. Napoieon secured the support of the Prince of Bavana

which resulted in the Bavarian

and

French armies linking-up in Wuaberg. 4 He

then began the deployment of the

rande

Arme e from the English Channel to



the Rhme River.

The G r a n d e A r m d e was the fullest expression of France s nat~onal

mllitary strategy. Initially organized to fulfill and protect the dream of the French

Revolution, the G r a n d e g became the means to achieve continental

hegemony. Inspired by unbridled nationalism France instituted national

conscription allowing the development of an army of over

400.000

by 1805 42

Napoleon s army inherited a corps organuational structure which became

the standard for European m~litary ystems. The corps organizational structure

gave the

G r a n d e A r m d e

unmatched flexib~lity nd reacn. The corps structure

simplified the rapid deployment of 200,000 French soldiers from the Atlantic coast

across the Rhine prqecting an overwhelming force agamst the Austrians.

43

It

also provided an effective means of employment Corps organizations allowed

the Napoleon and his Marshals greater flexibility n shaptng the battlefield

because French corps could move and fight independently. Although Napoleon

attempted to create a French navy to contest British dominion of the seas, the

G ra nd e A m d e Was the definitive element of Napoleon s national m~litary

strategy.

The political isolation of the Third Coalition from Prussia and Bavaria and

the deployment of the Gr an de Anae e prov~dedhe resources for Napoleon to

fashion his operational strategy. Destroy~nghe Third Coalition was the nat~onai

objective. To eliminate this alliance. Napoleon aecided to destroy Ferdinand s

and Alexander s armies. The destruction of these armies would expose Vienna

to French occupation and force Austria to make a separate peace and thus break



Me C~al i t ion .~ and Alexanaefs armtes were thea result. Ferd~nand

operational objectives and operational centers of grav~ty. Napoleon designed his

campaign with the operational objective destroying the northem Austnan and

Russian armies. 5

Initially operating on exterior lines. the rande

Amge

converged on

the decisive point- Ulm. Fixing the Austrians in place through Murat s

demonstrations. Napoleon executed an operational envelopment of the Austrian

army cutting its lines of communication.

6

This simultaneously gave Napoleon

central position with respect to the Austrian and approaching Russtan army and

therefore setting the in~tial onditions for the next battle wtth the Russtans.

Totally cut off. Mack surrendered the Austrian army at Ulm. The quick vtctory

over the Austrians resulted in few casualties and gave the rande Arm e an

opportunity to refit and rearm. This operational pause staved off culmination.

Napoleon then turned on the Russians, but they slipped away north of Vienna.

Bad weather reduced available supplies and increased the difficulty of

conducting offensive operations. Napoleon had to quickly fight a decisive oattle

with the Russian army. He tdentfied the next decis~ve oint, the Praetzen Plain

and lured the Russian army there to destroy it. 7

A brilliant deception drew the Russian army to the Praetzen badlefieid east

of Austeriitz. Napoleon chose this terrain because it was shaped like a funnel,

with the Olmutr Road (in he north) at the top of the funnel, a flat plateau necked

down from north to south by the Goldbach Brook on the west, and a senes of

large ponds on the south east. The town of Praetzen was almost dead center in



the funnel. Napoieon s initial dispositions exposed his southern flank (the spout

of the funnel) to the Russians. Kutusov identified this vulnerability and took the

bait. At

0630

on 2 December Kutusov moved almost half his army against the

French southern flank. down the spout of the funnel. The Russians (with

34,000

troops) marched right into Napoleon s trap. Before the Russians could exploit the

exposed flank. Napoleon moved Davours Corps

(12,000 troops) into strong

defensive positions along Goldbach Brook, effectively putting a stopper in the

spout of the funnel. For several hours the Russians hurled themselves against

Davout s Corps. The Russians inflicted heavy losses on Davout s corps but. the

French held their positions. At approximately0900, Napoleon launched his

counterattack with Soult s Corps augmented with another division. Soult (with

19.000 troops) attacked through the town of Praetzen (middle of the funnel)

hitting most of the Russian army over 50,000 troops) in the flank and rear. The

Russian army shattered and attempted to retreat across the frozen Satschan

Pond. French artillery fire on the ice causing the ice to break under the feet of

the fleeing Russian soldiers. Effective tactical employment of the rande

Armeie

at Austerlb destroyed the Russian army and sealed the fate of the

Third Coalition.

Austeriitz was an excellent example of the

use

of tactical envelopment.

Tactical envelopment Was the hallmark of the

G r a n d e A nn d e

The

G r a n d e

Armde

was adept at attaininga positional advantage through maneuver.

Usually. the French would use a corps to ix the enemy, then maneuver one or

two other corps against the enemy s flanks and rear. These tactics facilitated



battles of destruction but required good reconnaissance to find the enemy flanks

and greater mobility to exploit the advantage. At Austerliiz. however. Napoleon

demonstrated the ability to create an exposed enemy flank through tactical

deception.

After analyzing Napoleon s strategy process. the conditions that shaped

Napoleon s success become visible. The Third Coalition threatened the physical

existence of the French Empire making priorifization of effort and allocation of

resources easy. The centralization of politicai and military power in the Emperor

eased the redirection and integration of France s grand strategy. As a resuit.

Napoleon quickly identified a clear strategic objective. the destruction of the Third

Coalition. He then integrated the application of diplomacy and military power to

isolate and crush the Coalition. Napoleon was fortunate to inherit the national

military strategy that produced the

G r a nd e A m d e

Universal conscription

and the carps structure allowed the development, deployment, and employment

of the best army in Europe. The

G r a n d e A r m d e

let Napoleon strategically

project military power throughout central Europe and concurrently provided

superior operational and

tactiil

flexibility.

Napoleon s operational and tactical strategies at Ulm-Austerliiz were near

flawless. He ~ t h l e s ~ l yocused on the destruction of the Austrian and Russian

armies and used both operational and tactical deceptions to achieve surprise.

The Emperor created an operational design that was strong yet flexible. He used

exterior lines to concentrate combat power near Ulm to destroy the Austrian

army. This concentration simuitaneouslv provided the the

G r a n d e A m 4 e

a



central position with respect to the Russian Army. This gave Napoleon the

flexibility of interior lines with respect to the approaching Russian army. When

the Russians were denying Napoleon a climatic battle, he created a decisive poinr

and lured the Russian army there through

an

operational deception. Once the

battle began. Napoleon used a tactical deception to position the Russian army for

annihilation.

One hundred and thirty-five years later, in the spring of 1940, the German

Army forged a quick decisive victory of monumental proportions. In ust six

weeks, the German Army destroyed the combined Allied armies and with them

the French-British Alliance. At 0535 on 10 May. the German Army again crossed

the borders of Belgium and Holland to conquer France. Within ten days German

tanks reached the Channel Coast at Noyelles (at the mouth of the Sornme). The

German army's sichelschnitt (or sickle cut) enveloped the best of the Allied

ground forces. the entire British Expeditionary Force and two French Armies (1st

and 9th). This forced the evacuation of over 450,000 British and French troops

from the beaches at Dunkirk and left France alone to face the German

juggernaut. By

22

June. with his armies fleeing the unrelenting German advance.

Marshal Petain (France's hero of World War I surrendered France to German

occupation and subjugation.

The seeds of the German invasion of France sprouted in Poland in

September 1939. Germany's invasion of Poland was the rirnit of Allied tolerance

of German aggression. On 3 September, the Allies declared war on Germany.

After the rapid destruction of Polish resistance Hitlets attention immediately



turned toward the west. havlng secured Germany's eastern flank w~th

Nonaggression Treaty wtth the Soviet Union. While the Allied armies on the

French border fought a phony war, Hitler and the German GeneralStaff planned

the invasion of France for 12Novemoer

1939.

Bad weather and a reluctant

German General Staff repeatedly delayed the offensive. j However. by May

1940, Hitter's Generals and his army were ready and poised to attack France.

The key to German preparations was the campaign plan that evolved between

Hitler. and his Generals. The result of the evolutionary process was a bold

campaign plan that integrated operational deception, surprise. and a deep

concentrated armored thrust to penetrate and then envelop Allied Forces. J

Examining the 1940 Campaign in France through the strategy process will

idenMy the situational circumstances that produced a quick decisive victory for

the German Army. By 1940, Hitler controlled the destiny of Germany and

therefore his objectives became German national obj-ves. Hitter outlined his

objectives for Germany in Mein Kampf, which he wrote while in prison. In his

book, Hitter described his idea of German domination over Europe and eventually

the world. His ultimate goal was to unite all Germanic peoples under the Third

Reich and to carve out sufficient Lebensraum (living space) to ensure economic

and physical security.

5

Four national objectives framed Hitlefs strategic vision. He wanted to ( 1

regain German territory lost after World War

1

(2) assimilate all German~c

peoples. and 31seize living space in eastern Europe. These objectives were

heavily contingent on Hitler's fourth and most important objective. military



rearmament. To accomplish these objectives. Hitler mobilized the

economic.

political and military power of Germany. Economically, Hitler's policies forced the

nationalization of key industries.

j

Diplomatically, he furthered

his

expansionist

objectives whenever possible through false promises and commitments. As

Napoleon (with a Nonaggression Treaty) neutralized Prussia before attacking the

Austrians. Hitler neutralized Me Soviet Union before attacking France

.

The key

element of Hitler's grand strategy, however, was restoring Germany's military

power, because Hitler intended to carve out Germany's Lebensraum through

rnilitaty conquest.

The national military strategy supported the German conquest of Europe.

by developing. deploying, and employing air and land forces to fight ground

campaigns on the Continent. Because of Germany's limited strategic reserves,

the campaigns had to be quick and decisive. This forced the German military to

develop a form of warfare known ever since as Blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg combined

armor, aircraft, and infantry ~nto n integrated military instfument which could

sustain a rapid operational tempo. The German national military strategy

accomplished this through the orchestration of technology with force structure,

weapon systems, doctrine, and training.

7

The German Luftwaffe

(Air

Force) developed prmanly to support ground

forces through interdiction and close air support. As a result, the Luftwaffe

employed territori lly based commands composed of bombers, dive oombers.

fighters. rransports, and reconnaissance aircraft. This manner of employment

provided flexible and responsive support to German Army Groups. 9



The cornerstone of German national military strategy was tne German

Army. The heart of the German Army was the Panzer corps. These were large

combined arms mechanized formations capable of independent operations.

Panrer divisions were the building blocks for the Panzer corps.

It

too

was a

combined arms armored formation. Each Panzer corps also had a squadron of

tuka

dive bombers in

d i i t

support. Stukas supported deep armored thrusts

beyond artillery range. It was this force structure that gave the German

Army

its

decisive edge during the French Campaign of

1940.

9

The strategic objective of this campaign was to destroy the alliance

between France and Britain and conquer and subjugate France. These were

ambitious objectives considering relative force ratios. Both the Allied including

Belgium and Dutch forces) and German armies had roughly the same numbers of

divisions 136). The French, however, learned the wrong lessons from World

War

I

Convinced that the linear defense was the strongest form of war, the

Allies neglected the development of armored forces. In

1940

the Allies had only

three armored divisions and one independent armored brigade and these units

lacked proper communications equipment. To further reinforce the defense. the

Allies distributed many of their tanks to their infantry divisions. Even though the

Allies had better tanks bigger guns and thicker armor). they could not employ

coherent armored organizations. Air power was the only distinct German

advantage. In terms of aircraft, the Germans had a ten to one numerical

superiority in bombers and a six to one numerical superiority in close air support

aircraft dive bombers).M Accordingly, in terms of relative combat power, the



aspiring. It sought to . . . force a decision by land, through the destruction of

the Allied armles in France. To accomplish this, Manstein developed a bold

scheme of maneuver. ife placed the main effort in the center through the rugged

Ardennes Forest French Marshal Petain declared the Ardennes impassable and

so. the French left me area lightly defended. Additionally, an effective deception

fixed the Allied forces along the Belgium frontier. German deep operations

(airborne assaults and air strikes) in the low countries convinced the Allied High

Command. the main attack was coming through Holland and Belgium. Through

this deception and the unexpected location of the main attack, the German's

achieved oth strategic and operational surprise. 3

Unprepared for an armored assault, the French defenses in the Ardennes

quickly buckled and German Panzer columns catapulted across the Meuse at

Sedan. To execute the rapid penetration and envelopment, the German General

Staff

fashioned an armored spear to thrust through Sedan to the coast. Seven of

the ten available Panzer divisions, organized into two Panzer Corps under a

Panzer Group headquarters formed the armored spear which drove to the heart

of France. Strategic and operational surprise combined with an operational

penetration and envelopment established the conditions for the destruction of the

Allied armies in nomtem France.

The operational concept directed an attack by three Army groups. Army

Group B with

29

divisions (including one Panzer Corps with three Panzer

Divisions) and Army Group C with

19

divisions conducted supporting attacks in

the north and south respectively. Army Group B attacked through Holland into



Belgium. Its mission was to press the attack vigorously and

fix

Allied forces

defending along the Belgium frontier and deceive the enemy of location of the

main effort Army Group C was to attack the Maginot tine and fix the French

Second and Third Armies. The Army Group A, with 45 divisions (including seven

armor divisions) was the main effort. Its mission was to attack in the center

through the Ardennes Forest cross the Meuse River. penetrate the French Ninth

Army defenses at Sedan, drive to the mouth of the Somme, and then envelop

the Allied armies from the south.

Guderian's Panzer Corps arrived on the Meuse and occupied Sedan on12

May. By 16 May, Guderian's Corps broke through the French defenses and was

driving east. The surprise and speed of the attack created such psychological

trauma within the Allied command that it never recovered. When the situation

was fully explained to French Foreign Minister Ed'ouard Daladier. he exclaimed:

. . it means the French Army is destroyed. 6 After the penetration. the Panzer

columns drove west to mouth of the Somme and then turned north to complete

the envelopment of the northern Allied armies.

The army groups operated on exterior lines which facilitated the

convergence of combat power on the Allied armies. There were three decisive

po~ntsn this campaign: Sedan, Noyelles-Aberville, and Dunkirk. Sedan was

decisive because it was the German Army's gateway to the intenor of France.

The seizing

of Noyeiles and Abenrille was decisive becauseit div~aedhe Allied

forces and secured the flank of Army Group A on the English Channel. Dunkirk

was a lost opportunity for the German Army. If Hitler had not sto~pedhe



German Panzen on

22

May, the Allied Armies wouid have been cutoff from the

channel ports. This would have kept 300.000 British soldiers fmm escaping and

may have knocked Great Britain out of the war. But, the fear of culmination and

over extension sapped Hitter s will.

8

In this campaign that the Wermacht s higher operational tempos

paradoxically reduced the potential of culmination. The higher operational

tempos of the German Panzer units prevented the Allies from concentrating

against them. This reduced German attrition (casualties) and conserved combat

power.

The German s destruction of the nowern Allied forces did cause the

culmination of the Allied defense of France. After Dunkirk the French were

neither physically nor psychologically able to launch a major counteroffensive.

Physically, the French had no reserves to conduct a counteroffensive but, more

importantly even the French High Command succumbed to defeatism. By 24

May, even General Maxime Weygand. French Commander in Chief, believed the

war was lost.

German tactics focused on the ability to rapidly concentrate combat power

through the employment of combined arms formations. Guderian s attack on

Sedan was an excellent example of German tactical finesse. During this battle.

Guderian s motorized infantry and sapper (engineer) units made an assauit

crossing of the Meuse with supporting close air and anillery fires. The infantry

secured crossing sites and reduced the French initial defensive belts. Guderian

then threw several tank brigades across the river. The tanks attacked into the

depths of the French defense (with tactical air elements providing fire support).



Simultaneously, the infantry continued to expand the bridgeheaos while German

artillery defeated French counterattacks. These synchronized attacks quickly

ovewhelmed the French defenses and Guderian s Corps achieved an

operational penetration.

s

Fmm the analysis of Hitler s strategy process, the elements that produced

the German victory in 1940present themselves. Hitter s national objectives

demanded a grand strategy that closely integrated offensive political and military

policies. In retrospect. Hitter had difficulty matching his national objectives

(Germany s dominion over all of Europe) with Germany s strategic means.

Germany lacked large quantities of many strategic materials such as oil and

iron-ore limiting production. Germany was just emerging from the postwar

depression, which made Hitler reluctant to fully mobilize the population, economy,

and industry for another war (Germany economy and industries were not fully

mobilized until late 19421. Germany s tack of strategic depth forced Hitler to

develop a grand strategy that was very opportunistic. He initially attempted to

attain national objectives through diplomatic subterfuge and coerclon whenever

possible. If diplomacy failed, or when the opportunity occurred. Hitler called on

the German military to secure the objective quickly by force.

7

These integrated offensive political and military policies provided the

foundation for Germany s victory in 1940. The Allies declaration of war in

September 1939 posed an immediate and direct threat to Hitter and the Third

Reich. Anticipating this response to the invasion of Poland, Hitler politically

isolated the Allies and secured Germany s eastern flank by signing a



Nonaggression Pact with the Soviets in August. This allowed Hitler

to

focus all of

Germany's military might against France. Germany's strategic posture also

benefited from the Allies' defensive strategy and doctrine. The Allied defensive

posture allowed Germany to turn and face this western threat unhindered.

Without interference from the Allies. Germany was able to refit and redeploy the

military forces in Poland and mobilize, equip, and train additional divisions. Most

importantly, however, it gave Hitler and his generals time to clearly identify the

strategic objective. the destruction of the Alliance and the occupation of France.

Hiller's opportunistic grand srrategy developed a very responsive and

offensively based military strategy. Germany's limited strategic depth demanded

quick decisive victories. The integration of these policy requirements

produ ed

Blitzkrieg or lightining war . As the vantage point of German national military

strategy. Blitzkrieg developed combined land and air forces to conduct sudden

military offensives. German Panzer corps were the physical fulfillment of this

concept. The German's military strategy orchestrated the development of force

structure, doctrine, and training with technology producing an effective combined

arms organization. the Panzer Corps. These organizations in tum gave the

German Army the ability to synchronize the effects of infantry, armor, artillery.

engineers, and close air support. This level of synchronization allowed the

Germans to quickly overwnelm numerically superior forces. Bliizkrieg proved

very successful in France, because France lacked the operational depth to

absorb the lightning thrusts of the German Panzer Corps.

The brilliance of the German operational and tacticai strategies of 1940



was how effectwely they focused the German military strengths agatnsr Allied

weaknesses. The Allies lacked operational depth both

physic lly

and

conceptually. Physical depth was lost when the Allies identified the wrong

location of the German main effort. was further reduced when Holland and

Belgium attempted to remain neutral, forcing the Allies to remain on the Belgium

frontier until the invasion began. Conceptually. the Allies lacked operational

depth because of their strict adherence to a forward linear defense. The Allies

were

so

dedicated to the concepts of forward defense, they failed to constitute

any operational or strategic reserves. As a result, Germany s unexpected

armored penetration at Sedan burst the Allied defense like a pin through a

balloon.

alf century later, on the Arabian Peninsula the evolution of combined

arms reached another level of synchronization, the conduct of joint warfare. Joint

warfare integrated the application of military power of separate military services:

army, air force, navy and marine. The key organization for executing this form of

warfare was a unified command. This command orchestrated the employment of

military force at the operational level throughout the dimensions conflict: land,

sea. air, and even space. The United States quick decisive victory in the Gulf

iNar reflected this new level of synchronization for military power, joint

operations.

7

The roots of the conflict emerged from an imaalance of military and



economic power on the Arabian Pennsula. In 1989. Iraq s economy was

staggering under the burden of a large national debt incurred from the protracted

war with Iran and a subsequent military build-up. By

1990

lraq could no longer

even

pay

the intemst on its foreign loans. lraqi President Saddam Hussein s

solution was to invade and occupy Iraq s oil-rich neighbor. Kuwa~t.

On

17

July

1990

Hussein

accused

Kuwait of cheating

l r q

out of billions of

dollars of oil revenues and demands reparations. lraq began massing several

armored divisions on the Kuwaiti border. Kuwait agreed to negotiate with lraq

over the reparations. The negotiations began 1August, but at

1

AM August

(Kuwaiti time), lraq mvaded Kuwait. Within

18

hours, lraqi forces secured Kuwart

City and the Kuwaiti Government had fled to Saudi Arabia. On

6

August. 11 lraqi

divisions were in Kuwait consolidating along the Saudi border. Also on

6

August

the first U.S. military forces deployed to Saudi Arabia. 7

Although the U S was a member of

a

twenty-six-nation coalition organized

to fight lraqi aggression, the

U S

played the dominant role in forging the victory.

The U.S. established the strategic objectives, developed the coalition, provided

most of the military forces, and designed the operational strategy. President

George Bush moved quickly to isolate lraq politically. Through his leadership.

international consensus solidified against Hussein. The result was a 6 nation

coalition willing to directly confront lraq. President Bush also energized the

United Nations wnich passed several resolutions. The resolutions demanded the

withdrawal of lraqi forces from Kuwait and established a trade embargo. 75

These actions established the political conditions necessary for the

U.S.

to



employ military force. Military force was used against lraq in two major

campaigns: Desert Storm. and Desert Shield. The defensive campaign (Desert

Shield) lasted fmm 2 August 1990 until 17 January 1991. Its purpose was to

deter further lraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia, show the resolve of the

coalition. and set the conditions for an offensive campaign (if required). On 29

November, the U.N. authorized the use of force to compel Iraq s withdrawal,

if

lraq did not leave Kuwait by 15 January 1991. By

17

January 1991, the U.S.

and other members of the coalition had exhausted all diplomatic efforts to prevent

a conflict.

7

The U.S., in conjunction with its coalition partners decided to

execute the offensive campaign to drive lraq out of Kuwait.

Again, as in the previous historical examples, surprise and deception were

key elements of the operational design. At 0250 on 17 January. the U.S. led

coalition initiated Desert Storm with a surprise air attack against lraqi air defense

assets and other critical targets. Surprise was achieved thmugh the use of

advanced stealth technology. The first waves of aircraft into lraq were F-117

stealth fighters which traveled to their targets undetected. These attacks were

also supported by Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles launched

from

U.S. Navy

ships in the Gulf. Continuous follow -on attacks against lraq were made by U.S.

and coalition fighters for the next 31 days. The combination of the sophisticated

U.S. aircraft and precision guided munitions quickly eliminated lraqi air defense

capabilities, and national command. command communications and control

structures. After securing air supremacy, and severing lines of communicarion,

the air operation concentrated on attriting lraqi forces in Kuwait.



On 23 February. ground operations began. Coaiition forces fixed enemy

units in Kuwait with an amphibious deception and a supporting attack aiong the

coast. Simultaneously, two U.S. Corps (XVlllth and Vllth) enveloped the lraqi

forces

from

the west and completed their desbuction. The focus of the

envelopment was the elite Republican Guard Divisions. the backbone of the lraqi

Amy

In just

100

hours, the U.S. military decimated the lraqi Army, fourth largest

.army in the world, and restored the legitimate government of Kuwait. For the

moment, U.S. interests in SWA were secure.

8

Although involved in the region since World War II. the U.S. never clearly

defined its policy in Persian Gulf until

1979.

In

1979,

President Jimmy Carter

identified the unrestricted flow of oil from the Penian Gulf as vital to the interests

o the U.S.. This became known as the Carter Do~trine. ~~he economies of

the U.S. and the U.S.'s major trading partners are heavily dependent on otl as a

source of energy. The Persian Gulf contains roughly 75 percent of the world's oil

reserves. Western Europe and Japan receive

80

to 90 percent of their oil from

the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the economy of the US. would experience senous

harm if the flow of oil

from

the gulf regton was cutoff. Although, many believed

the U.S. also had a moral obligation to turn back lraqi aggresston, the U.S. vital

national Interest was to Insure the untnterrupted flow of ad from Southwest Asia

(SWA). By seizing Kuwait. Saddam liussein controlled almost 50 percent of the

wond's known reserves. This was

too

much power to leave n the nands

of

someone as unstable as Saddam Hussein. Pursuant to U.S. national interests.



Pres~dentGeorge Bush established these straregic objectives on 5 August)

following the lraqi invasion of Kuwait:

8

Immediate and complete withdrawal of lraqi forces from Kuwait

Restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti Government

Security and Stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf

Safety and protection of lives of American citizens abroad

The Persian Gulf, however, did not always inspire this level of U.S.

concern but. an increasing global dependency on oil imports and the end of the

Cold War pushed this region near the top of US. national interests. Previously,

U.S. grand strategy focused almost exclusively on the containment o

communism. Secretary of State Dean Acheson first fully articulated this grand

strategy in a paper for the National Security Council NSC-68) in

1949.

However.

the U.S. did not adopt this strategy until 1951. NSC-68 identified the spread of

communism as a threat to the survival of the U.S. and outlined economic, political

and military policies to prevent the Soviet Union from exporting Marxist-Leninism.

The diplomatic effom included the development of alliances modeled after the

North Atlantic Treaty organization. also included an increase in foreign aide

and military sales to threatened nations. The keystone of the policy: however.

was the rearming of the US. to directly confront communist aggression. This

policy resulted in an unprecedented peacetime buildup of US. military power and

set the foundation of U.S. National Military Strategy for the next forty years.g1

During the cold war. U.S. military strategy had two major components: a

nuclear component. and a conventional component. The strategic nuclear

strategy balanced on an idea of mutual assured destruction MAD). This strategy

developed. deployed, and employed the strategic nuclear triad. The triad was a



system based on: strategic bombers. land based intercontinental ballistic

missiles, and submarine launched ballistic missiles. The operational concept was

to deter a nuclear attack by insuring a massive retaliatory capability even in the

event of a first or preemptive nuclear strike from the Soviet Union. Any single

part of the

triad

could destroy the Soviet Union (hence MAD). MAD made

strategic nuclear conffict unthinkable.82

The second major part of the U.S. Cold War military strategy was the

conventional component. It developed and deployed conventional

U

forces to

deter and

if

requtred fight a global conventional conflict w~thhe Soviets. To plan

and conduct integrated land, naval, and air operations rhroughout the world, the

National Security Act of 1947 created joint regional organizational structures.

These joint organizations were called Unified Combatant Commands. Un~fied

Commands synchronized the unique capabilities of each service creating a

synergistic effect at the tactical, operational. and strategic level of war. The

synergistic effects would overload the enemy's command and operational

functions; thereby, exposing enemy vulnerabilities and reducing enemy freedom

of action. As these Unified Command structures matured. they became the

conduits for projecting U.S. military power and the nucleus for the development of

military force structure. operational strategy. doctrine and train~ng.

Another key concept of

U.S.

military strategy was to have quality rather

than quantity. Although global in

scope,

the conventional strategy pnmarilv

focused on fighting the Warsaw Pact in Europe. Force structure. weapon

systems, training, and doctrine were also influenced by the Europe-first



philosophy of the cold war. U.S. military forces were never able to match the

Warsaw Pact forces one for one, so the U.S. military strategy attempted to

achieve superiority by combining technology with intelligent and motivated mtlitary

personnel. This philosophy produced a relatively small but very technically

advanced, highly trained. all volunteer military.

Revolution

in

Afghanistan and the fall of the Shah of Iran mitigated the

predilection with a Europe first strategy. In response to these events the U.S.

organized the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (in

1981)

to handle a Soviet

incursion into SWA. but the RDJTF was inadequate. To meet ever increastng

regional security requirements, the Department of Defense established a unified

regional command: U.S. Central Command or CENTCOM

in

1982.

Geographically, the new command centered on the Arabian Peninsula and

crucial fingers of water along its side: The Arabian Gulf: the gulf of Aden: and the

Red Sea. But. .[also included] Egypt, the Sudan, the Horn of Africa,

Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This Unified Command structure encouraged

continuous regional planning. War planning initially focused on blocking a Soviet

incursion. but by

1989

had correctly identified Iraq as the major regional threat.

As

a result, ENT OM planners had the framework for Desert Shield and Desert

Storm in June 1990. ffi

Detailed development of the Desert Storm campaign plan began in

October.

1990.

The key elements that established the strategic framework for

the offensive were the diplomatic efforts to build the coalition and the deployment

of an additional U.S. corps (Vllth Corps). This gave the U.S. and coalition military



forces significantly greater freedom of actionwhile reducing the Iraqis'. Vllth U S

Corps closed in theater in January establishing the necessary conditions to

execute Desert Storm. The objective of the coalitions operational strategy was to

destroy the lraqi forces in Kuwait. To achieve this objective, the Desert Storm

campaign plan integrated simultaneous and sequential combined operations.

Desert Storm had three ma or combined operations. There was the continued

naval blockade of lraqi ports. the independent air offensive. and then the ground

offensive. The intent was to continue Iraq's strategic isolation with the naval

blockade: isolate and attrit the lraqi Forces in Kuwait through air operations and

then complete their destruction with a ground offensive.

The naval blockade reduced Iraq's access to strategic materials,

munitions. and repair parts pushing lraqi forces in Kuwait toward culmination.

Independent

air

operations lasted

31

days. These air attacks initially focused on

attacking the designated strategic centers of gravity, the lraqi: national command

and control facilities, nuclear-chemical production facilities. and lines of

communication with the lraqi forces in Kuwait. Initially

US.

air forces conducted

joint offensive counterair strikes to destroy lraqi Air Defence

(AD)

systems.

Neutralization of lraqi AD was a decisive point because it gave coalition forces

control of the air space over Iraq. Coalition control of lraqi air space totally

exposed the lraqi centers of gravity to air operations. The final portions of this

operation were the direct attacks against lraqi ground forces. lraqi RepuDiican

Guard Forces (Identified as the operational center of gravity by CENTCOM)

became the primary target, followed by attacks on forward defensive un~ts.The



combined naval and air campaigns prepared the lraqis for the decisive blow. On

7

February, the ground offensive began. Operating on exterior lines. the

coalition forces fixed, then enveloped Me lraqi army.

8

To establish the exterior lines of operation to envelop the lraqi forces, the

U.S. Third Army organized a series of logistic bases extending 300 miles west of

Dhahran. Extending the logistical support, facilitated the distribution of the bases

of operation which subsequently supported converging lines of operation. These

logistical bases also supported an accelerated operational tempo. With their

objective the elite lraqi Republican Guard Divisions the operational center of

gravity) the enveloping U.S. corps attacked 300 miles in less than

5 days. The

combination of Me speed of the envelopment with the success of the fixing attack

and amphibious deception completely surprised the Iraqis. The U.S.

envelopment of the lraqi army caused a similar level of psychological paralysis as

did the German breakthroughat Sedan caused within the Allied army in 1940.

At

0800. 8 February the cease went into effect. Four of the eight lraqi Republican

Guard Divisions were completely destroyed, as were 30 to 40 lraqi infantry and

mechanized divisions. Coalition casualties totaled less than a single battalion.

Remnants of remaining lraqi units fled north to Basra. In 100 hours of ground

combat. the US. led military coalition liberated Kuwait.

8

Throughout the campaign, the combined effects of advanced technology,

sound doctrine, rigorous training, and high quality personnel provided U.S. forces

a distinct tactical advantage. U.S. mililitary force structure, training, and

equipment resulted from U.S. military strategy. Therefore, U.S. tactical



supenority was directly attributable to the effectiveness of U.S. military strategy.

The Battte of Medina Ridge clearly demonstrated the level of U tactical

superiority created by US. military strategy. Two major engagements occurred

during this battle which began when 2nd Brigade.

st

Armored Division 2AD)

encountered the 2nd Brigade of the lraqi Medina Division Republican Guard).

Although

it

was foggy, US. M lA l tanks wit thermal sights were able to identify

lraqi T-72 tanks at

4000

meters and engage them at

3600

meters. Effective

range of lraqi tanks was 1800 meters. Within in forty minutes, the 2nd Brigade,

2AD

annthilated the 2nd Brigade of the Medina. 2AD quickly launchea a pursutt

wtth elements of its Attack Helicopter Battalion AHB). company of AH-61

Apache Helicopters cutoff and destmyed the remainder of the Medina Divbon.

Two hours after meeting 2AD, me Medina ceased to exist. This level of tactlcal

ability also prevailed within the other dimensions of conflict: air, sea, and space.

raq was unable to contestUS. supremacy in space for intelligence,

communication. and navigation) or on the sea. In the air, the lraqi Air Force fled

to Iran rather then face US. fighters. In the final assessment the US. victory in

the Gulf resulted from an effective military strategy that developed. deployed. and

employed consistently superior military organizations.

he conditions established for quick, decisive, victory in

U.S.

National

Military Strategy compare well with situational conditions in the preceding

historical examples. In all three cases there were clear military objectives.

For



the Germans in 1940. however. this clarity came only after several months of

heated debate between Hitler and his generals. Clear objectives facilitate unity of

effort at every level war: strategic, operational, and tactical and are essential for

designing effective campaigns. The struggle between Hitler and his generals

highlights the responsibility of senior military leadership in assisting the civilian

political leadership in identifying and selecting appropriate military objectives.

Arh culating the need for clear military objectives in U.S. military strategy codifies

this responsibility for U.S. senior military leaders.

The idea of attainability and overwhelming force get more abstract..

Attainability and overwhelming force are both functions of ways (methodology)

and means (resources).

ll the examples suggest. that both a superior means

and superior ways were necessary for quick decisive victory.

The historical analysis indicates achieving quick decisive victory was

dependent on the effectiveness of a nation s military strategy in developing an

asymmetrical military capability (means)-relative o the threat. The superior

organizational sttuctures of the

G r a n d e A17ne e.

the German Panzer corps,

and the

U.S.

Unified Commands allowed these respective military systems to

conduct new forms of warfare that were beyond the capability of their enemies.

In 1805 the unitary armies of the Austrians and Russians could not match the

speed and power generated by the corps of the

Gr a n d e A rmge

Likewise the

French Army of 1940. steeped in static defensive doctrine could not cope with the

rapid mechanized warfare waged by the German Panzer corps. The U.S. victory

in the Gulf also reflects this pattern. The Iraqis military forces were extremely



vulnerable to U.S. CENTCOM s capability to plan and conduct sequential and

simultaneous joint operations. This vulnerability exposed Iraq to ever increasing

levels of destruction.

A superior methodology was also a critical element of the quick decisive

victories. To realize the full potential of the asymmetrical means, required a very

effective operational strategy. This was refle ted in the execution of each

campaign plan. The encirclement of the Austrian army at Ulm. the German

penetration at the Ardennes, and the U.S. envelopment of the Iraqi Republican

Guard, all demonstrated the synergistic effects of combining superior capability

and superior methodology.

These campaigns also reflect a direct relationship between a high

operational tempo and swift conflict termination with minimum casualties. It

appears, when a high operational tempo combines with surprise (eased by

deception) the synergistic effect results in psychological paralysis of enemy

command and control elements. This condition degrades the enemy s ability to

concentrate combat power and accelerates moral collapse. These combined

effects produce quicker victories and fewer casualties.

The critical element of quick decisive victory, however, is a military

strategy that links grand strategy with an integrated and coherent force structure.

doctrine and training combined with an operational des~gnhat takes advantage

of the strengths of the forces provided. This concept is complex, but more

accurately describes the conditions for quick decisive victory then those now

described in U.S. military strategy.



CONCLUSlONS

The comparative analysis shows that the principle of decisive force'

effectively outlines the conditions for quick decisive victory. Quick decisive

victory is not an unattainable goal or Holy Grail. It should remain a fundamental

part of U S military strategy and doctrine to focus the development of force

structure and training on winning wars. Quick decisive victory provides the

impetus for maintaining superior military capability and continuing to develop

superior methodologies. Codifying this concept in U.S. Military Strategy and

doctrine, however, also incurs grave risks.

Quick, decisive, victories are the exception rather than the rule. The

U.S.

military experience is better characterized by protracted bloody conflicts.

Therefore. quick decisive victory may create unrealistic expectations that will

cloud the judgement of senior military leaders.

The U S is in a general sense strategically defensive and historically will

not conduct preemptive military operations. This will normally result in the

strategic initiative being conceded to the enemy and subsequently causes the

U.S. military response to

be

reactive. This decreases the possibility of achieving

strategic surprise and increases the burden on the operational strategy to

develop speed and shock within the campaign. Overall, giving up the strategic

initiative reduces the potential for quick decisive victory.

The

U S

Military's "demand" for quick decisive victory conflicts with

Clausewitz's fundamental assertion that war is an extension of politics.

Advertising the U.S. military's reluctance to fight a prorracted war. hamstrings



political leaders and degrades the threat of U.S. military power. 2educing the

ambiguity in relation to when the US. will use military force allows other nations

to better predict the parameters of a U.S. response. This may give foreign

nations a distinct advantage and enables them to pursue more effective

strategy with respect

to

the U.S..

Additionally, the preoccupation of U.S. national military strategy with quick,

decisive. victory and the corresponding policy of crisis response results in the

neglect of concepts for prevention. It appears the U.S. national military strategy

has two speeds deterrence or crisis response. These concepts do not address

or incorporate the limited or restrained application of military force to prevent

conflict from occurring.

The concept of quick decisive victory should remain as part of U.S.

national military strategy.

It

must be balanced, however, by incorporating

concepts of employment in operations other than war, as well as concepts for

protracted warfare. Incorporating these concepts would help resolve

a

current

disconnect between U.S. military strategy and military doctrine. Both Joint and

Service doctrines discuss employment of U.S. military forces in strategic

environments other than war formerly described as Low Intensity Conflicts). The

U.S. military participates in these operations on a daily basis: but the U.S. military

strategy does not include a principle for applying force under these conditions.

A

possible solution is to develop a concept of preventive force. Preventive force

would conceptually focus on the indirect application of military power to stop

conflicts from occurring or growing.



ENDNOTES

' U.S. Army, FM 100-5

(May 1986). p. 1-4.

Joint Sa

.

(October 1992),

p.

10.

B.R. IflInan and Daniel

F.

Burton, Jr, "Technology

and

Competitiveness"

Bxmgn

Affairs

(Spring 1990), pp.

1

16 1 34 and Edward Lumak. "On the Need to Reform

American Strategy,* r nnin (Washington, DC 1981), pp. 13-27.

H.

Norman Schwartzkopf, New York, 1992), p.357-363.

Schwartzkopf described the initial briefing to the President and his request for an

the additional heavy corps(to do the job right) on

11

October.

'George J. Church, "The

100

Hours,"

im

(1

1

March 1991). p 24 The total

allied casualty figures were 149 KIA and 513 wounded.

Schwartzkopf, !zkg.a pp. 386-387. 469-470. Schwartzkopf outlined the

campaign objectives as: destroy or force the withdrawal of Iraqi forces in Kuwait:

restore the legitimate Kuwaiti goverment; repatriate foreign nationals a POWs

held in Iraq; and pmmote the security and stability of the Persian Gulf region.

Schwartzkopf stated by 27 February

.

we had won decisively."

'James Blackwell. hun er

(

New YoYork 1991). p. xxviii. Predicted

casualty rates ranged from 5.000 to 30,000.

8 Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow

Maxwell

AFB.

1988). pp. 13-16.

lbid., p.i4.

DanidJ. Kaufman. David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan.

e uritv

(Maryland, 1991). p.3.

l

Donald Nuechterlein,

nt (Lexington.1985). p.174.

l lbid.

I

Alexander Alexiev, Santa

Monica. 1988). p.8.

S Nuechterlein, p.175. Nuechterlein dicusses relationship between survival. vital.

major, and peripheral interests.



2 3

.*

Drew.

p

14.

lbid., pp.14-16. Drew and Snow outline the purpose and framework of grand

strategy.

Ibid., pp 18-19. Ideas taken from Drew and Snows explanation of military

strategy.

pp 7-9 to 7-12. The explanation of the concepts of

operational W i n nd their relationship

to

campaign planning are from emerging

Army doctrine.

21 Ibid., p.7-9.

Ibid.. p.7-10.

Ibid.. pp. 7-10 to 7-1 1.

Ibid., p.7-11

-(May

86).

ppl0-1

1

Outlines the the relationship between tactics and

battle.

Albert Sidney Britt l l l h e(West Point, 1972) .

PP

57-79. primarily use Sidney's historical account of the campaign.

David Chandler,

h

of Nawleon, (New York.

1966 .

pp 330-333.

3

Ibid.

Ibid., p.60. The Austrians fail to take into account a ten day difference in

calendars

(with

the Russians).

As

a result, the Russians are ten days behind the

Austrians giving Napoleon operational space and time.

3

lbid.

j

lbid.. p.62. This directive testifies to Napoleon's wholistic approach to the

campaign and to the grand design.

*

Ibid., p.65.



35

Chandler., pp.402 -408.

7

Chandler., pp.409-412.

38

Britt., p.50.

Ibid.

Chandler.. p.331.

Britt, p.60.

Chandler.. p.403.

Britt pp.4448. The corps organization allowed Napoleon to distrrbute the

deployment of his

army

along multiple mutes. yet still concentrate the entire

force quickly for battle.

Chandler.. p.327.

45 Philip

J.

Haythornwaite,

..

(New York,

1988).pp.114-115.

Robert

M.

Epstein, "The Historical Practice of Operational Art." Gwrse

Camment* (SAMS, AY92-93). pp. 4-3-1 to 4 3 3.

47

Britt., pp.74-76.

Britt

outlines Napoleon's selection of the battlefield and the

deception to draw the Russians literally into a sack.

Ibid.

4Q Haythomwaite., p.82. Haythomwaite describes the Grande Armee's tactical

doctrine of envelopment.

Alistar Home. Jo nse

Rat

France 194Q. (New York, 1984, pp. 194 to 201

and Eric von M a n s t e i n . l o s t (Presidio, 1986), pp.94-126. The two

accounts diier slightly in the relative certainty of the coast and the northern

Allied forces were German objectives. Manstein's Map 4 (submitted to

O

and

eventually approved by Hitler). however; clearly shows the operational intent is to

penetrate in the center and envelop the northern Allied forces.

Home.. pp.173-194. Homestates that Hadler plays a major role in resisting

Hitter's efforts to launch an attack from November to February.



Manstein., p. 103. The aim of the western offensive,

I

submitted must be to

for e

an issue by land.

. .

Bany Posen, h Sources of

(London. 1984). pp.178181.

Ibid.

Home.. p.125.

Ibid.. pp.74 to 75.

Len Oeighton,

BUkchg (New

York, 1980). pp.155-169.

SB

Mathew Cooper.

h

Of FailUflL (Ft

Leavenworth. AY 89-90). pp.43-46.

Horne.,7&84. Home outlines Guderian's efforts to develop the Panzer Corps

and the doctrine for the Blikrieg.

*

Manstein, pp. 102-104.

61

lbid pp.217 to 221. Home compares the German and Allied armies. Home

argues mat the Germans were not significantly superior in men or material, but

were significantly superior in doctrine. training, and methods of employment.

Mellenthin supports this in

nzer

(pp.12-30).

Manstein., pp.94-126. The biggest difference between Manstein and Home's

assessment is that Home does not believe OKH ever identified the major

objectives of the operation. ~ a k t e i nndicates that these objectives were

understoodby

the senior commanders and Hitler and never addresses their

absence

from

the final order. believe Manstein to be correct. Most of the senior

leaders would have resolved any questions during the war games conducted

throughout the plans developmentand giving general missmn orders was

consistent with the German's concept of Aufstragtaktic.

lbid.

a Home., pp. 246-309 and 430

bid

ffi F.W

von Mellenthin,

nter

(New York. l98O), pp.

22-23.

7 Home.. pp.649650. The Allies suffered nearly ten times the casualties as the

Germans. The German casualty rates were well below the German's

expectations.



Fuller.. pp. 398400 and Horne, p.610.

Mellenthin.. pp. 15-21.

Posen.. pp179-181

7t

Robert Allan Doughty, h he

(Princeton. 1985), pp. 178-190. Doughty attributes the

German victory not the Superiority of the German Army but, to France's failure to

adapt between wars. There is some

trut

in Doughty's argument, however, it

was not ust a French defeat. The Germans also destroyed the armies of Britain,

Holland, and Belgium. Credit for developing and effectively employing large

integrated combined arms formations, must

be

given to the German

Army.

2

Department of Defense,

hla (Washington, DC. April 1992). p.31

7

bid.

75

Church, "100 Hours," p.32

76 Ibid.

77 Blackwell,

hunder

pp.79-81.

78Church, pp 30-32.. Alexiev, Afahanstan p.8.

Alexiev. Afohanistan p.8.

DOD, pp. 3-8 and

20 21.

A critical component of

the

maturation

process was the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 which empowered the theater

ClNCs and gave them full authority for employmentof all assigned forces.

a Clay Blair. The FornottenW a New York. 1987), pp.25-27.

82 Fred Kaplan,

h

(Stanford University, 1991). pp.

3 7-319.

-rmed Forces School Publication. iNorfolk. 1994). p. 18-2.

Schwartzkopf., pp.271. 275.

85

lbid.

Blackwell. hunder pp.79-81.



U.S.

and News and Wand Report.

rrumo

Random

ouse 1992 .

pp

340 360.

Ibid.



OOKS

Appleman. Roy

E. out

he YNorth Washmgton. D.C.:

U.S. Army. 1986.

Blair, Clay. The Fognt&U?&. New York: Anchor Press. 1987.

lackwell. James. New York: Bantam Books. 1991

Britt, Albert S. J 3 W N a t u m

West Point: USMA. 1972.

Chandler. David.The amew York: MacMillan Co. 1966.

Cooper, Mathew. 3 1945: An

m v

of F a W Ft.

Leavenworth: SAMS AY 99-90.

Deighton. Len. 3hklaeg New York: Ballentime. i982.

Doughty. Robert

A.

h The

1919 193.

Hamden: Archon. 1985.

.

Fuller, J.F.C. the

W

. New York: Funk and

Wagnals. 1956.

Haythomthwarte. Philip

J

. .

. New York: Random

House. 7988.

Home. Alistar. ToLoseaBattle New York: Penquin. 1984.

Manstein, Erich von.

nst Victories.

Presidio: Presidio Press. 1986.

Margiotta. Franklin. and Ralph Sanders.

sea^& .

Washington D.C.: American University. 1985.

Mellenthin. F.W. von.

PanzerBattles.

New York: Balantime. 1980.

Schwatlzkopf. H. Norman.

he ~ O P S ~

. w

t

ake a

York: Bantam. 992.

U.S.

News and World Report. ntlmohWlthoutoronto: Randam

House. 1992.

quick decisive victory the search for the holy grail

Documents