coalminesinquiry.qld.gov.au · queensland coal mining of inquiry affidavit of jason hill i, jason...

QUEENSLAND COAL MINING BOARD OF INQUIRY

AFFIDAVIT OF JASON HILL

I, Jason Hill, of in the State of Queensland, Industry

Safety and Health Representative, solemnly and sincerely affirm and declare:

Employment

1.

P e1

Signed: Take I

AFFIDAVIT Name: Hall Payne Lawyers

| am an elected Industry Safety and Health Representatives (ISHR) pursuant to the

Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld) (the CMSH Act).

| was first elected to my position in or about May 2012‘ | was re-elected into my

position in or about July 2016 and have recently been re-elected into my position for

another four-year term.

As part of my position I am based at the Rockhampton office of the Queensland

District Branch of the Mining and Energy Division of the Construction, Forestry,

Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (the Union). Prior to commencing work in the

Rockhampton office in about early 2018, I was based in the Blackwater office.

My employment history prior to being elected as an ISHR includes:

(a) between 1986 and 1992 I performed work at coal mines, predominantly the

Moura coal mine, in a range of contractual roles and performed work on an on/off

basis, which mainly involved shutdown work;

(b) between 1992 and 1997 l was employed as an underground coal miner at the

Gordonstone mine. | was employed by a company called ARCO;

(c) between 1997 and 1998 | was employed at the Oaky Number One mine as an

underground coal miner. I was employed by a company called Allied which was

a contractor to the mine operator Mount Isa Mines;

Address. Ground Floor 27 Peel Streét South Brisbane QLD 4101 Phone No: (O7) 3017 2400 Fax No: (O7) 3017 2499 Email: general@hallpayne‘com.au



I, Jason Hill, of in the State of Queensland, Industry Safety and Health Representative, solemnly and sincerely affirm and declare:

Employment 1. I am an elected Industry Safety and Health Representatives (ISHR) pursuant to the

Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld) (the CMSH Act).

I was first elected to my position in or about May 2012. I was re-elected into my position in or about July 2016 and have recently been re-elected into my position for another four-year term.

As part of my position I am based at the Rockhampton office of the Queensland District Branch of the Mining and Energy Division of the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (the Union). Prior to commencing work in the Rockhampton office in about early 2018, I was based in the Blackwater office.

My employment history prior to being elected as an lSHR includes:

(a) between 1986 and 1992 I performed work at coal mines, predominantly the Moura coal mine, in a range of contractual roles and performed work on an on/off basis, which mainly involved shutdown work,

(b) between 1992 and 1997 I was employed as an underground coal miner at the Gordonstone mine. I was employed by a company called ARCO,

between 1997 and 1998 I was employed at the Oaky Number One mine as an underground coal miner. I was employed by a company called Allied which was a contractor to the mine operator Mount Isa Mines,

(C)

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Signed:

AFFIDAVIT

Taken vnv. ix

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4.

2.

3.

Name: Hall Payne Lawyers Address: Ground Floor, 27 Peel Street South Brisbane QLD 4101 -u Phone No: (07) 3017 2400 Fax No: (07) 3017 2499 Email: [email protected]

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HLJ.001.001.0001

(d) between 1998 and 2012 l worked as a coal miner and deputy at the Oaky North

Mine in Queensland. | was employed by a company called Mount Isa Mines, and

later Xstrata, and I worked in underground ooal mining operations;

(e) in or about May 2006 | obtained my deputy cenificates. After obtaining that

certificate l was qualified to work as a third line member of management, and l

was eligible to hold a third-class certificate under the predecessor to the CMSH

Act. | was also able to inspect areas and certify them as being safe and | could

direct a change in activities in an area that | was responsible for; and

(f) between 1998 and 2012, as part of my employment at the Oaky North mine, I

was also elected as a miners’ officer, which is the equivalent of being a Site

Safety Health Representative (SSHR) under the current CMSH Act, and later as

an SSHR. l was elected to those positions by my peers, and l was re-elected

each period and continued to perform that role until l left the mine.

5, | was also an active member of mines rescue for approximately 11 years and

competed in competitions as pan of that role.

Training

6. l have a range of qualifications that enable me to perform the role of an ISHR. Those

qualifications include:

(a) S1, 82 and S3, which are qualifications that the CMSH Act requires an ISHR to

have before being eligible to be elected to office and include modules on:

(i) Apply Risk Management Processes;

(ii) Conduct Safety 8- Health Investigations; and

(iii) Communicate Information,

(b) a certificate in Mine Gas and Testing, which l obtained in 2006;

(c) a certificate in contraband searches, which I obtained in February 2007;

(d) deputy certificate (as outlined above);

(e) a certificate in Mine Ventilation and Engineering, which l obtained in 2006;

(f) a certificate IV in Training and Assessment;

(g) a certificate in Dust Monitoring;

(h) a certificate in ICAM Training and Investigation;

(d) between 1998 and 2012 I worked as a coal miner and deputy at the Oaky North Mine in Queensland. I was employed by a company called Mount Isa Mines, and later Xstrata, and t worked in underground coal mining operations,

(e) in or about May 2006 I obtained my deputy certificates. After obtaining that certificate I was qualified to work as a third line member of management, and I was eligible to hold a third-class certificate under the predecessor to the CMSH Act. I was also able to inspect areas and certify them as being safe and I could direct a change in activities in an area that I was responsible for, and

between 1998 and 2012, as part of my employment at the Oaky North mine, I was also elected as a miners' officer, which is the equivalent of being a Site Safety Health Representative (SSHR) under the current CMSH Act, and later as an SSHR. I was elected to those positions by my peers, and I was re-elected each period and continued to perform that role until I left the mine.

(f)

I was also an active member of mines rescue for approximately 11 years and competed in competitions as part of that role.

Training 6. I have a range of qualifications that enable me to perform the role of an ISHR. Those

qualifications include:

(a) $1, $2 and $3, which are qualifications that the CMSH Act requires an ISHR to have before being eligible to be elected to office and include modules on;

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

Apply Risk Management Processes,

Conduct Safety & Health Investigations, and

Communicate Information,

a certificate in Mine Gas and Testing, which I obtained in 2006,

a certificate in contraband searches, which I obtained in February 2007,

deputy certificate (as outlined above),

a certificate in Mine Ventilation and Engineering, which I obtained in 2006,

a certificate IV in Training and Assessment,

a certificate in Dust Monitoring,

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(0

(9)

(h) a certificate in ICAM Training and Investigation,

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5.

Signed(

Taken by:

HLJ.001.001.0002

(i) a certificate in Shot Firing;

a certificate in Establishing and Maintaining a Risk Management System;

a certificate in Operating a Longwall;

a certificate in Respiratory and Hygiene Protection;

a certificate in Mine Emergency Management Systems;

a certificate of completion for the United Mines Workers of America Local Union

Mine Health and Safety Committee Training Program; and

a certificate of completion for the United Mines Workers of America Health and

Safety Training for Miners’ Representatives.

Annexed and marked JH-1 is a bundle of documents listing the different qualifications

that l have obtained for working in the black coal mining sector.

There are three (3) elected lSHRs that work in the black coal mining industry, namely:

Stephen Woods;

Stephen Watts; and

me.

All of us work from the Union's offices. l work in the Rockhampton office with Stephen

Watts. Stephen Woods works in the Mackay office.

The lSHRs, unlike union organisers, do not have a geographic area or “patch” that we

each cover. Each ISHR has a responsibility for each and every coal mine in

Queensland, which we share collectively.

(i)

(k)

(I)

(m)

(n)

(0)

7.

lSHRs

a.

(a)

(b)

(e)

9‘

1o.

1 1.

Page

Signed: Tak

There is an unspoken rule with respect to the geographic location of an ISHR, namely

Moranbah mines tend to call Stephen Woods and mines south of Moranbah tend to

call me or Stephen Watts, but we will all receive calls from each mine from time to

time. As a general rule whoever takes the call deals with the matter, however in terms

of geographic location of the mines sometimes it is more appropriate to ask the closest

ISHR to follow up.

Signed:

9.

8. There are three (3) elected ISHRs that work in the black coal mining industry, namely:

Stephen Woods,

Stephen Watts, and

7.

ISHRs

11.

10.

(a)

(b)

(c)

All of us work from the Union's offices. I work in the Rockhampton office with Stephen Watts. Stephen Woods works in the Mackay office.

The ISHRs, unlike union organisers, do not have a geographic area or "patch" that we each cover. Each ISHR has a responsibility for each and every coal mine in Queensland, which we share collectively.

There is an unspoken rule with respect to the geographic location of an ISHR, namely Moranbah mines tend to call Stephen Woods and mines south of Moranbah tend to call me or Stephen Watts, but we will all receive calls from each mine from time to time. As a general rule whoever takes the call deals with the matter, however in terms of geographic location of the mines sometimes it is more appropriate to ask the closest ISHR to follow up.

a certificate of completion for the United Mines Workers of America Health and Safety Training for Miners' Representatives.

Annexed and marked JH-1 is a bundle of documents listing the different qualifications that I have obtained for working in the black coal mining sector.

(i)

(j)

(K)

(l)

(m)

(n)

(o)

a certificate in Shot Firing,

a certificate in Establishing and Maintaining a Risk Management System,

a certificate in Operating a Longwall,

a certificate in Respiratory and Hygiene Protection,

a certificate in Mine Emergency Management Systems,

a certificate of completion for the United Mines Workers of America Local Union Mine Health and Safety Committee Training Program, and

me.

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HLJ.001.001.0003

12.

13,

14.

15.

16.

Most of the SSEs (or their delegate) will call the same ISHR to make notifications if

they already have our contact details. Sometimes, on very rare occasions, they will call

an ISHR that they know is further away geographically. l assume this may be

motivated by stalling the arrival of an ISHR on site.

The ISHRs notify each other by email when they receive a written notification about an

incident. We also have ongoing discussions on a regular basis. | estimate that l would

speak to Mr Woods on average four to five times per week} As I work in the same

office with Mr Watts we talk regularly; almost on a daily basis. As we remain in

constant communication with each other, the lSHRs don't tend to schedule regular

meetings.

On behalf of the ISHRs | maintain a register for dust diseases and exceedances. We

also keep a spreadsheet that updates the inspections that we perform at various mines

so that we can ensure each mine is inspected regularly. We are also investigating the

capacity of the Union's computer system to be able to record different details about

notifications received so that we can easily generate reports that show the trends in

the industry. I also keep a separate spreadsheet that details gas exceedances that are

notified as HPls.

When the ISHRs have discussions we generally cover a range of matters including:

(a) issues that we are identifying in the industry;

(b) advice that is being given to SSHRs, including enquiries that have been made by

them;

(c) our views with respect to certain aspects of the legislation regarding health and

safety in the black coal mining industry in Queensland, namely the how it should

be read and options for legislative amendment;

(d) leave arrangements, including who will cover various types of workloads while

one of us is on leave; and

(e) any matters of relevance in relation to SSHRs, including when election periods

are due to expire, and any other information that SSHRs have provided to us.

l don't tend to make a note of the conversations that l have with the other lSHRs.

There are no formal minutes of the meetings or discussions that we have as far as l

am aware.

12. Most of the SSEs (or their delegate) will call the same ISHR to make notifications if they already have our contact details. Sometimes, on very rare occasions, they will call an ISHR that they know is further away geographically. I assume this may be motivated by stalling the arrival of an ISHR on site.

13. The ISHRs notify each other by email when they receive a written notification about an incident. We also have ongoing discussions on a regular basis. I estimate that I would speak to Mr Woods on average four to five times per week. As I work in the same office with Mr Watts we talk regularly, almost on a daily basis. As we remain in constant communication with each other, the ISHRs don't tend to schedule regular

meetings.

On behalf of the ISHRs I maintain a register for dust diseases and exceedances. We also keep a spreadsheet that updates the inspections that we perform at various mines so that we can ensure each mine is inspected regularly. We are also investigating the capacity of the Union's computer system to be able to record different details about

notifications received so that we can easily generate reports that show the trends in the industry. I also keep a separate spreadsheet that details gas exceedances that are notified as HPIs.

14.

15. When the ISHRs have discussions we generally cover a range of matters including:

(a) issues that we are identifying in the industry,

(b) advice that is being given to SSHRs, including enquiries that have been made by them,

(c) our views with respect to certain aspects of the legislation regarding health and safety in the black coal mining industry in Queensland, namely the how it should be read and options for legislative amendment,

(d) leave arrangements, including who will cover various types of workloads while one of us is on leave, and

(e) any matters of relevance in relation to SSHRs, including when election periods are due to expire, and any other information that SSHRs have provided to us.

16. I don't tend to make a note of the conversations that I have with the other ISHRs. There are no formal minutes of the meetings or discussions that we have as far as I am aware.

Signed : Taken§l

HLJ.001.001.0004

Interaction with SSHRs

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

Signedi

At most coal mines in Queensland there are site safety and health representatives

(SSHRs).

Up to two (2) SSHRs may be elected at each coal mine. To be eligible to be elected as

a SSHR, the individual must either hold appropriate safety and health competencies or

be provided by the SSE with an opportunity to obtain them. A duly elected SSHR

cannot perform that role until they have obtained the appropriate safety and health

competencies.

In my view SSHRs provide a vital role in maintaining safety at individual coal mines.

They are the “eyes and the ears on the ground” for both the ISHRs and the

Inspectorate. More often than not, | endeavour to keep the conversations that I have

with SSHRs confidential‘ When | speak to SSHRs about issues that they are

encountering, | also keep the other ISHRs updated so we are all on the same page.

| find that SSHRs are generally very good at inspecting and identifying hazards if and

when they arisev They are also experienced in identifying areas where things can be

improved to minimise the risk to health and safety of coal mine workers. As the SSHRs

work at the coal mines, they are easily able to be contacted by workers who wish to

report safety hazards and they are also able to very quickly attend locations where

there are workplace health and safety hazards.

The Union runs training seminars for SSHRs on an annual basis, facilitated by the

ISHRs.

In my experience the SSHRs that tend to communicate with the ISHRs most frequently

are those who are employed on a permanent full-time basis and are union members.

There are a few SSHRs who are employed as casuals, or contractors, who also have

a positive working relationship with the lSHRs, but they are a minority.

As far as l am aware, the SSHRs also communicate with the Inspectorate about safety

issues that they encounter, and they often provide a crucial and immediate link to the

SSE at their relevant coal mine.

Interaction with SSHRs At most coal mines in Queensland there are site safety and health representatives (SSHRs).

18. Up to two (2) SSHRs may be elected at each coal mine. To be eligible to be elected as a SSHR, the individual must either hold appropriate safety and health competencies or be provided by the SSE with an opportunity to obtain them. A duly elected SSHR cannot perform that role until they have obtained the appropriate safety and health competencies.

17.

19.

20.

21.

In my view SSHRs provide a vital role in maintaining safety at individual coal mines. They are the "eyes and the ears on the ground" for both the ISHRs and the Inspectorate. More often than not, I endeavour to keep the conversations that I have with SSHRs confidential. When I speak to SSHRs about issues that they are encountering, I also keep the other ISHRs updated so we are all on the same page.

I find that SSHRs are generally very good at inspecting and identifying hazards if and when they arise. They are also experienced in identifying areas where things can be improved to minimise the risk to health and safety of coal mine workers. As the SSHRs work at the coal mines, they are easily able to be contacted by workers who wish to report safety hazards and they are also able to very quickly attend locations where there are workplace health and safety hazards.

The Union runs training seminars for SSHRs on an annual basis, facilitated by the ISHRS.

In my experience the SSHRs that tend to communicate with the ISHRs most frequently are those who are employed on a permanent full-time basis and are union members. There are a few SSHRs who are employed as casuals, or contractors, who also have a positive working relationship with the ISHRs, but they are a minority.

23. As far as I am aware, the SSHRs also communicate with the Inspectorate about safety issues that they encounter, and they often provide a crucial and immediate link to the SSE at their relevant coal mine.

22.

g r

.4 'I

GLIB.

Signed: Taken by

HLJ.001.001.0005

24. In my view, even though they have protections under the CMSH Act for talking to an

ISHR in their capacity as an SSHR, all SSHRs know that they can still be targeted for

other matters if they upset the SSE. For that reason, the relationship between the

SSHRs and the lSHRs at mines that utilise insecure methods of employment such as

casual and labour employment, for example the Grosvenor coal mine, is virtually non-

existent.

SSHRs at Oaky North coal mine

25. ln relation to the Oaky North mine, I have a very good relationship with the SSHRs‘ |

keep them regularly updated regarding industry issues, and they frequently contact me

to talk through safety issues to obtain guidance. We keep the channels of

communication open and we talk regularly. The SSHRs at the Oaky North mine are

employed on a permanent full-time basis.

26, To ensure there is always an elected SSHR at the Oaky North mine, the elections

have never been historically held at the same time. That way, their terms expire at

different times which can be advantageous if there are delays with an election

occurring. In my view it is best practice for SSHRs’ periods of appointment to be

"staggered" so that they don't lapse at the same time.

27. In March 2020 l was involved in a dispute with the Inspectorate and the SSE regarding

an SSHR election at the Oaky North mine. I took issue with the election process and

sent written correspondence to the Chief Inspector regarding my concerns.

28‘ The requirements for the election of SSHRs are contained in $.93 of the CMSH Act,

regulations 12K-P of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2017 (Qld) (the

CMSH Reg) and Schedule 1B of the CMSH Reg.

29. Specifically, regulation 12K(b) of the CMSH Reg requires a written request for an

election of a SSHR to be sent to the Chief Inspector and the SSE by a coal mine

worker. In this case, the Oaky North Lodge sent the written request to the Chief

Inspector and the SSE, Brad Watson, requesting the election of one SSHR‘ The SSE

contacted the Inspectorate and made a different proposal for this election. The Chief

Inspector agreed with the proposal from the SSE.

30. The election then proceeded on the terms requested by the SSE and there were

funher issues with it. A private company called the Australian Electoral Company was

appointed by the company, with the approval of the Chief Inspector, and l spoke to the

(1»-, \‘. _4

individual employees of the Australian Electoral Company when | aflen/de%qr‘@7cfifiéjgm q ‘ -_.~<~

A? /V

Signed: Taken by:

24. In my view, even though they have protections under the CMSH Act for talking to an ISHR in their capacity as an SSHR, all SSHRs know that they can still be targeted for other matters if they upset the SSE. For that reason, the relationship between the SSHRs and the ISHRs at mines that utilise insecure methods of employment such as casual and labour employment, for example the Grosvenor coal mine, is virtually non- existent.

SSHRs at Oaky North coal mine

25. In relation to the Oaky North mine, I have a very good relationship with the SSHRs. I keep them regularly updated regarding industry issues, and they frequently contact me to talk through safety issues to obtain guidance. We keep the channels of communication open and we talk regularly. The SSHRs at the Oaky north mine are employed on a permanent full-time basis.

26. To ensure there is always an elected SSHR at the Oaky North mine, the elections have never been historically held at the same time. That way, their terms expire at different times which can be advantageous if there are delays with an election occurring. In my view it is best practice for SSHRs' periods of appointment to be "staggered" so that they don't lapse at the same time.

27.

28.

29.

In March 2020 I was involved in a dispute with the Inspectorate and the SSE regarding an SSHR election at the Oaky North mine. I took issue with the election process and sent written correspondence to the Chief Inspector regarding my concerns.

The requirements for the election of SSHRs are contained in s.93 of the CMSH Act, regulations 12K-P of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2017 (Qld) (the CMSH Reg) and Schedule 1B of the CMSH Reg.

Specifically, regulation 12K(b) of the CMSH Reg requires a written request for an election of a SSHR to be sent to the Chief Inspector and the SSE by a coal mine worker. In this case, the Oaky North Lodge sent the written request to the Chief Inspector and the SSE, Brad Watson, requesting the election of one SSHR. The SSE contacted the Inspectorate and made a different proposal for this election. The Chief inspector agreed with the proposal from the SSE.

30. The election then proceeded on the terms requested by the SSE and there were further issues with it. A private company called the Australian Electoral Company was appointed by the company, with the approval of the Chief Inspector, and I spoke to the

individual employees of the Australian Electoral Company when

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Signed: Taken by:

HLJ.001.001.0006

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

the day of the election. | asked them for evidence that they had received formal

training as required by the CMSH Reg, but they were unwilling or unable to provide it

to me. They told me that | needed to obtain it from the Chief Inspector.

Another issue that | had is that the Australian Electoral Company were paid for by the

company which gave the impression of a lack of independence.

Significantly, the Australian Election Company only asked the SSE for a list of workers

who were eligible to vote and the relevant stakeholders, for example the Union's

Lodge. had no opportunity to check that it listed the relevant coal mine workers.

The SSE then asked the contractor companies to provide a list of workers who should

be eligible to vote and when the scrutineers went through the list they realised that

there were people on it who did not work at the mine anymore, and had not done so

for a long time.

l also observed problems with the notice of the election and am of the view that it does

not comply with the requirements of the CMSH Reg because it failed to identify the

place where the polling was taking place, which was moved, and the place where the

votes would be counted.

At some stage in the process of the election it became one concerning both SSHR

positions at the Oaky North Mine not just the position that the Lodge had written about.

| don't know how that came about but l am concerned that this was not a proper way to

fill the second SSHR position.

| am also concerned that the SSE misled the Chief Inspector by stating that the

Australian Election Company had conducted an election for an SSHR at the mine

previously. To the best of my knowledge that is false.

SSHRs at Grasstree coal mine

37.

38.

There are two SSHRs performing work at the Grasstree Coal Mine. l believe l have a

good relationship with them.

Both the SSHRs at the Grasstree Coal Mine contact me when they have issues that

they would like to talk through and they are both experienced coal miners who seem to

have a solid understanding on safety in the black coal mining sector.

31.

32.

33.

34.

the day of the election. I asked them for evidence that they had received formal training as required by the CMSH Reg, but they were unwilling or unable to provide it to me. They told me that I needed to obtain it from the Chief Inspector.

Another issue that I had is that the Australian Electoral Company were paid for by the company which gave the impression of a lack of independence.

Significantly, the Australian Election Company only asked the SSE for a list of workers who were eligible to vote and the relevant stakeholders, for example the Union's Lodge, had no opportunity to check that it listed the relevant coal mine workers.

The SSE then asked the contractor companies to provide a list of workers who should be eligible to vote and when the scrutineers went through the list they realised that there were people on it who did not work at the mine anymore, and had not done so for a long time.

I also observed problems with the notice of the election and am of the view that it does not comply with the requirements of the CMSH Reg because it failed to identify the place where the polling was taking place, which was moved, and the place where the votes would be counted.

35.

36.

At some stage in the process of the election it became one concerning both SSHR positions at the Oaky North Mine not just the position that the Lodge had written about. I don't know how that came about but I am concerned that this was not a proper way to

fill the second SSHR position.

I am also concerned that the SSE misled the Chief Inspector by stating that the Australian Election Company had conducted an election for an SSHR at the mine previously. To the best of my knowledge that is false.

SSHRs at Grasstree coal mine

37.

38.

There are two SSHRs performing work at the Grasstree Coal Mine. I believe I have a good relationship with them.

Both the SSHRs at the Grasstree Coal Mine contact me when they have issues that they would like to talk through and they are both experienced coal miners who seem to have a solid understanding on safety in the black coal mining sector.

Signed: T¢{ken

HLJ.001.001.0007

Relationship between the ISHRs and the Inspectorate

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45‘

Signed:

Until recently there were regular quarterly meetings between the ISHRs and the

Inspectorate at which we could discuss issues relevant to the industry, and also issues

between ourselves, with a view to resolving them together. In my view, this helped with

the dialogue both ways. There was often debate during the quarterly meeting, but we

would all shake hands and move on afterwards. The quarterly meetings promoted a

collaborative relationship between the two groups, and they continued until late-2018

until Chief Inspector Albury resigned.

While l did not go to the last meeting between the ISHRs and the Inspectorate, l am

aware that a meeting occurred on or about 19 December 2019, A couple of days prior

to that meeting, the lSHRs, including myself, met with the new Chief Inspector, Peter

Newman, on or about 17 December 2019. There have been no further meetings

between the Inspectorate and the ISHRs since the last meeting in December 2019.

After Chief Inspector Albury resigned, the quarterly meetings started to fall apart and

we stopped having them on a regular basis. The new Chief Inspector, Mr Newman,

made no effort to reinstate them.

Prior to the meeting in December 2019, the last meeting between the lSHRs and the

Inspectors was in or about 20 February 2019. | considered the meeting in February

2019 to be a good meeting and I don't know why the meetings stopped after that. The

meeting seemed productive and the communications lines were still open. We had a

few debates during that meeting but l didn't get the impression that there were any

“hard feelings".

When the meetings first stopped after the February 2019 meeting, | made several

attempts to schedule the next meeting, however l was always told words to the effect

of:

"I will look into it and gel back to you’ "

"Leave it with me."

Despite being told that they would get back to me, no one ever did. From memory, |

also sent some emails to Inspectors asking for a meeting to be scheduled, however

my correspondence was ignored and no one ever confirmed a meeting.

| personally do not know why the meetings stopped. | have tried several times to

schedule further meetings, however I have given up after being constantly being

ignored.

Relationship between the ISHRs and the Inspectorate 39. Until recently there were regular quarterly meetings between the ISHRs and the

Inspectorate at which we could discuss issues relevant to the industry, and also issues between ourselves, with a view to resolving them together. In my view, this helped with the dialogue both ways. There was often debate during the quarterly meeting, but we would all shake hands and move on afterwards. The quarterly meetings promoted a collaborative relationship between the two groups, and they continued until late-2018 until Chief Inspector Albury resigned.

4t.

40. while I did not go to the last meeting between the ISHRs and the Inspectorate, I am aware that a meeting occurred on or about 19 December 2019. A couple of days prior to that meeting, the ISHRs, including myself, met with the new Chief Inspector, Peter Newman, on or about 17 December 2019. There have been no further meetings between the Inspectorate and the ISHRs since the last meeting in December 2019.

After Chief Inspector Albury resigned, the quarterly meetings started to fall apart and we stopped having them on a regular basis. The new Chief Inspector, Mr Newman, made no effort to reinstate them.

Prior to the meeting in December 2019, the last meeting between the ISHRs and the Inspectors was in or about 20 February 2019. I considered the meeting in February 2019 to be a good meeting and I don't know why the meetings stopped after that. The meeting seemed productive and the communications lines were still open. We had a few debates during that meeting but I didn't get the impression that there were any "hard feelings".

42.

43. When the meetings first stopped after the February 2019 meeting, I made several attempts to schedule the next meeting, however I was always told words to the effect of:

"l will look into it and get back to you. "Leave it with me. '

II

44.

45.

Despite being told that they would get back to me, no one ever did. From memory, I also sent some emails to Inspectors asking for a meeting to be scheduled, however my correspondence was ignored and no one ever confirmed a meeting.

l personally do not know why the meetings stopped. l have tried several times to schedule further meetings, however I have given up after being constantly being ignored.

pace a

Signed Take

HLJ.001.001.0008

46.

47.

In addition to the quarterly meetings, members of the Inspectorate and the ISHRs also

sit on a number of committees together. Those committees include, but are not limited

to the:

(a) Coal Mining Safety and Health Advisory Committee;

(b) Recognised Standard Committee; and

(c) Occupational Mines Health Advisory Committee.

When | saw Inspectors at the committee meetings, | would ask them about scheduling

another meeting between the ISHRs and the Inspectorate, however | always received

a response similar to what | have described above and then no one ever got back to

me.

Participation and roles in investigations

Between 2013 and late-2018

48.

49.

Between around 2013 and late-2018, the ISHRs and lnspeciorate had a good working

relationship during investigations into serious accidents and incidents that had

occurred at coal mines. Both sides would gather evidence together but we would then

conduct our own independent investigation and asked each other questions if we

needed extra information.

The ISHRs would attend the scene of the incident with the Inspectors and we would

work together to collect the evidence. We would also share information that we had

obtained by talking to workers and various test results as they were received.

Between late-2018 and Januagg 2019

50.

51.

The working relationship between the Inspectorate and the ISHRs slowly started to

deteriorate when Chief Inspector Albury stood aside in late-2018. In my view, things

really started to change in mid-2019.

The Inspectorate no longer allows us to gather evidence at the same time that they do.

They tell us to leave if we try to view a scene while they are still there and we have to

wait until they are finished.

Taken by:

46. In addition to the quarterly meetings, members of the Inspectorate and the ISHRs also sit on a number of committees together. Those committees include, but are not limited to the:

47.

(a) Coal Mining Safety and Health Advisory Committee,

(b) Recognised Standard Committee, and

(c) Occupational Mines Health Advisory Committee.

When I saw Inspectors at the committee meetings, I would ask them about scheduling another meeting between the ISHRs and the Inspectorate, however I always received a response similar to what I have described above and then no one ever got back to me.

Parficipation and roles in investigations

Between 2013 and late-2018

48. Between around 2013 and late-2018, the ISHRs and Inspectorate had a good working relationship during investigations into serious accidents and incidents that had occurred at coal mines. Both sides would gather evidence together but we would then conduct our own independent investigation and asked each other questions if we needed extra information.

49. The ISHRs would attend the scene of the incident with the Inspectors and we would work together to collect the evidence. We would also share information that we had obtained by talking to workers and various test results as they were received.

Between late-2018 and January 2019

50.

51.

The working relationship between the Inspectorate and the ISHRs slowly started to deteriorate when Chief Inspector Albury stood aside in late-2018. In my view, things really started to change in mid-2019.

The Inspectorate no longer allows us to gather evidence at the same time that they do. They tell us to leave if we try to view a scene while they are still there and we have to wait until they are finished.

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HLJ.001.001.0009

52.

53>

54.

55.

56‘

The ISHRs have no idea when the Inspectorate is conducting coercive interviews; we

only know they are occurring if a Union member tells us about it‘ I am also aware that

the Inspectorate has been making direct contact with SSEs to ask them to make

arrangements for their employees to attend coercive interviews‘ Some of those

employees are members of the Union and when they contact us, they tell us that they

haven't been approached by anyone from the Inspectorate, and it was the SSE who

told them that the Inspectorate wanted to interview them.

It seems as though the ISHRs have been completely pushed out of the investigation

process, which makes it almost impossible for us to discharge our function under

s.1 18(1)(d) of the CMSH Act.

l have also had issues where Inspectors have removed crucial evidence from the mine

before the ISHRs were given an opportunity to photograph or test it. l have also

become aware of situations where the company was invited to attend while evidence

was tested, but the ISHRs weren’t even told about it. It seems as though the

Inspectorate is deliberately excluding the ISHRs from the investigation process.

Since late-2019 the Inspectorate, for whatever reason, decided to not share as much

information with the ISHRs.

Fatality Investigation

57.

Signed:

There was a further fatality in the coal mine sector in Queensland

| was on Ieave at the time however Mr Woods called me and told

me about it, and shortly after that Mr Watts called me. | drove to the mine and we both

arrived around 11.00pm.

52.

53.

54.

55.

The ISHRs have no idea when the Inspectorate is conducting coercive interviews, we only know they are occurring if a Union member tells us about it. I am also aware that the Inspectorate has been making direct contact with SSEs to ask them to make arrangements for their employees to attend coercive interviews. Some of those employees are members of the Union and when they contact us, they tell us that they haven't been approached by anyone from the Inspectorate, and it was the SSE who told them that the Inspectorate wanted to interview them . It seems as though the ISHRs have been completely pushed out of the investigation process, which makes it almost impossible for us to discharge our function under

s.118(1)(d) of the CMSH Act.

I have also had issues where Inspectors have removed crucial evidence from the mine before the ISHRs were given an opportunity to photograph or test it. I have also become aware of situations where the company was invited to attend while evidence was tested, but the ISHRs weren't even told about it. It seems as though the Inspectorate is deliberately excluding the ISHRs from the investigation process.

56. Since late-2019 the Inspectorate, for whatever reason, decided to not share as much information with the ISHRs.

Fatality Investigation

57. There was a further fatality in the coal mine sector in Queensland . I was on leave at the time however Mr Woods called me and told

me about it, and shortly after that Mr Watts called me. I drove to the mine and we both

arrived around 11.00pm.

Page

Signed:

HLJ.001.001.0010

58.

59.

60.

61.

62‘

63.

When we l arrived, we went to the scene of the incident and noticed that the

Inspectorate had started to cover it with a tarpaulin because it looked as though it was

going to rain. We weren't able to properly view the scene or photograph it. Mr Watts

and l decided to come back to the mine the following day once Mr Woods had arrived.

l had a brief discussion with Inspector before we left and told him that we

would be back the following day. All he said to me was:

"Yep."

Mr Woods arrived after us and met us at the hotel. The following morning all three

ISHRs attended the mine together and the Inspectors would not allow us to attend the

scene of the incident. While we were trying to say that we were entitled to view the

scene of the incident, Mr raised his voice at me and said words to the effect of:

"You and Stephen [Watts] were there last night. "

In response, l said to him words to the effect of:

"It had been covered up by the time we got there. It was dark and we weren't able to

inspect it or photograph it."

My argument fell on deaf ears and he refused to let me attend the scene of the

incident. The SSHR was with us and he wouldn’t let the SSHR in either. Eventually l

went back to the hotel room and then left to go back to Rockhampton the next

morning. I did not gain access to the scene of the incident before I left.

As far as l am aware, there has been no attempt by the Inspectorate to try and involve

the ISHRs into the investigation The situation is currently one of

“us and them" and the relationship is now completely unworkable.

Communication between the ISHRs and the Inspectorate

64,

Signed: Taken by,

Up until late 2019 the Inspectorate would share their inspection reports with the

ISHRs, and the ISHRs would also share our inspection reports with the Inspector‘ The

ISHRs would also provide regular updates to the Inspectorate on enquiries that we had

made in accordance with s.121 of the CMSH Act, and both sides would keep other

updated regarding the resolution of those issues.

[v

58.

59.

When we I arrived, we went to the scene of the incident and noticed that the Inspectorate had started to cover it with a tarpaulin because it looked as though it was going to rain. We weren't able to properly view the scene or photograph it. Mr Watts and I decided to come back to the mine the following day once Mr Woods had arrived.

I had a brief discussion with Inspector before we left and told him that we would be back the following day. All he said to me was:

"Yep. JJ

60.

61.

62.

Mr Woods arrived after us and met us at the hotel. The following morning all three ISHRs attended the mine together and the Inspectors would not allow us to attend the scene of the incident. while we were trying to say that we were entitled to view the scene of the incident, Mr raised his voice at me and said words to the effect of:

"You and Stephen [Watts] were there last night. "

In response, I said to him words to the effect of:

"lt had been covered up by the time we got there. If was dark and we weren't able to

inspect it or photograph it. "

My argument fell on deaf ears and he refused to let me attend the scene of the incident. The SSHR was with us and he wouldn't let the SSHR in either. Eventually I went back to the hotel room and then left to go back to Rockhampton the next morning. I did not gain access to the scene of the incident before I left.

63. As far as I am aware, there has been no attempt by the Inspectorate to try and involve the ISHRs into the investigation The situation is currently one of "us and them" and the relationship is now completely unworkable.

Communication bemeen the lSHRs and the Inspectorate

64. Up until late 2019 the Inspectorate would share their inspection reports with the ISHRs, and the ISHRs would also share our inspection reports with the Inspector. The ISHRS would also provide regular updates to the Inspectorate on enquiries that we had made in accordance with $.121 of the CMSH Act, and both sides would keep other updated regarding the resolution of those issues.

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HLJ.001.001.0011

65. Up until late 2019, the Inspectorate sent the ISHRs copies of any directives that were

issued to SSEs. In my view, the regular exchanging of information helped a lot

because it kept the ISHRs updated regarding the issues that the Inspectorate was

dealing with and this enabled the ISHRs to reallocate our resources to other issues to

avoid a possible double up. In my view, this was the best possible use of all resources

that the ISHRs and the Inspectorate had available because we were able to ensure

that we complimented each othefs roles to promote workplace health and safety for

coal mine workers and resolve more issues.

66. Up until late 2019, if the ISHRs identified issues when they attended a mine, we would

call the Inspectorate and tell them about it. This would often work both ways, and each

side kept each other regularly updated and allowed both groups to stay on top of

trends that were arising in the black coal mining sector. When there was resistance

from an SSE about an ISHR entering a mine, we used to call the Inspectorate and they

would facilitate our entry. That has completely stopped.

67. On 17 February 2020 Inspector Steven Smith sent an email to all of the SSEs and the

ISHRs. Annexed and marked JH-2 is a copy of that document. The email said that the

Inspectorate would only send a mine record entry report by an inspector to the relevant

SSE and it was a matter for the SSE and the coal mine operators as to how they

distributed it, l understood that email to mean that the Inspectorate was not sending

the reports to the ISHRs anymore and we had to try and get them from the SSE.

68. Since late-2019, | have sent numerous separate s.121 Notifications to the Inspectorate

but only received responses when I called an inspector to follow up. Some of the

matters | have raised up to three (3) months ago still haven't received a response.

Based on my previous experience with the relation to the Inspectorate, this is the

longest that l have ever waited for a response in relation to s.121 Notifications.

Serious accidents and high potential incidents at Coal Mines in Queensland and ISHR responses

69v In my experience, some SSEs or their delegates notify rne and the SSHR at the same

time by text message. l have been actively discouraging the notification of incidents by

text message because l prefer to receive them verbally so | can ask questions during

the conversation. Sometimes, however, the verbal notification is simply a voicemail

message and when l try to call them back so that l can ask questions, they do not

answer} l then notice that the written notification often refers to th "misal- voicemail message is left, and not the time that l am actually spoken}

Page

Signed: Taken by:

65.

66.

67.

68.

Up until late 2019, the Inspectorate sent the ISHRs copies of any directives that were issued to SSEs. In my view, the regular exchanging of information helped a lot because it kept the ISHRs updated regarding the issues that the Inspectorate was dealing with and this enabled the ISHRs to reallocate our resources to other issues to avoid a possible double up. In my view, this was the best possible use of all resources that the ISHRs and the Inspectorate had available because we were able to ensure that we complimented each other's roles to promote workplace health and safety for coal mine workers and resolve more issues.

Up until late 2019, if the ISHRs identified issues when they attended a mine, we would call the Inspectorate and tell them about it. This would often work both ways, and each side kept each other regularly updated and allowed both groups to stay on top of trends that were arising in the black coal mining sector. When there was resistance from an SSE about an ISHR entering a mine, we used to call the Inspectorate and they

would facilitate our entry. That has completely stopped.

On 17 February 2020 Inspector Steven Smith sent an email to all of the SSEs and the ISHRs. Annexed and marked JH-2 is a copy of that document. The email said that the Inspectorate would only send a mine record entry report by an inspector to the relevant SSE and it was a matter for the SSE and the coal mine operators as to how they distributed it. I understood that email to mean that the Inspectorate was not sending the reports to the ISHRs anymore and we had to try and get them from the SSE.

Since late-2019, I have sent numerous separate $.121 Notifications to the Inspectorate but only received responses when I called an inspector to follow up. Some of the matters I have raised up to three (3) months ago still haven't received a response. Based on my previous experience with the relation to the Inspectorate, this is the longest that I have ever waited for a response in relation to $.121 Notifications.

Serious accidents and high potential incidents at Coal Mines in Queensland and ISHR responses 69. In my experience, some SSEs or their delegates notify me and the SSHR at the same

time by text message. I have been actively discouraging the notification of incidents by text message because I prefer to receive them verbally so I can ask questions during the conversation. Sometimes, however, the verbal notification is simply a voicemail message and when I try to call them back so that I can ask questions, they do not answer. I then notice that the written voicemail message is left, and not the ti

Pag

Signed: Taken b

HLJ.001.001.0012

70.

71.

72_

73.

74.

75.

Signed: Ta

When l receive a notification by way of text message, l will either send a reply text

message asking a lot of questions or I will try to call the person back so that we can

have a discussion. l have found that | do not always get a reply to my text message, or

the person doesn’t answer or return my call. Sometimes I don't get the notifications

immediately because l am often underground doing inspections and | do not have

phone coverage; however I do check my voicemails regularly and | always follow up a

notification as soon as l can‘

If I am aware that there is a SSHR at the coal mine, one cf the questions that | will

always ask when | receive a verbal or text message is whether the SSHR has been

notified. The usual response that l get is:

"We sent them a text message at the same time we sent one to you. “

"Yes."

"Not yet but they are next. "

“We will."

It is not uncommon for an ISHR to receive a verbal or text message notification several

hours after an incident, or even the next day. l detail examples of this below.

If there has been a serious accident or a fatality at a coal mine, l am generally

contacted relatively quickly. l usually get a phone call in those circumstances as I have

made it clear in the past that it is not acceptable to simply send me a text message or

leave me a voicemail message in relation to a fatality or a serious accident. That

message appears to have been received by the SSEs. l have pressed this because |

need to be able to quickly gather enough information to ascertain the urgency of the

matter, and I may also need to be able to brief the other ISHRs before we embark on

our immediate travel to the coal mine.

After receiving the verbal or text notification I then receive a written notification in the

form of a Form 1A by email. The email is usually sent to both me and the Inspectorate

at the same time. Sometimes the SSHR is also included into the same

correspondence, but not always‘

Generally speaking, l receive all of the notifications for mines near Emerald,

Blackwater, Tieri and Middlemount because l am just a couple of hours away. If I am

on leave, l generally arrange for Mr Watts or Mr Woods to receive those notifications in

my absence‘

70. When I receive a notification by way of text message, I will either send a reply text message asking a lot of questions or I will try to call the person back so that we can have a discussion. I have found that I do not always get a reply to my text message, or the person doesn't answer or return my call. Sometimes I don't get the notifications immediately because I am often underground doing inspections and I do not have phone coverage, however I do check my Voicemails regularly and I always follow up a notification as soon as I can.

71. If I am aware that there is a SSHR at the coal mine, one of the questions that I will always ask when I receive a verbal or text message is whether the SSHR has been notified. The usual response that I get is:

"We sent them a text message at the same time we sent one to you. " eyes.)

"Not yet but they are next. " "We wifi."

72. lt is not uncommon for an ISHR to receive a verbal or text message notification several hours after an incident, or even the next day. I detail examples of this below.

73. If there has been a serious accident or a fatality at a coal mine, I am generally contacted relatively quickly. I usually get a phone call in those circumstances as I have made it clear in the past that it is not acceptable to simply send me a text message or leave me a voicemail message in relation to a fatality or a serious accident. That message appears to have been received by the SSEs. I have pressed this because I need to be able to quickly gather enough information to ascertain the urgency of the matter, and I may also need to be able to brief the other ISHRs before we embark on our immediate travel to the coal mine.

74.

75.

After receiving the verbal or text notification I then receive a written notification in the form of a Form 1A by email. The email is usually sent to both me and the Inspectorate at the same time. Sometimes the SSHR is also included into the same correspondence, but not always.

Generally speaking, l receive all of the notifications for mines near Emerald, Blackwater, Tieri and Middlemount because l am just a couple of hours away. If l am on leave, l generally arrange for Mr Watts or Mr Woods to receive those notifications in my absence.

Signed:

HLJ.001.001.0013

Filing and management of notifications

76,

77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

Page 1

Signed: Taken b

Over the last 12 months, l estimate that the Union has received around 11500

notifications of HPlsv We receive, on average, around three or four notifications per

day. An example of an HPl notification form is annexed and marked JH-3.

As soon as I receive a notification, and | am able to access my diary, I immediately

make a written note about it. My hard copy diary is the most up-to-date diary that l

have. l also utilise an electronic calendar which is largely up to date; however, l carry

my hard copy diary with me all the time and don't always have access to my electronic

diary.

After receiving the verbal or text message notification I generally, depending on the

nature of the incident, wait until the written notification is provided by the SSE before l

advise the other ISHRs of the notification. The only exception to that rule is if there has

been a serious accident or a fatality, in which case l immediately contact the other two

ISHRs to tell them about it because we generally travel to the relevant mine

immediately to commence our investigation‘

The way that l notify the other ISHRs of a written notification that | have received is

that, once l have read it, I send the notification to my Administration Assistant for filing

and "cc" the other two ISHRs into that correspondence. The other two ISHRs do the

same thing with the notifications that they receive.

l always read all notifications that are forwarded to me by the other ISHRs as soon as |

can so I can stay on t0p of trends that are occurring in the industryv I never simply file

notifications that l have received from other ISHRs, regardless of whether or not it is a

matter that l am responsible for.

Upon receiving notifications from other ISHRs, and upon me sending notifications to

other ISHRs, we always talk to each other and ask questions if we are not clear on the

nature of the issues. We also briefly discuss the cause of ceriain incidents, particularly

when there is a trend that we have identified. An example of this is an HPI that I

received in relation to the Peak Downs Mine which prompted me to make an enquiry

regarding a Mine Record Entry. In those circumstances, l have always kept the ISHRs

up to date on the status of any correspondence that has been sent and received so

that they are fully aware.

Filing and management of notifications 76. Over the last 12 months, I estimate that the Union has received around 1,500

notifications of HPIs. We receive, on average, around three or four notifications per day. An example of an HPI notification form is annexed and marked JH-3.

77.

79.

Hcc"

80.

As soon as I receive a notification, and I am able to access my diary, I immediately make a written note about it. My hard copy diary is the most up-to-date diary that I have. I also utilise an electronic calendar which is largely up to date, however, I carry my hard copy diary with me all the time and don't always have access to my electronic

diary.

78. After receiving the verbal or text message notification I generally, depending on the nature of the incident, wait until the written notification is provided by the SSE before I advise the other ISHRs of the notification. The only exception to that rule is if there has been a serious accident or a fatality, in which case I immediately contact the other two ISHRs to tell them about it because we generally travel to the relevant mine immediately to commence our investigation.

The way that I notify the other ISHRs of a written notification that I have received is that, once I have read it, I send the notification to my Administration Assistant for filing and the other two ISHRs into that correspondence. The other two ISHRs do the same thing with the notifications that they receive.

I always read all notifications that are forwarded to me by the other ISHRs as soon as I can so I can stay on top of trends that are occurring in the industry. I never simply file notifications that I have received from other ISHRs, regardless of whether or not it is a matter that I am responsible for.

Upon receiving notifications from other ISHRs, and upon me sending notifications to other ISHRS, we always talk to each other and ask questions if we are not clear on the nature of the issues. We also briefly discuss the cause of certain incidents, particularly when there is a trend that we have identified. An example of this is an HPI that I received in relation to the Peak Downs Mine which prompted me to make an enquiry regarding a Mine Record Entry. In those circumstances, I have always kept the ISHRs up to date on the status of any correspondence that has been sent and received so that they are fully aware.

81.

»-*4l-1 _ " *"" ~:f~;»;¢ 3 ' * r *

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Signed:

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HLJ.001.001.0014

82.

83.

84.

In terms of my filing system | have a folder for each individual mine within my Microsoft

Outlook email account. l continuously monitor the contents of the inboxes because the

Union's server has limited capacity to hold dated emails. As a matter of general

practice. I keep emails for 12 months‘

I also maintain an action list which I update constantly‘ Within that action list | always

ensure that there is a status update of each and every matter for which | have

carriage. That includes s_121 notifications, when a response is due, etc. | have been

using an action list for approximately five years and it is the first thing that | check

every morning when I get into the office. If l am not in the office, | utilise my electronic

diary and then update my action list as soon as | am able to.

As soon as something is received or sent, | update my action list. | also include dates

by which | need to respond to minutes, and other task associated with the committees

that | am involved in as part of my action list. Further, my action list is colour coded in

the following way:

(a) green indicates that the task has been done;

(b) red indicates that something is overdue; and

(c) orange indicates that something is pending.

Notifications during leave

85.

86.

Signed: Taken

There are periods during the period that the terms of reference for the Board of Inquiry

refers to, including:

(a) 16 August 2019 until 22 August 2019; and

(b) 18 December 2019 until 23 January 2020,

when | was on leave.

When l am on leave, l change the message on the voicemail on my phone to say that |

am on leave. I also ensure that the voicemail message contains the telephone contact

details of the other ISHRs so that everything can proceed smoothly in my absence.

Page 1

82.

83.

84.

In terms of my filing system I have a folder for each individual mine within my Microsoft Outlook email account. I continuously monitor the contents of the inboxes because the Union's sewer has limited capacity to hold dated emails. As a matter of general practice, I keep emails for 12 months.

I also maintain an action list which I update constantly. Within that action list I always ensure that there is a status update of each and every matter for which I have carriage. That includes $.121 notifications, when a response is due, etc. I have been using an action list for approximately five years and it is the first thing that I check every morning when I get into the office. If I am not in the office, I utilise my electronic diary and then update my action list as soon as I am able to.

As soon as something is received or sent, I update my action list. I also include dates by which I need to respond to minutes, and other task associated with the committees that I am involved in as part of my action list. Further, my action list is colour coded in the following way:

green indicates that the task has been done,

red indicates that something is overdue, and

orange indicates that something is pending.

(a)

(b)

(C)

Nofih'cations during leave

85. There are periods during the period that the terms of reference for the Board of Inquiry refers to, including:

16 August 2019 until 22 August 2019; and

18 December 2019 until 23 January 2020,

(a)

(b)

when I was on leave.

86. When I am on leave, I change the message on the voicemail on my phone to say that I am on leave. I also ensure that the voicemail message contains the telephone contact details of the other ISHRs so that everything can proceed smoothly in my absence.

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HLJ.001.001.0015

87.

88.

89‘

There have been occasions where l have had a missed call and then the same

number tried calling me again, despite my voicemail message stating that l am on

leave. For that reason, | always monitor my phone when | am on leave in case a

notification is left on my voicemail message, or I receive a text message, so that

nothing is missed‘ l then forward the information to the other ISHRs so that they can

deal with it.

Even when | am on leave, if a very serious event has occurred, such as a fatality or a

serious injury to a worker, | will generally cancel my leave and immediately travel to

the relevant mine to provide assistance to the other ISHRs during their investigation.

There are a few notifications related to gas exceedances that were handled by Mr

Watts and Mr Woods while | have been on leave. | have detailed them below.

Potential conflict of interest for inspectors

90.

91.

92.

The SSE at the Coal Mine, is related to one of the

inspectors, . The SSE is the son-in-law of Inspector because

he married the inspector's daughter. The inspector told rne ihis.

Dispute this family relationship, | have seen Inspector name on notification

forms as being the inspector notified about HPls involving gas exceedances at the

Coal Mine. My understanding is that the inspector who is contacted about

an HPI is the same person who “releases the scene" and gives permission for work to

resume.

| don't believe an inspector who is related to a manager at a mine should be allowed to

be the inspector who takes notifications about incidents at that mine.

Visits to coal mines and communication with mine management

93.

94.

In my experience, the majority of SSEs at black coal mines in Queensland do not

welcome ISHRs at all. There are a couple of SSEs that appear to be okay with working

with us, however, for the majority of visits you get the distinct impression that the SSEs

are not happy that an ISHR is there.

l have never had issues raised with the adequacy of the notice that l have provided

regarding a visit, or with respect to my identification. | have, however, had several

arguments about safety management documents, what they are and why l require

them. | have also had issues where SSEs try to deliberately delay giving rne

documents | have requested for as long as possible.

Page 1s

Signed: Taken

8W¢

87. There have been occasions where I have had a missed call and then the same number tried calling me again, despite my voicemail message stating that I am on leave. For that reason, I always monitor my phone when I am on leave in case a notification is left on my voicemail message, or I receive a text message, so that nothing is missed. I then forward the information to the other ISHRs so that they can

deal with it.

88.

89.

Even when I am on leave, if a very serious event has occurred, such as a fatality or a serious injury to a worker, I will generally cancel my leave and immediately travel to the relevant mine to provide assistance to the other ISHRs during their investigation.

There are a few notifications related to gas exceedances that were handled by Mr Watts and Mr Woods while I have been on leave. l have detailed them below.

Potential conflict of interest for inspectors

90. The SSE at the Coal Mine, is related to one of the inspectors, . The SSE is the son-in-law of Inspector because he married the inspector's daughter. The inspector told me this.

Dispute this family relationship, I have seen Inspector name on notification

forms as being the inspector notified about HPIs involving gas exceedances at the Coal Mine. My understanding is that the inspector who is contacted about

an HPI is the same person who "releases the scene" and gives permission for work to resume.

91.

92. I don't believe an inspector who is related to a manager at a mine should be allowed to be the inspector who takes notifications about incidents at that mine.

Visits to coal mines and communication with mine management

93.

94.

In my experience, the majority of SSEs at black coal mines in Queensland do not welcome ISHRs at all. There are a couple of SSEs that appear to be okay with working with us, however, for the majority of visits you get the distinct impression that the SSEs

are not happy that an ISHR is there.

I have never had issues raised with the adequacy of the notice that I have provided regarding a visit, or with respect to my identification. I have, however, had several arguments about safety management documents, what they are and why I require them. I have also had issues where SSEs try to deliberately delay QIMQII documents I have requested for as long as possible.

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HLJ.001.001.0016

95.

96.

97‘

98.

I have also had to have debate about whether or not l am allowed to take copies of

safety and management documents, despite s.119(1)(d) the CMSH Act clearly stating

that l am able to, l have had to have several arguments with SSEs about the fact that,

not only can l review any document related to the health and safety at a coal mine, |

am also able to take copies of them.

In my view the ISHRs should be exercising the right to take copies of safety and

management documents more then what we do, and we have had discussions

amongst ourselves‘ Making better use of that power is something we are going to try

and focus on in the future.

| have had issues at coal mines where | have not been allowed to enter straight away.

As most coal mines have gates that require a swipe card to enter, they are able to

exclude us despite knowing that we are coming there because we have sent a

notification clearly stating the time and date that were coming. In my view sometimes

the SSEs deliberately delay me being able to enter a mine; it is as though they are

trying to say to me ‘This is my mine, | am the boss".

l have also had issues at the Grosvenor Mine where I have been refused access to

documents. There have been occasions where l have not been sent documents within

the timeframe that l have asked them to send them to me, or at all. As recently as

during the week beginning 8 June 2020 l sent correspondence to the mine asking for

Mine Record Entry documents that I have previously requested, however they have

not been provided to me. The documents that | am trying to obtain relate directly to

gas readings and trends in relation to gas at the mine. VWthin my most recent

correspondence I have specifically identified that I consider that the SSE has impeded

my ability to perform my statutory function on two occasions.

Inspection of coal mines

Investigations after serious accidents or fatalities

99‘

100.

Signed:

There is always an investigation into an HPI‘ If there has been a serious injury or

fatality, the ISHRs usually attend the mine as soon as possible to commence our

investigation. We investigate independently from the Inspectorate.

As outlined above, the ISHRs and the Inspectorate previously gathered evidence

together and then went away and conducted our own investigations. More recently, the

Inspectorate has often started its investigation regardless of when the ISHR

95.

96.

I have also had to have debate about whether or not I am allowed to take copies of safety and management documents, despite s.119(1)(d) the CMSH Act clearly stating

that I am able to. I have had to have several arguments with SSES about the fact that, not only can I review any document related to the health and safety at a coal mine, I am also able to take copies of them.

In my view the ISHRs should be exercising the right to take copies of safety and management documents more then what we do, and we have had discussions amongst ourselves. Making better use of that power is something we are going to try and focus on in the future.

97.

98.

I have had issues at coal mines where I have not been allowed to enter straight away. As most coal mines have gates that require a swipe card to enter, they are able to exclude us despite knowing that we are coming there because we have sent a notification clearly stating the time and date that were coming. In my view sometimes the SSEs deliberately delay me being able to enter a mine, it is as though they are trying to say to me "this is my mine, I am the boss".

I have also had issues at the Grosvenor Mine where I have been refused access to documents. There have been occasions where I have not been sent documents within the timeframe that I have asked them to send them to me, or at all. As recently as during the week beginning 8 June 2020 I sent correspondence to the mine asking for Mine Record Entry documents that I have previously requested, however they have not been provided to me. The documents that I am trying to obtain relate directly to gas readings and trends in relation to gas at the mine. VI/ithin my most recent correspondence I have specifically identified that I consider that the SSE has impeded my ability to perform my statutory function on two occasions.

Inspection of coal mines

Investigations after serious accidents or fatalities

99. There is always an investigation into an HPI. If there has been a serious injury or fatality, the ISHRs usually attend the mine as soon as possible to commence our investigation. We investigate independently from the Inspectorate.

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100. As outlined above, the ISHRs and the Inspectorate previously gathered evidence together and then went away and conducted our own investigations. More recently, the Inspectorate has often started its investigation regardless of when the ISHRs arib1.QF*_§1/0

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HLJ.001.001.0017

and we are often confronted with evidence being removed by the time we arrive at the

mine.

101. If the incident doesn't result in a serious injury or fatality, the investigation is usually

carried out at the local level by the mine management. Unless we ask for the outcome

of the investigation, the ISHRs do not receive the outcome of the investigation. My

understanding is that the Inspectorate receives the outcome of the investigation

directly from the mine management, however they are not required to send it to the

ISHRs.

102. If l think the HPI is serious I will generally follow up the mine management for the

outcome. Sometimes my request is ignored; if l ask for the full investigation report I

usually won't get it but I will be provided with findings. It all depends on who the mine

management are as to what sort of response l receive. l will usually exercise my

powers under 5.119 of the CMSH Act to get this information.

103. In relation to gas exceedances, the mine management usually explains the cause of

the incident and the steps taken to prevent a reoccurrence in the written notification.

Most mines also include the data from their gas detectors on the written notification so

we do not need to request it.

Inspections

104. There are a range of factors that determine when an ISHR attends a mine for an

inspection. They include:

(a) the frequency of HPIs;

(b) complaints from coal mine workers about health and safety matter; and

(c) requests from SSHRs.

Role in investigation of complaints from coal mine workers

105, When l receive a complaint from a worker, | will generally contact the SSHR to see

whether it can be resolved at the workplace level. If they have the matter in hand, we

usually allow them to manage the matter and simply help if they require it.

106. If the matter can't be resolved by the SSHR, or the SSHR has been unable to resolve

it, I will generally go and inspect the mine and require the mine management to

provide me with relevant safety documentation so that l can investigate it.

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and we are often confronted with evidence being removed by the time we arrive at the

mine.

101. If the incident doesn't result in a serious injury or fatality, the investigation is usually

carried out at the local level by the mine management. Unless we ask for the outcome of the investigation, the ISHRs do not receive the outcome of the investigation. My understanding is that the Inspectorate receives the outcome of the investigation directly from the mine management, however they are not required to send it to the ISHRs.

102. If I think the HPI is serious I will generally follow up the mine management for the outcome. Sometimes my request is ignored, if I ask for the full investigation report I usually won't get it but I will be provided with findings. It all depends on who the mine management are as to what sort of response I receive. I will usually exercise my powers under $.119 of the CMSH Act to get this information.

103. In relation to gas exceedances, the mine management usually explains the cause of the incident and the steps taken to prevent a reoccurrence in the written notification. Most mines also include the data from their gas detectors on the written notification so we do not need to request it.

Inspections

104. There are a range of factors that determine when an ISHR attends a mine for an inspection. They include:

(a) the frequency of HPIs,

(b) complaints from coal mine workers about health and safety matter, and

(C) requests from SSHRs.

Role in investigation of complaints from coal mine workers

105. When I receive a complaint from a worker, I will generally contact the SSHR to see whether it can be resolved at the workplace level. If they have the matter in hand, we usually allow them to manage the matter and simply help if they require it.

106. If the matter can't be resolved by the SSHR, or the SSHR has been unable to resolve it, I will generally go and inspect the mine and require the mine management to provide me with relevant safety documentation so that l can investigate it

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107.

108.

The ISHRs receive complaints from coal mine workers about safety matters at least a

couple of times each week. They include union members and non-union members, We

treat all complaints from coal mine workers the same‘

Prior to the breakdown in the relationship between the ISHRs and the Inspectorate, we

used to call each other and tell them things that we had heard. That has now stopped

and the ISHRs no longer keep the Inspectorate updated about complaints we receive,

nor does the Inspectorate keep us updated regarding matters they are investigation

and complaints that they receive.

Circumstances of use of powers in s. 119 of the CMSH Act

109.

110‘

| exercise powers under s.119 of the CMSH Act on an almost daily basis. Those

powers are usually exercised to:

(a) require the mine management to provide safety documentation;

(b) attend the mine to do an inspection;

(c) investigate complaints made by coal mine workers; and

(d) talk to coal mine workers and mine management.

There is no “one size fits all" approach in relation to when | would exercise my powers

under s.119 of the CMSH Act. It all depends on the type of complaint or incident, the

willingness of the mine management to discuss matters with me or the ability of an

SSHR to be able to resolve the issue.

Strengths and weaknesses of the statutory powers of ISHRs

111.

112.

113.

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I think the statutory powers of ISHRs work well, however I believe there is a lot of room

for improvement, especially in light of the way in which the relationship between the

Inspectorate and the ISHRs has developed.

| believe the ISHRs should have more power to attend a mine unannounced, to

conduct an inspection. We are currently required to provide notice of an inspection to

the mine management and that gives them time to clean up housekeeping and other

issues that we need to address,

While ISHRs have the power to participate in inspections, our powers are limited. We

have no right to participate in coercive interviews and we only hear they are occurring

when a union member tells us about it. At the very least we should be told who is

being interviewed and then sent a copy of the transcript once it has been prepared. At;

107. The ISHRs receive complaints from coal mine workers about safety matters at least a couple of times each week. They include union members and non-union members. We treat all complaints from coal mine workers the same.

108. Prior to the breakdown in the relationship between the ISHRs and the Inspectorate, we used to call each other and tell them things that we had heard. That has now stopped and the ISHRs no longer keep the Inspectorate updated about complaints we receive, nor does the Inspectorate keep us updated regarding matters they are investigation and complaints that they receive.

Circumstances of use of powers in s. 119 of the CMSH Act

require the mine management to provide safety documentation,

attend the mine to do an inspection,

investigate complaints made by coal mine workers, and

109. I exercise powers under 119 of the CMSH Act on an almost daily basis. Those powers are usually exercised to:

(a)

(b)

(C)

(d)

110. There is no "one size fits all" approach in relation to when I would exercise my powers under $.119 of the CMSH Act. It all depends on the type of complaint or incident, the willingness of the mine management to discuss matters with me or the ability of an SSHR to be able to resolve the issue.

talk to coal mine workers and mine management.

Strengths and weaknesses of the statutory powers of ISHRs

111. I think the statutory powers of ISHRs work well, however I believe there is a lot of room for improvement, especially in light of the way in which the relationship between the Inspectorate and the ISHRs has developed.

112. I believe the ISHRs should have more power to attend a mine unannounced, to conduct an inspection. We are currently required to provide notice of an inspection to the mine management and that gives them time to clean up housekeeping and other issues that we need to address.

113. While ISHRs have the power to participate in inspections, our powers are limited. We have no right to participate in coercive interviews and we only hear they are occurring when a union member tells us about it. At the very least we should be told who is being interviewed and then sent a copy of the transcript once it has been prepared.

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HLJ.001.001.0019

114.

115.

the moment we only get transcripts from union members on request and we are being

denied information that would progress our inspections.

l also believe that the ISHRs should be sent lab testing results that the Inspectorate

receives for evidence. At present, the Inspectorate takes the evidence and tests it

which means that the ISHRs cannot access it or arrange for it to be independently

tested. l also believe there should be greater powers for ISHRs to be able to access

evidence as part of our inspections.

Section 166 of the CMSH Act deals with the power for inspectors and inspecting

officers to give a directive to reduce risk. The ISHRs do not have that power. | believe

the powers provided under 5.166 of the CMSH Act should be extended to ISHRs.

Gas exceedances

116‘

117.

118.

119}

120.

Signed:

Gas exceedances have been a common HPI notification since the point in time at

which the Inspectorate started to require that it be notified. | am not sure when that

was but l do recall seeing correspondence from the Inspectorate to that effect‘

In my experience, gas management is an inevitable issue that all underground black

coal mines need to manage. It is a hazard that cannot be eliminated, so the

management of it is crucial to the safety of underground black coal mine workers.

Methane is naturally produced by coal‘ It is an in situ gas that is in the seam and may

come from surrounding strata/ground which can result in a gas exceedance in

underground coal mines. Gas exceedances refer to the percentage of methane that is

measured.

If methane levels are detected at a rate of 2.5% or more it becomes a reportable

event, according to the definition published by the Inspectorate. If methane levels

reach than 5%, it can be highly flammable and there is a serious risk of ignition. All

underground coal mines in Queensland use ventilation systems to help manage the

methane levels. Ventilation systems serve several purposes. One purpose is to

remove and dilute toxic and flammable gases. They also provide cooling and remove

dust

All coal mines in Queensland have gas monitoring throughout the mine so they can

constantly track the levels of methane, which is a requirement under the CMSH Act.

Some mines also have gas detectors on mobile plant and the mobile plant is set to

aw

“trip out” once methane reaches certain levels.

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the moment we only get transcripts from union members on request and we are being denied information that would progress our inspections.

114. I also believe that the ISHRs should be sent lab testing results that the Inspectorate receives for evidence. At present, the Inspectorate takes the evidence and tests it which means that the ISHRs cannot access it or arrange for it to be independently tested. I also believe there should be greater powers for ISHRs to be able to access

evidence as part of our inspections.

115. Section 166 of the CMSH Act deals with the power for inspectors and inspecting officers to give a directive to reduce risk. The ISHRs do not have that power. I believe the powers provided under $.166 of the CMSH Act should be extended to ISHRs.

Gas exceedances

116. Gas exceedances have been a common HPI notification since the point in time at which the Inspectorate started to require that it be notified. I am not sure when that was but I do recall seeing correspondence from the Inspectorate to that effect.

117. In my experience, gas management is an inevitable issue that all underground black coal mines need to manage. lt is a hazard that cannot be eliminated, so the management of it is crucial to the safety of underground black coal mine workers.

118. Methane is naturally produced by coal. lt is an in situ gas that is in the seam and may come from surrounding strata/ground which can result in a gas exceedance in underground coal mines. Gas exceedances refer to the percentage of methane that is measured.

119. If methane levels are detected at a rate of 2.5% or more it becomes a reportable event, according to the definition published by the Inspectorate. If methane levels reach than 5%, it can be highly flammable and there is a serious risk of ignition. All underground coal mines in Queensland use ventilation systems to help manage the methane levels. Ventilation systems serve several purposes. One purpose is to remove and dilute toxic and flammable gases. They also provide cooling and remove dust.

120. All coal mines in Queensland have gas monitoring throughout the mine so they can constantly track the levels of methane, which is a requirement under the CMSH Act. Some mines also have gas detectors on mobile plant and the mobile plant is set to "trip out" once methane reaches certain levels.

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HLJ.001.001.0020

121. If the methane levels reach more than 2.5%, that area of the mine is deemed to be

unsafe and must be evacuated immediately.

122. Gas exceedances are very difficult situations to manage as an ISHR. You generally

need to be there when one happens to be able to investigate it. A gas exceedance can

arise very quickly, and it can be resolved in a matter of minutes which means that

there is often no utility in embarking on a four hour return journey to a mine to

investigate one because it is usually resolved by the time you get there.

123_ One advantage with managing gas exceedances as an ISHR is that when we receive

a notification we are generally advised of the incident, the cause of the incident and

the steps taken to prevent a reoccurrence all at the same time. Further‘ the SSEs

generally include data from the gas sensors on the written notification and it is very

easy to assess the incident without having to set foot in the mine. An investigation is

required for all gas exceedance that result in a notification of an HPI.

124. | am aware that between January 2017 and May 2018 the Inspectorate expressed

concerns about some mines not notifying events that amount to an HPlv The biggest

issue was that there were gas exceedances that involved methane levels being

detected at more than 2.5%. l received an email from the Inspectorate on 30 May

2018, which appeared to be addressed to the SSEs in Queensland coal mines which

summarised the requirements for notifications. Annexed and marked JH-4 is a copy of

that email.

125‘ In June 2019 l also received a document that had been prepared by the Inspectorate

about gas exceedances. Within that document the Inspectorate summarised best

practices for managing gas exceedances and also spelt out when a gas exceedance

amounted to an HPI which needed to be reponed. Annexed and marked JH-5 is a

copy of that document.

Gas exceedances at the Oaky Nonh Coal Mine

126. The Oaky Nonh Mine is located outside Tieri and it is operated by Glencore.

Signed:

121. If the methane levels reach more than 2.5%, that area of the mine is deemed to be unsafe and must be evacuated immediately.

122. Gas exceedances are very difficult situations to manage as an ISHR. You generally need to be there when one happens to be able to investigate it. A gas exceedance can arise very quickly, and it can be resolved in a matter of minutes which means that there is often no utility in embarking on a four hour return journey to a mine to

investigate one because it is usually resolved by the time you get there.

123. One advantage with managing gas exceedances as an ISHR is that when we receive a notification we are generally advised of the incident, the cause of the incident and the steps taken to prevent a reoccurrence all at the same time. Further, the SSEs generally include data from the gas sensors on the written notification and it is very easy to assess the incident without having to set foot in the mine. An investigation is required for all gas exceedance that result in a notification of an HPI.

124. I am aware that between January 2017 and May 2018 the Inspectorate expressed concerns about some mines not notifying events that amount to an HPl. The biggest issue was that there were gas exceedances that involved methane levels being detected at more than 2.5%. l received an email from the Inspectorate on 30 May 2018, which appeared to be addressed to the SSEs in Queensland coal mines which summarised the requirements for notifications. Annexed and marked JH-4 is a copy of that email.

125. In June 2019 I also received a document that had been prepared by the Inspectorate about gas exceedances. Within that document the Inspectorate summarised best practices for managing gas exceedances and also spelt out when a gas exceedance amounted to an HPI which needed to be reported. Annexed and marked JH-5 is a copy of that document.

Gas exceedances at the Oaky North Coal Mine

126. The Oaky North Mine is located outside Tieri and it is operated by Glencore.

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HLJ.001.001.0021

127. In my view, the Oaky North mine is actually a gassier pit than the Grosvenor mine.

Despite being a gassier pit, we receive less HPI notifications from Oaky North than

what we do from the Grosvenor mine. | believe that is because the Oaky North Mine

has a better gas drainage and ventilation system in place which means they can

manage it slightly better. Notwithstanding that, there have been approximately seven

HPI notifications about gas exceedances at the Oaky North mine within the period that

the terms of reference for the Board of Inquiry refers to. They are as followsv

31 August 2019

128.

129.

130‘

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 9.03am on 31 August 2019. The

Inspectorate was verbally notified at 10.22am on 31 August 2019 and l was notified at

10.45am. l received the written notification regarding the incident on 1 September

2019 at 12.16pm.

The incident occurred because during the initial extraction of Iongwall 501,

concentrations of methane exceeded 2.5% as they were passing through the Iongwall

back bleeder regulator and into the Iongwall back bleeder system.

| did not attend the mine to investigate this incident because l knew that work had

already commenced and that the Inspectorate had authorised it. For that reason, l did

not consider that there was an unacceptable risk to the health and safety of workers. l

observed that the mine had identified the cause of the gas exceedance and taken

steps to prevent it from reoccurring.

14 October 2019

131. There was incident involving a gas exceedance on 14 October 2019 at 3.15pm. l was

on leave at the time and Mr Watts dealt with the notification.

3 November 2019

132.

133.

Signed: Taken

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 9.05pm on 3 November 2019. l

was verbally notified at 12.25pm on 4 November 2019 and the Inspectorate was

verbally notified at 11.30am on 4 November 2019, The written notification was

received at 2.22pm on 4 November 2019.

The incident is said to have occurred because there was a plug of gas that had been

ejected from the GOAF that momentarily exceeded the diluting capability of the airflow.

That resulted in a peak of 29% of methane being tecorded. The gas conqqntrggignls-

were above 2% for approximately 22 seconds.’ l

127. In my view, the Oaky North mine is actually a gassier pit than the Grosvenor mine. Despite being a gassier pit, we receive less HPI notifications from Oaky north than what we do from the Grosvenor mine. I believe that is because the Oaky North Mine has a better gas drainage and ventilation system in place which means they can manage it slightly better. Notwithstanding that, there have been approximately seven HPI notifications about gas exceedances at the Oaky North mine within the period that the terms of reference for the Board of Inquiry refers to. They are as follows.

31 August 2019

128. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 9.03am on 31 August 2019. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 10.22am on 31 August 2019 and I was notified at 10.45am. I received the written notification regarding the incident on 1 September 2019 at 12.16pm.

129. The incident occurred because during the initial extraction of longwall 501, concentrations of methane exceeded 2.5% as they were passing through the longwall back bleeder regulator and into the longwall back bleeder system.

130. I did not attend the mine to investigate this incident because I knew that work had already commenced and that the Inspectorate had authorised it. For that reason, I did not consider that there was an unacceptable risk to the health and safety of workers. I observed that the mine had identified the cause of the gas exceedance and taken steps to prevent it from reoccurring.

14 October 2019

131. There was incident involving a gas exceedance on 14 October 2019 at 3.15pm. I was on leave at the time and Mr Watts dealt with the notification.

3 November 2019

132. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 9.05pm on 3 November 2019. I was verbally notified at 12.25pm on 4 November 2019 and the Inspectorate was verbally notified at 11.30am on 4 November 2019. The written notification was received at 2.22pm on 4 November 2019.

133. The incident is said to have occurred because there was a plug of gas that had been ejected from the GOAF that momentarily exceeded the diluting capability of the airflow. That resulted in a peak of 2.9% of methane being recorded. The gas were above 2% for approximately 22 seconds.

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HLJ.001.001.0022

134. l did not attend the mine because the Inspectorate had approved for work to

recommence and l considered that there was no longer an unacceptable risk to coal

mine workers, Further, I was not told until the following day so there was little that l

could do once l found out.

25 November 201g

135.

136.

137.

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 3455pm on 25 November 2019‘

The Inspectorate was noiified at 5.25pm on 28 November 2019 and I was notified at

8.10am on 29 November 2019. The written notification was received on 29 November

2019 at 11.58am, The author of the notification apologised for the tardy notification in

relation to the matter and advised that the investigation was delayed for a range of

factors that were not specified.

The incident was said to have occurred during general calibration tests of the gas

sensors was the result of a pressure differential due to the opening regulator doors

being discounted. As a result, there was a fall in the Iongwall 504 GOAF area which

expelled a spiking gas that momentarily overwhelmed the diluting airflow in the mixing

chamber. The gas level peaked at 3% and remained over 2.5% for 38 seconds.

l did not attend the mine to investigate this matter because | was not told until four

days later. As I was aware that the Inspectorate had been contacted the day prior and

work had recommenced, l considered that there was no unacceptable risk to coal mine

workers and therefore there was no need for me to attend the mine to investigate the

matter.

1 December 2019

138.

Signed: Take

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 1.20pm on 1 December 2019.

The Inspectorate was notified at 3.30pm on 1 December 2019 and l was notified at

3.50pm. The written notification was received at 1.13pm on 3 December 2019.

Pa

134. I did not attend the mine because the Inspectorate had approved for work to recommence and I considered that there was no longer an unacceptable risk to coal mine workers. Further, I was not told until the following day so there was little that I could do once I found out.

25 November 2019

135. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 3.55pm on 25 November 2019. The Inspectorate was notified at 5.25pm on 28 November 2019 and I was notified at 8.10am on 29 November 2019. The written notification was received on 29 November 2019 at 11.58am. The author of the notification apologised for the tardy notification in relation to the matter and advised that the investigation was delayed for a range of factors that were not specified.

137. I did not attend the mine to investigate this matter because l was not told until four days later. As I was aware that the Inspectorate had been contacted the day prior and work had recommenced, I considered that there was no unacceptable risk to coal mine workers and therefore there was no need for me to attend the mine to investigate the matter.

136. The incident was said to have occurred during general calibration tests of the gas sensors was the result of a pressure differential due to the opening regulator doors being discounted. As a result, there was a fall in the longwall 504 GOAF area which expelled a spiking gas that momentarily overwhelmed the diluting airflow in the mixing chamber. The gas level peaked at 3% and remained over 2.5% for 38 seconds.

1 December 2019

138. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 1.20pm on 1 December 2019. The Inspectorate was notified at 3.30pm on 1 December 2019 and I was notified at 3.50pm. The written notification was received at 1.13pm on 3 December 2019.

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HLJ.001.001.0023

139.

140.

The incident occurred due to a planned ventilation change to maingate 504 from the

intake air to return air ventilation from maingate 505 and exhausting via the north

mains returns‘ The objective of the exercise was to increase the pressure differential

across to the GOAF seals and increase maingate 505 vent qualities, The ERZ

interface was not disabled when they were changing the intake air way which tripped

power and greater gas omissions out of 504 GOAF than previously expected resulted

in a peak gas exceedance of 2.65% at the base of the shaft. The fan ‘knife gate’ was

pariially set open as part of the recirculation control and the gas concentration that

went through the fan was 1.92%.

On this day l was travelling to Brisbane. When I received the notification regarding the

incident the problem had already been identified and rectified. There had been an

event change and it was apparent to me that the cause of the issue would not happen

again‘ Also, work had recommenced which therefore indicated that the Inspectorate

had already determined that there was no unacceptable risk to the health and safety of

coal mine workers, For that reason, | did not attend the mine.

6 December 2019

141‘

142.

143.

There was an incident involving a gas exoeedance at 5,56pm on 6 December 2019.

The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 8.50pm on 6 December 2019 and l was

notified at 9.00pm. | received the written notification at 10.36pm on 6 December 2019,

The incident occurred because they were erecting a line of brattice along the tailgate

shields after an initial incident to course the airflow into the tailgate proper. As a result,

a gas exceedance of 2.14% was detected as the shearer was coming into the tailgate‘

The crew were instructed to erect a Sherwood cuttain to provide more control over the

tailgate area airflow, however the GOAF stream methane concentration was within the

limits at that time.

On that day I was in Brisbane and travelling home‘ | was not told about the incident

until three hours later but was advised that work had already been recommenced at

the same time as the notification. l knew that the Inspectorate had already satisfied

itself that there was no unacceptable risk to health and safety of workers. and I was

also told the cause and the steps taken to reclify the incident when l received the

verbal notification‘ In my view the incident was explainable and | had no reason to

attend the mine to investigate the incident.

18 March 2020

Signed:

139. The incident occurred due to a planned ventilation change to margate 504 from the intake air to return air ventilation from margate 505 and exhausting via the north mains returns. The objective of the exercise was to increase the pressure differential across to the GOAF seals and increase margate 505 vent qualities. The ERZ interface was not disabled when they were changing the intake air way which tripped power and greater gas omissions out of 504 GOAF than previously expected resulted in a peak gas exceedance of 2.65% at the base of the shaft. The fan 'knife gate' was partially set open as part of the recirculation control and the gas concentration that

went through the fan was 1

140. On this day l was travelling to Brisbane. When I received the notification regarding the incident the problem had already been identified and rectified. There had been an event change and it was apparent to me that the cause of the issue would not happen again. Also, work had recommenced which therefore indicated that the Inspectorate

had already determined that there was no unacceptable risk to the health and safety of

coal mine workers. For that reason, I did not attend the mine.

.92%.

6 December 2019

141. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 5.56pm on 6 December 2019. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 8.50pm on 6 December 2019 and I was notified at 9.00pm. I received the written notification at 10.36pm on 6 December 2019.

142. The incident occurred because they were erecting a line of brattice along the tailgate shields after an initial incident to course the airflow into the tailgate proper. As a result, a gas exceedance of 2.14% was detected as the shearer was coming into the tailgate. The crew were instructed to erect a Sherwood curtain to provide more control over the tailgate area airflow, however the GOAF stream methane concentration was within the limits at that time.

143. On that day I was in Brisbane and travelling home. I was not told about the incident until three hours later but was advised that work had already been recommenced at the same time as the notification. I knew that the Inspectorate had already satisfied itself that there was no unacceptable risk to health and safety of workers, and l was also told the cause and the steps taken to rectify the incident when I received the verbal notification. In my view the incident was explainable and I had no reason to attend the mine to investigate the incident.

18 March 2020

Signed:

HLJ.001.001.0024

144. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 3.30pm on 18 March 2020. l

was on leave at the time and Mr Wans dealt with this notification.

Gas exceedances at the Grasslree Mine

145.

146.

The Grasstree Mine is operated by Anglo-American and is located in Middlemount.

There have been approximately 17 notifications about gas exceedance at the

Grasstree Coal Mine between 1 July 2019 and 5 May 2020. They are as follows.

14 June 2019

147.

148.

149.

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 12.38pm on 14 June 2019. The

Inspectorate was verbally notified at 12.54pm on 14 June 2019 and I was verbally

notified at 12.59pm. The written notification was received at 7.21am on 17 June 2019.

The incident occurred in the Iongwall 908 tailgate when a strata waiting event caused

an increase in the gas rate. A barometric low also occurred and this has also

increased the GOAF gas rate. The gas peaked at 2.52% for approximately 20 seconds

before trending back into acceptable limits. The timing of the gas peak was also

associated with the movement of winding cage in of ventilation shafts of the

underground mine. The movement of the winding cage has been assumed to have

caused ventilation pressure changes to the ventilation circuit of the Iongwall‘

I was in the office on this day. When I received the notification, I was aware that work

had already recommenced and the Inspectorate had authorised that, so they had

satisfied themselves that there was no unacceptable risk to the safety of coal mine

workers. I was also satisfied that they had identified the cause of the incident and

taken preventative steps to stop if from reoccurring, so it was not necessary for me to

attend the mine to investigate the matter.

28 Jul! 2019

150. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 1.16am on 28 July 2019. The

Inspectorate was verbally notified at 2.00pm on 28 July 2019 and l was verbally

notified at 2.10pm. The written notification was received at 10.35am on 29 July 2019.

144. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 3.30pm on 18 March 2020. I was on leave at the time and Mr Watts dealt with this notification.

Gas exceedances at the Grasstree Mine

145. The Grasstree Mine is operated by Anglo-American and is located in Middlemount.

146. There have been approximately 17 notifications about gas exceedance at the Grasstree Coal Mine between 1 July 2019 and 5 May 2020. They are as follows.

14 June 2019

147. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 12.38pm on 14 June 2019. The- Inspectorate was verbally notified at 12.54pm on 14 June 2019 and I was verbally notified at 12.59pm. The written notification was received at 7.21am on 17 June 2019.

148. The incident occurred in the longwall 908 tailgate when a strata waiting event caused an increase in the gas rate. A barometric low also occurred and this has also increased the GOAF gas rate. The gas peaked at 2.52% for approximately 20 seconds before trending back into acceptable limits. The timing of the gas peak was also associated with the movement of winding cage in of ventilation shafts of the underground mine. The movement of the winding cage has been assumed to have caused ventilation pressure changes to the ventilation circuit of the longwall.

149. I was in the office on this day. When I received the notification, I was aware that work had already recommenced and the Inspectorate had authorised that, so they had satisfied themselves that there was no unacceptable risk to the safety of coal mine workers. I was also satisfied that they had identified the cause of the incident and taken preventative steps to stop if from reoccurring, so it was not necessary for me to attend the mine to investigate the matter.

28 July 2019

150. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 1.16am on 28 July 2019. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 2.00pm on 28 July 2019 and l was verbally notified at 2.10pm. The written notification was received at 10.35am on 29 July 2019.

Signed: TakeH

HLJ.001.001.0025

151_

152'

The reason for the gas exceedance was the reduced performance of the GOAF

drainage due to a bore hole deterioration and failure of compressor units. There was

also an abnormal increase in the gas rate due to strata movements in the caved, and

the barometric low in the afternoon was a steeper change than normal. The failure of a

compressor in the venturi set on the GOAF drainage hole was also pivotal to the

exceedance. Gas peaked at 2.96% but was diluted to 2% in the main returns.

This incident occurred on a Sunday. When l received the notification, | was aware that

work had already recommenced and the Inspectorate had authorised that, so they had

satisfied themselves that there was no unacceptable risk to the safety of coal mine

workers. I was also satisfied that they had identified the cause of the incident and

taken preventative steps to stop if from reoccurring, so not necessary for me to attend

the mine to investigate the matter.

26 October 2019

153.

154.

155.

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 5.40am on 26 October 2019.

The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 8.00pm and l was verbally notified at 8.04pm.

The written notification was received at 9.52am on 28 October 2019.

The incident occurred in the Iongwall 808 tailgate when a GOAF fail event caused an

increase in gas. The gas was found by the ERZ controller when he was doing an

inspection of the lailgate roadway and the reading was 276% on his personal gas

device. The Iongwall 808 had only commenced production a few days prior and the

gas accumulation was associated with GOAF flashing and first caving.

l was not told about this incident until some 17 hours later. By the time I had been

advised the cause of the event had been investigated and preventative action had

been implemented. I formed the view that there would not be much achieved by

attending the mine to investigate this matter and | was also satisfied that there was no

longer on unacceptable risk to the health and safety of coal mine workers because the

Inspectorate had authorised work recommencing.

1mm 156.

Signed:

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 11.203m on 30 October 2019.

The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 12.30pm on 30 October 2019 and | was

verbally notified at 12.35pm. The written notification was received at 7.14am on 4

November 2019.

151. The reason for the gas exceedance was the reduced performance of the GOAF drainage due to a bore hole deterioration and failure of compressor units. There was also an abnormal increase in the gas rate due to strata movements in the caved, and the barometric low in the afternoon was a steeper change than normal. The failure of a compressor in the venturi set on the GOAF drainage hole was also pivotal to the exceedance. Gas peaked at 2.96% but was diluted to 2% in the main returns.

152. This incident occurred on a Sunday. When I received the notification, l was aware that work had already recommenced and the Inspectorate had authorised that, so they had satisfied themselves that there was no unacceptable risk to the safety of coal mine workers. l was also satisfied that they had identified the cause of the incident and taken preventative steps to stop if from reoccurring, so not necessary for me to attend

the mine to investigate the matter.

26 October 2019

153. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 5.40am on 26 October 2019. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 8.00pm and l was verbally notified at 8.04pm. The written notification was received at 9.52am on 28 October 2019.

154. The incident occurred in the longwall 808 tailgate when a GOAF fail event caused an increase in gas. The gas was found by the ERZ controller when he was doing an inspection of the tailgate roadway and the reading was 2.76% on his personal gas device. The longwall 808 had only commenced production a few days prior and the gas accumulation was associated with GOAF flashing and first caving.

155. I was not told about this incident until some 17 hours later. By the time I had been advised the cause of the event had been investigated and preventative action had been implemented. I formed the view that there would not be much achieved by attending the mine to investigate this matter and l was also satisfied that there was no longer on unacceptable risk to the health and safety of coal mine workers because the Inspectorate had authorised work recommencing.

30 October 2019

156. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 11.20am on 30 October 2019. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 12.30pm on 30 October 2019 and I was verbally notified at 12.35pm. The written notification was received at 7.14am on 4

November 2019.

Signed:

HLJ.001.001.0026

157. The incident occurred due to a failure of the GOAF drainage plant in the Iongwall 808

tailgate. A failure of the mine communication system caused the GOAF drainage plant

to trip. During the downtime associated with the GOAF drainage plant trip, namely

approximately two hours, gas levels in the tail gate steadily rose and exceeded limits.

The reading peaked at 2.82%‘

158. I was in Brisbane on this day, By the time | had been advised the cause of the event

had been investigated and preventative action had been implemented‘ I did not

consider there to be an unacceptable risk to coal mine workers as a result.

7 November 2019

159. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 1.43pm on 7 November 2019.

The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 7.30am and | was verbally notified at 7.15pm.

The written notification was received at 10.44am on 8 November 2019.

160. The incident occurred because the machine doors located outbye in the 909 tailgate A

heading were closed prior to the regulator opening. This resulted in a sudden pressure

drop in the 909 tailgate dogleg which subsequently caused an increased gas omission

into the 909 tailgate dogleg from the purging point of the 909 GOAF. The tailgate

dogleg sensor recorded an exceedance above 2.5% for 70 seconds with a maximum

of 2.58%.

161‘ In my view this incident was easily explainable. It was a matter of the process of how

they had entered the tailgate. As they had identified the issue and rectified it, I was of

the view there was no longer an unacceptable risk to the health and safety of coal

mine workers, so | did not attend the mine_

12 November 2019

162. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 3.30pm on 12 November 2019. I

was not advised about this incident until 4.59pm on 13 November 2019 and the

Inspectorate was verbally notified at 4.55pm. The notification was sent at 7.38am on

14 November 2019.

163. The incident occurred due to planned maintenance stoppage of the auxiliary fan to do

electric coal checks. The fans could not be quickly restarted because an electrical fault

occurred. During the downtime associated with the electrical fault the gas levels in the

area steadily rose and exceeded 2.5%. v

, 5 ‘1

'

Signed: Taken b

157. The incident occurred due to a failure of the GOAF drainage plant in the longwall 808 tailgate. A failure of the mine communication system caused the GOAF drainage plant to trip. During the downtime associated with the GOAF drainage plant trip, namely approximately two hours, gas levels in the tail gate steadily rose and exceeded limits. The reading peaked at 2.82%.

158. l was in Brisbane on this day. By the time I had been advised the cause of the event had been investigated and preventative action had been implemented, I did not consider there to be an unacceptable risk to coal mine workers as a result.

7 November 2019

159. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 1.43pm on 7 November 2019. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 7.30am and I was verbally notified at 7.15pm. The written notification was received at 10.44am on 8 November 2019.

160. The incident occurred because the machine doors located outbye in the 909 tailgate A heading were closed prior to the regulator opening. This resulted in a sudden pressure drop in the 909 tailgate dogleg which subsequently caused an increased gas omission into the 909 tailgate dogleg from the purging point of the 909 GOAF. The tailgate dogleg sensor recorded an exceedance above 2.5% for 70 seconds with a maximum of 2.58%.

161. In my view this incident was easily explainable. It was a matter of the process of how they had entered the tailgate. As they had identified the issue and rectified it, I was of the view there was no longer an unacceptable risk to the health and safety of coal mine workers, so I did not attend the mine.

12 November 2019

162. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 3.30pm on 12 November 2019. I was not advised about this incident until 4.59pm on 13 November 2019 and the Inspectorate was verbally notified at 4.55pm. The notification was sent at 7.38am on 14 November 2019.

163. The incident occurred due to planned maintenance stoppage of the auxiliary fan to do electric coal checks. The fans could not be quickly restarted because an electrical fault occurred. During the downtime associated with the electrical fault the gas levels in the area steadily rose and exceeded 2.5%. N

H::'\1nl'1»°.I I

n-sir

Signed:

Page 27

Taken bl-

HLJ.001.001.0027

164. l was not advised about the incident until the following day and by the time I had been

advised of it, the cause of the incident had been identified and corrective measures

had been implemented. The cause was explainable and | formed the view that there

was no longer an unacceptable risk to the health and safety of coal mine workers so |

did not attend the mine.

21 November 2019

165. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 4‘42pm on 21 November 2019.

166.

The Inspectorate was notified at 5.45pm on 21 November 2019 and l was notified at

6.00pm. The written notification was received at 8.4pm on 21 November 2019.

The incident occurred as a result of a failure of the GOAF drainage venturi

compressor. The mine was evacuated and work had not recommenced‘ As the mine

had been evacuated, | did not consider there to be an unacceptable risk to the safety

of coal mine workers. There had been no ignition and no one had been injured, so | did

not attend the mine to investigate it.

5 December 2019

167.

168.

169.

There were two incidents involving gas exceedances at 5.27pm on 5 December 2019.

The Inspectorate was verbally notified of the incident at 7.00pm on 5 December 2019

and l was verbally notified at 7.20pm. A written notification for both incidents was

received at 10.19am on 6 December 2019.

Both incidents occurred because there was a power loss due to birds shorting out the

power supply to shafis fans. When the fans were restarted the gas accumulation

arrived at the shaft seven gas monitoring and triggered a code red. That means that

area of the mine was evacuated due to the gas level being greater than 2.5%‘ There

was a similar event caused at a different shaft, which was caused by the same thing.

I was in Brisbane at the time‘ When | spoke to the person who made the notification,

they advised me that work had already commenced and l had satisfied myself that the

Inspectorate determined that it was safe to do so. l did not consider that there was an

unacceptable risk to the health and safety of coal mine workers because the incident

was easily explainable and appropriate steps had been taken to restart the fans.

11 Januagg 2020

170.

Signed:

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 12.29pm on 11 January 2020. |

was on leave at the time and Mr Woods dealt with the notification in my abgenc

164. I was not advised about the incident until the following day and by the time I had been advised of it, the cause of the incident had been identified and corrective measures had been implemented. The cause was explainable and l formed the view that there was no longer an unacceptable risk to the health and safety of coal mine workers so I

did not attend the mine.

21 November 2019

165. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 4.42pm on 21 November 2019. The Inspectorate was notified at 5.45pm on 21 November 2019 and I was notified at 6.00pm. The written notification was received at 8.4pm on 21 November 2019.

166. The incident occurred as a result of a failure of the GOAF drainage venturi compressor. The mine was evacuated and work had not recommenced. As the mine had been evacuated, I did not consider there to be an unacceptable risk to the safety of coal mine workers. There had been no ignition and no one had been injured, so I did not attend the mine to investigate it.

5 December 2019

167. There were two incidents involving gas exceedances at 5.27pm on 5 December 2019. The Inspectorate was verbally notified of the incident at 7.00pm on 5 December 2019 and I was verbally notified at 7.20pm. A written notification for both incidents was received at 10.19am on 6 December 2019.

168. Both incidents occurred because there was a power loss due to birds shorting out the power supply to shafts fans. When the fans were restarted the gas accumulation arrived at the shaft seven gas monitoring and triggered a code red. That means that area of the mine was evacuated due to the gas level being greater than 2.5%. There

was a similar event caused at a different shaft, which was caused by the same thing.

169. I was in Brisbane at the time. When I spoke to the person who made the notification, they advised me that work had already commenced and I had satisfied myself that the Inspectorate determined that it was safe to do so. I did not consider that there was an unacceptable risk to the health and safety of coal mine workers because the incident was easily explainable and appropriate steps had been taken to restart the fans.

incident involving a

11 January 2020

170. There was an gas exceedance at 12.29pm on 11 January 2020. I was on leave at the time and Mr Woods dealt with the .

s

notification in my absence

;

*~jt§111

Signed: Taken by:

HLJ.001.001.0028

28 Januagg 2020

171.

172.

173.

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 9.50am on 28 January 2020.

The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 11.10am on 28 January 2020 and | was

notified at 11.20am. The written notification was received at 4.38pm on 28 January

2020.

The incident was said to have occurred due to an air leak being found which caused a

dead spot in the ventilation in the return airways adjacent to an old sealed area. The

gas accumulation was discovered by a deputy when completing an inspection of the

airway. The was gas found on his personal gas detector to be over 2.5% and was

reported to peak at 2,74%.

In my view this incident occurred as a result of a bad mining practice, however they

fixed it very quickly. It related to a ventilation change which allowed an air leak. | was

in the office when this was received however work had already been commenced very

quickly and | was of the view that there was no unacceptable to the health and safety

of workers as a result of this incident.

22 Febnlaf! 2020

174.

175.

176.

Signed:

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 5.32am on 22 February 2020.

The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 1.00pm on 22 February 2020 and I was

verbally notified at 1.05pm. The written notification was received on 24 February 2020

at 8.12am.

The exceedance was due to a case being purged from the GOAF due to the ventilation

changes resulting from shield movements and the shearer position. A peak reading of

3.05% was recorded during a period of three minutes when the censor recorded an

undulating gas concentration. A brattice (a partitioner that is built between columns of

the subsurface mine to direct air for ventilation) was installed to prevent further

exceedances, and it is believed that a GOAF drainage hole was late to become active

which has also contributed to the exceedance.

I was notified about this incident five hours later and by that point work had already

been recommenced. For that reason, | formed the view that there was no

unacceptable risk to the health and safety of workers because the Inspectorate had

released the scene. At the time l was in Mackay and I was on my way back to

Rockhampton when l received the notification‘"

’

Page 2

Taken

28 January 2020

171. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 9.50am on 28 January 2020. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 11.10am on 28 January 2020 and I was notified at 11.20am. The written notification was received at 4.38pm on 28 January 2020.

172. The incident was said to have occurred due to an air leak being found which caused a dead spot in the ventilation in the return airways adjacent to an old sealed area. The gas accumulation was discovered by a deputy when completing an inspection of the airway. The was gas found on his personal gas detector to be over 2.5% and was reported to peak at 2.74%.

173. In my view this incident occurred as a result of a bad mining practice, however they fixed it very quickly. It related to a ventilation change which allowed an air leak. I was in the office when this was received however work had already been commenced very quickly and I was of the view that there was no unacceptable to the health and safety of workers as a result of this incident.

22 February/ 2020

174. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 5.32am on 22 February 2020. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 1.00pm on 22 February 2020 and I was verbally notified at 1.05pm. The written notification was received on 24 February 2020 at 8.12am.

175. The exceedance was due to a case being purged from the GOAF due to the ventilation changes resulting from shield movements and the shearer position. A peak reading of 3.05% was recorded during a period of three minutes when the censor recorded an undulating gas concentration. A brattice (a partitioner that is built between columns of the sub-surface mine to direct air for ventilation) was installed to prevent further exceedances, and it is believed that a GOAF drainage hole was late to become active which has also contributed to the exceedance.

176. I was notified about this incident five hours later and by that point work had already been recommenced. For that reason, I formed the view that there was no unacceptable risk to the health and safety of workers because the Inspectorate had released the scene. At the time I was in Mackay and I was on my way back to Rockhampton when I received the notification.

Page 265' /S et

Signed: Taken i

_.ea

HLJ.001.001.0029

14 March 2020

177.

178.

179.

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 8.40am on 14 March 2020. The

Inspectorate was verbally notified at 2.50pm on 14 March 2020 and | was verbally

notified at 2.55pm. The written notification was received at 7.00am on 16 March 2020.

The incident occurred in the maingate 910 panel after the failure of an auxiliary fan

causing an accumulation of gas to occur. There were several attempts to restart the

fan and during the period of stopping and starting the gas concentration remained

under 2.6%, The fan was tripping due to high vibration and ultimately a decision was

made to replace the fan. The production face was closed until a replacement fan could

be brought to the location‘ During the period of waiting for the replacement fan the gas

concentration slowly increased and was found to be exceeding 2.5% at a depth of 40

metres into the face when the ERZ controller inspection occurred. As a result of the

incident the ventilation arrangements were improved by centre bagging after the

accumulation was discovered. A change of shift and changeover of ERZ controller had

also occurred during that shift.

l was notified about this incident eight hours after it occurred. When | spoke to the

person that contacted me, l considered the cause to be very clear and identified that it

had already been rectified and the Inspectorate had already authorised work

recommencing. For that reason, l considered that there was no ongoing risk to the

unacceptable health and safety of coal mine health and safely workers so | did not

attend the mine to investigate.

20 March 2020

180.

181.

Signed:


Inspectorate was notified at 7.00am on 20 March 2020 and | was notified at 7.45am.

The written notification was received at 8‘55am on 23 March 2020.

The incident was said to have occurred due to gas being purged for the GOAF due to

the ventilation changes resulting from shield movements and the shearer position. A

ventilation arrangement of flaps was installed and adjusted at shield 193 to the tailgate

to prevent funher gas exceedances. A GOAF drainage bore hole was late to become

active at the location and also contributed to the exceedance. There was a peak

reading of 3.72% recorded for a period of eight minutes,

Pa

Take

14 March 2020

177. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 8.40am on 14 March 2020. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 2.50pm on 14 March 2020 and I was verbally notified at 2.55pm. The written notification was received at 7.00am on 16 March 2020.

178. The incident occurred in the margate 910 panel after the failure of an auxiliary fan causing an accumulation of gas to occur. There were several attempts to restart the fan and during the period of stopping and starting the gas concentration remained under 2.5%. The fan was tripping due to high vibration and ultimately a decision was made to replace the fan. The production face was closed until a replacement fan could be brought to the location. During the period of waiting for the replacement fan the gas concentration slowly increased and was found to be exceeding 2.5% at a depth of 40 metres into the face when the ERZ controller inspection occurred. As a result of the incident the ventilation arrangements were improved by centre bagging after the accumulation was discovered. A change of shift and changeover of ERZ controller had also occurred during that shift.

179. I was notified about this incident eight hours after it occurred. When I spoke to the person that contacted me, I considered the cause to be very clear and identified that it had already been rectified and the Inspectorate had already authorised work

recommencing. For that reason, I considered that there was no ongoing risk to the unacceptable health and safety of coal mine health and safety workers so I did not

attend the mine to investigate.

20 March 2020

180. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 6.08am on 20 March 2020. The Inspectorate was notified at 7.00am on 20 March 2020 and I was notified at 7.45am. The written notification was received at 8.55am on 23 March 2020.

181. The incident was said to have occurred due to gas being purged for the GOAF due to the ventilation changes resulting from shield movements and the shearer position. A ventilation arrangement of flaps was installed and adjusted at shield 193 to the tailgate to prevent further gas exceedances. A GOAF drainage bore hole was late to become active at the location and also contributed to the exceedance. There was a peak reading of 3.72% recorded for a period of eight minutes.

30

Signed: Take\ DYE

I

HLJ.001.001.0030

182.

183‘

184.

185'

186.

I was in Brisbane on this day to meet with Thiess. | had also had several discussions

with the relevant manager of the mine as detailed below because there were three gas

exceedances at the mine on this day. l was aware that work had already

recommenced and that the Inspectorate had satisfied themselves that there was no

imminent risk to the health and safety of coal mine workers. For that reason, I had no

reason to believe that there was an unacceptable risk that would justify the need to

contact an ISHR to attend the mine to inspect it.

There was a further incident involving a gas exceedance at 4.44am on 20 March 2020.

l was notified at the same time as I was notified of the abovementioned case

exceedance. The Inspectorate was notified at 7.00am. The written notification was

received on 23 March 2020 at 8.54am.

The gas exceedance was believed to be due to gas being purged from the GOAF due

to the ventilation changes resulting from shield movements and the shearer position. A

peak reading of 2.52% was recorded during a period of four seconds. A brattice was

installed and adjusted at shield 195 to prevent a further a gas exceedance. The GOAF

drainage bore hole referred to earlier was late to become active again and also

contributed to the exceedance.

As the incident had happened several hours prior to me being notified, and because |

had the opportunity to ask the manager that contacted me by telephone a range of

questions regarding the investigations that had occurred, I was satisfied that there was

no unacceptable risk to the health and safety of coal mine workers as a result of this

incident.

There was a further incident involving a gas exceedance at 12.00pm on 20 March

2020. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 1.50pm on 20 March 2020 and l was

verbally notified at 1.55pm. The written notification was received on 23 March 2020 at

8.50am.

Taken by:

182. I was in Brisbane on this day to meet with Thiess. I had also had several discussions with the relevant manager of the mine as detailed below because there were three gas exceedances at the mine on this day. I was aware that work had already recommenced and that the Inspectorate had satisfied themselves that there was no imminent risk to the health and safety of coal mine workers. For that reason, I had no reason to believe that there was an unacceptable risk that would justify the need to contact an ISHR to attend the mine to inspect it.

183. There was a further incident involving a gas exceedance at 4.44am on 20 March 2020. I was notified at the same time as I was notified of the abovementioned case exceedance. The Inspectorate was notified at 7.00am. The written notification was received on 23 March 2020 at 8.54am.

184. The gas exceedance was believed to be due to gas being purged from the GOAF due to the ventilation changes resulting from shield movements and the shearer position. A peak reading of 2.52% was recorded during a period of four seconds. A brattice was installed and adjusted at shield 195 to prevent a further a gas exceedance. The GOAF drainage bore hole referred to earlier was late to become active again and also contributed to the exceedance.

185. As the incident had happened several hours prior to me being notified, and because I had the opportunity to ask the manager that contacted me by telephone a range of questions regarding the investigations that had occurred, I was satisfied that there was no unacceptable risk to the health and safety of coal mine workers as a result of this incident.

186. There was a further incident involving a gas exceedance at 12.00pm on 20 March 2020. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 1.50pm on 20 March 2020 and I was verbally notified at 55pm. The written notification was received on 23 March 2020 at 8.50am.

Signed:

1.

Page 31

Taken by

HLJ.001.001.0031

187. The incident was said to have occurred due to gas being purged from the GOAF due

to the ventilation change resulting from shield movements and the shearer position. A

peak reading of 4.27% was recorded during a period of 15 minutes. The main gate

seal brattices were to be renewed as part of maintenance, the maingate shield

brat-[ices were to be adjusted, the tailgate six-man door was to be adjusted, and the

brattices and flaps adjusted and an arrangement was performed and tested with

smoke tubes. The same GOAF drainage bore hole was late to become active and also

contributed to the exceedance. The issues were verified as a major factor due to a

gassy GOAF bleed found issuing between shields 195 to 196 to 197. Shields 196 to

197 were found to be left back and shields 193, 194 and 195 were found to be fallers.

The shield staggered in that way also contributed to the ventilation obstruc'tions and

gassy ventilation from behind the shields.

24 March 202Q

188.

189.

190.

191.

Signed:


Inspectorate was verbally notified at 8.30am and l was verbally notified at 8.35am.

The written notification was received at 8.10am on 25 March 2020.

The incident was said to have occurred in the Iongwall 808 tailgate roadway. It resulted

in a peak reading of 2.57% which was recorded during a period of 13 seconds.

Changes were made to the automation of the tailgate GOAF shields to ensure that

multiple batching did not occur. There were also discussions with the crew to ensure

that they were aware of the issues and understood how to advance the shields without

causing a gas exceedance.

| had already satisfied myself when l received the call that work had recommenced

and that the Inspectorate had determined that there was no imminent risk to the health

of safety of workers. l was also satisfied that a thorough investigation had already

taken place and effective controls had been implemented. For that reason, l formed

the view that there was no unacceptable risk to the health and safety of coal mine

workers,

I was also on my way to Brisbane on that day. Had an investigation been required |

would have contacted one of the other ISHRs and planned for them to attend the mine,

but that was not necessary.

187. The incident was said to have occurred due to gas being purged from the GOAF due to the ventilation change resulting from shield movements and the shearer position. A peak reading of 4.27% was recorded during a period of 15 minutes. The main gate seal brattices were to be renewed as part of maintenance, the maingate shield brattices were to be adjusted, the tailgate six-man door was to be adjusted, and the brattices and flaps adjusted and an arrangement was performed and tested with smoke tubes. The same GOAF drainage bore hole was late to become active and also contributed to the exceedance. The issues were verified as a major factor due to a gassy GOAF bleed found issuing between shields 195 to 196 to 197. Shields 196 to

197 were found to be left back and shields 193, 194 and 195 were found to be fallers. The shield staggered in that way also contributed to the ventilation obstructions and gassy ventilation from behind the shields.

24 March 2020

188. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 2.40am on 24 March 2020. The

Inspectorate was verbally notified at 8.30am and I was verbally notified at 8.35am. The written notification was received at 8.10am on 25 March 2020.

189. The incident was said to have occurred in the longwall 808 tailgate roadway. It resulted in a peak reading of 2.57% which was recorded during a period of 13 seconds. Changes were made to the automation of the tailgate GOAF shields to ensure that

-multiple batching did not occur. There were also discussions with the crew to ensure that they were aware of the issues and understood how to advance the shields without

causing a gas exceedance.

190. I had already satisfied myself when I received the call that work had recommenced and that the Inspectorate had determined that there was no imminent risk to the health of safety of workers. l was also satisfied that a thorough investigation had already taken place and effective controls had been implemented. For that reason, I formed the view that there was no unacceptable risk to the health and safety of coal mine

workers.

191. I was also on my way to Brisbane on that day. Had an investigation been required I would have contacted one of the other ISHRs and planned for them to attend the mine,

but that was not necessary.

Page

Signed Takeno

HLJ.001.001.0032

25 March 2020

192.

193.

194.

195.

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 5.50pm on 25 March 2020. The

Inspectorate was verbally notified at 8.30am on 25 March 2020 and I was verbally

notified at 8,35am on 26 March 2020.

The incident occurred as the shearer had left the tailgate after the completion of the

tailgate shuffle and was positioned at 182 shield. A peak reading of 2.63% was

recorded during a period of 34 minutes where the concentration fluctuated as the gas

layering cleared. The gas concentration exceeded 2.5% five times during that periodv

There were changes made to the automation of the tailgate GOAF shields to the

correct the advance sequence. There was also a digital play back of automation of the

shields that revealed that a group of four shields had been lefl back. The mine

engaged in crew talks to include awareness of the issues and how to advance the

shields without causing a gas exceedance.

There were also alterations made to brattices and it was discovered that next GOAF

drainage had not come into production yet. Subsequent mining of the next four metres

brought the GOAF drainage well into production and gas concentration reduced

generally.

I did not attend the mine because I was not notified until the following day. As work

had already recommenced and the Inspectorate had authorised the recommencement

of work, | formed the view that there was no unacceptable risk to the health and safety

of coal mine workers and did not attend the mine to investigate.

6 AQn'l 2020

196.

197.

Signed: Taken

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 11,14am on 6 April 2020‘ | was

notified of the incident at 12.45pm on 6 April 2020, and the Inspectorate had been

notified at 12.40pm. The written notification was received at 3_18pm on 6 April 2020.

The incident occurred as the shearer had left the tailgate afler the completion of the

tailgate shuffle and was positioned at 183 shield when the exceedance occurred. The

tailgate strata was reported to have been hanging back eight metres at the start of the

shift and had fallen in during the event so that is was flush with the tail gate shields.

The GOAF drainage bore holes had decayed due to strata movement and flooding

from the strata make of the water being used underground.

Page

25 March 2020

192. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 5.50pm on 25 March 2020. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 8.30am on 25 March 2020 and I was verbally notified at 8.35am on 26 March 2020.

193. The incident occurred as the shearer had left the tailgate after the completion of the tailgate shuffle and was positioned at 182 shield. A peak reading of 2.63% was recorded during a period of 34 minutes where the concentration fluctuated as the gas layering cleared. The gas concentration exceeded 2.5% five times during that period. There were changes made to the automation of the tailgate GOAF shields to the correct the advance sequence. There was also a digital play back of automation of the shields that revealed that a group of four shields had been left back. The mine engaged in crew talks to include awareness of the issues and how to advance the shields without causing a gas exceedance.

194. There were also alterations made to brattices and it was discovered that next GOAF

drainage had not come into production yet. Subsequent mining of the next four metres brought the GOAF drainage well into production and gas concentration reduced generally.

195. I did not attend the mine because I was not notified until the following day. As work had already recommenced and the Inspectorate had authorised the recommencement of work, I formed the view that there was no unacceptable risk to the health and safety of coal mine workers and did not attend the mine to investigate.

6 April 2020

196. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 11.14am on 6 April 2020. I was notified of the incident at 12.45pm on 6 April 2020, and the Inspectorate had been notified at 12.40pm. The written notification was received at 3.18pm on 6 April 2020.

197. The incident occurred as the shearer had left the tailgate after the completion of the tailgate shuffle and was positioned at 183 shield when the exceedance occurred. The tailgate strata was reported to have been hanging back eight metres at the start of the shift and had fallen in during the event so that is was flush with the tail gate shields. The GOAF drainage bore holes had decayed due to strata movement and flooding from the strata make of the water being used underground.

I 11

pa

Signed: Take

HLJ.001.001.0033

198. There were also brattices and ventilation flaps in the tailgate which were knocked

down from a wind blast from the GOAF. It was also discovered that the next GOAF

drainage had not yet come into production‘ It was eight metres beyond the face

position.

199. At the time I was involved in a meeting the Rockhampton office. By the time the

incident had been reponed they had identified the cause of the incident and had taken

preventative measures to stop it from happening again. I was satisfied that there was

no unacceptable risk to coal mine workers as a result.

11 AQrII 2010

200. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 9.25pm on 11 April 2020. The

Inspectorate was verbally notified at 8.20am on 12 April 2020 and l was verbally

notified at 8.30am.

201. The incident was said to have been due to gas being purged to the GOAF due to the

caving of an intersection. The gas accumulation caused an immediate trip of power

supply to the AFC and shearer. A peak reading of 4.18% was recorded during a period

of 65 minutes where the concentration fluctuated as the gas layering cleared.

202. | was not notified about this incident until the following day. By the time that | had been

notified the source of the incident had been identified and corrective action had been

taken. As a result, I considered that there was no unacceptable risk to coal mine

workers so l did not attend the mine to investigate it.

Gas exceedances at the Grosvenor Coal Mine

203. | received some of the verbal and written notifications in Mr Woods’ absence in relation

to gas exceedances at the Grosvenor coal mine. They are as follows.

21 Jul! 2019

204. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 1.05pm on 21 July 2019. I was

verbally notified at 2.40pm on 21 July 2019 and l received the written notification at

5.34pm on 22 July 2019. The inspectorate was verbally notified at 2.36pm on 21 July

2019‘ The inspector who received the notification is related to the SSE at the mine, as

l have outlined above.

Signed:

T

198. There were also brattices and ventilation flaps in the tailgate which were knocked down from a wind blast from the GOAF. It was also discovered that the next GOAF drainage had not yet come into production. lt was eight metres beyond the face position.

199. At the time l was involved in a meeting the Rockhampton office. By the time the

incident had been reported they had identified the cause of the incident and had taken preventative measures to stop it from happening again. l was satisfied that there was no unacceptable risk to coal mine workers as a result.

11 April 2010

200. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 9.25pm on 11 April 2020. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 8.20am on 12 April 2020 and I was verbally notified at 8.30am.

201. The incident was said to have been due to gas being purged to the GOAF due to the caving of an intersection. The gas accumulation caused an immediate trip of power supply to the AFC and shearer. A peak reading of 4.18% was recorded during a period of 65 minutes where the concentration fluctuated as the gas layering cleared .

202. l was not notified about this incident until the following day. By the time that I had been notified the source of the incident had been identified and corrective action had been taken. As a result, l considered that there was no unacceptable risk to coal mine workers so I did not attend the mine to investigate it.

Gas exceedances af the Grosvenor Coal Mine 203. I received some of the verbal and written notifications in Mr Woods' absence in relation

to gas exceedances at the Grosvenor coal mine. They are as follows.

21 July 2019 204. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 1.05pm on 21 July 2019. I was

verbally notified at 2.40pm on 21 July 2019 and l received the written notification at 5.34pm on 22 July 2019. The inspectorate was verbally notified at 2.36pm on 21 July 2019. The inspector who received the notification is related to the SSE at the mine, as l have outlined above.

Page 34

Signed; Taken by

HLJ.001.001.0034

205.

206.

The incident occurred when a control room operator noticed the tailgate gas levels

rising while they were cutting out to the maingate. The Iongwall was contacted to set

up and do maintenance while the barometer was falling the tail gate gas levels were

rising. The gas levels kept rising while the shearer was parked at the maingate and

peaked at 2.51%.

I considered this incident to be explainable because there was low pressure

underground and there was maintenance occurring‘ The low pressure meant that less

things expanded and gas from the GOAF will escape. l decided not to visit the mine

due to the explainable nature of this incident and considered that there was no

unacceptable risk to the health and safety of coal mine workers.

22 Jul! 2019

207,

208.

209.

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 12.45pm on 22 July 2019. I was


5.35pm on 22 July 2019. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 4.42pm on 22 July

2019.

The incident occurred when the Iongwall shearer had cut out part of the tailgate area

and the Iongwall was advancing the tailgate shield when the tailgate roadway flushed

in beside the tailgate shield 149. The flushing event caused a temporary restriction in

the Iongwall ventilation circuit which resulted in the inbye sensor detecting 25% at

12.45pm and peaking at 2.89% at 12.54pm.

| was not notified about this incident until four hours after it occurred. By that time work

had recommenced. | considered this incident to be easily explainable because it was

caused by a fall in the wall and was quickly rectified. For that reason, l did not consider

thereto be an unacceptable risk to the safety of coal mine workers.

23 Jul! 2019

210.

211.

Signed:

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 3.44pm on 23 July 2019. | was


7.50pm on 23 July 2019. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 5.07pm on 23 July

2019.

The incident occurred while the shearer was cutting from tailgate to maingate in Uni-Di

and a cavity formed on the Iongwall face from the room support of shields 44 to 27.

The resulting rock drilling restricted the ventilation on the face and pushed ventilat'

into a GOAF which caused s spike in methane and peaked at 2.71%.-

Taken

205. The incident occurred when a control room operator noticed the tailgate gas levels rising while they were cutting out to the margate. The longwall was contacted to set up and do maintenance while the barometer was falling the tail gate gas levels were rising. The gas levels kept rising while the shearer was parked at the margate and peaked at 2.51%.

206. I considered this incident to be explainable because there was low pressure underground and there was maintenance occurring. The low pressure meant that less things expanded and gas from the GOAF will escape. I decided not to visit the mine due to the explainable nature of this incident and considered that there was no unacceptable risk to the health and safety of coal mine workers.


verbally notified at 4.45pm on 22 July 2019 and I received the written notification at 5.35pm on 22 July 2019. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 4.42pm on 22 July 2019.

208. The incident occurred when the longwall shearer had cut out part of the tailgate area and the longwall was advancing the tailgate shield when the tailgate roadway flushed in beside the tailgate shield 149. The flushing event caused a temporary restriction in the longwall ventilation circuit which resulted in the in bye sensor detecting 2.5% at 12.45pm and peaking at 2.89% at 12.54pm.

209. I was not notified about this incident until four hours after it occurred. By that time work had recommenced. I considered this incident to be easily explainable because it was caused by a fall in the wall and was quickly rectified. For that reason, I did not consider there to be an unacceptable risk to the safety of coal mine workers.


verbally notified at 5.12pm on 23 July 2019 and I received the written notification at

7.50pm on 23 July 2019. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at 5.07pm on 23 July 2019.

211. The incident occurred while the shearer was cutting from tailgate to margate in Uni-Di and a cavity formed on the longwall face from the room support of shields 44 to 27. The resulting rock drilling restricted the ventilation on the face and pushed ventilation into a GOAF which caused s spike in methane and peaked at 2.71%

Page 35 \

Signed: Taken ~ y *Gs- ..§8»,*

.r

J

HLJ.001.001.0035

212. l considered this incident to be explainable. There was a cavity fallen on the face

across a long length of the Iongwall; nearly 40 metres. The issue had been resolved

and l didn't think there was much that could be done from preventing this incident from

occurring. I did not consider there to be an unacceptable risk to the safety of coal mine

workers.

24 Jul! 2019

213.

214.

215.

There were two incidents involving gas exceedances at 12.15pm on 24 July 2019. l

was verbally notified about both incidents at 3.49pm on 24 July 2019 and l received

the written notifications at 4.38pm on 24 July 2019. The Inspectorate was verbally

notified of both incidents at 3.49pm on 24 July 2019.

The incidents occurred because while dealing with a cavity in the tailgate area the

shearer had cut out the tailgate area and retreated back to shield 131 to allow for the

tailgate shearers to be advanced. There was a GOAF fall while the shearer was

stopped and that resulted in a gas exceedance which peaked at 3.12% on the outbye

sensor. The gas exceedance was above 2.5% for around two minutes. The inbye

sensor also detected a gas exceedance and peaked at 2.7% and remained above

25% for about one minute.

Both of these incidents were the result of a GOAF fall. I considered the incident to be

explainable and did not think that much could have been done about it. Further, the

legislation allows for incidents like this and provide an exemption to it amounting to an

HPI in those circumstances. For that reason, l did not consider there to be an

unacceptable risk to the safety of coal mine workers.

17 August 2019

216.

217.

Page

Signed: Taken

There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 3.28pm on 17 August 2019. |

was verbally notified at 5.05pm on 17 August 2019 and | received the written

notification at 8.43pm on 18 August 2019. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at

4.55pm.

The incident involved power tripping when the shearer was cutting out to the maingate.

The gas levels peaked at 2.79% 0n the inbye tailgate sensor. The cause of the event

could not be identified, nor could the source of methane be located.

212. I considered this incident to be explainable. There was a cavity fallen on the face across a long length of the longwall, nearly 40 metres. The issue had been resolved and I didn't think there was much that could be done from preventing this incident from occurring. I did not consider there to be an unacceptable risk to the safety of coal mine

workers.

24 July 2019 213. There were two incidents involving gas exceedances at 12.15pm on 24 July 2019. I

was verbally notified about both incidents at 3.49pm on 24 July 2019 and I received the written notifications at 4.38pm on 24 July 2019. The Inspectorate was verbally notified of both incidents at 3.49pm on 24 July 2019.

214. The incidents occurred because while dealing with a cavity in the tailgate area the shearer had cut out the tailgate area and retreated back to shield 131 to allow for the tailgate shearers to be advanced. There was a GOAF fall while the shearer was stopped and that resulted in a gas exceedance which peaked at 3.12% on the outbye sensor. The gas exceedance was above 2.5% for around two minutes. The in bye sensor also detected a gas exceedance and peaked at 2.7% and remained above 2.5% for about one minute.

215. Both of these incidents were the result of a GOAF fall. I considered the incident to be explainable and did not think that much could have been done about it. Further, the legislation allows for incidents like this and provide an exemption to it amounting to an HPl in those circumstances. For that reason, I did not consider there to be an

unacceptable risk to the safety of coal mine workers.

17 August 2019 216. There was an incident involving a gas exceedance at 3.28pm on 17 August 2019. I

was verbally notified at 5.05pm on 17 August 2019 and I received the written notification at 8.43pm on 18 August 2019. The Inspectorate was verbally notified at

4.55pm.

217. The incident involved power tripping when the shearer was cutting out to the maingate. The gas levels peaked at 2.79% on the in bye tailgate sensor. The cause of the event could not be identified, nor could the source of methane be located.

QR DECMQRAT/ou 9 F .mf I<.f=='° - s=;>*§

TO o "qa'td

lm Y'

A'

Page

Signed: Takeno

HLJ.001.001.0036

218. In my view there is little that could have been done about this event once the gas

levels started to drop. The Inspectorate had authorised work recommencing and by the

time l had been notified the issue appeared to have been rectified. As the gas levels

dropped and did not rise again, | did not consider there to be an unacceptable risk to

the safety of coal mine workers.

Affirmed by the deponent on 24 July 2020 at Rockhampton in the presence of:

Signed:

Dgp nent

Signed: Taken by:

218. In my view there is little that could have been done about this event once the gas levels started to drop. The Inspectorate had authorised work recommencing and by the time I had been notified the issue appeared to have been rectified. As the gas levels dropped and did not rise again, l did not consider there to be an unacceptable risk to the safety of coal mine workers.

Affirmed by the deponent on 24 July 2020 at Rockhampton in the presence of:

Signed:

epnbnent Solicitor/Justice of the Peace

Page 37

Signed: Taken by:

HLJ.001.001.0037



This is the annexure marked “JH-1" referred to in the Affidavit of Jason Hill affirmed 24 July 2020.

Signed:



This is the annexure marked "JH-1" 2020.

referred to in the Aflidavit of Jason Hill affirmed 24 July

Signed Token Uv

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Statement of Attainment A Statement of Attainment is issued by a Registered Training Organisation

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BSBWHS409 Assist with workplace monitoring processes

a __q _.- agiggnigdfifiztgy Nmomuv aomsm Certificate Number: CO_$OA_BSBWHS409_10711_1 MINING

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Statement of Attainment A Statement of Attainment is issued by a Registered Training Organisation

when an individual has completed one or more accredited units

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Jason Hill

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BSBWHS409 Assist with workplace monitoring processes

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Q Authorised Signatory Dated: 17 July 2017 Certificate Number: CO_SOA__.BSBWHS409_10711_1

NATIONALLY Rzcocaussln TRAINING

I

HLJ.001.001.0041

The following content was covered in the unit of competency BSBWHS409 Assist with workplace monitoring processes:

Coal workers’ pneumoconiosis (CWP) Legislative requirements surrounding respirable dust monitoring in Queensland Overview of occupational hygiene hazards Sampling environment and equipment Sampling limitations Collecting workplace information and data Documenting and evaluating results of monitoring Recognised Standard 14 Monitoring respirable dust in coal mines Sampling to AS 2985 - 2009 Australian standard; workplace atmospheres - method for sampling and gravimetric determination of respirable dust Use and applications of real-time monitors Use and application of an anemometer Dust observation methods and best practices for underground and surface mines

The following content was covered in the unit o competency BSBWHS409 Assist with workplace monitoring processes:

Gplluaikslia in Queensland

i spheres - method

noel-'lilac wl- 11"H\°l'l.~\.l|*

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_ MINER, 12CM12. JANA SYSTEM 2 Competent 1411112005 14/11/2010 I OCC 00000699 MINER. JOY 120M12 Gunplbnl 21M 0/19” 2711MB“ OOC 00000700 MINER, JOY 126M12 LIMITED Omnpqlanl "NOIIOQZO 2M10IZQ04 00C 00000701 MINER. JOY 12(2M12 OPERATIONAL Compolanl 1M0“) 0810412006 000

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Comments: Tale - 031111 00000737

$301151? APPLY MINE COMMUNICATION Competent 1410812003 woo/zoos OCC EM

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MNGGZA, FACILITATE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS Comments: GW - 000819 MNC.U13BA. APPLY MINE TRANSPORT SYSTEMS MNC4U14I15/16A, GENERIC. U/G MOBILE EQUIP MNC.U143‘A, APPLY MINE SERVICES

3 SYSTEMS

MNC.U148.A. APF'l Y MINE FIXED PLANT SYSTEMS

MNC.U15.A ATTACHMENT ODS CASSETTE RACKER, MINER MNC,U15.A ATTACHMENT TUBE BASKET MNC.U15.A ATTACHMENT WET DUSTER

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GROUPS

00001677 RAMCAR Competent DBIOBIZOOG 0710912001 OCN 00001036 SHUTTLE CAR,JOV15$C 00m Inn! 1011 {/1097 0411012001 OOC

Qualification

Code Skill tmlivo Ruvlaw Dale Site Date

00000163 CABA INTRODUCTION TO OPERATORS USE Quullfiad OQIOMOW 09/002008 OCC TRAINING OCN

00000164 CABA OPERATIONS TRAINERIASSESSOR Qualified 1011212006 10/1 212011 OCN

00000393 FIRST AID. ADMINISTER ENTONOX Qualified 22/022001 wmooa OCC ANALGESIA \

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00000510 INDUCTION. CONTRACTOR, SURFACE (2 Ouallflad 141080003 HIDE/2008 OCC Your)

00000512 INDUCTION. CONTRACTOR. UNDERGROUND Qualified 1410842003 121080008 OCC (2 Year)

00000513 \ INDUCTION, EMPLOYEE, 5 YEAR Qualified 2903/2006 29/03/2011 OCC £REFRESHER (DO NOT USE)

00000866 1

MEDICAL, COAL BOARD Qualified 0310312008 03/03/2013 UCC

00001569 QUALIFIED MAINTENANCE 0F CABA Qualified 01I02!2007 01/02/2009 OCC EQUIPMENT OCN

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Coda Efluctlw Review Dale Dam

00000008 *24HR STATUTORY DEISEL COMPLIANCE Trained 2510112007 \OCC ‘

CHECK FAMILIARISATION

00000092 AREA INDUCTED. UIG ROUND NORTH Trilned 2310711999 21ID7I2006 OCC GENERAL (MONITOR ONLY)

00000168 CABLE AWARENESS Qualified 15/06/2006 1510612011 OCC

00000193 CONFINED SPACE AWARENESS Qualified 13(06f2002 121002007 OCC 00000195 I CONTINUOUS MINER NO GO 7ONES Qualified 2410212005 24/02/2010

I OCN

00000248 DIABETES AWARENESS Qualified 22/03/2007 22(03l2012 \ OCC\

00000248 DIESEL PARTICULATE AWARENESS Trained 22/03/2007 OCC

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3 00000339 EMERGENCY RESPONSE. EXERCISE. LEVEL Quallflnd 181050006 1610192007 OCC

4 00000343 EMERGENCY RESPONSE, FIRE TRAINING - Ouallllad 191080002 1210612007 OCC

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1011212006

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1011212011 g OCN I

FIRST AID. ADMINISTER ENTONOX ANALGESA FIRST AID, LOW VOLTAGE (SWITCHROOM) RESCUE

22102t2007

1410612007

22102/2008 OCC

1411212007 OCC

00000401 00000510

00000512

27/06/2006 27/06/2009 OCC I I

14Ioarzooa

woarzooa 12/08/2008 OCC

12/08/2008 OCC q

00000513

Qualified

Qualified Qualltled

Quallhed

Qualified 29/03/2006

r

29/03/2011 OCC l

00000666 00001569

CABA OPERATIONS TRAINER/ASSESSOR

FIRST AID, SENIOR (APPLY - HLTFA301 B) INDUCTION. CONTRACTOR. SURFACE (2 Year) INDUCTION, CONTRACTOR, UNDERGROUND (2 Year) INDUCTION. EMPLOYEE, 5 YEAR REFRESHER (DO NOT USE) MEDICAL, COAL BOARD QUALIFIED MAINTENANCE OF CABA EQUIPMENT OCN

Qualified Qualified

03/0312008 . 03/03/2013 01/02/2007 01102/2009

OCC OCC

00000008 Trained I OCC

00000092 Trained 2110712006 OCC 'U 1.VI

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l 00000168

25/01/2007

23107/1999

1610812006 0000019alI:l 13/061/2002

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24/02/2006 22/03/2007 22/03/2007 11/08/2005 15/06/2006 19/10/1999

I

00000aa2 g

I

0§&010 15/06/2011

I17/10/2006

15f06/2011 QOCC 12/08/2007 acc 24/02/2010 IOCN 22/03/2012 OCC

OCC OCC

:acc OCC

00000333 00000338

Qualified Qualified

18/0712002 1 woa/200a

17/07/2007 16/03/2004

.acc OCC

00000339

00000343

00000344

18-f05t2006

13/0612002

09/1012003 1 00000346

Qualified

Qualified

Qualliied

Qualified

Quanfiea

25/01/2007 1 l | .

00000347

00000352

0911012003

21/03/2002 00000352 1 21/04/2005 00000357 00000381

24HR STATUTORY DEISEL COMPLIANCE CHECK FAMILIARISATION AREA INDUCTED, U/GROUND NORTH

IGENERAL (MONITOR ONLY) I CABLE AWARENESS CONFINED SPACE AWARENESS CONTINUOUS MINER NO GO ZONES DIABETES AWARENESS DIESEL PARTICULATE AWARENESS DUST RESPIRABLE AWARENESS EDDIE CURRENT WINCH AWARENESS EMERGENCY EXERCISE - ESCAPE ROUTE - 2ND EGRESS EMERGENCY RESPONSE AWARENESS EMERGENCY RESPONSE. EXERCISE. LEVEL a EMERGENCY RESPONSE. EXERCISE, LEVEL 4 EMERGENCY RESPONSE, FIRE TRAINING D

EXTINGUISHERS EMERGENCY RESPONSE. FIRE TRAINING - FOAM LOW EXPANSION EMERGENCY RESPONSE, FIRE TRAINING . HIGH EXPANSION FOAM TURB EMERGENCY RESPONSE. FIRE TRAINING - HOSES EMPLOYEE SERVICES. EEO AWARENESS EMPLOYEE SERVICES, EEO AWARENESS ENERPAC SAFETY ENVIRONMENTAL AND COMMUNITY AWARENESS

Qu Iified Qualified

Competent Qualified

29/01r2004 21/03/2002

1 B/05/2007 OCC

12/06/2007 OCC

-07110/2008 OCC

I 25101/2012 OCC

07/10/2008 OCC

20103/2007 20/04/2010 27/01/2009 20/03/2007

OCC OCN OCC OCC

00000361 ENVIRONMENTAL AND COMMUNITY AWARENESS

Qualified 19/05/2005 18/05/2010 OCN | * 1

H ;

00000371 I ERZ CONTROLLER FAMILIARISATION CHECK LIST OCN

Qualified 28/02/2007 28/02/2012 OCN

00000385 00000387 00000394

13/09/2011 30/1 1/2013

OCN I OCC I OCC

I

I

I 00000400 00000402

FBR RAMCAR FAMILIARISATION FEEDER BREEKER NO GO ZONES FIRST AID, EQUIPMENT FAMILIARISATION FIRST AID, SENARIO TRAINING FIT 2 WORK. PRACTICAL

Trained Trained Trained

Competent Qualified

13/09/2006 30/11/2008 01 111/2007 07/10/2004 22105/2003

07110/200B 20/05/2008

OCC OCC

http://aucoccsrv010/prjtes/person.asp?page=trainirlg&person= l 743

1

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Page 45

26/04/2009

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HLJ.001.001.0045

Person Viewer

00000404 00000411

00000434

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(10001860

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FIT Z WORK, THEORY i FRICTIONAL IGNITION AWARENESS

GAS DRAINAGE 8- OUTBURST AWARNESS

GAS DRAINAGE & OUTBURST AWARNESS

GAS MONITORING AUSTDAC EIMCO OPERATOR LEVEL

GRINDER SAFETY AWARENESS

HEALTH L WELL BEING 1

HEALTH l WELL BEING 2

HEALTH 81 WELL BEING 3

- H EAT ILLNESS AWARENESS

HEAT ILLNESS AWARENESS HEAT MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT

HYDRAULIC SAFETY AND AWARENESS

INCIDENT INVESTIGATION. ART-T (1 DAY)

JENMAR BOLT INSTALLATION TRAINING

JENMAR BOLT INSTALLAWON TRAINING

MANUAL HANDLING/BACK CARE COURSE

MANUAL HANDLING/BACK CARE COURSE

MEDICAL, MINES RESCUE - UNDERGROUND

MINE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS TRAINING (MEMS)

OAKY CREEK NATIVE TITLE AWARENESS

OCN MOP 69 - HEAT MANAGEMENT

OCN 5.0.?‘ PACK 1

OCN S.O.P. PACK 2

OCN SOP. PACK 3

PANEL STANDARDS

PERMIT ISOLATION TRAINING

PPE AWARENESS‘ HEARING PROTECTION

PRACTICAL STRATA AWARENESS PROCESS CONTROL

PRODUCTION SKILLS. LEVEL 4 ASSESSMENT

RIB AWARENESS! CONTROL ‘

SECURITY ASSESSMENT TO DEAL WlTH EXPLOSIVES

SKIN CONDITION AWARENESS

SOFTWARE. MICROSOFT EXCEL SPONTANEOUS COMBUSTION AWARENESS

SPONTANEOUS COMBUSTION AWARENESS

STRATA CONTROL AWARENESS STRATA CONTROL AWARENESS

STRATA CONTROL PRINCHPLES

TAGGING 8| ISOLATION REFRESHER

TRAFFIC RULES REFRESHER

TRAINING SCHEME ASSESSMENT

UPEE ASSESSMENT

VENTSTOP TRAINING

WATERBORNE BACTERIA PRESENTATION

Competency Legend

Current

Refresher < 30 days Needs Rafresher!

http://aucoccswl) lO/nrites/nerson.asp 7nage=training8wersnn= l 743

Gulllfisd Qualified

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22/03/2005

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07H 112002

15I07/2004

11/08/2005

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21/0312002

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05/ 1012006

HIDE/2000 01/1 112007

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17111712003

21104/2005

29/1112007

23/03/2001

1510612001

1810612002

28/08/2008

20/04/2006

22/03/2007

291012008 22/03/2012

191041201 2

30/10/2013

22/05/2010

2410212010

221002006 0111212010

02/1042009

05'10f2007 05/ 101201 1

27/09/201 1

12I1112007

23/02/201 1

14/08/2012

30110I2013

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02/10/2010

22/03/2010

12/08/2010

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26/04/2009


00000404 30/01rz003 00000417 00000434 00000434 00000107

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22/03/2007 19f0412007 30/10/2008 23/0512005

29/01/2008 22/03/2012 1910412012 30/10/2013 22/0512010

OCC OCC OCC OCN OCN

24/0212010 OCN 24/022009 22104/2006

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01/12/2010 02/10/2009

00000454 00000466 00000467 00000468 00000475 00000475 00000476 00000488

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1

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23/02/2006 14/0B/2007 30/10/2008 05/10/2006 10/11/2002 19/02/2007

05/1012011 27/09/201 1 12f11/2007 23/02/2011 14/0612012 30/10/2013 05/10/2011

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20/04/2011 02/10/2010 22/0312010 12/08/2010

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OCC OCN OCN OCC OCN OCC OCC OCC

00001334 00000477 00001339 00001340 00001341 00001370 00001374 00001394 0~001397 00001404 00001410

20/04/2006 02/10/2008 22/03/2005 12108/2005 02/01/2008 07/1112002 I

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FIT 2 WORK. THEORY FRICTIONAL IGNITION AWARENESS GAS DRAINAGE & OUTBURST AWARNESS GAS DRAINAGE & OUTBURST AWARNESS GAS MONITORING AUSTDAC EIMCO OPERATOR LEVEL GRINDER SAFETY AWARENESS HEALTH & WELL BEING 1 HEALTH s. WELL BEING 2 HEALTH & WELL BEING 3 HEAT ILLNESS AWARENESS HEAT ILLNESS AWARENESS HEAT MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT HYDRAU LIC SAFETY AND AWARENESS INCIDENT INVESTIGATION. ART-T (1 DAY) JENMAR BOLT INSTALLATION TRAINING JENMAR BOLT INSTALLATION TRAINING MANUAL HANDLING/BACK CARE COU RSE MANUAL HANDLING/BACK CARE COURSE MEDICAL, MINES RESCUE ¢ UNDERGROUND MINE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS TRAINING (MEMS) OAKY CREEK NATIVE TITLE AWARENESS OCN MOP 69 - HEAT MANAGEMENT OCN S.O.P. PACK 1 OCN S.O.P. PACK 2 OCN S.O.P. PACK 3 PANEL STANDARDS PERMIT ISOLATION TRAINING PPE AWARENESS. HEARING PROTECTION PRACTICAL STRATA AWARENESS PROCESS CONTROL PRODUCTION SKILLS, LEVEL 4 ASSESSMENT RIB AWARENESS/ CONTROL SECURITY ASSESSMENT TO DEAL WITH EXPLOSIVES

Competent Trained

Qualified Qualllled Qualified

Competent Competent Competent Qualfled_ Qualified Qualified Qualified

Competent 15/07/2005

Qualified Qualified- Qualified Quallfled Qualmea Qualified Trained

Qualified

05/10/2006 31/08/2000 01/11/2007 19/0512005 7107/2003

21/04/2005 29/11/2007 23/031200t

r 05/10/2011 30/08/2007 01111/2012 18/05/2010 16/07/2008 20/04/2010

00001641 ~0001655 00001847 00001847 00001855 00001855 00001850 00001880 00001881 00001886 00001929 00001978 00001983

SKIN CONDITION AWARENESS SOFTWARE. MICROSOFT EXCEL SPONTANEOUS COMBUSTION AWARENESS SPONTANEOUS COMBUSTION AWARENESS STRATA CONTROL AWARENESS STRATA CONTROL AWARENESS STRATA CONTROL PRINCIPLES TAGGING a. ISOLATION REFRESHER TRAFFIC RULES REFRESHER TRAINING SCHEME ASSESSMENT UPEE ASSESSMENT VENTSTOP TRAINING WATERBORNE BACTERIA PRESENTATION

Competent Competent Competent Competent

Trained

15/06/2001 18/06/2002 26/08/2008 20/04/2006 22/03/2007

OCN OCC OCC OCN OCC OCN OCC OCC OCC OCC OCN OCC OCC

L

Current Refresher < 30 days

Needs Refresher!

http://aucoccsn/010/prites/person.asp?nage=trainin,Q&Derson= 1743

may

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HLJ.001.001.0046




Signed:



This is the annexure marked "JH-2" referred to in the Affidavit of Jason Hill affirmed 24 July 2020.

.\::=»*--r "II--TE

Signed

Page 47

HLJ.001.001.0047

Sarah Cavanagh

Subject: Standardisation of MRE distribution

Importance: High

From: @dnrme.gld.gov.au>

1

Page 4B

Sarah Cavanagh

Subject:

Importance:

Standardisation of MRE distribution

High

1

HLJ.001.001.0048

Subject: Standardisation of MRE distribution Importance: High

Good afternoon All Operators, SSE’s and CFMEU,

The process of electronically distributing a Mine Record Entry by an Inspector is being standardised for all coal

mines. This standardisation may affect your current site processes, hence this communication. Mine Record Entries by an Inspector will be delivered only to the coal mine operator and the site senior executive, via their respective email address,

Where additional distribution lists have been included in the past for a mine, they will no longer be used.

How the Coal Mine Operator or the SSE choose to distribute copies of Mine Record Entries, is not a matter in which an Inspector has a role.

This standardisation of process will take effect immediately. Please direct any enquiries to the undersigned.

Regards

Stephen Smith Regional Inspector of Coal Mines — North Region

Mines Inspectorate | Resources Safety and Health Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy

Queensland Govemmenl P: M:

E: Steghen‘[email protected] A: Level 5, 44 Nelson Street, Mackay QLD 4740 | P0 Box 1801

Mackay QLD 4740 W: www.dnrme.gld.gov.au

The information in this email together with any attachments is intended only for the person or entity to which it is

addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. There is no waiver of any confidentiality/privilege by your inadvertent receipt of this material. Any form of review, disclosure, modification, distribution and/or publication of this email message is prohibited, unless as a necessary part of Departmental business.

If you have received this message in error, you are asked to inform the sender as quickly as possible and delete this message and any copies of this message from your computer and/or your computer system network.

Page 4 9

Subject: Standardisation of MRE distribution Importance: High

Good afternoon All Operators, SSE's and CFMEU,

The process of electronically distributing a Mine Record Entry by an Inspector is being standardised for all coal mines. This standardisation may affect your current site processes, hence this communication. Mine Record Entries by an Inspector will be delivered only to the coal mine operator and the site senior executive, via their respective email address.

Where additional distribution lists have been included in the past for a mine, they will no longer be used. How the Coal Mine Operator or the SSE choose to distribute copies of Mine Record Entries, is not a matter in which an Inspector has a role.

This standardisation of process will take effect immediately. Please direct any enquiries to the undersigned.

Regards

Stephen Smith Regional Inspector of Coal Mines - North Region Mines Inspectorate | Resources Safety and Health Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy

(iueenslan Government P: M:

E: [email protected] A: Level 5, 44 Nelson Street, Mackay QLD 4740 | PO Box 1801 Mackay QLD 4740 W: www.dnrme.qld.gov.au

I I D I o s c

The information in this email together with any attachments is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. There is no waiver of any confidentiality/privilege by your inadvertent receipt of this material. Any form of review, disclosure, modification, distribution and/or publication of this email message is prohibited, unless as a necessary part of Departmental business. If you have received this message in error, you are asked to inform the sender as quickly as possible and delete this message and any copies of this message from your computer and/or your computer system network.

2

HLJ.001.001.0049



This is the annexure marked "JH-3" referred to in the Affldavit of Jason Hill affirmed 24 July 2020.

Signed: en




Signed

Page 50

HLJ.001.001.0050

PLEASE UU NUI KLI'UKMAI lHlS PUKIVI MINES INSPE C TORA TE NOTICE OF C ONFIRMA TION

VERSION ll T0 THE MINES INSPECT ORA T E 0F A COAL MINE November 20] 7 HIGH POTENTIAL INCIDENT! SEAIOUS A C CIDE T OR DISEASE

MINE: OAKY NORTH MINE DATE16/12/20l9 T Ilix noticc* is made by 01'0" behalf of the SSE primarily ** pursuant to section 198(4) or (5) oft/1e CMSHA to confirm the initial oral report to an inspecmr and an ISHR. I! is also used to reporlprexcribed diseases pursuant lo section 198(6) afthc CMSHA. NOTE: " Nulicu rcqulrud “illllll 48 hours nr 24 l\n||rs i|| llll' rust‘ 0n Inlalily' M Aha scru-s Io report “Non-Rupormlvlv Incidents“

SECTION 1: INITIAL ORAL REPORT Made By: M D Downs Company Pusition: UMM I Phone: Made To: lnsp Neil Randolph Time: ~ 20:50 hrs Date:6/12/2019 Made To: ISHR Jason Hill Time: ~ 21:00 hrs Date:6/12/2019 Made To: SSHR Joe Barber Time: ~ 21:05 hrs Dale 6/12/2019

SECTION 2: SERIOUS ACCIDENT Is this a SERIOUS ACCIDENT: I NO

|

~07}. 1' Act slfi: .»| SERIOUS “TIDE/VT is mm l/ml (‘HILWI (n) rlrurh nr (In; a Forum m Ilu mhnim'd m Iun'pilul m’ an in-paliunflu- II'L'IIIHH'IH ofllw injury. ' ' ' .‘llw hr drflnlllnn l! I.\ 1| III'I '\'l)Tl-’ 1- ll hilt‘ Iml im'Im/wl In rln' Alffllliliflfl rifSERIOUSACFIDEA/T. .411 xlllfliljfiil') :wqufrrs hnmmlinle nurlfimtinn vfuu m'chlcllr "Ilml mums u prmu

J ' ' In Allllfl' nu injnn‘. filming nr liktlr Ia mum’. n [n'rmnm'nl injun' In n pvrmll ‘x \njrlr or Ivr'ullll ‘Z (Thix l\ nl.\|| ll III'I m lldilml bl‘ Jr! .\. I 7!

VOTE {V Sr'hudu/v '7 off/w Rr'gulullnn drfim's' SERIOUS EODIL l' INJLJR l'ux rm "in/‘my urn/ungn'ing. m‘ IMF/j‘ Io vmlmlgw'. Iifi' u!‘ valuing. 0r likely m

: ' ' mmr. u [Il'l'lmllll'lllfill/"1‘!!! Im|llll"u/u prnun.

SECTION 3: PRESCRIBED HPI TYPE BEING REPORTED SCHEDULE lC 10b A ventilation fm'lurr: musing a dangerous accumulation afmellmue or other gas that endangers Ihe

Acl 19R(2b) .cly am! health nfa permn.

SCHEDULE 2 Must n0! interfere with site Choose an item. without inspectarate

~ '7 - n Part l Au mm 1) per'mssw"

SCHEDULE 2 (‘l .t Investigation Report m an _ / 'lOOSC ‘lll l Cln. ' ' ‘ ' Part 2 Au 20 I ( m

< Impecmr wnlun l month. NOTE I: Sun” III'I Iljlm in Srlu'dulv I('ul.\u qunlilr 14x Inn-A in .S'rlq/r .7. Parr I runI/ur I'ur! I. Sl'r Ilrmih on raw-nu‘ "fl/1h [nrm

SECTION 4: NON PRESCRIBED HPI OR NON REPORTABLE INCIDENT NRI

N ON PRESCRIBED HP] U Where a “malt/l" mun”! be mmIc In flu.’ Svhurlulu I C lull lln' uvunr ix u

III’! m‘ ‘lg/hm! In’ ('MSHA su-riun I 7

Wlm'u Ilw inch/en! Ix \igni/icunl uml hm u safely “numugc " m xhurc will: NON REPORTABLE INCIDENT (NRI) El ,,,,,,,,.,,,.

VOTE I Au x! 7 III’! "(m rm", ur n .vm'irx ujurruls. 11m! mum or In“ (lu- lmlenllul rn rmm' n niguijimn/(uh-um’ r/[rrl (In rlu'1nfl‘n-urlwuhh u/n prn'nn "

SECTION 5: REPORTABLE DISEASE SCHEDULE l Chronic obstructive coal workers’ legionellosis silicosis Other

ulnlonnry disease I] pucumoconiosis E] D U Ta bu rvpm-luhlm'. Ihc :Il'xmsa mml lull-1' Ilfl'll vanmn'lrrl by n rm'rcm urfm'nn'r rnul uu'm' wm-A-w w/m um (‘\‘fmwvl

YO TE I . . , . . m dual/"gen! mnl Imx hml the lllllglm.\l\ ruymnnl In- u uunumuml nq-a/ mlmrr m- mun/m llm'lm'

NOTIE 2: 1m- n'h'valll hux ullun' (nofuflhz'r disnmr Inlarmalinu is mlulrul ml rhislom)

SECTION 6: DETAILS OF THE EVENT NOTE lufin'nmlinn Ilnll'illt'll in this main" im'lmlm‘ lllu “I'rimmjv Ilgfm'mnllnu "ra'llllin'd by s. "18(1) "fl/Ir ‘ m

CONCISE DESCRIPTION OF THE NATURE OF THE EVENT (1m! all IIIIIL'I' infurnmlinu in Ilm "Other infill'umlinlI/rluraiLs'"fil'lll Ire/0w)

LW; shearing inlo lhc TG and cutting into a stub in the block side ~ airflow going into stub and moving the goafstrcnm exit point up the face towards the MG" Peak reading 0f2,84 % CH4 recorded — power lrippcd correclly before this‘ Gas back to 0.55 % when stable. DATE: 6/12/2019 I TIME: ~ 1756 hrs I LOCATION: LW 501- AFC TG Driveframe EQUIPMENT INVOLVED: LW Shearer/1G m'ea layout I DAMAGE: None

ENVIRONMENTALCONDITIONS:(§) [Light 1:1 l [Mu-ME [Sunnyt El 1w“; n {my x [\Vlnd)‘: El

PERSONS INVOLVED: (x) lNumber: 0 [Employee E] Contractor [I ILaholll-llire El [Visitor El

N1\ME(S)OF DECEASED: TYPE DEATH I NATURALEI l XCCIDENT U

NAM E(S) OF PERSONS INJURED INJURIES EMPLOYER (vnmmclur whm-appliruhh!

NAME EMPLOYER h-murm'lur whore uppllvable) NAMES OF ANYONE WHO SAW THE INCIDENT OR WERE ‘

, _ PRESENT 1\'I"l‘HE 'I'IME AND IF NO WITNESSES, NAME ' _ Slufl Manner R COdy Glencote

OF PER-“ON FINDING THE INCIDEN'I‘

OTHER INFORMATION/DETAIL: Erectcd a line ofbrallicu along the TG shields nfler the initial incident, to course airflow into the TG proper. Another gas exceedance at 20:23 his @ 2.14 % as [he shearer coming into (he TG. Crew instructed to now also erect a

Sherwood curlain to provide more control over the TG area airflow. Note guafstream methane concenlration within limits at thFiifi tings. age

MINES INSPECTORA TE VERSION I I

November 2017

NO TICE OF CONFIRMA TIO/\' TO THE MINES INSPECTORA TE OF A COAL MINE

HIGH POTENTIAL INCIDENT, SERIOUS A CCIDENT OR DISEASE MINE' OAKY NORTH MINE DATE:6/12/2019 This notice* is made by or 0" behalfofthe S.S'Eprimarily ** pursuant to section I98(4) or (5) of the CMSHA lo eon/irm the initial oral report to an inspector and an ISHR. In is also used to report prescribed diseases pursuant to section I98(6) of the CMSHA.

*If* NOTl7 : * Notice required within 48 hours or 24 hours in the rnsr o f f fntnlily. 'Also serves to rcporl "Non Rcportublo lincidcnls '

INITIAL ORAL REPORT SECTION 1: Made By: M D Downs Company Position: UMM Phone: Made To: Insp Neil Randolph Time: 20:50 hrs Date:6/12/2019 Made To: ISHR Jason Hill Time: 21:00 hrs Date:6/12/2019 Made To: SSHR Joe Barber Tinle: 21:05 hrs Date 6/12/2019

SECTION 2: SERIOUS ACCIDENT Is this a SERIOUS ACCIDENT: NO AOTE I: .4(°r sl6: A SFRIOI S 4(l(lll)l~INT is Nm' rlmr 1wu5('.v (al) 1luurlu Ur (lr) 11 p¢'r.\'un Fu be uflarliffwf re lmspirul as an in-paric nlfnr rrumm al ofrhc i1y'fu'.\'

.-ill: Br dcjilririun fr is al HP!

NOTE 2: Il'71iiF' not 1`II¢'lIuI¢'d in the ¢l41inirin/1 ofSERIOL'.S'A(IFlDE '\'T. .-ld xl98(2)(iii) r'¢"q1lfl'¢'s inlnverliurm lm ryirnrimr dun a¢'cirI('1II 'llml wfiasux al purser m so[[vr all iujurr. ¢wf»°.\ing Ur Iilerlv to (°u1m'. a [n'rnnm¢'m infuser rn ( I p¢'r.\nn s sufvrl' or Irr'ulrll (7°lIis is nI.uI u I IPI as d¢'[Fm'l/ hr .4c'l s. I 7)

.=\0TE 3: RI (INH1l 'ildlujr 11l(I(IIlgcriII3,. orliA¢'ll'Io w1¢IrlI1gv1° IMWW ¢'alIsillg. vrfikvbwo Srlledllll' 9 IhfilU' Rvquiul/rm d¢'filws SERIOL'S BUDIL Y I.-'v.lL~' ' (`IlH.\l' u p¢'rmml¢'nl iulurs' of/ In'uI/h " of p¢'r.sun.

SECTION 3: PRESCRIBED HPI TYPE BEING REPORTED SCHEDULE IC lob A ventilation failure causing a dangerous accumulation of methane or vllwr gas rhaf umlang, ere the

sqfeqv and In alfh :J a person. Act wsml SCHEDULE 2

Choose an item. Must not inter ere with site without inspectorate perfusion Part l Act "L u( 1 1

SCHEDULE 2 Choose an item. lnve.s1igation Reporr to an inspector within I month. Part 2 A "*u I ( l c )

NOT!" I: Sn' details am row Ne u lids arm Some /IPI laws in Si/urdnlv I(lalso quuli/\' as nix in Sriznfulr 2, Parr I and/or Pan 2.

SECTION 4: NON PRESCRIBED HPI OR NON REPORTABLE INCIDENT NRI NON PRESCRIBED HPI H /lau a nmrcla cum ml be nuulc 10 the .Slflaezlulc l(` lm! ill' was! is or

HPI as :in/F/wr! be ('M.SIIl.4 s¢ orion I7

NON REPORTABLE INCIDENT (NRI ) WIu'ru /IN im'iden! is Si;,nuicalrl am/ has H .wIfel.l' Ilu5.s'ug¢' m slum. win/J lmluslrv

wow." I n YSOH .»|crsl7 /IPI 'nu 1 vom, or ( I s¢'1'i( s err On the an try or lwalfla o no up HIS r/mr v¢ul.~»ws or Iras the pnlrrlrinl pa cwusz. n .\igmyImul url use r.

REPORTABLE DISEASE SCHEDULE 1 SECTION 5: Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease

coal workers' pneumoconiosis

lcgionellosis silicosis Other

vows I To be raporrabfc ill' fliswm max! have he n canrrnm~d by or ('Hl'l'('lU rwfnrrm r m l m m u nrkvr 11'/1n nwx ¢.rpn.vwl In rlu.w/zg<°nr nm( /ms had Lin' dluguunis confirmed in' u uumimmwl nwdivul adviser or munllrr rlucmr

.VOTE 2: Ti¢~A r¢'lvvam lmxaluau' (lm under disease in ormulion is' required on this arm)

DETAILS OF THE EVENT SECTION 6: A O Tl; "I rinlm\ IIqlhrnnulion' rwIuir¢'d by x. lW8(3) qfrlre .l( 'r Iuj4n'muri4ul prr»1°id¢'¢l in this ,u criou ilrvlflrlr S the

CONCISE DESCRIPTION OF THE NATURE OF THE EVENT (put all other ilwn°nlarinn in flu "0rh¢r in/brmnlifm/dcmilx" /Is/ be/ony

'airflow going into stub and moving the goafstream exit point up power tripped correctly before this. Gas back to 0.55 % when stable.

LW, shearing into the TG and cutting into a stub in the block side the face towards the MG. Peak reading of 2.84 % CI-I4 recorded

TIME: ~» 1756 hrs DATE: 6/12/2019 LOCATION: LW 501 - AFC TG Driveframe DAMAGE: None E UIPMENT INVOLVED: LW Shearer I TG area layout

Dark: X x NS: ENVIRONMENI A L L NDllllIl x Wcl: Light : Sunny: Windy: Dry: PERSONS INVOLVED: (K) Number: 0 Employee Contractor Labour Hire Visitor NAMIC(S) OF DECEASED: TYPE DEATII NATURAL ACCIDENT NAM1-;(s) OF PERSONS INJURICD INJURIES EM PLOY ER (¢'onlm¢'mr l\°ln'r¢' applicable)

NAMES OF ANYONE WHO SAW THE INCIDENT OR WERE PRl*1!~il'INT \'l` THE TIME AND IF NO WITNESSES, NAME OF PERSON FINDING TIIE INCIDENT

NAME EM P LOY E R (conmwfor wlrcre applicable) Shift Manager RCody Glencore

OTHER INFORfVIATION/l)ETAIL: Erected a line of brattice along the TG shields after the initial incident, to course airflow into the TG proper. Another gas exceedance at 20:23 hrs @ 2. 14 % as the shearer coming into the TG. Crew mstmcted to now also erect 'I Sherwood curtain to provide more control over the TG area airflow. Note goafstream methane concentration within limits at this tine.

age

PLEASE UU NUI KILPUKNIAI nuns ruwvn

HLJ.001.001.0051



This is the annexure marked “JH-4" referred to in the Affldavit of Jason Hill affirmed 24 July 2020.

Signed:




Signed: Taken by

Page 52

HLJ.001.001.0052

From: Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy Sent: Wednesday, May 30, 2018 13:54 To: Jason Hill

Subject: Notification and reporting requirements associated with deaths, serious accidents, high potential incidents and prescribed diseases

To all coal mine SSEs

The purpose of this email is to remind SSEs of the notification and reporting requirements associated with deaths. serious accidents, high potential incidents and prescribed diseases.

Section 198 of the Coal Mininq Safety and Health Act 1999 (CMSHA) requires that all deaths, serious accidents, high potential incidents and prescribed diseases that occur on coal mines be notified to an inspector and an industry safety and health representative by the SSE. Section 16 of the CMSHA provides the meaning of a serious accident while section 17 provides the meaning of high potential incident.

Schedules 1 and 1C of the Coal Mininq Safetv and Health Requlation 2017 (CMSHR) provide lists of prescribed diseases and high potential incidents that must be reported.

The CMSHA requires that notifications are made as soon as possible after the SSE becomes aware of the following:

0 deaths at a coal mine ~ serious accidents which result in bodily injury endangering or likely to

endanger life or which cause or are likely to cause permanent injury to the person's health

v high potential incidents listed in schedule 1C of the CMSHR.

The notification by the SSE must include:

~ the precise location where the event occurred o the date and time the event occurred ~ the number of persons involved in the event . if the notification is about a death, the name of the person who died o for serious accidents or high potential incidents:

o the name of any witnesses or persons who were present when the event happened

o the name of any person who was injured as a resuli of the eveni o if no-one was present when the death or injury occurred, the name

of the person who discovered the event o a brief description of what and how it happened.

For serious accidents which cause a person to be admitted to a hospital as an in- patient for treatment for an injury, any other high potential incidents that are not prescribed in Schedule 1C, or diseases of a type prescribed in Schedule 1, the SSE must ensure that the notification is made as soon as practicable after the SSE becomes aware of them.

From: Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy Sent: Wednesday, May 30, 2018 13:54 To: Jason Hill Subject: Notification and reporting requirements associated with deaths, serious accidents, high potential incidents and prescribed diseases

To all coal mine SSEs

The purpose of this email is to remind SSEs of the notification and reporting requirements associated with deaths, serious accidents, high potential incidents and prescribed diseases.

Section 198 of the Coal Mininq Safety and Health Act 1999 (CMSHA) requires that all deaths, serious accidents, high potential incidents and prescribed diseases that occur on coal mines be notified to an inspector and an industry safety and health representative by the SSE. Section 16 of the CMSHA provides the meaning of a serious accident while section 17 provides the meaning of high potential incident.

Schedules 1 and 1C of the Coal Mininq Safety and Health Requlation 2017 (CMSHR) provide lists of prescribed diseases and high potential incidents that must be reported.

The CMSHA requires that notifications are made as soon as possible after the SSE becomes aware of the following

. .

. deaths at a coal mine serious accidents which result in bodily injury endangering or likely to endanger life or which cause or are likely to cause permanent injury to the person's health high potential incidents listed in schedule 1C of the CMSHR.

The notification by the SSE must include;

. . . . . O

O

O

the precise location where the event occurred the date and time the event occurred the number of persons involved in the event if the notification is about a death, the name of the person who died for serious accidents or high potential incidents:

the name of any witnesses or persons who were present when the event happened the name of any person who was injured as a result of the event if no-one was present when the death or injury occurred, the name of the person who discovered the event a brief description of what and how it happened. O

For serious accidents which cause a person to be admitted to a hospital as an in- patient for treatment for an injury, any other high potential incidents that are not prescribed in Schedule 1C, or diseases of a type prescribed in Schedule 1, the SSE must ensure that the notification is made as soon as practicable after the SSE becomes aware of them.

Page 53

HLJ.001.001.0053

Where a notification is made verbally the SSE must ensure it is also provided to an inspector and industry safety and health representative in writing, within 24 hours for the death of a person, otherwise within 48 hours.

Section 201 of the CMSHA requires the SSE to conduct an investigation and prepare a report for any serious accident or high potential incident. For accidents or incidents listed in Schedule 1C of the CMSHR, forward the report to an inspector within 1 month of the occurrence.

Additionally the SSE must ensure that statistical information is provided to the Mines Inspectorate. This includes completing and submitting:

- the Queensland Mining Industry Incident Report (commonly referred to as the form 5A), which must be completed for serious accidents, high potential incidents, lost time/disabling incidents and diseases within 28 days of the event occurring, and

~ the Monthly Incident Summary Report at the end of each calendar month.

Further information relating to notification and reporting can be obtained from the Deganmenj of Natural Resources and Mines web site.

Shaun Dobson Deputy Chief Inspector of Coal Mines Resources Safety and Health Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy QLDMineslnsgectorateQdnrme.gld.gov.au

Click to download the above document

Queensland (lover-1mm

Th\s email was sent by Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy , Resources Safety and Health, 1 WHllarn St, Brisbane QLD 4000 to j.h\[email protected]

U nsubscrlge

Pcwmud by6 VlSlOn

Where a notification is made verbally the SSE must ensure it is also provided to an inspector and industry safety and health representative in writing, within 24 hours for the death of a person, otherwise within 48 hours.

Section 201 of the CMSHA requires the SSE to conduct an investigation and prepare a report for any serious accident or high potential incident. For accidents or incidents listed in Schedule 1C of the CMSHR, forward the report to an inspector within 1 month of the occurrence.

Additionally the SSE must ensure that statistical information is provided to the Mines Inspectorate. This includes completing and submitting:

.

. the Queensland Mining Industry Incident Report (commonly referred to as the form 5A), which must be completed for serious accidents, high potential incidents, lost time/disabling incidents and diseases within 28 days of the event occurring, and the Monthly Incident Summary Report at the end of each calendar month.

Further information relating to notification and reporting can be obtained from the Department of Natural Resources and Mines web site.

Shaun Dobson Deputy Chief Inspector of Coal Mines Resources Safety and Health Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy [email protected]

Click to download the above document

This email was sent by Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy , Resources Safety and Health, 1 William St, Brisbane QLD 4000 to [email protected]

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Page 54

HLJ.001.001.0054




Signed:

°<>,

“(Rf-‘kw.

iv)- or Jusflv-




Iaken by: Signed:

Page 55

HLJ.001.001.0055

In ‘Wymwl ,,| “mm W u-H] w‘, Mm ‘ m1 t'wq‘

Methane management in underground coal mines

Best practice and recommendations

June 2019

Qusensland ‘WWI my 4-lyl

Pa -56

HLJ.001.001.0056

This publication has been compiled by Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy.

© State 0f Queensland, 2019

The Queensland Government supports and encourages the dissemination and exchange of its information. The copyright in mis publication is licensed under a Creative Commons Aflribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence.

Under this licence you are free, without having to seek our permission. to use this publication in accordance with the Iioence terms.

You mus! keep intact the copyrighi notice and attribute the State of Queensland as the source of the publication.

Note: Some content in (his publication may have different licence terms as indicated.

For more information on this licence, visit https:llcrealiveccmmons.org/Iicenses/bymnl.

The information contained herein is subject to change without notice‘ The Queensland Government shall not be liable for technical or other errors or omissions contained herein. The reader/user accepts all risks and responsibility for losses, damages, costs and other consequences resulting direcfly or indirectly from using this informaiion‘

This publication has been compiled by Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy.

© State of Queensland, 2019

The Queensland Government supports and encourages the dissemination and exchange of its information. The copyright in this publication is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence.

Under this licence you are free, without having to seek our permission, to use this publication in accordance with the licence terms.

You must keep intact the copyright notice and attribute the State of Queensland as the source of the publication.

Note: Some content in this publication may have different licence terms as indicated.

For more information on this licence, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/_

The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. The Queensland Government shall not be liable for technical or other errors or omissions contained herein. The reader/user accepts all risks and responsibility for losses, damages, costs and other consequences resulting directly or indirectly from using this information.

Page 57

HLJ.001.001.0057

SUMMARY As Queensland underground coal mines have become deeper and Iongwall production rates have

increased. mines are struggling to control the percentage of methane (CH4) in the Iongwall return

roadways tailgate.

Under the Coal Mine Safety and Heallh Act 1999 and the Coal Mining Safety and Health

Regulation 2017, if methane concentration is equal to or greater than 2.5% then the underground

mine is dangerous and workers must be withdrawn from the mine‘ Methane is explosive between

5% and 15%.

The Mines Inspectorate recently completed a series of compliance audits and requested methane

gas monitoring data from eight longwail mines so that a detailed analysis could be undertaken. The

audits revealed that all mines‘ gas monitoring systems complied with the Coal Mining Safely and

Health Act 1999 but a review of gas data indicated that mines were not reporting all incidents over

25% methane. Modelling of the mines‘ ventilation and methane emissions has shown that in some

cases explosive mixtures of methane could have been present in the atmosphere flowing into the

Iongwall tailgate,

Following the issue of directives and substandard conditions and practice notices (SCPs), five

mines introduced additional gas monitoring in the Iongwall tailgate interlocked to the Iongwall

shearer so it automatically trips power to the shearer when methane reaches a certain level

determined by a trigger action response plan (TARP).

Modelling of methane concentrations described in this document demonstrates how an increase in

the general body concentrations in the Iongwall tailgate increases the risk profile of Iongwall

operations. From {his a mining operation can determine the applicability of lhis modelling to their

operations and use this to determine the risk profile for their Longwall operations.

The Mines Inspectorate expects all underground coal mines to have effective gas monitoring

systems with suitably placed methane detectors to prevent explosive accumulations of methane in

areas where it could be ignited. Best practices and recommendations to achieve this are outlined in

this document for mine operations to consider‘ At the time of writing this report, the Mines

Inspectorate is also developing draft amendments to the regulation to prescribe minimum methane

monitoring requirements. at all relevant locations in an underground coal mine.

SUMMARY

Page 58

HLJ.001.001.0058

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Purpose

Background

Definition of methane i oldent.

Longwall methane analysis ......

Methane monitoring audits...

Modelling of methane concentration .....................

Heirarchy of controls.

Best practice and recommendations .....

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1' Methane incident definition

Figure 2: Typical Longwall Tailgate Arrangement

Figure 3. Longwall Tangate Ventilation Arrangement

Figure 4: Longwall Tailgate Ventilation Arrangement 30% Methane in TGW . .

Figure 5 Longwall Tailgate Ventilation Arrangement 2.0% Methane in TG ....................................

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Summary of tailgate methane monxtonng data - all Queensland underground Iongwall

mines ...............................................................................................

Page 59

HLJ.001.001.0059

PURPOSE

The purpose of this document is to provide Queensland coal mines with information to consider when:

~2~ determining location of additional monitor(s) that are interlinked to cut power to the Iongwall shearer which are critical controls for the management of risks from methane.

é‘ determining suitable TARPs to prevent dangerous accumulations of methane in areas in the Iongwall tailgate where there are potential ignition risks.

This document does not cover the management of other gases which may be present in an underground coal mine.

BACKGROUND

In January 2017 the Mines Inspectorate became aware of issues relating to the management of methane in Iongwall coal mines‘ Coal mining operators were not controlling the methane levels in the

Iongwall tailgate roadways. There were numerous occasions where the general body methane concentration met and exceeded 2.5%.

In February 2017 the Chief Inspector of Mines issued a letter to all underground site senior executives

(SSEs) and underground mine managers (UMMs) advising them that if a roadway in a mine contains an atmosphere where the methane concentration is equal to or greater than 2.5% it is taken to be dangerous under section 366 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2017. If this occurs,

coal mine workers must be withdrawn to a place of safety under section 273 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999. As such, every occasion when methane is found in mine roadways required to be ventilated under regulation at a general body concentration of 2.5% or greater, must be reported

as a high potential incident (HPI)

Investigations into these exceedanoes were undertaken at eight underground coal mines resulting in

the issuing of directives and SCPs as well as the initiation of gas management audits focussed on

methane management.

Operations at two sites were suspended due to the number of "dangerous" gas exceedances not

being reported.

Subsequently eight underground coal mines were required to provide their real-time gas monitoring data to the Mines Inspectorate for the period 2016 to 2018 for analysis.

Methane management in underground coal mines 1

PURPOSE The purpose of this document is to provide Queensland coal mines with information to consider when:

~:» determining location of additional monitor(s) that are interlinked to cut power to the longwall shearer which are critical controls for the management of risks from methane.

determining suitable TARPs to prevent dangerous accumulations of methane in areas in the longwall tailgate where there are potential ignition risks.

This document does not cover the management of other gases which may be present in an underground coal mine.

BACKGROUND

Methane management in underground coal mines 1 Page 60

HLJ.001.001.0060

Definition of methane incident

For the purposes of the detailed analysis a ‘methane incident’ was defined as follows:

FIGURE 1: METHANE INCIDENT DEFINITION

One occurrence

Start time

End time

‘f- \A ifi’ R Limit

Elapsed time

Exceedance elapsed time was the period above the limit of 25% methane


One occurrence

scar: time End time

Limit

Elapsed time

Definition of methane incident

For the purposes of the detailed analysis a 'methane incident' was defined as follows:

FIGURE 1: METHANE INCIDENT DEFINITION

7 1

Exceedance elapsed time was the period above the limit of 2.5% methane


HLJ.001.001.0061

LONGWALL METHANE ANALYSIS

The analysis of methane monitoring data from all underground coal mines with Iongwall operations

from July 2016 to June 2018 has revealed that exceedances of general body methane concentrations

occurred in six of the eight mines, with all six failing to report some of these exceedances to the

Inspectorate.

Results of the detailed analysis of four coal mines having a large number of incidents are shown

below. These mines are referred to as Mines A, B, E and F.

Mine A

~ v There were 264 independent methane exceedance incidents.

'2' In some, more than one gas detector exceeded 2.5%.

~t~ Only 22 of these were reported to the Inspectorate

One occurrence lasted 600 minutes.

v There were 69 days without methane monitoring data from the tailgate detectors.

Methane levels above 2.5% were recorded over a total of 318 hours.

Methane levels above 2.0% were recorded a total of 517 times, over a total of 1,559 hours (65 days).

Mine B

~2~ There were 72 independent gas exceedance incidents (greater than or equal to 2.5%) in the roadway. ln some, more than one gas detector exceeded 25%.

v Only 15 of these were reported to the Inspectorate

'Z- One occurrence lasted 157 minutes.

v Methane levels above 2.5% were recorded over a total of 14 hours.

Methane levels above 2.0% were recorded a total of 355 times, over a total of 198 hours.

Many of these incidents correlated directly with the diurnal variation of the barometer and were predictable‘

v There were 135 independent gas exceedance incidents (greater than or equal to 25%) in the roadway. In some incidents, more than one gas sensor exceeded 2.5%.

v Only 44 of these were reported to the Inspectorate

~:' One occurrence lasted 530 minutes.

Methane levels above 25% were recorded over a total of 78 hours‘

v Methane levels above 2.0% were recorded a total of 603 times, over a total of 82430 hours (576 days).

Mine F

'2' There were 263 independent gas exceedance incidents (greater than or equal to 2.5%) in

the roadway) plus another eight reported incidents without supported data. In some incidents, more than one gas sensor exceeded 2.5%.


LONGWALL METHANE ANALYSIS

The analysis of methane monitoring data from all underground coal mines with longwall operations from July2016 to June 2018 has revealed that exceedances of general body methane concentrations occurred in six of the eight mines, with all six failing to report some of these exceedances to the Inspectorate.

Results of the detailed analysis of four coal mines having a large number of incidents are shown below. These mines are referred to as Mines A, B, E and F.

Mine A

~:- There were 264 independent methane exceedance incidents.

»2~ In some, more than one gas detector exceeded 2.5%.

~:~ One occurrence lasted 600 minutes. »:~ There were 69 days without methane monitoring data from the tailgate detectors.

~:~ Methane levels above 2.5% were recorded over a total of 318 hours.

~:~ M 65thdane levels above 2.0% were recorded a total of 517 times, over a total of 1,559 hours ( ays).

Only 22 of these were reported to the Inspectorate

Mine B

~:~ There were 72 independent gas exceedance incidents (greater than or equal to 2.5%) in the roadway. In some, more than one gas detector exceeded 2.5%. Only 15 of these were reported to the Inspectorate ~:.

.;.

~:~ .;.

~:~

One occurrence lasted 157 minutes. Methane levels above 2.5% were recorded over a total of 14 hours. Methane levels above 2.0% were recorded a total of 355 times, over a total of 198 hours. Many of these incidents correlated directly with the diurnal variation of the barometer and were predictable.

Mine E

~:» There were 135 independent gas exceedance incidents (greater than or equal to 2.5%) in the roadway. In some incidents, more than one gas sensor exceeded 2.5%. Only 44 of these were reported to the Inspectorate *Z*

0:0

.;.

.;.

One occurrence lasted 530 minutes. Methane levels above 2.5% were recorded over a total of 78 hours. Methane levels above 2.0% were recorded a total of 603 times, over a total of 82430 hours (576 days).

Mine F

~:~ There were 263 independent gas exceedance incidents (greater than or equal to 2.5%) in the roadway) plus another eight reported incidents without supported data. In some incidents, more than one gas sensor exceeded 2.5%.


HLJ.001.001.0062

't' Only 34 of these were reported to the Inspectorate

~t- One occurrence lasted 423 minutes.

~1~ Methane levels above 2.5% were recorded over a total of 83.1 hours.

':~ Methane levels above 2.0% were recorded a total of 822 times, over a total 1008 hours (42 days).

A summary of the results and analysis from all the underground mines is shown in Table 1.

Note that as the data recording frequency (time interval between samples) for monitoring the Iongwall

return atmosphere was not consistent, in some cases there may be more exceedances than are

actually recorded.

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF TAILGATE METHANE MONITORING DATA - ALL QUEENSLAND

UNDERGROUND LONGWALL MINES BETWEEN 1I7I16 AND 3016/18

Exceedances Exceedances not Elapsed time alor Elapsed timea! or Methane recording reported reported exceeding 2.5 % exceeding 2.0 % frequency

(Hours) (Hours)

A 22 242 318 1559 5 mlnules

B 15 57 14 198 10 seconds

C 7 13 10 28 Variable store time step, 1 minute above

2.5%, 12 minutes below 2.5%

D 4 1 <1 2 Variable store time step. 20 seconds

above 2.5%, others between 1 In 10

minutes

E 44 91 7B 1374 1U minutes

F 34 229 83 1008 5 minutes from July 2016 lo April 2017;

30 seconds from May 2017 to June 2018

G 0 0 0 Variable store time step, 1 minute above


H 0 0 0 Variable store time step, 1 minute above

2.5%, 12 minules below 2.5%

Five of the six underground mines issued with directives have implemented additional risk controls

by placing an additional methane monitor in the Iongwall tailgate return airway within 400 metres of the Iongwall face. This additional monitor operates with specific TARPs for the purpose of controlling


Only 34 of these were reported to the Inspectorate .;. .;. 0:9

0:0

One occurrence lasted 423 minutes. Methane levels above 2.5% were recorded over a total of 83.1 hours. Methane levels above 2.0% were recorded a total of 822 times, over a total 1008 hours (42 days).

A summary of the results and analysis from all the underground mines is shown in Table 1.

Note that as the data recording frequency (time interval between samples) for monitoring the longwall return atmosphere was not consistent, in some cases there may be more exceedances than are actually recorded.

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF TAILGATE METHANE MONITORING DATA - ALL QUEENSLAND UNDERGROUND LONGWALL MINES BETWEEN 1/7/16 AND 30/6118

A 22 242 318 1559 5 minutes

B 15 57 14 198 10 seconds

C 7 13 10 28 Variable store time step, 1 minute above


D 4 1 <1 2 Variable store time step, 20 seconds

above 2.5%. others between 1 to 10

minutes

E 44 91 78 1374 10 minutes

F 34 229 83 1008 5 minutes from July 2016 to April 2017,

30 seconds from May 2017 to June 2018

G 0 0 0 Variable store time step, 1 minute above


H 0 0 0 Variable store time step, 1 minute above


Five of the six underground mines issued with directives have implemented additional risk controls by placing an additional methane monitor in the longwall tailgate return airway within 400 metres of the longwall face. This additional monitor operates with specific TARPs for the purpose of controlling


HLJ.001.001.0063

the Iongwall operation to avoid incidents of general body methane concentrations equal to or greater

than 2.5% in the tailgate.

Neither these monitors nor their alarm or trip levels are currently specified in the legislation Mines A,

E, and Mine F had these monitors installed, however they did not experience a reduction in

exceedances during the data review period afier corrective actions had been implemented. At the

lime of writing this report the Mines Inspectorate is finalising proposed amendments to the legislation

to clarify and confirm minimum methane monitoring requirements, for all the relevant locations in the

return airway from a Longwall face.

METHANE MONITORING AUDITS

As a result of the methane exceedances the Mines Inspectorate issued several directives and SCPs.

and initiated gas management audits focused on methane management.

These audits found that:

The installation of the gas monitoring equipment was in compliance with the Coal Mining

Safety and Health Regulation 2017.

Five mines introduced additional gas monitoring in the Iongwall tailgate.

v The additional monitor was at a distance of not greater than 400 metres outbye of the

Iongwall face‘ The monitor was interlocked to the Iongwall shearer so that it automatically

tripped electric power to the shearer when the methane reached a certain level determined

by a TARP but not greater than 25%.

-:- Some mines interlocked the methane monitor, located at the start of the Iongwall block in the

return ventilation split. to the shearer‘ This monitor tripped power to the shearer when the

methane concentration in the Iongwall return ventilation split reached a certain level

determined by a TARP but not greater than 2.5%.

v Two mines reduced the trip level for power to the shearer to 2%. This significantly reduced

the number of tn'ps due to exceeding 25% methane in the tailgate.

v Mine sites failed to report an HPI when the tailgate monitor detected a general body methane

concentration of 2.5%. Mines have started to understand that this is an HPI.

The risk associated with an increase in methane concentrations in the Iongwall tailgate had

not been adequately assessed by the mines.

The initial approach was that mines did not consider the methane in the Iongwall tailgate

return roadway made it a dangerous place according to the relevant legislation. There was

discussion on whether this should be considered an HPI as there are no people present in

the tailgate during production, however, further analysis of the hazard has highlighted the

scenarios that a dangerous place is potentially present, and also that explosive mixtures of

methane could be present.

Methane management in underground ooal mines 5

the longwall operation to avoid incidents of general body methane concentrations equal to or greater than 2.5% in the tailgate.

Neither these monitors nor their alarm or trip levels are currently specified in the legislation. Mines A, E, and Mine F had these monitors installed, however they did not experience a reduction in exceedances during the data review period after corrective actions had been implemented. At the time of writing this report the Mines Inspectorate is finalising proposed amendments to the legislation to clarify and confirm minimum methane monitoring requirements, for all the relevant locations in the return airway from a Longwall face.

METHANE MONITORING AUDITS

As a result of the methane exceedances the Mines Inspectorate issued several directives and SCPs, and initiated gas management audits focused on methane management.

These audits found that:

»:~ Five mines introduced additional gas monitoring in the longwall tailgate.

~:» Some mines interlocked the methane monitor, located at the start of the longwall block in the return ventilation split, to the shearer. This monitor tripped power to the shearer when the methane concentration in the longwall return ventilation split reached a certain level determined by a TARP but not greater than 2.5%.

»:» The installation of the gas monitoring equipment was in compliance with the Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2017.

~:~ The additional monitor was at a distance of not greater than 400 metres outbye of the longwall face. The monitor was interlocked to the longwall shearer so that it automatically tripped electric power to the shearer when the methane reached a certain level determined by a TARP but not greater than 2.5%.

~:~ Two mines reduced the trip level for power to the shearer to 2%. This significantly reduced the number of trips due to exceeding 2.5% methane in the tailgate.

o o*o Mine sites failed to report an HPI when the tailgate monitor detected a general body methane concentration of 2.5%. Mines have started to understand that this is an HPI.

The risk associated with an increase in methane concentrations in the longwall tailgate had not been adequately assessed by the mines.

The initial approach was that mines did not consider the methane in the longwall tailgate return roadway made it a dangerous place according to the relevant legislation. There was discussion on whether this should be considered an HPI as there are no people present in the tailgate during production, however, further analysis of the hazard has highlighted the scenarios that a dangerous place is potentially present, and also that explosive mixtures of methane could be present.


HLJ.001.001.0064

MODELLING OF METHANE CONCENTRATION

On numerous occasions around the world methane has ignited when the shearer has been cutting

into the tailgate. This occurred in the 2010 Upper Big Branch mining disaster resulting in a methane

and coal dust explosion which killed 29 coal mine workers.

The increase in the general body concentrations in the Iongwall tailgate increases the risk profile of Iongwall operations. The following modelling has been undertaken to evaluate the risk.

Figure 2 shows a sketch of a typical layout at the tailgate end of a Iongwall face.

FIGURE 2: TYPICAL LONGWALL TAILGATE ARRANGEMENT

TYPICAL LONGWALL TAILGATE ARRANGEMENT

Goal Smam —>-> _,__> "but mu

SHEARER

nmn mum

The methane monitor required by section 244(1)(b) of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation

2017 at the intersection of the Iongwall face and return roadway, is fitted near the tailgate armoured

flexible conveyor (TG AFC ) motor under the carport (a protective canopy around the TG AFC motor

and gearbox). Figure 2 shows that the TG AFC monitor can be up to 8.0 metres away from the cutter

picks at the TG side of the cutting drum.

Due to obstruction by the body of the shearer, air is deflected around the shearer and behind the

shields, flushing out goaf gases. This has been seen on coal mines gas monitoring systems with a

gradual increase in methane levels at the TG end as the shearer progresses towards the tailgate. If

the shearer is left at the TG end, the methane levels settle back down to more ambient conditions as

equilibrium with the goaf gases is reached.


it

TYPICAL LONGWAIJ. TAILGATE ARRANGEMENT

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MODELLING OF METHANE CONCENTRATION

On numerous occasions around the world methane has ignited when the shearer has been cutting into the tailgate. This occurred in the 2010 Upper Big Branch mining disaster resulting in a methane and coal dust explosion which killed 29 coal mine workers.

The increase in the general body concentrations in the longwall tailgate increases the risk profile of longwall operations. The following modelling has been undertaken to evaluate the risk.

Figure 2 shows a sketch of a typical layout at the tailgate end of a longwall face.

FIGURE 2: TYPICAL LONGWALL TAILGATE ARRANGEMENT I

L J

The methane monitor required by section 244(1)(b) of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2017 at the intersection of the longwall face and return roadway, is fitted near the tailgate armoured flexible conveyor (TG AFC ) motor under the carport (a protective canopy around the TG AFC motor and gearbox). Figure 2 shows that the TG AFC monitor can be up to 8.0 metres away from the cutter picks at the TG side of the cutting drum.

Due to obstruction by the body of the shearer, air is deflected around the shearer and behind the shields, flushing out goal gases. This has been seen on coal mines gas monitoring systems with a gradual increase in methane levels at the TG end as the shearer progresses towards the tailgate. If the shearer is left at the TG end, the methane levels settle back down to more ambient conditions as equilibrium with the goal gases is reached.


HLJ.001.001.0065

Figure 3 shows the possible ventilation arrangement when the shearer is in the TG end of the face

wiih a total face ventilation quantity of 50 mals. Monitoring results from mines show that, when high

levels of methane are present in the tailgate, ihe TG drive monitor may remain at around 0.5%.

FIGURE 3: LONGWALL TAILGATE VENTILATION ARRANGEMENT

EFFECT OF AIRFLOW AROUND THE SHEARER AND EFFECF ON METHANE LEVEIS

Goal smam "5" cm 1.5% cu.

J_ —>._> 50 m’/s

TG AFC

DRIVE

"355'" \ 465% c k,

7 15

m’/s

50

m'ls

Modelling shows that if there is a 2.5% general body concentration of methane in the Iongwall tailgate

roadway then there could be an average of 45% methane in the airway adjacent to the Iongwall face

of (he tailgate operations. The gas distribution in this area is not homogenous and there is usually a

pan of this area where the true 'goaf stream’ exists (usually evident by increased temperature and

humidity and high methane levels associated with lower oxygen levels).


Figure 3 shows the possible ventilation arrangement when the shearer is in the TG end of the face with a total face ventilation quantity of 50 m3/s. Monitoring results from mines show that, when high levels of methane are present in the tailgate, the TG drive monitor may remain at around 0.5% .

Modelling shows that if there is a 2.5% general body concentration of methane in the longwall tailgate roadway then there could be an average of 4.5% methane in the airway adjacent to the longwall face of the tailgate operations. The gas distribution in this area is not homogenous and there is usually a part of this area where the true 'goal stream' exists (usually evident by increased temperature and humidity and high methane levels associated with lower oxygen levels).


HLJ.001.001.0066

Figure 4 shows the difference in the above situation when there is 3.0% methane general body

concentration in the tailgate roadway.

FIGURE 42 LONGWALL TAILGATE VENTILATION ARRANGEMENT 3.0% METHANE IN TG

EF Cl’ OF AIRFLOW AROUND THE SHEARER AND EFFECT ON METHANE LEVELS

GOI' Strum 5'5,‘ m4 mas cm

J _’_> so m=/s

11: m: nmve

‘23% \ ~1&5!‘ C h

A

As can be seen, the presence outbye of a 3.0% general body methane concentration in the Iongwall

tailgate roadway means that the average methane concentration in the airway adjacent to the

Iongwall face of the tailgate operations could be as high as 5.5%. As this is not homogenous, parts

of this roadway will have a methane concentration below 5% while in other pans the methane

concentration could be well above 5%. Methane is explosive between 5 and 15%.


EFFECT OF AIRFLOW AROUNDTHE SHEARER AND EFFECT ON METHANE LEVELS

Goof Stream 5.5% cH,

> » I . f . ~» | . . . » | l . l . . . ~ . - ¢ | | » | . - | . - ,

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0.5% on. I •

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Figure 4 shows the difference in the above situation when there is 3.0% methane general body concentration in the tailgate roadway.

FIGURE 4: LONGWALL TAILGATE VENTILATION ARRANGEMENT 3.0% METHANE IN TG I

As can be seen, the presence outbye of a 3.0% general body methane concentration in the longwall tailgate roadway means that the average methane concentration in the airway adjacent to the longwall face of the tailgate operations could be as high as 5.5%. As this is not homogenous, parts of this roadway will have a methane concentration below 5% while in other parts the methane concentration could be well above 5%. Methane is explosive between 5 and 15%.


HLJ.001.001.0067

As can be seen from Figure 5, when there is a methane concentration of 240% in the Iongwall face

of the tailgate roadway, the average methane concentration in the airway adjacent to the Iongwall

tailgate operations drops to 3.5% which is below the explosive limit.

FIGURE 5: LONGWALL TAILGATE VENTILATION ARRANGEMENT 2.0% METHANE IN TG

EFFECT OF AIRFLOW AROUND THE SHEARER AND EFFECI' O HANE LEVE

Gall imam 3'5,‘ m‘ 1.0% cu,

J— _>-> 50 m'ls

ma‘

There will be operational differences in the layouts shown above when, for example, due to creep

or the alignment of the maingate (MG) and TG roadways, the tailgate end of the AFC could be

significantly closer to the chain pillar rib line.

The position of the shearer when cutting into the tailgate is potentially the location of the highest

risk of an ignition of methane in the Iongwall. There could be sparks from the shearer picks

contacting any steel or incendive material, such as steel pipes or pipe hangers left in the goaf area

as the Iongwall retreats‘ There is also the risk of tramp steel left in the tailgate area from secondary

support operations or other work previously conducted in the TG roadway.

The mos! recent ignition in a Iongwall in Queensland occurred when the shearer was in the position

similar to that shown in Figure 2. However, at the time of the incident the shearer drums were not

operating and the ignition source most likely occurred at the tailgate AFC where the chain contacts

the strippers as it comes over the sprocket.


EFFECT OF AIRFLOW AROUNDTHE SHEARER AND EFFECT ON METHANE LEVELS

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As can be seen from Figure 5, when there is a methane concentration of 2.0% in the longwall face of the tailgate roadway, the average methane concentration in the airway adjacent to the longwall tailgate operations drops to 3.5% which is below the explosive limit.

FIGURE 5: LONGWALL TAILGATE VENTILATION ARRANGEMENT 2.0% METHANE IN TG I

There will be operational differences in the layouts shown above when, for example, due to creep or the alignment of the margate (MG) and TG roadways, the tailgate end of the AFC could be significantly closer to the chain pillar rib line.

The position of the shearer when cutting into the tailgate is potentially the location of the highest risk of an ignition of methane in the longwall. There could be sparks from the shearer picks contacting any steel or incendive material, such as steel pipes or pipe hangers left in the goal area as the longwall retreats. There is also the risk of tramp steel left in the tailgate area from secondary support operations or other work previously conducted in the TG roadway.

The most recent ignition in a longwall in Queensland occurred when the shearer was in the position similar to that shown in Figure 2. However, at the time of the incident the shearer drums were not operating and the ignition source most likely occurred at the tailgate AFC where the chain contacts the strippers as it comes over the sprocket.

Methane management in underground coal mines g Page 68

HLJ.001.001.0068

HIERARCHY OF CONTROLS

The hierarchy of controls model should be used in the risk management process. Measures

towards the top of the pyramid are the most effective and provide the highest level of protection.

1* Remove the hazard

MSubstitute a safer Maltemative Se arate e0 le froEn the hpazaprd

Redesign or modify equipment

. . ‘ Use tralning and rules Admlnlslrallve t0 reduce flSk

Provide fit- for- vsunal prolemve equlpmenl purpose protective equipment


HIERARCHY OF CONTROLS

The hierarchy of controls model should be used in the risk management process. Measures towards the top of the pyramid are the most effective and provide the highest level of protection.

Remove the hazard

Substitute a safer a l e motive

Separate people from the hazard

Redesign or modify equipment

Use training and rules to reduce risk

Provide Ht-for- purpose protective equipment


HLJ.001.001.0069

BEST PRACTICE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The relevant standard1 and legislationz must be complied as a minimum, however, in addition,

operations using the hierarchy of controls should consider the following.

E"9i"eeri"9 controls ~t~ Consider including additional mining engineering controls

to reduce the potential reservoir of methane in the Iongwall

goaf or in the underlying and overlying seams e.g‘ pre-

drainage and/or goaf drainage

Trigger action response ~:' Consider the modelling of methane concentrations plans

described in this document which shows that, in a typical

layout, a methane concentration of 2.5% in the Iongwall

tailgate roadway will result in a dangerous level of

methane in the airway adjacent to Iongwall tailgate

operations.

~2~ Consider introducing additional gas monitoring in the

Iongwall tailgate, within 400 metres outbye of the Iongwall

face interlocked to the Iongwall shearer so that it

automatically trips power to the shearer and the AFC when

the methane concentration reaches 2.0%.

4' Consider interlocking the gas monitor a! the return of the

ventilation split to the Iongwall shearer so that it

automatically trips power to the shearer and the AFC when

the methane concentration reaches 2.0%.

é‘ Consider the impacts of lag times and calibration

tolerances that can affect the accuracy and trip time for

any methane monitors.

‘t. Consider ventilation velocity and impacts from adjacent

goaf and rib emissions with different concentrations for

inbye and outbye sensors.

~t- The gas monitoring system must be capable of

recognising static data issues and raising an alarm.

ifoFiiig system v Underground gas monitoring system data should be

readily available at all times in a format that is recoverable

to demonstrate continuous monitoring of the mine

atmosphere has been undertaken to ensure dangerous

conditions are not present.

‘ Australian and New Zealand standard, ASINZS 2290312018, Electrical equipment for coal mines - Introduction, inspection and maintenance, Pan 3: Gas detecting and monitoring equipment

1 Coal Mine Safety and Health Act 1999 and Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2017

Methane management in underground coal mines 11 P99e 79

BEST PRACTICE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

o o*o

The relevant standard' and iegislation2 must be complied as a minimum, however, in addition, operations using the hierarchy of controls should consider the following.

~:~ Consider interlocking the gas monitor at the return of the ventilation split to the longwall shearer so that it automatically trips power to the shearer and the AFC when the methane concentration reaches 2.0%.

O 000

Consider including additional mining engineering controls to reduce the potential reservoir of methane in the longwall goal or in the underlying and overlying seams e.g. pre- drainage and/or goal drainage

Consider the modelling of methane concentrations described in this document which shows that, in a typical layout, a methane concentration of 2.5% in the longwall tailgate roadway will result in a dangerous level of methane in the airway adjacent to longwall tailgate operations.

Consider introducing additional gas monitoring in the longwall tailgate, within 400 metres outbye of the longwall face interlocked to the longwall shearer so that it automatically trips power to the shearer and the AFC when the methane concentration reaches 2.0% .

Consider the impacts of lag times and calibration tolerances that can affect the accuracy and trip time for any methane monitors.

Consider ventilation velocity and impacts from adjacent goal and rib emissions with different concentrations for in bye and outbye sensors.

.;. The gas monitoring system must be capable of recognising static data issues and raising an alarm.

Underground gas monitoring system data should be readily available at all times in a format that is recoverable to demonstrate continuous monitoring of the mine atmosphere has been undertaken to ensure dangerous conditions are not present.

1 Australian and New Zealand standard, AS/NZS 2290.3:2018, Electrical equipment for coal mines - Introduction, inspection and maintenance, Part 3.' Gas detecting and monitoring equipment 2 Coal Mine Safety and Health Act 1999 and Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2017


HLJ.001.001.0070

Tube bundle detectors ~1' Due to the inherent lag time, these systems can only be

used to verify normal background levels and should not be

used for identifying peak levels.

-:~ Where possible the tubes should be run in return roadways

to reduce condensation which can lead to accumulations

of water blocking the tube. Suitably placed self-draining

water traps need to be placed lo remove these

accumulations.

5:51:33: and transportable ~2- Real time detectors should be installed on a suitable plate

and hanger with the wire harness clamped to the plate to

prevent movement.

'2' The detector should be moumed on the downstream side

to prevent ingress of dirt and moisture.

~2- The detector should be at a height and position in the

roadway that enables it to adequately measure the gas of

interesi. Blockages of the gas paih can lead to serious

issues with the Tao’ response time of the detector. ln

roadways with high velocities and total mixing this may not

be an issue. Installation standards need to be developed

that cover the purpose of the gas monitoring required.

'2' Access to the detector will be required for maintenance

purposes. The installation should be designed to allow

easy access for calibration and detector change out.

Where easy access is not possible a suitable means of

access to the detector needs to be available (i.e‘ portable

work platform, not a ladder).

" The time it takes for a detector to register 90% of the change in gas

levels

Maintenance °f detectors -:' Maintenance of detectors should be in accordance with

original equipment manufacturers (OEM) procedures and

the relevant standard.


Q 000 Due to the inherent lag time, these systems can only be used to verify normal background levels and should not be used for identifying peak levels.

o 996 Where possible the tubes should be run in return roadways to reduce condensation which can lead to accumulations of water blocking the tube. Suitably placed self-draining water traps need to be placed to remove these accumulations.

• s *O Real time detectors should be installed on a suitable plate and hanger with the wire harness clamped to the plate to prevent movement.

»z» The detector should be mounted on the downstream side to prevent ingress of dirt and moisture.

The detector should be at a height and position in the roadway that enables it to adequately measure the gas of interest. Blockages of the gas path can lead to serious issues with the T90* response time of the detector. In roadways with high velocities and total mixing this may not be an issue. Installation standards need to be developed that cover the purpose of the gas monitoring required.

~!* Access to the detector will be required for maintenance purposes. The installation should be designed to allow easy access for calibration and detector change out. Where easy access is not possible a suitable means of access to the detector needs to be available (i.e. portable work platform, not a ladder).

* The time it takes for a detector to register 90% of the change in gas levels

~:~ Maintenance of detectors should be in accordance with original equipment manufacturers (OEM) procedures and the relevant standard.

O 0 0


HLJ.001.001.0071

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HLJ.001.001.0072

coalminesinquiry.qld.gov.au · queensland coal mining of inquiry affidavit of jason hill i, jason...

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