quake: quadruple key and encryption
DESCRIPTION
QUAKE: Quadruple Key and Encryption. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Third Annual National Early Hearing Detection and Intervention Conference, Washington, DC, February, 2004. Background. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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QUAKE: Quadruple Key and Encryption
Craig A. Mason Shihfen Tu Quansheng SongUniversity of Maine
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Third Annual National Early Hearing Detection and Intervention Conference,
Washington, DC, February, 2004.
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Background University of Maine research team
involved in research in informatics and developmental epidemiology
Contact Information Craig A. Mason: [email protected].
edu Shihfen Tu: [email protected]
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To Link or Not to Link… Data linkage provides huge opportunity for
public health research Integrate large, complex, longitudinal datasets Address questions impossible to do any other way
This impractical 10 or 15 years ago Lead to fears of “Big brother”
Abuse of information Has identifiable information be released by researchers?
Individual rights versus public good At what point does the public right to health trump my
right to privacy? (assuming either of these exist)
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Strategies for Addressing Concerns
Legislative Procedural Educational Our focus: Technological
Review linkage strategies Review encryption issues
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Deterministic Linkage A series of common identifying fields are
selected across two databases Records are matched across databases
based on these fields Two records must have identical values
across all of these fields in order to be linked “John”, “Bartholomew”, “Szapoznick” “Jon”, “Bartholomew”, “Szapoznick”
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Probabilistic Linkage Two records do not have to match
across all fields in order to be linked For a possible pairing, a value is
calculated that reflects the likelihood that the two records are (or are not) the same person
Based upon the frequencies of values and the quality of the data
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Reliability of data fields Greater reliability results in increased odds of a correct match If a field is pure noise, correct matches will be random
Frequency of field values The more common the value in a field, the greater the odds
that the records will be erroneously matched E.g., a match based on the name Szapocznik is more likely to
reflect a correct match than is a match on the name Smith Number of matches
The greater the number of individuals in one database that also appear in the other database, the greater probability of linkage across databases.
If two databases have no individuals in common, the probability of a linkage across the databases must be zero
Factors Influencing Probabilistic Linkage
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Statistician’s Anonymous
“I’m David, and I’m a bean-counter”
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Encryption Ecretsay odecay Information is coded so that true values are
not obvious Ancient field Modern era focus on electronic
transmission of sensitive data Notice the little yellow padlock in the bottom
corner of your browser when shopping on e-bay?
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Encryption Techniques Asymmetric or public key
Different key for encryption and decryption Encryption key is public Decryption key is private Decryption key cannot be derived from encryption
key Provide security of data transmission
Anyone can use the public key to code a message Only I can decrypt it
Typically based on product of large primes
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Challenge of Factorization
Factors hard to find But once you know one, the other is easy to find
Public Key: 114,381,625,757,888,867,669,235,779,976,146,612,010,218,296,721,242,362,562,561,842,935,706,935,245,733,897,830,597,123,563,958,705,058,989,075,147,599,290,026,879,543,541
Private Key Based on Factors:3,490,529,510,847,650,949,147,849,619,903,
898,133, 417,764,638,493,387,843,990,820,577
and32,769,132,993,266,709,549,961,988,190,83
4,461,413,177,642,967,992,942,539,798,288,533
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Encryption Techniques Symmetric key
Same key for encryption and decryption Key is not made public
Secret key - One Key to Rule Them All More secure than asymmetric key
Nothing suggesting a possible key is published Asymmetric key must be 6 to 30 times longer
than symmetric key for equivalent security Useful if you know in advance exactly who
will want to encrypt a message to you
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Encryption Techniques Security often described in terms of bits
128 bit encryption indicated 2128 possible keys
3,402,823,669,209,384,634,633,746,074,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
A lot of possibilities… Widespread use of 1024 and 2048 bit
encryption on the horizon 128 bit symmetric = 2304 bit asymmetric
(Cryptography, p.166)
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A Dirty Little Secret.. These big numbers hide the fact that the
security is only as good as the algorithm Think reliability of DNA testing Plaintext attack (and its variations)
If the only unique name in the data set is Szapocznik
And the only unique variation in the encrypted data set is “X*GFfF825d=“…..
The key can be resolved
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A Dirty Little Secret..
Even without the key, you can determine my grade Some computational or physical wall between
decrypted and encrypted data
SCREENING DATA SCHOOL DATALast Name First Name Last Name First Name GradeMason Craig KLFIP XCSEA B+Mason James FDDFO UIQMB A-Smith Craig KLFIP UIQMB D-
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One-to-One Encryption
Identifiers are encrypted into a unique value
Craig
93812….2431Encryption
KeyH3~f9(-d
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One-to-Many Encryption
Identifiers are encrypted into one of multiple values Lack of uniqueness increases challenge of decryption
Craig
93812….2431Encryption
KeyH3~f9(-dor9Dj1D[d dfR1”d/Gor
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That’s nice, but how can this help with data
linkage?
All right. But apart from the sanitation, the medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, the fresh water system, and public health… What have the Romans ever done for us?
--- Reg, spokesman for the People’s Front of Judea
Monty PythonLife of Brian
(and Martin White, UC Berkeley)
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The Politics of Linkage
Two data systems contain information on same individuals Would like to link data for public health research
Service Data: Craig A. Mason…. School Data: Craig A. Mason….
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Service Data: Craig A. Mason…. School Data: Craig A. Mason…. I may not want schools to know about health services I have received
The Politics of Linkage
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Service Data: Craig A. Mason…. School Data: Craig A. Mason…. What solution may allow data to be linked, yet prevent sources from seeing each other’s
identifying data
The Politics of Linkage
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Quake
QUAdruple Key and Encryption
Service Data: Craig A. Mason…. School Data: Craig A. Mason….
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Quake Requires algorithms to be reversible You can “undo” a process to come back to
original value
22;22
3515;1553358;853
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Quake Requires algorithms to be commutative You get the same answer even if you do the
problem backwards
46313423
4321
8765
;50432219
8765
4321
1535;1553835;853
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Quake
052385043…9471 757260024…2512
Each provider selects their own unique encryption key that is used to encrypt identifiers prior to linkage
Service Data: Craig A. Mason…. School Data: Craig A. Mason….
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Quake
850258434…3435
052385043…9471
420504763….8372
757260024…2512
Community members representing individuals in each dataset also select their own unique encryption keys
Service Data: Craig A. Mason…. School Data: Craig A. Mason….
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Quake
850258434…3435
052385043…9471
420504763….8372
757260024…2512
Hidden Key: 342002330…2852 Hidden Key: 147742268…0042
The encryption keys for the community representatives and the providers are entered separately, and the combined keys are hidden from the users
Service Data: Craig A. Mason…. School Data: Craig A. Mason….
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Quake
850258434…3435
052385043…9471
420504763….8372
757260024…2512
Service Data: *Bj&!33t…. School Data: yy#K66….
These combined encryption keys are used to encrypt identifiers in each file prior to linkage
Hidden Key: 342002330…2852 Hidden Key: 147742268…0042
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Quake
850258434…3435
052385043…9471
420504763….8372
757260024…2512
Service Data: *Bj&!33t…. School Data: yy#K66….
Symmetric key with 1:many encryption
Hidden Key: 342002330…2852 Hidden Key: 147742268…0042
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Quake
850258434…3435
052385043…9471
420504763….8372
757260024…2512
Service Data: *Bj&!33t…. School Data: yy#K66….
The combined encryption keys are not stored so neither party can decrypt on their own
Hidden Key: 342002330…2852 Hidden Key: 147742268…0042
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Illustration of Security
Rep Key: 3
Provider Key: 7
Hidden Combined Key: 21
To see why, consider the following simple keys
Service provider key: 7 Community representative key: 3 Combined key: 3 x 7 = 21
Simple message to encrypt, “A”
Simple encryption algorithm Each letter has a value 1-26,
repeating “A”=1, “Z”=26, “A”=27…
Multiply that value by the encryption key in order to obtain the new value
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Illustration of Security
Rep Key: 3
Provider Key: 7
Hidden Combined Key: 21
Once encrypted, “A” becomes “U”
Original Message: A
Encrypted Message: U
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Illustration of Security
Rep Key: 3
Provider Key: 7
Hidden Combined Key: 21
If the community representative applied their key to the encrypted message, they would see “G”
21 ÷ 3 = 7 “G” is the letter with value 7
Encrypted Message: U
De-Encrypted Message: G
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Illustration of Security
Rep Key: 3
Service Provider Key: 7
Hidden Combined Key: 21
If the service provider applied their key to the encrypted message, they would see “C”
21 ÷ 7 = 3 “C” is the letter with value 3
Encrypted Message: U
De-Encrypted Message: C
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Illustration of Security
Rep Key: 3
Service Provider Key: 7
Hidden Combined Key: 21
Only by working together can the message be decrypted
Encrypted Message: U
Fully Decrypted Message: A
Partially Decrypted Message: G
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Quake
850258434…3435
052385043…9471
420504763….8372
757260024…2512
Service Data: *Bj&!33t…. School Data: yy#K66….
Once each dataset encrypted, several possible methods for linking
Hidden Key: 342002330…2852 Hidden Key: 147742268…0042
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Linking Encrypted Files Simple approach
Bring both encrypted files together on independent, non-networked machine
Each of the four parties enters their own key Respective files internally decrypted and linked New, de-identified linked file containing fields of
interest created Record of identifiers and keys electronically or
physically erased DoD 5220.22-M protocol
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Linking Encrypted Files Benefits
Flexible linkage strategies (partial names, etc.) Easiest to perform Once completed no identifiers to enable
plaintext attack Issues
Process of encryption/decryption can be computationally demanding
Potential record of encrypted data and all keys Can be destroyed, but time consuming
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Variation of QuakeKey: 052385043…9471 Key: 757260024…2512
Service Data: Craig A. Mason School Data: Craig A. Mason
Each provider selects own unique encryption key used to encrypt identifiers prior to linkage
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VariationKey: 052385043…9471 Key: 757260024…2512
Service Data: *Bj&!33t…. School Data: yy#K66….
Identifiers in their file encrypted with a 1:1 symmetric key
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Service Data: *Bj&!33t….
VariationKey: 052385043…9471 Key: 757260024…2512
School Data: yy#K66….
Parties then switch encrypted files If identifying fields in both files are all equal..
May be prone to variations of a plaintext attack Inclusion of additional records whose identifiers
contain random noise can nearly eliminate this risk
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Service Data: Jf*72Coo….
VariationKey: 052385043…9471 Key: 757260024…2512
School Data: Jf*72Coo….
Each party then applies their own key to the other parties already-encrypted file
Identifiers in each file will have the same value Can not determine key used by other source
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Service Data: Jf*72Coo….
VariationKey: 052385043…9471 Key: 757260024…2512
School Data: Jf*72Coo….
If files brought together by one of the parties They may be able to conduct a plaintext attack May then be able to determine key used by other
party Both files linked by trusted third party
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Service Data: Jf*72Coo….
VariationKey: 052385043…9471 Key: 757260024…2512
School Data: Jf*72Coo….
Again, may bring in community representatives
Linked Data: Jf*72Coo, Services, Grades
Final Linked Data: Services, Grades
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Variation Link based upon the encrypted
identifier fields No need to decrypt files when linking Apply deterministic and probabilistic
algorithms to encrypted data No machine ever sees all keys
Final file contains no identifiers and only a limited number of fields of interest
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Variation of Quake Issues
Requires 1:1 encryption algorithm Can be addressed, but adds level of
complexity Can not examine partial strings
Specific partial strings can be generated prior to encryption
Month of birth, day of birth First letter of first name
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Advanced Linkage Protocols for Addressing Confidentiality
Concerns Encrypted Linkage Protocols
Unique encryption keys administered by each database administrator and community liaisons
No one at any time sees the other person’s identifiers Person conducting the linkage never sees any identifiers Resulting linked set includes no decrypted identifiers Resulting file can not be decoded, expanded, or relinked
without agreement and cooperation of all parties The community participates in the process
Technology that creates confidentiality concerns may provide means for reducing those concerns