putting your air space to work with business-class wireless · wpa-psk • wpa-psk becoming...
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1© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Putting Your Air Space to Workwith Business-Class Wireless
Dmitry [email protected]
Cisco Expo 2006 Kiev
2© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Cisco Unified Wireless Security
© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
3© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Cisco WLAN Security Leadership and Innovation
• Industry's first implementation of 802.1X/EAP authentication and dynamic key derivation
• Chaired and led the 802.11i work group• Wrote or co-wrote many EAP RFCs• Technical leadership role in Fast Secure
Roaming 802.11r• Industry leading, patent pending rogue
detection, mitigation and suppression• Continuing to innovate with Self-
Defending NetworkLocation enabled security; Access Control / IDS alertsInvented host posture analysis (NAC)Invented Management Frame Protection (MFP)Invented Self Defending Network (NIC)
4© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Cisco Unified Wireless NetworkEngineered to Deliver on the SDN Strategy
Keep Clients SafeKeep Clients Safe•Strong Mutual Authentication•Strong Encryption •True Wireless IPS•Adaptive Client Policies
Endp
oint
Prot
ectio
n
Protect the Network
Protect the Network
•Rogue AP detection and containment•Multilayer client exclusions
Ano
mal
y an
d ID
S/IP
S
Keep Clients HonestKeep Clients Honest
•Network Admission Control•Guest Access
Adm
issi
on C
ontr
ol
An initiative to dramatically improve the network’s
ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
An initiative to dramatically improve the network’s
ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
Cisco strategy to dramatically improve the
network’s ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
Cisco strategy to dramatically improve the
network’s ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
Integrated Management
5© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Checklist for Secure Wireless LANs
Implementation Checklist802.1X(EAP)
WPA2 (AES) or WPA (TKIP)
Management Frame Protection
Cisco CSA
Keep Clients SafeKeep Clients Safe•Strong Mutual Authentication•Strong Encryption •True Wireless IPS•Adaptive Client Policies
Endp
oint
Prot
ectio
n
6© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Protected Access
What are WPA and WPA2?
• Authentication and Encryption standards for Wi-Fi clients and APs
• 802.1X authentication
• WPA uses TKIP encryption
• WPA2 uses AES encryption
Which should I use?
• Go for the Gold!
• Silver, if you have legacy clients
• Lead, if you absolutely have no other choice (i.e. ASDs)
Gold
WPA2/802.11i•EAP•AES
Gold
WPA2/802.11i•EAP•AES
Silver
WPA•EAP•TKIP
Silver
WPA•EAP•TKIP
Lead
dWEP (legacy)•EAP/LEAP•VLANs + ACLs
Lead
dWEP (legacy)•EAP/LEAP•VLANs + ACLs
7© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
How does Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Authenticate Clients?
Client associates CorporateNetwork
WLAN Client Access Point/Controller
RADIUS server
Cannot send data until… Data from client Blocked by AP
…EAP authentication complete
802.1x RADIUS
EAP
Client sends data Data from client Passed by AP
8© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
EAP Protocols and Database Compatibility
EAP-TLS PEAP EAP-TTLS LEAP EAP-FAST
Login scripts (MS DB)
Yes1 Yes1 Yes
Yes
Funk
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes Yes
Password expiration (MS DB)
N/A Yes No Yes
Client & OS availability
XP, 2000, CE,
and others2
XP, 2000, CE, CCXv2 clients3,
and others2
Cisco/CCXv1 or above clients and
others2
Cisco/CCXv3 clients4
and others2
MS DB support Yes Yes Yes Yes
LDAP DB support Yes Yes5 No Yes
OTP support No Yes5 No No
1 Windows OS supplicant requires machine authentication (machine accounts on Microsoft AD)2 Greater Operating System coverage is available from Meetinghouse and Funk supplicants3 PEAP/GTC is supported on CCXv2 clients and above4 Cisco 350/CB20A clients support EAP-FAST on MSFT XP, 2000, and CE operating systems. EAP-FAST supported on CB21AG/PI21AG clients with ADU v2.0 and CCXv3 clients5 Supported by PEAP/GTC only, i.e., not PEAP-MSCHAPv2
9© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
EAP Best Practices
• Leverage existing database where possible
• Consider TCO of solution, not just client s/w cost
• Consider future of 802.1X (e.g. NAC) when deploying authentication infrastructure
• Be aware of EAP timing parameters, dot1x holdoff, client exclusion policies
10© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
EAP Best Practices
• Where practical, eliminate key authentication issues when initially implementing EAP
• Use Active Directory Group Policy Security configsto ease deployment of root certificate (PEAP)- or obtain EAP server cert from public CA
• Verify EAP server certificate includes “EKU” field for “server authentication”
Self-signed certificates may be helpful for proof-of-concept or where customers are not deploying PKI
11© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
802.11i PMK Caching
• Whenever an AP and a STA have successfully passed dot1x based authentication, both of them may cache the PMK record to be used later.
• When a STA is going to (re-)associate to an AP, it may attach a list of PMKIDs (which were derived via dot1x process with this AP before) in its RSNIE in the (re-)association request frame.
• When PMKID exists in STA’s RSNIE, AP can use them to retrieve PMK record from its own PMK cache, if PMK is found, and matches the STA MAC address. AP can bypass dot1x authentication process, and directly starts WPA2 4-way key handshake session with the STA.
• PMK cache records will be kept for 1 hour for non associated STAs
• Enable PMK caching to bypass 802.1X Authentication
12© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
WPA-PSK
• WPA-PSK becoming somewhat popular recentlyAvailable on some handhelds, esp. Symbol
Advantage: unique per-client, temporal keys
Disadvantage: PSK shared across all clients (similar key management issues with static WEP)
• WPA-PSK does not function on Distributed Architecture with AAA MAC auth
• Make sure that customers are aware of Dictionary Attack potential with WPA-PSK
PSK may be set explicitly as 64 Hex character or with “passphrase”which uses a well-known expansion to generate PSK
Brute force attack on 256 bit key is non-trivial
Strong passwords should be used if utilizing “passphrase”
13© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
EAP-TLS PEAP EAP-TTLS LEAP EAP-FASTOff-line Dictionary attack vulnerability
No No No
No
No
Yes
No
Medium
High
Yes No
Application Specific Device (ASD) support (Cisco NIC)
No No Yes Yes
Local authentication (IOS)
No No Yes Yes
Server certificates? Yes Yes No No
Deployment complexity High Medium Low Low
Client certificates? Yes No No No
RADIUS server scalability Impact
High High Low Low/Medium
EAP Protocols: Feature Support
14© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Microsoft XP Supplicant info
• KB885453 must be obtained from Microsoft directly
• Beware of reauthenticationbehaviors in Microsoft XP SP2
• Should only impact non-Microsoft servers
15© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
End-user requirements
• Login scripts, drive mappingNetwork must be available to machine prior to user login
• Machine authenticationMachine certificate
Machine ID (i.e. username)
• CiscoSecure ACS machine authentication restrictionCapability for ACS group mapping user auth w/o machine auth (note that “No Access” is default when enabled)
16© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
EAP-FAST – Simple, Versatile, and Secure
EAP-TLS
PEAP-GTC
PEAP-MSCHAPv2
EAP-TTLS
AAAEAP-FAST tunnel
OTPMSCHAPv2 CertsUID/PW
VersatileVersatile • Robust SupportFast Roaming (CCKM)IOS Local AuthenticationCisco NAC
• Client stacks from Funk and Meetinghouse
SimpleSimple • Simple to deploy• No certs to provision or manage• Supports secure username/password
authentication
SecureSecure • Support for multiple authentication types (OTP, MSCHAPv2, Certs)
• Open standard (on the path to RFC)• Supported in CCXv4
17© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
What makes 802.11 vulnerable to attacks?
Most common attacks are against management frames
Common Attacks:• VOID11• Aireplay• File2air• Airforge• ASLEAP• Jack attacks• FakeAP• Hunter/Killer
Cisco MFP
Protected
18© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Management Frame Protection (MFP)
• A solution for clients and infrastructure (APs)
• Clients and APs add a MIC (signature)into every management frame
• Anomalies are detected instantly andreported to Wireless Control Server (WCS)
MFP Protected
MFP Protected
19© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
CCX v5• MFP• Client Policies
CCX v5• MFP• Client Policies
CCX- Driving Security Standardization
CCX v1• 802.1X authentication• EAP-TLS & LEAP• Cisco pre-standard TKIP• Client Rogue reporting
CCX v1• 802.1X authentication• EAP-TLS & LEAP• Cisco pre-standard TKIP• Client Rogue reporting
CCX v2• WPA compliance• Fast Roaming with CCKM• PEAP
CCX v2• WPA compliance• Fast Roaming with CCKM• PEAP
CCX v3• WPA2 compliance• EAP-FAST• CCKM with EAP-FAST• AES encryption
CCX v3• WPA2 compliance• EAP-FAST• CCKM with EAP-FAST• AES encryption
CCX v4• CCKM with EAP-
TLS, PEAP• WIDS• MBSSID
CCX v4• CCKM with EAP-
TLS, PEAP• WIDS• MBSSID
20© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
• Trend: Embedded adapters in most devices• Result: Adapter reference designs in most
devicesHow do you ensure that all of your client devices support your chosen 802.1X type(s) and encryption option(s)?
• Options:Try to standardize on adapters from one vendorUse WPA/WPA2 “extended EAP” certified clientsRely on what is available in WindowsUse a commercial supplicant suiteSupport a mix of authentication typesUse Cisco Compatible Extensions (CCX) adapters
Security and WLAN Clients
21© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Cisco Security Agent (CSA) - Host Intrusion Prevention System
• CSA stops day zero malicious code without reconfiguration or update.
• CSA has the industry’s best record of stopping Zero Day exploits, worms, and viruses over past 4 years:
2001 – Code Red, Nimda (all 5 exploits), Pentagone (Gonner)2002 – Sircam, Debploit, SQL Snake, Bugbear, 2003 – SQL Slammer, So Big, Blaster/Welchia, Fizzer2004 – MyDoom, Bagle, Sasser, JPEG browser exploit (MS04-028), RPC-DCOM exploit (MS03-039), Buffer Overflow in Workstation service (MS03-049)2005 – Internet Explorer Command Execution Vulnerability
• No reconfiguration of the CSA default configuration, or update to the CSA binaries were required
CSA Provides Day Zero Attack Protection
CSA Wireless Awareness• Shutoff multiple network interfaces• Disable Ad Hoc mode• Connect to only corporate SSIDs
22© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Cisco IDS SupportCisco Controller Architecture
Cisco Distributed Architecture
Rogue AP Detection/Location
Ad-hoc network Detection
Rogue AP Containment
RF Interference Detection
Rogue/Unregistered client with scan-mode AP
Ad-hoc Network Location and Containment
Mgmt Frame (assoc, authentication) FloodEAP Frame Flood
MAC Spoofing
Switchport Tracing
WIDS Signature Analysis
Client Exclusion
23© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Cisco Unified Wireless NetworkEngineered to Deliver on the SDN Strategy
Keep Clients SafeKeep Clients Safe•Strong Mutual Authentication•Strong Encryption •True Wireless IPS•Adaptive Client Policies
Endp
oint
Prot
ectio
n
Protect the Network
Protect the Network
•Rogue AP detection and containment•Multilayer client exclusions
Ano
mal
y an
d ID
S/IP
S
Keep Clients HonestKeep Clients Honest
•Network Admission Control•Guest Access
Adm
issi
on C
ontr
ol
An initiative to dramatically improve the network’s
ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
An initiative to dramatically improve the network’s
ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
Cisco strategy to dramatically improve the
network’s ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
Cisco strategy to dramatically improve the
network’s ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
Integrated Management
24© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Checklist for Secure Wireless LANs
Implementation ChecklistCisco NAC for wired and wireless
Cisco CSA
Guest: Integrated captive portal w/traffic tunnelingKeep Clients HonestKeep Clients Honest
•Network Admission Control•Guest Access
Adm
issi
on C
ontr
ol
25© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
The Need for Admission Control
• Viruses, worms, spyware, etc. continue to plague organizations
Viruses still #1 cause of financial loss* (downtime, recovery, productivity, etc.)
• Most users are routinely authenticated, but their endpoint devices (laptops, PCs, PDAs, etc.) are not checked for policy compliance
• Unprotected endpoint devices are often responsible for spreading infection
Ensuring devices accessing the network comply with policy (security tools installed, enabled, and current) is difficult and expensive
“Endpoint systems are vulnerable and represent the most likely point of infection from which a virus or worm can spread rapidly and cause serious disruption and economic damage.”
– Burton Group*2005 FBI/CSI Report
26© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
NAC ApplianceLeverages Cisco Clean Access
• Sold as virtual or integrated appliance
• Self-contained product integrates with but does not rely on partners
The NAC Solution
• Offers customers a deployment timeframe choice• Adapts to customers’ investment protection requirements
NAC Infrastructure
NAC Framework
•Sold through NAC-enabled products
• Integrated solution leveraging Cisco network and vendor products
27© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Cisco Clean Access: Out of Band Deployment
• VLAN based QuarantineManager performs switch management and port assignmentServer performs remediation and is deployed on the quarantine VLAN.
• Support for multiple switch infrastructures (2950, 3550, 3750, 4500, 6500)
SNMP v1/v2c for “reads”SNMP v1/v2c/v3 for “writes”
• Supports multi gigabit network deployment because:
Server is only in the data path for non-certified devices
• Host retains IP address after “certification”
Based on smart internal VLAN and DHCP mapping
• Does not require 802.1X infrastructure
CCA Server
CCA Manager
28© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
.1
.1
Internet
192.168.1.x/24
.9
172.18.10.x/24
.2
ACS / DHCP
10.1.1.x/24.11
Wireless Controller
192.168.2.4
192.168.2.x/24
.21
172.18.10.0/24 SSID “guest”/ VLAN 172
Clean Access Server
Clean Access Manager
.8
192.168.3.x/24
.21
172.19.10.0/24 SSID “regular”/VLAN 173
CCA Network Configuration
VLAN 172 & 173
Intranet
.10
29© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
CCA Design Requirements
• All Guest & Corporate/”Regular” wireless traffic coming into the Controller must go through CAS before being allowed access to the Internet and Internal/corporate network
• Configure dynamic interfaces called “Guest” and “Regular”in the Controller for vlan 172 and 173, respectively
• Trunk vlans 172 and 173 to the untrusted interface of the CAS
• Configure network scanning for well-known viruses and an Acceptable User Page for Guest users; Configure agentscanning for Windows Hotfixes and an Acceptable User Page for Regular users
• Optionally, set user timeout session, bandwidth and access control management uniquely for Guest and Regular users
• The Guest user will be redirected to a weblogin and must click on Guest access button; Regular user will be redirected to a weblogin and must use the CCA Agent
30© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
NAC2 – Ubiquitous Admission ControlCTA-Capable Endpoints with NAC-Capable 802.1X Supplicants
CTA NetworkAccess Device
(NAD)
NetworkACS
VendorServer
802.1x
EAPo802.1xEAPoRADIUS HCAP
12
3
4
5
67
8
1. 802.1X connection setup between NAD and endpoint2. NAD requests credentials from endpoint (EAPo802.1X)
This may include user, device, and/or posture
3. CTA, via NAC-capable supplicant, sends credentials to NAD (EAPo802.1X)
4. NAD sends credentials to ACS (EAPoRADIUS)
5. ACS can proxy portions of posture authentication to vendor server (HCAP)User/device credentials sent to authentication databases (LDAP, Active Directory, etc)
6. ACS validates credentials, determines authorization rightsE.g. visitors given GUEST access, unhealthy devices given QUARANTINE access
7. ACS sends authorization policy to NAD (VLAN assignment)
8. Host assigned VLAN, may then gain IP access (or denied, restricted)
31© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Secure Guest Access
SSID Client Default Gateway= Internal= GUEST
Enterprise user Guest user
Switch-to-switch guest tunnel
EnterpriseNetwork
DMZ Guest controller• Captive portal native in
the controller• Two options for guest
access:(1) Guest users can be placed on guest VLAN(2) All guest traffic is tunneled to a guest controller
• User DB can be local or RADIUS
• Robust administrationAmbassador loginCustomizable web pages
32© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Cisco Unified Wireless NetworkEngineered to Deliver on the SDN Strategy
Keep Clients SafeKeep Clients Safe•Strong Mutual Authentication•Strong Encryption •True Wireless IPS•Adaptive Client Policies
Endp
oint
Prot
ectio
n
Protect the Network
Protect the Network
•Rogue AP detection and containment•Multilayer client exclusions
Ano
mal
y an
d ID
S/IP
S
Keep Clients HonestKeep Clients Honest
•Network Admission Control•Guest Access
Adm
issi
on C
ontr
ol
An initiative to dramatically improve the network’s
ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
An initiative to dramatically improve the network’s
ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
Cisco strategy to dramatically improve the
network’s ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
Cisco strategy to dramatically improve the
network’s ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
Integrated Management
33© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Checklist for Secure Wireless LANs
Implementation ChecklistWireless IDS
Rogue Detect/Containment
FIPS Protect the Network
Protect the Network
•Rogue AP detection and containment•Multilayer client exclusions
Ano
mal
y an
d ID
S/IP
S
34© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
HYPE: External wIDS sensors are the best way to detect and remediate all wireless attacks
Protect the Network:wIDS Detection and Containment
REALITY: Most attacks/events occur on the AP/Client channel
802.11a Channel 152Valid client
802.11g Channel 6Valid client
802.11g Channel 6Attacker
802.11a Channel 153Rogue AP
802.11a Channel 153Rogue client
ROGUES and AD HOCs: Detected quickly via intelligent off channel scanning
802.11g Channel 1Ad Hoc client
802.11g Channel 1Ad Hoc client
RF Containment
RF Containment
On-channel attack detectedOff channel rogue detectedAP contains rogue clientOff channel ad hoc net
detectedAP contains ad hoc net
35© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
A Complete Solution for Handling Rogues
4. View Historical Report
2. Assess Rogue AP (Identity, Location, ..)
1. Detect Rogue AP(Generate alarm)
3. Contain Rogue AP
• Can be automated• Multiple rogues contained
simultaneously
36© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Cisco WCS – Centralized Security Management
37© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Cisco Unified Wireless NetworkEngineered to Deliver on the SDN Strategy
Keep Clients SafeKeep Clients Safe•Strong Mutual Authentication•Strong Encryption •True Wireless IPS•Adaptive Client Policies
Endp
oint
Prot
ectio
n
Protect the Network
Protect the Network
•Rogue AP detection and containment•Multilayer client exclusions
Ano
mal
y an
d ID
S/IP
S
Keep Clients HonestKeep Clients Honest
•Network Admission Control•Guest Access
Adm
issi
on C
ontr
ol
An initiative to dramatically improve the network’s
ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
An initiative to dramatically improve the network’s
ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
Cisco strategy to dramatically improve the
network’s ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
Cisco strategy to dramatically improve the
network’s ability to identify, prevent, and
adapt to threats
Integrated Management
38© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Security Management
CS-MARS• Network wide
anomaly detection• Rules based
correlation
WCS• Simple, Powerful
Dashboard• Robust Reporting
39© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
Checklist Summary
Wireless IDS
Rogue Detect/Contain
FIPS
802.1X (EAP)
WPA2 (AES) or WPA (TKIP)Management Frame Protection
Cisco CSA
Cisco NAC for wired and wireless
Cisco CSA
Guest: Integrated captive portal w/traffic tunneling
Keep Clients SafeKeep Clients Safe•Strong Mutual Authentication•Strong Encryption •True Wireless IPS•Adaptive Client Policies
Endp
oint
Prot
ectio
n
Keep Clients HonestKeep Clients Honest
•Network Admission Control•Guest Access
Adm
issi
on C
ontr
ol Protect the Network
Protect the Network
•Rogue AP detection and containment•Multilayer client exclusionsA
nom
aly
and
IDS/
IPS
40© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev
The Cisco Difference• Unifying wireless and wire line
Utilizing all of Cisco’s security expertise and product line
Not reinventing the wheel
• Location, Location, LocationOnly WLAN system with RF fingerprinting for rogue location accuracy
• INTEGRATED air monitoringOnly WLAN system that does not require separate air monitors
Built-in rogue protection and intrusion detection
• Security Designed for Real-Time ApplicationsFast Secure roaming
• Active leadership in standards bodies802.11i, 802.11r, 802.11w, 802.11k
41© 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.CiscoExpo04/2006 Kiev