putting science in its place. conservation biology 16(4)

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Conservation Biology, Pages 863–873Volume 16, No. 4, August 2002

Essays

Putting Science in its Place

ERIC T. FREYFOGLE* AND JULIANNE LUTZ NEWTON†

*University of Illinois College of Law, 504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue, Champaign, IL 61820, U.S.A., email [email protected]†Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Sciences, University of Illinois, W-503 Turner Hall, 1102 South Goodwin Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801, U.S.A.

Abstract:

Science and policy are both relevant to managing land. How they fit together is best understood byviewing land management as a process and by beginning the inquiry from and with that process, drawingdistinctions between issues of substance and process and between the functions of describing nature andevaluating it normatively. This process-based approach and these two distinctions help isolate and clarify thevarious proper roles of science in the overall land-management equation. They also clarify (1) when naturecan be said to possess intrinsic value; (2) why it is proper for conservation biologists to base their work onnormative goals as long as they make it clear what they are doing; and (3) why arguments surrounding eco-system management, which should focus on competing policy visions, are often diverted into less fruitful ar-guments about science and process. A process-based approach that employs our distinctions is particularlyuseful, we argue, in showing why confusion arises so easily when science-based terms such as

ecological integ-rity

are used not just for science purposes but as normative land-management goals. Using science terms inthis way can strengthen the conservation cause by expanding the influence of scientists, but dangers lurk inthe practice, including dangers to the integrity of science as such. On balance, a goal less overtly tied to sci-ence—such as land health—offers a better option for land management.

Poniendo a la Ciencia en su Lugar

Resumen:

La ciencia y la política son pertinentes al manejo de la tierra. La manera en que se entrelazan seentiende mejor si se considera manejo de la tierra como un proceso e iniciando la búsqueda desde y con eseproceso, elaborando distinciones entre aspectos de esencia y proceso y entre las funciones de la descripción dela naturaleza y su evaluación normativa. Esta estrategia basada en los procesos y estas dos distincionesayudan a aislar y aclarar los diferentes papeles adecuados de la ciencia en la ecuación general del manejo dela tierra. Ellos también aclaran (1) el porqué se puede decir que la naturaleza posee valores intrínsecos; (2)el porqué es adecuado para los biólogos de la conservación basar su trabajo en metas normativas siempre ycuando dejen en claro lo que están haciendo; (3) el porqué los argumentos referentesal manejo de ecosiste-mas, que deberían estar enfocados a las visiones políticas que compiten, frecuentemente son desviados haciaargumentos menos fructíferos sobre la ciencia y los procesos. Nosotros argumentamos que una estrategiabasada en los procesos que emplea nuestras distinciones es particularmente útil para mostrar el porqué sur-gen confusiones tan fácilmente cuando son usados términos basados en la ciencia, como es el caso de

inte-gridad ecológica

, no solo con propósitos científicos sino como metas normativas de manejo. El uso de térmi-nos científicos en esta forma puede fortalecer la causa de la conservación al extender las influencias de loscientíficos, pero esconde riesgos en la práctica, incluyendo los peligros de la integridad de la ciencia como tal.En balance, una meta menos claramente ligada a la ciencia, como lo es la salud de la tierra ofrece una mejor

opción.

Paper submitted January 30, 2001; revised manuscript accepted September 19, 2001.

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Putting Science in its Place Freyfogle & Newton

Conservation BiologyVolume 16, No. 4, August 2002

Introduction

Land management is, in operation, a complex, human-guided enterprise. Policy factors are important to it, andso are good data and good science. Our aim is to clarifythe proper roles of science in that enterprise: that is, toput science in its place. We do so by centering our anal-ysis on two key distinctions: (1) description versus eval-uation, which considers the contrasting functions ofdescribing land in all its functional complexity and eval-uating it normatively—deciding whether a given or pro-posed landscape is good or bad in human terms and (2)substance versus process, which attends to the differ-ences between, on the one side, the substantive normsor standards used to evaluate a landscape’s goodness orbadness and, on the other, the various processes bywhich such standards are developed and then applied inthe field to a given tract or landscape.

Description, Evaluation, and Intrinsic Value

In the context of land, the aim of science is to describenature and how it functions, rather than to pass norma-tive judgment upon it. A description could focus on asingle moment in time and space or on change overtime or space, dwell on community composition, at-tend to causal mechanisms or relationships, or predictfuture events or conditions based on assumed condi-tions. In all cases, however, science’s function is en-tirely descriptive in the sense that it merely states (orpredicts) facts. Practitioners of science would accord-ingly describe a seriously eroding farm field much dif-ferently than they would a vegetatively covered fieldthat builds soil, but they would have no purely scien-tific basis for claiming that one field was better thanthe other. They would describe a largely untouchedforest in different terms than a monocultural pine plan-tation but could not say which landscape was more de-sirable. Pure description of this kind we refer to as “sci-ence.” Those who produce it, when engaged solely inthat task, we call “scientists.”

Normative standards are needed to judge natural con-ditions; that is, to decide whether a condition or changein nature is qualitatively good or bad, absolutely or com-paratively. Judgments of this type entail the applicationof chosen normative standards to particular natural con-ditions, a process we refer to as “evaluation.” Normativestandards can vary widely, depending on the aims of thepeople setting them. Does a field or landscape yield asmuch corn as possible? Does it provide good recre-ational opportunities for hikers and hunters? Does it pro-vide good places to build homes? Does it provide foodand habitat for particular desired wildlife species? Underapplicable standards, a particular land parcel might bedeemed good if completely paved with asphalt. It might

also be deemed good if planted in tallgrass prairie plantsand burned annually.

In drawing this sharp distinction, we are challengingwidely held views about what science entails. Objec-tions are easy to imagine. Is not clean water normativelybetter than polluted water? Is not a field that holds soilnormatively better than one that is eroding? Is not amixed-age, mixed-species forest better than an even-aged, monocultural plantation? And if the answers hereare yes, might not a scientific appraisal of a landscape(or a comparison of two prospective conditions of alandscape) at least sometimes produce valid normativejudgments?

Our answer is an unequivocal no. Consider, for in-stance, an old-growth forest versus a monocultural pineplantation. The old-growth forest would often bedeemed better, but what if the pine plantation is thesole remaining home of an endangered species, the treesbeing harvested provide a critically needed medicine, orthe plantation provides the most environmentally andeconomically sound way of meeting valid timber needs?In such cases, the pine plantation might, overall, be nor-matively better. Clean water, of course, is typically bet-ter than contaminated water, but again, what if the con-tamination is a high saline level that sustains anendangered pupfish? The point is that one cannot movefrom landscape facts to substantive judgment withoutdrawing upon other considerations. And because theseconsiderations can vary from setting to setting, so toocan evaluations about the desirability of various landconditions. To be sure, one might propose a comparisonbetween two alternative landscape conditions, one soobviously good and the other so horrid that no sane per-son would prefer it. But an instance would not, we be-lieve, undercut our claim; it would merely highlight thatsubstantive standards vary within a confined range andthat a particular landscape might rate abysmally underall conceivable standards.

Although we are confident in claiming that science inthis setting is purely descriptive (in the sense we have justexplained), we do recognize (and set to the side as unim-portant here) limits on the power of humans to engage invalue-free description, whether because of Heisenberg’suncertainty principle, because values inevitably affectwhich questions are asked and which facts are selected,or for other reasons (Callicott 1999

a

). We also recognizethat certain descriptive conditions, such as clean waterand fertile soil, have powerful normative overtones in thesense that, absent unusual factors, such conditions wouldbe viewed as normatively good. But unusual factors doarise, particularly in landscapes heavily used by humans,as our pine plantation example illustrates. Until substan-tive standards are brought into the picture, science alonemerely describes.

Our distinction between description and evaluationcan be illuminated by considering the claim sometimes


Freyfogle & Newton Putting Science in its Place

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made that nature merely “is”: that, in other words, na-ture is neither good nor bad and that one therefore can-not jump from the “is” of nature to the “ought” of de-sired landscape. In what sense might this be true? If bynature one means the world as described by science, thestatement is a simple tautology. Science is purely de-scriptive and makes no claim about the “ought.” Thestatement’s accuracy becomes debatable only when it isvested by the speaker or listener with a much differentmeaning, when the claim being made is that a naturalarea always lacks normative status or content.

Natural communities can plainly differ widely in theirgoodness and badness once they are subjected to evalua-tion. Not only can nature as evaluated be deemed nor-matively good or bad, but an evaluation could lead tothe identification of a particular landscape as an idealone—a long- and well-used pastoral landscape, for in-stance. Such a landscape might serve, as a consequenceof this evaluation, as an example of the normative “ought,”with land managers thereafter using it as a baseline bywhich to judge and manage other lands. Considered nor-matively, in short, nature can be highly value-laden.

Aside from any evaluation, however, the claim that na-ture just “is” is subject to an important challenge. Manypeople perceive a transcendent moral order in the uni-verse, whether coming from God or elsewhere. Onewidespread belief based on a transcendent order is thathumans have special moral value that distinguishes themfrom other life forms, value that does not rest on humanconvention alone (Baer 1971; Zizioulas 1989). A relatedcommon belief is that other life forms or collectives alsopossess certain value independent of any human action inrecognizing it or creating it (Baer 1966). To the extentthat a transcendent moral order does exist, some parts orconditions of nature might stand on their own (that is,prior to any evaluation) as the “ought” of moral goodness.

The moral value that arises by reason of a transcen-dent order is one type of what is commonly called

in-trinsic value

, a term that typically comprises any moralvalue possessed by a thing that does not arise due to thething’s contribution to human utility. As thus defined,the term includes both objective value arising by reasonof a transcendent moral order and all value, not based onutility, that humans create through moral reasoning andconvention. Many philosophers, for instance, concludethat endangered species possess intrinsic value, but be-lieve that such value exists only when morally guidedhumans are present to recognize it (Wenz 2001). Claimsof intrinsic value not based on religion remain largelywithin the modernist world view, which requires thepresence of a valuing human subject to confer or ascribevalue (Callicott 1999

d

).The matter of intrinsic value is worth considering in

the context of land management because of the light itsheds on science’s varied roles. Neither type of intrinsicvalue has any tangible existence, which means neither is

amenable to direct study through empirical data collec-tion and analysis. Because scientists rest their descrip-tions of nature on empirical data, they possess no toolswith which to describe intrinsic value or even to com-ment meaningfully on it. Intrinsic value is not an issue ofscience (excluding, here as elsewhere, social-sciencestudies of the human behavior involved).

Of the two types of intrinsic value, claims based on atranscendent moral order pose the greater difficulties forscience. Science presumes that the world is a purely phys-ical phenomenon and seeks to understand it as such. It re-jects

ab initio

any claim that nonmaterial forces, pro-cesses, essences, or moral orders exist in the world. Thispresumption is pervasive and highly potent, so much sothat scientists are prone to assume that science has dis-proved transcendent forms and values (Wilson 1998). Infact it has not. Science merely employs analytic methodsthat presume their nonexistence and seeks to describe allthat it perceives without them (Berry 2000).

Three observations, useful to what follows, emergefrom our consideration of intrinsic value: (1) Intrinsic-value claims are unscientific in the sense that scienceyields no clear proof to sustain them, but they are notunscientific in the sense of being falsified or otherwisedisproved. (2) Because science has no tools with whichto study intrinsic value, it has no legitimate role in as-sessing claims about it (although scientists, in their rolesas citizens, certainly do). (3) The claim that we cannotshift from the “is” of nature to the “ought” of desiredlandscape outcomes is plainly true only if “nature” refersto the detailed description generated by pure science. If“nature” means something other or more than that, theclaim raises issues that go beyond science and that nor-matively might be false.

The Substance and Process of Evaluation

Evaluation and the Distinction between Substance and Process

Evaluation in the land-management setting is a matter ofpassing judgment on the goodness or badness of condi-tions or processes in nature. Put simply, evaluation is un-dertaken when identified people employ substantive cri-teria to make determinations of goodness or badness.This activity is usefully divided into two parts: (1) thesubstantive criteria used to judge (the substantive evalu-ation standards) and (2) the overall process by whichthe standards are applied and land-use practices are set(the evaluation process).

Substantive Evaluation Standards

Substantive evaluation standards properly reflect the fullrange of factors people might take into account in decid-

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ing whether a landscape is good or bad, from the mosthighly practical considerations to ones that are entirelyaesthetic, moral, or religious. Is the land producing food,fuel, and fiber for humans in the way desired by thosewho set the standards? Is the land a beautiful, healthfulplace for people to live? Is adequate habitat provided forparticular species or (if desired) all native species? Areadequate natural areas set aside for study, recreation,and other purposes? Do current and proposed land-usepractices properly reflect moral duties to future genera-tions and other life forms, all as determined by thosewho set the standards?

In thinking about standards, it is useful to break their con-stituent elements into three overlapping components: (1)

human utility

, with utility broadly conceived to includeaesthetics and the full range of quality-of-life issues; (2)

re-spect

or

virtue

, drawing upon a wide range of moral and re-ligious assessments of nature and of how humans ought tointeract with it; (3)

humility

or

precaution

, which takesinto account and seeks to accommodate the considerablelimits on human knowledge and understanding.

Although these components are not difficult to graspin broad terms, a few explanations may be helpful. Atranscendent moral order, to the extent recognized,would likely enter the standards as part of component 2,as would other claims of intrinsic value. A sense of moralobligation to future human generations might also enterin to component 2, although it could also be deemedpart of component 1. A perceived need to act cautiouslytoward the land might well fit within all of the compo-nents. It appears here separately because of the empha-sis that it receives in many proposed schemes of evalua-tion standards (Ehrenfeld 1981; Freyfogle 1993, 1998;Raffensperger & Tickner 1999).

Plainly, these components can take a variety of forms,and much discussion today centers on them. Many pro-posed land-management goals or guidelines draw overtlyon all three components. Others emphasize one or two.For our purposes it is chiefly important to note the threecomponents and to recognize the diverse ways they cancome together. It is not the case that standards fall intotwo distinct categories: those based only on human util-ity and those based on a “biocentric” perspective of theworld. Real life is vastly more complex: various factorsintermingle complexly, forming an undivided range.

The Evaluation Process and Its Importance

A number of questions and issues need to be raised andresolved—however deliberately—whenever a processfor evaluating land is put in place. Who will the evalua-tors be? What spatial scale will be employed? What studywill occur and what evidence will be deemed relevant?How frequently will evaluations be updated?

The way an evaluation process is structured and con-ducted can have considerable effect on the evaluation

that results, which is to say that any given evaluationwill be much influenced by the process that produces itand not just by the substantive evaluation standards thatare employed. Who decides, upon what evidence, and inwhat setting can all considerably influence the ultimateevaluation. Processes can entail little or much study, littleor much expert scientific input, and little or much discus-sion and deliberation. All affect the outcome.

The effect of process on outcome is usefully illus-trated by considering the methods available to gain pub-lic input on an issue of policy. One method, the standardopinion poll, seeks evaluations from people as isolatedindividuals without study or deliberation. It presumesthat people know enough to make determinations, andit allows them to select the standards to use in doing so.The opinion-poll approach is usefully compared to its op-posite: the courtroom process in which public jurors arecalled upon to make consensus evaluations. Courtroomjurors are deliberately screened to ensure that they haveno prior knowledge of the dispute and no cause for bias.Carefully prepared evidence is presented to them, in a set-ting arranged to encourage reflection. Decisions are madeby jurors acting collectively. The laws they apply (theevaluation standards) are established in advance and prof-fered when the time comes to judge.

Methods of gaining public input vary between theseextremes, with the method chosen having considerableeffect on the input received. In this way and many oth-ers, process can be as important as substantive standardsin shaping ultimate decisions—as the legal professionfor generations has known well.

Setting Standards—the Process

Substantive evaluation standards are themselves typi-cally the products of a process—here termed the stan-dard-setting process—one that also exerts considerableinfluence on what it yields. Such processes can be pub-lic and highly formal ones, as when the U.S. Congressenacts laws that are signed by the president or when afederal agency promulgates regulations after extensivestudy and hearings. On the other side, they can be ca-sual, individual, and instantaneous, as when an individ-ual landowner makes a snap land-use decision. Scholars,of course, commonly develop and propose their ownsubstantive evaluation standards (conservation biolo-gists and economists prominently among them), and ahuge and useful literature on the subject exists. Collec-tively, the standards in a given setting can be viewed asthe overall management goal, although the term

goal

might also be applied to a single standard in isolation,particularly if it is a standard that takes precedence overother applicable standards.

Complicating the matter of how standards arise is thefact that a standard-setting process can be intertwinedwith an evaluation process; that is, one process can both



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set standards and apply them. They are often inter-twined when substantive evaluation standards are insuf-ficiently detailed to apply to a given landscape, vestingevaluators with so much latitude that they are requiredin effect to complete the standards-setting work by put-ting flesh on incomplete standards. For instance, a sub-stantive evaluation standard might call upon evaluatorsto make determinations as to what is “reasonable” or“feasible” or “cost-effective” under the circumstances. Itmight, alternatively, call for a determination as to whethera landscape produces the “highest sustained yield” of aresource or provides for the “maximum diversity” of plantand animal species. To varying degrees, such terms aresufficiently vague that those who apply them must givethem meaning. As they do so, they engage both in settingstandards (even if merely fine-tuning) and in evaluation.

Health as Metaphor

Our comments here are pertinent to the question ofwhether it is metaphorical to speak of land or an ecosys-tem as being healthy (Callicott 1992, 1999

c

; Ehrenfeld1992). Our answer is simple: yes and no. Yes, if thequestion is one purely of science, and no, if the questionrefers to health as a substantive evaluation standard.

Although scientists are free to develop new terms andmake new uses of old ones, they have so far used healthsolely to describe the functioning of individual organ-isms. Because an ecosystem is not an organism, it cannotliterally possess health in this way. To speak of ecosys-tem health as science, therefore, is to use the term meta-phorically—at least until such time as the term is as-signed a broader meaning. On the other hand, the largercommunity apart from science does not limit the term

health

so narrowly but uses it in other ways, as whenpeople speak of community health, public health, or thehealth of the economy. In such settings, all value-laced,health describes modes of functioning that are thriving,vigorous, and growing in desired ways. These are literaluses of the word, and land can be healthy in the same lit-eral way. In this regard, it is worth noting the claim ofWendell Berry (1995) that the well-being of an organismis so linked to surrounding life that it is misleading tospeak of the health of an organism in isolation. The com-munity “is the smallest unit of health,” in his view, and“to speak of the health of an isolated individual is a con-tradiction in terms.”

Leopold and Land Health

In similar manner, our approach sheds light on one ofthe most prominent proposed standards for land man-agement, the goal of land health proposed by Aldo Leo-pold. Responding to what he viewed as an acute na-tional need, Leopold proposed that the conservationcommunity come together to embrace land health as its

guiding aim. In a series of late writings (many, unfortu-nately, unpublished at his death) Leopold explained gen-erally what land health means and listed the principalsymptoms of land sickness. As he defined it, land healthcenters chiefly on the functioning of ecological processesand only indirectly on biological composition (Callicott1992, 1999

b

; Freyfogle 2000).Leopold did not offer

land health

as a term or state-ment of science, although he drew extensively upon sci-ence in formulating it. He offered it instead as what wecall a substantive evaluation standard. His first require-ment for healthy land was that the soil be retained andkept fertile. Eroding fields, he knew, could still sustainlife, but they would do so over time at lower levels ofproductivity. Productivity, in turn, was a good thing inmany ways, not the least because it promoted overall hu-man utility. By including soil preservation as part of landhealth, Leopold drew upon all three component parts ofsubstantive evaluation standards: (1) fertile soil contrib-uted to long-term human utility; (2) soil conservationshowed proper respect for what he viewed as the bioticright of other life forms to exist; and (3) conservationseemed a wise way to act cautiously in the face of our ig-norance about community functioning. In similar ways,Leopold’s other functional components of land healthdrew upon the various elements of substantive stan-dards, while leaving open the possibility that, in givensettings, other substantive standards would also havebearing.

Because it is best understood as a substantive evalua-tion standard, land health as Leopold defined it is prop-erly challenged—as are other substantive evaluation stan-dards only based upon a full assessment of the factorsrelevant to the setting of them. Accordingly, it is wrong todismiss such a goal as bad science, although it would cer-tainly be proper to argue that better science could im-prove it. It would also be wrong, given our comments onhealth as metaphor, to claim that such a goal presumes anoutdated organismic understanding of ecosystem func-tioning. In Leopold’s case, neither land health nor hisnow-famous land ethic, in which he used the term

stabil-ity

as a synonym for land health, was based on such anunderstanding (Callicott 1992; Freyfogle 2000).

The Roles of Science

Having divided the land-management process into itscentral parts, it becomes easier to see the many ways sci-ence fits into the process and the full range of ways thatscientists as such can contribute to it.

Setting Standards

Science plays a vital supporting role in the standards-set-ting process, chiefly with respect to two of the three

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components. Science has its slightest role in formulat-ing the respect or virtue component of the standards, be-cause this component addresses questions of moral andreligious value that are largely detached from science.Science’s main role here is likely to be indirect. By help-ing people learn about the natural world, it can stimu-late their moral sentiments, prompting changes in whatthey value (Callicott 1989).

In terms of the humility or precautionary componentof the standards, science is useful in highlighting limitson human knowledge and abilities and in emphasizingnature’s indeterminacy and interdependencies. In theend, humility raises questions of value or virtue ratherthan science, but good science can help greatly in theexploration of such questions. Scientists would be re-miss if they did not step out of their science roles andengage these issues.

Science’s most prominent role lies in helping to gaugethe many factors relating to human utility, particularlythose pertaining to the land’s carrying capacity and itslong-term ability to satisfy diverse human needs. With re-spect to endangered species, for instance, science isneeded to help estimate the direct and indirect utility ofvarious species; similarly and even more so, science isneeded to gauge the benefits of particular ecosystem pro-cesses. Still, even with respect to human utility, sciencemust be interpreted in light of human needs, desires, andaspirations. Science has little to say about aesthetics, forinstance, or about the functioning of the market econ-omy. Thus, on this component as well, science needs towork in tandem with other considerations.

Evaluating Nature and Implementing Chosen Standards

Science becomes even more important during the evalu-ation process and thereafter, when land-use plans anddecisions are developed and implemented (here termed

implementation

). A standards-setting process couldlead to a determination, for instance, that farm fieldsshould be used in ways that preserve the quantity andquality of the soil. Science would then be needed tostudy various land-use patterns, whether existing or hy-pothetical, to determine whether they satisfy this stan-dard. Similarly, a chosen standard might call for the res-toration of a native salmon population in a given river.Again, science would be needed to decide whether par-ticular plans of action would or would not achieve thatstandard.

Formulating Processes Used to Set Standards, Evaluate,and Implement

Science can also provide valuable information when pro-cedural issues are being resolved. Some processes willbe far better than others in making good use of science.For instance, the spatial scale of a land-management ef-

fort presents an important process issue. The choiceamong possible scales is not itself a science issue, butscience can help describe appropriate ecological bound-aries such as watersheds or functional boundaries of ec-osystems. Evaluation and implementation done on sucha scale is more likely to incorporate good science than asimilar effort undertaken on a less natural scale. This isparticularly true, of course, in the conservation of biodi-versity, which is most effectively done by managing eco-systems rather than individual species in isolation(Knight 1996). Scientists can provide useful advice onthe issue of scale, as they can on many other process is-sues, in terms of timing, study methods, data drawnupon, deliberation modes, and monitoring and feedbackmechanisms.

Conservation Biology, Values, and Advocacy

A process-centered approach to land management helpsshed light on the issue of values and advocacy in conserva-tion biology (Noss 1996). If conservation biology werenothing more than science, its aim might be simply to cat-alogue and describe the elements of biodiversity, currentlyand prospectively, along with their processes, functions,and interactions. It would produce no judgments or rec-ommendations, and passion would not have a role in it.

Conservation biology, however, began with the postu-late that biotic diversity has intrinsic value and deservesprotection (Soulé 1985). That overarching goal still mo-tivates the discipline (Meffe & Carroll 1997). Such a goalplainly reaches beyond science and is best understood(in our framework) as a substantive evaluation standard.To the extent that the embedded standard—protectingand restoring native biodiversity—is accepted, conserva-tion biology is well grounded in established policy, but,when the embedded substantive standard is contestedor rejected, the discipline is not.

The question commonly asked about conservationbiology is whether it is in some way scientifically ille-gitimate because its practitioners embrace a particularstandard and advocate on behalf of it. We think not.Conservation biology is hardly alone in seeking to pro-mote established, widely shared policy aims (Meine &Meffe 1996). Human medicine offers a good comparison(Soulé 1985; Ehrenfeld 2000); it is premised on the simi-lar non-science determination that it is good to preservehuman life. Normative bases such as these, in fact, under-gird much contemporary science. Soil scientists pre-sume (and with good reason) that it is typically good toretain soil and keep it fertile; water-quality researcherspresume (with equally good reason) that clean water istypically better than polluted. In the case of conserva-tion biology, the normative bases are in fact wellgrounded in public sentiment (Kempton et al. 1995). Innone of these instances is science establishing the nor-mative bases that undergird it; we do not mean here to



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say otherwise. And we must keep open, again, the possi-bility that, in particular physical settings, infertile soil orcontaminated water or biological impoverishment mightbe normatively preferred, based on governing substan-tive standards. Science in these settings does not createits own the normative bases; it accepts them and usesthem to guide its efforts.

We see no problem with advocacy on the part of con-servation biologists, so long as they remain clear aboutwhich aspects of their work are science (mere descrip-tion) and which go beyond science to become advocacyfor particular, biodiversity-enhancing standards. That isperhaps best done when scientists expressly state thenormative presumptions upon which they work, partic-ularly when those presumptions might be challenged.Clear expression serves many good purposes, not theleast of which is to put pressure on opposing interests tomake clear their own presumptions. Once normativepresumptions are set forth—supported, when appropri-ate, with evidence from public opinion surveys, legisla-tive determinations, and the like—conservation biolo-gists can proceed with their science work, as objectivelyand responsibly as medical researchers and many otherscientists.

Understanding Ecosystem Management

How, then, might ecosystem management be under-stood in terms of this analysis, and what roles might sci-ence rightfully play in it? Is it chiefly a descriptive activ-ity, that is, pure science as we have described it? Is italso or instead a matter of setting substantive standards?Does it include evaluation and implementation? Might itaddress process-related matters, such as who the evalua-tors will be and on what spatial scale management willtake place?

Ecosystem management encompasses a variety of ac-tivities and processes, so much so that these questionsyield varied answers (Grumbine 1994; Yaffee 1999). Agiven effort at ecosystem management could include ev-ery step and activity described above, from the stan-dards-setting process through the evaluation processand on to implementation, with perhaps procedure-set-ting tasks woven in. On the other hand, it could be con-figured more narrowly, with the roles of science withinit limited accordingly.

At its fullest, ecosystem management could providethe entire procedural and substantive framework formaking decisions about a landscape—much as an indi-vidual landowner might do if completely unhindered byoutside factors and constraints. To do the full job well,ecosystem management ought to cover all the steps: (1)prescribe the procedural rules for setting standards, in-cluding who sets them and how; (2) provide substantiveguidance (as appropriate) for use in that process, includ-ing minimum requirements for the substantive evalua-

tion standards that ultimately emerge; (3) set the govern-ing procedural rules for the evaluation process, in termsof data collection, assessment, and study; and (4) ex-plain the processes for implementation, including howresponsibilities should be assigned and plans prepared.

A more limited form of ecosystem management wouldbe one in which functions at one or both ends of theoverall land-management sequence are omitted. Thus,an ecosystem management process might begin withsome or all of the substantive evaluation standards al-ready in place, perhaps set by law or by agency or land-owner decision. At the other end, it might terminate ear-lier, at the stage of detailed evaluation, for instance, orearly in implementation, leaving later steps for others toperform.

Ecosystem management efforts often become con-fused and contentious because the assigned functionsare unclear and feuding interests have differing under-standings of what is going on. A prime example of con-fused guidance appeared in the 1995 federal

Report ofthe Interagency Ecosystem Management Task Force

,which strongly endorsed the ecosystem approach forfederal management efforts (Freyfogle 1997). At variousplaces the report refers to ecosystem management asmerely “a process,” the neutral aim of which is to selectand then achieve whatever “desired ecosystem out-come” is deemed appropriate in the collective view ofthe various participants. Language of this type suggeststhat the standards-setting and evaluation processeswould be merged. At other places, however, the reportstates that ecosystem management is a “goal driven” en-terprise; it is “a method for sustaining and restoring nat-ural systems and their functions and values” with a pre-determined goal of “restor[ing] and sustain[ing] the health,productivity, and biological diversity of ecosystems.” Suchlanguage, sprinkled throughout the report, suggests thatmanagement processes are to begin with an importantsubstantive evaluation standard already in place. Thefederal report, in short, pushes two ways, sowing confu-sion along the way.

Ecosystem management is a contested managerial ap-proach. At least nominally, controversies around itlargely involve such scientific issues as whether ecosys-tems exist, how they might be characterized, andwhether their natural functioning is sufficiently orderlyand persistent to serve as a management guide (Pickett& White 1985; Worster 1993, 1994; Pahl-Wostl 1995).We cannot elaborate here, but it is our sense that manysuch debates, ostensibly about science, are more aptlyunderstood as disputes about other issues, disputes thatwould be more productive if the real issues were faceddirectly. The issue in a given debate, for instance, mightreally be about the best substantive evaluation standardsto employ in a given evaluation process. Or it might beabout matters of process, such as who the evaluators areor whether sound input is being gained from users of

870



managed lands. Even the prominent debate about what,as a matter of science, characterizes an ecosystem islargely miscast when the true land-management issue ischoosing the best spatial scale for management—a pro-cess-related issue that science informs but does not de-termine.

Using Science Terms as Standards

No small amount of confusion arises in the land-manage-ment arena when terms developed by scientists to aid inscience are borrowed and put to use as overall manage-ment goals. As tools useful in the descriptive work of sci-ence, such terms can become degraded. As substantiveevaluation standards, they can be poorly cast. Beyondthat, scientists can have a hard time keeping straightwhat is science and what is not when a single term isused in two ways—as both the descriptive

is

(or

will be

)and the normative

ought

. Nonscientists, predictably,risk even greater confusion. The practice of using termsin two ways, however, is not without potential benefits.How the costs and benefits compare is a matter that de-serves more attention.

Ecological Integrity as a Goal

The much-discussed idea of ecological integrity illus-trates this practice. As a science term,

ecological integ-rity

is used as a shorthand way of describing the func-tioning of particular ecosystems, typically ecosystemslargely unaffected by humans (Karr 1990). It is used sci-entifically, too, as a benchmark by which to measure theextent to which humans have altered given landscapes(Angermeier 2000; Sagoff 2000). Like other scienceterms, ecological integrity might prove useful in manag-ing land at any step in the overall effort where science isproperly employed.

Ecological integrity, however, might also be used (andhas been used quite prominently) as a normative idea,that is, as a shorthand way of identifying a key feature ofa valued landscape. Or, to draw upon the above termi-nology, a standards-setting process could, in a given spa-tial setting, select ecological integrity as a substantiveevaluation standard. (The standard, in such an instance,might be the only one chosen for the landscape, or itcould be one of several chosen standards.) When thishappens, ecological integrity shifts from being a toolused simply to describe nature to being part of a land-management goal, perhaps even the key standard thatforms the goal.

When used as a tool to describe nature, ecological in-tegrity is subject to challenge if and to the extent that itis poor science. Scientists could debate its utility in de-scribing nature and measuring human-caused change,but their debate on that issue, being pure science,

would carry no moral or normative overtones. Con-versely, when ecological integrity is put to use in a sub-stantive evaluation standard, it would not be subject toobjection on this scientific basis, because substantiveevaluation standards are by no means limited to valid sci-entific ideas. Standards can, and indeed normally should,draw upon many moral and prudential considerations. Asubstantive evaluation standard could legitimately(though perhaps unwisely) draw an idea from scienceand then proceed to modify the idea—based upon con-siderations of human utility, virtue or respect, and hu-mility or precaution—yielding a revised version of theidea, quite distinct from pure science.

Plainly, a single term used in two ways can breed con-fusion. It is an obvious problem with an obvious solu-tion: to find another term to fill one of the verbal roles.Given the obvious solution, why might science terms beput to normative uses when the result may be confusionand worse? One speculative answer is that scientists areunaware of what they are doing, or they are aware of itbut underestimate the dangers. Another is simply thatthe terms are already familiar and conveniently at hand.Without discounting these answers, it is possible to pro-pose another: scientists are well aware of what they aredoing, and they mix verbal roles deliberately as a way toexpand science’s roles in land management, particularlyin the vital step of setting standards.

To choose ecological integrity as a guiding standard isto promote one normative vision of land over others.The vision being promoted, it is important to note, isstrongly slanted toward conservation, and it is a vision inwhich scientists as such would play a dominant role inachieving it. One could phrase a strongly proconserva-tion standard in other ways, using only nonscience terms.But standards phrased in nonscience terms would notsimilarly grant to scientists the influence they receivewhen a guiding standard uses terms that so obviouslyplay to their expertise.

Our argument here is speculative, particularly to the ex-tent that it requires proof of the motives driving individ-ual scientists. Yet we are inclined to believe that suchspeculation is useful even without exploring motives. Thefundamental reality is that a goal phrased in scientificterms is likely to augment the roles of science and scien-tists in efforts to promote it. Whether or not intended,such a phrasing entails a move to gain power. And it is, inthe case of ecological integrity, a move to exercise thatpower sharply in favor of land conservation.

Friends of conservation might see much to like in anyattempt to add strength to their cause. As for the legiti-macy of such a move, other disciplines have done muchthe same and with great effect: witness the spectacularsuccess of economics in elevating the descriptive term

efficiency

into an all-purpose normative goal. Even so,the dangers in seeking influence in this way are notmodest.



871

When ecological integrity becomes an influential stan-dard, its proponents might easily be prone to clarify ormodify the term in ways that are simply not justified sci-entifically. Because substantive evaluation standardsneed not stand alone as science, their manipulationsmight well be proper as a normative matter. But it iseasy to see how adjustments made to standards couldquickly cross back to the science side and distort scien-tific conclusions. This is particularly true, we believe,given that the power gained by pushing ecological integ-rity as a standard depends upon the confusion generatedby the term—much as the influence of economists isbased on widespread confusion about efficiency. Themore blurring that occurs between science and evalua-tion standards, the more power scientists acquire, yetthe more likely it is too that the various components ofstandards (moral and precautionary factors, for instance,as well as estimates of overall utility) will permeate thescience side and cause distortion.

As we see matters, though, the greater danger lurkingin such a verbal sleight of hand is a different one: norma-tive disagreements about the nonscience components ofsubstantive evaluation standards will become, throughconfusion, disagreements instead about matters of sci-ence. Those who resist measures to promote integritycould well respond (as they already have responded) byclaiming that they are bad science rather than by con-testing their legitimacy as sound substantive evaluationstandards. In the extreme, the entire scientific field thatstudies land functioning could turn into a political battle-ground, with disagreements framed as issues of sciencestanding as surrogates for arguments that chiefly reflectdiffering perspectives on human utility, morals, and thewisdom of acting humbly.

Misplaced arguments of this type can easily crop up asdisputes about how to define key scientific terms. For in-stance, does nature on its own operate as a “system?”The answer depends not only on nature but on how onedefines the word

system

. When the question is purelyone of science, cool heads might prevail and a consen-sus definition might emerge. But when more is riding onthe question—when an affirmative answer to it willhave vast effects on land-management practices—a con-sensus definition might prove elusive. Misgivings aboutthe wisdom of conservation can take the form of techni-cal arguments about the definition of

system

or

order

or

integrity

or

health

. Those who favor intensive land usescan bolster their policy preferences by defining a termsuch as system so that no natural community—and per-haps nothing short of a machine—possesses it. Thosewho oppose efforts to promote ecological integrity caneasily define it, if they choose, so that no natural areaever has it.

We might illustrate today’s predicament by imaginingtwo scientists who independently study a particular,barely altered natural area. The scientists might both use

the term integrity to describe how barely altered areasfunction, yet disagree factually as to how the particulararea they study does function. Alternatively, they mightagree entirely on how the particular area functions andyet disagree as to whether it is helpful to use the term in-tegrity to describe that functioning, and if so how theterm might be defined. Finally, they might agree that thenatural area possesses integrity but disagree on whetherthe maintenance of that integrity is an appropriate aimfor land-management efforts. Facts, definitions, policyfactors: all are good matters to talk about, but it is hardto discuss them sensibly when they are mingled andconfused.

Given these dangers (if not already realized costs) ofemploying science terms as land-management goals, wesee considerable appeal in using an updated version ofLeopold’s land health as an alternative conservationgoal. The term

land

is plainly not a scientific term; thus,is not subject to criticism in the ways a term such as eco-system is (Callicott 1999

c

). As for the term health, it isless likely to draw criticism as bad science (Callicott1999

c

), although we recognize that the term has some-times been so attacked. Its virtue is that, apart from sci-entists and their quibbles about its metaphorical usage,health has strong, broad connotations (Karr 2000). It isnot popularly viewed as a technical science term (al-though academics sometimes view it as such), and peo-ple will be more likely to sense (rightly) that many pol-icy factors are relevant to it (Ehrenfeld 1992). At thesame time, it promotes a vision of the land as a vigorous,productive operation, and no one can avoid recognizingthe strong roles of science in understanding and manag-ing that operation.

Ecology and Politics

Our probing here of the contentious intellectual terrainsurrounding such terms as ecosystem, ecological integ-rity, and health lead us to conclude with more wide-ranging comments about the political context in whichsuch debates take place, particularly debates among sci-entists. Nature is so interwoven and interdependent thatthose who seek evidence of structure and system caneasily find it. Yet given the constancy of natural change,the variations among communities, and the various op-tions as to scale of analysis, those who seek disorder canfind that too. Is it possible that a scientist might be par-ticularly inclined, for nonscience reasons, to look forone rather than another?

To argue that nature is random and disorderly abovethe organism level is the ultimate expression of classi-cal liberalism, which sought to knock down traditionalsocial restraints and maximize individual freedom. It isno surprise, then, that those who see chaos in naturesometimes turn for historical support to such influen-tial liberal philosophers as John Stuart Mill, whose ato-

872



mistic view of nature corresponded with his individual-istic view of the human social condition (Sagoff 2000).How one views nature, as historian Donald Worster hasspeculated, may have more to do than we yet recog-nize with one’s political and social leanings (Worster1993, 1994).

A view of nature-as-chaos builds upon and carries for-ward the powerful force of American individualism. Atthe same time, it is easily associated with widespreadhostility toward government constraints on liberty andto America’s deep-seated love of the free market. It iseasy to see why private industry prefers a view of natureas chaotic. With equal ease one can see why pro-libertyand pro-market think tanks offer unwavering support forthe nature-as-chaos view. Their embrace of disequilib-rium says much about them and little about the sound-ness of any relevant science.

But might it be true that independent scientists alsohave trouble keeping matters straight, whether they per-sonally favor the chaos and competition of the market orinstead see social welfare as dependent chiefly on healthyfamilies, neighborhoods, schools, churches, and othercommunal structures? Is it irrelevant whether scientists be-lieve humans ought to share, cooperate, and act humblywhen dealing with one another or whether they are com-fortable with the aggressive pursuit of self-chosen aims?

Communities in nature are not machines, and theyare not organisms. Their closest analogue, it wouldseem, is the human social community, a fact Aldo Leo-pold recognized near the end of his life when he drewa parallel between ecology and sociology (Leopold1946). In important ways, both disciplines deal with ul-timate levels of organization, which leads one to won-der: Rather than distance itself from social and politicalconsiderations, might ecology do better to embracethem more openly, not so as to bias research but tohelp improve it. Might ecology move ahead today bydrawing more extensively on the wisdom of observerswho have struggled to find sense in communal struc-tures and who have attended in their prescriptions notto the parts in isolation but to their lasting and healthyinteractions?

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