putting power into practice...putting power into practice: capacity-building and the european...
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Putting power into practice:
Capacity-building and the European Parliament’s role
in EU trade negotiations
Evelyn Coremans1 and Katharina Meissner2
--- Draft – please do not cite or circulate without permission ---
1 PhD researcher, Leuven International and European Studies (LINES), KU Leuven,
2 Assistant Professor, Institute for European Integration Research, University of Vienna,
Abstract
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament (EP) has acquired
the right to ratification of international agreements that are concluded in the context of
the EU’s Common Commercial Policy. In addition, the European Commission is now
formally obliged to inform the EP throughout the negotiations. These provisions
prompted a need for developing administrative mechanisms and structures to support the
EP in the execution of its formal role of overseeing the negotiations and ratification of
the final agreement.
Consequently, the first question addressed in this article considers how the EP has built
and institutionalised the administrative capacity needed to fulfil these newly formalised
powers. Secondly, empirical observation has shown that not all trade negotiations are
created equal in terms of how much of that administrative capacity the EP is willing to
actually deploy during the negotiation process. This article therefore reflects on the
factors that motivate the EP’s International Trade Committee (INTA) to put this
administrative capacity into practice and develop the relevant political capacity for each
individual trade agreement under negotiation. We grasp the combination of
administrative and political capacity as enhanced policy capacity of the EP.
Based on interviews with EU officials, document analysis and fieldwork in INTA, the
article analyses the development of the EP’s administrative and political capacity during
negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the United States
(TTIP). The authors find that the specific nature of politicisation of this trade agreement
explains why INTA has translated its post-Lisbon administrative capacity into specific
political capacity for overseeing the TTIP negotiations.
Key words
Common Commercial Policy, European Parliament, European Union, TTIP, Trade
18
Introduction
This article aims to unravel the relationship between formal competency changes, politicisation
and the development of policy capacity in EU decision-making between the institutions.
Borrowing from Wu, Ramesh and Howlet (2015, p. 166), we define policy capacity as a "set
of skills and resources - or competences and capabilities - necessary to perform policy
functions”. Policy capacity is seen as including both administrative and political capacity in
relation to a specific policy field (see table 1 in the theory section). This is a crucial element as
an actor’s policy capacity is the foundation for his substantive influence on policy outcomes.
With the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament (EP) has seen an extensive formalisation of
decision-making powers in the field of international trade agreements. Concretely, the Lisbon
Treaty bestowed the EP with the formal right to ratification and the right to be kept informed
throughout the negotiation of trade agreements with third countries.3 We expect that the
formalisation of those powers engendered a need for developing new administrative
mechanisms to support the EP in the execution of its oversight role. Earlier changes in the EP’s
rules of procedures – like the introduction of direct elections – have been linked to increased
administrative capacity through more complex administrative support structures and higher
staff numbers (Gungor, 2009; Neunreither, 2002; Westlake, 1994). We assume that
administrative capacity is a prerequisite for the EP to have an impact on decision-making in
EU CCP (Farrell & Héritier, 2003; Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, 2016). Hence, we will
analyse whether and how the EP has built this administrative capacity needed to fulfil its treaty-
based powers in EU CCP since 2009.
Next, the article reflects on the factors that motivate the EP’s willingness to put this
administrative capacity into practice. In order words, what prompts the EP to turn its
administrative capacity into political capacity? We argue that traits relating to the specific
context of individual trade negotiations are crucial in motivating the development of political
3 We refer to a formalisation – rather than a complete overhaul – as the EP had already extended its influence in
EU Common Commercial Policy (CCP) via informal mechanisms long before the Lisbon Treaty entered into
force (Van den Putte, De Ville, & Orbie, 2015). As will become clear further on in this article, this practice of
informal procedural change continues also after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (Meissner, 2016; Ripoll
Servent & Servent, 2014; Van den Putte et al., 2015)
18
capacity. The case of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) shows that
the administrative capacity built up since 2009, was only translated into political capacity under
influence of a significant degree of politicisation throughout the negotiation process – leading
to enhanced policy capacity of the EP.
As the policy domain of EU CCP has seen such an extensive growth of EP formal powers after
Lisbon, it makes for an ideal subject to study the development of the EP’s policy capacity. Of
all concluded and on-going negotiations post-Lisbon, the TTIP has proven to be the most
influential in terms of ad-hoc changes to the decision-making procedures, which is why it was
selected as the case for this article. Our focus lies on the development and institutionalisation
of policy capacity, that is administrative and political capacity, implying that we cover the
formative stages of this process rather than the effect on EP empowerment and influence
(Farrell & Héritier, 2003; Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, 2016).4
The following section identifies that the current literature has been skewed towards a narrow
focus on the EP’s staff and political actors and lacks studies that assess the broader
organisational aspects at the meso-level of the EP’s Committee administration. The second
section outlines the theoretical approach, combining literature on EP policy capacity and
institutionalisation to develop a coherent approach for analysing EP policy capacity and the
factors motivating its development. The third section probes the plausibility of our argument
by analysing in-depth the changes in administrative and political capacity since the Lisbon
treaty and the TTIP negotiations. The empirical research relies on 14 semi-structured
interviews with EU officials from the Council, the European Commission and the EP. These
are supplemented by qualitative analysis of official EU documents, and participatory
observation by way of a five-month internship by one of the authors in the secretariat of the
EP’s Committee on International Trade (INTA). The final section summarizes our conclusions.
4 In the conclusion however, we will address some of the consequences of our findings for EP empowerment and
political influence in EU CCP.
18
State of the art
Similar to United States Congressional literature, research on the EP has evolved from a mainly
descriptive exercise in the 1960s and 1970, to a more theoretically complex body of work by
the early 2000s (Hix, Raunio, & Soully, 2003; Webb Hammond, 1996). The majority of these
earlier studies have tended to focus on the political aspects of the functioning of the EP. In
particular, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and their respective political
groups were the main unit of analysis (Hix et al., 2003).
From the mid 1990s, scholars of the EP started to recognise the effect of parliamentary
administrative procedures on political decision-making outcomes. Scholarly attention turned
to the EP’s organisational structure and mainly the daily functioning of the standing committees
(Bowler & Farrell, 1995; Mamadouh & Raunio, 2003; Neuhold, 2001; Neuhold & Radulova,
2006; Settembri & Neuhold, 2009). 5 Characterising the committees as the “legislative
backbone” of the EP (Westlake, 1994, p. 191) and centres of “information, expertise, prestige
and power” (Ward, 1974, as cited in Bowler & Farrell, 1995, p. 221), these studies motivate
their attention for EP committees based on their role in developing the EP’s policy capacity.
This policy capacity, in turn is considered crucial for the EP’s influence in wider EU decision-
making.
This early literature focuses on the MEPs and the political functioning of the committees, a
bias inherited from the previous research tradition that focussed on MEPs and political groups
(Neuhold, 2001; Winzen, 2011). The administrative wing of the EP and its committees had
largely escaped attention, except for a few accounts of the EP’s organizational structure that
noted the relevance of parliamentary administrative capacity. Neuhold (2001) indicates the
importance of the EP committee secretariats in terms of increasing the functional capacity of
the EP by providing information on both technical and political issues. Costa (2003) argues
that one of the main functions of the EP general secretariat is to provide the necessary expertise
for developing a representative technocratic counterweight to the executive bureaucracy – i.e.
the Commission. In addition, committee secretariats provide coherence and continuity in the
5 See Winzen (2011) for a more detailed overview of this literature.
18
face of the rapid turnover of MEPs, as well as maintaining stable contacts with Council and
Commission (Costa, 2003).6
But other than these few studies, the only significant focus of EU studies on administrations
had been directed towards the executive administrations in EU policy-making – mainly the
Commission (Egeberg, Gornitzka, Trondal, & Johannessen, 2013; Trondal & Peters, 2013).
The reason for this gap in EP literature could be that, until recently, EP officials were not
considered to have significant impact on the policy process in the EP (Costa, 2003).
In recent years, EP scholars have started to shift their attention to the administrative level of
the EP’s organisation (Dobbels & Neuhold, 2012; Egeberg, Gornitzka, & Trondal, 2014a,
2014b; Egeberg et al., 2013; Marshall, 2012; Winzen, 2011).7 There is now a general consensus
that the EP administrative staff does play an important role for the EP’s policy capacity – and
consequently the EP’s influence in EU decision-making – and that it therefore merits further
study (Dobbels & Neuhold, 2012; Egeberg et al., 2014a, 2013; Marshall, 2012; Neuhold &
Dobbels, 2015).
The result is a recent empirical body of research about the daily functioning of the EP
administrative base and the role of administrative staff in the EP decision making process. The
research field can be divided into four main themes: the roles and tasks of parliamentary
administrative staff (Dobbels & Neuhold, 2013; Winzen, 2011; for earlier indications, see also
Costa, 2003; Neunreither, 2002); the determinants of these officials’ behaviour (Egeberg et al.,
2013; Marshall, 2012), including demographic research (Egeberg et al., 2014a);
interinstitutional relations between EP and Commission administrators (Egeberg et al., 2014b;
Marshall, 2012); and finally the factors that determine the impact that EP administrative staff
have on internal EP politics (Högenauer, Neuhold, Christiansen, & Dobbels, 2016; Neuhold &
6 Costa concludes, however that the EP general secretariat did not exercise significant leadership at the time
(Costa, 2003).
7 One of the few earlier exceptions is the study by Costa (2003), who builds upon earlier accounts in the French
literature and provides a very detailed description in his assessment of the power of the EP general secretariat.
18
Dobbels, 2015).8 In line with the prominent role of the EP committees in the policy process,
these studies have mainly focussed their attention on the staff of committee secretariats.
Such a narrow focus on staff and their role within the EP internally implies that there exists a
bias towards the staff as the chosen unit of analysis, whereas the study of other organisational
aspects of EP administration remains elusive. Considering that “the way in which the EP
administration is organized significantly affects their role in EP decision-making”, it is
important to address this organisational meso-level of the EP’s policy capacity (Egeberg et al.,
2013, p. 510). In order to integrate the study of the EP’s administration into the broader research
agenda of EP empowerment and parliamentarisation, a wider focus on the whole Committee
administrative system is imperative.
Filling this gap and recognising the importance of going beyond the single institutional
resource of staff for the EP’s policy capacity, this article chooses the committee’s
organisational structure as the unit of analysis. This choice is consistent with the general
consensus in contemporary literature that the majority of the EP’s power resides at committee
level (Gungor, 2009). Addressing policy capacity from the organisational level allows us to
broaden the empirical and theoretical understanding of the EP administrative apparatus beyond
a narrow focus on staff to include other variables at the organisational level, such as working
practices, procedures and interinstitutional relations.
Theoretical framework
Policy capacity, defined as a “set of skills and resources - or competences and capabilities -
necessary to perform policy functions”, encompasses this organisational aspect of the EP’s
administrative resources (Wu et al., 2015, p. 166). In order to have a lasting impact and to be
transformed into political capacity, ad-hoc changes in administrative capacity need to go
through an institutionalisation process. We therefore combine insights from administrative
capacity (Egeberg et al., 2013; Trondal & Peters, 2013) and institutionalisation literature
(Farrell & Héritier, 2003; Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, 2016). Most studies on EP
institutionalisation do not specifically address the role of administrative capacity building
8 For a more detailed overview of this literature, see Neuhold & Dobbels (2015).
18
(Egeberg et al., 2013), and only a few briefly touch upon the role of administrative capacity for
the institutionalisation of the EP (de Vrieze, 2015; Gungor, 2009; Roederer-Rynning &
Greenwood, 2016). Research seems to be centred either on the overall EU polity level (e.g.
Farrell & Héritier 2003; Rittberger 2012) or on the individual staff level (see previous section).9
Again, the organisational meso-level escapes attention.
The institutionalisation of policy capacity comprises elements of independence, integration,
and co-optation of actors outside the organisation (Trondal & Peters, 2013). From the
perspective of the EP’s role in EU CCP, this institutionalisation consists of the development of
(1) structures and processes that allow parliamentary committees to act independently from
other EU institutions, (2) procedures for effective inter- and intra-institutional coordination
(integration), and (3) tools to co-opt actors outside the EU institutions such as external
stakeholders, national parliaments or administrations of trade negotiation partners.10
Policy capacity exists of two components that are qualitatively different in terms of which
relationship they affect. We understand administrative capacity as the resources that affect the
internal policy capacity of an institution, whereas political capacity in this article refers to the
relationship between the institution and external actors. When mapping both elements onto the
typology of institutionalisation, administrative capacity covers independence and intra-
institutional integration, and political capacity spans inter-institutional integration and co-
optation (
9 Next to the literature on the EP within the EU’s polity and on individual administrative staff, there is a large
body of research on political groups and MEPs within the EP (e.g. Hix et al. 2005).
10 Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood mention autonomy as the building of the EP’s own expertise without relying
on other EU institutions, and complexity “as the development of an administrative apparatus” (Roederer-Rynning
& Greenwood, 2016). Both qualities correspond to our concept of development of an independent policy capacity.
Gungor (2009) refers to similar qualities of institutionalisation, noting that the increasing complexity and volume
of EP administration contributed to the EP’s autonomy. Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood’s (Roederer-Rynning
& Greenwood, 2016) concept of coherence as the development of uniform rules and practices correspond with
what we term intra-institutional integration. The dimensions related to institutionalisation like committee
structure, type of secretariat, meeting frequency, and the decision-making rules as suggested Franklin de Vrieze
(2015) also relate to such intra-institutional integration.
1
Table 1).
Hence, evidence of institutionalisation of administrative capacity within the EP should point
to (1) the development of structures and processes that allow parliamentary committees to act
independently from other EU institutions and (2a) the simultaneous creation of procedures for
effective intra-institutional integration. On the other hand, evidence of institutionalisation of
political capacity should become evident in the creation of (2b) procedures for inter-
institutional coordination (inter-institutional integration) and (3) co-optation of external actors
such as external stakeholders, national parliaments or administrations of trade negotiation
partners.
2
Table 1: Organisational administrative capacity: typology, indicators and operationalisation
Policy capacity Institutionalisation Institutional resources (indicators) Operationalisation
Administrative
capacity
Independence Availability of capable individuals Staff numbers, background, seniority, dedicated staff
Processes for timely and systematically
collecting and analysing data
Frequency of reports produced, IT systems, centrality of data collection,
document retention policy, research service
Organisational commitment to evidence-
based policy
Mission statements, rules of procedure
Efficient information system Internal communication systems (e-mail, phone)
Intra-institutional
integration
Internal organisation
Organigram, DG-Unit relation, secretariat, types of staff, frequency and
format of internal coordination meetings, policy desk-research service
relation
Political capacity Inter-institutional
integration
Political-institutional environment Relations with other legislative & executive actors/institutions through
formal and informal coordination procedures
Co-optation Policy learning relations with public, civil
society organisations and business groups
Information sessions, informational flyers, public conferences, media
publications, interviews, access points, consulting of outside experts
Relations with national (EU and non-EU)
actors
Parliamentary delegations, missions
Reference: own illustration based on de Vrieze, 2015; Gungor, 2009; Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, 2016; Wu et al., 2015
3
Administrative capacity
Studies on administrative capacity indicate that the EP needs a certain amount and quality of
expertise, supporting staff and internal organization in order to effectively monitor the EU’s
legislative procedures (Dobbels & Neuhold, 2012; Héritier, Moury, Schoeller, Meissner, &
Mota, 2015). Next to and often related to availability of staff, time is frequently mentioned as
a significant constraint in terms of administrative capacity of the EP (Judge et al., 1994; Ringe,
2010).11 Because of the specific nature of negotiating procedures for EU trade agreements –
e.g. process of adapting mandates, use of negotiation rounds, ratification process – a certain
level of administrative capacity is required for the MEPs to be able to process information
quickly and thoroughly if they want to influence ongoing negotiations and vote in a timely and
informed manner. Ringe indicates the importance of EP staff resources in handling the
“informational deficit” that MEPs face for making policy choices and voting (Ringe, 2010, p.
52).
Hence, the concept of administrative capacity is centred on the idea of informational deficit
and the ability to process information efficiently (quickly) and effectively (in such a way that
it is readily deployable for enhancing parliamentary influence) in the policy process. The quest
for information has been centre-stage throughout the increase of EP influence in EU CCP –
similarly to the development of its role in comitology:
“It must also be pointed out here that the EP was not ‘drowned’ by the Commission
sending it all sorts of information on comitology at its own discretion, but that the EP
has in fact been very persistent in requesting to be sent all these specific documents
for many years (Bergström, 2005; Bradley, 2008). Given the many positive effects
that the literature attributes to the availability of information, such as government
effectiveness (Drew and Nyerges, 2004), actual pursuit of the legislator’s preferences
(e.g. Strøm, 2000) and popular control (Bovens, 2007), and further given the very
strong interest that the EP has traditionally had in gaining information rights for
comitology, one would at the very least expect to see its organization adapt to the
changing circumstances.” (Brandsma, 2012, pp. 81–82).
11 However, the EP can also use time constraints and urgency in decision-making to its advantage when it employs
a delaying strategy in order to push for more parliamentary powers (Farrell & Héritier, 2003).
4
In the context of the EU’s CCP, the EP faces an informational deficit compared to the
Commission, which is at the centre of the negotiations with the third country. The EP therefore
puts a great deal of effort into retrieving more information about the negotiation of international
agreements from DG Trade. Much of this quest for information happens by way of DG Trade
sharing negotiation documents and providing debriefings in the INTA Committee (Meissner,
2016).
With the formalisation of the EP’s right to be kept informed, we expect that the increased influx
of information has led to changes in the EP’s administrative procedures in order to more
efficiently and effectively retrieve and process information within the institution since 2009.
These changes involve (1) developing structures for the EP Committee to become independent
in its information processing, and (2) updating procedures for intra-institutional integration so
as to ensure efficient information transfer between Committee services. Both elements are
considered crucial in the process of institutionalising a sufficient degree of administrative
capacity to support formal treaty obligations.
Political capacity
Yet, although we expect that institutionalisation on an internal level improved, we also
conjecture that the use of that administrative capacity on the inter-institutional level is
conditional upon the EP’s willingness to undertake such costly exercises. Ringe observes that
“… individual legislators’ choices about participation in the negotiation process regarding a
particular policy proposal are a function of their willingness to invest their scarce time, energy,
and budgetary resources.” (Ringe, 2010, p. 53). While the EP’s administrative capacity on an
internal level falls together with its ability to monitor negotiations in the context of CCP, it also
needs to be willing to turn this ability into political capacity. In other words, administrative
capacity is only of value in terms of policy influence when it is transformed into political
capacity.
Political capacity, in contrast to the focus of administrative capacity on the EP’s internal level,
refers to the EP’s external interaction with other EU institutions or third actors. It is understood
as the EP’s “coordinative capacity with respect to external interactions” (Farrell & Héritier
2004, 1186). This capacity builds on mechanisms and procedures the EP develops for inter-
institutional relations and co-optation of civil society organizations, national parliaments or
5
trade partners in the context of specific negotiations. Political capacity implies willingness in
the sense that the EP needs to actively ‘exploit’ (Bowler & Farrell 1995, 220) its administrative
capacity and its prerogatives granted by the Lisbon Treaty.
In his study on comitology, Brandsma notes that “the need to organize information flows in an
accessible manner only arises when it is instrumental to a specific parliamentary right”
(Brandsma, 2012). Interest in a clearly defined policy issue motivates MEPs willingness to
invest resources in that policy issue, which engenders a process of political capacity building.
We therefore expect political capacity building on an inter-institutional and external level
predominantly in those instances where the EP has a specific and practical policy interest. This
interest can either be inherently political thanks to party-political preferences (e.g. Hix et al.,
2006) or it can be strategic in order to expand policy turf (McKenzie & Meissner, 2016). In
cases of both a political and a strategic interest, the trigger for increasing political capacity is
specific in the sense that it is linked to individual trade negotiation processes: politicisation and
public attention. Political salience can enhance both political interest in an issue as well as
interest thanks to increasing the likelihood of expanding policy turf.
Regarding inter-institutional integration, the EP can vary the degree of interaction with the
Commission by choosing to develop, maintain and enhance coordination with the DG Trade
on trade negotiations (e.g. McKenzie & Meissner, 2016). Regarding co-optation, the EP can
also vary its efforts to interact with third actors like national parliaments, civil society
organizations or the negotiation partner. Given the importance of TTIP to the EU and the
public, we expect that the EP scores high on both dimensions; meaning it strengthened its
political capacity by developing procedures for inter-institutional interaction with the
Commission and co-optation with external actors throughout the course of negotiations.
In the following empirical section, we explore the extent to which the EP’s administrative
capacity has developed after the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the extent to which the INTA
Committee has increased its political capacity for the highly politicised TTIP negotiations. We
expect to observe that the EP’s internal administrative capacity (i.e. independence and intra-
institutional integration) has been strengthened since the Lisbon treaty, and that the EP was
willing to turn this administrative capacity into political capacity for the TTIP negotiations on
the dimensions of inter-institutional interaction and co-optation.
6
Methodology
The research design of this article is based on a plausibility probe (Eckstein 2000, 140) of our
argument in a single, in-depth case study (Gerring 2004). The case study is “an intensive study
of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring
2004, 342). While we restrict our plausibility probe to one case – TTIP – in the policy of EU
CCP, we assume that our argument also holds for developments of administrative and political
capacity in cases related to other policies. The plausibility probe into our argument aims to
increase confidence in the theoretical conceptualization (Eckstein 2000, 141) of administrative
and political capacity (see theory section above) and its connection to salience and
politicization.
Regarding data gathering, we triangulated document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and
participant observation by one of the authors during five months fieldwork in the secretariat of
the INTA committee. Participant observation means the “method in which the observer
participates in the daily life of the people under study” (Becker & Geer 1957, 28) over a longer
period of time. The method is used to get an in-depth understanding of a particular organization
(Becker 1958, 652). During five months of fieldwork, one author participated in the daily
routines of the secretariat of INTA, gathered detailed data, and recorded them by taking notes.
Based on this, we can draw on a unique set of first-hand information. Furthermore, both authors
carried out semi-structured interviews over the course of 2015 with 14 officials who were
directly involved in EU trade negotiations. In order to gather relevant data we guaranteed strict
confidentiality to our interview partners. Where possible we recorded interviews, otherwise we
took notes during and immediately after the interview.
Empirics: the Lisbon Treaty, TTIP, and the EP’s policy capacity
Growing administrative capacity since the Lisbon Treaty
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EP has been put on equal footing
with the Council as regards the ratification of agreements within the remit of the EU’s CCP. In
order to support this new role for the EP, the Treaty established a legally binding obligation on
the Commission to report to the Council’s Trade Policy Committee (TPC) and to the EP on the
progress of negotiations, including immediately and fully informing the EP at all stages of the
7
procedure (Articles 207§3 and 218§10).12 Updating the 2005 Framework Agreement, the 2010
Interinstitutional Framework Agreement (2010) concretizes the EP’s right to be informed
throughout the negotiation process by the Commission:
“The information … shall be provided to Parliament in sufficient time for the EP
to be able to express its point of view if appropriate, and for the Commission to be
able to take Parliament’s views as far as possible into account. This information shall,
as a general rule, be provided to Parliament through the responsible parliamentary
committee and, where appropriate, at a plenary sitting.” (European Union, 2010, p.
50).
Has the EP’s INTA Committee’s administrative capacity adapted to these new circumstances
of increased influx of information on international trade agreements? In other words, do we
observe a change in INTA’s committee structures that promotes (1) independent information
processing and (2) intra-institutional information transfers?
Administrative capacity: independence
Even though the EP and the Commission had already set out the basis for information exchange
on trade policy issues prior to the Lisbon Treaty (in the Framework Agreement of 2010), it was
only after the increased workload in the 7th legislature that actual changes in administrative
capacity building started to take place in the INTA Committee. A study by DG EXPO’s Policy
Department contains some statistics illustrating the increased workload from the 6th to the 7th
legislature:
“During the 2004–2009 legislative period, Parliament’s Committee on International
Trade (INTA) dealt with only 2 codecision procedures, 21 consultation procedures
and 18 assents to international agreements. To compare, between December 2009
and March 2014 INTA dealt with 53 ordinary legislative procedures (corresponding
to the former codecision procedure) and 73 consent procedures. If one includes non-
binding reports and resolutions, the number of files dealt with by INTA totalled 69
12 Interestingly, the Commission and the EP had already agreed on a Code of Conduct in 1995, which specified
that the Commission would inform the competent parliamentary committee of the draft recommendations relating
to negotiating directives of international agreements, and that the Commission would keep the EP regularly and
fully informed of the progress of negotiations (European Union, 1995, p.70).
8
for the period 2004-2009, while in the period 2009-2014 it dealt with 200.”
(European Parliament, 2014, p. 6-7)
As a result of this increase in workload, the INTA Committee secretariat more than doubled in
size between 2010 and 2015 (European Parliament, 2014; European Parliament, 2015).13
In addition to an increase in staff numbers, the largest area in which significant changes have
taken place is the development of technical expertise and knowledge – both at staff and MEP
level. Drawing on the technocratic nature of current discussions in the INTA Committee
meetings, it is obvious that the level of expertise and knowledge on trade issues among MEPs
in the INTA Committee has expanded significantly.
In general, the activity in INTA in terms of meetings has seen a steady increase between 2010
and 2013 (Graph 1). The decline in frequency of formal Committee meetings has been offset
by a steep increase in general informal meetings and monitoring group meetings (Graph 2).14
Graph 1: Total number of meetings held in INTA Committee 2010-2013
Source: Secretariat of the Committee on International Trade, 2014.
13 However, due to recent budget cuts the number of staff in the secretariat is being reduced which puts strain on
the workload of the remaining staff (observation).
14 Graph 2 only portrays the most prominent of the total number of meetings in the INTA Committee.
103
126
174182
2010 2011 2012 2013
TotalnumberofmeetingsheldinINTACommittee2010-2013
9
Graph 2: Main meetings formats of INTA Committee 2010-2013
Source: Secretariat of the Committee on International Trade, 2014.
The INTA Committee has also been able to rely on the EP’s increasingly strengthened technical
support services – i.e. the Legal Service, DG EXPO’s Policy Department and the European
Parliamentary Research Service – for providing legal advice and supporting analyses and
studies of the very technical and complex policy issues in the trade area (201507The future of
the EU trade policy). Interestingly, the number of studies and policy briefings has not risen
much between 2010 and 2013.
Figure 1: Number of studies by DG EXPO Policy Department for the interest of INTA, 2010-2013
(Source: INTA Legacy Report for the 7th Parliamentary Term 2009-2014)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2010 2011 2012 2013
Numberofm
eetings
MainmeetingformatsofINTACommittee2010-2013
CommitteeMeetings
PublicHearings
TechnicalBriefings
Monitoringgroups
OtherInformalmeetings
10
Administrative capacity: intra-institutional integration
In terms of in-house development of expertise and internal organization, the mechanism of
INTA Monitoring Groups has played the largest role. Monitoring groups were created on
initiative of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) group in June 2011,
as a new mechanism to monitor ongoing negotiations for bilateral trade agreements
(20110621INTAMinutes). By September 2011, a main body of monitoring groups was
established. Monitoring groups are headed by a Standing Rapporteur, an MEP from INTA
selected from the different political groups in Parliament on the basis of the De Hondt system
(20110922INTAMinutes). By November, a more detailed schedule of the monitoring groups
showed a clear geographical sorting and designated Standing Rapporteurs amongst the MEPs
by name (20111122INTAMinutes, Figure 1). In addition, a practice was set to include an item
“Feedback from Monitoring Groups” in each INTA meeting, establishing a duty to inform
between the two forums.15
15 In addition, separate standing rapporteurs were designated to the EPA negotiations, although not establishing
separate monitoring groups but addressing discussions on the EPA’s in their geographically relevant monitoring
group (20111122INTAMinutes).
11
Figure 2: Active INTA monitoring groups on international trade negotiations or geographical areas, as decided on 22
November 2011
Source: 20111122INTAMinutes
Over the course of 2012, several new monitoring groups were created (20120229-
0301INTAMinutes; 20120326-27INTAMinutes; 20120425-26INTAMinutes;
20120903INTAMinutes).16 Early 2013, INTA chair Vital Moreira commented on the added
value of the monitoring groups for the functioning of the INTA Committee as they collected
information and expertise that otherwise would not have been accessible
(20130222CouncilSecretariatSummaryINTAMeeting, p. 5).
In July 2014 – at the beginning of the 2014-2019 term, the INTA General Principles regarding
Standing Rapporteurs and Monitoring Groups were revised (20140401INTAMinutes).17 The
16 These were monitoring groups for Mexico, Ecuador/Bolivia, the Southern Caucasus (i.e. Georgia, Armenia,
Azerbaijan), Indonesia, and Central Asia (20120229-0301INTAMinutes; 20120326-27INTAMinutes; 20120425-
26INTAMinutes; 20120903INTAMinutes).
17 During the electoral transition period, special arrangements were made for the US monitoring group
(20140401INTAMinutes).
12
practice of monitoring groups was extended to include topical, pluri-, and multilateral
negotiations as opposed to geographical division only (20140722INTAMinutes).18 As a result,
by September 2014 a total of 38 INTA monitoring groups existed, allocated to the different
political groups based on the De Hondt system (20140903INTAMinutes). The general
principles were updated again in February 2015 (20150223-24INTAMinutes; INTA General
Principles regarding Standing Rapporteurs and Monitoring Groups for Negotiations and
Implementation of International Trade Agreements, 24 February 2015, consulted 21.04.2016).
By July 2015, an advance schedule for convening monitoring groups was tried out (20150713-
14INTAMinutes). In November that year, it was decided that the practice of such advance
scheduling on Monday afternoons would be continued in 2016, a clear indication that
monitoring groups have become common practice for following up on trade negotiations
(20151130-1201INTAMinutes). In addition to such block-booking of monitoring groups,
INTA started collecting quantitative (except for the US monitoring groups, see below) and
qualitative data on their attendance and content (20160125INTAMinutes).
Today, INTA monitoring groups consist of one Standing Rapporteur, nominated by the
political group that was allocated to the monitoring group based on the De Hondt system. Other
political groups can appoint a Shadow Standing Rapporteur by written communication to the
INTA secretariat. Standing Rapporteurs are responsible for organising and chairing meetings
of their monitoring group, and have access to confidential information forwarded by the
Council or Commission (INTA General Principles regarding Standing Rapporteurs and
Monitoring Groups for Negotiations and Implementation of International Trade Agreements,
24 February 2015, consulted 21.04.2016).
18 The first topical monitoring group would be on the Environmental Goods Agreement, created in June 2015
(20150615-16INTAMinutes). The provisions do not apply to pluri- and multilateral agreements that are negotiated
in the context of the WTO (INTA General Principles regarding Standing Rapporteurs and Monitoring Groups for
Negotiations and Implementation of International Trade Agreements, 24 February 2015, consulted 21.04.2016).
13
Figure 3: Active INTA monitoring groups on international trade negotiations or geographical areas, in February 2017
Source: https://polcms.secure.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/c66c582f-3d7d-4893-92fa-
496c4e4c4453/inta-standing-and-shadow-rapporteurs.pdf
Since their creation, monitoring groups have become the foundation for the development of
expertise in INTA. Without this kind of specialised administrative subdivision in the
Committee, it would be impossible to maintain a detailed follow-up of the on-going order of
business in EU external trade policy (Interview 1_KM). Monitoring groups have become mini-
information-processing hubs, building expertise that is relied upon at the higher levels of INTA
meetings and even plenary meetings. As we will see in the next section, the creation of this
basic administrative capacity has been crucial for developing a sufficiently strong policy
capacity in individual trade negotiations.
Next to the monitoring group system, the INTA Committee has witnessed several other
changes in administrative capacity. Firstly, starting from 2011, a limited number of MEPs of
the INTA Committee has been allowed to consult the final negotiation directives of the
Commission in a secured reading room. Even though the practice of the Commission informing
the EP about the draft recommendations for the directives for opening trade negotiations was
already established since the 1995 Code of Conduct (OJ 1995 C089; OJ L304, 20/11/2010),
14
the EP had no official access to the amendments made to those draft directives by the Council
(Interview 17, 18). Instead, the INTA secretariat had to rely on an unofficial summary of the
main changes in the final directives, which the Commission provided informally (Interview 17,
18). With MEPs having access to the full text of the negotiation mandate, the INTA Committee
has taken another step towards independent information processing.
Political capacity in the TTIP case
Political capacity: inter-institutional interaction
For coordination during on-going negotiations, the 2010 Framework Agreement concretized
the extent to which the Commission would inform the EP about ongoing trade talks, relying on
oral briefings and written information. The Commission also committed itself to providing the
EP with all relevant trade policy documents that are shared with the TPC, including documents
from third parties (subject to originator’s consent), whereas before this exchange was limited
to documents originating from the Commission’s Director-General for Trade exclusively
(Letter De Gucht – Moreira 26/10/2010). Inter-institutional cooperation between the
Commission and the EP was reported to work positively and well-organized (Interviews 16,
18, 19).19
Yet, the most transformative changes have been since the start of TTIP negotiations mid-2013,
especially in relation to the frequency and extent of document sharing to the EP. Since the
TTIP negotiations, the final negotiation directives for trade agreements are made public, which
aids the EP’s oversight task significantly. This happened for the TTIP and TiSA negotiations.
Starting with the Japan FTA negotiations, the Parliament has also been pressing the Council
19 The same extent of interaction cannot be reported for the Council-EP coordination on the negotiation of
international agreements. The lack of proactive information provision from the Council to the EP is a source of
frustration and disappointment for any member of the EP’s staff (Interviews 16 to 19; INTA Opinion on AFCO
report on transparency, accountability and integrity in the EU institutions of 11/12/2015). The procedure is rather
ad-hoc (Interview 19) and the Trade Policy Committee (TPC; in which the Council and the European Commission
coordinate on CCP) remains a black box for the EP (Interview 16).
15
not to adopt the final negotiation directives before it had adopted its own resolution laying
down Parliament’s red lines for the trade negotiation (Interview 17). This occurred in advance
of the EU negotiations with Japan, as well as the TTIP negotiations (European Parliament,
2012a; 2012b; 2013a).20
Towards the end of 2013, the Commission started considering specific arrangements for access
to TTIP documents and dissemination of US negotiation documents
(20131202CouncilSecretariatSummaryINTAMeeting). By the spring of 2014, all TTIP
documents sent to the TPC (‘EU Limite’) were also sent simultaneously to MEPs in the INTA
Committee (full and substitute members) via e-mail. Individualised, watermarked copies of
documents marked ‘EU Restricted’ were sent to selected members of the INTA Committee
(INTA Chair and Vice-Chairs, INTA Group Coordinators, Rapporteurs and Shadow
Rapporteurs for the US) and Chairs and Rapporteurs of other Committees involved in the US
monitoring group (answer to EP question E-002830/2014). ‘Consolidated negotiation texts’
were accessible to this same selected group of MEPs from INTA and Chairs and Rapporteurs
from other relevant Committees in a secure reading room (EP Report April 2015).
By the end of 2014, the use of a reading room at the EP or the Commission premises was
extended to MEPs who did not have access to 'EU Restricted' documents so far (Commission
Communication 25/11/2014 C(2014) 9052 final). ‘EU Limite’ documents were also made
available to all MEPs via e-mail (INTA minutes 21/01/2015;
20150113ConferenceOfCommitteeChairs). These arrangements continued until the end of
2015, when Commissioner Malmström and INTA Chair Bernd Lange (MEP) agreed upon new
arrangements for access to documents relating to the TTIP negotiations. These operational
arrangements extended access to all MEPs to all docs (‘EU Limite’, ‘EU Restricted’ and
‘consolidated texts’), with rules varying between the types of documents (Letter Commissioner
Malmström to INTA Chair Bernd Lange, 02/12/2015).
20 This practice is part of a gentleman’s agreement between Council and Parliament. For the TiSA negotiations,
the final negotiation directives were approved by the Council before the Parliament adopted its resolution
(European Parliament, 2013b).
16
All MEPs got access to individualized and watermarked copies of ‘EU Limite’ documents via
an online system (‘SharePoint’), with possibility to print. This IT tool is a pilot project for other
negotiations as well, however at the time of writing it is used for TTIP documents only
(Interview 17).21 INTA Secretariat staff and Group advisors got similar access on a need-to-
know basis.22 ‘EU Restricted’ documents are accessible to all MEPs (and staff on a need-to-
know basis) in a secure reading room, with only note-taking allowed. Individualised and
watermarked paper copies of these ‘EU Restricted’ document are sent to the Parliament
President, INTA Chair & Vice-Chairs, INTA Group Coordinators, INTA Standing and Shadow
rapporteurs on TTIP, and Chair and Standing rapporteurs of Committees involved in US
monitoring group, as had been the practice before. Two individualised and watermarked paper
copies are also sent to the INTA Secretariat. Finally, since the end of 2015 all MEPs are allowed
access to ‘consolidated negotiation texts’ in a secure reading room, with no paper copies
allowed. In spring 2016, access to classified documents (including ‘consolidated negotiation
texts’) was further extended to Members of National Parliaments in reading rooms in Member
State capitals (answers to parliamentary questions E-014341/2015; E-015494/2015; E-
001371/2016; European Commission, 17/09/2015 internal document).
Hence, access to TTIP documents has been extended from a selected number of INTA
Members to all MEPs and even national parliaments. The “Trade for all” strategy now
envisages extending these practices for similar negotiations as well.23 Yet throughout this
process of extending access to negotiating documents, it became clear that the EP lacked the
administrative capacity to handle the increased influx of information. There was a need to
supplement written information with more explanatory interactions, to inform MEPs more
thoroughly to help the quality of discussions in the INTA Committee (Interview 11). These
21 Documents for other trade negotiations go through INTA secretariat and are distributed by e-mail to INTA
members (Interview 17).
22 The limits of such “need-to-know” were articulated in the document setting out the operational arrangements
of 02/12/2015.
23 Interestingly, all documents – even consolidated texts – relating to the TiSA negotiations are being sent via e-
mail (Interview 18).
17
interactions over time developed from infrequent, informal meetings to an institutionalised
framework of EP-Commission interaction.
The INTA monitoring group on the US, which is now often referred to as the “TTIP monitoring
group” considering it covers TTIP issues 90% of the time, also enjoys special status. It is the
only monitoring group that is open to participation by all MEPs, also for in camera meetings
(Interview 17, 18). At the same time, it is also the only monitoring group where there is a
briefing by the Commission chief negotiator before each negotiation round with the US
(Interview 18, 19). This allows participants of the monitoring group to have a direct input in
upcoming negotiations. In other monitoring groups, such debriefings only take place after the
respective negotiation round with the external trade partner. Compared to other monitoring
groups, it is the most structured and detailed one in the INTA committee (Interview 19). With
9 meetings and an average of 22 MEPs attending, compared to an average of 3 meetings and 3
MEPs attending for all other monitoring groups, the US monitoring group was by far the most
popular monitoring group in 2015.
While the particularities of the US monitoring group often result in the meetings being very
large, with sometimes up to 50 participants, the flexibility of the format and lack of
interpretation obligations still allows for open discussions. Nevertheless, at times the high
participation rate has made the monitoring group a “semi-public” event, which has resulted in
the Commission chief negotiator becoming more diplomatic and cautious in his debriefing
(Interview 19).
In addition to monitoring groups, INTA also organises technical briefings on specific topics
that require more in-depth discussion. Such technical briefings have become common practice
since their introduction in 2010 (Letter De Gucht – Moreira 26/10/2010). This happens usually
on demand of the Parliament, but sometimes the Commission proactively asks to organise a
briefing. These briefings are open to the same MEPs as the relevant monitoring group is, but
attendance is usually lower because of the technical nature of the topics: “MEPs want to have
enough information but not more than they can handle, as they have plenty of other dossiers as
well.” (Interview 17). In such technical briefings, the Commission gives background
information on specific topics that are specifically fact- and expertise-based (Interview 14, 19).
This is rather different from the monitoring groups, which are also used to pass political
messages (Interview 19). Technical briefings are also used in case there is no specific
monitoring group that covers the topic in question (Interview 14). In essence, technical
18
briefings are even more informal and flexible than monitoring groups are. This is particularly
the case for larger monitoring groups, like the one on the US.
Since 2010, contacts between DG Trade and the INTA Committee on staff level have also been
intensified by establishing a practice of briefing meetings between the INTA Secretariat,
political group advisors, and DG Trade ahead of monthly INTA Committee meetings (Letter
De Gucht – Moreira 26/10/2010; observation).
Additional element is that the profile of the INTA Committee chair changed with the increased
importance of the INTA Committee after Lisbon: in 2014 INTA Chair Vital Moreira was
replaced by Bernd Lange, who takes a much more assertive stance as Committee Chair
(Interview 14). The INTA Committee has also been encroaching on the AFET Committee in
terms of importance in the eyes of third countries, as the EP now has a much stronger influence
on trade policy than on official foreign policy of the EU (Interview 14).
The practice of monitoring groups and technical briefings ensures a level of specialisation of
the MEPs involved in the file (Interview 14). The practice of having a Standing Rapporteur for
each region also ensures continuity for the Commission’s contacts in the EP for specific
geographical regions. Without the current practice of allocating the monitoring groups to a
specific political group, the Standing Rapporteur could change quite easily after the report or
resolution had been voted in plenary (Interview 11). In addition, the members of a monitoring
group ensure a much more stable base of interlocutors with the rest of the Parliament. Frequent
interactions also reduced the need for bilateral meetings between DG Trade and MEPs on a
specific negotiation (Interview 11, 14).
Next to inter-institutional communication, intra-institutional communication has been
strengthened to a significant degree with the TTIP negotiations: INTA legacy report 7th term p
6-7:
19
Political capacity: co-optation:
tbw
Results
Summarising the results on the EP’s administrative and political capacity, we found that the
EP has successfully enhanced its capacity on an internal, administrative, level since it was
granted new powers with the Lisbon Treaty, and that it was willing to translate this into capacity
on an external, political, level during the TTIP negotiations (table 2). Administrative and
political capacity together build the EP’s policy capacity that is its set “of skills and resources
– or competences and capabilities – necessary to perform policy functions” (Wu, Ramesh and
Howlet 2015, 166).
Having distinguished administrative capacity into (1) independence of the EP, and (2a) intra-
institutional integration, we found that the EP has enhanced its resources and organizational
structure since the Lisbon Treaty. Regarding the first dimension, to act independently from
20
other EU institutions, the EP’s INTA Committee secretariat indeed doubled in size between
2010 and 2015. The INTA Committee, which is the central committee in EU CCP, developed
rules of procedure to ensure a systematic and evidence-based approach on trade policy:
examples are the practice of “Feedback from monitoring groups” or the revision of INTA
General Principles regarding Standing Rapporteurs and Monitoring Groups. By now, the EP
has its own legal service, the European Parliamentary Research Service and DG EXPO’s Policy
Department, which enhance processing data and information within the organization.
Regarding the second administrative dimension of intra-institutional integration, the
establishment and expansion of monitoring groups turned out to be crucial to follow trade
negotiations effectively (Interview 1_KM, Interview 8_KM). Apart from an overall increase
of INTA meetings, the INTA Committee set up country-specific monitoring groups with
Standing Rapporteurs and Shadow Standing Rapporteurs. The monitoring groups and the
Standing Rapporteurs are responsible for gathering information on trade negotiations and for
setting up person-to-person contact with other EU institutions (Interview 4_KM). With its new
intra-institutional structure of monitoring groups and rapporteurs, the EP is nowadays much
better equipped to be involved in trade negotiations than it was before the Lisbon Treaty
(Interview 1_KM, Interview 2_KM).
Political capacity was differentiated into (2b) inter-institutional integration, that is relations
with other EU institutions, and (3) co-optation of third actors such as civil society
organizations, national parliaments or the trade negotiation partner. In the case of TTIP, we
found that the EP put a great deal of effort into inter-institutional integration. It was successful
with several of its demands with which it obtained better access to documents and information:
making the negotiation directives public, getting access to all negotiation documents by all
MEPs, being debriefed before and/or after each bargaining round, having technical briefings
with the Commission, and organized briefing meetings before INTA Committee meetings.
While the EP has, according to the Lisbon Treaty, the right to be informed about trade
negotiations, the quality and quantity of information on and involvement in the TTIP
negotiations was unprecedented (Interview 11, 13, 14_KM). One example are technical
briefings which the Commission used to have only with the Council, but which the EP
successfully managed to demand in its own favour (Interview 4_KM). The practice of
monitoring groups and technical briefings ensures a level of specialisation of the MEPs
involved in the file (Interview 14). The practice of having a Standing Rapporteur for each
21
region also ensures continuity for the Commission’s contacts in the EP for specific
geographical regions. Without the current practice of allocating the monitoring groups to a
specific political group, the Standing Rapporteur could change quite easily after the report or
resolution had been voted in plenary (Interview 11). In addition, the members of a monitoring
group ensure a much more stable base of interlocutors with the rest of the Parliament. Frequent
interactions also reduced the need for bilateral meetings between DG Trade and MEPs on a
specific negotiation (Interview 11, 14).
Further to inter-institutional integration, the EP also greatly enhanced its political capacity in
the area of co-opting third actors. The degree of engaging with civil society organizations on
TTIP was unusually high: the EP, and also the INTA Committee, organized public hearings,
workshops with experts, and it teamed up with civil society organizations. One example was
the joint initiative of the EP together with the European Ombudsman and civil society where
they successfully put pressure on the Commission to introduce a transparency initiative on
TTIP (EP 2015). Apart from civil society, the EP also organized a lunch meeting with national
parliaments and it addressed the US as the negotiation partner directly. It organized hearings
and parliamentary sessions with American officials in order to discuss the TTIP negotiations
(Interview 12_KM).
+ the motivating factors (explanatory)
22
Table 2: Empirical results on the EP’s policy capacity
Policy capacity Institutionalisation Institutional resources
(indicators)
Operationalisation Results
Administrative
capacity
Independence Availability of capable
individuals
Staff numbers, background, seniority,
dedicated staff
INTA Committee secretariat doubled in
size between 2010 and 2015
Processes for timely and
systematically collecting and
analysing data
Frequency of reports produced, IT systems,
centrality of data collection, document
retention policy, research service
Legal Service, DG EXPO’s Policy
Department and the European
Parliamentary Research Service
Organisational commitment
to evidence-based policy
Mission statements, rules of procedure Practice of “Feedback from monitoring
groups” in each INTA meeting,
revision of INTA General Principles
regarding Standing Rapporteurs and
Monitoring Groups and of INTA
General Principles regarding Standing
Rapporteurs and Monitoring Groups for
Negotiations and Implementation of
International Trade Agreements
Efficient information system Internal communication systems (e-mail,
phone)
Intra-institutional
integration
Internal organisation
Organigram, DG-Unit relation, secretariat,
types of staff, frequency and format of internal
Increase INTA meetings between 2010
and 2013 (graph 1), INTA monitoring
groups, advance schedule for
23
coordination meetings, policy desk-research
service relation
monitoring groups, qualitative and
quantitative data gathering on
attendance of monitoring groups,
Standing Rapporteurs and Shadow
Standing Rapporteurs
Political
capacity
Inter-institutional
integration
Political-institutional
environment
Relations with other legislative & executive
actors/institutions through formal and informal
coordination procedures
Negotiation directives are made public,
EP resolution on negotiation directives
as de facto authorization of mandate,
changing rules of access to ‘EU
Limite’, ‘EU Restricted’ documents
and ‘Consolidated negotiation texts’ by
all MEPs, monitoring group meetings
with Commission before and/or after
each negotiation round, technical
briefings, briefing meetings ahead of
INTA Committee meetings
Co-optation Policy learning relations with
public, civil society
organisations and business
groups
Information sessions, informational flyers,
public conferences, media publications,
interviews, access points, consulting of outside
experts
Workshops, public hearings
Relations with national (EU
and non-EU) actors
Parliamentary delegations, missions Lunch with national parliaments,
meetings and parliamentary sessions
with US representatives
24
Conclusion
How has the EP built policy capacity since the Lisbon treaty and over the course of salient and
highly politicized policy issues? This article set out to explore the extent to which the EP’s
development of policy capacity is linked to the increasing politicization of policy issues. The
EU’s CCP and the negotiation of international agreements makes an ideal case given that the
EP is faced with two crucial developments in this area: first, the EP, now receives an enormous
amount of information in the area of CCP. For this, it requires the administrative capacity to
handle the briefings and documents provided by the Commission. Second, international
agreements have become publicly contested in recent years, and especially TTIP is a highly
politicized trade agreement. This requires the EP to develop the relevant political capacity in
order to keep up with specific policy developments in the individual negotiations. A
combination of the two – administrative and political capacity – constitute policy capacity.
Based on the conceptual differentiation of policy capacity into three dimensions –
independence and intra-institutional integration, interinstitutional interaction, and co-optation
– this article shows empirically that, first, the EP’s INTA Committee has developed an
independent and integrated institution since the Lisbon treaty through the establishment of
monitoring groups and responsible rapporteurs. These monitoring groups and rapporteurs were
created in an attempt to handle the growing influx of information on international trade
negotiations. Leveraging this administrative capacity, INTA managed to strengthen inter-
institutional integration with the Commission substantially during the TTIP negotiations. The
monitoring groups and rapporteurs gather information from the Commission and organize
debriefings and technical meetings. Further, since the TTIP negotiations, the INTA committee
has been increasingly collaborating with other committees, e.g. AFET and LIBE, in order to
be more effective in monitoring the negotiations (cf attendance of other Committees to US
monitoring group). Third, especially on TTIP, INTA made use of extensive co-optation by
collaborating with non-governmental organizations, gathering expertise from experts or
engaging in direct discussions with the US as negotiation partner (cf. lunch with national
parliaments November 2016). In brief, further developing post-Lisbon administrative capacity
into specific TTIP political capacity was crucial in strengthening the EP’s role in leveraging its
oversight right of the TTIP negotiations. The politicization of the TTIP negotiations was a
25
necessary factor for INTA to be willing to put its administrative capacity into practical political
capacity.
The results of this article and the question of capacity building within the EP also have
implications for the democratic legitimacy of EU decision-making. Administrative capacity
touches on the issue of the assumed automatic link between the availability of information –
i.e. transparency – and accountability (Naurin, 2007). Rather than being an automatic link, we
argue that the administrative capacity of the EP to gather and process information on the
Commission’s behaviour is a necessary factor to ensure an effective handling of this
information (Brandsma, 2012).
26
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Interviews
Interview 11_EC
Interview 14_EC
Interview 16_EC
Interview 17_EC
Interview 18_EC
Interview 19_EC
Interview 1_KM (2015): European Commission. Brussels, Belgium. February 02, 2015.
Interview 2_KM
Interview 4_KM
Interview 8_KM
Interview 11_KM (2015): European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium. February 26, 2015.
Interview 12 _KM (2015): European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium. February 27, 2015.
Interview 13_KM (2015): European Commission. Brussels, Belgium. February 27, 2015.
Interview 14_KM (2015): European Commission. Brussels, Belgium. February 27, 2015.