Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013

Putin’s Energy Diplomacy: An Eastern Pivot

Since the fall of the USSR, the new Russia implemented a myriad of different

strategies in an attempt to regain its influence over Eastern Europe and former Soviet

Republics, also know as “the neighborhood,” while seeking to regain the role of a global

power that exerts and substantial influence other nations. During the 1990’s, the country

was rocked by internal conflict and extreme economic hardship, causing it to look inward

and address those issues, preventing it from playing a major role on the world stage.

However, with the rise of oil prices, discovery of massive amounts of energy resources

and the emergence of Vladimir Putin and his takeover of the energy industry, Russia

rediscovered the energy card that it used so effectively in the Soviet era: oil and natural

gas. With Europe dependent on Russia for natural gas and oil, the country is in a strong

negotiating position, provided Europe remains dependent on Russia for its energy needs.

Up until now, Putin has successfully used a variety of methods to place the Russian

Federation in the position of power it currently holds. Through taking over many private

energy companies and exerting a strong government influence over many others,

opposing foreign energy companies, and signing numerous agreements to supply Europe

with much needed oil and gas, Putin has succeeded in increasing Russia’s global and

regional influence and massively improving the economy, but such an era may soon

becoming to an end, forcing development of new markets such as Northeast Asia.

During the 1990’s, the economic and political problems that the new Russian

Federation confronted brought the country to its knees. Massive corruption in business,

an unstable political situation, and low global oil prices devastated the newly formed

nation. The vast majority of Russia’s wealth comes from natural resources, assets that

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013 were now controlled by insiders who had taken advantage of their connections at the fall

of the Soviet Union to acquire formerly state-owned assets, such as large oil companies.

During the 1990’s, these select few competed ruthlessly against each other in a private

sector competition that bordered on lawless. Many of these oligarchs owned the main

company but not the subsidiaries, and would frequently extort all of the possible profits

from the subsidiary company often issuing new debt or shares of the main company to

dilute the wealth and influence of the subsidiary’s owners into nothing. This rampant

infighting among the oligarchs decimated the average Russian and the economy, causing

wage arrears and pension payments to be missed. Compounding the issue was the

collapse of the horizontal Soviet energy structure, which had a separate ministry

overseeing each aspect of the industry. With no clear head of the industry, regions

attempted to sell oil for their own gain, not the government’s, and no one knew who

controlled what resources and aspects of the industry. Out of this lawless situation

emerged men such as Vagit Alekperov, who had seen the benefits of a Western style,

flexible, and vertically integrated oil company during his time as Deputy Oil Minister in

the year before the collapse of the Soviet Union, he and established the first Western-

style oil company in Russia, Lukoil. These companies, unlike those created in the Soviet

Union, operated autonomously from the state, and given the lack of a clear tax structure

and enforcement policy, Russia could not receive sufficient tax revenue from these

companies to pay its bills the way it always had, through the energy industry and suffered

a severe financial crisis at the end of the 1990’s, leading it to default on its debt.

At the end of 1999, when Yeltsin named Putin his successor, all of the most

valuable formerly state-owned assets were in private hands, denying the government

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013 access to much needed revenues, and severely handicapped Russia’s ability to negotiate

using energy. Inheriting this situation, Putin was determined to place the oligarchs firmly

under his heel. While agreeing to let them keep their assets and much of their wealth, he

installed several ground rules. The new tax rate of 13% was a flat tax and everyone; even

oligarchs who had long avoided paying any kind of tax on their massive wealth, was

expected to pay, Putin saw the rate as a compromise with the oligarchs. In addition to

paying taxes, Putin, in no uncertain terms, told the oligarchs to choose between business

and politics, no longer would they be allowed to flaunt the massive influence they had

bought in Parliament under the Yeltsin regime. These two ground rules were the

foundation from which Putin was able to create and execute the strategy of “energy

diplomacy” that Russia practices today.

Putin’s first move was to take over the major energy companies through the state-

owned energy companies Rosneft and Gazprom. The most famous event of the early

stages of this new policy was the Khodorkovsky affair. After arresting or exiling several

media oligarchs, for criticizing the regime, Mikhail Khodorkovsky was the next to arouse

Putin’s anger. The billionaire owner of YUKOS became suspicious of corruption within

the Putin administration, especially after being outbid by the state oil company Rosneft

for several Northern oil fields. The state massively overpaid, purchasing the fields for

twice their worth. Angry at losing the bid as a result of what he felt was increasing

corruption in the government, Khodorkovsky gave a presentation on the issue, accusing

Putin and his close associates of corruption and saying the practice cost Russia $30

billion a year (10-12% of GDP)1. Khodorkovsky had also successfully bribed the Duma

1 The Putin System. Dir. Jean Carre. BBC. 2007. Film.

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013 to prevent a much higher tax on oil, even calling the finance minister on the eve of the

vote to inform him of such and the vote was cancelled. Putin saw these actions as a direct

violation of the rules he had laid out in his first meeting with the oligarchs and came after

Khodorkovsky and his YUKOS oil company for tax evasion, accusing him of illegally

acquiring the company and its assets. Khodorkovsky was arrested and the state assumed

control of YUKOS. With this acquisition through Rosneft, and other purchases through

both Gazprom and Rosneft, Putin had the resources he needed to develop his energy

strategy having taken over many of the major energy companies, and showing how he

rewarded those loyal to him and the harsh consequences of disloyalty. Beginning with

contracts between then German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder regarding the construction

of the Nord Stream, and another with the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and the

Turkey to construct the Blue Steam to provide gas for central and Southern Europe.2

Russia once again sought to influence Western Europe through its massive natural

resources.

Russia, as

strategically placed as a bridge between Asia and Europe, has a unique position as a

supplier of energy to both continents, giving it the potential for massive influence in both

spheres. While the sheer size of Russia makes transportation of energy difficult, the

amount of resources available in Siberia and other regions of the country are massive,

though also being depleted at a rapid rate. Currently, the easiest way for Europe to access

natural gas is though the Nord Stream through the Baltic and the Blue Stream from the

South. Having pipelines that run through multiple countries, especially those in the

2 The Putin System, Dir. Carre, Jean Micheal.

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013 “neighborhood” of former USSR republics gives the Russian state a huge amount of

leverage an influence over Eastern Europe especially since pipelines “hardwire

relationships.3 In addition, European countries desperately needed the energy that Russia

has in abundance, and were willing to overlook some of the atrocities of the Russian

government, such as the situation in Chechnya in order to receive natural gas. Despite the

immense benefits of these agreements for the European Union, they are far more critical

for Russia. The vast majority of Russian energy exports are to the, EU 80% of gas

exports are to the EU, and Russian energy imports make up 35% of the EU’s total gas

imports.4 While the EU certainly needs Russian energy imports, the percentages clearly

indicate the Russians need the EU as a major importer much more. The majority of the

Russian economy is based on a continued and increasing demand for hydrocarbons such

as natural gas and crude oil. Through energy, Russia has been able to rediscover a large

degree of its former influence; however, that influence is nowhere near as strong as

Russians would have the rest of the world to believe. The Russian economy is addicted to

natural resources and specifically exports to Europe. As new technology such as Liquid

Natural Gas develops, other pipelines, such as the proposed Nabucco pipeline, through

Europe that exclude Russia are constructed, and more regions begin to exploit there

natural gas resources, the influence of Russia will quickly wane and the economy will

suffer.

The

Nabucco pipeline is the first pipeline through Europe to exclude Russia, transporting gas

3 The Putin System, Dir. Carre, Jean. 4 "Energy Production and Imports ." epp.eurostat..ec.europa.eu. N.p., n.d. Web. 15 Dec. 2012.

<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports#Further_Eurostat_information>.

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013 primarily from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field, but the project has yet to get off of the

drawing broad. The distance for the pipeline was recently halved, it was originally

planned to cross all of Turkey and then proceed to Baugarten en der March in Austria.

Such a plan would be a direct commercial challenge to Russia and its influence.

However, the final plans have not been finalized as there remain many issues surrounding

the project, including one of the main sponsors, the German energy company RWE.

Sensing the competition, Gazprom developed a plan for their own pipeline in that same

region, and on December 7th, Gazprom began construction of the South Stream to

compete directly with the Nabucco5 and extend their influence into the Caspian region.

While Russia may have successfully countered the potential threat from the Nabucco,

there are other very pressing matters that must be addressed. More ominous for Russian

energy policy is the fact that the Nord Stream pipeline, which very recently opened a

second pipeline to Germany increasing its capacity to 55bcm has only been transporting

9bcm, or about 30-40% of the previous capacity to the European market, considering that

70% of Russian gas exports go to Europe, this does not bode well for future revenue

generation in the West European sector. Complicating the matter and darkening the

horizon for Russian energy diplomacy are the policies of Europe to slowly decrease their

dependence on Russian gas imports and search for a new source of energy. The recent

deal made between state-owned Norwegian energy company Statoil and the German gas

company Wintershall AG illustrates the changing dynamics of the European gas market,

the bread and butter of the Russian economy. The 10-year contract uses spot, or current

market prices, rather than fixing the rate to the price of oil. Such a method is cheaper than 5 Milutinovic , Ivan . "Gazprom and partners kick off construction of South Stream pipeline."

Russia Today [Moscow] 7 Dec. 2012: n. pag. http://rt.com. Web. 12 Dec. 2012.

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013 fixing the value of the contract linked to oil, the method that Gazprom uses for 60% of its

contracts, which has become very unpopular with the European Union. The move by

Statoil aims to create a more flexible European gas market, which could have a dramatic

effect on Gazprom exports if it does not show a willingness to adopt a more flexible

pricing method. The take or pay system used by Gazprom, which requires the countries to

either accept the gas as agreed, or pay a penalty has become increasingly unpopular

within the European market as more sources of gas and other energy become available.

Just this year exports to Europe have fallen 15%.6 Russia is currently faced with a

worrisome situation in Europe, as the economy needs high energy prices for support.

Given the situation, the South Stream investment of $32 billion on the eve of a potentially

massive shift in European energy policy possesses significant risks; major changes are

needed by Gazprom to maintain its status in Europe, although such changes, such as an

increasing switch to spot pricing will negatively affect revenue from the sale of gas. The

façade of an energy superpower is already falling apart, as the move by Statoil indicates,

and the grip of Gazprom has been loosened, a trend that recent developments such as

LNG will continue. Developing LNG allows gas to be transported by ship, without the

need of the pipelines that are the lifeblood of the Russian economy will present

increasingly greater challenges to Gazprom and Russian energy policy in the coming

years. While Putin predicts the global need for hydrocarbons to increase over the next 10-

12 years,7 the European developments necessitate that Russia seeks to find another

6 Rodova , Nadina . "Analysts question Gazprom's focus on European gas market Natural Gas | Platts." Energy News, Prices, & Data“ Oil, Natural Gas, Electric Power, Coal, Petrochemicals, Metals & Shipping | Platts. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Dec. 2012

7 Blagov, Sergei. "Russia Plans Increased Energy Exports | European Dialogue." European Dialogue. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Dec. 2012. <http://eurodialogue.org/energy-security/Russia-Plans-Increased-Energy-Exports>.

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013 market for its oil and gas, based on the unique geographic position of Russia, it has the

unique option to turn to the Far East, an area with huge reserves of energy and located

near the three largest gas consuming countries in the world, China, South Korea, and

Japan.

Despite the massive potential and enormous energy supplies of the Far East (the

Kovytka gas field is said to have more gas than the nation of Canada), Russian pipelines

and other methods of delivering energy to China, the Koreas, and Japan are still just

emerging from their nascent phases. The Kovytka field is capable of producing 2,000bcm

of gas for the next 30-40 years; however, Alexei Miller has said that Gazprom does not

plan to begin development in the region until 20188. With heavy pressure from the

Chinese to reach an agreement regarding energy supply, Miller and Gazprom could tap

into the resources earlier to meet the growing Chinese demand and open up the supply

route from the East as the Chinese requested, but the matter is still under discussion. In

addition to the Kovytka field, discussions are also ongoing concerning the Altai pipeline

that would bring in gas from Western Siberia directly to China, but talks between

Gazprom and Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) have been held up due to

the issue of pricing, although a framework has already been agreed upon. While Russia is

still seeking to break into the Chinese market and hardwire the relationship through the

construction of a pipeline, it has had slightly more success dealing with other markets in

the Asian theater. Russian began making inroads into the South Korean market as early

as 2005 through the Sakhalin-2 project. Through an asset swap with Shell that granted the

8 Ahn , Se Hyun. "Framing Energy Security Between Russia and South Korea?: Progress, Problems, and Prospects." University of California Press 50.3 (2010): 591-614. Jstor. Web. 11 Dec. 2012.

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013 company a 50% share of the Zapolyarnoye oil field and Gazprom received a 25% equity

share in the Sakhalin-2 project. The Russian energy giant quickly turned this to its

advantage, signing a contract with KOGAS, the state-owned South Korean gas company

to provide it with 1.5 million tons of LNG for 20 years.9

Russia has always had a presence in the Asian market, although the majority of its

resources went to Europe; however, Russia must now build on these contracts as it begins

to search for and develop Eastern Siberian energy reserves that can be rapidly shipped to

Asian nations in need of energy. LNG from the Sakhalin-2 project reaches South Korea

in two or three days by ship, making transport much simpler than having to pipe gas

across Russia and other Eastern European countries to reach the Western European

market. The benefits for both sides are large, and Russia and South Korea have

collaborated on several other energy and infrastructure projects, but there remain multiple

issues that severely hamper progress and must be addressed if Russia wants to establish a

greater foothold in the East Asian, specifically Northeast Asian energy market and begin

its necessary pivot from Europe.

Recently, Russian exports from the Sakhalin-2 project have met only 6% of the

South Korean demand, and the addition of the Sakhalin-3 project, and even then a

pipeline will be needed to meet the South Korean energy demands.10 While these

additions would allow Russia to meet the energy demands, the key issue then becomes

maintaining a competitive price relative to the Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian gas

suppliers. The recent shale gas revolution in the United States, and the prediction that the

US will become a net energy exporter threatens to further drive down the price of natural

9 Ahn, 604. 10 Ahn, 602.

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013 gas, the keystone of the Russian economy. To remain competitive, Gazprom would need

to lower its price, and as the company’s actions in Europe have illustrated, the state

energy giant is well aware that it needs a certain amount of revenue to keep fueling the

Russian economy. The new increase in supply necessitates a price drop for Gazprom to

remain competitive. Russia must deal with the price issue all over the world, as LNG

technology develops rapidly in other regions and poses a severe threat to the established

precedent, and Russian preference, for pipelines to create energy-based relationships.

Another issue facing Russia as it attempts to increase it’s share in the Northeast East

Asian market is the unpredictable attitude towards foreign companies, and the current

climate indicates a harsher tone being taken with foreign organizations and companies.

As a result, South Korea especially has shied away from Russian long-term contracts and

chosen the safer short-term option as a method of protecting itself against the

unpredictability of the Russian business laws and attitudes.

The unpredictability of the Russian government has discouraged long-term

investment and complicated the establishment of a stable long-term energy relationship.

Russia does not have a solid framework for dealing with outsiders, so any investment by

an individual or foreign country comes with significant additional risk. The Sakhalin-2

scandal in 2005 that resulted in the loss of millions of dollars by the Korean state railway

company illustrated the perils of dealing with Russia. After backing out of the initial

contract with Alfa-Eco regarding work on the Sakhalin-2 project, Korean Railways only

received $2.7 million of its investment back.11 While the scandal did raise doubts about

dealing with Russia, Korean Railways also failed to carry out the necessary due diligence

work to examine the profitability of such a project because of a lack of Russian experts to 11 Ahn, 604.

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013 properly analyze the situation and all of the associated risks. Russia is still a relatively

new player in the Northeast Asian gas market, and has nowhere near the level of

influence that it possess in Europe. Events such as this scandal cast Russia in a bad light

and inhibit its ability to build trusting relationships. A process complicated by the

unpredictable internal politics of the country, especially when it comes to the fierce

defense of natural resources. Putin and Medvedev both believe that Russian energy

resources are “too important to be left entirely to market forces,” and the state has the

right to regulate the development and use of these resources.12 Russia’s leaders

undoubtedly understand the importance of energy to the country, but overzealously

defend the right of the state to such resources and drive away much-needed foreign

investment, a crucial element for the development of resources in the Eastern Siberian

region. Russia likes to play its energy cards, the only real means of gaining more

influence, close to the chest, and more foreign involvement limits this ability. The

Northeast Asian market contains three of the world’s largest gas-consuming nations in

Japan, China, and South Korea, an unbelievably rich market for Russian gas. Russia

clearly aims to play the leading role in energy policy in the region, preferably through the

construction of a pipeline such as the Altai. On the other hand, if Russia encourages

competition between these three nations, it can more clearly understand the dynamics of

regional competition and use this information to negotiate favorable contracts with the

three largest gas importing nations in the world, but such a method could severely

damage the overall situation.

Each country is paralyzed by the fear of exclusion from the resources in the Far

East as the result of a Russian agreement with one of its rival nations. Each country has 12 Ahn, 605.

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013 its own fears regarding the supply of gas, Japan and China watch each other closely and

fear exclusive access of the other while South Korea is concerned about the stability of a

pipeline through China and North Korea. Russia has its own fears concerning the balance

of exports to an economic superpower like China. Too much reliance on exports to China

gives the Chinese leverage over Russia, exactly the opposite of what Russia wants to

achieve. Additionally, the relationship of North and South Korea is critical to the

development of a secure pipeline in the region. The Russians must maintain positive

relations with the North Koreans in the hope of using the country as a way to reach the

rich South Korean market. Russia must find the delicate balance by negotiating with all

parties to maintain balance in the relationship with Northeast Asia conducive to allowing

Russian oil and gas to flow into the region. However, there remains the massive issue of

infrastructure in the Russian Far East, which is incredibly undeveloped and simply does

not currently have the means to transport sufficient volume to sate the hunger for gas in

Northeast Asia.

A severe lack of pipelines and other transportation methods to move gas from

European Russia and Siberia leaves the Far East with two options, the first of which is to

transport resources by boat, a method only available in the summer, or the prohibitively

expensive method of rail transportation. Simply put, a system for the efficient and

effective transportation of gas throughout the region does not exist and there must be

massive development in the region for such a system to be realized. Compounding the

difficulty is the incredibly harsh climate of the Far East that frequently results in

significant cost increases from the initially planned amount due to the required

technology to protect against the weather. Developing such a system requires a

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013 substantial amount of money through foreign investment, which has been very nervous as

a result of unclear tax and business laws surrounding Russian natural resources. The

chronic underdevelopment of the region, which also contains such a vast potential for

wealth has also taken its toll on the population. Such underdevelopment has led to the rise

of organized crime, while strong regionalist sentiment has propagated a fear of the North

Koreans and Chinese, many regional problems are being increasingly blamed on North

Korean lumberjacks. This fear of Northeast Asians severely inhibits the development of

trusting relationships and increased cooperation in the region. A jointly-constructed

Russian and Chinese pipeline would benefit both countries interests; however, the

Russian population’s increasing distrust of the Chinese led the government to change the

plans for the pipeline and construct it entirely in Russia. In this sense, the aims of the

government are getting in their own way, the desire to quell regionalist sentiment directly

clashes with the desire for collaboration with China on a jointly constructed pipeline.

The biggest danger to the development of Russian strategy in the Far East is the

shale gas revolution in the United States, putting the US in a position to become a net

exporter of energy by 2020. Combined with massive newly discovered gas reserves, the

role of LNG will become increasingly important, and allow other countries to enter and

influence the East Asian theater without the need to construct potentially prohibitively

expensive pipelines crossing the brutally challenging environment in the Far East. Such

entrance into the Northeast Asian would deprive the Russian government of the ability to

charge a higher price than other companies, a position it, until recently, held very firmly

in Europe. Another competitor in the market able to undersell the Russians and

necessitate a price cut for the Russians to remain an effective option, and thus reduce the

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013 revenue from the region. Developing more efficient technology in emerging fields such

as LNG is essential for Russia to establish and hold an influence in the region. For now

the Russians have fallen behind in the LNG field and absolutely must develop in that area

to make a strong energy play for the Northeast Asian market and the incredible potential

within it.

Russia, considered by some an energy superpower, a categorization that Putin

vigorously denies, has massive unrealized energy potential. While its influence is on the

wane in Europe and competition is beginning to increase, the Russian still have

significant influence as a result of the complex pipeline system. However, Russia is far

too dependent on exports to the EU supporting their economy. Due to the increasing

competition and initiative by Europe to move away from Russian energy dependency,

circumstances necessitate that Russia end its own addiction to the European market and

pivot to the Far East. Such a move comes with many challenges, including the

development of infrastructure in the incredibly harsh regions of Siberia and the Far East,

much greater cooperation with China, the Koreas, and Japan, and the establishment of a

trusting relationship between these nations. Complicating the issue is the recent rise of

shale gas and LNG technology requiring Russia to upgrade its own LNG technology to

remain competitive and enable it to exert influence in Northeast Asia while resisting the

attempts of the United States to enter the lucrative market. While faced with many

challenges, if navigated correctly, Russia can retain a presence in Europe while

successfully pivoting to Asia. However, there remains much work to be done through

negotiations and the construction of strong energy-based relationships using contracts and

pipelines in the regions. Russia must take advantage of this window of opportunity before

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013 it shrinks though the entrance of competitors into the market. Russia has immense

potential for a bright future in energy, but its plan must be carefully chosen and quickly

executed, which based on previous Russian actions in the region has not been the case.

Swift and decisive action could increase the influence of Russia to immense levels, but

the window of opportunity has begun to close, and with it the potential for Russia

successfully maximizing the benefits of the necessary Eastern pivot.

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013

Works Cited

Ahn , Se Hyun. "Framing Energy Security Between Russia and South Korea?: Progress, Problems, and

Prospects." University of California Press 50.3 (2010): 591-614. Jstor. Web. 11 Dec. 2012.

Blagov, Sergei. "Russia Plans Increased Energy Exports | European Dialogue." European Dialogue. N.p.,

n.d. Web. 12 Dec. 2012. <http://eurodialogue.org/energy-security/Russia-Plans-Increased-

Energy-Exports>.

Derrick Petroleum . "Oil and Gas - Mergers and Acquisition Review: Gazprom finally grabs Kovykta for

$771 million!!! Is Kovykta there in Gazprom’s near term development list??." Oil and Gas -

Mergers and Acquisition Review. N.p., n.d. Web. 13 Dec. 2012.

<http://mergersandacquisitionreviewcom.blogspot.ru/2011/03/gazprom-finally-grabs-kovykta-

for-771.html>.

"Energy Production and Imports ." epp.eurostat..ec.europa.eu. N.p., n.d. Web. 15 Dec. 2012.

<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports

#Further_Eurostat_information>.

Katz , Mark . "Russia's Energy Supply: A Foriegn Policy Tool?." Fair Observer N/A (2012): n. pag.

www.fairobserver.com. Web. 6 Dec. 2012.

Milutinovic , Ivan . "Gazprom and partners kick off construction of South Stream pipeline." Russia Today

[Moscow] 7 Dec. 2012: n. pag. http://rt.com. Web. 12 Dec. 2012.

Paillard , Christophe-Alexandre. "Rethinking Russia: Russia and Europe's Mutual Energy Dependence."

Journal of International Affairs 63.2 (2010): 65-84. http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu. Web. 7 Dec.

2012.

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Peter Sisson Pitt Research Symposium Essay January 28, 2013

Rodova , Nadina . "Analysts question Gazprom's focus on European gas market | Natural Gas | Platts."

Energy News, Prices, & Data – Oil, Natural Gas, Electric Power, Coal, Petrochemicals,

Metals & Shipping | Platts. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Dec. 2012.

<http://www.platts.com/newsfeature/2012/naturalgas/europeangas/index>.

The Putin System. Dir. Jean Carre. BBC. 2007. Film.

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