purport, implicature and presupposition: sanskrit abhiprāya and tibetan dgo s pa/dgo s gži as...

D. SEYFORT RUEGG

P U R P O R T , I M P L I C A T U R E A N D P R E S U P P O S I T I O N :

S A N S K R I T A B H I P R A Y A A N D T I B E T A N DGONS

PA/DGOfi:S G~I AS H E R M E N E U T I C A L C O N C E P T S

The Tibetan hermeneutical term dgons g~i has no known Sanskrit original,

nor does it seem to be attested in the literature translated into Tibetan from

Sanskrit. It is in fact likely to be a terminological development of the Tibetan

hermeneuticians, who have employed it alongside the terms - both well

attested in extant Sanskrit works as well as in Tibetan translations from the

Sanskrit - dgons pa = abhiprdya ' intention, intended meaning, purport ' i and

dgohs pa can = dbhiprdyika 'pertaining to intention, intentional' said of a

Stitra-text the surface meaning of which does not reflect the ultimate and

definitive intention (abhiprdya) of the Buddha. 2

Beside the rendering 'intentional (i.e. purportive) foundation, ground',

the expression deep meaning (in contrast to surface meaning) may serve to

paraphrase dgons g~i. 3 It is, according to the hermeneuticians, what the Buddha

ultimately and definitively had in mind even when communicating quite

other (sometimes opposed) teachings in Stitras that these hermeneuticians have

accordingly described as dbhiprdyika and as having for their motivation (dgos pa = prayojana) certain purposes envisioned by the Buddha - in conformity

with the salvific principle governed by his skill in means (updyakau'salya) - intended to aid these addressees, who are thus defined as the special and

specific trainees (gdul bya = vineya) of a particular dbhiprdyika (and neydrtha) Sfitra.

In Buddhist exegesis and hermeneutical theory the concept of intended

purport thus underlies the categories of the dbhiprdyika (dgohs pa can) in

Sfitra-interpretation, and of the intentionally communicated (dgohs b~ad: sam. dhyd bh~sita-, sam. dh(y)a-ya bhd.sita-) in Tantra-interpretation. On the

contrary, a Sfitra or Tantra that is not dbhiprdyika in this way is described as

'non-intentional' (dgohs rain). Coupled with two further sets of contrasting categories - the literal (sgra ji b~in pa = yathdruta, i.e. standard linguistic

usage) as against the non-literal (sgra /i b~in pa ma yin pa = na yathdruta, i.e. non-standard linguistic convention or special code), 4 and the provisional

Journal of Indian Philosophy 13 (1985) 309-325. 0022-1791/85.10 © 1985 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

310 D. SEYFORT RUEGG

meaning requiring to be further (i.e. otherwise) interpreted (dran [ba 7] don = neydrtha) as against the meaning that is definitive and certain (nes [paT] don = nitdrtha) - the dgohs b~ad and the dgons min make up a set of six points (mtha'drug = .sa.tkoti). This .sa.tko.ti is well known in Tantrik hermeneutics, and is treated in the commentarial literature on the Guhyasamdja in particular, s

It is interesting to note that Sa skya Pand.i ta Kun dga' rgyal mtshan

(1182-1251) has however not restricted the term s.a.tkoti and the six points

making it up to Tantrik hermeneutics alone. For when discussing, in his

mKhas pa rnams 7ug pa'i sgo, the matter of rebutting objections (brgal /an) in the interpretation of the Buddha's teachings, he has used the term

mtha'drug with reference to textual exegesis (g~uh b~ad pa) in general, even while quoting Candrakfrti's Tantrik Pradipoddyotana as his source. 6

Indeed, Sa skya Pandi ta observes, if one's understanding does not follow the .sa.tko.ti, mistakes will be made whether one is explaining Sfitra or Tantra.

According to the mKhas ]ug, the .sat. ko.ti consists of dgohs pa/dgons pa b~ad pa and dgons pa ma yin pa, ties pa 'i don and drab ba 7 don, sgra /i b~in pa and sgra/i b~in mayin pa. In this connexion Sa skya Pan. d.i ta expounds dgons pa b~ad pa by means of the four abhiprdyas (dgohs pa) and four abhisamdhis (Mem por dgons pa) set forth in the Mahdydnasfftrdlam. kdra (xii.16-18) for example. 7 As for exegesis of the non-intentional (dgohs pa ma yin pa), he specifies that this variety of interpretation is employed when the Buddha's intention (dgohs pa) is directly recognized through the

words and sense (tshig don, of a given Sfitra-passage) themselves, without there being any need to search out a further abhipraya, s Sa skya Pan.d.i ta's

mKhas 7ug - a work that may have been composed in the third decade of the thirteenth century 9 - is accordingly one of the oldest available original Tibetan sources concerned with the subject of abhiprdya in the context

of scriptural exegesis and hermeneutics. And the fact that it extends to general exegesis the points of the s.at.kot.i attested in the Indian sources as devices in Tantrik hermeneutics is noteworthy. 1°

The dgots g~i is however not included amongst the points of the s.atkot.i, and it has accordingly not been treated in the relevant section of the mKhas Tug. But this terms appears elsewhere in Sa skya Pandi ta's works, with Bu

ston (1290-1364), in the commentary on the Mahdydnasdtrdlam. ka-ra by rGyal sras Thogs med (1295-1369), and already somewhat earlier with bSod nams rtse mo (1142-1182).

PURPORT, IMPLICATURE AND PRESUPPOSITION 311

Among the instances of dgons g~i cited by Bu ston Rin chen grub in his

treatise on the tathdgatagarbha we find non-substantiality (nairdtmya or

nih. svabhdvata-) and Emptiness (~fmyata-). S~nyatd is regarded as the dgohs g~i ' intentional foundation or ground' for an dbhiprdyika teaching of the Buddha (rather than as the expressed content of his teaching) in cases where

he is thought by the hermeneuticians to have considered it inappropriate to

express and communicate Emptiness and non-substantiality to his addressee, either directly and explicitly (dnos ~su: mukhya))r by implication (gugs kyis = sdrnarthydt, or don gyis = arthdt), because this specific auditor was (at

that particular time) unprepared for such a teaching owing e.g. to the fact that he was disturbed and frightened by the idea of Emptiness. 11

The existence of a dgohs g~i is one of three criteria required so that a Sfitra can be properly and legitimately identified by the hermeneutician

as intentional (dbhiprdyika) and needing further interpretation in another sense (neydrtha). The other two criteria are the Buddha's motive (prayojana) in communicating it, already mentioned above, and incompatibility between the primary, surface meaning (dhos la gnod byed; cf. Sanskrit mukhydrthabddha) of a given Sfitra or Sfitra-passage and the real purport of the Buddha's teaching established by interpretation of the whole of the Buddha's Word (buddhavacana), i.e. the entire canonical corpus. 12

I1

In a closely reasoned article recently published in this Journal (12 [1984],

p. 1 ff.), Michael Broido has argued in favour of rendering dgons g~i by

'implication c ' - that is, the content of an implication (pp. 4 - 5 and 28

of his article). And the noun dgopis pa Broido renders by 'implication A'

- that is, the act of implication (p. 4). Implication c he then describes as referring to the 'fact or state of affairs or proposition implied by an implicative

utterance, as against the topic or subject-matter or what the utterance is about '

(p. 5) and as against the ' "implied object" (e.g. a topic or a thing implicitly referred to) ' (p. 28). The question whether ~dnyatd is a fact or a thing he

leaves open (p, 5); but he observes that the dgohs g~i 'seems to be the content • . . and not say the topic implied' (p. 5). 13

Now the problem - and indeed the potential difficulty - that arises if we are to use the term and concept of implication in analysing the theory of dbhiprdyika utterances, which are often understood as having a meaning that


has to be further (i.e. otherwise) interpreted (g~an du drab ba'i don, also bkri ba'i don i.e. neydrtha) - and which are provisional insofar as the obvious (surface or 'literal') meaning is not the one that is in the Buddha's mind in the Final analysis - rather than a meaning that is certain and def'mitive Qies pa'i don, i.e. nftdrtha), is that this Buddhist hermeneutical theory has nothing to do with either of the kinds of implication usually recognized in logic and semantics, namely logical implication and semantic implication. 14 (i) The dgons g~i which, in a given hermeneutical system, is regarded as corresponding to what is intended in the ultimate sense (pdramdrthika) by the Buddha - and hence to the nftdrtha - is not according to this theory something to be logically inferred (r[es su dpag par bya ba = anumeya 'inferendum') through the means of right knowledge known in Buddhist philosophy as inference (r/es su dpag pa = anumdna). That is, it is not a logical consequent known by inference from an antecedent within the Sfitra-passage in question. (ii) Nor does the dgohs g~i represent the content of semantic implication in the standard sense of this term. This kind of implication is in fact regularly designated in Indian and Tibetan philosophical language by the specific terms

~ugs kyis = sdmarthydt or, sometimes, don gyis = arthdt. And what is thus implicitly communicated - the implication C - is designated in Tibetan not by the term dgons g~i but by the term ~ugs bstan, the antonym to d~os bstan which designates what is explicitly conveyed by the primary meanings of words. What is implicitly communicated in this way is sometimes described in Sanskrit as utsfftra, in contradistinction to what is explicitly conveyed expressis verbis, that is, granthatas 'textually' and sfftratas 'in the S~tra's own words', is Semantic implication may, moreover, be considered to be linguistically secondary in relation to what is explicitly expressed. In the Buddhist hermeneutical theory under consideration here, however, the dgons g~i is clearly primary from the hermeneutician's systematical point of view; for it corresponds to the pdrarndrthika and to the nftdrtha - i.e. to what the Buddha has in mind in the final analysis (within a given hermeneutical system) - whereas the meaning of an dbhiprdyika Sfitra-passage is secondary in this frame and corresponds to the neydrtha which the Buddha puts provisionally to use, in a perlocutionary fashion as it were, for a given purpose and in a particular pragmatic situation relative to specific addressees (the Vineyas or 'trainees' of the particular Stitra-passage in question).

Finally, it is not the case that in dbhiprdyika or neydrtha Sfitra-passages the dgohs g~i is communicated to the Vineya by implication in addition to


the obvious surface content that is explicitly expressed. The trainees for whom

the dbhiprdyika or neydrtha Sfitra-utterance is specifically destined by the

Buddha are indeed not expected to be yet able to grasp the dgohs g~i, i.e.

the certain and definitive meaning the Buddha has in mind. For if they were,

there could be little purpose in teaching them the dbhiprdyika and neydrtha Sfitra-passage.

For the reasons stated, then, the dgons g~i cannot be an implication in

the standard logical or semantic senses of the term. is a

However, even though the dgohs g~i is not conveyed to the specific Vineya

of an dbhiprdyika or neydrtha Sfitra by means of either of these kinds o f

implication, it may be said that, from the point of view of the competent

systematical hermeneutician as well as from that of the Buddha, the dgons g]i is in a very special sense an implicate in the Buddha's teaching insofar

as it is considered as a system. And just as the Buddha has it in mind when he

gives other quite different and non-concordant - or even incompatible -

teachings to specific Vineyas unable yet to comprehend what he actually

has in mind, so that competent exegete, who has at his disposal the corpus

of the Buddha's teachings (together, eventually, with the oral and/or written

commentarial tradition), is able to discover - to 'calculate' as it were - the

dgons g~i by means of the systematical interpretation of this corpus.

Thus, while for the Buddha the dgons g]i is a kind of presupposition underlying his utterances as an experienced teacher, for the hermeneutician

it can perhaps also be described as an implicature (see below Section VI)

discoverable through the systematical interpretation of the corpus of the

Buddha's teachings having regard to his motive (prayo]ana) in a particular

pragmatic and communicative situation of teaching.

III

If we now look for a parallel (if not the immediate source) for the notion of

dgohs g~i in the literature of Indian semantics, it could no doubt be best

compared with suggestive force (vyafi/ana-) and poetic resonance (dhvani). Thus, where the surface meaning of an dbhiprdyika or neydrtha Sfitra, or

Sfitra-passage, is clearly and totally discordant with the sense and purport

of the Buddha's teaching taken as a whole and as established by systematical

interpretation of the canonical corpus - e.g. in the case of parindmandbhisamdhi where the meaning is to be transmuted or cancelled ~6 _ the form of dhvani


which is most closely comparable is the one in which the obvious surface content is altogether unintended (avivak.sitavdcya), this surface meaning being then either totally annulled (atyantatiraskr.tavdcya) or transmuted into another meaning (arthdntarasam. kramitavdcya). On the other hand,

in those cases where the dbhiprdyika or neydrtha meaning is compatible with the total corpus of the Buddha's teaching within the frame of a given hermeneutical and doctrinal system and where it is therefore at least provisionally acceptable, comparison can be made with that form of suggestion where the expressed content is still meant even though another, unexpressed, meaning is actually the one intended (vivaks.itdnyaparavacya). ~ 7

Moreover, the philosopher-hermeneutician able by means of systematical exegesis to grasp the dgons g~i in an dbhiprdyika or neydrtha Sfitra, is, in certain respects, not unlike the cultivated and expert sahrdaya, that is, the aesthetically sensitive and cultivated connoisseur of Indian poetics.

But there nonetheless appears to exist an important difference in this

matter between K~vya and Alam. k~ra~stra on the one side and Buddhist

philosophical hermeneutics on the other. For poetics does not have a place

for a listener or reader corresponding to the specific trainees (vineya) for

whom the Buddha's dbhiprdyika and neydrtha utterances are specially destined

as useful and thoroughly motivated - even though provisional - propaedeutic

devices.

IV

It is interesting to note that the terms dgons g~i and dgons pa = abhiprdya as well as dgos pa = prayojana can all be glossed by the English words 'intent' or 'intention' in one or the other of their historically attested uses. Thus, for

'intent' the Shorter Oxford English dictionary records the meanings (1) act of intending; (4) understanding; frame of mind, spirit; thought of any kind; (5) meaning; purport; (7) intended subject, theme; and (6) end purposed; aim, purpose. And for 'intention' it records (3) meaning, import; (4) the act of intending; (5) that which is intended; a purpose, design.

The Sanskrit word dbhiprdyika - an adjective derived from the noun abhiprdya by means of the suffix -ika- denoting belonging to (see L. Renou, Grammaire sanscrite, p. 247: appartenance; J. Wackernagel and A. Debrunner,

Altindische Grammatik 11/2, p. 311: ZugehOrigkeit) with Vrddhi of the base - means 'intentional' in the sense of 'pertaining to intention'. ~8 An


dbhiprdyika Sfitra-passage is intentional too in the sense that it is governed by

a purpose, that is, the Buddha's motive(s) (prayojana) in communicating a

provisional, surface teaching intended specially for the specific addressee of

such a Sdtra. (Additionally, an dbhiprdyika Sfitra may be intentional in the

sense that intentionality attaches to it, that is, that pointing beyond its

provisional, surface meaning it is directed towards the definitive, deep meaning,

in other words towards the dgohs g~i.) As the 'intentional ground', the dgo~is g]i is intentional in the first sense

of pertaining to the Buddha's definitive, deep meaning or intention: it is

that towards which the Buddha's communicative act in teaching is ultimately

and finally directed, even though it is not expressed directly in an dbhiprdyika and neydrtha Sfitra and is accordingly not conveyed to the specific and special

addressee - the trainee (vineya) - of such a Sfitra. But the dgons g~i is

of course not itself motivated in the special sense noticed above of being

governed by a salvific and propaedeutic prayofana (dgos pa) as defined by

the hermeneutical theory under consideration here,

The definition of the word 'intentional' given in the Shorter Oxford English dictionary - i.e. 'of or pertaining to intention or purpose' - appears to take

into account at least the first two of the above-mentioned uses of the word.

While the meaning 'governed by an intention, or purpose' is doubtless a usual

one in every-day English (as it also is of the French word 'intentionnel'),

the term 'intentional' is being used here simply as an adjective to the noun

'intention'.

The use of this word to describe one particular category of Sfitra - namely

that category which has an underlying but unexpressed ultimate abhiprdya - need not be nullified or rendered inappropriate by the fact that any utterance

may be described as intentional insofar as it conveys a speaker's or author's

intended meaning, and that it is motivated by the purpose he has in making

his utterance. In this wider sense, every Sfitra serves to convey, directly or indirectly, the Buddha's intention (abhiprdya, understood either as dgo~is pa or as dgohs g]i).

If Sfitras in general have sometimes been described in the Abhidharma

literature as being dbhiprdyika, this is in contradistinction to the Abhidharma

which is said in this literature to be ldks.an, ika = mtshan hid pa 'comprising technical definitions, technical'. In other words, the adjective ldks.an, ika is to

be understood in this case as derived not from laksan, d 'figurative meaning'

but from laksana 'characteristic, definit ion') 9 As for the neydrtha, it is


contrasted by Yagomitra with that the meaning of which is analysed and clarified (vibhaktdrtha, i.e. n[tdrtha). 2°

In his commentary on the Mahdydnasfftrdlamkdra (fol. 133b) rGyal sras Thogs med points out that the category of the neydrtha is not coextensive

with the twin categories of abhiprdya and abhisamdhi, for Asafiga has stated in his Mahdydnasamgraha (ii. 31) that it is the whole of the corpus of the

Buddha's word (and not just that portion of it which may be regarded as neydrtha) that is to be understood in terms of the four abhiprdyas and the four abhisamdhis. Moreover, rGyal sras Thogs med explains, this corpus

in all its sections serves as a counteragent (gaen po = pratipaksa) against the wrong practices of disciples, so that it may be subsumed in its entirety under

the pratipaks.dbhisam, dhi. rGyal sras Thogs reed then explains that this view is not contradicted by the passage of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (p. 106)

where Asafiga has defined abhisamdhi as a semantic transmutation of linguistic

forms (ndmapadavyah]ana); for although this definition is indeed tantamount to explaining abhisam, dhi as neydrtha, it relates to pari.~mandbhisam, dhi only. This view expressed by rGyal sras Thogs med is supported by the three

examples given in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (p. 107).

However, as seen above, the main hermeneutical schools do in fact

recognize the existence of utterances of the Buddha which are neither dgotis b~ad nor dgons pa can inasmuch as no further intention additional to the

one expressed and conveyed by the words of the utterance itself has to be sought for. Such utterances - which do then contain a dgons pa (abhiprdya) in the wide sense but no dgons g~i or unexpressed intentional ground - are accordingly described as non-intentional (dgohs rain = dgons pa ma yin pa or dgo~s pa can ma yin pa).

VI

Given the requirement, from the point of view of systematical hermeneutics, to postulate an unexpressed dgons g~i in certain of the Buddha's utterances which are in some specific way non-concordant or incompatible with the final and definitive doctrine within the frame of a given philosophical system - namely in those Sfitras or Sfitra-passages which the hermeneuticians


describe as dbhiprdyika and neydrtha and as being motivated by particular

salvific purposes (prayojana) entertained by the Buddha in order provisionally

to help the specific and special addressees (vineya) of these Sfitras - it may be useful to consider here what H. P. Grice has termed conversational implicature. Grice's notion cannot, however, be simply borrowed without modification and adaptation to the hermeneutical concerns being studied in this paper. 21 The Sfitras in question are in the first place scarcely conversational

in Grice's sense. Nor, more importantly, do Grice's four categories associated with what he has called the Co-operative Principle - namely the categories

of Quality, Quantity, Relevance and Manner - all apply in every dbhiprdyika (and neydrtha) Sfitra because of the existence in them of a deliberately

unexpressed intentional ground, the dgons g~i. In fact Grice's Co-operative

Principle yields in such Sfitras to what we might call a Salvific Principle put to use in a perlocutionary manner.

Still, in conformity even with this Salvific Principle of the Buddha, 'flouting'

- or more specifically updya-governed salvific exploitation - of the Conversational

Maxims are to be found in dbhiprdyika and neydrtha Sfitras, just as they have been recognized in Grice's second type of conversational implicature involving

exploitation of the maxims) 2 Thus, in the case ofparin, dmandbhisamdhi, there is obvious exploitation of the maxims of Quality and Manner; while

in other forms of dbhiprdyika utterance exploitation is detected through systematical hermeneutics. And both in the pragmatic situation of the Buddha's

communicating an dbhiprdyika teaching to specific trainees according to their

particular intellectual and spiritual dispositions (bsam pa = d~aya) and within the frame of the systematical interpretation of the Word of the Buddha (buddhavacana) as a whole, the dgons g~i does involve something that might

be compared with implicature, thus distinguishing it on the one side from logical implication, entailment and consequence and oll the other sicle from semantic implication. The implicature being considered here will not be inferred in terms of either logical or semantic inference and implication; yet it will be elicited both with regard to a given pragmatic situation - i.e. the speaker,

addressee(s) and other contextual factors affecting the communication of the Sfitra - and in terms of a systematical hermeneutics. This elicitation of meaning will satisfy the hermeneutic maxim that meaning is not to be inferred but elicited (sensus non est inferendus sed efferendus). 23

In an interesting way, then, and within the frame of a given system of philosophical hermeneutics, the dgohs g~i is a kind of presupposition for


the speaker - the Buddha as Teacher - when uttering an dbhiprdyika (and neydrtha) Sfitra, and even for the hermeneutician - who is of course not

the specific and special Vineya of the intentional Sfitra. Each of them will,

in his own way, be committed to the truth of the proposition corresponding

to the dgotis g~i and to the reality of the corresponding fact or state of

affairs. But from the point of view of the addressee of the dbhiprdyika Stitra

- i.e. the specific Vineya to whom it is in particular being communicated

- the dgons g~i would not normally be recognized as existent; and a fortiori

it would not be regarded by him as satisfying a truth-condition.

At the same time the dgons g~i figures as the condition for the Buddha's

employment of the dbhiprdyika Stitra in an effective manner as a useful

salvific propaedeutic. And it will function also as a kind of felicity-condition

for both the speaker and hermeneutician, but again not normally for the

addressee. In both these ways, then, the dgons g~i is for the hermeneutician

a systemic implicature - or a systemic presupposition - in the particular

communicative situation where the Buddha teaches a special (type of) addressee

by means of an utterance having above all a perlocutionary effect, and where

the hermeneutician then submits it to systematical interpretation. 24

Finally, as a dgons g~i Emptiness (~ffnyata-) - whether described as a fact,

a state of affairs or otherwise - appears as a kind of reality-condition rather

than as a truth-condition involving a propositional content (which ~nyatd can hardly be).

For the teacher when uttering an dbhiprdyika and neydrtha Sfitra, and also

for the hermeneutician when interpreting such an utterance in the context

of the total corpus of Sfitras, such intentional Sfitra-passages requiring further

interpretation are, within the given hermeneutical frame, finally neutralized by the non~ibhiprdyika and nitdrtha Sfitras.

v i i

Turning now to the question of the relation between dgons pa = abhiprdya and dgolisg~i, it appears from our sources that the concept ofdgohsg~2i is appreciably narrower than the ofdgons pa, but that the two terms nevertheless refer to the intention of the Buddha in a canonical utterance. That is, whereas

any Sfitra at all can properly be said to contain an intention (see §IV above), only such Sfitras in which the Buddha's ultimate intention is not directly expressed and communicated (dnos bstan) and the surface teaching of which


is destined by the Buddha to serve as a provisional (and perlocutionary)

propaedeutic device for the corresponding specific Vineyas may be said to

have the dgovis g~i being discussed here. And it is only this latter kind of

Sfitra that is termed dgons pa can = dbhiprdyika by most hermeneuticians,

even though it is true that all Sfitras, including also those that are non-

dbhiprdyika and nitdrtha, convey the Buddha's intention and have as their

motivation his purpose of helping living beings by his teaching. In other

words, while the terms dgons pa and dgons g]i have basically the same

meaning, the latter has a much more restricted scope since it is reserved for

a particular category of utterance within buddhavacana. It appears moreover that the non-literal (sgra ji b~in ma yin pa = na

yathdruta-) dbhiprdyika Sfitra differs significantly from the neydrtha one above

all in one case. This is that of the M~dhyamika who accepts the definitions

of the Aksayamatinirdekasfftra and Samddhirdjasfftra according to which the

difference between neydrtha and nitdrtha is stated to result from a difference

in content - that is, whether a Sfitra teaches ~ffnyatd or the equivalent

(in which case it is nitdrtha) or teaches something else (in which case it is

neydrtha) - and does not depend on whether the expression-level is explicit

and literal or not. 2s In other respects, and for philosopher-hermeneuticians

following other definitions of this difference, the categories ofdbhiprdyika and neydrtha seem to have largely converged in Sfitra hermeneutics at least;

and the difference in terminology appears mainly to reflect originally distinct

historical antecedents and exegetical traditions. Further research is required on

this point.

In the case of the four kinds of abhiprdya (dgohs pa) mentioned in the

Mahdydnasfttrdlamka-ra and related texts alongside the four abhisamdhis (ldem por clgohs pa) (see Section I above), however, the word abhiprdya has been used in a significantly narrower and more specific way that sets

it off from the wider and more general use where abhiprdya is an equivalent

of bhdva, dkaya, and artha 'meaning, purport ' . For these four kinds of

abhiprdya are located by the hermeneuticians only in certain Sfitra-passages

which are intentional (dbhiprdyika) in the technical sense identified above,

whereas in its wide sense the word abhiprdya denotes the intended meaning

of any and every Sfitra-text (see Section IV above). Whilst no dgons g~i is

specified by the Tibetan hermeneuticians in the case of the wide use of dgons pa = abhiprdya, a dgons g]i is identified by them in the case of the set of

four abhiprdyas listed in the Mahdydnasfftrdlam. kdra, etc. (It has at the same


time to be recalled that Asafiga has stated in his Mahdydnasam. graha that all

the Buddha's teaching (buddhavacana) - and not just that portion of it

which is regarded as neydrtha and dbhiprdyika in the technical sense - has

to be understood in terms of the four abhiprdyas and four abhisamdhis. See

Section V above.)

(With regard to the relation between the concept ofdbhiprdyika and that

of neydrtha, a possibly useful differentiation from the analytic point of

view might be to say that the latter is, in some cases at least, a more purely

semantic and content-oriented notion whilst the former is perhaps more readily understood in terms of pragmatics and speech-act theory.)

v i i i

It might seem attractive to approach the analysis of the Buddha's intention

in its form ofdgons g~i in dbhiprdyika and neydrtha Sfitras by identifying it

- as well as its direct expression (as abhiprdya = dgons pa in the wide sense

noted above) in non-dbhiprdyika and nitdrtha Sfitras - with the actual

kerygrna of the Buddha's word (buddhavacana), as opposed (rather in the

manner of Bultmannian demythologization) to the dbhiprdyika utterances

and neydrtha formulations to be found in buddhavacana. This would however seem to involve us in an oversimplification. That

part of the Buddhist canon that is dbhiprdyika and neydrtha is very clearly

not to be rationalized or interpreted away in the view of the Buddhist

hermeneuticians: interpretation in terms of a further, unexpressed meaning

which is resorted to by them in order to calculate a dgohsg~i and to elicit

the Buddha's final and definitive intention, or deep meaning, is indeed

quite different from just interpreting away the provisional surface meaning.

The dgons g~i is, then, a text-transcendent teleological goal or focus of the

Buddha's teaching, rather than the text-immanent meaning of an dbhiprdyika or neydrtha Sfitra. Its addressee - the specific and special Vineya of the Sfitra-passage in question - will be ultimately brought to an understanding

of the dgo~sg~i or 'intentional ground' - as well as of the direct expression

of the Buddha's abhiprdya found in the non~ibhiprdyika and nitdrtha S~tras - precisely through the mediation of the dbhiprdyika utterance and neydrtha formulation, which work with and through the specific trainee's conceptual fore-structure of understanding (Vorverst~indnis), i.e. his pre-suppositions (Voraussetzungen) and pre-judices (Vorurteile). (These pre-suppositions need


of course have nothing to do with the semantic notion of presupposition

dealt with above, any more than these pre-judices need have anything to do

with prejudice in the current sense.)

IX

In sum, the dgons g~i of our sources functions neither as a standard inferential

implicate nor as a semantic-linguistic implicate of an dbhiprdyika or neydrtha Sfitra-passage, of which it is rather the intentional (i.e. purportive and

teleological) foundat ion or ground. It thus occupies the place of a systemic

implicature and presupposition in a canonical whole - linguistic and also

pragmatic, and inclusive of non~bhiprdyika and nTtdrtha Sfitras too - of

which the dbhiprdyika and neydrtha Sfitras are but a part. (In the technical

language of Indian exegetical theory, moreover, the unexpressed intention

is semantically utsf~tra ' text- transcendent ' as opposed to s~trdrtha or text-

immanent.) And insofar as it is not directly expressed or conveyed within

an utterance or text by means of inferential or semantic implication, it is the

function of systematical hermeneutics to calculate and elicit it.

The term dgons g~i is not used in our sources in such a way that we may

simply translate it by the words unexpressed presupposition or implicature

or by suggested meaning (on the model ofdhvani and vya~jana-). And it thus

appears necessary to render it by the expression ' intentional foundat ion ' or

' intentional ground' (the term intentional being understood here as explained

in Section IV above).

It should be noted finally that in Modern Tibetan the word dgons g~i is

used in the sense of ' (undeclared) intention, idea, plan' . 26 It is thus both

related to and different from the nouns 'char g~i ' idea' and rtsis g~i 'p lan '

(as well as the verbal auxiliary rtsis ' intend, plan, expect ' , French 'compter ' )

where the connotat ion of undeclared is not present.

c/o lndological Seminar University of Hamburg D-2000 Hamburg 13, F.R. G.

NOTES

1 The Tibetan word dgons pa is an honorific and is used to translate Skt. abhipr~va when

322 D. S E Y F O R T R U E G G

the ' in tent ion ' of an honoured , recognized and authoritat ive speaker or author such as the Buddha is being referred to.Abhiprdya may be translated into Tibetan also by the (non-honorific) word bsam pa, which also renders bhdva 'meaning' , as well as dkaya 'proclivity, disposit ion' . For Skt. abhiprdya, cf. P~li adhippdya. 2 See F. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit dictionary s.v. dbhiprdyika '(specially, esoterically) intentional, intended'• Edgerton renders abhiprdya by ' in tent ion ' (and also, in some contexts , 'difference' , for which meaning compare Pali adhippdya). 3 In Le traitb du tathdgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub (Paris, 1973), the present writer has translated dgo~is g~i by ' fondat ion intentionnelle ' . For references see below, note 11. 4 Here ruta = sgra is opposed to artha = don as the letter is to sense or purport• 5 In the tradition of the Guhyasamd/a for example, the satkoti is included as one o f the seven alamkdras (rgyan bdun), a further set o f hermeneut ical categories. See Y. Matsunaga, Journal of lndian and Buddhist studies 11/2 (1963), pp. 4 7 0 - 7 6 ; and 12/2 (1964) p. 19 f.; E. Steinkellner in L. Ligeti (ed.), Proceedings o f the Csoma de K6r6s Memorial Symposium, (Budapest, 1978), p. 445 ff.; M. Broido, Journal o f the Tibet Society 2 (I 982), p. 18 f., and in E. Steinkellner et al. (ed.), Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy, Proceedings of the Csoma de K6r6s Symposium, (Vienna, 1983), p. 19 f., as well as the article cited below, note 10. 6 Sa pan mKhaspa (rnams) 'l"ugpa'isgo, Chapter ii, fol. 4 1 b - 4 2 a = p. 1 0 6 - 0 8 • 7 Cf. E. Lamotte , La critique d ' interpr6tat ion dans le bouddhisme, Annuaire de l'lnstitut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves 9 (M61anges Gr6goire, Brussels, 1949), pp. 3 4 1 - 6 1 ; D. Seyfort Ruegg, Thborie du tathdgatagarbha et du gotra (Paris, 1969), pp. 1 6 5 - 6 6 , and Traitb du tathdgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin ehen grub, p. 83 ff. a dgotis pa g~an btsal mi dgos par tshig don de ~id kyis saris rgyas kyi dgo~s pa dhos su 'phrod pa 'o. 9 A thesis on Chapter iii o f the mKhas 7ug has just been completed under my supervision by Dr David Jackson. See also L. van der Kuijp,JIABS 7 (1984), p. 4 7 - 4 8 • 10 Padma dkar po ( 1 5 2 7 - 1 5 9 2 ) also regards the s.a.tkoti as applicable to general exegesis in his dBu ma g~un lugs gsum gsal bar byed pa, hes don grub pa 'i ~iti rta, fol. 9 b - 10b. Instead of the ( 'Tantr ik ' ) term dgohs b~ad Padma dkar po uses dgohs pa can (gyi mdo) for his third category, and for his four th he uses dgotis pa can ma yin pa ('i mdo). Cf. M. Broido, JIP 12 (1984), pp. 2 5 - 2 6 . 11 Emptiness (kanyatd) is of course not the only dgons g~i possible for an dbhiprdyika SOtra. For other examples of dgotis g~i see for example Bu s ton 's bDe g~egs s~ih po gsal ba'i rgyan (mDzes rgyan), fol. 8 b - 9 a , 1 0 b - 1 l a, 12al, 15a5, 18b6, 24b3, 27a5, 32a4 and 37b3, translated in our Trait~ du tathdgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub.

When discussing the dbhiprdyika character of (at least one form of) the tathdgatagarbha doctrine in his sDom gsum rab dbye (fol. 9a), Sa skya Pandi ta considers the dgons g~i to be k~nyatd; see our Traitb du tathdgatagarbha.. . , p. 32. - For examples of dgotis g~i according to the Vijfianav~da tradition as found in rGyal sras Thogs med 's commen ta ry on the Mahdydnasfftrdla~kdra (fol. 132b f.), see M. Broido,JIP 12 (1984), pp. 24-25~ And for further examples ofdgohsg~i from other sources, see below, note 12. 12 See Bu ston, mDzes rgyan, fol. 12a ff. (and Le trait~ du tathdgatagarbha . . . . p. 90 ff.).

The triad of dgohs g~i, dgos pa and dfios la gnod byed is to be found earlier in Sa skya Pand.i ta 's sDom gsum tab dbye, fol. 9a (see Le traitb du tathdgatagarbha . . . . p. 32) and in his Thub pa'i dgohs pa rab tu gsal ba, fol. 54a. For a still earlier use of the term

P U R P O R T , I M P L I C A T U R E A N D P R E S U P P O S I T I O N 323

dgohs g~i see bSod nams rtse mo ( 1 1 4 2 - 8 2 ) , Byan chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la Tug pa'i 'grel pa, fol. 74a (the last reference I owe to Dr David Jackson). In these texts the dgo~is g~i is, respectively, ston pa aid (kgtnyata-), chos kyi sku 'i saris rgyas (dharmakdya- buddha) and kun rdzob par yod pa (existence of things on the relative, surface level of samvrti).

As for the third criterion, that of incompatibi l i ty with the primary meaning, in addit ion to the expression dnos la gnod byed we find in bSod hams rtse mo (loc. cit. ) dnos kyi don la gnod pa, which corresponds to Skt. mukhydrthabddha. Other equivalent expressions also to be found are sgra ji b~in pa la gnod byed and ~gras zin la gnod byed. On this criterion see our Thborie du tathdgatagarbha et du gotra, pp. 158, 2 2 0 - 2 1 , and Trait~ du tathdgatagarbha . . . . pp. 1 0 4 - 0 5 . 13 The significance in the present context of the dist inction being made by Dr Broido on p. 5 and also on p. 28 of his article is no t wholly clear to me. He illustrates his distinction, however, when he adds (p. 5): 'Borderline cases are possible, such as ~nyatd: is this - in its technical, madhyamaka use - a fact or a thing? '

One could answer this quest ion by observing that , if by ' th ing ' a bhdva is meant , then ~anyatd is not a thing, this having been made amply clear e.g. in N~g~rjuna's Mfdamadhyamakakdrikds as well as in many a Mah~y~nasfitra. The s tatus of kftnyatd as a dharma is on the other hand complicated. ,4kdka, (apratisamkhya-)nirodha and nirvdna = pratisamkhydnirodha are indeed all included in the Sarvfistiv~dins' list of 75 dharmas and in the Vijfi~navadins' list o f 100. 14 In his article cited above (note 5), p. 447, E. Steinkellner has described neydrtha as implicit meaning and nftdrtha as explicit meaning in the context of the Aks.ayamati- nirde~astitra and the Madhyamaka. However, that for this SOtra - and for the M~dhyamika who bases his definit ions of neydrtha and nitdrtha on it - the relation between these two terms has nothing at all to do with the opposi t ion implicit/explicit should be clear from the very fact that this S~tra states that a canonical text teaching kanyatd and non-substant ial i ty is nftdrtha whereas one that does not do so is neydrtha. In other words, the criterion here is the content of the teaching, and not the (explicit or implicit) mode o f expression of a teaching. For the Vijfi~nav~dins, and to a degree for the Yog~cara-M~dhyamikas, on the other hand the difference between neydrtha and n~tdrtha is indeed connected with the dist inction between non-literal and literal (yathdruta), and accordingly with the opposi t ion implicit/explicit.

For a consequence of this impor tan t difference between the pure M~dhyamikas and Bu ston, who apparently follows here the Yog~c~ra-M~dhyamika view, see our Le traitb du tathdgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub, pp. 5 7 - 5 8 . is See Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakogabhdsya iii.28ab and vi.3 (p. 333). In his Abhidhar- makokavydkhyd (i.20) Ya~omitra has glossed utstitra by utkrdntam, sf~trdt 'exceeding the Sfitra'.

In Abhidharmakokabhds.ya iii.28ab, the concept of utsatra - as opposed to s~trdrtha - appears in parallel with that of neydrtha - in contradist inct ion to the n~tdrtha (= vibhaktdrtha according to Ya~omitra) that conforms with the stitrdrtha, which excludes utsgtra interpretat ion. In the context o f utsfftra Vasubandhu has fur thermore ment ioned the isti (iii.28ab) - a term which, in grammatical exegesis, denotes a desideratum to be extracted from a SOtra-formulation by means of interpretat ion, as opposed to what is immediately realized through a Stitra in grammar (cf. prdpti/ga in contradist inct ion to is. t. ijfia ).

Now, in Indian exegetical theory , explanat ions and meanings that are utstitra are

324 D. S E Y F O R T R U E G G

normally considered to be unjustified and unacceptable; see for example Patafijali, Mahdbhdsya, Paspa~ihnika p. 12.27, and M~gha, Sikupdlavadha ii.112 (with F. Kielhorn, JRAS 1908, pp. 501-2 ) . The term uts~tra has been exp!ained as sutrad udgatam, i.e. satrdndn2dha 'not found in/based on the Sfitra'; see Sivar~mendra Sarasvati, Mahdbhdsyasiddhdntaratnaprakdka (ed. M. S. Narasimhacharya, Pondicherry, 1973), p. 106. According to a maxim cited by N~ge~a in his Uddyota on the above passage from the Mahdbhdsya concerning utsatra explanation, what is found in a Vrtti or V~rttika is [i.e. must be considered] present in the basic S~tras themselves (sf~tresv eva hi tat sarvam yad vrttau yac ca vdrttike). - For some observations on utsfftravydkhydna, see P. V. Kane, History o f Sanskrit poetics (Delhi, 1961 ), p. 170ff. (Compare further P. Hacker, Notes on the Mand.fikyopanisad and Sariakara's Agama~istravivarana, in lndia maior [Festschrift J. Gonda, Leiden, 1972], p. 115, who however uses the term utsatra in a non-condemnatory fashion).

The problem posed by the legitimacy or otherwise of utsatra explanation appears to be reflected in the Tibetan terminology as attested in the Tibetan translation of Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakokabh(sya, where we find both the evaluative and condemnatory mdo dan 'gal ba 'contrary to the Sfitra' and the more neutral renderings redo las "das pa and redo las thai ba 'exceeding the Sfltra'. lsa It is important to note that in Tantrik texts on the other hand the dbhiprdyika and non~bhiprdyika - and the neydrtha and n~tdrtha - may both be fully intended and be in full force together. That is, whereas in systematical SOtra-hermeneutics a given Sfltra-passage can (within a single hermeneutical system)finally and definitively bear only one value (the non4bhiprdyika and nftdrtha one), in Tantrik hermeneutics a single passage can be meant to convey both the intentional and non-intentional - neydrtha and nitdrtha - values. 16 As an example ofparindmandbhisamdhi theMahdydnasatrdlam, kdrabhds.ya and the authorities following it quote the verse

asdre sdramatayo viparydse ca susthitdh / klekena ca susam, klis.t.d labhante bodhim uttamdm / /

See Thkorie du tathdgatagarbha et du gotra, pp. 375 -6 . According to certain authorities, moreover, we have a further example of this type ofabhisarn, dhi in the verse

mdtaram, pitaram hatvd rdjdnam dvau ca krotriyau / rdstram sdnucaram hatvd ~uddha ity ucyate narah / /

See Le trait~ du tathdgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub, pp. 83 -84 . Both of these verses, together with a third one, are cited in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (ed. P. Pradhan, Santiniketan, 1950), p. 107. 17 The intended meaning in question is closely related to another concept in Indian semantics, that o f tdtparya 'purport ' . According to some writers on the subject, tdtparya is quite simply identical with suggestive force (vyaajand, dhavani), whereas according to other authorities it represents an additional force (vrtti) of words. This point need not detain us here. la See Ya§omitra, Abhidharmakokavydkhyd vi.3, who glosses dbhiprdyika by abhiprdye bhavah. 19 See Vasubandhu, Abhidharrnakoka vi.3 with Ya~omitra's Fydkhyd. Ya~omitra glosses Idks.anika by laksan, e bhavah. . 2o See Ya§omitra, Abhidharrnako~avydkhyd iii.28ah.

P U R P O R T , I M P L I C A T U R E AND P R E S U P P O S I T I O N 325

21 That Grice's Maxims are not wholly applicable in the analysis of utterances whose function is something other than that of augmenting the addressee's store of propositional knowledge has indeed been noted by J. Lyons, Semantics, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1977), p. 593.

For recent discussions of implicature, apart from Lyon's book just cited see S. C. Levinson, Pragmatics (Cambridge, 1983), and G. N. Leech, Principles ofpragmatics (London, 1983). 22 See Levinson, op. cit., p. 109 ff. 23 See E. Betti, Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften 2 (Tiibingen, 1972), p. 14. Cf. J. Bleicher, Contemporary hermeneutics (London, 1980), p. 58. 24 On the relation between implicature and presupposition and connected problems, see e.g.J. Lyons, op. cit., pp. 592-606; S. C. Levinson, op. cit., pp. 9 -10 , 25 -27, 100 ff. 2s See above, note 14. 26 The meaning ' intention' is duly registered in M. Goldstein, Tibetan-English dictionary of Modern Tibetan (Kathmandu, 1975). Strangely it is not listed under ' intent ' / ' intention' in M. Goldstein and N. Narkyid, English-Tibetan dictionary of Modern Tibetan (Berkeley, 1984).

purport, implicature and presupposition: sanskrit abhiprāya and tibetan dgo s pa/dgo s gži as...

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