Union Representation and Organization in European Contact Centres: Experiences and Challenges

Report for UNI Europa ICTS

Professor Phil TaylorDepartment of Human Resource Management

University of StrathclydeGlasgow, G1 1XU

philip.taylor@strath.ac.uk

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1. Introduction – From Call Centre to Contact Centre

The call centre as a distinctive organisation transformed interactive customer service work in developed economies. More recently, call/contact centres have established a significant presence in developing economies, providing voice services for international clients (Messenger and Ghosheh, 2010) and domestic customers. The term ‘contact centre’ is preferred, as it has become the industry standard and accurately reflects the evolution from pure ‘voice’ operations to multi-channel customer interaction. Many millions are now employed globally; more than 4 million in the United States US), 1 million in the United Kingdom (UK), the two largest developed country markets, and 876,000 in the Philippines and 439,000 in India, the two largest offshoring destinations i.

Fundamentally, the call centre is defined by the integration of new telephone and computer technologies (Taylor and Bain, 1999), especially the Automatic Call Distribution system, which routes calls to waiting agents within and/or between centres. The call/contact centre’s technological ‘architecture’ has major implications for structuring and pacing work, for increasing labour productivity and for monitoring and measuring performance.

Contact centres are ‘flat’ organisations, meaning that a large majority of employees are call-handlers and promotion opportunities are limited. Females comprise 60-70 per cent of the European workforce, overall, but proportionately far fewer women than men achieve promoted positions (Scholarios and Taylor, 2011).

Despite differences in type, mass production centres and standardised workflows dominate (Lloyd and Payne, 2009). The lean, low-cost, high control model is most common globally (Holman et al, 2007). Work combines a ‘Taylorist’ legacy of fragmented tasks with the emotional labour required for customer servicing. Micro-management involves intense quantitative measurement of Call Handling Times (CHTs), waiting times, ready/on-call times, wrap times and call volumes (Bain et al, 2002) and qualitative evaluation of performance (empathy, manner, customer satisfaction). Consequently, work is widely experienced as intense, pressurised and stressful. Occupational health studies (Baldry et al, 2007; de Cia et al, 2012), show ill-health arising from musculo-skeletal and psycho-social problems and work overload.

The 2008 crisis and recession have had lasting consequences. Evidence shows a step-change in lean working and work intensification. The watchwords are now ‘doing more with less’. Where call volumes are unchanged, fewer agents are used. Where call volumes have increased, similar or fewer agents are engaged. Lean is accompanied by forms of Performance Management. Workers are ranked, typically, by five categories (ranging from ‘excellent’ to ‘underperformer’), based on differentiation between individuals and fixed numbers forced in each category through a Bell curve distribution. Such practices have been spread by McKinsey and other consultants. Being designated an ‘underperformer’ triggers a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) and often leads to corrective action and exit. In British Telecom (BT), punitive PM is the most problematic employment relations issue (CWU, 2011; 2013), causing widespread stress and anxiety. The CGT believed that a number of the infamous suicides at France Telecom (2009-10) were associated with restructuring and intense PM at contact centres (Taylor, 2013).

In the context of these major challenges, it is important to understand the influence and effectiveness of trade unions as they seek to defend and improve their member and workers’ conditions. This report concentrates on three principal topics or questions relating to contact centres in ICTS:

In what areas do unions have strengths and weaknesses in the extent of collective agreements? What are the patterns of union density in ICTS across diverse European countries?

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What factors encourage contact centre workers to join unions in both non-union and unionised environments? Conversely, what factors might dissuade workers from joining unions?

To provide evidence from case studies where workers have successfully organised.

The study is based on several sources: academic research in management and labour studies; reports by professional bodies and consultants; government statistics; and trade union documentation, which corrects the tendency in academic literature to view workers’ experiences through a management prismii. This report draws on the author’s research over two decades, much based on engagement industry stakeholders. Finally, a survey was conducted with unions affiliated to UNI Europa. Twenty-eight surveys were distributed and 16 returned, from Belgium [2], Finland, France [2], Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Spain and the UK.

2. Characteristics of European Contact Centres in ICTS

Providing exact employment data for European countries is challenging because, even when governments classify occupations, the sector often defies quantification. National statistical codes reveal numbers only for those employed by outsourcers and understate those employed in-house. However, informed estimates are possible.

After the UK, the largest workforces are Germany (520,000), Sweden (262,500), France (270,000), Italy (200,000), and Spain (100,000). Other estimates are Poland (80,000), Denmark (70,000) , Belgium (60,000), Finland (15,000), Lithuania (2,000), Latvia (1,200) and Estonia (600). The UK as the most notable LME (Liberal Market Economy) has been the most significant contact centre geography in Europe. Beyond the UK, variation exists. Germany established its sector earlier than France, but both, in common with western and southern EU states, came to have large, relatively mature sectors. Sweden is the most prominent Nordic, being an early mover and regional hub. Most Eastern Europe states have sectors that face two ways, to domestic and international customers, Poland being a strong example. The Baltic States have limited activity.

The European sector is far larger than a decade ago, but expansion has not happened at an equal pace. Contrasting tempos of growth have occurred between countries. Expansion was interrupted by economic crisis, although modest growth resumed after 2010. Against that, offshoring (UK to India or the Philippines, France to Maghreb, Spain to Latin America, to Eastern Europe), has affected employment levels, albeit differentially. The outcome is a finely grained pattern of uneven development. In sum, contact centres are a significant and (still) growing activity which, from the perspective of trade unions presents opportunities and challenges for representing and organising very many workers.

Financial services and telecoms have the largest share of contact centre activity as their processes lend themselves to the digitilisation of mass consumer markets. The relative share of these industries differs, but telecoms in every case accounts for a significant proportion of employment; e.g. France (60 per cent), Finland, (33 per cent), Germany (30 per cent). Consultants predict that a sizable proportion of new contact centre jobs will come from the telecoms/IT verticals (Contact Babel, 2013), much of it in outsourcing, where a marked tendency to subcontracting already exists. For Italy, estimates are that 70 per cent of work is outsourced. In Germany a majority of centres are ‘independent’. In Sweden most outsourcing is in ICTS. The acquisitions by Capita and Serco of O2 and Carphone Warehouse in the UK confirm the trend. The attraction of outsourcing lies in its promise to reduce overall costs (Kinnie et al, 2008), through lower labour costs (reduced salaries, contractual flexibilities, optimised labour

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utilisation). The result has been the expansion of third-party specialists (e.g. Teleperformance), and increased delivery by generalist providers, such as IBM, and Indian BPO companies (e.g. FirstSource).

It is beyond the scope of this report to provide a comprehensive analysis of outsourcing and offshoring, but several observations can be made. First, domestic outsourcing is highly developed. Evidence suggests that, in the context of cost-cutting and intense competition, it will increase as the telecoms market develops ‘quad play’ provision (mobile, broadband, cable, land line). Second, pay levels are generally lower in outsourcing, by 10 per cent or more. Outsourcing is associated with inferior Terms and Conditions. Third, several respondents reported how contractual insecurity, and the threat of client exit due to outsourcing or offshoring was used to ‘frighten’ workers into moderating demands. The ver.di correspondent commented on how employers induce fear amongst employees that they cannot compete with employees in low paid countries. Fourth, the scale of offshoring and its effects on employment and unions varies across Europe. Perhaps, 20 per cent of telecoms’ voice services has been relocated from Italy and France, and even more from Spain. Other unions, such as those in Belgium, report little impact. The CWU reported outsourcing as more of a threat than offshoring.

In sum, offshoring has exerted pressure on wages and conditions (Bain and Taylor, 2008), affecting unions’ representational ability in some countries because of relocation fears. Despite weaknesses, there is experience that unions can draw on from initiatives taken to combat offshoring and its effects on employment (Box 3) and conditions (Taylor and Bain, 2008), and to internationalise workers interests.

3. Extent of Collective Agreements, Union Recognition and Union Density

3.1 By Country

Variation exists between countries in terms of the extent of collective agreements and union recognition. It is helpful to use the Varieties of Capitalism categorisation (Hall and Soskice, 2001), which segments LMEs (Liberal Market Economics), such as the UK, from the CMEs (Coordinated Market Economies) of mainland Europe. It might also be helpful to distinguish the Nordics from the CMEs overall.

LMEs

The LMEs (UK and Ireland) are considered first. The UK reveals a trend common to many countries, namely the residual strength of collectivism and union density in the ‘incumbent’, former nationalised companies. BT has a national collective agreement (CA) with the CWU which encompasses contact centres. Union density is estimated at 80 per cent. The only other firm with a CA is O 2, hitherto owned by Telefonica, but recently acquired by Capita. Density is estimated at around 70 per cent. O 2 provides an example of successful union organising (Box 1), which followed the company establishing a non-union facility in Glasgow. The contrast between BT and O2 and companies without CAs, is evidenced by the latters’ densities - Virgin (10-15 per cent), Talk Talk (10 per cent), EE (10 per cent), CarPhone Warehouse (<10 per cent), Vodafone (<10 per cent), Three (< 5 per cent) and Sky (<5 per cent) – and by those of outsourcers which deliver services - Web Help (<5 per cent), Teleperformance (<5 per cent).

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Box 1 - Case Study - O2 Contact Centre (Glasgow)Discussion with Communication Workers Union (CWU) Reps, 14 September 2012

The O2 centre in Glasgow was set up as a non-union site. Bottom-up organising grew the union. By 2013, when operations transferred to Capita, robust union organisation had been established.

BM (Chair) ‘We now have over 700 members out of a workforce of 1,200 in Glasgow. When the facility opened (2005) it was non-union. With hard work we built the union from no members to perhaps 720. The union was started when staff were being sacked willy-nilly by management. In the early days, meetings would be in the car park and attended by small numbers. Membership built up over time. When we started we did not have a clue so we contacted CWU for advice. Their initial thought was that the clerical branch in Manchester would assist us. However, the distance was too great for hands-on support. After a merger of Scottish branches, we received support from the local clerical branch. Previously we had huge [turnover] which made it hard to keep members, but when it slowed it became easier to hold onto people’.

‘People join because we have a long history of saving jobs. Management were exiting people on a whim, but we successfully defended people so, initially, people joined as a form of insurance. The thinking was, ‘The union will get us out of the shit’. We have a good record of defending people in disciplinaries. We had three last week that could have led to exits – two ended with Final Warnings and one with no action. From the perspective of the union’s reputation, you are only as good as your last result. Over the last 18 months, recruitment has been good. We have an agreement now that lets us speak to each new intake for 45 minutes. Out of each intake of 16-17, 75% join the union.

D. (Rep) ‘We have improved members’ communications. In a recent strike ballot we used Facebook to good effect. We got a 30% return whereas in the previous ballot over pay, 2 years ago, we got a 5% return. The business walked right over the top of us, but they have not been able to this time. We made an important point as far as the members were concerned. If they were apathetic and did not vote they wouldn’t get a pay rise. One problem we faced is KPIs over which we have no control. The KPI that caused us problems was Fizzback [customer feedback]. If you failed it you got no bonus. We challenged management and won respect through supporting individuals in cases of unfairness’.

In Ireland, union strength in the ‘incumbent’ is also evident. In Eircom density is estimated at 90 per cent. At Vodafone, density is around 60 per cent and at O2 30 per cent.

CMEs

Data was provided for six CME countries (France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium). Variations exist. The extent of collective coverage in telecoms is either 100 per cent (France or Italy) or almost 100 per cent (Spain and Belgium). According to the CGT (2010) half of French centres have a union, with the highest percentage in telecoms (73 per cent), which reflects industry agreements. Union presence is more limited in outsourcing. CAs are negotiated for the sector and provide minimum terms and conditions, and reflect the legal-institutional, employment relations framework where such agreements are mandatory. They do not determine specific Terms and Conditions at company or workplace levels, where variation can exist. Elsewhere, CAs are more limited. Ver.di indicated that 10-15 per cent of outsourced centres were covered by CAs, a figure that does exclude in-house centres.

Contrasts exist between CA coverage and union density, although strict comparisons are difficult as some respondents give figures for outsourced centres, while others give overall figures. In Italy, SGIL

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report density as 40 per cent, and in France the CFDT gives it as 10 per cent. In Belgium, unions provide contrasting figures; LBC-NKV state 30-35 per cent, and CNE 60 per cent. In the Netherlands, the FNV is attempting to negotiate a new Collective Labour Agreement (CLA) following expiration in May 2102. FNV estimates density at 10 per cent, but excludes the higher in-house densities. Similarly, the figure given by ver.di for Germany (12 per cent) was for outsourced centres. In Spain the CCOO reported density at below 10 per cent. Drilling down to country level produces a finely-grained difference between CMEs (Holman, 2013) and a further distinction with the Nordics.

Nordics

In Norway, 50 per cent coverage by collective agreements was reported, and in Finland 100 per cent. A common finding is that overall contact centre union density is lower than national averages of 40 per cent. However, telecoms densities are much higher, at 75 per cent and 60-70 per cent respectively Overall, the Nordics have the highest levels of union organisation and collective representation. In Sweden, all employees were union members in a quarter of companies, with mean density at 78 per cent. Outsourced centres were lower at 63 per cent (Strandberg and Sandberg, 2007).

Eastern Europe and Baltic States

In Romania, in common with much of Eastern Europe, CAs are scarce. However, FSCOM does have a CA with Romtelecom, ‘available’ for all including contact centre workers. Members are active here, but not in Orange, Vodafone, IMB, Oracle, RCS and UPC, because of fear of losing their jobs. Overall density is less that 10 per cent, most members of the Free Union of Telecommunications. In Latvia, two CAs were reported between LSAB and Lattelcom enterprises. Density is reported at 28 per cent.

3.2 By Company

Companies where unions are strongest

Respondents provided instructive feedback on companies where unions have notable strengths and weaknesses. This is not a complete audit, but the data enables general themes to emerge. In the UK, union strength is intimately connected to collective agreements at BT and O2, both having state-owned legacies. Even though O2 resulted from privatisation, it was spun out of the incumbent BT. In Ireland, the CWU reports union strength at Eirocom through full collective bargaining and a CA at Vodafone.

In France, the CFDT identified Orange, SFR, Bouyges, Teleperfornace, Acticall, B2S, CLA, Sitel and Coriolis as companies where unions were strongest. In Italy, Telecom Italia and Wind were identified, while in Spain the CCOM respondent included global third-party outsourcers Teleperformance, Sitel and Transcom as sites of union strength. In Belgium, respondents indicated that union strength was found in the bigger businesses, like SNT, NALLO, In2com (ex-SITEL) and Belgacom, the former incumbent. The respondent for LBC-NVK added IPG, Stefafannini, Unamic, Teleperformance and Telenet. For the outsourced sector of the Netherlands, Teleperformance, Unamic/HCN, Sitel, SNT, Centalia, Call-IT, essentially the bigger companies, were identified as stronger. In Germany, Deutsche Telekom was reported as having the strongest union base.

In Norway, the most unionate companies are Telenor AS, Every AS, Net Com, Transcom, Nextcall, NextGenTel, a mix of ex-incumbent and new entrants. For Finland, Elisa, Finnet Group and TeliaSonera were cited by the union Pro as the strongest companies. The limited responses from Eastern Europe indicate union strength at national telecom providers, Romatelecom (part of Deutsche Telekom) in Romania, and Lattelcom in Latvia.

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Companies where unions are weakest

In the UK, beyond BT and O2 no recognition exists. A national organiser reported,

Businesses will not come out and say that they are anti-union, individuals are free to join a union and so on, but the cultures are not at all encouraging. In the case of Virgin it was explicitly anti-union when they de-recognised the CWU in 2012. (D. Rafferty)

In Ireland, the picture has some similarities. Beyond the residual strength of Eircom and Vodafone, weaknesses exist. O2 has disregarded its global collective bargaining agreement and taken advantage of the Irish system to deny collective bargaining. The CWU respondent adds;

…it is safe to assume that nearly all other call centres and companies in the telecoms sector are anti-union. [There are] swathes of entirely private anti-union contact centres. opening up all over the country, with no legal right to Collective Bargaining.

Across the CMEs, union weakness is reported in UES Centre de Contacts (France), H3G and I Care (Italy) and Stream, Customerworks, Eulen and Integrated Call Services and others (Spain). The union respondents for Belgium and the Netherlands make similar important observations regarding the relationship between size and union weakness. In Belgium, employment law requires companies with over 50 employees to comply with CAs and to have Elections Social. Below that level no obligation exists, facilitating small, anti-union outfits. In the Netherlands, similarly there are many small anti-union ‘cowboys’. Collective agreements are less pronounced among new telecom and mobile providers and, especially, outsourcers. In Finland, DNA was cited as a notable anti-union company. The limited data for Eastern Europe indicates union weakness beyond the core firms. FSCOM lists anti-union companies in Romania as Cosmote, Orange, Vodafon, IBM, RCS&RDS and Oracle. In Latvia, companies other than Lattlecom are anti-union or sources of union weakness.

3.3 Synthesis

Provisional themes emerge. First, trade unions have a residual strength in the incumbent, ex-state companies where union agreements and social dialogue have been readily transitioned to contact centres. Second, the influence of the national regulatory regime is discernible, for some companies that appear as sources of union weakness, or even anti-union in one national context, are cited as sources of union strength in another. Third, transnational contact centre providers (e.g. Teleperformance, Transcom) and new mobile firms show opportunism, adjusting practices as employment regimes require, despite a preference for union avoidance. Fourth, a relationshop exists between ‘unionateness’ and size, with large numbers of small anti-union companies, ‘cowboys’, to use the FNV’s term.

4. Union Strengths and Organising Successes

4.1 Collective agreements and union organising

The question was not wholly relevant respondents in some countries because national regulatory frameworks prescribe binding agreements, overcoming the distinction between unionised and non-unionised workplaces. The CFDT stated, ‘In France as long as collective union agreements exist everybody has to apply them whether unionised or not. A collective agreement makes law’ . However, even in favourable employment regimes union activity is imperative. CAs establish minimum pay and conditions, which can be improved by enterprise or workplace agreements, where workplace unions are

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the key lever. In Belgium and Spain enterprise agreements are firmed up by workplace elections when the union is able to embeds CAs. Box 2 presents insight into Spain where the CCOO commits to bottom-up organisation.

Box 2 - Case Study – Spain, Organising in AdversityPepe Utrilla - CCOO – Federacion de sevices Financieros y Administrativos)

Pepe Utrilla of CCOO reported on the problems facing unions in Spain, given the scale of the crisis and the impact of labour reforms. In adversity, the union is developing approaches and adopting techniques that can strengthen effectiveness. Reps are key to in building workplace organisation.

‘The unions can become stronger at winning elections in contact centres after sectoral agreements are signed…wherever there is a large union presence in the workplaces it still guarantees observance of the agreement. [The most successful method] is the constant presence of workplace reps, solving problems on a day-to-day basis, on scheduling, worker errors, and getting results by implementing CAs. It is important to adapt the message of the union to the workforce, to communicate directly and collectively what the union is trying to do. This communication must be face-to-face’.

In Finland the union PRO has mounted several recruitment campaigns with the aim of securing union representation. The outcome is mixed with some campaigns successful, others not. Research on Germany has examined working conditions and collective voice under the challenging conditions of shareholder value, the flight of employers from industry-level associations, market liberalisation and cost cutting (Doellgast, 2010). While ver.di has been unable to negotiate sectoral agreements for subsidiaries of its core firms, participation rights and workplace strength provide ‘a crucial source of countervailing power in negotiations over work re-organisation’ (ibid: 325).

In the UK, instances exist of the successful organising of non-union workplaces and companies in telecoms. O2 (see Box1) is an excellent recent example. In Ireland when the incumbent sold its mobile operation (Eircell) to Vodafone, the CWU was able to gain a collective agreement.

4.2 Issues and concerns prompting workers to join unions

Several themes emerge from the plentiful evidence provided by unions of the concerns that might prompt workers to join. First, there is what can be termed the traditional bargaining agenda. Several respondents emphasised that their ability to act collectively and to improve salaries and conditions, demonstrated their value and attracted members. Workers explicitly acknowledged the importance of union participation in bargaining to counter the low pay that is widespread in the sector. Second, the ‘front line’ contact centre work issues prompt workers to join. Several respondents cited the monotony and repetition of work, and the intensity, pressure and stress generated by targets. These are the constant refrains of contact centre workers, wherever they are located, and for which they seek redress.

Third, and relatedly, several unions emphasised the importance of performance management issues and the raising of targets, and the injustice and insecurity that follow from ratings and the Bell curve. The essential point was made that the union is attractive because, in the words of the Spanish respondent, ‘People on the workfloor know that the union will defend them’. This view of the union as protector amounts to much more than a servicing function for, as in O2, defensive actions can play a major role in building the union’s reputation and growing its base. Fourth, unions report that concerns over employment security, the ‘precarity’ of contracts (fixed term, temporary) and flexibilities over working time were important. Unions in some countries, more than others, also raised the threats of outsourcing

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and offshoring. One Belgian union stressed effects for workers of the continuous comparisons employers make with outsourcers, which are used to threaten the loss of jobs. The external threat of competition from offshoring to Chile, Columbia or Mexico, was causing ‘instability’ amongst agents in Spain, prompting some to seek union protection.

4.3 Successful union techniques, methods and campaigns

As Performance Management has emerged as a major issue facing members, unions have taken steps to counter the threat. The CWU (Ireland) gave an example of challenging this ‘primary tool in controlling and intimidating staff in centres’. It produced a survival guide and provides advice for members through branches or directly from head office. Participating in UNI’s action on PM, the CWU held an all-day session of members, which led to its ‘own call centre charter’.

Box 3 – Case Study – Campaigning Against OutsourcingFionnuala Ni’ Bhrogain - CWU Ireland

‘When Vodafone decided to outsource their Dundalk call centre there were several issues with the way it was handled. As a response, the CWU launched a high profile campaign. One publicity tool centred on the fact that Vodafone were the sponsors of the Dublin football team and activists came out in force on match day to hand out stickers for jerseys urging Vodafone to not export Irish jobs. Public embarrassment brought the company to the table and a better deal was struck. The campaign involved making workers themselves the centre of the action and having them take the lead promoting the issues both in the media and with colleagues. The density in the centre leaped to 99%’.

The CNE in Belgium has developed enterprise level ‘rules for limiting and controlling monitoring and preventing sanctions and punishments’, counter controls that might be aspirational, but should nevertheless be articulated. Unions have striven to minimise PRP and maximise collective pay awards. In Germany, Works Councils may be involved in target setting, presenting opportunities for ver.di to negotiate good practice. The Belgian CNE identified, as did the CCOO in Spain, that personal contact at the workplace is most effective for union building. These unions place great importance on the role of shop stewards for educating workers and leading campaigns, such as UNI’s call centre action month. The FNV reported successful visits to contact centres, organising in preparation for a new CLA. A national organiser of the UK’s CWU stressed the need to make union messages acceptable to young people. Techniques such as leafleting were less successful than the use of social media or facebook. However, for achieving recognition ‘the most important thing was to find and train the right internal workplace leaders’, who can take membership beyond the 5-10 per cent to the 25-30 per cent level’, establishing the critical mass necessary in order to gain recognition.

While the national-institutional framework is central for establishing collective agreements, workplace trade unionism is important for improving conditions, as Doellgast (2008) has shown for Germany. Her argument resonates with Taylor and Bain (2001), who stressed the significance of workplace unionism. When unions mobilise around the ‘front line’ work issues (targets, breaks, pressure) they can challenge management’s ‘frontiers of control’

5. Union De-recognition and Weaknesses

Unions provided examples of de-recognition. Negotia in Norway cited the case of Norstat AS and the CWU in the UK that of Virgin. The wider regulatory employment framework clearly has an influence. In Spain recent labour reforms have made it more difficult to establish legal collective agreements.

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The ver.di respondent spoke for several others when he made the point that employer anti-unionism deters recruitment, instilling fears in employees that they can be easily substituted. Some employees, it was perceived, saw being identified as a trade unionist as damaging to career. Problems also arose from the increasing demands from employers for flexibility. Some factors encouraging some workers to join unions might at the same time act as deterrent. The Irish CWU reported that ‘the vulnerability caused by insecure contracts are also a very good reason for someone to not join a union!’. ‘Fear of dismissal’, ‘being singled out’ and ‘precarious employment’ were cited. While performance management’s unfairness might lead some to union protection, ‘on the job penalties’ might discourage joining. Outsourcing could heighten workers’ need for collective response, or increase their vulnerability.

Respondents reported that the composition of the workforce was not always conducive. Students and peripatetic young people were not the best for union building. The Latvian respondent thought that the ‘fresh blood’ did not know much about unions, a perception shared by others. Yet, it was conceded, many young workers have ‘a personal interest in the same things as everyone else, decent salaries, transparency, jobs without being mobbed [harassment]’, factors that play to union strengths.

Others, more prosaically, reported that the cost of subscriptions was off-putting. As the CWU (UK) organiser put it, ‘They are low paid. If they are having to dim the lights and turn down the fires, then union subs come low on their list of priorities’. Physical and organisational obstacles often made recruitment difficult. Contact centres might be in awkward locations, perhaps on private industrial estates, where organisers encounter ‘low level harassment’. Complex shift timings, dispersed residential patterns and travel to work arrangements, combined with the inability to hold meetings on company premises, compound the challenges unions face in organising non-union workplaces.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

This study confirms the importance of contact centre employment in ICTS in Europe and as a source of union membership. The crisis of 2008 and recession have generally led to lean working, cost efficiencies and tougher Performance Management. In this challenging context, the first questions aimed at identifying the strengths and weaknesses of unions in collective agreements and membership densities, were posed. Unions generally have strengths in the incumbent, ex-state companies where agreements were readily transitioned to contact centres. Differences result from the national regulatory regime between LMEs, CMEs and the so-called Nordics. The emergence of large outsourcers is a significant development. They favour union avoidance, despite tactical adaption to the dominant national employment regimes. There remain numbers of small anti-union companies termed ‘cowboys’. In answer to the second question concerning the areas of success, unions have recruited where they have demonstrated their ability to act collectively to improve terms and conditions. Intervention over ‘front line’ issues of work prompts joining, as does defending workers over performance management and disciplinary measures. Unions report workers joining for security when on ‘precarious’ contracts or perhaps threatened with job loss by offshoring or outsourcing. Workplace organisation is vital, particularly the role of representatives, shop stewards and local leaders, who can challenge management’s ‘frontiers of control’. Conversely, employer anti-unionism is seen to deter recruitment as does the precariousness of employment contracts, which can enhance vulnerability. Other factors inhibiting recruitment were cited, including high attrition, related to large numbers of student or young workers, union subscriptions and logistical and access problems at target sites. Three focused case studies from the UK (O2), Ireland (Vodafone) and Spain provide insight into successful organisation.

The following recommendations are not exhaustive, nor prescriptive, but indicate ways that UNI Europa and its telecom affiliates may strengthen recruitment and organising activities. Of course, there is no ‘silver bullet’ that can overcome the deficit in union influence vis-à-vis employers and governments in a period of austerity, recession and crisis. These recommendations recognise that UNI and constituent unions are

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engaged in activities that are appropriate for representing members and recruiting and organising non-members. They are, thus, complementary to already existing agendas.

The first recommendation is that unions should establish and/or extend union organisation amongst major outsourcers. This priority stems from the growing role of outsourcers, particularly specialist ‘voice’ providers, which represent a cost-cutting solution, are more weakly organised and in which employees, generally, have lower pay and inferior ‘flexible’ conditions. Initiatives at European, national-sectoral, enterprise and workplace levels should be informed by the experience of what has and what has not worked for unions.

The second recommendation concerns explicit union opposition to emergent forms of Performance Management (PM). New forms of PM, based on the practices of differentiation between worker ratings and forced distribution (the Bell curve) have intensified labour and hugely increased workers’ insecurity, contributing stress, depression and anxiety. This recommendation includes the development of charters and codes of practice on PM, based on surveys and the involvement of members that can generate organising materials.

A third recommendation is that unions nationally see workplace-based unionism, structured around traditional bargaining agendas, but highly attuned to the lived experiences of ‘front line’ contact centre workers, as an organising imperative. The presence and activity of reps, shop stewards or delegates are more than important than ever, vital for ensuring employer adherence to, or ‘uplifting’, nationally negotiated CAs and for creating bridgeheads in non-union workplaces.

A fourth recommendation is that unions make the bargaining case for greater recognition of the skills and for higher remuneration and reward in the context of the evolution of contact centre work. Some processes are becoming standardised and web-based, such as billing, but more complex products are growing. The industry predicts that calls will become longer and more complex and a greater emphasis is placed on enlarged ‘skill sets’, such as emotional intelligence, empathy and cross selling. Agents’ skills may be a defining element in firms’ competitive strategies.

A fifth recommendation concerns the importance of continuing campaigns against insecure contracts, including temporary employment, fixed-term and newer forms of precarity, such as ‘zero hours’ contracts.

A sixth recommendation urges renewed strategies and tactics to combat the negative effects of offshoring, given the reported vulnerability of workers in certain European states, including Spain, France and Italy.

References

Bain, P. and Taylor, P. (2008) ‘No passage to India? Initial responses of UK trade unions to call centre offshoring’, Industrial Relations Journal, 39.1, 5-23

Bain, P., Watson, A., Mulvey, G., Taylor, P. and Gall, G. (2002) ‘Taylorism, targets and the pursuit of quantity and quality by call centre management’, New Technology, Work and Employment, 17.3: 170-185

Baldry, C., Taylor, P. and Bain, P. (2007) “’Bear with me”: the problem of health and well-being in contact centres’, in G. Wood and P. James (eds) Institutions, Production and Working Life, Oxford: OUP, 235-254

Contact Babel (2013) UK Contact Centres in 2013: The State of the Industry, Newcastle: Contact Babel

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CGT (2010) The Call Centres – Evaluation of our Knowledge of the Sector, Paris: Confederation Generale Travailleurs

CWU (2011) ‘Performance management’, The Voice, August-September, p.7-9, Wimbledon: CWU

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i See Taylor (2014) for robust estimates of employment levels for 25 countries.ii In the Global Call Centre Project (Holman et al, 2007) data on union voice and worker experiences is provided by managerial respondents.