puppetmasters: elections as instruments of military rule

PUPPETMASTERSE L E C T I O N S A S I N S T R U M E N T S O F M I L I T A R Y R U L E

AMSTERDAM & PEROFF LLP

T H A I L A N D 2 0 1 1 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N R E P O R T S E R I E S , N O . 1

One year ago, the Royal Thai Government massacred

ninety-one people to avoid an early election it feared it

might lose. Finally, the general elections for which dozens

of Red Shirts gave their lives are on track to take place

in June or July 2011. While it is hoped that the elections

will be free of outright fraud and ballot stuffing, the com-

petitiveness and fairness of the process are being under-

mined in many other ways.

The upcoming elections will take place in a context of in-

timidation and repression, coupled with the continuing

efforts by most of the institutions of the Thai state to

secure a victory for the Democrat Party. Aside from com-

peting against a hobbled opposition under rules designed

to artificially boost its seat share, the Democrat Party will

once again avail itself of the assistance of the military, the

bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the rest of the establish-

ment. These institutions stand ready to commit whatever

money, administrative resources, and television airtime

might be necessary to haul the otherwise unelectable

Mark Abhisit Vejjajiva over the hump.

In this series of reports, Amsterdam & Peroff details the

attempts by Thailand’s Establishment to fix the results of

the upcoming general elections. This report — the first

in the series — focuses on the Royal Thai Army’s effort

to protect its dominant position in Thailand’s political

life by manufacturing a victory at the ballot box for the

Democrat Party. As usual, fraud and intimidation are the

generals’ stock-in-trade.

AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 1 1

1. INTRODUCTIONThe Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army, General Prayuth Chan-

ocha, promised the Thai public that the military will observe a policy of strict

neutrality in the 2011 general elections. Given the resources that Thailand’s

armed forces have expended since 2006 to steer voters into returning the

desired election results, overthrow elected governments it did not consider

worthy of its support, and impose its own proxies on a recalcitrant electorate,

there is no chance that the generals will stay on the sidelines. Indeed, just as

in the 2007 elections, the Royal Thai Army has its own candidate for Prime

Minister — Mark Abhisit Vejjajiva. Whereas their efforts failed to save the

Democrat Party from defeat in 2007, this time Thailand’s armed forces are

determined to stop at nothing to manufacture a legislative majority on behalf

of Mark Abhisit. Not only is the dominant role that the military has managed to

assert over Thailand’s political system at stake in these elections; the prospect

that an opposition victory might result in the investigation and prosecution of

senior generals for their role in the massacre of Red Shirt protesters in April

and May 2010 has raised the stakes even further. For Thailand’s armed forces,

defeat is not an option in the 2011 general elections.

A few months ago, Mark Abhisit made the imaginative claim that the Thai

military remains under civilian control.1 Considering that he owes his job to

the generals, the Prime Minister knows better. In fact, with the choice of Mark

Abhisit as its frontman, the Royal Thai Army has shown that it has learned the

lessons of 1992, when General Suchinda Kraprayoon’s insistence on personally

serving as Prime Minister triggered massive protests in Bangkok, complete

with a massacre of unarmed protesters. To avoid a repeat of that debacle,

Mark Abhisit’s urbane demeanor and patrician pedigree are the ideal cover

for the military’s continued dominance of Thailand’s political life. Beyond

the window-dressing, however, the reality is that the Thai military has almost

never been under civilian control. What is worse, the generals have more power

today than they have had in decades.

Having staged more coups than any modern army, the Thai military’s views

still figure into every political calculus. And while its budget has more than

doubled since the 2006 coup, the events of April and May have shown that

1. Shawn W. Crispin, “Tentative Democrat, Reluctant Autocrat,” AsiaTimes Online, December 15, 2010. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LL15Ae01.html


its competence and commitment to democratic values are beyond the pale of

analysis. Unlike his predecessor, General Prayuth Chan-ocha finds it impossible

to resist the temptation of reminding the public that he is in charge. Almost

every day, the public is treated to his windbaggery on a range of topics lying

well beyond his narrow constitutional authority and still more limited intellect.2

The military’s handling of the border dispute with Cambodia, moreover, has

offered ample evidence for the proposition that the generals take no orders

from civilians. Embarrassingly, General Prayuth and Defense Minister Prawit

Wongsuwon recently rejected Indonesian mediation of the dispute, to which

the government had already agreed, leaving dumbfounded Cambodian officials

to wonder aloud whether it is the generals or the civilians who have the right

to negotiate.3 Free to disregard, in the most conspicuous ways, whatever

instructions are issued by a feeble civilian government, General Prayuth and

his associates are determined to return Mark Abhisit’s servile administration

to power — if at all possible, through means that may allow the government to

claim some “democratic” legitimacy.

This report examines the state of civil-military relations in Thailand,

highlighting the dominance of the Royal Thai Army over the country’s civilian

government on each of the five dimensions that experts generally consider to

measure civilian control — elite recruitment, public policy, internal security,

external defense, and military organization. The report goes on to illustrate

the crucial role that Thailand’s armed forces will play in the upcoming general

elections in support of the Democrat Party. The generals appear to have taken

a two-pronged approach to the elections. On the one hand, the rumors of a

military coup, the thinly veiled threats of violence and chaos, and the constant

accusations disloyalty to the monarchy hurled against the opponents of the

regime serve to intimidate the electorate into voting for the Democrat Party,

out of fear of what the military might do should the opposition win yet again.

On the other hand, the Royal Thai Army has committed massive financial,

organizational, and logistical resources to fixing the outcome of the elections.

In constituencies around the country, the military is actively engaged in the

effort to mobilize Democrat Party voters, buy the support of influential local

2. See Pravit Rojanaphruk, “The Army Chief Who Dons Too Many Hats,” The Nation, April 20, 2011.http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/04/20/national/An-army-chief-who-dons-too-many-hats-30153484.html

3. “Govt United on Border Observers, Says Abhisit,” Bangkok Post, April 11, 2011.http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/231345/govt-united-on-border-observers-says-abhisit


figures, bully opposition candidates, and suppress the opposition’s vote.

While the junta’s recourse to these practices in lead-up the 2007 elections

was extensive (and well documented), the military’s aggressiveness has since

intensified with the skyrocketing costs of a potential electoral defeat.

2. MILITARY RULE BY CIVILIAN PROXYThe past several years have witnessed the re-assertion of the power of the Royal

Thai Army to levels not seen since the tragic events of “Black May” 1992. While

the coup d’état of September 19, 2006 was, from the military’s perspective,

above all a defensive act designed to prevent its political marginalization, the

generals quickly determined that the armed forces had to stay on offense if

they were to continue to stave off the threat to their power posed by popular

elected politicians. Still, recent history has taught the Royal Thai Army that

direct military rule is untenable and possibly counterproductive in modern

times. Instead of attempting to extend the life of the junta that seized power

in 2006, the generals have sought to consolidate their political power while at

the same time retreating behind a façade of constitutional democracy.

Messy and ugly though its actions have been, the military has thus far succeeded

in the attempt to reassert its dominance over Thailand’s political system. The

relentless campaign to destroy Thai Rak Thai, for one, managed to bring back

the weak civilian governments that Thailand used to elect before Thaksin’s rise.

Moreover, while the Royal Thai Army failed to secure an election victory for

the Democrat Party in the 2007 elections, the junta had written enough safety

mechanisms in the new constitution to prevent an electoral defeat from having

effects too adverse or long-lasting. Above all, the generals could now rely on

Thailand’s politicized judicial branch — empowered by the 2007 Constitution

to overturn the results of freely conducted elections — to confer upon the

removal of elected governments a semblance of legality. That happened in late

2008, with the court-ordered dissolution of the People Power Party and two

junior members of its governing coalitions. After the Court’s verdict, the Royal

Thai Army successfully used its influence to install Mark Abhisit Vejjajiva in

the Prime Minister’s office, propped up by a coalition that joined the Democrat

Party with the most unprincipled among the politicians who had supported

the previous government.

By making Mark Abhisit the Prime Minister, the Royal Thai Army entered into


a mutually beneficial arrangement with the Democrat Party. The Democrats

received positions of prestige and influence they could never have attained

on the basis of their electoral strength alone. In return, Democrat politicians

offered the military the veneer of a civilian administration behind which the

generals have been able to run the country without seizing power directly.

Because of the Democrats’ conservative, anti-democratic ideology — and the

weakness of their coalition — Mark Abhisit’s administration has never posed

any threat to the generals’ autonomy and clout.

As new elections approach, Thailand’s armed forces exercise a degree of power

inconsistent with the minimum standards of civilian control a democracy must

meet.4 On each of the dimensions upon which specialists generally base their

assessment of civil-military relations, the Thai military dominates over the

country’s formal, civilian leadership. In a recent article, Croissant et al. identify

five dimensions based on which civilian control can be conceptualized and

assessed systematically: 1) Elite recruitment, which speaks to the processes

leading to the selection and legitimation of political office holders; 2) Public

policy, encompassing agenda-setting, policy formulation, and policy adoption;

3) Internal security; 4) National defense; and 5) Military organization, intended

as the degree to which civilians control the size/structure of the armed

forces, their doctrine/education, as well as the amount and type of equipment

procured.5 A brief survey of each dimension reveals just how far Thailand is

from approximating the ideal of “civilian control.”

The most visible aspect in the re-establishment of the military’s predominance

over Thailand’s political system is the role that it has played in the area of

elite recruitment. Starting with the removal of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006,

the Royal Thai Army has continually inserted itself in the process by which

civilian leaders are selected and replaced. It is well known that the military

played a key role in the rise of Mark Abhisit Vejjajiva by inducing former

Thaksin allies to switch their support to the Democrats. This entailed not only

holding a meeting with the leaders of these smaller parties at the home of

former Army Chief Anupong Paojinda, complete with a call from “a man whose

message could not be refuted.”6 By that time, the military had done much

4. See Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is... and Is Not,” Jour-nal of Democracy 2(1991): 75-88, 81.

5. Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Paul Chambers, and Siegfried O. Wolf, “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging De-mocracies,” Democratization 17(2010): 950-975.

6. “Democrat Govt a Shotgun Wedding?,” The Nation, December 10, 2008.


to demonstrate that it would not have accepted any alternative government

by crippling the administration of Somchai Wongsawat. Having called on the

former Prime Minister to resign after the clashes between the police and the

People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) on October 7, 2008, General Anupong

refused to execute the government’s order to disperse the PAD’s occupation of

Suvarnabhumi and Don Muang airports. For politicians interested above all in

holding on to their offices, the promise of stability that the military’s backing

of Mark Abhisit’s administration provided was likely decisive to the decision

to switch. Since then, the military has made good on that promise by propping

up the government, holding the fragile coalition together through a series of

crises, scandals, and massacres that would have brought down almost any

civilian administration, in Thailand or elsewhere.

The key role that the military plays in the recruitment of elites has also

taken somewhat less visible forms, related to the increased fusion between

Thailand’s armed forces and the Privy Council. Because the Privy Council has

long dominated appointments to various senior positions in the bureaucracy

and the judiciary, the fact that some of the Privy Council’s most prominent

figures are former generals has given these institutions an unprecedented

degree of integration and unity of purpose. The Privy Council itself has been

highly instrumental in protecting Mark Abhisit’s administration and very

active in making sure that various high-profile offices are held by the “right”

people. Pasit Sakdanarong, the former secretary to the Constitutional Court

president who leaked videos showing Democrat politicians lobbying the

Court in the party’s recent dissolution case, revealed that the dismissal of the

charges against the Democrat Party took place at the behest of Privy Council

President General Prem Tinsulanonda.7 Similarly, coalition politician Chumpol

Silapaarcha recently complained that the selection of appointed Senators

(totaling half of the upper house) is monopolized by an unnamed “mysterious

figure” thought to be General Prem himself.8

While the Thai armed forces continue to wield enormous power in Thailand,

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/read.php?newsid=30090626

7. “Pasit alleges Constitution Court lobbied to spare Democrat,” The Nation, April 10, 2011.http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/Pasit-alleges-Constitution-Court-lobbied-to-spare--30152964.html

8. “Mysterious Figure ‘Dominating’ Senator Selection: Chumpol,” The Nation, April 1, 2011.http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/Mysterious-figure-dominating-senator-selection-Chu-30152296.html


the generals are typically happy to leave most aspects of domestic policy

formulation to other wings of the Thai Establishment, including civil servants

and coalition politicians. In fact, Democrat Party officials have been quoted as

saying that the generals are “scared shitless” of the prospect of running the

country directly, without the cover of a civilian government.9 Still, on matters

of importance including amendments to the constitution, the armed forces

can at any stage impose the desired policies or veto the adoption of policies

they oppose. In the areas of internal security, external defense, and military

organization, moreover, the military is unmistakably in charge.

With regard to internal security, the Thai armed forces control most activities

related to counterinsurgency in the South and the preservation of the regime’s

stability against threats posed by pro-democracy forces. The traditional

authority of the military to manage internal security was recently strengthened

with the introduction of legislation such as a new Emergency Decree in 2005

and a new Internal Security Act in 2008. Both laws contain inordinately

broad specifications of the circumstances that might warrant the recourse of

emergency powers and reserve sweeping, unaccountable powers for the armed

forces. Even at the time they were introduced, international human rights

organizations condemned the provisions for posing a threat to democratic

governance in Thailand. Upon the junta’s completion of the draft Internal

Security Act in late 2007, for instance, Human Rights Watch condemned it for

being “aimed at perpetuating military rule” and for leaving Thailand “in an

environment prone to abuses and the arbitrary use of power.”10

Over the past two years, the systematic abuse of those provisions, in manners

inconsistent with international law, has repeatedly given the military the power

to essentially take over the country’s administration, suspend constitutional

rights, and commit a plathora of human rights violations for which security

forces have enjoyed complete impunity.11 The Emergency Decree, which was

invoked in 2009 and again for almost nine months during 2010, not only

9. Shawn W. Crispin, “Do or Die for Thai Democracy,” AsiaTimes Online, April 13, 2011.http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MD13Ae01.html

10. Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Internal Security Act Threatens Democracy and Human Rights,” November 5, 2007. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/11/04/thailand-internal-security-act- threatens-democracy-and-human-rights

11. Asian Legal Resource Centre, “Thailand: Arbitrary Detention and Harassment un-der the Emergency Decree,” August 31, 2010. http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2010statements/2791/


gave the generals a prominent role in the country’s administration — the

Center for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES) supplanting the

Cabinet as the principal executive body — but also placed few restrictions

on the military’s authority to re-establish “order.” Partly as a result, none of

the officials involved in the 2010 massacres have been subjected to criminal

prosecutions. In fact, senior officers who orchestrated the crackdowns were

rewarded with promotions.

With regard to external defense, similarly, ever since Mark Abhisit became

Prime Minister the military has repeatedly demonstrated its autonomy from

the civilian administration and its power to override decisions taken by the

government. Throughout the past two years, for instance, the military has

continued to enforce its policy of towing Rohingya refugees out to sea on

barges with no navigational equipment; whereas the policy has resulted in

the death of hundreds of refugees, no members of the security forces have

ever faced any criminal investigations or disciplinary action. It is, however, the

border dispute with Cambodia that has offered the most disturbing evidence

of the military’s dominance of foreign policy. Reportedly, in February 2011

the generals authorized the heavy artillery fire into Cambodian territory,

featuring the use of devastating cluster bombs,12 without even consulting the

civilian government.13 When the government agreed to Indonesian mediation,

in the wake of the bloody clashes, top generals stepped in and overruled the

administration; the following day, Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban

was trotted out to bring the government back in line with the generals’

position.14 In the end, Thailand agreed to send its representatives to a Joint

Boundary Commission meeting in Indonesia only after obtaining that the host

country would be barred from participating in the negotiations.15 Aside from

demonstrating the powerlessness of the civilian government, the military’s

interference continues to undermine the prospects of putting an end to the

dispute.

12. “Thailand ‘Admits Cluster Bombs Used against Cambodia’,” BBC, April 6, 2011.http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12983127

13. See Shawn W. Crispin, “Bombshells and Rally Cries,” AsiaTimes Online, February 8, 2011.http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MB08Ae01.html

14. “Suthep Opposes Presence of Foreign Troops in Disputed Zone,” National News Bureau of Thailand, March 24, 2011.http://thainews.prd.go.th/en/news.php?id=255403240011

15. “JBC Meeting Off to a ‘Smooth Start’,” The Nation, April 8, 2011.http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/04/08/national/JBC-meetIng-off-to-a-&039;smooth-start&039;-30152770.html


With regard to military organization, finally, since the coup the Thai armed

forces have exercised complete autonomy over both policy and procurement.

Not only has the military’s budget more than doubled since 200616 — the

generals have been permitted to buy any equipment, however fraudulent,

obsolete, or overpriced, that offers opportunities for the kinds of kickbacks

that make them wealthy in spite of meager government salaries.17 When the

government finally acknowledged that the GT-200 bomb detectors were a

fraud, in February 2010, all branches of the Thai armed forces participated in

a joint press conference where they rebuked Mark Abhisit and insisted that

the devices were effective no matter how convincing the scientific evidence

attesting to the contrary.18 Earlier this year, the government rolled over and

approved a new, US$2.3 billion cavalry unit based in Northeast Thailand, which

has long been described by General Prem as his “last wish.”19 This comes on

the heels of the authorization of another wasteful infantry division in Chiang

Mai.20

3. VOTE ARMY?As things stand, Thailand is in essence a military regime except in name and

outward appearance. What separates the country from full-blown military

rule is simply the military’ preference for hiding behind a weak civilian

administration and its lack of interest in policy areas that do not affect the

generals’ power, prestige, and proceeds. But this state of affairs is hardly stable,

16. See Paul Chambers, “Thailand on the Brink: Resurgent Military, Eroded Democ-racy,” Asian Survey 50(2010): 835–858, 850.

17. “GT-200 a Costly Dowsing Rod,” Bangkok Post, February 19, 2010.http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/33124/gt200-a-costly-dowsing-rodSee also Saksith Saiyasombut, “Undelivered Ukrainian APCs and German weapon ex-ports to Thailand,” Siam Voices, September 13, 2010.http://asiancorrespondent.com/40239/undelivered-ukrainian-apcs-and-german-weapon-exports-to-thailand/

18. Andrew MacGregor Marshall, “Coups in Thailand: Never Say Never,” Reuters, April 6, 2011.http://blogs.reuters.com/andrew-marshall/2011/04/06/coups-in-thailand-never-say-never/

19. Saksith Saiyasombut, “A New Cavalry Unit in Thailand’s North-East: Old Wish, New Threat?,” Siam Voices, March 3, 2011.http://asiancorrespondent.com/49429/a-new-cavalry-unit-in-thailands-north-east-an-old-wish-to-a-new-threat/

20. Wassana Nanuam, “Red Presence Forces Military to Establish New Division,” Bang-kok Post, July 29, 2010.http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/188371/red-presence-forces-mili-tary-to-establish-new-division


considering that it has come into being only through the denial of majority

rule and has remained in existence only thanks to the worst in a series of

massacres of pro-democracy demonstrators. For this reason, the upcoming

elections present the army with both opportunities and risks. On the one

hand, an acceptably “clean” Democrat victory would give the current regime

the claim to electoral legitimacy it currently lacks. The voters’ endorsement,

in other words, would give the arrangement described above a chance to

consolidate by muffling the opposition’s cries for the return to democracy.

On the other hand, an opposition victory would force the military to choose

between three undesirable options — accept a diminished role, rely on the

judiciary to invalidate the results, or once again stage a coup. Consequently,

the Royal Thai Army is deeply involved in the campaign to earn Mark Abhisit

at least the fig-leaf of an electoral mandate. What is more, while observers

generally do not expect that there will be much in the way of outright fraud,

intended as ballot stuffing, destruction of opposition ballots, or physical voter

suppression, it would be naive to rule out the possibility — particularly as the

generals might come to view the costs of undoing an unfavorable result to

exceed the potential downsides of manufacturing a favorable one.

In view of that, the military can be expected to try everything short of rigging

the elections outright and then engage in whatever amount of fraud it perceives

might help the Democrat Party without attracting international condemnation

and, most importantly, without leading to a massive voter uprising. Its most

powerful weapons are intimidation and organizational resources funded by

taxpayer money.

The work of intimidating voters is led by none other than the Commander-

in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army, General Prayuth Chan-ocha. Having often

signaled that he would not hesitate to intervene if things were not to go his way,

General Prayuth has recently urged Thai voters to turn out in force against the

opposition. The Army Chief also echoed the Prime Minister’s warning that the

elections are a choice between the Democrat Party’s policies and a new cycle

of violence and instability. The implication is that if Thai voters reject Mark

Abhisit, yet again, the military has no qualms about giving the next elected

government the same treatment it offered the last three. In weighing their

options, the electorate is reminded that voting against the Democrat Party

might lead to more coups, more anarchy, and more massacres.

Aside from intimidating voters with thinly veiled threats of violence and chaos,


both the military and civilian leadership are actively engaged in a campaign

to bully the opposition into moderating their criticism of Thailand’s status

quo. Whereas the government’s recourse to legislation that criminalizes the

expression of dissenting opinions — the 2007 Computer Crimes Act and

Article 112 of the criminal code, defining the crime of lese majeste — has been

both systematic in nature and unprecedented in scope over the past two years,

the abuse of these repressive measures appears to be intensifying further as

elections approach.

In February, a web designer for an opposition website, Tanthawut

Taweewarodomkul, received a thirteen-year prison sentence for the publication

of online content he had no involvement in either drafting or posting. Others

have been arrested at recent Red Shirt demonstrations for passing out literature

calling for the abolishment of Article 112, or for distributing a documentary

produced by the Australian television network ABC. On April 11, 2011, General

Prayuth himself sent a group of military officers to file lese majeste complaints

against three Red Shirt leaders (including two sitting members of parliament)

for speeches given during the commemoration of the first of massacres the

army committed in 2010. The speeches in question contained no criticism of

either the King or the royal family, but rather condemned the abuse of the

lese majeste law and called on the military and the government to stop hiding

behind the monarchy to protect their own power. In explaining his actions to

the press, General Prayuth doubled down by calling on voters to cast ballots

meant to “protect the monarchy.”21 Three days later, the Department of Special

Investigations (DSI) announced that eighteen Red Shirt leaders are currently

under investigations for lese majeste in connection with the demonstrations on

April 10, 2011.22 After revealing that most such leaders are being investigated

because they were caught on video using “body language that indicated joint

action or support, such as yelling, cheering and clapping” during the offending

speeches,23 the DSI charged all of them for both lese majeste and sedition.

21. “Vote to Protect Monarchy: Army Chief,” The Nation, April 13, 2011.http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/04/13/national/Vote-to-protect-monar-chy-Army-chief-30153123.html

22. “DSI Says at Least 18 UDD Core Leaders of UDD May Face Insulting Monarchy Charges,” MCOT News, April 15, 2011.http://www.mcot.net/cfcustom/cache_page/195944.html

23. “DSI ruam laktan len ngan 18 daeng lom Jatuporn,” Matichon, April 16, 2011.http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1302949087 An English trans-lation is available at: http://thaipoliticalprisoners.wordpress.com/2011/04/17/an-unspoken-lese-majeste/


Having repeatedly warned that those who “offend the institution” will be

hunted down like dogs, both the military and the simulacrum of a civilian

government behind which the generals operate continue to associate those

who oppose their rule with enemies of the monarchy.24 The agenda is obvious

— accusations of disloyalty, the frequency with which opposition activists

are targeted, and the harshness of their legal treatment are designed to

both discredit the opposition in the eyes of the public as well as discourage

opponents from making too incisive a case against Thailand’s real structure

of power. At the same time, by portraying the opposition as enemies of the

nation and the monarchy, the military is laying the groundwork for another

coup in the event that the opposition should manage to win the next election.

The reason for doing so publicly is to tell voters, in no uncertain terms, that

they should vote for the Democrat Party if they wish to avoid the chaos that

another military coup might bring.

Beyond this, the military is expanding on the range of underhanded measures

it is known to have implemented in the run-up to the 2007 elections. Days

before the last general elections took place, Human Rights Watch issued a

scathing report in which it condemned the Election Commission for failing to

counter the military’s attempt to undermine the fairness and freedom of the

electoral process. Citing the contents of a leaked internal memo issued by the

then-junta, the Council for National Security, three months before the polls,

Human Rights Watch highlighted a number of tactics used by the military

to damage the People Power Party and deliver a victory for the Democrats,

including “various operations to harass, block, and discredit the People Power

Party and its supporters” as well as “the mobilization of army-run television

channels, radio stations, intelligence, and security agencies to present reports

and circulate rumors discrediting the People Power Party and Thaksin.”25

Election monitoring organization ANFREL also found that the military’s actions

“undoubtedly created a climate of fear where freedom of expression and

assembly was curtailed.”26 Even though the Election Commission subsequently

24. See Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Thailand’s Military on the Offensive: The Thai Army Politicizes the Monarchy,” Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2011.http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703922504576272432046756072.html

25. Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Military Interference Undermines Upcoming Elections,” December 20, 2007.http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/12/19/thailand-military-interference-under-mines-upcoming-elections

26. The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) , “Thailand: Restoring Democracy,


ruled, in a 4-1 vote, that the junta had failed to remain neutral during the

campaign, the commissioners also determined that the generals enjoyed

“constitutional immunity” for actions undertaken in an effort to safeguard

national security. Evidently, under the new rules of the game introduced after

the 2006 coup, rigging an election has become something of a constitutional

priority in Thailand, perhaps insofar as it saves the military the trouble of

staging another coup.

Considering the eventual failure of the military’s campaign in 2007, as well

as the costs that the military incurred (in terms of public image, internal

cohesion, and human lives) in its subsequent effort to undo the results of the

elections, the generals have taken an even more aggressive approach to the

2011 campaign. After all, the Thai military is no more prepared to accept the

“wrong” election result than it was four years ago; as noted, the stakes were

raised even further by the 2010 massacres, for which senior officers need

continuing guarantees of impunity.27

The opposition recently disclosed details of just such a plan. The plan

reportedly envisions the establishment of an election taskforce and the

deployment of security forces to influence voting decisions by intimidating

voters, buying the support of local notables, and spreading fear with regard

to the opposition’s support of a secret conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy.

The plan also calls for staging incidents of electoral irregularities that might

help frame opposition candidates, laying the “legal” foundations for their

disqualification by the Election Commission or the dissolution of the party

itself.28 It bears noting that while the Democrat Party was the beneficiary of

most irregularities in 2007, back then the Election Commission intervened

almost exclusively to invalidate the results of races that had been won by the

People Power Party and its allies. The People Power Party was subsequently

dissolved by the Constitutional Court based on one such episodes.

Given the stakes involved as well as the scale of the attempts made by the

Elections to the House of Representatives,” Report of the International Election Obser-vation Mission, March 2008.

27. Shawn W. Crispin, “Do or Die for Thai Democracy,” AsiaTimes Online, April 13, 2011.http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MD13Ae01.html

28. “Tu chae pen chak paen bong kan yub sapha yong yok yai tahan-- lom puea thai,” Khao Sod, April 9, 2011.http://www.khaosod.co.th/view_newsonline.php?newsid=TVRNd01qTTFNakV5TlE9PQ%3D%3D&sectionid


government and the security forces to fix the results of the elections, it is no

surprise that Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban would angrily reject

the possibility of inviting foreign election observers. That is not because he

does not “respect Westerners” or is concerned about Thailand’s sovereignty,

as he claims,29 but rather because foreign observers threaten to expose the

lengths to which the government and the army are willing to go to trample on

the Thai people’s sovereignty. While foreign election observers will likely not

be allowed to monitor the process, one can be sure that the government will

call upon the military to guarantee “security” at polling stations throughout

the country. Given the military’s tendency to associate “security” with the

continuing existence of its puppet regime, the physical intimidation of voters

may also soon be described as a matter of “national security.”

Perhaps most worrisome on this count is the Royal Thai Army’s history of

pre-election violence (most notably in the 1970s) as well as its involvement in

bombings and other violent incidents throughout 2010, as part of a “strategy of

tension” designed to justify the government’s continued recourse to emergency

powers and draconian restrictions on the rights of the opposition.30 As Philip

Willan wrote with reference to the “strategy of tension” masterminded by

right-wing groups and parts of the Italian state beginning in the late 1960s,

“terror increases people’s desire for security at the expense of their desire

for change.”31 Whenever Thailand has appeared on the verge of democratic

change, the Royal Thai Army has never hesitated to use violence and terror, to

strike fear in the hearts of those who may have otherwise wanted the generals

to go back to the barracks.

4. DEFYING MILITARY CONTROLIt is frequently pointed out that the Thai military does not function as

instrument of external defense, but rather as a private guard that protects

Thailand’s Establishment (which includes prominent generals) from the

people’s democratic aspirations. This position confers upon the military the

ultimate veto role in Thailand’s network of political power. Much like Latin

29. “Thailand Rejects Foreign Election Monitors,” AFP, March 24, 2011.http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/SEAsia/Story/STIStory_648749.html

30. See Robert Amsterdam, “No Respite from Fear,” August 16, 2010http://robertamsterdam.com/thailand/?p=296

31. Philip Willan, Puppetmasters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy (Lon-don: Constable & Company Ltd., 1992), 14.


American caudillos a few decades ago, the Thai military has never shied

away from human rights violations, massacres, and military takeovers when

democracy threatened the Establishment and the conservative interests it

embodies. Thanks to American support and the existence of limited external

threats, over the past several decades the Thai military has wholly dedicated

itself to maximizing its own power and budget at the expense of the rule of law,

civilian institutions, and the Thai people’s freedom. Today, Thailand’s military

remains as strong, meddlesome, and brutal as ever. Thailand’s political conflict

cannot be fully resolved unless an institution that is so doggedly committed to

the cause of preventing Thailand from ever becoming a democratic country is

either scrapped or reformed.

There is no doubt, as the country’s Prime Minister is reported as stating, that

the upcoming elections offer the Thai people a clear choice. The decision before

the Thai electorate, however, goes well beyond the endorsement of alternative

policies or candidates. The choice before them is whether to accept military rule

and legitimize its implausible civilian façade, however begrudgingly, or to once

again defy Thailand’s Establishment with a vote that demonstrates an enduring

commitment to democracy and self-determination. Choosing democracy over

dictatorship is guaranteed to have its costs, as the Thai military has never

taken kindly to the public’s effrontery. But it would be worse still for Thai

voters to succumb to intimidation and fear, and wait for future generations

to deliver the country from military rule. To give the generals the opportunity

to further consolidate their grip is to allow the costs of eventually taking on

the military to multiply several times over. As the tragic events of 2010 have

reminded us all, those costs are measured in human lives.

T H A I L A N D 2 0 1 1 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N R E P O R T S E R I E S , N O . 1

puppetmasters: elections as instruments of military rule

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