public sector reform: what works and...

Public Sector Reform:

What Works and Why?

An IEG Evaluation of World Bank Support

W O R L D B A N K I N D E P E N D E N T E V A L U A T I O N G R O U P

2008

The World Bank

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Contents

i i i

vii Abbreviations

ix Acknowledgments

xi Foreword

xiii Executive Summary

xix Management Response

xxiii Chairperson’s Summary: Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE)

1 1 Objective, Scope, and Method of Evaluation3 Objectives and Framework4 Scope 5 Criteria for Evaluation7 Methods

9 2 Historical Overview of Public Sector Reform at the World Bank11 1946 to 1982: PSR at the Margins12 1983 to 1989: Focus on Quality of Government14 1990 to 1996: Increasing Awareness of Governance Agenda15 1997 to 2007: PSR Efforts Become Central, Include Anticorruption

19 3 World Bank Support for Public Sector Reform21 Lending Projects for Public Sector Reform24 AAA Tasks for Public Sector Reform25 Institutional Development Grants25 Country Portfolios of PSR Activities28 Thematic Distribution of PSR Projects30 Staffing for PSR

33 4 How Public Sector Reform Outcomes Differ by Country Groups35 Measurement, Attribution, and the Role of Governments, the Bank, and Donors37 Summary Results38 IEG Project Ratings40 Reasons for Country Differences

43 5 Public Sector Reform Outcomes and Performance by Thematic Area45 Overview of Thematic Differences64 Summary Lessons from Thematic Comparisons

67 6 Strategic Summary, Ratings, and Recommendations69 Reform Motivations, Expectations, and Success Factors71 Country PSR Strategy Entry Points72 Summary Evaluation Ratings73 Recommendations

77 Appendixes79 A: Data Set Description: Public Sector Reform Lending, AAA and Institutional

Development Funds81 B: Statement by the External Advisory Panel

These appendixes are available online athttp://www.worldbank.org/ieg/psr/appendix.html.

000 C: Public Sector Reform Project List, Fiscal 1990–2006000 D: Public Sector Reform—Advisory and Analytical Activities, Fiscal 1999–2006000 E: Public Sector Reform—Institutional Development Funds, Fiscal 1992–2006000 F: Clients and Other External Stakeholders Interviewed

81 Endnotes

85 Bibliography

Boxes5 1.1 Scope of Review of the Bank’s Anticorruption Activity

36 4.1 Pros and Cons of CPIA as a Governance Measure50 5.1 Too Much Attention to the Technical Aspects—Not Enough to the Human

Element in Ghana62 5.2 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative–Multi-donor Trust Fund

Figuresxiv ES.1. Lending Projects with Significant PSR Components, 1990–200622 3.1 Lending Projects with Significant PSR Components, 1990–200623 3.2 Lending Value in Projects with a Significant PSR Component23 3.3 Regional Distribution of Public Sector Reform Projects28 3.4 Themes Included in Projects with Significant PSR Funding29 3.5 Public Sector Reform Conditions54 5.1 Number of CSA Projects with Various Subcategories of Conditions

Tables6 1.1 Results Framework for Public Sector Reform7 1.2 Case Study Countries24 3.1 Public Sector Reform AAA Products

P U B L I C S E C T O R R E F O R M : W H AT W O R K S A N D W H Y ?

i v

26 3.2 IDF Grants on Public Sector Reform Themes 26 3.3 Public Sector Reform Lending and AAA Activities in Relation to Public Sector

Governance31 3.4 Public Sector Staffing and Specialties by Region38 4.1 Percent of Countries with Improved CPIA Governance Scores by PSR Theme

and IDA/IBRD Classification39 4.2 Percent of Countries with Improved Governance CPIA Scores by Region,

1999–200639 4.3 Summary of IEG Project Ratings for Closed PSR Projects, 1999–200646 5.1 Changes in Selected CPIA Scores by PSR Theme, Initial Governance Score,

and IDA/IBRD Classification49 5.2 Improvement Rates in Public Finance Management (CPIA 13) by IDA/IBRD

Classification53 5.3 Civil Service and Administrative Reform: Types and Challenges59 5.4 State Capture and Bureaucratic Corruption, and Indirect Ways to Combat

Them72 6.1 Overall Bank Performance Ratings, 1999–2006

C O N T E N T S

v

Central post office in Morrocco. Photo by Julio Etchart, courtesy of the World Bank Photo Library.

v i i

Abbreviations

AAA Analytical and advisory activitiesACT Anticorruption and governance (transparency) BEEPS Business Environment and Enterprise Performance SurveyCAS Country Assistance StrategyCEM Country Economic Memorandum CFAA Country Financial Accountability Assessment CPAR Country Procurement Assessment ReportCPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment CSA Civil service and administrative (reform)DPL Development Policy LoanDFID Department for International Development (United Kingdom)DPR Development Policy Review EITI Extractive Industries Transparency InitiativeESW Economic and sector workGAC Governance and anticorruption (strategy)HIPC Heavily indebted poor countriesIBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentICRG International Country Risk Guide IDA International Development AssociationIDF Institutional development funds IEG Independent Evaluation Group IGR Institutional and Governance ReviewIMF International Monetary FundMTEF Medium-term expenditure frameworkNGO Nongovernmental organizationOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentOPCS Operations Policy and Country ServicesPEFA Public Expenditure and Financial AccountabilityPER Public Expenditure Review PETS Public expenditure tracking surveys PFM Public financial management PIU Project implementation unitPPAR Project Performance Audit ReportPREM Poverty Reduction and Economic Management NetworkPRSC Poverty Reduction Support CreditPSG Public sector governancePSM Public sector managementPSR Public sector reformSAL Structural Adjustment LoanTAX Tax administration (reform)WBI World Bank InstituteWDR World Development Report

Government building in Hanoi, Vietnam. Photo © Galen Frysinger.

i x

Acknowledgments

This evaluation of the World Bank’s support for

public sector reform was prepared by the Coun-

try Evaluation and Regional Relations division in

the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG).

The team was led by Steven Webb and comprised

Milka Casanegra (tax administration), Corky de

Asis, Tim De Vaan, Anne Evans (civil service and

administrative reform), Odd-Helge Fjeldstad (an-

ticorruption), Ilka Funke (assistant team leader),

Gita Gopal, Ina Hoxha, Keith Kranker (database

and statistical analysis), Evelina Mengova (data-

base), Victor Orozco (database and statistical

analysis), Vikki Taaka (logistics and document

handling), Rajiv Joseph Tharian, Gemi Thomas,

Sofia Valencia, Richard Webb (history), and Clay

Wescott (public financial management). The coun-

try case studies were prepared by de Vaan, Funke,

Hoxha, Orozco, Tharian, Webb, and Wescott.

Helen Chin, Heather Dittbrenner, and William

Hurlbut assisted with editing.

The team received guidance and support from the

IEG management team—Shahrokh Fardoust, Ali

Khadr, and Vinod Thomas—and in the initial

stages work from Ajay Chhibber, Lily Chu, and Kyle

Peters. Cheryl Gray, Director of IEG World Bank

during the final phases of preparing the evalua-

tion, recused herself from management oversight

because of her earlier key role in the public sec-

tor reform agenda.

Colum Garrity, Gregory Kisunko, and others on

the Public Sector and Governance Sector Board

were generous in helping gather information.

The peer reviewers—Catherine Gwin, Roumeen

Islam, and Marcelo Selowsky—gave useful sug-

gestions at several stages of the process, as did sev-

eral other colleagues in IEG.

A panel of external advisors—Professor Shankar

Acharya (Indian Council for Research on Inter-

national Economic Relations), Professor Francis

Fukuyama (School for Advanced International

Studies, Johns Hopkins University), and Dr. Ngozi

Okonjo-Iweala (until November 30, 2007, of

Brookings Institution)—gave useful inputs at sev-

eral stages of the evaluation. Professors Acharya

and Fukuyama provided a joint comment on the

report going to the Committee on Developmen-

tal Effectiveness.

Director-General, Evaluation: Vinod Thomas

Senior Manager, IEGCR: Ali M. Khadr

Task Manager, IEGCR: Steven B. Webb

Government building in Yaroslavl, Russia. Photo © Linda Garrison/cruises.about.com.

x i

Foreword

World Bank support for public sector reform has

grown strongly in recent years, and for good rea-

sons. The success of development activities, in-

cluding all those the World Bank supports,

depends on the effectiveness and efficiency of a

country’s public sector. To address the questions

of what is working and why, the Independent

Evaluation Group has examined Bank lending

and other kinds of Bank support from 1999 to

2006 for reform of the core public sector in four

areas: public financial management, administra-

tive and civil service, revenue administration, and

anticorruption and transparency.

A majority of countries that borrowed to support

public sector reform improved their perform-

ance in some dimensions, but there were short-

comings in important areas. Middle-income

borrowers saw improvements in their public sec-

tor quality more frequently than low-income bor-

rowers, even though the low-income group

usually had greater needs for public sector

improvement.

Performance usually improved for public financial

management, tax administration, and trans-

parency, but not for civil service. Direct meas-

ures to reduce corruption—such as anticorruption

laws and commissions—rarely succeeded, as they

often lacked the necessary support from political

elites and the judicial system.

Analytic work, including the development of

monitorable indicators, was especially useful in

financial management, but such analysis was

usually absent in the civil service and adminis-

trative area, which contributed to the differences

in outcomes.

The Governance and Anticorruption Strategy ap-

proved by the Board in 2007 and being imple-

mented now proposed actions that could address

concerns raised in this evaluation. The recom-

mendations of this evaluation highlight direc-

tions that deserve priority.

First, it pays to recognize the especially complex

political and sequencing issues in public sector re-

form projects. That in turn puts a premium on un-

derstanding the political context, identifying the

prerequisites to achieve the objectives, focusing

on the basic reforms initially, and being realistic

about the time it takes to get significant results.

Second, the priorities for anticorruption efforts

should be based on an assessment in each coun-

try of the types of corruption most harmful to de-

velopment. Sustaining efforts to reduce corruption

have better prospects when they emphasize mak-

ing information public and building country sys-

tems to reduce the opportunities for corruption.

Third, it is important to strengthen the civil ser-

vice and administrative components of public sec-

tor reform. This effort includes providing a better

framework and indicator sets for quality of civil ser-

vice. Although the difficulties of civil service reform

have led to some calls for abandoning this area, the

evidence indicates that improved civil service is es-

sential for major improvements in other public sec-

tor areas. Successes with some aspects of civil

service have shown what is possible.

Vinod Thomas

Director-General, Evaluation

x i i i

Executive Summary

The Bank has devoted an increasing share—now

about one-sixth—of its lending and advisory sup-

port to the reform of central governments, so it

is important to understand what is working, what

needs improvement, and what is missing. To ad-

dress these questions, the Independent Evalua-

tion Group (IEG) has examined lending and other

kinds of Bank support for public sector reform

(PSR) between 1999 and 2006 in four areas: pub-

lic financial management, administrative and civil

service, revenue administration, and anticorrup-

tion and transparency.

Although a majority of countries that borrowed

to support PSR experienced improved perform-

ance in some dimensions, there were short-

comings in important areas and in overall coor-

dination. The frequency of improvement was

higher among International Bank for Recon-

struction and Development (IBRD) borrowers

than among International Development Asso-

ciation (IDA) borrowers. Performance usually im-

proved for public financial management, tax

administration, and transparency, but not usually

for civil service. Direct measures to reduce cor-

ruption—such as anticorruption laws and com-

missions—rarely succeeded. Recommendations

of this evaluation focus on improving guidelines

for civil service and anticorruption reforms and

on setting realistic objectives and sequencing of

reforms.

The public sector is the largest spender and em-

ployer in virtually every developing country, and

it sets the policy environment for the rest of the

economy. About one-sixth of World Bank projects

in recent years have supported PSR (see figure

ES.1) because the quality of the public sector—

accountability, effectiveness, and efficiency in ser-

vice delivery, transparency, and so forth—is

thought by many to contribute to development.

Improving the efficiency of government coun-

terparts is also essential for the effectiveness of the

Bank’s support for development.

Two themes of this evaluation correspond to the

primary dimensions of the public sector: how it

manages finances over the budget cycle and how

it organizes and manages its employees—their re-

cruitment, pay, and promotions. A third theme—

tax administration—is a part of the public sector

that the Bank has often supported with special proj-

ects or components. The fourth theme of the eval-

uation—anticorruption and transparency—has

cross-cutting issues that appear in the other the-

matic areas and also in special components of

some PSR projects. (Anticorruption components

of sectoral projects are outside the scope of this

evaluation, as are decentralization and legal and ju-

dicial reforms.) Forty-seven percent of IBRD bor-

rowers and 74 percent of IDA borrowers in the

period 1999–2006 had one or more projects with

components in at least one of these four areas.

The effectiveness and efficiency of a country’s public sector is vital to

the success of development activities, including those the World Bank

supports. Sound financial management, an efficient civil service and

administrative policy, efficient and fair collection of taxes, and transparent op-

erations that are relatively free of corruption all contribute to good delivery

of public services.

The evaluation team assembled and analyzed a

database that combined information on all bor-

rower countries and on the more than 460 proj-

ects that since 1990 have focused on PSR in one

or more of the four thematic areas. The team also

did in-depth studies of 19 countries, including

field visits to 6, and supplemented this with in-

formation from IEG’s recent country evaluations.

The knowledge of outcomes is imperfect, because

of measurement problems and the long lag be-

tween the start of reforms and seeing their full ef-

fects. Nonetheless, public sector performance on

some key dimensions seems to have improved in

a majority of cases where there have been Bank

lending and analytical and advisory activities. But

outcomes vary substantially across country types

and thematic areas. Success or failure of PSR in any

country is determined mainly by government ac-

tions, but Bank actions have also contributed.

Patterns of Bank Support for PSRAlmost all countries received some analyti-

cal and advisory assistance (AAA) on public

sector issues over 1999–2006, but coverage

varied by theme. Most IDA and blend coun-

tries had extensive AAA, and three-fourths had

PSR lending, including policy-based projects. For

instance, Burkina Faso had nine PSR loans, in-

cluding eight development policy credits, with

major components in all four thematic areas, plus

six AAA products.

About half of IBRD countries had no PSR

lending in the period 1999–2006, and about

a quarter had two or more loans. In most IBRD

countries, the Bank stayed engaged, even with

problem governance states. It did so through AAA

or lending if the countries wanted it; the lending

was usually associated with considerable im-

provement in the public sector performance.

The higher frequency of PSR lending to IDA

countries reflects both a greater need in

these countries for PSR and stronger pres-

sure from the Bank and other donors to

conduct PSR.

Among countries getting PSR lending, more than

80 percent of IBRD borrowers and 69 percent of

x i v


0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Fiscal year

0

5

10

15

20

25

Investment lending Development policy lending Total, as percent of World Bank projects

Perc

ent o

f Ban

k pr

ojec

ts

Num

ber o

f pro

ject

s

Figure ES.1: Lending Projects with Significant PSR Components, 1990–2006

Source: World Bank database and IEG staff calculations.

IDA borrowers showed improved performance.

Country cases identify three factors contributing

to success in the different areas:

• Being realistic about what is politically and

institutionally feasible, as well as being op-

portunistic in preparing technical foundations

for what might become feasible in the future.

In Bangladesh, the Bank supported preparatory

work on difficult areas of civil service and an-

ticorruption when substantive reform was not

on the table. These later proved useful when

a reform-minded government came to power.

• Recognizing that enhancing technology is not

enough by itself, that the most crucial and dif-

ficult part is changing behavior and organi-

zational culture. In Ghana, for instance,

implementation of the integrated financial man-

agement system stalled until attention turned

to changing behavioral patterns and incentives.

• Dealing with the basics first, such as ensuring

that taxpayers have unique identification num-

bers before installing a complex collection sys-

tem or ensuring that the government is

executing a one-year budget reasonably well be-

fore launching sophisticated multiyear budg-

eting. Some projects in Bulgaria, Cambodia,

Guatemala, the Russian Federation, and Sierra

Leone did this relatively well. In many countries,

however, the policy-based lending conditions

were across the board and exceeded the gov-

ernment’s technical or political implementation

capacity. Projects in Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana,

Honduras, and Indonesia had difficulty be-

cause they went straight to sophisticated meas-

ures, such as installing accrual accounting,

when the personnel capacity was not ready

and the government was not successfully ad-

ministering cash accounting.

Variation across Themes Public expenditure and financial manage-

ment was almost always a component in

PSR loans. Public financial management—man-

aging the money from budget planning, to pro-

curement, treasury functions, and monitoring—

has often been the leading edge of PSR, in both

the diagnostic and lending phases of Bank sup-

port. In this area (and in tax administration), the

ministry of finance has usually been given strong

support, and the Bank’s analytic tools have be-

come the most systematic and widely accepted.

About two-thirds of all countries that bor-

rowed for financial management showed

improvement in this area in a Bank-wide data

set (the Country Policy and Institutional Assess-

ment), and it was the most consistent area of im-

provement in the case studies. Budget formulation

and reporting usually received more attention

and had more success than the downstream

phases of the spending cycle, such as procurement

and auditing.

Fiscal crises often initially motivated governments

to seek financial management help from the Bank,

and the projects examined usually succeeded in

resolving the fiscal crises and making recurrence

less likely. To improve the effectiveness of spend-

ing, however, the criteria and loan conditions

have been harder to specify.

The Bank’s diagnostic work on financial man-

agement has contributed to the effectiveness of

lending in this area. Public Expenditure Reviews

are now more frequently participatory or are gov-

ernment led and give more attention to institu-

tions and the implementation of the budget. The

Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability

(PEFA) indicators have made an important ad-

vance by laying out a framework for all aspects of

public budgeting and financial management, a

framework agreed to by donor and borrower

countries. They are monitorable and actionable—

the government can observe and affect them

directly.

Civil service and administrative (CSA) re-

form has been the second most common

area of PSR lending. Although CSA per-

formance has improved in fewer than half of

the borrowing countries, improving CSA has

been essential for sustaining PSR in other

areas. The urgent issue of affordability of a wage

bill often led to emphasis on retrenchment and

salary adjustments that were politically unrealistic.

This approach typically failed to improve public ad-

ministration, as noted in a 1999 IEG evaluation

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y

x v

(IEG 1999). Since then, the Bank has advocated

the same approach, with similar lack of success in

some countries, such as Cambodia, Honduras,

and the Republic of Yemen; elsewhere, however,

it has had some success by focusing more on per-

sonnel management reforms, such as merit-based

recruitment and promotion, to improve per-

formance and counter patronage-based systems.

The frequent failures of CSA reform, despite con-

tinued acknowledgment of its importance, seem

to reflect the lack of a coherent strategy (with iso-

lated exceptions) and of clear diagnostic tools to

address CSA issues. Along with the inherent po-

litical difficulty, the weak diagnostic work on civil

service seems to be one reason reform projects

in this area have less success than financial man-

agement reforms. AAA on civil service is less than

one-fourth as common as for financial manage-

ment, and it did not precede lending in most

case study countries.

Bank projects for tax administration have

generally succeeded and benefited from strong

government ownership, particularly by ministries

of finance, and from good diagnosis and strategy

(often led by the International Monetary Fund).

More than three-fourths of countries with invest-

ment projects for tax administration improved

their performance. In the areas of tax administra-

tion, IDA countries with investment projects had

higher rates of improvement than IBRD coun-

tries. For countries with a fiscal crisis, tax admin-

istration reform was an attractive entry point,

particularly in former Eastern Bloc countries.

Attention to anticorruption and trans-

parency in country strategies and lending

programs has grown since the late 1990s. A

majority of the borrowers for PSR have in-

creased transparency but not reduced per-

ceptions of corruption. Even after 1997, when

direct approaches were no longer taboo for the

Bank, lending usually supported indirect measures

against bureaucratic corruption—reducing op-

portunities for corruption by simplifying proce-

dures and regulations, moving to e-government

in various areas, and rationalizing personnel man-

agement. These had some success. Direct meas-

ures to reduce corruption—such as anticorrup-

tion laws and commissions—rarely succeeded,

as they often lacked the necessary support from

political elites and the judicial system.

The Bank has helped develop tools to improve

transparency and reduce bureaucratic corrup-

tion, such as the Public Expenditure Tracking Sur-

vey, quantitative service delivery surveys, and the

Business Environment and Enterprise Perfor-

mance Survey. In Bulgaria and the Indian state of

Orissa, direct anticorruption measures helped

make public service delivery more efficient and

accessible to citizens while staying within the

bounds of political feasibility. Some government-

wide transparency efforts, such as access to in-

formation laws and implementing agencies and

the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,

also show promise as tools against state capture,

but it is too soon to see results.

The Bank’s diagnostic work on corruption and

transparency generally follows a separate track

from other public sector areas, focusing on global

perceptions or the experience of the private busi-

ness sector and giving less attention to the extent

of corruption in the core public sector. Most

Country Financial Accountability Assessments and

Country Procurement Assessment Reports have

not dealt adequately with risks of corruption in

those systems. Institutional and governance re-

views rarely analyzed the political factors con-

tributing to corruption, although their saliency is

widely acknowledged.

Despite its mantra of “no one size fits all,” the

Bank has not developed a framework that ade-

quately recognizes the long duration of the process

to reduce corruption and the differences in where

countries need to start. As steps in the process, ex-

periences in Nigeria and Cambodia suggest that re-

ducing the development cost of corruption

(including eliminating it in Bank-supported in-

vestment projects) is politically feasible and valu-

able for development. Still, the Bank’s stance

against corruption needs operational clarification

in country contexts—for instance, how the ex-

tent of corruption should affect the balance be-

tween investment and budget-support operations.

x v i


Sequencing and Coordination across ThemesThe evidence does not support either of two po-

sitions taken by some observers—that PSR is too

difficult to be worth trying or that public sector

issues are so interlinked that only comprehensive

solutions will work. Many PSR projects have suc-

ceeded, although usually not immediately. To re-

alize the full benefits of improving public service

delivery and accountability, PSR must eventually

lead to substantial improvement across the board,

including the civil service; modest and selected

entry points can have partial success and can lay

the basis for later progress.

Starting with AAA has been a successful way for the

Bank to develop a trusting relationship with gov-

ernments to work on sensitive areas of PSR. In

Egypt, a reformist government requested Bank sup-

port for anticorruption after an Investment Climate

Assessment in 2006 identified corruption as a major

barrier for business. Often a Public Expenditure Re-

view with financial management emphasis was a

good starting place, as in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Tan-

zania, Uganda, and several Indian states.

The Bank has improved the integration of AAA and

lending in the various aspects of public financial

management, but not across the full range of PSR

themes. Results are better where arrangements are

institutionalized to coordinate staff in diverse sec-

tors within the country program (as in the Latin

America and Caribbean Region, with the sector

leaders in close proximity to country directors).

Otherwise, coordination occurs less regularly,

when there happens to be alignment of person-

alities, skills, and schedules.

Recommendations Design PSR projects and allocate Bank re-

sources to them with recognition that PSR

has especially complex political and se-

quencing issues. Be realistic about the time it

takes to get significant results, understand the

political context, identify prerequisites to achieve

the objectives, and focus first on the basic re-

forms that a country needs in its initial situation.

Reconsider the balance between development

policy and investment lending; institutional

change usually needs the sustained support of in-

vestment projects, although development policy

lending can help secure the enabling policy

changes.

In country PSR strategies, set priorities for

anticorruption efforts based on assessments

of which types of corruption are most harm-

ful to poverty reduction and growth. Only

when the country has both strong political will

and an adequate judiciary system should primary

emphasis be on support for anticorruption laws

and commissions. Given that reducing corrup-

tion will be a long-term effort, the Bank should

emphasize two things: building country sys-

tems that reduce the opportunities for corruption

that are most costly to development and making

information public in ways that stimulate popu-

lar demand for more efficient and less corrupt

service delivery. The country team needs opera-

tional clarification about how the Bank’s anticor-

ruption efforts fit within the overall country

strategy.

Strengthen the CSA components of PSR,

giving them a better framework and in-

dicator set, and give more attention to

the budget-execution phases of financial

management. This will require PEFA-like

actionable indicators for CSA performance and

more linkage between the implementation

of reforms for civil service and for financial

management.

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y

x v i i

The Palacio de Gobierno in Lima, Peru.

x i x

Management Response

Concurrence with the Broad Thrust of theAnalysis and RecommendationsThe evaluation contains a number of important

conclusions that management welcomes in the

context of its overall assistance to countries in PSR.

Specifically, management appreciates the find-

ings on the long-term nature of PSR, the conclu-

sion that an incremental approach can produce

results, and the usefulness of economic and sec-

tor work (ESW) up front. It will build on these in

work going forward.

PSR requires timeManagement notes IEG’s finding that many PSR

projects have succeeded, although often not im-

mediately. The key lesson is to be realistic as to

timing. That fact has implications regarding the

lending products that best support PSR. In many

cases, a programmatic approach using a series of

loans, notably Development Policy Loans (DPLs),

linked to a government’s medium-term program has

proven successful (see, for example, World Bank

2007a). As noted in the review, specific investment

operations, either in parallel with DPLs or self-

standing, can provide a longer time frame of sup-

port. Country context will determine the exact mix.

Incremental approachThe IEG review concludes that support through

modest and selected entry points can have par-

tial success and can lay the basis for later progress,

including in difficult areas such as civil service

reform. That fits with management’s view that

PSR needs strong country ownership and that

the Bank needs to tailor its assistance to the coun-

try’s pace of reform. It also reinforces the point

above with regard to lending instruments.

Usefulness of ESWThe IEG review notes the benefit of up-front ESW.

It credits good diagnostic work in public financial

management (PFM) as having contributed to suc-

cessful outcomes of Bank support. In particular,

it cites Public Expenditure Reviews and the Pub-

lic Expenditure and Financial Accountability

(PEFA) indicators as useful in this regard. Man-

agement notes the potential value of prior ESW

with regard to support for countries that want to

undertake civil service reform.

Management ObservationsManagement has just a few issues that it would like

to raise with regard to the analysis in the review.

These issues are related to governance and anti-

corruption, to analytic and advisory activities (AAA)

work on PFM, and to the evolution of Bank sup-

port over time, learning the lessons of experience.

Management also acknowledges that greater

progress needs to be made on civil service and ad-

ministrative reform but notes that the outcomes

Management welcomes this Independent Evaluation Group (IEG)

evaluation of World Bank support for public sector reform (PSR), cov-

ering the period from 1999 through 2006. Management sees much

on which it can build from the review’s findings. However, it would like to make

a few observations on the review, relative to recent strategy and policy changes.

Last, management broadly concurs with the recommendations, with some nu-

ances and clarifications.

are weaker in poor governance environments and

stronger in better governance environments, as

measured by the Country Policy and Institutional

Assessment.

Governance and anticorruptionThe Bank does thematically classify a portion of its

support as “other accountability/anticorruption.”

However, as emphasized in its new Governance

and Anticorruption (GAC) strategy, management

sees corruption as an outcome of poor gover-

nance (World Bank 2007c). Support for better

governance—and so for reduced corruption—is

being mainstreamed across the Bank’s entire port-

folio, including in traditional investment opera-

tions. Though this is recognized in the IEG review,

from some of the discussion, a perception might

be that the review is of the Bank’s anticorruption

agenda rather than that subset of the agenda that

can usefully be addressed through PSR. For in-

stance, the IEG review does not evaluate treatment

of GAC in country assistance strategies, GAC in sec-

tors, or GAC in projects or global partnerships on

GAC. The World Bank Group’s overall approach

to anticorruption is best discussed in the context

of the strategy cited above. Management has com-

mitted to report to the Board in 2008 on progress

in implementation of this strategy.

Demand side of support for good governanceand anticorruptionThe report points to possible missed opportuni-

ties for supporting the demand side of good GAC.

Management would point out that in many cases,

countries have incorporated innovative measures

into sector projects supported by Bank lending

that helped develop the demand for good gov-

ernance—for example, expenditure tracking sur-

veys, beneficiary surveys, and citizen scorecards.

Understandably, the purely sectoral operations

with these components were beyond the scope

of the IEG review.

Scope of public financial management AAAManagement would like to reiterate its different

view on one point—whether Country Financial Ac-

countability Assessments (CFAAs) and Country

Procurement Assessment Reviews (CPARs) should

incorporate more diagnosis of corruption issues.

CFAAs and CPARs typically identify aspects of

country PFM systems that might facilitate cor-

ruption (such as off-budget accounts, inadequate

financial management and procurement infor-

mation systems, weak regulatory environments, in-

adequate systems of internal control and internal

audit, poor capacity of implementing agency staff,

excessively complex financial administration rules

leading to poor enforcement, and “cash ra-

tioning”). Management considers this coverage of

corruption issues appropriate. Given the com-

plexity and multifaceted dimensions of the cor-

ruption issue, neither detailed corruption

diagnostics nor the development of anticorruption

strategies can be undertaken as part of the CFAA

or CPAR per se. That said, as part of its overall work

on implementing the new strategy, management

is developing stronger linkages with corruption is-

sues in the Bank’s PFM work, recognizing that

PFM systems are an important instrument in a

country’s anticorruption agenda and also that

PFM performance is affected by the overall cor-

ruption environment.

Learning the lessons of experienceManagement notes that the review covers seven

years. During that period, many of the lessons

cited in the IEG review have been taken into ac-

count in Bank work, notably regarding develop-

ment policy operations (DPOs). The Bank

extensively reviewed its experience with adjust-

ment lending, held wide consultations, and

moved in 2004 from adjustment to DPOs (World

Bank 2004b). That change was more than just in

name and incorporates many of the suggestions

that the IEG review highlights—including the

importance of strong country ownership, a long-

term approach to policy reform taken in realis-

tic incremental steps, customization, and a sharp

reduction in the number of conditions to just

those critical for the success of the reform (nor-

mally taken in advance of Board approval of the

operation—one indicator of ownership). One of

the reasons for these changes was to better po-

x x


sition the Bank to help countries strengthen pub-

lic sector institutions. Under DPOs, the type of

conditions has changed, notably toward measures

to strengthen public sector management, and

the number has fallen significantly (World Bank

2007a).

ConclusionOverall, management warmly welcomes this eval-

uation from IEG. Management generally accepts

IEG’s recommendations. Detailed responses to

the recommendations are outlined in the Man-

agement Action Record.

M A N A G E M E N T R E S P O N S E

x x i

x x i i


Management Action Record

Design PSR projects and allocate Bank re-sources to them with recognition that PSR hasespecially complex political and sequencingissues. Be realistic about the time it takes to get sig-nificant results, understand the political context, iden-tify prerequisites to achieve the objectives, and focusfirst on the basic reforms that a country needs in itsinitial situation. Reconsider the balance betweendevelopment policy and investment lending, becauseinstitutional change usually needs the sustained sup-port of investment projects, although developmentpolicy lending can help secure the enabling policychanges.

Within country PSR strategies, set priorities foranticorruption efforts based on assessments ofwhich types of corruption are most harmful topoverty reduction and growth. Only when thecountry has both strong political will and an ade-quate judiciary system should the Bank put primaryemphasis on support for anticorruption laws and com-missions. Given that reducing corruption will be along-term effort, the Bank should emphasize (i) build-ing country systems that reduce the opportunities forcorruption that is most costly to development and (ii)making information public in ways that stimulate pop-ular demand for more efficient and less corrupt ser-vice delivery. Provide operational clarification to thecountry team about how the Bank’s anticorruption ef-forts fit within the overall country strategy.

Strengthen the CSA components of PSR, pro-viding them with a better framework and indi-cator set, and give more attention to the budgetexecution phases of financial management. Thiswill require PEFA-like actionable indicators for civil ser-vice and administrative performance and more link-age between the implementation of reforms for civilservice and for financial management.

Ongoing/Agreed. Bank management agrees in principle with this recommendation,noting that it points to the importance of intensifying AAA upstream of PSR operations—which can have significant budget implications. How the recommendation can best beimplemented will require learning by doing and will depend on country context. To im-plement the GAC strategy, the Bank’s regional Vice Presidential units have identified26 countries that currently are initiating country-specific country GAC strategyprocesses—including, in some of these countries, intensified governance assess-ments that aim to, among others, identify political obstacles to reform and feasibleapproaches to sequencing. At the conclusion of this learning process, Bank manage-ment is committed to reporting to the Board whether and how it intends to system-atize and scale up its GAC work, including AAA. Reporting on the agreed actions willbe done in the context of overall GAC reporting.

Mostly agreed. Management agrees with the recommendation that the most effec-tive way in which PSR can support anticorruption efforts is by giving priority to workon country systems and on information flows to the public. As the recommendation sug-gests, the more complex challenge (which goes beyond the scope of PSR operationalwork) has to do with the relationship between country strategies and operations morebroadly and anticorruption efforts. Management’s response to this broader challengehas been laid out in the strategy, “Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Gov-ernance and Anticorruption” (World Bank 2007c). Three ways in which GAC strategyimplementation addresses this broader challenge are (i) by signaling that GAC is notonly a PSR concern but “is everybody’s business”; (ii) by intensifying efforts to managefiduciary and other GAC risks in Bank operations; and (iii) by underscoring that approachesto addressing GAC are country specific and should be derived from poverty-reductionpriorities. With regard to IEG’s request for operational clarification, this last point im-plies that attention to GAC issues generally will be most intensive in those sectors thatare given priority for poverty reduction in country strategies. The GAC implementationprogress report to the Board, to be presented in 2008, will report on experience.

Ongoing/Agreed. Bank management agrees with the recommendation that a betterframework is needed for the civil service and administrative components of PSR work.A strategic staffing exercise, being undertaken as part of GAC strategy implementa-tion, will help implement this recommendation. The Poverty Reduction and EconomicManagement anchor already has begun recruiting to strengthen its staffing on civil ser-vice and administrative reform. Under the GAC strategy and implementation plan, in-tensified work is under way within that anchor to develop a new generation of“actionable indicators,” with indicators for civil service and administrative a top pri-ority. However, as is evident from the seven-year experience of developing the PEFAindicators—cited as a success in the IEG evaluation—the development of new andbetter indicators is a challenging task that will take time. For the budget execution phasesof financial management, Bank management notes that both the PEFA indicators andthe CFAAs give them strong attention. An earlier, narrower focus on budget formula-tion has already has been incorporated in the Bank’s operational work. Managementwill monitor and report on progress on these actions in reports to Executive Directorson the implementation of the GAC initiative.

Recommendation Management response

x x i i i

Chairperson’s Summary:Committee on

Development Effectiveness

On March 26, 2008, the Committee on Development Effectiveness

(CODE) discussed the evaluation of World Bank support for public

sector reform and the draft management response.

BackgroundKey strategy documents include “Strengthening

World Bank Group Engagement on Governance

and Anticorruption” (World Bank 2007c) and Re-

forming Public Institutions and Strengthening

Governance: A World Bank Strategy (World Bank

2000). The update on implementation of the 2000

Bank strategy was prepared in April 2002, and it

was also reviewed in 2005 as part of the Sector

Strategy Implementation Update, which was dis-

cussed by CODE. The Independent Evaluation

Group (IEG) evaluations related to public sector

reform (PSR) include “Country Financial Ac-

countability Assessments and Country Procure-

ment Assessments Reports: How Effective are

World Bank Fiduciary Diagnostics?” (IEG 2007),

considered by the CODE Informal Subcommittee

in 2007; and “The Impact of Public Expenditure

Reviews: An Evaluation” (IEG 1998) and “Civil

Service Reform: A Review of World Bank Assis-

tance” (IEG 1999), which were considered by

CODE in 1999.

Main Findings and RecommendationsIEG reviewed the Bank support for PSR between

1999 and 2006 across four themes—public fi-

nancial management (PFM), civil service and ad-

ministration (CSA), revenue administration, and

cross-cutting anticorruption and transparency

initiatives. One of the key findings was that per-

formance in at least one dimension of PSR im-

proved in a majority of countries that borrowed

for core public sector activities. IEG also noted

that outcomes of PSR lending were better in PFM

and revenue administration, but less successful

in CSA. It found that direct measures to reduce

corruption rarely succeeded, and it was more

effective to strengthen systems and increase

transparency. IEG identified three factors con-

tributing to better performance: realism about

what is feasible; attention to behavior and orga-

nizational culture as well as incentives that are un-

derlying drivers of reform; and focusing on the

basic issues first. The need for a Bank frame-

work that recognizes the long-term process re-

quired to reduce corruption and the different

starting points of countries was noted. IEG’s

main recommendations were as follows: (i) rec-

ognize the complex political and sequencing

issues in the design of PSR projects and alloca-

tion of resources; (ii) set priorities for anticor-

ruption efforts within country PSR strategies

based on an assessment of which types of cor-

ruption are most harmful to poverty reduction

and growth; and (iii) strengthen the CSA com-

ponents of PSR.

Draft management responseManagement found that the report offered rich

insights. It appreciated the manner in which the

evaluation was undertaken and the dialogue with

IEG on different aspects of PSR. Management was

encouraged by the improved performance in a ma-

jority of countries that borrowed for PSR, al-

though it also recognized that there was no room

for complacency. Although broadly agreeing with

the thrust of the analysis and recommendations,

management commented on the treatment of

the anticorruption agenda, support to the de-

mand side of governance and anticorruption, and

scope of the analytic and advisory activities related

to PFM. It cautioned that the IEG evaluation may

be perceived as a review of the Bank’s anticor-

ruption agenda rather than of PSR that contributes

to reducing corruption. Regarding more diagno-

sis of corruption issues through the Country Fi-

nancial Accountability Assessments (CFAAs) and

Country Procurement Assessment Reports

(CPARs), management considered that there is ad-

equate coverage in these diagnostic assessments,

which typically identify aspects that might facili-

tate corruption. It remarked that work was on-

going to develop stronger links with corruption

issues in the Bank’s PFM work. Management

noted that many lessons emerging from this eval-

uation report have been taken into account in the

Bank’s PSR work.

Overall Conclusions and Next StepsThe Committee welcomed the clear and well-

written evaluation and the positive response from

management. Noting the central importance of

PSR to the Bank’s work, members were gratified

by the improvements in performance in countries

receiving International Bank for Reconstruction

and Development or International Development

Association resources for PSR. There was broad

agreement with the main findings and recom-

mendations, and members agreed on the im-

portance of political commitment, complexity of

sequencing, and the need to sustain efforts over

the long term, especially to change organiza-

tional culture and behavior in support of PSR. Al-

though the Bank has demonstrated comparative

advantage in PFM, a member cautioned against

excessive focus in this area. The importance of a

holistic approach to address the broader and

more fundamental issue of government effec-

tiveness—including of CSA and the delivery sys-

tems for various public services/functions—was

emphasized. Some members emphasized the

need for selection criteria based on the Bank’s

comparative advantage vis-à-vis other actors.

There were several comments about support for

CSA and anticorruption and the advisability of a

more nuanced approach than a simplistic direct

effort. Other interventions related to the need to

consider the sustainability of PSR improvements;

the progress in the Bank’s knowledge of PSR

support since the World Development Report

(WDR) of 1997, whose findings are echoed in

the report; the link between PSR and poverty re-

duction; and internal institutional issues, in-

cluding incentives and instruments to better

support PSR. Better understanding of PSR issues

based on comprehensive international experi-

ence, and the need for candor in evaluation and

learning from failures, were recommended.

The following main issues were raised during the

meeting.

Challenges of PSRGiven the central importance of PSR to the Bank’s

work and the complexity of PSR, speakers were

encouraged by the Bank’s performance in this

area. Members generally concurred with IEG’s

findings and emphasized the need for a country-

specific approach; government ownership and

political will; time and patience for organizational

culture and behavioral changes; coordination

with other donors; and an opportunistic and re-

alistic approach and appropriate sequencing for

PSR. A member remarked on the paradox of PSR

support, which can build capabilities but may not

lead to an increase in government effectiveness;

it was suggested that IEG could further explore

this dichotomy in future evaluations. Manage-

ment commented that the Bank was attempting

to increase government responsiveness and

effectiveness in public service delivery by en-

couraging beneficiary participation in imple-

menting, monitoring, and providing feedback.

Another member highlighted that PSR outcomes

depend on both the Bank’s and the government’s

x x i v


efforts and emphasized that IEG needs to be clear

that it is evaluating the Bank’s and not the gov-

ernment’s performance. IEG clarified that the

evaluation’s primary focus is the effectiveness of

the Bank’s programs, but there is a strong coun-

try context that needs to be considered. The issue

of how the Bank may bring about government

commitment, political will, and behavior changes

was raised. A member suggested that the Bank can

only increase capacity and knowledge, which can

lead to change. Questions were also raised on how

to ensure sustainability of efforts and what the link

between PSR and poverty reduction is. Manage-

ment sought to ensure sustainability by estab-

lishing models of success that would increase

interest and political commitment for further re-

forms. Based on limited data, IEG found that sus-

tainability had been more likely in PFM and

tax administration than in CSA and cross-cutting

anticorruption initiatives. Management and

IEG commented on the links between PSR and

poverty reduction, which is the final outcome (for

example, greater budget transparency leading

to predictable flow of resources for service de-

livery, and better targeting of social spending).

The challenges of addressing CSA, which must be

done country by country, go beyond the intro-

duction of merit-based systems and could bene-

fit from a long-term “in-service” approach. A

member sought clarifications about IEG’s refer-

ence to the “ingrained patronage systems” and

whether this is applicable to all countries. IEG clar-

ified that CSA initiatives often did not succeed be-

cause of difficulties in removing resistance to

reforms and indicated that it would take a care-

ful look at the language in the final report. It was

expected that country teams would have a better

understanding of the context in which PSR sup-

port, including for CSA, would be implemented.

In view of the complexity of PSR, a few members

stressed the importance of sharing experiences

and lessons learned. Some speakers were inter-

ested in learning not only from successful expe-

riences but also from failures and from countries

that have made progress in PSR but that did not

borrow from the Bank for this purpose. A mem-

ber found that the findings of this IEG evaluation

are similar to the main messages of the 1997 WDR

and of the 1999 IEG evaluation on civil service re-

form and wondered what the real progress in

the Bank’s PSR work has been. Management ex-

plained how key findings from the 1997 WDR are

being integrated into its work, such as focusing

on the basics and being more realistic in PFM.

As for the overall lower performance for CSA,

management clarified that outcomes were poor

in weaker governance environments but much

stronger in those countries with a higher gover-

nance environment, as measured by the Coun-

try Policy and Institutional Assessment. Hence,

the key challenge is CSA reform in weaker gov-

ernance environments. IEG indicated that al-

though the Bank is moving in the right direction

in implementing the 1997 WDR recommenda-

tions, the report also highlights the need for con-

tinued efforts to strengthen support for PSR for

which there is no single solution.

Focus of Bank support for PSRWhile noting the Bank’s demonstrated compara-

tive advantage in PFM, many speakers remarked

on the need for a broader, comprehensive ap-

proach to PSR. A few of them cautioned about put-

ting too much emphasis on PFM, which may

detract from broader PSR efforts in other parts of

the government, including service delivery (for ex-

ample, health, environment, transport). Several

others noted that PFM and CSA are interrelated

and stressed the importance of continued support

for CSA, which contributes to good governance.

A few members supported a more nuanced ap-

proach in which the Bank should focus on areas

of comparative advantage vis à vis other donors.

They added that the Bank could still provide sup-

port for CSA, but this should depend on the coun-

try’s request and readiness to address this area.

IEG noted that the report underscores the im-

portance of the interlinkages between the dif-

ferent areas of PSR but also brings out the merits

of more specific and opportunistic interventions

where there is country ownership. Management

agreed that PSR is broader than PFM and com-

mented on Bank support to improve public ser-

vice delivery. It also noted that the Bank’s ability

to support comprehensive reforms depends on

country ownership and political commitment,

and there is a need to be opportunistic and

C H A I R P E R S O N ’ S S U M M A R Y: C O M M I T T E E O N D E V E L O P M E N T E F F E C T I V E N E S S

x x v

incremental in its intervention. Responding to a

question raised about the development of a new

financial instrument to enable long-term support

for PSR, management said the appropriateness

of existing instruments is being reviewed in the

context of the president’s six strategic themes.

Governance and anticorruption (GAC)Several speakers considered indirect approaches

to be more effective in addressing GAC issues in

PSR, such as simplifying processes and enhancing

the robustness of systems, which would reduce

opportunities for corruption. A member urged a

clear articulation of the GAC agenda in PSR and

noted the need for adequate diagnostic tools for

GAC, as well as for assessing the fiduciary risks in

the use of country systems for procurement, and

social and environmental safeguards. He sug-

gested that the CFAAs and CPARs should be ad-

justed to better track progress in GAC. A speaker

reiterated the Development Committee’s request

for actionable governance indicators. Manage-

ment clarified that the CFAAs, the CPARs, the Pub-

lic Expenditure and Financial Accountability

and the Public Expenditure Review already as-

sess the system’s vulnerabilities, which could pro-

vide opportunities for corruption. It added that

efforts are under way to identify and address cor-

ruption risk through systematic corruption risk

mapping in procurement systems.

Staff skill mix and budget resourcesA few speakers sought information on availability

of resources within the overall budget frame-

work, appropriate staff skill to work on PSR, par-

ticularly CSA, and balance of staff between

headquarters and country offices and between the

Poverty Reduction and Economic Management

Network and the Regions. Management said a

strategic staffing exercise is ongoing in the con-

text of the GAC strategy, including for CSA.

Other commentsA member asked how IEG ensures the inde-

pendence of its evaluation, given the staff mobil-

ity between IEG and the Bank. IEG explained

that staff who have directly worked on the topic

being evaluated do not take part in the evalua-

tion. There was a request for IEG to do an eval-

uation on Bank support for privatization of public

firms. IEG indicated it would consider future

work on this, but cautioned that its work pro-

gram in the near term was already very full.

Jiayi Zou, Chairperson

x x v i


Chapter 1Evaluation Essentials• The objective of this evaluation is to

inform decision making about theselection of public sector reform pro-grams based on what is likely towork.

• The scope of the evaluation is Bank support between fiscal 1999and 2006 for country programs toenhance the rule-based operationof governments.

• The evaluation focuses primarily on the effectiveness of countryprograms.

City government building in Guayaquil, Ecuador. Photo © Damon P. Coppola.

Objective, Scope, andMethod of Evaluation

Objectives and FrameworkThe intended audience also includes government

officials and other stakeholders that want to see

what lessons are available for improving project

and program design and for better using the

Bank’s support for PSR.

In other words, the evaluation seeks to provide

country directors or finance ministers with knowl-

edge of what sort of PSR program is likely to work

in their country, based on what has been learned

from the 1999–2006 experiences.

Foremost, this evaluation considers the design of

country programs for PSR—not only the con-

tent and sequence of reforms within the key the-

matic areas, but also the coordination and

sequence of the overall program. Based on in-

terviews with Bank managers and the experi-

ences in a sample of countries, the evaluation also

considers how the Bank organizes its PSR work

and resources.

Support for improving the operation of the gov-

ernment has long been part of the Bank’s work

with countries. The rationale for this work has

evolved and its centrality has grown. Since the late

1980s, it has become one of the most prominent

items on the reform agenda, as will be detailed in

chapters 2 and 3.

The attention to PSR has emerged from two con-

siderations. First, the quality of the public sector—

accountability, efficiency in service delivery,

transparency, and so forth—correlates strongly

with—and is thought by many to contribute to—

long-term growth and poverty reduction, although

causality probably runs both ways (Bates 2001;

Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005; Przeworski

and colleagues 2000; van de Walle 2001).

Second, the World Bank works prima-

rily with government counterparts and

intermediaries. Improving the effi-

ciency of and public support for their

work contributes to the effectiveness

of the Bank’s support to development, because

38 percent of total Bank lending during 1999–

2006—amounting to $62 billion—went directly to

budgets without project earmarks (policy reform

lending, budget support, and so forth), and the

majority of investment lending is executed by

core government agencies.

In 2000 the Bank produced and discussed with its

Executive Board a strategy document—Reform-

ing Public Institutions and Strengthening Gov-

ernance: A World Bank Strategy.1 The strategy

aimed to help build efficient and accountable

public sector institutions in addition to providing

discrete policy advice. The strategy noted that a

The main objective of this Independent Evaluation Group (IEG)

evaluation is to help the World Bank learn how to contribute

more effectively to public sector reform (PSR) in its member countries.

The quality of the publicsector has a strongrelationship with growthand poverty reduction.

3

main lesson from experiences in the 1990s was

that “neither good policies nor good investments

are likely to emerge and be sustainable in an en-

vironment with dysfunctional institutions and

poor governance” (World Bank 2000, p. vii).

The PSR strategy “focuses primarily on core pub-

lic sector institutions and their interface with sec-

toral institutions. It touches only lightly on

institutional concerns within specific sectors… and

it does so primarily to point out generic issues that

concern many sectors” (World Bank 2000, p. 12).

The strategy identified eight areas of

public sector reform in which Bank ac-

tivities could contribute:

• Public expenditure analysis and management

• Administrative and civil service reform

• Revenue policy and administration

• Anticorruption

• Decentralization

• Legal and judicial reform

• Sectoral institution building

• Public enterprise reform.

Concerning tactics to work in these areas, the

strategy also said that PSR support should avoid

trying to make “one size fit all” and should aim to

ensure that basic reforms were done first, before

attempting more sophisticated ones.

Scope PSR is part of the agenda for improving gover-

nance, which includes three broad areas: rule-

based operation of the government itself to

improve the supply of public goods, voice and ac-

countability for citizens to demand better public

services, and more efficient and effective regula-

tion of the private sector to improve its compet-

itiveness.2 PSR in this document refers mainly to

the first area and to the aspects of the second that

deal with transparency and access to informa-

tion. It does not deal with regulation of the pri-

vate sector.

To assess the relevance and effectiveness of the

PSR strategy, the evaluation focuses on projects

in the period between fiscal 1999 and 2006, and

it also looks back to the previous decade to see

the long term of countries’ PSR programs. The

evaluation focuses on the four areas outlined in

the Bank’s 2000 public sector strategy that pertain

to the way the core government organizes itself:

• Public financial management (PFM) con-

cerns the management of money through the

entire budget cycle. This includes budget plan-

ning and execution, in particular, financial

management information systems and medium-

term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs), pro-

curement, auditing, and monitoring and

evaluation. It also includes the implementa-

tion of reforms arising from country financial

accountability assessments (CFAAs) and coun-

try procurement assessment reviews (CPARs)

and the strengthening of key budgetary ac-

countability institutions, such as public ac-

counts committees of the legislature and

supreme audit institutions.

• Civil service and administrative (CSA) re-form involves all aspects of the management

and organization of personnel. It includes pro-

grams to downsize the civil service and re-

forms to the personnel information system

(including civil service censuses), career paths,

pay grades (decompression), other aspects of

the incentive system, and the organization of

ministries.

• Tax administration reform includes the

key aspects of revenue administration, partic-

ularly the institutional setting and develop-

ment of operational processes, including

automation and interaction with taxpayers (ac-

tual and potential).3

• Anticorruption and transparency (ACT)

reforms are involved in the first three areas;

going further, many recent operations support

specific activities to combat corruption and

improve transparency across the public sec-

tor.4 Box 1.1 explains how the Bank support

evaluated here relates to the full spectrum of

work on anticorruption.

The evaluation recognizes the interdependence

of these components of PSR and recognizes that

the Bank’s PSR programs have sometimes worked

across these dimensions. This evaluation does

not delve into sector-specific issues or the reform

4


A Bank-wide strategy forPSR was published in 2000.

of state-owned enterprises, which are important

but deserve separate treatment.

The present evaluation considers all types of Bank

activities to support PSR in countries, including

development policy and investment/technical as-

sistance loans, institutional development fund

(IDF) and other grants, and the major institu-

tional pieces in all types of analytical and advisory

activities (AAA), such as Public Expenditure Re-

views (PERs), Institutional and Governance Re-

views (IGRs), and others. Consideration of AAA has

been coordinated with IEG’s ongoing evaluation

of economic and sector work (ESW).

The evaluation covers the period mainly from fis-

cal 1999 through 2006. Thus, it does not evaluate

the 2007 Governance and Anticorruption (GAC)

strategy, which could address some of the issues

raised in this evaluation; whether that strategy

does so will depend on the implementation. The

Board approved the strategy in April 2007 and the

implementation plan in October 2007.

Criteria for EvaluationIn terms of IEG’s three standard evaluation con-

cerns—relevance, efficacy, and efficiency—this

evaluation is mainly about efficacy, that is, see-

ing what the Bank-supported programs have

done and figuring out what was effective and

why.

The evaluation concurs with the public sector

strategy: in essentially all the borrowing coun-

tries, the objective of PSR is relevant, generally

and in the four areas of evaluation focus. The

proper management of those resources must be

a key determinant of development because core

O B J E C T I V E , S C O P E , A N D M E T H O D O F E VA L U AT I O N

5

This IEG evaluation reviews only part of the World Bank’s work onanticorruption, dealing with cross-cutting systems (IEG evaluatedthe full range of the Bank’s anticorruption work in 2004; IEG 2004b).The Bank’s Anticorruption Strategy, endorsed by the Board in 1997,contained four principal pillars:

• Mainstreaming anticorruption in country analysis, countrystrategy, and lending decisions. This includes the CPIA for theInternational Development Association resource allocationand anticorruption in country assistance strategies (for ex-ample, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Albania).

• Helping countries that request assistance in curbing cor-ruption. This includes support for cross-cutting public man-agement systems and transparency reforms, as well asanticorruption in key sectors, such as extractive industries,health, education, and transport.

• Preventing fraud and corruption in Bank projects and pro-grams. This includes fiduciary controls (financial management,procurement, risk mapping, and mitigation) and investiga-tion of fraud and corruption by the Bank’s Department of In-stitutional Integrity.

• Contributing to international efforts to fight corruption. Thisincludes collaboration with donors, the Development Assis-

tance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and support for regionaland global conventions such as the OECD Convention againstBribery of Foreign Officials.

This review primarily covers anticorruption aspects in the sec-ond pillar, focusing on cross-cutting public management systemsbut not on anticorruption reforms in individual sectors.

The 2007 Governance and Anticorruption Strategy (GAC) con-sists of three broad levels:

(i) Country level: Helping countries build more capable and ac-countable systems (including core public management sys-tems, demand-side institutions, and sectoral institutions)

(ii) Project level: Combating corruption in Bank operations(iii) Global level: Global partnerships and collective action.

This IEG evaluation primarily focuses on the country level of theGAC strategy dealing with strengthening core public managementsystems, but covering projects and activities undertaken before thelaunch of the 2007 strategy. The GAC strategy has just commencedimplementation, and an IEG evaluation on the GAC is planned in duecourse.

Box 1.1: Scope of Review on the Bank’s Anticorruption Activity

Inputs from theUltimate Bank’s country desired impacts PSR areas and outcomes Outputs in the countries programs

public sector spending accounts for 15 percent to

30 percent of gross domestic product in the

Bank’s borrowing countries. In another view, 38

percent of total Bank financing during 1999–2006

went directly to budgets without project ear-

marks (development policy lending, budget sup-

port, debt relief, and so forth), and the great

majority of investment lending is executed by

core government agencies. Therefore, improv-

ing the core public sector is essential for the

overall effectiveness of the Bank’s support to

development.

The World Bank’s results framework for PSR in

table 1.15 shows how PSR can contribute to the

goals of poverty reduction and growth, as well as

accountability of government to citizens. This

evaluation takes the potential connection as a

given and examines the extent to which programs

achieved the objectives of PSR.

6


Table 1.1: Results Framework for Public Sector Reform

Public expenditure and financial managementFiscal discipline, allocation of re-sources consistent with policypriorities, and good operationalmanagement

Civil service and administrative reformHigh-performing public service that attracts, retains, and motivatescompetent staff; transparent,nondiscretionary pay regime appro-priate to local labor market; wagebill within budget constraint

Tax administrationImproved revenue performance;more equitable and efficient taxsystem, reduced tax evasion; moreopen to citizen feedback

Anticorruption and transparencyExecutive branch and personnel areheld accountable for use of fundsand other actions; accountabilityenhanced by audit institutions andpublic access to information; ac-countability and transparency helpdiscourage use of public office forprivate gain

Economic growth

Reduced poverty

Security of life andproperty

Participation and empowerment ofpeople

Improved quality ofand access to publicservices (water,health, and so forth)

Comprehensive budget; transparentbudget planning, approval, and exe-cution; robust and timely account-ing and audit; cost-effective andtransparent procurement (CPIA 13)

Adequate personnel informationsystem; reduced salary compres-sion and turnover; adequate train-ing; effective business processesand interministerial coordination (CPIA 15)

Improved information system; well-paid staff; reduced arrears; reducedcost of taxpayer compliance; re-duced collection cost (CPIA 14b)

In addition to anticorruption meas-ures in the three areas above, clearrules about conflict of interest;sanctions enforced through effec-tive laws, audits, prosecution, andjudiciary; public has access to infor-mation and protection for whistle-blowers (CPIA 16)

Developmentpolicy lending

Technical assistance/investment lending

IDF and othergrants

AAA (PERs, PRSPS,IGRs, other)

Note: AAA = analytical and advisory activities; CPIA = Country Policy and Institutional Assessment; IDF = institutional development fund; IGR = Institutional andGovernance Review; PER = Public Expenditure Review; PRSP = Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.

⎨

⎧

⎩

⎨

⎧

⎩

Obviously, programs are efficient only if they

are effective. Coordination of Bank staff and donor

support, or its lack, would qualify as an efficiency

issue. To what extent were staff skills, internal or-

ganization, incentives, and relations with external

partners aligned for effective support to the coun-

try? By and large, however, the Bank and others

are still trying to figure out what works; fine tun-

ing for efficiency can come afterward.

The question of how effectively the Bank’s strat-

egy was implemented at the country level im-

plies several more specific questions:

• Was Bank support at the country level based on

sound analysis and adequate knowledge of in-

stitutional and political realities?

• To what extent was the Bank-supported pro-

gram tailored to fit the needs of the country and

to take account of institutional and political

realities? To what extent did the Bank use a pri-

oritized and phased approach? Did the program

address basics first?

• Which entry points for the PSR agenda worked

best?

• To what extent did the Bank use lending and

AAA instruments appropriate for country

conditions, including the degree of reform

commitment?

In assessing results, the evaluation draws lessons

on whether the Bank has achieved better results

in some areas of PSR than in others or whether

it has generated better results in some types of

country situations than in others. The question has

two parts regarding to what extent the Bank con-

tributed to PSR in client countries:

• To what extent did PSR succeed in countries

where the Bank was providing support?

• What aspect of the Bank support, if any, con-

tributed to the success?

Attributing PSR results to Bank sup-

port poses a challenge. The evidence

for definitive successes generally

emerges in the longer term, for which

there are only preliminary conclusions. In addi-

tion to the World Bank program influences, the

review considers the impact of conditions in the

country and the programs of other actors, such

as international finance institutions (the Interna-

tional Monetary Fund [IMF] and regional devel-

opment banks) and bilateral donors. Important

country conditions include (i) macroeconomic

conditions, which are linked (causation is in both

directions) to the fiscal situation of the govern-

ment and therefore its ability to address long-

term priorities; (ii) labor market conditions, which

affect the challenges for personnel reforms in

the public sector; and (iii) political conditions

and events, because most authors on the subject

identify political support as essential for success

in PSR.

Methods The evaluation employs three main ways to an-

swer questions: country case analyses, thematic

analyses of the four selected thematic dimen-

sions, and statistical analysis of the pattern of

O B J E C T I V E , S C O P E , A N D M E T H O D O F E VA L U AT I O N

7

Table 1.2: Case Study Countries

Region IDA IBRD

Sub-Saharan Africa Burkina Faso,a Ethiopia, Ghana, Sierra Leone,Tanzania,a Uganda

East Asia and Pacific Cambodiaa Indonesia (blend)

Europe and Central Asia Albania Bulgaria,a Russian Fed.

Latin America and the Caribbean Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras, Argentina, Guatemala

Middle East and North Africa Yemen, Rep. of

South Asia Bangladesh India (blend)a

a. Countries where the team made field visits.

The attribution of PSRresults to Bank support isdifficult.

PSR interventions and outcomes in the full set of

countries for which data are available. The eval-

uation also draws on the previous IEG evaluations

of public expenditure reviews (IEG 1998), civil ser-

vice reform (IEG 1999), anticorruption activities

(IEG 2004b), capacity building in Africa (IEG

2005), support to low-income countries under

stress (IEG 2006b), and fiduciary instruments—

CFAAs and CPARs (IEG 2007)—plus relevant

Country Assistance Evaluations and Project Per-

formance Audit Reports (PPARs). All aspects of the

evaluation were informed by interviews with task

managers and other relevant staff, field visits,

and exchange with IEG teams doing country as-

sistance evaluations and relevant PPARs.

The main unit of analysis is the country program,

as it is generally recognized that success in PSR

depends on a combination of support instru-

ments, which cannot therefore be well appreci-

ated in isolation.

Statistical analysisFor the full set of Bank borrower countries, there

are three types of analysis of the pattern of pub-

lic sector issues, interventions, and outcomes.

First, chapter 3 examines the pattern of choices

for PSR intervention, particularly how they relate

to a country’s International Bank for Recon-

struction and Development (IBRD) or

International Development Associa-

tion (IDA) status and to the initial qual-

ity of the public sector in the country.

Second, the chapter looks at the

medium-term change in public sector quality in-

dicators in the countries where the Bank has

worked on PSR. Third, it examines the data to see

what factors correlate with project success, as

measured in IEG reviews of Implementation Com-

pletion Reports.

Chapter 4 looks at the evidence on these two

questions, organized by country groups. It also dis-

cusses the quality of data and the questions of at-

tribution. Chapter 5 examines the evidence on ef-

fectiveness according to theme.

Country analysisWith a topic as nuanced and country specific as PSR,

country cases are an important complement to

statistical analysis. The country reviews contributed

to an understanding of how different combina-

tions of interventions work in various country set-

tings. The evaluation team did desk reviews of the

Bank-supported programs for PSR in 19 countries,

drawing on country assistance evaluation findings

and PPARs, where available; for six of the analyses

the team also made field visits (table 1.2).

Countries represented different Regions, subre-

gions, and income groups, and all the countries

had substantial Bank support in PSR. The selection

of countries was also coordinated with the de-

centralization and legal/judicial evaluations to re-

duce the burden of the evaluations on client and

Bank staff time.

Each country-level review examined the role of PSR

within the country assistance strategy (CAS). Each

also explored how the strategy was implemented

and what contribution Bank support made to

achieving the PSR objectives. The evolving eco-

nomic, political, and institutional capacity condi-

tions in each country affected the outcomes, and

the evaluation considers whether the Bank took

appropriate account of these conditions in the

design and implementation phases of its support.

Thematic analyses These compare the evolution of Bank practice

with the state of the art in the four thematic areas.

They begin with a review of the literature on in-

ternational experience and then pose questions

to be covered in the country studies. Then, draw-

ing on the results of the statistical analysis and

country studies, they describe the patterns of

success and failure of the most common ap-

proaches in each thematic area.

8


The main unit of analysisfor the evaluation is the

country program.

Chapter 2Evaluation Essentials• The Bank’s engagement with PSR

has gone through four phases.• PSR was initially neglected, except

in building institutions to carry outpublic investment projects that theBank was financing.

• In the 1980s, institutional develop-ment gained recognition as a keycomponent for carrying out policyreforms supported by developmentpolicy lending.

• In the 1990s, many became con-vinced that institutional developmentneeded to be central in most CASs.

• Since 1997, the public sector andgovernance agenda has been for-malized, and anticorruption has been added explicitly.

The north block of the Secretariat building in Delhi, India, is the administrative heart of the government.

Photo © Patrick Horton/Lonely Planet Images.

Historical Overview ofPublic Sector Reform at

the World Bank

Only recently, however, has the Bank identified

governmental capability as a central obstacle to

successful development and allocated an impor-

tant share of its funding operations and analyti-

cal work to improving the institutional capability

of borrowers, not only in the specific projects or

sectors financed by the Bank, but in the overall

conduct of government functions.

The Bank’s engagement with PSR has gone through

four main phases. The discussion of them is based

on interviews with more than 45 current and for-

mer Bank staff and on review of more than 75 doc-

uments and publications (see Bibliography and

appendix E [see http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/

psr/appendix.html for appendix E]).

1946–82—PSR was neglected except in the build-

ing of institutions to carry out public investment

projects that the Bank was financing.

1983–89—Institutional development gained

recognition as a key component for carrying out

policy reforms supported by adjustment lending.

1990–96—The collapse of communist states,

frequent failures of macroeconomic adjustment

programs, and persistence of project loan fail-

ures in Africa convinced many people that insti-

tutional development needed to be central in

most CASs.

1997–2007—The public sector and governance

agenda was formalized, and anticorruption was

added explicitly to the agenda.

1946 to 1982: PSR at the MarginsDuring the Bank’s first 36 years of operation,

public sector management (PSM) capacity was

almost entirely absent in Bank statements, as a

major determinant either of the success of Bank

projects or of overall economic development in

borrower countries. Only a small num-

ber of loans and technical assistance

projects concerned themselves with

broad institutional development in

member countries, beyond the design

of specific project implementation

units.

The vigorous institutional development and PSM

effort by other donors suggests that the 36-year-

long, almost complete absence of that work in the

Bank’s agenda had more to do with particular

The current prominence of public sector governance in the World Bank

is a relatively recent feature of its agenda. Issues related to public sec-

tor capability have been present in Bank operations from its earliest

days, above all when it came to evaluating creditworthiness and making de-

cisions to lend and when ad hoc institutions were designed to ensure the suc-

cess of specific projects.

1 1

The Bank initiallyneglected PSR except tobuild up institutions tocarry out investmentprojects that the Bankwas financing.

features of the institution than with predominant

development thinking. The most evident dis-

tinctive feature separating the Bank from other

donors during the first two to three decades of its

existence was its dependency on market financ-

ing. To raise funds in the market, the Bank culti-

vated a lending culture that stressed visibly and

measurably productive loans, stressed the en-

ergy and transport infrastructure sectors, and

downplayed social and institutional objectives.

The creation of IDA in 1960 introduced a quasi-

grant element into Bank lending, but Bank lend-

ing strategy remained constrained by the primacy

of market funding well into the 1970s.

Among the earliest sources of contact with pub-

lic administration issues were country surveys

prepared by Bank missions between 1950 and

1966. In all, 25 surveys were carried out—the

first in Colombia and the last in Morocco. Many

touched on basic issues of administrative capa-

bilities and political economy. Some of the re-

ports, such as the one on Colombia, resulted in

the creation of new national bodies for pro-

gramming and planning or in strengthening ma-

chinery already in existence.

The Bank’s initial involvement with PSM took the

form of an insistence on national planning mech-

anisms in borrower countries (Mason and Asher

1973). The second area of institutional develop-

ment in which the Bank was operationally in-

volved was the creation of development finance

institutions. Between 1950 and 1971, the Bank

helped design and fund 39 such operations,

mostly during the 1960s.

More broadly, the Bank was drawn increasingly

into the creation, support, and guidance of proj-

ect implementation units (PIUs) and sector in-

stitutions as instruments to ensure

efficient management and coordina-

tion of energy, transport, and agricul-

tural investments. The development

of sector lending in particular enabled

the Bank to contribute to the strength-

ening of government in specific areas,

such as railways and communications

in India, power in Mexico and Colombia, and

ports in other countries.

Another encounter with public administration

took the form of a growing volume of training and

advisory work, including technical assistance mis-

sions and the creation of the Economic Devel-

opment Institute in 1956—an implicit recognition

of deficiencies in government capacity. By the

early 1950s, there was a “growing belief at the Bank

that the relatively low level of economic man-

agement in the countries which it dealt with con-

stituted a major impediment to development”

(Mason and Asher 1973, p. 324), and in 1952, the

Board approved the exploration of a training ini-

tiative. Nonetheless, government managerial ca-

pacity was not a significant feature in the Bank’s

strategy in these years.

An exception to the prevailing neglect of gov-

ernment capacity during these years was a study

on rural development in Africa (Lele 1975). The

study contains a rich discussion of cultural factors

affecting rural development and of the need “to

build human and institutional development ca-

pacities.” The subsequent increase in concern

for good government, in both analysis and oper-

ations, came to be closely associated with the

Sub-Saharan Africa Region, where extreme gov-

ernmental deficiencies became the seeds for a

strategic reappraisal. A subsequent study rein-

forced the call for attention to government ca-

pacity (World Bank 1981).

1983 to 1989: Focus on Quality ofGovernmentQuality of government first appeared as a central

developmental issue for the Bank in the 1983

World Development Report (World Bank 1983).

The principal section in the report, “Management

in Development,” discussed the appropriate size,

role, and managerial efficiency of the state:

Policy and institutional reform are com-

plementary. Policies are relevant only if

there is the institutional capacity to carry

them out, while strong institutions are in-

effective—even counterproductive—if the

1 2


In the 1980s, institutionaldevelopment gainedrecognition as a key

component for carryingout policy reforms

supported by adjustmentlending.

policy framework discourages efficiency

(World Bank 1983).

One precipitating factor for this conceptual “bend

in the road” was the strong evidence that gov-

ernment weakness and corruption was key to ex-

plaining the project failures and disappointing

development record of the 1970s, especially in

Africa. In both rich and poor countries, the pre-

vious development model had placed a great deal

of faith in government, but financial crisis and

economic failure naturally led to a reappraisal of

government’s role and capabilities.

A new consensus developed in favor of smaller and

better government. In response to the Legal

Department’s objections against any political in-

tervention by the Bank, the concern for govern-

mental quality was cast in the politically neutral

terms of managerial capacities.

The changing composition of Bank operations also

contributed to the rethinking of government.

During the 1970s the Bank expanded its work

related to basic needs policies and its lending for

education, health, and urban social infrastruc-

ture—sectors that demanded more of the general

administrative capacities of governments than in-

frastructure lending. Furthermore, the rise in ad-

justment lending drew the attention of the Bank

and policy makers to the institutional constraints

on successful adjustment; policy reforms needed

institutions that could implement them.

In 1983, the Bank created its first organizational

unit dedicated to research and operational sup-

port related to administrative efficiency in gov-

ernment, the Public Sector Management Unit.

During the 1980s, the unit devoted much of its

time to the restructuring of public enterprises. An-

other line of PSM work was civil service reform,

focusing especially on downsizing.

By 1986, in addition to the central PSM unit, spe-

cialized PSM units had been created in three

Regional departments and in the Industrial Re-

structuring Division. A 1986 internal review of in-

stitutional development lending found that most

Bank managers were not convinced of the worth

of institutional development work and that the

Bank lacked intellectual and conceptual leadership

in the institutional development field.

The growth of structural adjustment and sector

adjustment lending throughout this period be-

came a vehicle for an expansion and broadening

of the scope of institutional development opera-

tions. Adjustment lending could accommodate a

variety of concerns and targets, creating space

for reform in core administration, especially in civil

service and financial management, and for across-

the-board reform in the management of state-

owned enterprises.

A review of institutional development work car-

ried out through sector adjustment loans be-

tween 1983 and 1987 found that 55 of 65 sector

adjustment loans approved by the Bank included

institutional development components

and that results were mixed, with good

implementation of simpler reforms but

poor results with more complex and

politically sensitive reforms (Paul 1990).

Though much institutional develop-

ment work was packaged in adjust-

ment loans, the principal instrument

for achieving institutional development

was project-related and freestanding

technical assistance, which accounted

for 95 percent of total Bank technical assistance

resources during the 1980s.

A more complete study of PSM operations during

the 1980s mirrored previous conclusions; the

record was mixed. PSM successes had been lim-

ited, and roughly half the PSM effort had gone into

Africa, where dramatic breakthroughs were lack-

ing. The key problems were the political costs of

bureaucratic reform and the long maturation pe-

riods required for PSM success. The relatively un-

satisfactory record of institutional development

efforts during these years was confirmed by a

1988 IEG review of performance evaluation, which

noted that in a large number of operations the

principal determinants of underperformance were

institutional. A special report on Africa concluded,

H I S T O R I C A L O V E R V I E W O F P U B L I C S E C T O R R E F O R M AT T H E W O R L D B A N K

1 3

The growth ofadjustment lending inthe 1980s became avehicle for expandingand broadening thescope of the Bank’sinstitutionaldevelopment operations.

“The root cause of weak performance has been

the failure of public institutions” (World Bank

1989).

1990 to 1996: Increasing Awareness ofGovernance AgendaBetween 1990 and 1996, four factors increased the

Bank’s awareness of the governance agenda and

induced a more active response: (i) the collapse

of communism, which created an unprecedented

need for reconstructing the public sector; (ii)

recognition of the need for “second-generation”

reforms of the institutions; (iii) donors’ increas-

ing demands and expectations for IDA as condi-

tions for the replenishment of IDA funding; and

(iv) the unacceptable failure rate of in-

vestment lending, especially in Africa.

Intellectual currents also came to bear,

as institutional economics helped to

legitimize the governance-related con-

cerns voiced by noneconomists.

The operational response toward the former

communist states transitioning to democracy and

a market economy went through a learning

process, moving from privatization and social

safety support to a growing recognition of the

need for core institutional and public adminis-

tration development:

At the beginning of the transition, the Bank

understood the need to reorient and

strengthen public sector institutions, but it

greatly underestimated the consequences of

still-weak core institutions and public ad-

ministrations managing the transition process

. . . . PSM reform has often been approached

in an ad hoc manner, without a compre-

hensive long-term institutional development

and reform strategy (IEG 2004a, p. viii).

The Bank’s report on adjustment lending (World

Bank 1990) recognized that early

adjustment loans were often too opti-

mistic about governments’ implemen-

tation capacity and reform commitment.

This directed attention both to meas-

ures that enhance government imple-

mentation capabilities and to what the

report called “the political economy of reform.” In

the pursuit of growth, conditionality had thus

evolved to include administrative reforms as well

as macroeconomic measures. Although it stated

that the Bank must avoid interfering in politics, the

report considered that “the cost of failure was too

great for the borrowing countries and the Bank to

ignore the potential contribution of a better un-

derstanding of the reality of the political econ-

omy of adjustment.”

A task force report titled Governance and De-

velopment (World Bank 1992a) spelled out a jus-

tification for Bank involvement in matters of

governance, particularly in its more sensitive, po-

litical aspects such as the rule of law, transparency,

corruption, and military expenditures. It said lit-

tle about the traditional “technocratic” aspects

of public sector financial and human resource

management; these already had a long record in

the Bank’s agenda, and the issues had more to do

with efficacy than legal and political propriety.

The heart of the report was an elucidation of the

relationship between economic growth and gov-

ernance. The report ended by sanctioning par-

ticular governance considerations that had

previously been excluded.

In October 1996, World Bank President James

Wolfensohn set new precedents by speaking out

against “the cancer of corruption” at that year’s

Annual Meeting (Wolfensohn 1996). This speech

opened the way to a more explicit discussion of

the subject within the Bank. This was made ac-

ceptable under the Bank’s bylaws by redefining

“the ‘C’ word not as a political issue but as some-

thing social and economic” (Mallaby 2004, p. 176).

There was a cost to this tactic in that the Bank

would engage on the corruption issue while still,

in practice, adhering to a prohibition against look-

ing seriously at the political system, which is often

the root cause of corruption (Thomas 2007,

p. 742). Perhaps the biggest boost to the growing

anticorruption movement came about because of

the East Asian crisis of 1997–98, in which public

opinion identified market failures with corruption,

most notoriously in Indonesia.

1 4


In the 1990s, manybecame convinced that institutional

development needed tobe central in most CASs.

A 1992 task force justifiedBank involvement in

governance, particularlyin political aspects that

had previously beenproscribed.

1997 to 2007: PSR Efforts Become Central,Include AnticorruptionThe Bank’s work on broad institutional develop-

ment and governance increased substantially be-

tween 1997 and 2000. This work moved to the

center of CASs, as will be elaborated in the next

chapter.

The 1997 World Development Report, The State

in a Changing World (World Bank 1997b), laid out

the rationale and created an official commitment

for that enhanced role. In the same year, the Bank

issued a report titled Helping Countries Combat

Corruption: The Role of the World Bank (World

Bank 1997a). This report stated the developmental

and legal rationale for including anticorruption

in the Bank’s agenda; admitted that “the Bank

has some catching up to do,” including with its in-

ternal controls; and laid out a comprehensive op-

erational proposal that placed anticorruption

efforts within the Bank’s framework for improv-

ing PSM and governance. It also highlighted co-

operation with civil society and other donors.

The greater prominence of the governance theme

after 1997 was more of a tipping point than a

major change in the underlying forces. For a

decade or more, the most powerful factor driving

governance was the rising tide of democracy. This

factor was most dramatic in the transition coun-

tries, but also in Latin America and, more spottily,

even in some African and Middle Eastern coun-

tries. Democracy brought the rhetoric of ac-

countability, decentralization, transparency, and

rule of law, all of which relaxed the inhibitions that

had previously prevented the Bank from includ-

ing such topics in country dialogues with a large

number of borrowers—much less incorporating

them as loan conditions. A related factor was the

end of the Cold War, which relaxed the pressure

to support authoritarian and corrupt govern-

ments for political reasons. The Bank now had a

freer hand to engage governments on gover-

nance issues.

This trend was closely related to the vigorous

growth of civil society organizations and the

Bank’s relations with them. Nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs) emerged as active devel-

opment partners of governments in social and en-

vironmental work and also as watchdogs of gov-

ernments. In both roles, stronger civil society

was itself a major form of institutional growth

and acted as advance troops for the direction in

which the Bank was going.

Non-Bank donors were moving in the same di-

rection, placing greater priority on governance and

civil society in their aid programs. They not only

set an example and created expertise but also in-

fluenced the Bank from within, through financial

leverage of the substantial donor trust funds man-

aged by the Bank.

Rising concerns with corruption con-

tributed to the strategic reformulation

during this period. One cause was the

publication of comparative measure-

ments of governance, including cor-

ruption, by several sources, including

Transparency International. The mes-

sage of these ratings was reinforced by emerging

revelations of large-scale corruption in several

borrower countries. The argument that corrup-

tion was only part of a larger problem changed

from a reason for inaction on corruption into a rea-

son for action across the whole governance front.

Following the publication of the 1997 World De-

velopment Report, other circumstances came

into play to reinforce a governance agenda. One

was a new strategic proposal, the Comprehensive

Development Framework. This framework gained

important momentum in 1999 when the G-7

agreed to support an enhanced Heavily Indebted

Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. The new initia-

tive was tightly monitored to ensure that debt re-

lief funds would be spent honestly and applied

toward poverty reduction. The Comprehensive

Development Framework was aptly suited for the

across-the-board surveillance and control of gov-

ernance implied by the enhanced initiative.

The step from soft IDA credits to open HIPC

debt-forgiveness grants also brought into the

open the issue of the fungibility of the money the

Bank loaned. The rationale for financial transfers

continued to be growth and poverty reduction,


1 5

Prominence of thegovernance theme after1997 was more of atipping point than amajor change in theunderlying forces.

but, if funds were fungible, the loans

could no longer be justified solely in

terms of the cost benefit of specific in-

vestments or of promised policy

changes.

To justify continued support, it would

be necessary to assure taxpayers in

donor countries that recipient gov-

ernments were making honest and efficient use

not only of the support received but of their en-

tire budgets. The governance agenda, especially

accountability and transparency, became both a

way to improve development performance and a

necessary condition for the continuation of IDA

replenishments and of aid in general.

A 1997 reorganization of the Bank had a substan-

tial effect on the Bank’s capacity to expand PSR op-

erations. One new thematic area, poverty reduction

and economic management (PREM), was to carry

forward the PSR agenda. Previously, PSM had been

the responsibility of a small, specialized unit; after

1997 the field gained prominence and resources

that allowed it to manage specialized PSM projects

and influence a variety of operations in all regions.

A coordinating mechanism was created around the

same time—the Public Sector Board.1 PREM

quickly expanded its capacity for PSM, growing

from about two dozen specialists in 1997 to around

200 by 2000, mostly in Regional units.

A strategy paper, Reforming Public Institutions

and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank

Strategy (World Bank 2000) set out the operational

agenda for this new effort. It provided a road

map for implementing an agenda of PSR for “core

public institutions.” These included the civil ser-

vice as a whole, public financial management,

legal and judicial reform, regulation of the private

sector, and decentralization. This expanded cov-

erage highlighted the shift from past operations,

which had focused on the institutional

capacity for specific projects. Corrup-

tion was to be “explicitly taken into ac-

count,” and new, programmatic lending

instruments, better suited to the com-

plexities and longer time requirements of insti-

tutional change, would be developed.

The fungibility problem was acknowledged and

became an argument for heightened fiduciary

safeguards.2 Analytic work would be increased

and moved upstream and would be more partic-

ipatory to enhance local ownership and align with

the cultural and historical specificity of institutional

reform paths and political economy.

In 1998, the Bank increased the detail and im-

portance of the governance part of the Country

Performance and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).

For allocations of IDA funding, the revised CPIA

placed heavier weight on the quality of govern-

ment management, including transparency and

corruption, as well as the technical aspects of

civil service and financial management, which

had been in the CPIA before. This increased the

leverage for the governance agenda.

The need for fiduciary control was more directly

addressed in 2004 by a multiagency partnership—

including the Bank, the IMF, and several bilater-

als, with a secretariat housed in the Bank—that

developed a performance measurement frame-

work for Public Expenditure and Financial Ac-

countability (PEFA). It focused mainly on financial

management, with increased weight given to

transparency and accountability and the down-

stream phases of the budget cycle. It also con-

sidered at the margin some aspects of civil service

and tax administration.

Again in 1998, another opportunity for donor co-

ordination arose, in this case between the World

Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction

and Development. This coordination led to the

creation of the Business Environment and En-

terprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), which

measures aspects of the business environment in

22 transition countries. Other new diagnostic in-

struments—the IGR, the Public Expenditure Track-

ing Survey (PETS), and the Quantitative Service

Delivery Survey—evolved at the Bank in the late

1990s to complement the PER.

1 6


When the fungibility ofmoney lent by the Bank

emerged as an issue,pressure increased toensure that recipient

governments wereefficiently using their

entire budgets.

The 2000 strategy set out for the first time

the Bank-wide agenda for PSR.

The governance agenda designed between 1997

and 2000 has mostly remained in place, with two

additions. The first addition was upgrading the im-

portance of “the demand side,” meaning citizen

participation, voice, and effective power in the

conduct of government (see World Bank 2004b).

Second, in 2006, the Bank prepared a reinforced

governance and anticorruption strategy, “Strength-

ening World Bank Group Engagement on Gov-

ernance and Anticorruption” (World Bank 2007c),

which the Board approved in 2007. The strategy

laid out seven principles:

• The Bank’s work on GAC is part of the mandate

to address poverty reduction, not an end in

itself.

• Strategy must be country driven.

• Strategy must be adapted to country circum-

stances, not “one size fits all.”

• Strategy requires the Bank to remain engaged

even in countries with weak governance, so the

poor do not “pay twice.”

• The Bank will work with many stakeholders.

• The Bank will not act in isolation, but with

partners.

• The Bank will work to strengthen, not bypass,

country systems through stronger institutions.

The staff, Board, and governments

recognized that the effect of this strat-

egy would depend less on the broad

principals than on the specifics of

implementation, with emphasis on

learning by doing. The Board ap-

proved a GAC implementation plan

in October 2007 with the understanding that it

would be a living document, evolving to reflect the

lessons of experience.


1 7

Since 2000 the importanceof citizen participationhas been recognized andanticorruption hasbecome a central concernfor the Bank.

Chapter 3Evaluation Essentials• Almost all countries get some AAA

for PSR.• A large majority of IDA countries get

lending for PSR, both investmentlending and development policylending.

• The IBRD countries are much moreselective in taking PSR lending; sometake investment lending and otherstake development policy lending.

• The Bank has put more staffing andresources for analytic work into PFM than into the areas of politicaleconomy and civil service (publicadministration).

Tanzanian Parliment Building, Dodoma, Tanzania. Photo © Shawn McCullars.

World Bank Support forPublic Sector Reform

First, the overall package is considered, and then

different types of ESW, lending, and other non-

lending support are examined in more detail. Each

country situation—and the Bank’s response to it—

is unique, yet there are some trends and patterns.

Lending Projects for Public SectorReform

Aggregate trends The Bank approved 467 lending projects from

1990 to 2006 with significant PSR components in

the areas evaluated in this report (see figure 3.1).1

These projects represent 11 percent of all World

Bank (IBRD and IDA) loans approved over the pe-

riod. Of the projects, 62 percent were development

policy loans (DPLs) or credits, and the rest were

investment loans. IDA financed 305 of the projects

fully and 12 in part (blend financing). About two-

thirds of these loans (304) have been made since

1999, and the analysis concentrates on those.

The majority of the 467 PSR projects were not cat-

egorized under (“pathed to”) public sector gov-

ernance (PSG), which reflects the prevalence of

DPLs with PSR components that are managed by

other sectors, especially economic policy. 2 The

public governance sector managed about a third3

of development policy projects with significant PSR

components from 1998 to 2006. In contrast, more

than three-fourths of investment loans with sig-

nificant PSG components have been categorized

under PSG since the mid-1990s.

Total funding to these 467 projects represents

about $47 billion in commitments, or about 13 per-

cent of Bank project lending over the period.

Many of these projects contain a variety of non-

PSR-related components; only 14 percent funded

PSR activities exclusively.4

Considering only the fraction of each project (43

percent, on average) associated with PSR (see

appendix A), these 467 projects represent about

$20 billion (about 5.4 percent of Bank lending) in

commitments designated specifically for PSR5

(figure 3.2). About 83 percent of this funding was

from DPLs. The number of DPLs (289) repre-

sented 62 percent of the 467 projects. Whereas

the majority of these PSR projects were IDA agree-

ments, more than half of the commitment

amounts had IBRD funding.

Both the number and funding of PSR-

related projects have risen over the

last two decades. In particular, there

have been significantly higher levels of

PSR lending since about fiscal 2000.

There was an average of 19 PSR programs per year

from 1990 to 1999, but this number more than

doubled to 40 programs per year from 2000 to

2006. Projects with a significant PSR component

almost doubled, from 7.6 percent of Bank proj-

ects to 14.5 percent,6 which reflects trends in

Bank thinking.7 The value of PSR lending, meas-

ured as a percentage of total Bank lending, in-

creased sharply around 2000, from 2.6 percent of

This chapter examines the patterns of the Bank’s lending and non-

lending support for PSR—over time, by Region, and by type of borrower—

and the public sector outcomes associated with that support.

2 1

The 467 projects represent about $20billion in commitmentsdesignated for PSR.

Bank loans in 1990–99 to 10.2 percent of lending

in 2000–06.

Although development policy lending for PSR has

grown steeply since 2001, the number of invest-

ment loans with significant PSR components

peaked in 1993–95 (at 12–14 projects per year) and

has been at or below that rate since. In other

words, this mechanism for sustaining medium-

term support for institutional development has not

grown apace with the other means for PSR support.

The number of DPLs with significant

PSR components did not grow rapidly

until about fiscal 2001. Since then, they

have predominated, partly because of

the expansion of Poverty-Reduction

Support Credits (PRSCs). Sometimes,

and for some parts of PSR, technical

assistance loans accompany the PRSCs, but in

other cases the country strategy anticipated that

general budget support would provide adequate

incentives and resources for institutional devel-

opment. At least in the cases investigated in detail,

such as Honduras, Tanzania, and Uganda, this did

not happen reliably. The budget-support projects

gave incentives to put resources toward big-budget,

front-line, poverty-reduction sectors such as ed-

ucation and health but not to the smaller, back-

office, institutional development for PSR. So in-

vestment PSR projects had value added in getting

attention and resources to the institutional re-

forms, according to Bank and government sources.

Regional distribution PSR projects were geographically concentrated in

Sub-Saharan Africa (173), Latin America and the

Caribbean (103), and Europe and Central Asia (90).

The number of projects increased in all Regions

throughout the last 20 years, although the pace of

growth varied (figure 3.3). Africa has the highest

share of PSR projects throughout the period (about

15 percent of projects in the Region had significant

PSR components), followed by Latin America and

the Caribbean and Europe and Central Asia. South

Asia had relatively few PSR projects in the 1990s;

it has had 33 PSR projects since 2000, making it the

second most active Region recently.

2 2


The number and fundingof PSR-related projects

have been rising, much ofthe recent increase

coming from policylending related to PSR.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Fiscal year

0

5

10

15

20

25

Investment lending Development policy lending Total, as percent of World Bank projects

Perc

ent o

f Ban

k pr

ojec

ts

Num

ber o

f pro

ject

s

Figure 3.1: Lending Projects with Significant PSR Components, 1990–2006

Source: World Bank database and IEG staff calculations.

W O R L D B A N K S U P P O R T F O R P U B L I C S E C T O R R E F O R M

2 3

Figure 3.2: Lending Value in Projects with a Significant PSR Component

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20060

5

10

15

20

IBRD commitments IDA commitments

Grants (negligible) Total, as percent of World Bank lending

PSR

lend

ing

(cur

rent

dol

lars

, mill

ions

)a

Perc

ent o

f Ban

k le

ndin

g

Fiscal year of approval

IBRD and IDA loans and grants

Source: World Bank data and IEG staff calculations.

a. The graph represents the sum of loans and grants for all projects multiplied by the share that each project allocated to a PSR theme.

Figure 3.3: Regional Distribution of Public Sector Reform Projects

0

5

10

15

20

25

Sub-SaharanAfrica

East Asiaand Pacific

Europe and Central Asia

Latin Americaand the

Caribbean

Middle East andNorth Africa

South Asia

Num

ber o

f pro

ject

s as

per

cent

age

of a

ll pr

ojec

ts in

regi

ona

1992–94 1995–97 1998–2000 2001–03 2004–06

Source: World Bank data and IEG staff calculations.

a. The graph represents numbers of projects with significant PSR components, as a percentage of all projects in the Region.

AAA Tasks for Public Sector Reform8

In 1999, the Bank committed to deliver for every

active borrower a set of five core diagnostics: a

poverty assessment, a Country Economic Mem-

orandum (CEM)/Development Policy Review, a

PER, a CPAR, and a CFAA.9 The pace accelerated

in 2001 when the Bank sought to have

an up-to-date core diagnostic (less

than five years old) for all active coun-

tries. The requirement was removed in

2004 because it became obvious that core diag-

nostic requirements were driven by Bank-speci-

fied timetables and not by the borrowers’ needs.

As a result of the Bank’s changing policy, as well

as the increased coverage, the number of CFAAs,

CPARs, and PERs peaked between 2002 and 2004

(see table 3.1). After a sharp decline in the num-

ber of CEMs in 2001, the number increased again

in 2003 and has remained stable since. The num-

ber of IGRs has steadily increased in the past four

years (appendix C [http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/

psr.appendix.html] has a list of AAA on PSR).

Coverage of AAA for IDA countries has increased.

At the end of fiscal 2006, 54 percent of active IDA-

eligible countries were covered with up-to-date

(five years or less) core diagnostic products, com-

pared with only 13 percent at the end of fiscal

2003. About 85 percent of these had an up-to-date

fiduciary study at the end of fiscal 2006, com-

pared with only 46 percent three years earlier. An-

alytical work in fragile states has significantly

increased since 2001: More than 85 percent have

up-to-date PERs and CFAAs; roughly 80 percent

have CPARs; more than half have a recent poverty

assessment, and more than one-third have a

CEM/Development Policy Review. The Bank also

2 4


Coverage of PSR-relatedAAA has increased for

IDA countries.

Table 3.1: Public Sector Reform AAA Products (number of products)

Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal1999–2000 2001–02 2003–04 2005–06 Total

Core ESW 41 111 198 124 474

Fiduciary studiesa 14 66 104 44 228

PSR CEM/Development Policy Reviewb 12 14 46 40 112

PSR Public Expenditure Reviewb 15 31 48 40 134

Noncore products

ESW 42 46 43 67 198

Public financial management 13 18 16 39 86

Tax administration 1 0 0 1 2

Civil service and administration 8 9 8 6 31

Anticorruption and transparency 20 19 19 21 79

of which: IGRs 0 3 5 10 18

Nonlending technical assistance 15 25 41 50 131

Public financial management 4 10 18 34 66

Tax administration 0 2 2 1 5

Civil service and administration 1 2 9 10 22

Anticorruption and transparency 10 11 12 5 38

Total, core and noncore 98 182 282 241 803Source: World Bank data and IEG staff calculations.Note: AAA = analytical and advisory activities; CEM = Country Economic Memorandum; ESW = economic and sector work; IGRs = Institutional Governance Reviews;PSR = public sector reform.a. Country Financial Accountability Assessment, Country Procurement Assessment, and Integrative Fiduciary Assessment.b. Reports that had as main two sectors the following sectors: general public administration, central government administration, PSM, PFM, civil service reform,other PSR, institutional development, and subnational government.

nearly doubled the budget for AAA in low-

income countries under stress during fiscal

2003–05 compared with fiscal 2000–02.

PERs have the longest history of AAA in address-

ing PSR issues, along with macrofiscal and sectoral

concerns. Since 1999 there have been 161 PERs,

with at least one in 72 percent of borrower coun-

tries. More than three-fourths of PERs since the

late 1990s have given substantial attention to PSR,

typically with chapters on the process of formu-

lating and (more recently) executing the budget.

A forthcoming IEG review of AAA finds that PERs

have substantial positive effect, especially pro-

grammatic ones that are becoming more com-

mon. In some cases, PERs have become part of

the regular budget cycle and thus contribute to

the PFM capacity building, even if there is not an

explicit section on institutions.

For instance, in Tanzania, a good PER with sub-

stantive institutional analysis led the government

to decide to do a PER every year and to have a pub-

lic conference on the report every year to launch

its budget discussions. The PERs discuss how

well the execution of the budget matched what

was approved by parliament the year before and

lay out options for the future composition

of spending. Donors participate in this conference,

and it has become a focal point for their decisions

about what aid to pledge in support of the budget.

Fiduciary studies, CFAAs, and CPARs are now the

most widespread form of AAA—79 percent of

countries have at least one—and are often done

in conjunction with PERs. IEG’s evaluation of the

instrument (IEG 2007) found that CFAAs have

shown steady improvement in quality since guide-

lines were issued in 2003, increasing from 27

percent satisfactory (including moderately satis-

factory) in fiscal 2001 to 97 percent in fiscal 2004

and 2005. For CPARs, the average quality of reports

before the 2002 guidelines was 49 percent satis-

factory; this increased to 84 percent satisfactory

between fiscal 2003 and 2005.

Nonetheless, action plans often lack an appro-

priately phased approach. Client consultation in

the preparation of CFAAs and CPARs

has increased, but the three Bank units

dealing with PFM have often not coor-

dinated adequately, resulting in frag-

mented action plans for clients.

Although core diagnostics added co-

herence to overall country AAA, in small countries

they sometimes crowded out other AAA for PSR

that might have had better value.

Institutional Development GrantsIDF grants concentrate on PSR. The IDFs, estab-

lished in fiscal 1993, support capacity building

and are part of nonlending technical assistance.

IDF grants are relatively small and last no more

than three years.10 A 2001 review recommended

that the IDF “focus its grants more sharply, par-

ticularly on governance,” and identified two focus

areas: financial accountability (financial manage-

ment and procurement) and legal and judicial

systems (World Bank 2001).

Most IDF grants are concentrated in the area of

PSG (table 3.2): in public expenditure and finan-

cial accountability (44 percent in fiscal 2004, 34

percent in fiscal 2005), in monitoring and evalu-

ation (16 percent in fiscal 2004 and 22 percent in

fiscal 2005), and in procurement (10 percent in

fiscal 2004, 18 percent in fiscal 2005). Civil service,

on the other hand, has a low and static number

of IDFs.

Country Portfolios of PSR ActivitiesOverall improvement to PSM requires achieve-

ments in all thematic areas, which the Bank can

and often does support in multiple ways. The

success of PSR in a country therefore depends on

the package of activities that the Bank and other

multilateral and bilateral organizations support.

In the country case studies (further discussed in

chapters 4 and 5), the evaluation considers the

overall donor package. This chapter considers

how the package of Bank support for PSR—lend-

ing and AAA—varies across countries and in dif-

ferent situations.

Table 3.3 shows how the pattern of Bank activi-

ties—PSR investment and DPLs/credits and AAA—


2 5

Fiduciary studies havebeen done in 79 percent ofcountries, but even withimproving quality, manystill result in fragmentedaction plans.

varies according to the borrowing window (IBRD,

blend, IDA) and to the initial (1999) CPIA (13–16)

governance rating as well as the change in the rat-

ing until 2006.

PSR lending has nearly always been accompa-

nied by PSR advisory work in recent years.

In contrast, that AAA was frequently unaccom-

panied by any significant PSR lending. From fis-

cal 1999 through 2006, 45 countries received

PSR-related AAA without any PSR lending, but

only one country received PSR lending with-

out any PSR advisory services. For the coun-

tries that had both, AAA tasks were more fre-

quent; only three countries had more loans than

AAA.

IDFs are mostly for PSR but are less common than

PFR lending in support. Of counties with PSR

lending support, 43 had no IDFs for PSR, and only

a few had more IDFs than loans for PSR. Fourteen

countries had an IDF without any lending. Unlike

with AAA, there is no reason IDFs should accom-

pany lending, as they are intended only for agen-

cies that are not getting support from lending

operations. Interviews in case study countries in-

dicated that country commitment tended to be

stronger with a loan than with an IDF grant.

2 6


PSR theme Fiscal 1995–98 Fiscal 1999–2002 Fiscal 2003–06 Total

Public financial management 38 37 110 185

Tax administration 3 2 1 6

Civil service and administration 21 8 12 41

Anticorruption and governance 4 14 6 24

Total 66 61 129 256Source: World Bank data and IEG calculations. Note: IDF = institutional development funds; PSR = public sector reform.

Table 3.2: IDF Grants on Public Sector Reform Themes (numbers of grants)

Table 3.3: Public Sector Reform Lending and AAA Activities in Relation to Public Sector Governance

Percent Percent with any Percent with PSR Percent Number of

Lending category PSR with PSR development with Percent countriesand governance lending investment policy PSR with in rowCPIA score in 1999 project project project AAA task PSR IDF (of table)

IBRD—all 47 32 40 82 49 54

4 + 27 20 13 73 47 11

3–3.9 57 32 57 86 57 28

< 3 50 43 36 86 36 15

IDA and blend—all 74 54 65 94 64 80

4 + 50 0 50 100 50 2

3–3.9 79 55 71 95 69 42

< 3 69 56 58 92 58 36Source: World Bank data and IEG staff calculations.Note: CPIA governance score is the average of CPIA 13–16. Countries are separated by their classification in 1999 as an IBRD, IDA, or blend country. Develop-ment policy and investment loans include those with the approval date in fiscal 1999–2006. If there is no 1999 CPIA score, the score from 2000 or 2001 is used.AAA = analytical and advisory activities; IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDA = International Development Association;IDF = institutional development funds; PSR = public sector reform.

IBRD lendingAmong IBRD borrowers, governments have wide

scope for selecting areas for which to borrow or

to have AAA. The pattern of Bank involvement dif-

fers according to each country’s initial gover-

nance situation.

Countries with initial governance CPIA ratings of

4.0 or above (11 countries) had no or, at most, one

project (3 cases) in the PSR area. All but one had

at least one and usually several AAA activities

(ESW or nonlending technical assistance). This in-

dicates that they no longer perceive much need

for Bank PSR lending, but the governments still

put at least some value in the Bank’s advice on PSR

via AAA.11 Case studies verified this.

Almost all countries with an initial governance

CPIA score between 3.0 and 3.9 had AAA in the

PSR areas, but the lending activity varied widely:

one-third had none, and almost half had two or

more loans. It appears, therefore, that the PSR ad-

vice has some value for all countries, but the gov-

ernments have divergent views about the

usefulness of Bank lending for PSR. (Presumably

it was available to virtually all of them if they

wanted it. Some received support from other

agencies as well or instead.)

Half of IBRD countries with poor initial gover-

nance—with scores below 3.0—asked for and re-

ceived PSR lending, usually two or more loans, and

all but one of the borrowers improved their gov-

ernance CPIA at least 0.5 points. Therefore, it ap-

pears that (i) the Bank often did stay engaged with

these problem governance states, (ii) it often did

so with lending (if countries wanted it), and (iii)

the engagement was usually associated with im-

provement in the public sector dimensions meas-

ured by the CPIA.

IDA financingOf countries with access to IDA or blend re-

sources,12 three-fourths took PSR lending (cred-

its) and almost all had AAA activities, usually

numerous. Forty-eight of the countries had two

or more PSR loans. These countries usually took

both policy-based and investment lending, in-

cluding technical assistance. IDA countries are,

therefore, more likely than mid-range

IBRD countries to take PSR lending.

This could reflect both a greater need

in these countries for PSR and stronger

pressure from the Bank and other

donors to make reforms.13

For the 39 IDA-blend countries with

initial governance CPIAs below 3.0, a

larger share of cases (28) had PSR lend-

ing, and all but four had some PSR AAA. In almost

all the cases with lending, the governance CPIA

improved (to above 3.0 about half the time).14

Even IDA states with relatively good initial gov-

ernance (CPIA scores above 3.5) received PSR

lending in five of seven cases, often multiple

loans.

Of the six IDA-blend countries with Standard &

Poor’s credit scores in 1999 (which presumably

indicated at least some credit access via the pri-

vate sector), all received PSR subsequent loans;

all but one received at least one DPL for PSR , and

two (Pakistan and India) borrowed heavily for

PSR. All six experienced improvements in their

CPIA governance score from 1999 to 2006, show-

ing the benefits of undertaking PSR reforms when

the country is not desperate for funds.

If having poor public sector institutions is one of

the main reasons that countries have income low

enough to qualify for IDA (as many now believe),

then it is appropriate and relevant that the Bank

had PSR activities in virtually all these countries.15

Global governance performance and indicators

usually take longer to improve, but on

the narrower measures of most CPIA

governance dimensions, there was at

least some improvement in the major-

ity of cases.

Recovering postconflict states typically got sub-

stantial amounts of PSR lending and AAA. The

typically strong improvement in CPIA ratings

for these countries presumably reflects a combi-

nation of benefits from Bank (and other donor)

support and spontaneous rebounding when a

development-oriented government takes over.

Some very small states, mostly islands in the


2 7

IBRD borrowers that mostneeded lending for PSR—those with low CPIAgovernance ratings—often did borrow, and theengagement usuallybrought improvement inpublic sector dimensionsmeasured by the CPIA.

Most of the countries thatdid borrow for PSRimproved their CPIAgovernance ratings.

Pacific and eastern Caribbean, got little or no

lending or AAA in the PSR area. But countries

that demonstrated clear disregard for good gov-

ernance usually still had some AAA for PSR, al-

though they received little or no lending.

Thematic Distribution of PSR ProjectsFor each PSR project, it is possible to identify

whether it has components related to the four

themes of PSR: PFM, CSA, tax administration

(TAX), and ACT (see appendix A).

Public financial management reformPFM was by far the most common theme: it was

a major component of 81 percent (379) of the PSR

projects in the data set. Although 13–14 projects

per year contained PFM components in the late

1980s and 1990s, this figure has risen to more than

30 projects per year since 2000 (see figure 3.4).

Many of these projects contained PFM as a primary

theme of the project.16 Although PFM investment

lending has increased somewhat, DPLs with PFM

components have risen the fastest since 2000.

If one multiplies the commitment amount of each

loan by the share designated as a PFM theme, the

amount we can attribute to PFM lending in the 467

projects with significant PSR components in-

creased from an average of $126.9 million in

1990–99 to $912.0 million per year in 2000–06.

This represented an increase from 0.6 percent to

4.7 percent of total Bank lending. Institutional

development grants for PFM also increased

strongly, from 15 in 1992–99 to 90 in 2000–06, ris-

ing from 3 percent to 18 percent of the total num-

ber of IDF grants.

Since 1990, there has been an increase in total

Bank support to PFM (including procurement);

within this, there has been an increase in program

lending. The number of projects with PFM com-

ponents of 25 percent or greater increased from

59 over the period 1990–99 to 157 over the pe-

riod 2000–06. About 31 percent of these PFM

loans were DPLs in 1990–99, and this increased

to about 67 percent during the years 2000–06.17

The increased lending was supported by IDF

grants for PFM, which increased from 15 in

1992–99 to 90 in 2000–06, and from 3 percent to

18 percent of the total number of IDF grants.

Loan commitments on projects with PFM com-

ponents of 25 percent or greater increased from

$2,179 million over the period 1990–99 to $14,946

million over the period 2000–06.

The number of PFM-focused projects (at least 25

percent of the projects) rose in all Regions from

1990–99 to 2000–06, including an increase from

22 to 64 projects in Africa, from 5 to 18 projects

in East Asia and the Pacific, and from 11 to 22 proj-

ects in Europe and Central Asia. Total commit-

ments on projects with PFM components over 25

percent rose in all Regions, most notably in Africa,

Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and

the Caribbean. A World Bank review (2006g)

found that 32 of 34 recent development policy

operations had conditions, triggers; milestones

linked to PFM-related analytic work and in most

cases were appropriately sequenced, took into ac-

count parallel actions, supported the evaluation

of results, and avoided addressing too many issues.

The World Bank Institute (WBI) and the Financial

Management network (under Operations Policy

and Country Services[OPCS]) have provided con-

siderable nonlending technical assistance to pub-

2 8


Figure 3.4: Themes Included in Projects withSignificant PSR Funding

Source: World Bank database and IEG staff calculations.Note: ACT = anticorruption and governance (transparency); CSA = civil service and administrative; DPL = development policy loan; IL = investment loan; PFM = public financial management; TAX = tax administration.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1990–98 1999–2006

Aver

age

num

ber o

f pr

ojec

ts w

ith

them

e (p

er y

ear)

ACT

ACT

TAXTAX

CSA

CSA

PFM

PFM

DPLDPL

DPLDPL

DPL

DPLDPL

ILIL

IL ILIL

ILIL

lic accounts committees and supreme audit in-

stitutions, which typically report to legislatures.

This part of the budget cycle rarely gets attention

in the lending process, because lending usually

goes to the executive branch, so the nonlending

route has been important. The WBI, for instance,

has had multiyear programs in the Dominican

Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Nigeria,

Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Viet-

nam. Other donors, such as the United Nations

Development Programme and the Canadian In-

ternational Development Agency, have also been

active in these areas and often look to the Bank

for leadership.

The Bank has, of course, used conditionality ex-

tensively with DPLs to encourage PSR. As shown

in figure 3.5, there was a recent rapid expansion

in the number of legally binding conditions related

to PSR.18 This occurred even as the total number

of conditions per loan declined (World Bank

2007a). This meant that the share of PSR in con-

ditionality increased even more sharply.

The boom in PFM conditionality in 2001 reflects the

growth of PRSCs and other budget-support lend-

ing, in which the expected positive effect on poverty

depends on improving the country’s institutions

to manage the budget funds. The efficacy of this

strategy to reduce poverty is being evaluated, but

evidence (see chapter 5) indicates some success

in the intermediate step of improving PFM.

Civil service and administration reformCSA reform was the second most prevalent theme

in PSR lending: more than half (261) of the proj-

ects with significant PSR components included a

CSA theme, a measure that remained roughly

constant (unlike other themes). Consistent with

the overall rise in the number of projects with sig-

nificant PSR components, there was an increase

from about 10 projects per year with CSA com-

ponents to about 20 projects per year.

The number of projects with CSA components de-

clined in Africa (where they had been very com-

mon) and, on average, rose in all the other

Regions. Like PFM, the majority of the CSA proj-

ects were DPLs.19 The number of CSA investment

loans overall trended downward

throughout the 1990s and early in this

decade.

In 2002, however, there was a sudden

and large increase in CSA lending,

mostly with DPLs. If the commitment amount of

each loan is multiplied by the share designated as

a CSA theme, the amount that can be attributed

to CSA lending rose from $126 million per year

in 1990–99 to $422 million per year in 2000–06.

This represents an increase from 0.54 percent to

2.17 percent of total Bank lending. In-

stitutional development grants for CSA

increased from 17 per year in 1992–99

to 34 in 2000–06. This represents about

35 percent of IDF grants over the en-

tire period.

Looking at other measures of the Bank’s activity

in CSA generally, the number of projects with sig-

nificant PSR components has grown over time,

particularly since 2000. This trend reflects an in-

creasing number of PSR projects overall, rather


2 9

Public financialmanagement was the mostcommon theme in PSRprojects and has increasedsharply since the 1990s.

Figure 3.5: Public Sector Reform Conditions

Source: Adjustment Lending Conditionality and Implementation Database and IEG staff calculations.Note: ACT = anticorruption and governance (trqansparency); CSA = civil service and administrative; PFM =public financial management.

0

50

100

150

1990 1995 2000 2005

Num

ber o

f con

ditio

ns

ACT reformCSA reformPFM reformTax administration reform

Fiscal year

By year of project approval and theme

More than half of projectswith PSR componentsaddressed CSA reform,mostly throughdevelopment policy lending.

than a greater share of projects with a CSA com-

ponent, which has stayed roughly constant. This

trend contrasts with both the ACT and PFM

themes, where the share of projects with these

components has gone up significantly over the

same period (see figure 3.5).

The mix of lending instruments between invest-

ment loans (or credits) and DPLs has fluctuated

since 1990. The number of investment loans with

CSA content declined gradually through most of

the 1990s but has risen since 2001. The number

of DPLs with CSA conditions increased substan-

tially since 2004 (figure 3.5).20

The case studies show that technical assistance

funded with investment loans has been a partic-

ularly important tool for encouraging reform in

the area of civil service reform, especially in poorer

countries where capacity levels are usually very

low. In some cases, the lack of supporting tech-

nical assistance was cited as a hindrance to

progress where only DPLs supported CSA re-

form. Learning from such experiences, especially

in PRSC countries, led in some cases (for exam-

ple, Tanzania) to the revival of investment lend-

ing to support civil service reforms.

Tax administration reformTAX reform was included in 24 percent of the proj-

ects with significant PSR components. It was in-

cluded in almost six projects per year from 1990

to 1999 and in seven to eight projects per year

from 2000 to 2006. Two-thirds of these projects

were DPLs. Tax administration conditions were

relatively less common overall, with only 192

legally binding conditions, roughly 27 per year

from 2000 to 2006. The strong role of

the IMF on tax issues may account for

this. In investment projects, TAX was

often the sole focus (10 percent of the

investment loans with significant PSR

components).

Anticorruption and transparency reformProject components explicitly identified as ACT re-

form became much more prevalent starting

around fiscal 1999. Anticorruption and gover-

nance components typically supported anticor-

ruption commissions or laws.

The term “governance” has many meanings—

including legal and regulatory reform, public en-

terprises, public financial management, civil ser-

vice, and administration of sector programs—but

in the context of classifying project components,

the term has usually meant transparency measures

that would help reduce corruption and promote

better accountability. This includes freedom of

information laws and agencies. So in this evalua-

tion, the category is called anticorruption and

transparency.21

ACT components appeared in only nine percent

of the PSR projects during the years 1990–99.

From 2000 to 2006, however, 38 percent of PSR

projects contained identifiable ACT components

(an increase from 1.7 to 15.1 projects per year be-

tween these respective periods), mainly due to the

presence of ACT conditions in policy reform proj-

ects. Increases in this indicator occurred in all

Regions.

The number of projects with ACT components

remains lower than the number of projects with

CSA and PFM components. The number is, how-

ever, much higher than in the 1980s and 1990s,

when almost no projects had ACT components.

ACT does not appear to be crowding out other

PSR themes. Rather, it appears that the other

three themes are included in about the same

fraction of PSR projects as earlier, and ACT should

be understood as an addition to the typical

package.22

Staffing for PSR Staffing is another indicator of Bank inputs, for not

all work shows up as coded activity with clear at-

tributes. Based on a survey of Regional public

sector managers, table 3.4 shows the allocation of

staffing across the Regions and thematic areas.

Within in the public sector part of PREM there are

almost 100 staff and regular consultants working

on country support in the four areas of this eval-

uation’s focus (not counting legal and judicial, de-

3 0


In 1999, the prevalence ofanticorruption andgovernance reform

components increasedsharply.

centralization, and so forth), plus the OPCS staff

working on country systems for financial man-

agement and procurement and the PREM Eco-

nomic Policy staff working on public expenditure.

The Regional distribution is roughly in proportion

with the distribution of projects, with the largest

number in Africa, followed by Europe and Central

Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and South

Asia.

PFM specialists account for more than half of

PREM staff, and there is an even larger contingent

within OPCS (not counting those who mainly

do financial management and procurement for

Bank projects). About one-fourth of PREM pub-

lic sector staff specialize in civil service. The rest

specialize in tax administration or anticorrup-

tion and political analysis, plus some in

decentralization and legal/judicial;

those themes, however, are not the

focus here. The civil service contin-

gent is almost as large as the PFM part

of PREM in Sub-Saharan Africa and Eu-

rope and Central Asia, but is much

smaller in the other Regions. Tax administration

specialists are all in Europe and Central Asia or

Latin America and the Caribbean, with none in

other Regions, despite the success of such proj-

ects in IDA countries (discussed in chapter 4).

The majority of staff are at G level, half of that E/F,

and again half of that at H. The share of H-level

staff in Africa was smaller than the average for the

other Regions.


3 1

Table 3.4: Public Sector Staffing and Specialties by Region

Europe Latin MiddleSub- East and America East and

Saharan Asia and Central and the North SouthTotal Africa Pacific Asia Caribbean Africa Asia

PREM 99 24 12 18 16 13 16

Public expenditure/ 60 11 7 7 12 7 16financial management

Civil service 28 9 2 6 2 3 6

Tax administration 5 0 0 4 1 0 0

Anticorruption 13 2 0 3 1 2 5

Political analysis 15 2 4 1 1 1 6

Level E/F 24 6 3 4 7 3 1

Level G 60 16 7 11 7 8 11

Level H 15 2 2 3 2 2 4

OPCS

Financial management 33 6 5 6 5 2 9

Procurement 78 16 17 14 7 9 15Source: IEG survey and calculations. Note: Some people work on more than one theme, so the total of people by themes exceeds the total number of people at various personnel grade levels. Theprocurement figures are all the G and H level; for staff at these levels, work on the country systems is a more substantial part of their activity (rather than justprocurement for Bank financed projects). PREM = Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network; OPCS = Operations and Policy Country Services.

Although anticorruptioncomponents have grownsince the 1980s, this doesnot appear to becrowding out otherthemes.

Chapter 4Evaluation Essentials• The majority of countries that bor-

rowed to support reform of the corepublic sector had improved perfor-mance in at least some dimensions,with outliers in every category.

• IBRD countries improved more oftenthan IDA countries, but the differ-ences with nonborrowers weresimilar.

• IDA countries that had more PSRloans did better—about as well asthe IBRD borrowers (one-timers)—whereas IBRD repeat borrowers didnot do better.

• IEG ratings of outcome and Bankperformance were also better forIBRD countries.

• Greater selectivity by countries intaking PSR loans could explain someof the difference, but IBRD wouldprobably have better outcomes evenwithout the selectivity effect.

Government building in Sofia, Bulgaria. Photo © J. Kaman/Travel-Images.com.

How Public Sector ReformOutcomes Differ by

Country Groups

Measurement, Attribution, and the Roleof Governments, the Bank, and DonorsExternal actors come into play, including the

World Bank along with other international insti-

tutions (IMF, the European Union, the United

Nations Development Programme, regional de-

velopment banks) and bilateral agencies. Several

of them are usually involved, in close collabora-

tion with the government when there is success,

but even excellent external support alone is in-

sufficient to guarantee success.

Measurement and timing further compound at-

tribution. Measurements of the initial governance

situation and the subsequent changes are far from

perfect, even with the many improvements over

the last decade. And when there is some reform

effort, the effects become evident only with a lag,

and an even longer lag is required to know if the

effect is sustained.

Although the evidence has weaknesses, and al-

though attribution will always be a problem, it is

important to examine available evidence to con-

sider midcourse corrections if the evidence seems

strong enough to suggest them.

Coordination with other donors in PSR support

has gotten increasingly sophisticated and gener-

ally well adapted to the country situation. For

instance, in Guyana the Inter-American Devel-

opment Bank is able to do policy-based lending

to complement the technical assistance work of

the Bank; in Bangladesh and Indian states, the

World Bank’s policy-based lending complements

the technical assistance grants of the United King-

dom’s Department for International Develop-

ment (DFID) programs. With Indian states, the

Asian Development Bank and World Bank have a

geographic division of labor. In Tanzania, there is

now basket funding for several dimensions of

PSR, to which the Bank contributes but which

does not always take the lead role. The govern-

ment has taken the lead, rightly insisting on bet-

ter coordination. Deputy Minister Lyimo, the

Bank’s lead counterpart and recipient of the 2006

Gill Award, demanded of all the donors, “One

process—one assessment.”

When governance changes in a country, it is never possible to say

precisely who is responsible—who should take credit for im-

provement or blame for deterioration. Of course the country it-

self, especially the government, has the most control and responsibility, but

the degree of that control varies, as does the degree of coherence within the

public sector. There is never success in PSR without favorable government

involvement.

3 5

Both the need for strong government participa-

tion and ownership in successful PSR and the

typical participation of many donors make it dif-

ficult to have any clear attribution of results to the

Bank’s intervention. This is unavoidable and ap-

propriate. What the Bank can ask for is that the

process in a country to which it contributes has

an impact that improves the public sector’s ac-

countability and efficiency in furthering growth

and poverty reduction.

Two kinds of outcome measures are

available for essentially all the coun-

tries receiving the Bank’s lending proj-

ects for PSR: the changes in governance

indicators and IEG project ratings.

There is also less systematic but deeper

information for a few counties in the

case studies.

Governance measuresThe CPIA is the main governance indicator con-

sidered here, though it has pros and cons (box

4.1). Indeed, one may consider the relevant CPIA

indicators as the specific objectives of core PSR.1

To measure changes in PSG, the analysis below

uses the change of the average of CPIA indicators

13–16 (the governance CPIA) between 1999 and

2006.2

The outcomes of PSR are inherently difficult to

measure. The discussion that follows provides in-

dicative information at best. The results here indi-

cate correlation, not causation, for several reasons:

• Imperfect measures of governance quality and

the absence of these measures across wide

ranges of countries and for a long enough time

frame to see the effects of PSR

3 6


Two available measures of outcome are changes

in CPIA governanceindicators and IEG

project ratings.

For this evaluation, two major advantages of the CPIA are that itcovers essentially all borrower countries and that it rates per-formance categories that correspond closely to the thematic areasof the evaluation.

Bank staff make the CPIA ratings, so one must ask if this biasesthe ratings so as to invalidate them as a measure for this evalua-tion. Bank management uses the CPIA ratings to allocate budgetand lending resources, especially for IDA countries, and wants themto be unbiased. An extensive benchmarking and vetting processis used to avoid bias and to counterbalance the natural tendencyof country teams to make their countries look better. An externalreview of the CPIA in 2004 concluded that there was no serious bias(World Bank 2004a). Collier (2007) also uses the CPIA to define hiscategory of failing states.

The team for this evaluation also tested whether more lendingfor a country biased its CPIA rating upward. (If there were such abias, it would undermine the CPIA as an indicator of progress forcountries that received lending for PSR.) For this test, we used theInternational Country Risk Guide (ICRG), one of the major externalrating projects, with coverage similar to CPIA; its ratings are pos-

itively but not perfectly correlated with CPIA ratings. We ran a re-gression to see if a variable for past Bank lending explained the di-vergence between the two ratings. Although the coefficient onlending was statistically significant, it was very small—having an-other loan of any type increased the total CPIA by less than 0.02,on a scale of 1–6, compared with what the ICRG would predict. Sofor comparing groups of countries, the conclusion was that the CPIAwas useable as a measure of initial conditions, and the change couldmeasure the progress in PSR.

To interpret the results with the CPIA, one must bear in mind thatthe nature of progress measured by the CPIA (at least for the pub-lic sector items) evolves as one moves up the scale. The low rat-ings mostly refer to basic processes in areas of concern—such ashaving a publicly approved budget, having rules for hiring person-nel and against accepting bribes, and having nominal rules forchecks on executive authority. These are necessary steps to im-proving the public sector, but effective implementation and en-forcement of rules to assure results only comes at the higher ratings.So a 3 is better than a 1 or 2, but a citizen may not perceive any better services and accountability until the rating gets to 4 or 5.

Box 4.1: Pros and Cons of CPIA as a Governance Measure

• The coarseness of most governance measures,

in addition to uncertainty and imprecision

• Difficulty in capturing the timing of the im-

pacts of the programs

• Nonrandom selection of countries for having

PFM lending programs and governance ratings

• Omitted variable biases and the lack of infor-

mation about PFM reforms with non-Bank

sources of support.

Summary ResultsThree-quarters of countries getting Bank PSR

lending in the period 1999–2006 experienced at

least some improvement in the governance CPIA

measure. In a quarter of the cases, the improve-

ment averaged at least one notch (0.5) across all

four categories, which is substantial for the rela-

tively short period covered. Countries with PSR

lending improved 0.3 points on average in the

CPIA from 1999 to 2006; countries without PSR

lending did not on average show a major change.

This correlation indicates a combination of two

phenomena: (i) Bank support helps improve pub-

lic sector performance and (ii) a selection process

exists whereby countries that are more enthusi-

astic about PSR (and would improve somewhat

anyway) are more likely to get Bank support.

Both phenomena are desirable. The statistical

analysis cannot tell which phenomenon pre-

dominates, and both were present in the case

study countries with successful programs.

Whether countries have improved their gover-

nance also depends on income level and where

they start. Countries in all categories of initial

governance and IBRD/IDA were more likely to im-

prove governance if they had a PSR project. Coun-

ties with lower initial ratings, say below 3.0, were

more likely to improve than those with higher rat-

ings. This is probably because movement in the

higher ratings requires more serious changes to

the way of doing business, as noted in box 4.1.

A number of countries improved even without

Bank lending for PSR, especially those that started

at low governance levels. Many countries had as-

sistance from other external sources,

even when the Bank was not involved.

And some just did it on their own.3

The Bank’s support for PSR is not in-

dispensable, even though it usually

does seem to be helpful. Table 4.1 in-

dicates that when there was not lend-

ing, IDFs and AAA from the Bank were

not consistently correlated with improved public

sector performance.

IBRD countries with PSR projects improved more

frequently than IDA countries, especially for those

with mid-range initial governance ratings. In some

cases, such as Cambodia and Honduras civil ser-

vice, this was because project design was less

well adapted to country circumstance

for the IDA borrower. A higher degree

of self-selection by IBRD borrowers

that had PSR lending programs proba-

bly also contributed to the difference.

Among countries with initially low gov-

ernance (CPIA lower than 3.0), however, for rea-

sons that are not clear, the rate of improvement

for borrowers was higher for the IDA countries

than the IBRD countries.

The Bank—with a variety of tools, international

knowledge, and analytic capacity—has a com-

parative advantage for diagnosis in the technical

aspects of the four PSR themes. Discussions with

the government counterparts and other donors

in the countries visited confirm this perception but

also indicate that the extent to which this advan-

tage is used varies across themes and across coun-

try types.

In some countries (typically IBRD countries), the

government has the financial freedom and in-

house technical capacity to decide whether, when,

and for what it will borrow for a PSR project.

Then the strategy tends to be custom made

(“selective”) to the country circum-

stances. But in countries getting major

budget support (typically IDA/PRSC),

the Bank and donors more often insist

on a full array of public sector reforms,

H O W P U B L I C S E C T O R R E F O R M O U T C O M E S D I F F E R B Y C O U N T R Y G R O U P S

3 7

Three-quarters ofcountries that receivedPSR lending over1999–2006 saw animprovement in theirgovernance CPIAmeasure.

Countries with lowerinitial ratings were morelikely to improve thanthose with higher ratings.

IBRD countries improvedmore frequently than IDAcountries when they hadPSR loans.

and staff often lack the time and resources to de-

sign a fully tailored product. So the result is likely

to be one size fits all, off the shelf.

The relatively favorable experience with PSR in

the IBRD (middle-income) countries, where the

leverage of lending rarely motivates reform, shows

that the Bank can motivate reforms on the basis

of its high-quality expertise and advice. (See also

the discussion on project ratings.) Especially in an

area such as PSR, where long-term commitment

is essential—one-off decisions and turnkey oper-

ations will never suffice—success has come if and

only when the experts work over time with gov-

ernment counterparts to design and implement

a project that fits local circumstances.

Regional differences in resultsJust as the incidence of lending varied across Re-

gions, so did the correlation of PSR lending with

changes governance scores (see table 4.2). Europe

and Central Asia has the highest rate of im-

provement for countries getting PSR lending—

90 percent—but the rate of improvement for

nonborrowers is almost as high. Clearly something

else is going on: European Union accession.

Almost all the countries in Europe and Central Asia

not borrowing for PSR in 1999–2006 were among

the first from the East to join the European Union

and had done a lot of reforms with Bank support

before 1999.

Latin America and the Caribbean had the second

highest rate of improvement for PSR borrowers

and a high differential with nonborrowers. In this

Region, the improvement rate for IDA was above

IBRD (both categories having significant num-

bers of countries). Africa and East Asia both had

70 percent improvement rates for borrowers,

with Africa having the larger differential from the

nonborrowers. The Middle East and North Africa

and South Asia have the lowest percentages of im-

provement in governance CPIA scores for PSR

borrowers.

IEG Project RatingsAnother source of evidence on these projects is

the ratings provided by IEG. Of the 238 PSR proj-

ects that closed during calendar years 1999 through

2006, three-quarters of PSR projects with IEG rat-

ings received an overall outcome rating of at least

3 8


Table 4.1: Percent of Countries with Improved CPIA Governance Scores by PSRTheme and IDA/IBRD Classification

MajorIBRD IDA or blend Total improvement

Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number (>0.5) (%)

Any PSR lending 81 31 69 62 73 93 24

With >=2 PSR IL 64 11 73 30 71 41 22

With >=4 PSR AL 25 4 83 12 69 16 6

With IDF(s) 84 19 67 45 72 64 25

Without IDF 75 12 76 17 76 29 21

No PSR lending 54 26 38 16 48 42 5

With IDF(s) 44 9 50 6 47 15 7

With AAA (only) 56 16 31 13 45 29 7

Source: WB CPIA scores and IEG staff calculations.Note: Entries show the percent and number of countries that show an improvement in the average of CPIA 13–16 between the years 1999 and 2006 (or closest yearavailable). Columns classify countries by their 1999 IBRD/IDA classification. Rows provide this figure for subsets of countries based on the number and type of in-vestment loans (IL) approved or active fiscal 1999–2006 and DPLs (AL) approved in fiscal 1999–2006. AAA = analytical and advisory activities; IBRD = InternationalBank for Reconstruction and Development; IDA = International Development Association; IDF = institutional development funds; PSR = public sector reform.

“moderately satisfactory” and almost half received

a rating of “satisfactory” or “highly satisfactory”

(table 4.3).4 Project design (quality-at-entry) and

supervision received usually received more fa-

vorable ratings on overall outcome, which suggests

that the main source of difficulty is with the coun-

tries’ performance. Another factor, however, is

that project objectives (against which outcomes are

judged) are sometimes overly ambitious, which

pulls down the outcome ratings. More modest

objectives with the same substantive projects

would have led to higher ratings.

PSR projects to IBRD countries received a larger

share of “satisfactory” outcome ratings (“moder-

ately satisfactory,” “satisfactory,” and “highly satis-

factory”) than IDA and blend countries. Differences

between development policy and investment lend-

ing projects were mixed but were generally small.

Projects in the Europe and Central Asia Region


3 9

Table 4.2: Percent of Countries with Improved Governance CPIA Scores by Region,1999–2006

Yes No

Region Percent Number Percent Number

Sub-Saharan Africa 70 30 47 15

East Asia and Pacific 70 10 56 9

Europe and Central Asia 90 20 86 7

Latin America and the Caribbean 75 20 25 8

Middle East and North Africa 57 7 0 2

South Asia 50 6 0 1

Total 73 93 48 42

Source: World Bank CPIA scores and IEG staff calculations.Note: Entries show the percent and number of countries with an improvement in the average of CPIA 13–16 between 1999 and 2006 (or closest year available).Columns classify countries by their 1999 IBRD/IDA classification. Rows provide this figure for subsets of countries based on the number and type of investmentloans approved or active fiscal 1999–2006 and development policy loans approved in fiscal 1999–2006.

Table 4.3: Summary of IEG Project Ratings for Closed PSR Projects, 1999–2006

Lending Lending instrument classification Region

East Europe Latin MiddleSub- Asia and America East and

All PSR Invest- Adjust- Saharan and Central and the North Southprojects ment ment IBRD Blend IDA Africa Pacific Asia Caribbean Africa Asia

Overall outcome rating

Percent S or HS 43 37 45 55 43 35 37 22 67 41 20 41

Percent MS, S, or HS 74 67 78 81 75 69 68 61 92 70 60 86

Overall Bank performancerating

Percent S or HS 79 66 85 89 78 73 68 78 92 84 70 86

Percent MS, S, or HS 80 67 86 91 78 74 69 78 92 88 70 86

Source: IEG Project ratings database and IEG staff calculations.Note: Table includes projects with significant PSR components that closed between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2006, and have received IEG project ratings (238 projects). Rowsindicate when cells provide the percent of projects with marginally satisfactory (MS), satisfactory (S), or highly satisfactory (HS) ratings.

performed the best on average, with South Asia and

Latin America and the Caribbean Region also doing

better than the others.

Projects implemented in countries with higher

CPIA governance scores5 received higher proj-

ect ratings. For example, 67 percent of countries

with a 1999 CPIA score above 4.0 received at least

a “satisfactory” IEG outcome rating, whereas only

54 percent of projects implemented in countries

with a 1999 CPIA score of 2.0–2.5 received this rat-

ing in the same period. In particular, projects in

countries with high governance scores scored

exceptionally high in the borrower preparation,

implementation, and compliance ratings.

In a sense, this result is not surprising, but it raises

the question of why PSR projects are not better de-

signed and implemented in the countries that

need reform most urgently—according to the

Bank’s own ratings. From the case study evidence,

it seems that expectations are often unrealistic

and the projects sometimes fail to take care of basic

matters first, especially in countries where the ba-

sics are most often missing. It is also possible that

the government commitment is less

predictable in the countries with weak

governance, making it more likely that

outcomes would fall below the satis-

factory range even if the expected

outcomes (ex ante objectives) were

unbiased on average.

The success rates for PSR projects—measured

by IEG ratings—was higher for IBRD loans than

for IDA credits. The reasons for this are not evi-

dent in the statistics, but the country cases sug-

gest two possible explanations. First, the design

of reforms is sometimes based on models for de-

veloped countries, which are too complex for

still-developing countries. And the gap is greater

for the IDA countries, which tend to have insti-

tutions that are further from those of developed

countries for which the models are developed.

Second, the expectations and objectives in heavy

budget-support projects tend to be more ambi-

tious and global, reflecting the donors’ list of

things that need fixing rather than the govern-

ment’s list of things it is ready to do. So the rea-

son for the lower success rate in IDA countries

may have been that IBRD borrowers had a

stronger say in selecting project components, in-

cluding conditions.

Ratings of IDF grants, most of them for PFM, have

improved overall (IEG 2007). For grants approved

between fiscal 2002 and 2005, relevance was rated

satisfactory in 99 percent, outcome in 79 per-

cent, sustainability in 72 percent, Bank perform-

ance in 90 percent, and client performance in 77

percent. Relevance, sustainability, and Bank per-

formance showed the greatest improvement since

2001. Procurement grants had the lowest per-

formance, with less than 70 percent of the grants

rated as satisfactory. Financial management grants

(including auditing) performed at levels similar to

the whole group; however, differences across Re-

gions were substantial. Financial management

grants included several best-practice cases, as in

Thailand and Turkey.

Interviews in some country visits indicated that

the government counterparts do not take IDFs as

seriously as loans. Quality of supervision also re-

mains a problem in IDF implementation. Super-

vision quality has depended on the availability of

the task team leader and was usually better with

a team leader based in the field. Continuity is

also important: the few grants for which team

leaders were changed more than once had lower

ratings for quality of supervision (IEG 2007).

Reasons for Country DifferencesSome of the outcome differentials result from the-

matic factors discussed in the next chapter, but oth-

ers are more cross cutting. In all four thematic

areas of PSR, the Bank concentrates on the formal

rules and regulations, and where divergence from

actual practices is recognized, the most common

strategy is to fix the formal rules in ways that en-

courage greater compliance and/or reduce op-

portunities for corruption. Such a tactic makes

sense for an institution like the Bank, which works

mainly with the executive branch of government.

However, it is often done without much knowledge

4 0


Projects implemented incountries with higher

CPIA governance scoresgenerally received higher

project ratings.

of what created the problem in the first place and

without a clear understanding of the informal

processes that typically determine the outcomes.

Some country cases show that the Bank’s un-

derstanding has improved regarding the difference

between formal managerial processes and the

practices that actually take place, driven by political

economy factors. Guatemala, Bolivia, Honduras,

and India are examples of relatively good practice.

The Bank has to some extent taken the differences

between formal process rules and administrative

practices into account in designing and carrying

out its support for PFM and taxes. Civil service and

corruption have proven more difficult and less

successful.

World Bank guidelines (World Bank 2001) rec-

ommended substantial participation by clients in

PFM data gathering and analysis to facilitate own-

ership by clients of the results of the analysis. Since

2001, the country cases have shown a mixed record

of the Bank’s PERs and other PFM AAA being more

responsive to demand from borrower countries,

including the private sector and civil society as

well as government. Bank assistance has also been

more active in helping to shape the demand. Good

examples were noted in Bangladesh, Tanzania,

Uganda, and Vietnam. In some places, such as

Bulgaria, the Russian Federation, and Ghana (until

recently), the Bank had a productive interaction

with the government but not with civil society.

Reasons for shortcomings include lack of incen-

tives for Bank staff to disseminate AAA findings,

Bank focus on supply-side rather than demand-side

interventions, and concern among Bank staff that

civil society awareness raising constitutes political

lobbying, which is forbidden by the Bank’s char-

ter. This is part of a broader issue: under matrix

management—according to interviews with staff—

the Bank has gotten better at building cutting-edge

skills, but not at integrating knowledge in support

of operations at the country level.

The Bank’s understanding of political economy is

improving, but much of it is still at a general level,

without connection to details of the

PSR agenda. Increasingly, there is agree-

ment that a governance assessment is

needed before a country proceeds to

specific public sector reforms. Ad-

dressing corruption, for instance, re-

quires understanding the nature of governance in

the particular country. For this, the Bank has done

much less. Through fiscal 2006 there were more

than 20 IGRs, on a variety of topics, but only 5 of

them gave serious attention to the political econ-

omy of the public sector as a whole. It is this sec-

tor that drives corruption and other aspects of the

PSR agenda being evaluated here.

Only in a few cases (for example, Bangladesh,

Bolivia, and Peru) have such analyses fed into

the PSR pillar of a CAS. Some argue that this is not

the comparative advantage of the Bank, given its

constitutional requirement to stay out of internal

politics and its dependence on the permission of

governments to do its work. But the official po-

sition of the World Bank Group, reflected in pres-

idential statements and backed by much evidence,

is that fundamental improvements in PSM re-

quire political commitment and are important

for growth and poverty reduction.

The Bank has done some work and could do

more to understand the political foundations of

governance in its partner countries. Collaborative

work, especially involving local researchers, is

useful in this area, and the Bank could and oc-

casionally does take the lead in sponsoring such

research. Some of this was done informally (India,

Mexico, and Tanzania), but usually it is done with-

out as much attention as to items in the regular

work program.6 Internal budget constraints have

hindered such work in many smaller

countries, where PREM staff do not

have much time or money left after

doing the standard macroeconomic

work. As the IMF already covers that

base, the Bank might consider a pub-

lic sector/political economist, rather

than a macroeconomist, as the core

of its team in some countries.


4 1

The Bank has improvedits responsiveness toborrowers, the Bank’smatrix management hascaused some problems.

The Bank has beenimproving itsunderstanding ofpolitical economy in itspartner countries butneeds to do more,particularly engaginglocal research.

Chapter 5Evaluation Essentials• Performance measures usually im-

proved for financial managementand tax administration, where Banklending supported such reforms.

• Measures for CSA systems—essential for sustaining other reformareas—did not improve on average.So improving the strategic frame-work and indicators needs high pri-ority.

• Bank-supported programs for corePSR have rarely succeeded in re-ducing overall corruption, but havehad some success in improvingtransparency.

• The thematic differences in out-comes result in part from financialmanagement and tax administrationbeing less politically and culturallysensitive than issues surroundingpublic employment and corruption.

• Bank practices also seem to havecontributed to the differences inoutcome.

Government building in Putrajaya, Malaysia. Photo © gferro.com.

Public Sector Reform Outcomesand Performance by Thematic Area

Overview of Thematic DifferencesThe statistical evidence follows from the same

methods as in chapter 4—looking at the per-

centage of countries in which the CPIA improved.

The difference is that in this chapter the ratings for

the individual thematic areas are used. Table 5.1

shows that for all countries (with CPIA informa-

tion), improvement was most likely—60–70 per-

cent likely—in PFM (CPIA 13) and revenue

administration (CPIA 14)1 for countries getting

projects in those areas. Quality of public admin-

istration (CPIA 15), which we take as civil service

reform, had the lowest success rate, with fewer

than 45 percent of borrowers in this area showing

improvement.

For transparency and anticorruption, the success

rate was just over half for countries that had PSR

lending in any of the thematic areas. Similar re-

sults obtain when considering only projects with

explicit (direct) transparency and anticorruption

components. It seemed more appropriate to con-

sider PSR lending in any theme, because all themes

aim to improve transparency and reduce cor-

ruption as at least collateral objectives.

Outcomes for IDA and IBRD countries were sim-

ilar for PFM and civil service. For tax administra-

tion reform, the IDA countries did a little better

than IBRD countries. This shows the importance

of attention to tax collection even in places where

the tax bases look meager. For transparency and

anticorruption, however, the success rate for IBRD

was considerably higher (almost equal to that with

PFM), and the success rate was much lower for ACT

among IDA borrowers. The question for the rest

of this chapter is why we see these patterns.

Public financial managementWhat was the support for PFM trying to achieve?

The framework for analyzing and improving PFM

came mostly from upper-income countries.

Among the PFM reforms pursued by Organisation

for Economic Co-operation and Development

(OECD) countries over the past 25 years, eight

broad components are noteworthy

(OECD 1995; Brumby 1999; Pollitt and

Bouchaert 2004; Rubin and Kelly 2005):

• Achieving budget savings through

more robust central controls or by

In addition to the differences in success across country groups, there are

also important differences across thematic areas of PSR. This chapter lays

out those differences and looks at country experiences for explanations.

Eight components offinancial managementare notable in the reformspursued by OECDcountries.

4 5

providing greater flexibility to managers and or-

ganizations in reallocating funds within budget

line items to reflect changing conditions and

priorities

• Restructuring budgets to include expenditures

for all government activities, global budgetary

targets, hard budget constraints, and program

allocations to facilitate results monitoring and

evaluation

• A multiyear budget linked to a realistic fiscal pol-

icy and revenue estimates

• Regular use of performance information in

monitoring against targets to facilitate ac-

countability and manage performance

• Shifting from cost accounting2 toward accrual

accounting3

• Shifting from compliance auditing4 toward per-

formance auditing5

• Computerized information systems providing

timely financial and related information to all

parties in the budget process

• Greater use of devolved budget management

and market-based mechanisms, such as user

and capital charges, market testing, outsourc-

ing, and performance agreements.

Most of the countries receiving PFM support are

doing better in that area, as noted earlier, which

is consistent with the more detailed results of

Levy and Kpundeh (2004) for a sample of African

countries. In examining why this happened and

what the limits to success are, the following ques-

tions are relevant:

• Have PFM reforms first rolled out in devel-

oped countries been transferred and adapted

appropriately to developing country settings?

4 6


Table 5.1: Changes in Selected CPIA Scores by PSR Theme, Initial Governance Score, and IDA/IBRD Classification

Major improvementIBRD IDA or blend Total (>0.5)

Number Number Number Numberof of of of

Percent countries Percent countries Percent countries Percent countries

CPIA (13)—Quality of budget and financial management

Any PSR PFM lending 64 28 61 59 62 87 28 87

No PSR PFM lending 21 29 32 19 25 48 10 48

CPIA (15)—Quality of public administration

Any PSR CSA lending 44 18 42 53 42 71 10 71

No PSR CSA lending 41 39 20 25 33 64 16 64

CPIA (14) —Efficiency of revenue mobilization

Any PSR TAX lending 67 18 73 26 70 44 32 44

No PSR TAX lending 46 39 56 52 52 91 21 91

CPIA (16) —Corruption, transparency and accountability

Any PSR lending 61 31 48 62 53 93 26 93

No PSR lending 38 26 44 16 40 42 7 42Source: World Bank CPIA scores and IEG staff calculations.Note: Entries show the percent and number of countries that show an improvement in the respective CPIA score between the years 1999 and 2006 (or closest year available). Columns clas-sify countries by their 1999 IBRD/IDA classification. Rows provide this figure for subsets of countries based on the number and type of investment loans approved or active fiscal 1999–2006and development policy loans approved fiscal 1999–2006. CPIA = Country Policy and Institutional Assessment; IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDA = Inter-national Development Association; PFM = public finance management; PSR = public sector reform; TAX = tax administration.

• Did the Bank understand the differences be-

tween formal, managerial processes and the

practices that actually take place, and did it

take the differences into account in designing

and carrying out its support?

• Has the bank stressed “getting the basics right”

before supporting more complex financial man-

agement reforms?

• Has PFM in sector ministries been a better

entry point than PFM in core ministries, or

vice versa? Have PFM projects/components

been usefully piloted in sector ministries before

wider rollouts have taken place? Has PFM in

subnational jurisdictions been a useful entry

point?

• Has the Bank’s PFM approach resulted in im-

proved public sector performance? Were the

benefits achieved greater than the costs in-

curred? In what technical areas and country

contexts has the Bank been effective/ineffective

and why?

The Bank’s Public Expenditure Management

Handbook (World Bank 1998b) stresses the im-

portance of getting the basics right first: Control

inputs before seeking to control outputs, account

for cash before moving to accrual accounting,

operate a reliable budget for inputs before mov-

ing to budgeting for results, make a comprehen-

sive budget and reliable accounting system before

trying an integrated financial management system,

get a proper budgeting and accounting function

before strengthening the auditing function, and

do reliable financial auditing before trying per-

formance auditing (Schick 1998; Shand 2001).

Evidence from case studies shows favorable results

where the Bank followed this advice. In coun-

tries such as Bulgaria, which is working to meet

the standards for admission to the European

Union, improving basic PFM has been an impor-

tant part of the agenda. In Guatemala, the Inte-

grated Financial Management System program

supported basic public finance building blocks

(improved budgeting, accounting, frameworks,

and cash management) and well-sequenced ca-

pacity building. Progress has taken place even in

weak capacity countries just emerging from con-

flict, such as Sierra Leone, which has improved

transparency, procurement, accounta-

bility in budget execution, and audits

(internal and external).

In some other places, however, such as

Ghana, Indonesia, and initially Hon-

duras, the Bank supported the installation of sys-

tems that turned out to be overly complex.

Guyana’s PFM program in the 1990s was also

overly complex, leading to problems at various

stages of procurement and implementation. When

Bank support for PFM restarted there after 2000,

it concentrated more on the basics first.

Ambitious PFM reforms in the Republic of Yemen

could have used a more incremental approach,

starting with core treasury systems and a general

ledger and then building broader capacity and

commitment for more extensive reforms. An ad-

vanced financial management information sys-

tem supported by the Bank, although showing

initial results, may be difficult to sustain in a low-

capacity environment.

Similarly, financial management information tech-

nology systems have been successfully adopted

in some cases when there are sufficient commit-

ment, capacity, and resources as part of a broad

and appropriately phased reform program, with

significant efficiency gains if conditions are right.

In places with weak capacity, however, such as are

found in many Bank borrowers, the principal

benefit from information technology may be en-

suring more systematic adherence to financial

rules by manual systems, which finance staff may

rely on more, as the older systems run in paral-

lel to technology-based systems.

The evidence is also mixed on the re-

lated question of whether PFM reforms

first tried in developed countries have

been transferred with appropriate adap-

tations to local conditions in developing

country settings. An early innovation was Bolivia’s

1990 Financial Management and Control Law,

which sought to increase the efficiency and effec-

tiveness of the public sector by switching from a

centralized rule-based system to a more modern,

decentralized, results-oriented system. Enacted

P U B L I C S E C T O R R E F O R M O U T C O M E S A N D P E R F O R M A N C E B Y T H E M AT I C A R E A

4 7

The Bank’s handbook onpublic expendituremanagement stresses theimportance of getting thebasics right first.

Case studies showfavorable results wherePFM reforms did addressthe basics first.

because of strong pressure from the

Bank and other donors, it lacked suffi-

cient incentives for public officials to

enforce it. As a result, the required an-

nual operating plans were formally un-

dertaken as a ritual, but were ignored

when it came to agency programming

and resource allocation (Dove 2002).

Another type of innovation introduced in devel-

oped countries and now being promoted by the

Bank among borrower countries is a multiyear per-

spective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy,

and budgeting. Despite concerns about achieving

transparency in multiyear budgeting and despite

challenges evident in developed countries in mak-

ing effective use of this tool (Oxford Policy Man-

agement 2000), MTEFs are central features of the

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and PRSCs

prepared in recent years. Craig and Porter (2003)

point out that aside from technical problems of

using this tool effectively, its use for upward ac-

countability to central ministries and donors can

undermine local political legitimacy and ac-

countability, sideline the role of legislatures, and

cut off important sources of local knowledge on

what works and what does not in poverty reduc-

tion. Many developing countries have followed the

example of developed countries in adopting this

reform to help achieve greater certainty on future

funding from donors.

Although MTEFs have been challenging for many

developed countries, Albania, Burkina Faso, South

Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda have adopted well-

functioning systems, with Bank support. Such an

innovation can be especially useful for a borrower

in a context of high aid dependency, where the

big uncertainty on the revenue side is donor sup-

port. Tanzania’s MTEF helps coordinate commit-

ment from the donors, which fund more than 40

percent of the budget, and thus helps get enough

certainty on the revenue side to plan

the budget. Implementation and uti-

lization of the MTEF has been more

difficult in Mali and Ghana.

Slovakia has an MTEF, implemented

with Bank support, that also includes

program budgeting and a firmer (compared with

previous years) ceiling for the current year and in-

dicative ceilings for the next two years. This frame-

work had the benefit of discouraging the past

practice of submitting budget requests that are out

of line with available resources. Program budgeting

is still considered separately from the real budget

preparation, however; there is little time devoted

to substance; performance indicators focus on out-

puts rather than outcomes; and program man-

agers are not accountable for results. In addition,

budget execution does not take place on a pro-

grammatic basis, which reinforces the view that

the program budget is not the real budget. Even

where MTEFs are proving useful, a less-detailed

and more strategic planning exercise might serve

the purpose better.

Entry points are important, as noted above; PFM

and tax administration are good thematic entry

points, and AAA is a good entry instrument—

such as PERs, CPARs, CFAAs, and PETS. Within the

limits of PFM project activities, the question of

entry points also arises. Some countries found it

helpful to pilot nascent MTEFs and other reforms

in ministries or subnational governments with

demonstrated PFM capacity, to draw lessons from

the pilot, and then to gradually scale up to other

ministries.

Argentina, Cambodia, India (state level), Russia,

and Tanzania were good examples. These initia-

tives were most successful when core ministries—

finance and planning—provided the support and

space for the sectoral or subnational interven-

tions to succeed. Although entry points were

mainly finance ministries or departments in min-

istries or subnational authorities, the Bank also

supported legislative oversight and civil society ini-

tiatives in Ghana, for example.

Regarding lending instruments, there has been a

shift toward more flexible, long-term lending in-

struments since 2000. This includes a shift in PFM

support from investment to programmatic policy-

based loans. The results of this shift are broadly

favorable, with strong performance in Ghana,

Guatemala, and Tanzania, for example. PFM out-

comes tied to HIPC accession and PRSCs proved

4 8


Financial managementreforms first tried in

developed countries havesometimes—but not

always—had appropriateadaptations for

application in developingcountries.

Some countries haveadopted well-functioning

MTEFs with Bank support,although such

frameworks have beenchallenging for many.

fruitful in Ghana, Honduras, Tanzania, and Uganda.

Yet the delayed treasury system in Indonesia and

the modest PFM improvements evident in Uganda

point to continuing challenges under the new

instruments.

In Mali, investment lending—rather than or in ad-

dition to policy-based lending—might have

achieved better results. In Guyana, India, Russia,

and Tanzania, the continuation of PSR investment

lending, in parallel with Policy Reform Loans and

often with longer-term instruments, was impor-

tant to sustain support for reforms.

The Bank has been cautious in considering the use

of procurement processes of governments or

other donors, usually preferring the processes

in the PIUs it sponsors rather than using govern-

ment systems.6 This can slow down improve-

ments in government systems and exacerbate

the delays in information technology projects,

and it still does not ensure that procurement will

be corruption free (see table 5.2).

For example, decentralized procurement in Hon-

duras within the ministries and agencies has lan-

guished for lack of capacity and because

perceptions of corruption make donors reluc-

tant to channel resources through the regular

civil service. Instead, a proliferation of PIUs has

led to expensive and fragmented procurement

managed under a host of balkanized rules and reg-

ulations. Procurement delays in Ghana, Guyana,

and Indonesia, among other countries, have ham-

pered PFM support, although this seems to be

improving. The U.S. Millennium Challenge Cor-

poration recently agreed to use the new infor-

mation management systems for the management

of its program in Honduras. This is a notable

achievement, given the strict requirements of the

U.S. government.

Investment projects for PFM and tax administra-

tion typically put a strong emphasis on technol-

ogy and sometimes carried the expectation that

it would be the main key to results,

without adequately recognizing that

changes of incentives, behavior, and

organizational cultures are more im-

portant and more challenging (see box

5.1). Even when the people-manage-

ment aspects were recognized in the

project design, if these more difficult as-

pects of the projects hit snags, the tech-


4 9

Table 5.2: Improvement Rates in Public Financial Management (CPIA 13) by IDA/IBRDClassification

CPIA (13) quality of budget and financial management and PFM PSR lending, 1999–2006

MajorIBRD IDA or blend Total improvement (>0.5)

Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number

Any PSR PFM lending 64 28 61 59 62 87 28 87

With > = 2 PSR PFM IL 29 7 64 22 55 29 28 29

With > = 4 PSR PFM AL 67 3 82 11 79 14 21 14

With PFM IDF 79 14 68 37 71 51 31 51

Without PFM IDF 50 14 50 22 50 36 22 36

No PSR PFM lending 21 29 32 19 25 48 10 48

With PFM IDF 20 10 38 8 28 18 17 18

With any AAA 26 19 31 16 29 35 14 35Source: World Bank CPIA scores and IEG staff calculations.Note: Entries show the percent and number of countries that show an improvement in the average of CPIA 13 between the years 1999 and 2006 (or closest yearavailable). Columns classify countries by their 1999 IBRD/IDA classification. Rows provide this figure for subsets of countries based on the number and type of in-vestment loans (IL) approved or active fiscal 1999–2006 and development policy loans (AL) approved in fiscal 1999–2006. AAA = analytical and advisory activities;IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDA = International Development Association; IDF = institutional development funds; PFM = pub-lic financial management; PSR = public sector reform.

The Bank has often usedPIUs rather thangovernment procurementsystems, but this slowsgovernment improvementswithout ensuringcorruption-freeprocurement.

nology parts of the project often continued to dis-

burse despite the changed conditions that re-

duced their effectiveness.

In the area of PFM, the Bank’s analytic work has

progressed furthest. A review of 50 recent devel-

opment policy operations found that more than

half were informed by at least three PFM studies

by the Bank and other development partners

(Parison 2005). The number of PERs has increased

from 17 per year for 1999–2002 to more than 23

annually since then.

Increased attention is now given to institutional

aspects. Initially, the focus was almost exclusively

on budget formulation—setting aggregates and

sectoral allocations—but since 2000 more atten-

tion has gone to the execution phase of the budget

cycle. PERs are now routinely (although still not

always) linked with CFAAs and CPARs, which now

include governmentwide assessments and some-

times subnational governments.7 The PETS has

proven to be a powerful addition to the Bank’s

toolkit for identifying problems with (and cor-

ruption in) expenditure and financial manage-

ment, although the cost and time demands have

made PETS impractical for universal

application.

A recent IEG evaluation (IEG 2007)

found that 64 percent of CPARs and 71

percent of CFAAs were of satisfactory quality, with

steady improvement in quality since the publica-

tion of the respective guidelines and with in-

creased donor collaboration. They could have

been more effective, however, with improved co-

ordination among the units preparing them and

other PFM reports; they could have avoided con-

fusing situations such as clients getting multiple

PFM action plans.

Despite these shortcomings, CFAAs and CPARs

contributed to a greater focus on PFM in subse-

quent CASs and to increased PFM lending. CASs

in 13 of the 22 countries studied proposed DPLs

with PFM prior actions and conditions, and only

4 CASs proposed such lending prior to the com-

pletion of the CFAAs/CPARs. Likewise, twice as

many CASs since 2000 proposed PFM investment

lending as was proposed in countries prior to

the completion of CFAAs/CPARs. These instru-

ments have only had a modest overall impact,

however, on PFM and procurement arrangements

and on the choice of instruments for Bank assis-

tance (IEG 2007, pp. 37, 41–42).

Routine monitoring of public expenditure man-

agement has improved greatly since the late 1990s,

first with the HIPC tracking process and more

recently with the PEFA indicators. The interest in

ensuring good management of HPIC resources

evolved into interest in ensuring that general

budget support, with instruments such as PRSCs,

went through efficient, transparent, and socially

accountable processes.

This led the Bank, along with other partners and

in consultation with many governments, to de-

velop the PEFA indicators.8 These focus on the

PFM process but also include a little on tax ad-

ministration, civil service, corruption, and relia-

bility of donor funding. There are 28 major

indicators of country performance, most with

subindicators, plus three indicators of donor prac-

tices, such as predictability of direct budget

support.

Building on the three budgetary outcomes dis-

cussed above, the indicators measure six dimen-

sions: budget credibility, comprehensiveness and

5 0


Box 5.1: Too Much Attention to the TechnicalAspects—Not Enough to the Human Element in Ghana

The Public Financial Management Technical Assistance Project in Ghanahad an information management system component that was overly com-plex, when simple spreadsheets could have done the job. It created “avery big conceptual, technical, and managerial challenge” and left gapsin policies and outputs. It did not link “the poor performance with the man-dates, role, organizational structures, overlapping responsibilities, outdatesprocedures and processes, and skill levels,” nor did it flag the issue of avail-ability for training. There were too many components for the PIU and gov-ernment to effectively coordinate, and the implementation schedule wasoverambitious. Functional units should have been given responsibilityfor implementing reforms rather than the PIU, which was recommendedin the midterm review but which was not done.

Source: World Bank 2004d.

CFAAs and CPARs helpedincrease the focus on PFM

issues in subsequentcountry strategies.

transparency, alignment with policy, predictabil-

ity and control, accounting and reporting, and ex-

ternal scrutiny and audit (see PEFA Secretariat

2005 for a complete listing). They indicate gra-

dations of improvement in PSM, corresponding

to a sequence, and provide a range of standards

that includes OECD countries, some of which

are also rated. PEFA is thus a model for what

could be extended to or replicated in other PSR

thematic areas.9

As of August 2007, 40 countries had completed

one or more PEFA assessments.10 PEFA and other

related indicators are useful because they meas-

ure actual practice, rather than perception or rep-

utation, and they look at actions that would be the

immediate objectives of reform.

An analysis of 15 countries with both HIPC and

PEFA ratings looked at 11 indicators where there

is close correspondence between the two as-

sessment methods. Over the period 2001–2006,

five countries showed improvement in the num-

ber of HIPC benchmarks met (with Ghana im-

proving by six benchmarks), six showed a decline,

and four remained largely unchanged. Based on

raw scores, eight countries improved, four de-

clined, and three were unchanged.

In terms of the different phases of the budget

cycle, the greatest improvement was in budget re-

porting, with less improvement in budget for-

mulation and some deterioration in budget

execution. At a more detailed level, more than 90

percent of countries could limit the discrepancies

between budget allocations and budget outturns

in 2006, compared with less than 50 percent in

2004. Eighty percent of countries met the bench-

mark on improvements in budget classification in

2006, the same as in 2004. However, there was a

decline in the quality of medium-term projec-

tions in budget processes and in ability to reflect

donor funds in the budget (de Renzio and

Dorotinsky 2007).

Some HIPC countries, where the Bank’s work on

PFM issues has been intense, have more detailed

records of progress. Taking the 23 countries par-

ticipating in HIPC that were monitored first in 2001

and then again in 2003–04 and con-

sidering the benchmarks set for 15 PFM

elements, the number of countries

meeting or exceeding the benchmarks

increased for 8 indicators, declined for

6, and stayed the same for 1. Of the

three main PFM areas (see appendix A),

budget reporting improved the most,

with 14 countries improving and 4

worsening.

Within this indicator group is, for example, the in-

dicator 13: “Regular fiscal reports track poverty re-

ducing spending.” Here the number of countries

meeting the benchmark increased from three to

seven. Forty-two percent of benchmarks in the “re-

porting” area were met in 2004, up from 33 per-

cent in 2001.

In the other two PFM areas of “formulation” and

“execution,” however, there were modest de-

clines between the two reporting periods in coun-

tries meeting the benchmarks (World Bank and

IMF 2006).11 Traditionally, the Bank gave more

attention to budget formulation than to budget

execution, and traditional financial management

looked mainly at Bank projects, not the whole

spending cycle. Somewhat more attention now

goes to the downstream aspects, but more con-

sistent effort is still needed in that direction.

In summary, the Bank’s increased PFM lending and

analytical work can be linked with encouraging

PFM improvements among borrowers, usefully

adapting PFM tools from other jurisdictions, and

carrying out effective monitoring with robust

assessment tools accepted by major donors.

However, progress is uneven, both across coun-

tries and across different types of indicators. Bank

performance might have achieved greater suc-

cess with deeper institutional and governance

analysis, greater attention to addressing basic

systems before moving to advanced

PFM tools, and more Bank support and

flexibility in working to improve coun-

tries’ own procurement systems. Con-

ditionality worked better when it

focused on PSR outcomes, leaving

country governments to pick specific


5 1

Routine monitoring ofpublic expendituremanagement hasimproved with the use ofPEFA indicators, whichmeasure practice ratherthan perception orreputation.

The Bank’s increased PFMlending and analyticalwork can be linked toencouraging PFMimprovements among its borrowers.

measures and the Bank to give technical assistance

on request.

CSA reform designWhat was the support for CSA reform trying to

achieve? This thematic area of reform includes sev-

eral components:

• Measures to track the existing staff—for in-

stance, developing computerized payroll and

human resources databases—are usually an

important early reform action without much

controversy. Pay and employment data are

often missing, and these data are essential to

diagnosing civil service issues and designing

reforms.

• Measures to contain and reduce the number

of staff—via retrenchment and layoffs, early

retirement, and hiring freezes—are usually the

most controversial components of CSA reform.

• Compensation reforms deal with pay struc-

tures and pensions.

• Human resource management reforms deal

with management of cadres generally and the

senior civil service particularly. This includes

merit-based recruitment, promotion and dis-

cipline, performance management, and ap-

praisal systems.

• Organizational reforms deal with issues such

as contracting, creating delivery agencies, and

process engineering and organizational re-

structuring. These issues are usually based on

functional and program reviews and aim to

improve operational efficiency.

• Demand-side reforms focus on the users of ser-

vices, through service standards, e-government,

and so forth.

• Training and capacity building.

Table 5.3 compares the different CSA reform com-

ponents in terms of political risk, financial impli-

cations, and demands on capacity.

The Bank’s involvement in CSA re-

forms evolved out of the need to ad-

dress the issue of an affordable wage

bill as a significant component of pub-

lic sector expenditures. As a result,

CSA reforms often emphasized (espe-

cially in the 1980s and 1990s) retrenchment and

salary decompression (increases at the top). But

this focus often overlooked indications that these

actions were politically unrealistic and also as-

sumed without evidence that these changes would

bring about improved public administration. This

approach usually failed, because the downsizing

either did not take place or was reversed by re-

hiring, often of the same people. Since then, the

Bank has continued to endorse the same formula

with similar lack of success in 1999–2006, al-

though in fewer countries, such as Cambodia,

Honduras, and the Republic of Yemen.

In the past few years, the Bank has shifted its

focus in many countries to human resource man-

agement reforms, such as merit-based recruit-

ment and promotion, both as a means to improve

performance and as a counter to patronage-based

systems. Drawing on project conditionality as a

proxy for the Bank’s activity in this area, the focus

on merit-based measures has grown significantly

in the past five years; downsizing is somewhat less

prominent (see figure 5.1).

In the 19 case studies, the reforms most fre-

quently supported with Bank programs since

1999 include payroll and human resources data-

bases, redeployment/layoff provisions, pay re-

forms, merit recruitment and promotion, and

training/capacity-building programs. The Bank

has continued to advocate downsizing and pay re-

forms, but merit-related reforms have risen in

importance since 2000 (see also Stevens and

Teggemann 2004.)

Database reforms and training have also been

common elements of many reform packages, in

part because of their less controversial nature as

well as their direct linkage to other reform areas,

particularly PFM. An important step in many coun-

tries has been to get the human resource database

and the payroll (usually at the ministries of fi-

nance) consistent with each other.

For administrative reforms, the bulk of activity has

centered on functional reviews, at times to support

downsizing efforts but also as a means to improve

operational efficiencies. In Russia, some redun-

5 2


The Bank used toemphasize retrenchment

and salary decompressionamong CSA reforms—

an approach that usually failed.

dant or duplicative functions were eliminated; in

Ghana, some minor process improvements have

been reported. However, in other case studies,

these reviews generally did not lead to real process

changes. There has been some reform effort fo-

cused on restructuring, including agency au-

tomation, such as in Tanzania. On demand-side

reforms, citizen charters, standards of service, or

other mechanisms like client service units and

surveys have been introduced in some countries

(Ghana, India, Russia, Tanzania, and Uganda), with

favorable results beginning to show in some places.

Outcomes. Despite the continued efforts and

some modification of the approach, civil service

reform has been relatively unsuccess-

ful, as is apparent from table 5.3. A

similar table using a non-Bank indica-

tor (the public administration rating

of the ICRG) also gave an unsatisfactory

result. Also, countries getting more Bank loans

(development policy or investment) for CSA re-

form did not do better on average than those

getting only one. The question is, why? And why

were there successes in some cases?

The case studies show that reform in the area of

CSA has been extremely challenging, even in a rel-

atively supportive environment. The cases high-

lighted a number of country-specific reasons why


5 3

In the past five years,merit-based measures forcivil service reform haveincreased.

Table 5.3: Civil Service and Administrative Reform: Types and Challenges

Successfully LittleDemanding of implemented or no

Component Political risk Financial cost capacity reforms progress

Pay and employment Minimal Modest Yes—but Rep. of Yemen, Honduras,data capacity Guyana Uganda

building is partof project

Downsizing High Significant Yes, to do it Russia, Bulgaria,one-time costs right (targeted) Tanzania, India Guyana,for retrenchment Uganda,

Ethiopia,Rep. of Yemen,

Cambodia,Sri Lanka

Compensation reforms Yes, in egalitarian Yes Yes Bulgaria, Albania Guyana,cultures, where lower Indonesia,ranks are politicized Rep. of Yemenor where unions Pakistanare strong

Human resource Yes, especially in Moderate Yes Bulgaria, Bolivia Ghanamanagement reforms patgronage-based (pilots), Albania

systems

Organizational reforms Moderate Modest Yes Russia, GhanaIndia, Tanzania

Demand-side reforms Moderate Modest Yes Tanzania,Uganda, India

Training No Modest No Ethiopia, Russia, BoliviaRep. of Yemen

Source: IEG country case studies.

implementation of these reforms—particularly

downsizing, pay decompression, and merit-based

reforms—failed.

First and most common, there can be

a lack of political commitment to reform

or a discontinuity over the implemen-

tation period. In some countries, the

government may adopt reform strate-

gies and even pass new legislation. But

then as implementation starts up, mo-

mentum slows, delays occur, and projects can

completely stall, such as in Ghana, Argentina, and

the Republic of Yemen. This issue of political com-

mitment can affect even the most uncontroversial

measures, such as introduction of new data sys-

tems, by reallocating resources or simply delaying

projects because of staff turnover.

Changes in political leadership can also result in

decisions to terminate, reverse, or dilute more

controversial reforms such as downsizing. In a

number of countries, such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia,

and the Republic of Yemen, the persistance of pa-

tronage systems and politicization of

the bureaucracy undermined imple-

mentation in the review period, par-

ticularly those reforms that affect pay,

recruitment, promotion, and downsiz-

ing. In addition, the strength of trade unions in the

public sector can subvert downsizing, pay, and

merit-based reforms in an otherwise supportive po-

litical regime. Concerted government effort partly

overcame this in Burkina Faso and Guatemala,

but not in Honduras.

Despite these political, cultural, and institutional

challenges, the cases give some examples of suc-

cessful CSA reforms. Six factors seem to have

contributed to these successes—and in their

absence, likely contributed to reform failures: an-

alytic diagnosis and advice, pragmatic oppor-

tunism in selecting reforms to support, realistic

external expectations, appropriate packages of

lending instruments, tangible indicators of success,

and effective donor coordination.

Strong and coherent technical and contextual

analysis. For CSA issues, the Bank’s analytical

tools are relatively underdeveloped and under-

used. There is no standard Bank diagnostic in-

strument or report for the analysis of the civil

service. The absence of a standard analytical tool

is partly a consequence of the lack of interna-

tional consensus around the “right” civil service

model for developing countries, or indeed for

developed countries. Debate continues about the

objective of CSA reform—whether it is afford-

ability, performance, or accountability—and the se-

quencing and fit with political realities.

The Bank has rarely analyzed the political con-

siderations that make civil service reform so dif-

ficult; the IGRs in Bolivia and Bangladesh are

notable exceptions. As a result, many of the case

studies attribute part of the failure to make head-

way in CSA to the narrow scope of the Bank’s an-

alytical work.

The diagnostic work done by the Bank on ad-

ministrative and civil service reform is typically rel-

egated to one chapter of a broader piece of

analysis, most often a financial report of some type.

In reviewing the country studies, for example, of

69 ESW reports that had some discussion of CSA,

only 5 were freestanding analyses of civil service

issues; 39 were PERs or other financial reports; 6

were CEMs; and 19 were parts of other broader

5 4


Civil service reforms,despite modifications in

approach, have remaineda relatively difficult and

often unsuccessful area ofthe Bank’s assistance.

The Bank’s analyticaltools for analyzing CSA

issues are underdevelopedand underused.

Source: Adjustment Lending Conditionality and Implementation Database and IEG staff calculations.

Note: CSA = civil service and administrative; HR = human resources.

Figure 5.1: Number of CSA Projects with VariousSubcategories of Conditions

0

10

20

30

1982–86 1987–91 1992–96 1997–01 2002–06

Downsizing CompensationHR/Merit Op. Eff./Policy reform

papers. Although the number has grown—25 re-

ports during the 1990s, increasing to 44 in the past

7 years—the bias toward using financial report-

ing vehicles remains strong. As a consequence, the

CSA analyses tend to focus on affordability issues

rather than on performance or accountability.12

This is not to deny the importance of affordabil-

ity, but rather to note that it has not usually proven

successful as an entry point for dialogue on civil

service reform.

Effective analysis of CSA issues is made more dif-

ficult by the scarcity of standardized data, such as

numbers of staff by grade and occupation group,

as well as data on the wage bill. Nor do standard

measures of performance or indicators of reform

implementation exist.

Recently, however, there has been some process

in this area. For instance, the CPIA question on

quality of public administration has four sub-

components: policy coordination and respon-

siveness, service delivery and operational efficiency,

merit and ethics, and pay adequacy and manage-

ment of the wage bill. WBI governance indicators

also measure bureaucracy quality. Although there

is no civil service equivalent to PEFA, there have

been a few diagnostic pilots in the Europe and Cen-

tral Asia Region (Albania and the former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia, for instance) and in some

Indian states—measuring rates of turnover, shares

of personnel recruited through competitive exams,

and so on—but these have not been widely ap-

plied in other countries.

Often even basic data are lacking, and initial re-

forms may involve personnel inventory and in-

formation systems. This is sometimes a good

opportunity for an entry point to the civil service

reform agenda. However, the Bank has not (with

other stakeholders) developed or promoted an ad-

equate framework and tools to incorporate CSA

issues into the standard diagnostics.

Russia is an example of a country for which the

Bank provided good quality analysis and advice

on CSA reforms that was well received and val-

ued by the client and that helped support the

client’s reform agenda. Bolivia and Honduras are

other examples where contextual

analysis was carried out to good ef-

fect. Understanding labor market con-

ditions has been an important part of

successful contextual analyses. Unfor-

tunately, the more common experience has been

the opposite—the absence of good diagnosis

and analysis can lead to inappropriate reforms or

failure to convince governments to take action.

This issue was highlighted in a number of case

study countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana,

Guyana, and Indonesia.

Taking a pragmatic and opportunistic approach

to CSA reforms where the institutional environ-

ment is challenging. Ingrained systems of pa-

tronage political appointments are often at the

root of problems with the civil service, which

successful diagnosis has understood. But the

Bank’s traditional tools, especially lending con-

ditions, are ill suited to addressing this funda-

mental challenge.

Some positive results are being achieved where

the design of reform measures is more pragmatic;

the reforms try to shift existing practice rather than

advocate all-or-nothing change. Russia, for ex-

ample, has started to require that new hires meet

certain minimum qualifications even if the final se-

lection is politicized, to keep track of absentees,

and to make it easier to fire them. In Cambodia,

selective, enhanced pay schemes have been used;

at first the Bank and IMF staff were unsupportive,

concerned that a two-tier salary system would

cause friction. But ultimately it was recognized that

an informal two-tier system was already in place

because of ad hoc donor arrangements and that

this program would encourage consistency and

a better targeting of resources. Implementation

of reforms through pilots—as in Russia—when a

more comprehensive approach would likely fail

can also be more effective in riskier environments.

Realistic expectations by the donor community.

It is now well acknowledged that CSA reforms take

time to implement and to show tangible results.

Tanzania provides a good example of a reform

process where the Bank and other donors have

let the government take the lead in terms of pace


5 5

Analytics tend to focus on civil service reformaffordability issues ratherthan on performance.

and direction and have shown patience for build-

ing capacity. In this case, the Bank has used a

longer-term and more flexible lending instrument

(such as an adaptable program loan) and has

pooled funds with other donors to respond to this

reality.

Other cases, however, show that Bank and other

donors can have expectations that are too short

term, which inevitably sets the reforms up for

failure. The Republic of Yemen offers an example

of this. It is also true that unrealistic expectations

can be created by the political leadership within

the country (such as Ghana), where broad and am-

bitious strategies are at times promoted and ap-

proved, but implementation stalls as vested

interests coalesce.

Appropriate package of lending in-

struments. The case studies show that

technical assistance funded with in-

vestment loans has been a particularly

important tool for encouraging civil

service reform, especially in poorer

countries where capacity levels are

usually very low. In some of the cases,

such as Cambodia, Honduras, and Tan-

zania, the combination of policy-based lending

supported by technical assistance was a positive

feature, particularly in countries with low capac-

ity for implementation.

In other cases, where only development policy

lending supported civil service reform, the lack of

supporting technical assistance was a hindrance

to progress. Learning from such experiences some-

times led to the revival of investment lending to

support civil service reforms. In Uganda, the gov-

ernment did not initially allocate enough budget

resources to the CSA reforms; now bilateral fund-

ing supports them.

Tangible indicators of success. Unlike tax re-

form, where leaders see obvious ben-

efits, the political leadership cannot

easily identify tangible benefits of CSA

reform. Linking CSA reforms to more

concrete PFM reforms where possible

is one way to address this. Most con-

ducive to this effort is the development of pay-

roll and human resources databases, as well as

training and capacity building in support of PFM.

Another strategy is to develop measurable indi-

cators of results. The Albania case study shows

some progress in this area, with the Bank sup-

porting the development of a number of civil

service–related measures, such as the percentage

of recruitment done by merit, which the gov-

ernment is now tracking on a regular basis. These

are not final outcome measures, but they provide

a more transparent method of demonstrating

progress in implementation.

A few other countries are tracking similar meas-

ures, such as FYR Macedonia and some Indian

states, but there is no standard set of indicators

or wide adoption that is similar to the PEFA indi-

cators. Further effort in this area is certainly worth

pursuing.

The case study of Russia offers additional insights.

Its reform agenda began with economic reforms

and then moved to fiscal reforms. Russia has

more recently reached the stage where poor ca-

pacity is holding back other reforms, and with this

realization at the political level, there is now a

growing acceptance of the need for civil service

reform. Not only has this case shown the impor-

tance of building demand for CSA reform through

identifying tangible benefits, but it also shows

that it is possible to proceed with some elements

of reform in the absence of or in advance of com-

prehensive action.

Effective donor coordination. In some countries,

reform strategies have become joint efforts with

the donor community, with positive effects. Tan-

zania, Bulgaria, and Guyana provide good exam-

ples, as does Ghana with its joint CAS process. In

some cases, the Bank has shown itself to be an ef-

fective facilitator, and results have generally been

more positive than when it has tried to drive re-

forms (such as downsizing) in the absence of po-

litical commitment. Interestingly, Tanzania’s reform

agenda suffered in the early years because an un-

coordinated approach by donors resulted in con-

flicting advice and multiple agendas. This situation

5 6


Case studies show thattechnical assistance

funded with investmentloans has been

particularly important in encouraging civil

service reform.

Linking CSA reforms toPFM reforms may help

overcome the perceivedlack of tangible benefit

to CSA reform.

changed when the government successfully de-

manded better coordination among donors.

These various Bank strategies to support CSA re-

forms in the case study countries are consistent

with and reflect a number of the recommenda-

tions from the 1999 IEG evaluation. For instance,

that report emphasized the need to preface re-

form design with institutional assessments of ad-

ministrative systems and analyses of labor market

trends in addition to budget scenarios. However,

this type of analysis is still the exception rather

than the norm.

Another recommendation proposed that the Bank

engage in a more participatory approach to reform

design and implementation. This is now hap-

pening, for example, in Tanzania. The Bank has

also made progress on the report’s recommen-

dation to coordinate better with other donors

and focus its input where it has a comparative ad-

vantage. In Bulgaria, for example, the Bank pro-

vided a roadmap for reform, but other donors

provided the technical assistance for specific re-

forms. The development of standardized per-

formance measures, as is being tried in Albania,

was a recommendation from the 1999 report.

Tax administrationWhat was the support for tax administration try-

ing to achieve, and why did it usually succeed? Tax

administration reforms aim—or at least should

aim—primarily to increase voluntary compliance.

Other important objectives include raising more

revenue, reducing evasion, and making the pat-

tern of tax collection and incentives correspond

to those intended in the legislation. This evalua-

tion does not discuss tax policy (legislation), al-

though tax administration is tax policy in the

sense that what actually gets implemented is what

matters (Bird and Casanegra de Jantscher 1992).

Legislated tax policy also matters for administra-

tion, of course, with clarity and the absence of ex-

emptions in the law facilitating collection,

compliance, and enforcement.

For tax administration reform, the typical entry

point for the Bank’s policy dialogue has been the

government’s need for additional revenue. Other

objectives include preparation for ac-

cession to the European Union (Bul-

garia), adapting tax administration to a

free market economy (Russia and other

Eastern European countries), and in-

creasing transparency and efficiency

to improve the image of tax administration with

voters and the business sector.

Over the past decades there have been several

trends in tax administration reform:

• Reorganization of tax departments along func-

tional lines

• Establishing a comprehensive system of tax-

payer identification numbers

• Computerization

• Granting autonomy to tax departments

• Establishment of large taxpayer units.

All these measures helped improve the effec-

tiveness of tax administration, but none was a

magic bullet. A judicious combination of these

measures with others, such as simplification of

procedures, appropriate collection systems, ef-

fective audit and appeal mechanisms, adequate

human resource policies, and well-designed tax-

payer information and service systems, are all

necessary to increase the effectiveness of tax ad-

ministration and reduce opportunities for cor-

ruption. Although there is not a unique ideal

administrative model that fits all revenue agencies,

there is a widely recognized set of administrative

strategies that allows experts to usually agree on

the main set of reforms needed in a country.

Some of these are captured in the PEFA indicators,

three of which deal with tax administration, each

with three subdimensions.

To develop an appropriate reform strategy, suc-

cess has depended on starting with a good diag-

nostic of the problems of the existing tax

administration. With respect to both diagnosis

and strategy design, it is advisable to

profit from work done previously by

other donors—for example, the IMF

in Albania, Bulgaria, and Tanzania—

and complement it with Bank work. A

pilot approach to tax administration


5 7

There have been positiveeffects where tax reformstrategies have becomejoint efforts with thedonor community.

The Bank’s entry point fortax administrationreform has typically beenthe need to increaserevenues.

reform has proven successful in many cases. In

some countries, implementation of the value-

added tax has been used as a pilot for introduc-

ing modern systems of taxpayer identification,

tax collection, and so on (for example, Albania).

In other countries, the establishment of large tax-

payer units has served the same purpose (for ex-

ample, in Bulgaria and Russia).

Outcomes. Among the 27 countries with tax

administration investment projects approved or

still active in 1999–2006, more than three-fourths

showed improved CPIAs (1999–2006) for rev-

enue mobilization; seven had major improve-

ments. In contrast, among countries with tax

administration conditions in DPLs but no

investment/technical assistance loans, only a bare

majority showed improvement—not much bet-

ter than in countries with no tax administration

lending. Doing a complete reform of tax admin-

istration takes some time—most of the Bank’s tax

administration investment projects lasted five to

seven years, and more than 80 percent had to be

extended to achieve the desired results. Patience

has paid off.

Working with other donors has been

important in most of the cases studied.

The IMF often helps with the diagno-

sis and strategy; others, such as DFID

and the European Union often help

with cofinancing. Still, the role of Bank

expertise is important; even when the IMF is pro-

viding a lot of technical advice, having the Bank

help design and manage the actual project has

been essential, according to interviews with coun-

try counterparts. And the IMF is not always avail-

able; in those cases, the in-house expertise and

consultant roster of the Bank become even more

important.

On diagnosis and general strategy for tax ad-

ministration (and treasury), the IMF routinely

takes the lead, as in Bulgaria, Guatemala, Russia,

and Uganda. The Bank has a good manual on tax

administration (Gill 2000), but it has not been up-

dated. Only a few regular Bank staff have the ap-

propriate expertise, so consultants have often

been used when IMF support was not available.

More contribution from Bank staff has been

needed and is beneficial, according to the case

studies, when there are tax administration proj-

ects, which the IMF does not have the instru-

ments to design, finance, or supervise. Bank staff

expertise is very thin in tax administration, as

noted in chapter 3, so care is needed to maintain

it and perhaps deepen it.

Anticorruption and transparencyWhat was the support for ACT trying to achieve?

The Bank’s standard definition of corruption has

been “the abuse of public office for private gain”

(World Bank 1997a). Although this does not in-

clude all kinds of corruption, it matches well the

corruption concerns for reform of the core pub-

lic sector.

The attention to anticorruption and transparency

in CASs, AAA, and projects has grown strongly

since the late 1990s, when the “C word” first gained

official usage. Initially, corruption only appeared

in the CASs of countries that were enthusiastic re-

formers or that were heavily aid dependent. It

was prominent in the 1997 Indonesia CAS and in-

cluded in the 1998 Honduras and Bolivia CASs. It

has become standard in PRSCs, starting with the

first in Uganda.

As more countries have opened up on the topic,

it has become a negative point of note if a coun-

try does not say it is doing something about cor-

ruption. Even the most ardent opponents of

discussing the topic initially now have something

on it in their CASs or Country Partnership Strat-

egy. Real action has come more slowly. The Bank

and others usually distinguish two broad types of

corruption—state capture (or grand) and bu-

reaucratic (or petty) corruption—and two ways

of combating it—indirect and direct—as laid out

in table 5.4, showing some examples in each of

the categories.

State capture gets the front-page headlines: “Hun-

dreds of millions stolen and stashed overseas”

or “Public enterprises sold to insiders for 20 per-

cent of true value.” It also includes more subtle

examples, where persons with political authority

make decisions, without explicit bribes, that ad-

5 8


Most of the Bank’s tax administration

investment projects havebeen extended, but they

have usually paid off.

vance the particular interests of their family and

business associates.

Bureaucratic corruption usually gets less media

attention but can have serious impacts on devel-

opment: some teachers and doctors frequently fail

to come to work, without consequences. People

have to pay bribes to get birth certificates or ac-

cess other public services.

The two phenomena have intrinsic links, how-

ever. Costs of grand corruption are described in

terms of how many school books and medicine

doses the stolen millions would buy, and these

calculations assume that efficient noncorrupt in-

stitutions use the funds—that is, without much bu-

reaucratic corruption. Grand corruption is rightly

condemned for setting a bad example at the top,

but the “little guys” at the bottom would tolerate

it less if they were not also getting some morsels

from petty corruption.

In considering the outcomes for anticorruption

and transparency efforts, one must keep in mind

that there are many aspects of the anticorruption

agenda that are not considered here—such as


5 9

Table 5.4: State Capture and Bureaucratic Corruption, and Indirect Ways to Combat Them

Types of corruption

State capture Bureaucratic

Examples

Ways to combat

Indirect

Direct

• Corrupt award of big contracts

• Embezzlement of public funds

• Kickbacks from big international corporations

• Privatization to insiders at bargain prices

Transparency

• Publication of budgets and actual spending—with comprehensible formats

• Access-to-information law

• EITI

• Independent audits published

• Procurement reform

Publication of opportunitiesCompetitive biddingE-procurement

• Anticorruption commission with high power

• Public officials’ disclosure of assets

• Investigation and prosecution of officials’unaccounted-for wealth

• Stolen asset recovery

• Bribe taking or extraction

• Skimming paychecks

• Nepotism in appointments

• Selective enforcement of taxes

• Absentee employees, teachers, doctors

• Doctors using public facilities for private payingpatients

• Teachers tutoring for pay to prepare students for tests

• Civil service pay reform

• Expenditure tracking surveys

• Bank payment systems for taxes and public salaries

• Public announcement of hiring opportunities

• Removal of ambiguity from laws and regulations

• Anticorruption commission with low-level mandate

• Prosecution/fining/firing of bribe takers

• Code of conduct for public officials

• Public officials’ disclosure of assets

• Investigation and prosecution of officials’unaccounted-for wealth

Source: IEG assessment.Note: EITI = Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

legal and judicial systems, public utilities, and pri-

vate corporations—and that CPIA 16 considers not

only the ultimate objective of lower corruption but

also transparency and accountability. Both are

process inputs for reducing corruption, as well as

for other objectives.

As shown in table 5.1, only 53 percent of countries

getting PSR lending showed improvement in CPIA

16, but the difference between IDA and IBRD

borrowers is the largest of any theme. The IDA

countries that borrowed for PSR did little better

than those that did not. IBRD countries, in con-

trast, had a 61 percent improvement rate, almost

as good as for PFM. Europe and Central Asia had

the strongest performance, with 79 percent of bor-

rowers improving, compared with none of the

nonborrowers. In half of the Europe and Central

Asia countries that borrowed for PSR, CPIA 16 im-

proved by 1.0 or more during the period

1999–2006.

Other indicators round out this pic-

ture. With the Corruption Perception

Index (from Transparency Interna-

tional) and the Worldwide Governance

Indicator for Control of Corruption

(from WBI), about half of the countries getting PSR

lending improved their corruption ranking from

1999 to 2006, which is only 4 and 10 percentage

points, respectively, better than the countries

with no PSR lending.13

For IDA countries, the improvement is slightly

less, and there is no difference from countries

without PSR lending. Because these results are

based on rankings, they change at least a little

even if nothing changes in the country’s per-

formance. The small or zero difference with non-

borrowers implies no significant improvement.

With the ICRG rating on corruption, the percent

of PSR borrowers that improve is much

lower—only 13 percent—and only 2

percent of countries without PSR lend-

ing show improvement. These results

from the non-CPIA indicators are con-

sistent with results in most of the case

studies—there is improved trans-

parency, which explains the improved

CPIA 16, but not usually reduction in corruption

per se.

As with civil service reform, reducing corruption

involves deeper and more politically challenging

change than in PFM. Even today’s relatively low

corruption in upper-income countries did not

come about quickly, but often took generations.

Bank programs can have only marginal effects

on whether and when the political will material-

izes to address corruption. The Bank’s lending

support for anticorruption efforts has mostly used

indirect methods, which still predominate, often

through reforms to PFM, civil service, and tax ad-

ministration, as discussed above.

Reducing opportunities for corruption by sim-

plifying procedures and regulations and getting

incentives right through, for instance, personnel

remuneration schemes, are systemic approaches

that have been incorporated in Bank support to

PFM, tax administration, and civil service reform.

The expressed objectives have been to make pub-

lic institutions more efficient, transparent, and

accountable—all goals valuable in their own right

that also contribute to reducing corruption. Some

empirical evidence supports the latter connection,

although some of the better government effec-

tiveness is explained by higher income, which

also correlates with both variables (Kaufmann,

Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005; Islam 2003).

In a variety of places examined for this evalu-

ation—Bulgaria, Guatemala, Indian states such

as Andhra Pradesh, Indonesia, Russia, and Tan-

zania—improvements to PFM (sometimes in-

cluding implementation of PEFA) and tax

administration improved transparency and re-

duced bureaucratic corruption. State capture

has been more difficult to address, and the eval-

uation did not find clear evidence of success in the

cases examined, at least not in the time observed.

A sample of HIPC countries that have imple-

mented PEFA showed a similar pattern; the CPIA

transparency and corruption indicator (16) has not

improved for the majority of the countries (all re-

ceived PSR lending), even though a majority of the

PEFA indicators showed improvement relative to

the previous (HIPC) assessment.

6 0


In some of the casestudy countries,

reforms on other publicsector themes improved

transparency andreduced bureaucratic

corruption.

Although manycountries now talkabout corruption,

action has been slow.

Why did the Bank-supported ACT programs

achieve as much as they have? Why has there not

been more progress? Three groups of issues seem

relevant: diagnosis and analysis (AAA), indirect ver-

sus direct approaches to different levels of cor-

ruption (state capture or bureaucratic), and

supply-side versus demand-side approaches.

AAA. Anticorruption and transparency diagno-

sis and monitoring has been a major growth in-

dustry within and outside the Bank for the past

decade (Levy 2007; World Bank 2006c). Some of

this work, like the World Governance Indicators

(from the WBI), tells about aggregate percep-

tions of the quality of governance in a country.

These indicators have served to alert authorities

that there is some problem; they can show

medium-term results if things improve through

government efforts or other factors, but they do

not connect to what the government controls di-

rectly. Thus, they are not actionable. Some indi-

cators, such as the Doing Business reports, tell

about governance issues facing private investors.

BEEPS gathers data about actual government

practices toward the companies surveyed, and

these are, therefore, actionable indicators for con-

structing a business-friendly environment.14 BEEPS

was conducted in 2000, 2004, and 2006, and the

changes over the period show a record of im-

provement in PSR borrowers, similar to that from

CPIA 16. BEEPS does not cover many aspects of

public sector corruption, because of its focus on

business issues. That focus, however, is important

for attracting foreign investment and therefore get-

ting the attention of political leaders.

In 19 countries, the WBI has done extensive gov-

ernance diagnostic studies, with much attention

given to anticorruption and transparency.15 WBI

diagnostics in Ghana and Guatemala, among

the case study countries, were central to devel-

oping extensive anticorruption strategies. The

diagnostic is a potentially important tool for

unbundling corruption, identifying weak/strong

institutions, and assessing the costs of corrup-

tion on different stakeholders. Moreover, it iden-

tifies key determinants of good governance in

a number of countries. This WBI governance di-

agnostic also addresses the importance

of providing information as a moni-

toring tool, as well as a tool for em-

powering stakeholders. Monitoring

and follow-up to the diagnostics have

often not happened, with exceptions that in-

clude Paraguay.

Although there is no PEFA indicator for corrup-

tion, improvements in the 28 areas covered by

PEFA can help reduce opportunities for corrup-

tion. Most CPARs and CFAAs do not adequately ad-

dress the question of how well procurement and

financial management systems protect against or

reduce the risk of corruption. They do not discuss

specific methods to identify corrupt practices

and measures to deter them in procurement and

financial management. They rarely look at the in-

centives for corruption in these areas. A few have

done so, such as for Bolivia and Indonesia, and

with broader application this could help countries

reduce corruption (IEG 2007).

For instance, researchers in Italy have developed

a method to measure corruption by comparing

the growth of infrastructure stock with amounts

of spending. In the context of Bank work this

would also identify the project areas where cor-

ruption is draining off the most public invest-

ment resources (Golden and Picci 2005).

The World Bank has been instrumental in devel-

oping new tools that help improve transparency

and societal accountability, such as the PETS in

13 countries and quantitative service delivery sur-

veys in FYR Macedonia and Papua New Guinea

(DFID n.d.). Although some of the instruments

used by the Bank and bilateral donors to assess

fiduciary risk have been useful for identifying in-

stitutional weaknesses in the PFM systems of de-

veloping countries, especially the PEFA framework,

the absence of political and cultural factors in

these analyses reflects a general weakness in Bank

and donor approaches to anticorruption.

Indirect or direct approaches for different

levels of corruption. Many of the previously

mentioned reforms to PFM, civil service (recruit-

ment and pay reform), and tax administration are


6 1

The development and useof diagnostic tools hashelped identify potentialproblem areas.

important indirect ways to reduce bureaucratic

corruption by reducing opportunities and incen-

tives for corrupt acts. Increasing transparency and

access to information in all parts of the public

sector also help reduce state capture by supply-

ing information that the media, civil society, and

the broader political process can use to demand

accountability and uncorrupt behavior from po-

litical leaders. Support for these measures has

been the most important way to date that the

Bank has advanced the anticorruption effort. Ex-

amples include the civil service, procurement,

financial management, and tax administration

measures in Albania, Bolivia, Guatemala, Russia,

and the Republic of Yemen.

Against state-capture corruption, the Extractive

Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has re-

ceived Bank support for the interna-

tional set-up and for implementation

in at least 12 of the 22 developing

countries that have signed on (box

5.2). EITI improves transparency on

the revenue side, but its potential and

hoped-for effects in reducing corrup-

tion and increasing transparency in

the use of funds depend mainly on a

process of information about mineral revenues

stimulating domestic political demands for ac-

countability and for more information. If a coun-

try already has the infrastructure of inquisitive

media, opposition parties, and democratic budg-

eting, EITI could have good effects on trans-

parency and corruption in a few years. In most

of the EITI signatory countries where the Bank

has provided support, however, there are great

needs for institution building.16

Direct anticorruption efforts supported by the

Bank have mostly targeted bureaucratic corrup-

tion, such as an anticorruption commission with

low-level mandate, prosecution and firing of those

who take bribes, establishing a code of conduct

for public officials, requiring public officials to

disclose their assets, and investigation and pros-

ecution of officials’ unaccounted wealth. In Gua-

temala, however, the government showed only

limited support for strengthening the anticor-

ruption commission, even as it supported mea-

sures—computerized systems for financial

management information and procurement—

that indirectly reduced corruption.

Most of these direct anticorruption mechanisms

also have potential against senior politicians and

businessmen involved in state capture, but they

are rarely invoked except to settle political scores.

In Indian states, the anticorruption commis-

sions—some of which are supported in Bank op-

erations—usually can investigate officials above a

certain level only with permission of the head of

the administration. The issue illustrates the diffi-

cult balance between protecting officials from

politically motivated prosecution and making

sure that all are subject to anticorruption rules.

In Ghana, the Commission on Human Rights and

Administrative Justice has a small anticorruption

unit cofunded by the government and donor; it

has reported that the government has restrained

its work and independence.

Tanzania had a good enquiry (United Republic of

Tanzania 1996) into forms, loci, causes, and reme-

dies for corruption. Its main recommendation

was to treat the problem of corruption by start-

ing at the top, but the government has not im-

6 2


Box 5.2: Extractive Industries TransparencyInitiative–Multi-Donor Trust Fund

Thus far, 22 developing countries have signed on to the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative (EITI)—14 in Africa, 3 in Europe and Central Asia,2 in East Asia, and 3 in Latin America and the Caribbean.

To help countries implement the principles, the Multi-Donor TrustFund for the EITI was established in 2004 through an agreement betweenDFID and the World Bank. The governments of Germany, the Nether-lands, and Norway joined in 2005. The goal of the EITI–Multi-Donor TrustFund is to broaden support for the EITI principles and process by estab-lishing extractive industries transparency initiatives in countries. TheMulti-Donor Trust Fund is an arrangement whereby the Bank managesfunds on behalf of multiple donors.

The EITI–Multi-Donor Trust Fund currently funds activities in more than12 countries, and the EITI has been endorsed in almost 10 more. Coun-try-specific grant agreements are signed between the recipient countryand the Bank to define and establish which activities are to be executedby the recipient.

Source: EITI Web site (http://www.eitransparency.org).

Reforms to financialmanagement, civil

service, and taxadministration areimportant indirect

approaches to reducingthe potential for

corruption.

plemented the recommendations. The Good Gov-

ernance Coordination Unit (donor funded but

staffed with Tanzanian civil servants) and the Pre-

vention and Combating of Corruption Bureau

have not done much yet. The national anticor-

ruption strategy and action plan theoretically em-

powers private citizens to take up a corruption

issue, but none seems to have done this with any

effect. Although the plan seems an ambitious and

all-encompassing anticorruption approach, it lacks

serious mechanisms to monitor compliance or to

hold implementing agencies accountable. Indirect

anticorruption efforts through financial manage-

ment have been more effective through the Min-

istry of Finance and the Public Procurement

Regulatory Authority. Support to the National

Audit Office has also encouraged demand-side

transparency.

The Bank’s country strategy and major opera-

tions have directly addressed state-capture cor-

ruption only in rare cases, when deep political and

economic crises exposed the corruption of old

regimes and brought in new ones dedicated to a

fresh start, such as in Indonesia in the late 1990s

and Nigeria after 2003. Advocating wholesale

transformation of neopatrimonial governments

has been politically difficult for the Bank and is usu-

ally avoided, even when formal or informal ana-

lytic work identifies the problem, as it did in

Bangladesh, Bolivia, Peru, and the Philippines.

Focusing reform efforts on combatting bureau-

cratic corruption seems unfair if state-capture cor-

ruption is persisting, but it may serve to make

public service delivery more efficient and helpful

to citizens while staying within the bounds of po-

litical feasibility. Reducing state capture (if possible)

would make reduction of bureaucratic corruption

more effective and sustainable, and reducing bu-

reaucratic corruption seems to have some use

in itself and may help move the broader political

culture toward opposing grand corruption. In

perception-based indicators of corruption, how-

ever, the persistence of state capture may obscure

progress in fighting bureaucratic corruption.

Supply- and demand-side approaches. The

measures discussed above are in the supply-side

category, in that the reforms are sup-

plied by the government (perhaps in re-

sponse to domestic or international

demands) and address corrupt prac-

tices by the government (perhaps in

response to bribes that accompany pri-

vate sector demands). In its transparency and an-

ticorruption efforts (like the rest of PRS), the

Bank has focused mainly on the supply side,

because it generally works with governments

and needs those governments’ approval for its

activities.

Nonetheless, there are more than a dozen proj-

ects listed in the GAC (World Bank 2007c) with

components aimed specifically at the demand

side for PSR in the areas of this evaluation. Most

of them include measures to strengthen the over-

sight capacity of legislatures and their audit com-

mittees. Other support for the demand side

includes WBI courses and contact with civil soci-

ety, the media, and NGOs. Some programs, for

example, in Guatemala and Indonesia, include

measures to strengthen grassroots monitoring

of local infrastructure developments and assist the

media in enhancing transparency. Transparency

and accountability of the budget processes are also

reflected in some country portfolios, such as in

Uganda. Generally, however, supply-side factors

are at the core of the Bank’s support of anticor-

ruption. In particular, this applies to support to

improve PFM legislation, public procurement sys-

tems, capacity of the auditor general’s office, and

CSA, especially payroll reforms.

Increasing awareness of the potential role of civil

society in fighting corruption has only materialized

in a few of the Bank’s anticorruption lending

programs. For example, reforms in Ghana to

strengthen good governance and social account-

ability have to an important extent been demand

driven from civil society; the Freedom of Infor-

mation Act is expected to further strengthen the

voice of civil society. In Indonesia, demand-side ef-

forts brought in civil society and local

stakeholders to perform monitoring

and evaluation functions, especially in

decentralization projects, investment

climate surveys, and PETS.


6 3

Direct anticorruptionefforts supported by theBank have mostlytargeted bureaucraticcorruption.

Country strategies andBank operations haverarely addressed statecapture directly.

In Ukraine, the Bank has supported a program

called Voices of the People. This program’s goal

is to improve municipal-level integrity by strength-

ening the voice of citizen groups as they demand

better services and governance. The Canadian

International Development Agency also supported

this program. It started as a pilot in four cities,

monitoring local service delivery, promoting NGO

capacity, and facilitating public involvement in

government decision making. Positive reaction to

the first phase led to the addition of six more

cities for the second phase, starting in 2003.

The cases and literature reviewed raise

challenges to traditional supply-side

approaches—leaving it to the govern-

ment and a country’s legal institutions

to devise and enforce public account-

ability. Conventional mechanisms, such as anti-

corruption commissions and audit and legislative

reviews, may not be enough (Reinikka and Svens-

son 2006, p. 368). Collusion, organizational

deficiencies, abuse of power, and lack of respon-

siveness to citizens have been hard to detect and

rectify, even with the best of supervision. When

the institutions are weak, as is common in de-

veloping countries, the government’s potential

role as auditor and supervisor is even more

constrained.

Evidence suggests that corruption can be sub-

stantially reduced only when the supply-side re-

forms are complemented by systematic efforts

to increase the citizens’ capability to monitor and

challenge abuses of the system and to inform the

citizens about their rights and entitlements. Break-

ing the culture of secrecy that pervades the gov-

ernment functioning and empowering people to

demand public accountability are important com-

ponents in such an effort.

Tailoring an anticorruption strategy to coun-

try circumstances. The Bank dutifully repeats

the mantra of “no one size fits all,” yet it has

not developed guidance on what to do if the

Chilean or Nordic size—that is, the size that fits

most countries where the Bank lends—does not

come close to fitting in the country at hand, es-

pecially IDA countries. Most developing coun-

tries today (as with Western Europe and the

United States 150 years ago) have political systems

that depend fundamentally on patronage. In these

places the recommendation to be opportunistic

in fighting all types of corruption often degener-

ates into a game, where prosecuting corruption

when it becomes most obvious or politically

vulnerable leads to it popping out elsewhere. An

open dialogue about the realistic options is

needed.

The typologies of corruption elaborated above still

do not provide a way to assess the cost of differ-

ent corruption types to development, set the cor-

responding priorities, and choose remedies that

work for the relevant situations.17 The experi-

ences in Indonesia, Nigeria, and Russia suggest

that reducing the development cost of corruption

is a politically attainable goal, even where pa-

tronage is ingrained in the political system. Even

in patronage-based, corrupt governments, most

leaders want to have at least somewhat more and

better public services and infrastructure in re-

turn for their patronage spending. Beyond keep-

ing corruption out of the projects it finances

(which should be a high priority because the

projects are presumably of high value for devel-

opment), the Bank has not developed a system-

atic way to determine how it can and should work

in such situations.

Summary Lessons from ThematicComparisons

Standards and measurementsActionable indicators exist for PFM and tax ad-

ministration. Indicators exist for corruption per-

ception, but mostly they are not actionable.

Indicators for transparency are being developed

in some areas—such as the Open Budget Pro-

ject—and could be replicated in others. These in-

dicators have sometimes been used to define

project objectives and baselines, but this could be

done more systematically. That would give more

objective indicators for judging project outcomes,

rather than relative to objectives defined in terms

6 4


The persistence of statecapture may obscure

progress in fightingbureaucratic corruption.

unique to each project, as is now the case with al-

most all projects.

For civil service, a few indicators exist, such as

number of public employees, wage bills, disper-

sion ratios for wage rates, and (occasionally) ab-

senteeism. However, these are not widely or

systematically tracked. Also there is not a set of in-

ternationally standardized indicators established

within a coherent framework for analysis.

Core agenda to be adaptedEveryone agrees that one size does not fit all, but

it also seems important to start with a basic adapt-

able pattern and from that learn the best ways to

adapt it. PFM, transparency of budget, and tax ad-

ministration have such patterns, which the Bank,

the IMF, OECD, and various other agencies and

bilaterals have helped develop.

For civil service and administration, there is no

such a pattern, although the beginnings for it have

been tried in isolated instances. Where manage-

ment of civil service and other personnel is

weak, the Bank has had some successes in sup-

porting the gathering of reliable data on num-

bers, total compensation, and attendance and

the institutionalization of these processes. Im-

proving the links between personnel manage-

ment and financial management information

systems has also been a useful way to get a tech-

nocratic start on problems that are often highly

politicized.

Motivation and competence of counterpartsIn PFM and tax administration, a lot of project,

AAA, and IDF resources go to capacity building in

the counterpart agencies. In the areas of CSA re-

form, there is less clarity about what content

should be. Capacity building needs to include

not only technical skills but also skills in manag-

ing and monitoring people.

Interdependence of the thematic areasThe analysis of PSR by themes should not leave

the impression that they can or should be dealt

with in isolation. There is a particular temptation

to leave civil service out, as out of fashion or too

difficult in practice, although it is sometimes also

dismissed as “easy, if there is only the political will.”

Nonetheless, CSA reform affects the incentives and

capacities of the people who have to implement

reforms in all the other areas, so it cannot be

ignored.

In the CPIA, the ratings for PFM are usually bet-

ter than for CSA, but never by more than one

grade (except in one country that has 5.5 for PFM

and 4.0 for CSA). Improving PFM to the point

where it gets beyond just processes and has real

effects on public service performance and ac-

countability has not happened without also im-

proving the civil service.

The extent of coordination among Bank staff spe-

cializing in the themes discussed here varies

within the operational Regions. Country cases

and other staff interviews revealed that in (large)

country offices, where the specialists sit in prox-

imity, and in Latin America and the Caribbean, with

country management teams representing all the

areas, there tends to be better coordination. In

other contexts, the Bank has not developed ad-

equate institutions to avoid having silos in the

Bank reflect and reinforce those that exist in the

client countries.


6 5

Chapter 6

Parliment building in Cape Town, South Africa. Photo by Trevor Samson, courtesy of World Bank Photo Library.

Strategic Summary,Ratings, and

Recommendations

Reform Motivations, Expectations, andSuccess FactorsPopular pressure and the desire for faster eco-

nomic growth and improved public services fre-

quently motivate reform. In countries with

well-established democratic processes and a free

press, such as Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile, India, and

the Czech Republic, the demand for PSR has been

substantial.

The Bank has sometimes played an encouraging

role by fueling the demand with information,

working with local think tanks and academic in-

stitutions, and supporting special institutions,

such as Mexico’s Federal Institute for Access to In-

formation. Participatory PERs in Tanzania, Uganda,

and Vietnam that the World Bank supports have

increased the popular interest in public expen-

diture and whetted the appetite for more infor-

mation, especially in local think tanks and NGOs.

But these types of PERs are still not common.

A fiscal crisis has frequently motivated coun-

tries to seek support from the Bank and other

donors for PSR, especially if financial assistance is

expected. Among the four areas of PSR discussed

here, tax administration and basic financial man-

agement have been most frequently what the

government was eager to do as a remedy for fis-

cal crisis. Actual and potential taxpayers suffer in

a fiscal crisis, so they are then more likely to sup-

port better revenue collection. South Korean

businessmen were explicit about this in 1998, as

they increased voluntary tax compliance to help

the country during the financial crisis. The Min-

istry of Finance, the World Bank Group’s typical

counterpart, is motivated to see reforms in these

areas and is the typical agent for accomplishing

them.

So the fiscal crisis motivation most often leads to

tax administration and PFM as entry points (Rus-

sia, Tanzania, Colombia, Indian states, and Ar-

gentina). In rare cases, the government has

successfully used civil service retrenchment as a

fiscal development policy measure (Tanzania and

some Indian states), but more often this does

not go beyond temporary freezes on salaries and

hiring. Fiscal crises are almost always temporary,

so except as memories they do not sustain the mo-

tivation that is needed for more complex reforms

that take longer to implement.

European Union accession has also success-

fully motivated PSR, and the positive results are

striking. Other factors may also have contributed

6 9

The motivation of countries for PSR has varied widely and mostly has

involved factors beyond the control of the World Bank Group. Aware-

ness of the motives is important for the Bank to choose the appropriate

instruments.

to these positive outcomes, such as completing

the dual transitions to democracy and from state-

planned to market economies. The governance

CPIA ratings for the 10 accession countries have

almost all improved since 1999.1

Although this specific model is not replicable in

most other parts of the world, three features of

the situation of the European Union accession

countries have general lessons. First, the European

Union’s conditions for entry are comprehensive

and standardized, with the pre-announced re-

wards (accession and major funding) dependent

on the extent and pace with which the country

meets the standards. Second, the promise of re-

wards and enforcement of standards are both

highly credible and extend over a long period—

forever on the issue of admission. Third, the Eu-

ropean Union–accession scenario enhanced the

World Bank’s effectiveness by emphasizing its

role as an advisor and facilitator, not an arm

twister, and its relatively small financing for PSR

had importance mainly through the earmark of

money for technical assistance and the supervi-

sion process.

A fourth category of motivation, and one over

which the Bank has considerable control, is

financial support, which includes general

budget support through loans, credits (IDA loans),

grants, debt relief (HIPC), and investment loans

for the costs of specific PSR activities. Budget

support often carries high hopes as a motivator,

but four realities have limited the effectiveness of

financial support as motivation for reform:

• First, countries where the Bank has the most

financial leverage have the furthest to go to im-

prove institutions, but the weakest capacity to

implement change. Countries with strong in-

stitutional capacity to implement change, in

contrast, are also likely to have good access to

financial markets and are thus less motivated

by the attractiveness of Bank financing. In-

deed, some see the acceptance of Bank fi-

nancing as the price to pay for getting the

expertise that comes with the money—a price

these countries are still willing to pay.

• Second, the Bank is often the leader of a con-

cert of donors, which adds to the financial

leverage but also makes the demands more

diverse and less focused, as each donor has its

own set of priorities. The Bank has helped co-

ordinate these demands—sometimes at a gov-

ernment’s request—with varying degrees of

success. In Tanzania and Guyana, this went rel-

atively well, but in other cases—Bangladesh

and Honduras—multiple agendas led to overly

complex sets of conditions.

• Third, the Bank may find itself under pressure

to lend for various reasons—international po-

litical strategy, defensive lending to avert default,

or the momentum of delivering budget support

on a predictable annual cycle. It has some-

times done this despite PSR conditions that

are vague or not well enforced, as a way to jus-

tify the lending. This type of lending under-

mines the credibility the World Bank’s seal of

approval for PSR programs.

• Fourth, the Bank’s tight schedules for com-

mitment and disbursement of lending, espe-

cially for IDA, often conflict with the long period

typically needed to implement PSR and the

need to respect political cycles and build con-

sensus and capacity. Investment projects did

better in this regard, especially if they were

adaptable program loans, like the public service

reform loan in Tanzania. These relatively small

investment projects were useful as a financial

incentive to the implementing agency, but not

for political ownership by the government as

a whole. Consequently, the most effective PSR

support from the Bank has often come in sit-

uations where the country does not urgently

need lending.

Expectations for the progress and effects of PSR

are the foundations for motivating the govern-

ment to undertake them and the Bank and other

donors to finance them. Thus, the ideal balance is

for expectations to be high enough to motivate but

not so high that they misguide efforts or that fail-

ures to meet them erode credibility and commit-

ment. Expectations for PSR have often been

unrealistic. Some of this is due to overstated goals

and the mismatch of objectives with disbursement

7 0


timelines. The generic problem was recognized at

least as early as the 1992 Wapenhans report (World

Bank 1992a), and the programmatic development

policy (now, development policy) loans and adapt-

able program loans were introduced as instru-

ments to allow longer time horizons.2

Nonetheless, the momentum of high budget-

support programs encouraged the search for suc-

cess stories that were sometimes overhyped and

led to overstated objectives, at least in the period

under evaluation. Thus, compared to middle-

income countries that pay essentially the full mar-

ket rate for loans, the pressure to exaggerate was

greater for the IDA countries, which faced if any-

thing greater challenges to produce results in the

short and medium term.

Expectations about reforming civil service and

reducing corruption have been especially difficult

to manage. Successful reforms in these areas have

taken a long time in any country, with important

historical antecedents. Although the Bank dutifully

repeats the mantra of “no one size fits all,” it has

not developed guidance on what pace of progress

to expect, given the initial conditions in a coun-

try. Most developing countries today (such as

Western Europe and the United States 150 years

ago) have political systems that depend funda-

mentally on patronage. Some countries have pro-

gressed more quickly in recent years, but an open

dialogue about the realistic expectations has been

missing.

Country PSR Strategy Entry Points In concluding, there are two cross-cutting ques-

tions: First, what should be the scope of reforms?

Second, what is the best mix of policy-based and

investment lending?

There are continuing debates over whether re-

forms should be rapid and comprehensive in

scope, taking a “big bang” approach, or incre-

mental and opportunistic (Wescott 2006). Some

stress the need for a “top-down,” politically driven,

all-encompassing reform process to take advan-

tage of narrow windows of opportunity. In con-

trast, North views piecemeal reforms as more

typical: “The single most important point about

institutional change, which must be grasped if

we are to begin to get a handle on the subject, is

that institutional change is overwhelmingly in-

cremental” (North 1990, p. 89). Although there

would seem to be more evidence of success of in-

cremental rather than strategy-driven reform,

both types have worked at times, and both have

sometimes failed.

One pattern we do see is that rapid reform only

succeeds when there is strong support at the be-

ginning—European Union accession countries

are the best group of cases—whereas gradual re-

forms have sometimes succeeded when public

support was initially weak (but did exist), be-

cause early successes of reform pilots builds sup-

port for more.

With either pattern of reforms, it has been use-

ful for the Bank to get a comprehensive and po-

litically savvy overview and strategy at the

beginning, which then gets modified as events un-

fold. This need not be formal ESW, publicly dis-

seminated. Sometimes a background paper on

sensitive political issues can be presented as re-

search in an academic setting, with a government

representative as discussant; the Bank then need

not take an official position. The case studies

show that with governments unsure about doing

PSR, focused and technocratic AAA (not neces-

sarily formal ESW) has often opened the door

for wider dialogue and eventually for lending sup-

port for PSR.

The Bank and its borrowing partners have tried

a variety of combinations of investment lending

and development policy lending, including for

the support of PSR. Investment and technical as-

sistance lending by itself can work well when the

government has the appropriate policy and legal

framework in place and the implementing agency

has good motivation, institutional autonomy, and

clear access to the funds. This is more likely to pre-

vail in middle-income countries and more mod-

ern Indian states. Where the appropriate policy

framework and incentives are not in place, an in-

vestment loan will not generate them, even with

S T R AT E G I C S U M M A R Y, R AT I N G S , A N D R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S

7 1

a willing implementing agency, as in Venezuela and

Argentina.

Where the country is getting substantial Provin-

cial Reform Loan or PRSC funds, the Bank and

other development partners often have assumed

that governments will give adequate resources and

attention to implementing institutional reforms,

but this has not always happened, as seen in

Uganda and Bangladesh (see IDD & Associates

2006). In such cases, the big but not always reli-

able inflows of budget support go to the large

high-priority areas, such as education and health;

this is appropriate, but the details of implement-

ing new systems of financial management or per-

sonnel administration get bypassed.

However, in other cases, channeling aid through

country systems has strengthened budget pro-

cesses, including comprehensiveness and trans-

parency. In cases where there is a multiyear

investment technical assistance loan, especially an

adaptable program loan, then the agency man-

aging the project gets funds as needed for im-

plementation but also gets the long-term and

focused attention of the supervision team, which

may help to improve fiduciary systems.

Summary Evaluation Ratings To arrive at summary ratings, the evaluation builds

up from ratings in each of the four themes and dif-

ferentiates AAA and funding operations. Because

the borrower performance and outcome are so

heterogeneous and largely beyond the Bank’s

control, the ratings here are for Bank performance

as a way to focus the learning process. Nonethe-

less, the country outcomes carry over somewhat

to the ratings of Bank performance, as it contrib-

utes to outcomes.

For every cell of the resulting 2 × 5 matrix, shown

in table 6.1, there are examples of highly satisfac-

tory work. So the results reflect the median, based

mainly on the tasks that were done but also con-

sidering opportunities missed. Almost every bor-

rower country needed some support in every cell

of the matrix. Sometimes other development part-

ners covered part of the program, so the Bank

played a lesser role there and in some cases played

none. In every case the Bank and country au-

thorities (and often other development partners)

share the credit or blame for the outcomes, with

the Bank having more control and therefore more

responsibility for the AAA and the countries hav-

ing more control over the selection, design, and

especially outcomes in the project areas.

The ratings here focus on Bank performance,

particularly the more strategic aspects of setting

agendas, fostering synergies within country port-

folios, and allocating and organizing Bank re-

sources. Thus, the ratings here differ from those

for individual PSR projects, which are usually

rated satisfactory for Bank performance.

In the PFM area, the diagnostics have developed

strongly, especially since 2000, with PEFA and

Public Expenditure and Institutional Reviews being

highly satisfactory examples. In most cases, the

Bank offered well-structured packages of lending

7 2


Table 6.1: Overall Bank Performance Ratings, 1999–2006

Reform area AAA Lending

Public expenditure and financial management Highly satisfactory Moderately satisfactory

Civil service and administration Unsatisfactory Moderately unsatisfactory

Tax administration N.A. (IMF usually leads) Satisfactory

Direct anticorruption and transparency Moderately unsatisfactory Moderately unsatisfactory

Integration and consistency across themes Moderately unsatisfactory Moderately unsatisfactory

Overall Moderately satisfactorySource: IEG assessment.Note: AAA = analytical and advisory activities; IMF = International Monetary Fund.

support, although sometimes the packages were

overly complex or gave too little attention to be-

havioral aspects of institutional change. Govern-

ment ownership for PFM investment projects was

usually good, because the main counterparts—the

ministries of finance—have a clear interest in

such projects. Implementation of the budget—

procurement and financial management—still

has received too little attention, especially in pol-

icy reform lending projects. The set-up of Bank

projects with PIUs and ring fencing has some-

times hindered improvement in financial man-

agement of the rest of the country’s resources.

For civil service, there has been some improve-

ment in the decade since the previous IEG eval-

uation, but not enough. Although some projects

have followed and had success with incremental

approaches that emphasize improving person-

nel management, in other places the Bank (often

with the IMF) continued to support simplistic re-

trenchment programs of the same sort that failed

in the past. Too often CSA diagnostic AAA is sim-

ply not done before projects tackle reform, as in

8 of 18 case study countries. The absence of a good

analytic and diagnostic framework hinders both

AAA and projects for CSA reform. Promising pi-

lots in a few countries have not been replicated

widely or brought into a multiagency context to

build international consensus for the equivalent

of PEFA. Analysis and projects do not focus often

enough on the features that would do the most

to improve the quality and efficiency of service de-

livery, although there has been some movement

in that direction.

Tax administration, the smallest area of Bank ac-

tivity in the PSR field, illustrates the potential for

reform when there is a good diagnostic and reform

framework (typically led by the IMF) combined

with typically enthusiastic government support

and effective project management from the Bank.

Anticorruption and transparency is new as an

area of its own. The Bank has done a lot of sur-

vey work that contributes to anticorruption di-

agnosis, especially to improve the environment for

business (as with BEEPS), but there has been less

diagnostic work at the country level about cor-

ruption in the core PSM areas that are the focus

of this report. The CPAR and CFAA, for instance,

have not usually given much attention to cor-

ruption issues pertaining to procurement and fi-

nancial management. The requisite analysis of

political factors in the specific country contexts was

typically missing.

Even more than in other areas, top-level govern-

ment ownership is essential for making progress

against corruption, but the diagnostic work and

program design rarely took this into account.

Furthermore, adequate guidelines for how to do

this did not exist, even in the 2007 GAC strategy.

(The learning process under way for its imple-

mentation aims to address this, but it is beyond

the scope of this evaluation.)

Because the main themes of PSR—PFM, civil ser-

vice, and anticorruption—look at different sides

of essentially the same phenomenon, the whole

portfolio of Bank support for PSR should be

greater than the sum of the parts. But it is less.

Coordination and integration across the themes

has often been inadequate or lacking, although

this improved in some country programs during

the evaluation period. The country GAC strate-

gies, now being developed as pilots, offer an op-

portunity to address this shortcoming more

systematically.

The overall rating for Bank performance is mod-

erately satisfactory, although the picture is het-

erogeneous. PFM has been the largest area of

Bank activity for PSR, and performance there has

been moderately to highly satisfactory. This out-

weighs the shortcomings in other areas.

Recommendations There are many favorable trends in PSR that the

Bank should continue to pursue and many areas

where improvements are needed. This chapter

highlights three recommendations.

Recognize the complexity and political natureof PSRFirst, the design of PSR projects and resource al-

location to them needs to reflect the fact that

they face more complex political and sequencing


7 3

issues than in most traditional areas of the Bank’s

activity. This implies, therefore, the need to (i) set

project objectives with realistic recognition of

the time it takes to get significant results, (ii) un-

derstand the political context, identifying pre-

requisites to achieve the objectives, and (iii) focus

first on the basic reforms that a country needs in

its initial situation and that generate political sup-

port for the process.

The PEFA indicators provide a good basis for this

in the PFM area, because they will track incre-

mental progress. As institutional change needs sus-

tained support, that support usually needs to

include investment projects; although develop-

ment policy lending can help secure the enabling

policy changes, it is not generally a substitute for

investment loans.

The political complexity and typically longer du-

ration of public sector reforms mean more ana-

lytical and preparatory work, including on political

issues. They also mean that any one loan, espe-

cially fast disbursing, will promise more modest,

incremental progress. For some countries, these

changes may entail more loans per year. Invest-

ment loans will often need to have longer dura-

tion. This does not mean to stop encouraging a

government to progress as fast as possible, but it

does recognize the value in setting more realis-

tic targets that, when accomplished, will enhance

the credibility of public sector reform in that

country and more generally.

These considerations are especially relevant for

countries starting with weaker-than-average ca-

pacity, and the initial steps there may need to focus

on capacity building and data collection. Coun-

tries with severe governance problems, where the

“bottom billion” live, may need more AAA for

PSR—nonlending technical assistance as well as for-

mal ESW—prior to policy reform lending.

Prioritize PSR effortsSecond, devote more effort at both country and

thematic levels to identify in each country where

PSR—including anticorruption efforts—will con-

tribute most to poverty reduction and growth. This

would feed into the country GACs mandated by

the 2007 GAC. Based on this, the country teams

would clarify the sequencing and priorities with

which they would be addressing the long-term

agenda of reducing corruption and improving

other aspects of governance.

Enabling such diagnosis at the country level may

require a strategic framework from the center. The

country team might meet as a group to compare

and synthesize knowledge about areas where cor-

ruption is a problem. Comparing cost of corrup-

tion across all sectors may not be possible in the

near term, but the country GACs could include

AAA to assess the costs of corruption within spe-

cific areas that previous information (Worldwide

Governance Indicators, CPIA, CPARs) identifies as

problematic—such as business licensing, pro-

curement, and tax administration.

For instance, researchers in Italy have developed

a method to measure corruption by comparing the

growth of infrastructure stock with amounts of

spending, which in the context of Bank work

would also identify the project areas where cor-

ruption is draining off the most public investment

resources (Golden and Picci 2005). The Bank’s di-

agnostic work looks comparatively at corruption

costs to some extent already, as in Doing Business

and BEEPS. The recommendation is to do this

more systematically, aiming at comparability. An al-

ternative approach could look comprehensively at

all areas (procurement, human resources man-

agement, taxation, licensing and regulation, and

so forth) of one or more sectors identified as piv-

otal for that country—such as natural resource

management, health, or agriculture.

To complement estimates of the cost of corrup-

tion, institutional and political analysis (perhaps

in the Institutional Governance Review format)

would need to consider the cost and feasibility of

the measures that aim to reduce the most costly

types of corruption. Having zero tolerance for

corruption in Bank-financed investment projects

makes sense in light of their high value for de-

velopment (that is why the Bank finances them)

and the strong institutional mechanisms that are

7 4


available to fight corruption in these projects.

These justifications from the country point of

view are in addition to the rationale of protecting

the anticorruption reputation of the Bank.

To reduce the negative effect of corruption on

growth and poverty reduction, Bank support for

PSR should emphasize (i) building systems (in

areas such as PFM, procurement, tax administra-

tion, and human resources management and in-

formation systems, as well as in licensing and

registration services, social services, and so on) that

reduce the opportunities for corruption that is

most costly to development (including any that

might be in Bank-supported projects) and

(ii) making better information public (as with

PETS, EITI, publicly discussed PERs, citizen re-

port cards, and so forth) in ways that stimulate pub-

lic demand for more efficient and less corrupt

service delivery.

Building the capacity of demand-side institutions,

like the legislature and its audit office and the news

media, is often needed to complement the meas-

ures to improve access to information. Only when

the country has both strong political will and an

adequate judiciary system should the Bank’s sup-

port for anticorruption put primary emphasis on

anticorruption laws and commissions.

Set a better framework for CSA Third, keep CSA reforms (including human re-

sources management systems) as a major com-

ponent of PSR, but design and implement them

with a better framework, and give more attention

to the budget-execution phases of PFM. Despite

the difficulties of improving CSA reform, it is not

something that can be ignored. Improving PFM

to the point where it gets beyond just processes

and has real effects on public service performance

and accountability has not happened without

also improving the civil service.

A better framework for CSA reform will require

things such as elaboration and implementation of

a PEFA-like set of actionable indicators for CSA per-

formance, which is foreseen in the 2007 GAC strat-

egy. There may need to be variants corresponding

to different types of public administrations—such

as presidential, continental European, and White-

hall. These indicators would guide the analysis of

CSA issues in CASs/Country Partnership Strate-

gies, as would AAA and lending.

As the framework for CSA diagnosis and reform

improves, the Bank’s staffing for public manage-

ment, including the civil service area, may need

enhancement in line with its importance in the

lending programs. Finding resources for this will

face the usual budget constraints, and manage-

ment may consider shifting some resources out

of standard macroeconomic analysis, especially

where the Bank’s program is relatively small and

the IMF already does a lot of analytic work. For in-

stance, the Bank might consider having a politi-

cal scientist or public management specialist with

some macroeconomics background as the core

of its team for some small countries.


7 5

Appendixes

7 9

APPENDIX A: DATA SET DESCRIPTION: PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM LENDING,

AAA, AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUNDS

1. LendingThe lending projects included in this public sec-

tor reform (PSR) evaluation were selected through

two processes, both looking at projects approved

during fiscal years 1990 through 2006. One process

(with multiple steps) started with a list of projects

from the World Bank project database that had at

least 25 percent of the project dedicated to PSR-

related themes or sectors.

PSR-related themes in this selection process in-

cluded administrative and civil service reform;

public expenditure, financial management and

procurement; tax policy and administration; other

accountability/anticorruption; and other public

sector governance. PSR-related sectors included

central government administration, subnational

government administration, and general public

administration.

The team examined each project’s appraisal doc-

umentation and included only the projects that

had objectives and policy actions pertaining to

public budgeting and financial management (in-

cluding audit and procurement), civil service and

administrative reform, tax administration, and

anticorruption and transparency.

Some development policy lending included so

many sectors and themes that PSR-related shares

did not make the 25 percent cutoff, even though

there were important PSR conditions. So the team

did a second selection process, using the Ad-

justment Lending Conditionality and Imple-

mentation Database. If there were at least three

conditions required for loan disbursement as ei-

ther prior actions or legal tranche-release condi-

tions1 in the focus areas of the evaluation, then

that project was added. Many of these projects

were already included from the first process.

The intersection of these two processes com-

prised 467 projects—the main database for the

evaluation. A list of these projects has been in-

cluded as appendix B (http://www.worldbank.org/

ieg/psr/appendix.html). For each project, de-

scriptive information was also collected from an

internal database, including a short description,

commitment amounts, important dates, sector

board, network, project status, lending instru-

ment type, and other information.

Within the data set, the projects were coded to in-

dicate whether they had components in the fol-

lowing four thematic categories: public finance

management (PFM), civil service and adminis-

trative (CSA) reform, tax administration (TAX), or

anticorruption and governance (transparency).

Many of the projects in the database included ac-

tivities in more than one of these categories. The

percentage allocations2 of all of the themes related

to PSR were combined to estimate a combined

share of the project allocated to PSR. This num-

ber was multiplied by the loan commitment

amount to obtain a rough indication of funding

(in dollars) allocated to PSR.

2. Analytic and Advisory Activities The analytic and advisory activities (AAA) list used

the following criteria:

(i) Only AAA that was delivered to the client be-

tween fiscal 1999 and 2006 is included. Inter-

nal databases do not allow retrieving a

complete list of AAA prior to fiscal 1999.

(ii) All core reports (Country Economic Memo-

randum[CEMs]/Development Policy Reviews

[DPRs], Public Expenditure Reviews, Country

Financial Accountability Assessment, Coun-

try Procurement Assessment Reports) were in-

cluded if they had as their main sector any of

the following eight categories: general public

administration, central government adminis-

tration, public sector management, public fi-

nancial management, civil service reform,

other public sector reforms, institutional de-

velopment, and subnational government.

(iii) For the noncore AAA, the team carefully read

the titles of all AAA that were either mapped

under four sector boards (Public Sector Gov-

ernance, Financial Management, Procurement,

and Economic Policy) or had as their main sec-

tor one of the above eight categories. AAA

that had a heavy sectoral focus was excluded

from this list.

(iv) For the AAA that did not fall under the above

four sector boards or eight sector categories,

the team used word-search techniques and

added those products relevant to our evalu-

ation. Once the core and noncore lists were

complete, the team classified each AAA as

PFM, TAX, administrative and civil service, or

anticorruption and governance (CEM/DPRs

and Public Expenditure Reviews were classi-

fied as generic PSR, because these products

cover several sectors not captured by the

internal Bank database). The total number

of AAA projects is 803. This list is in appen-

dix C (http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/psr/

appendix.html).

3. Institutional Development Fund grantsThe Institutional Development Fund (IDF) list

was based on a complete list of active and closed

IDFs (which began in fiscal 1992). The team fol-

lowed a procedure similar to steps (iii) and (iv)

for AAA. Team members carefully read the titles

of all IDFs that were either mapped under the sec-

tor boards Public Sector Governance, Financial

Management, Procurement, and Economic Policy,

or that had as their main sector one of the eight

categories (general public administration, cen-

tral government administration, public sector

management, PFM, civil service reform, other

public sector reforms, institutional development,

and subnational government). IDFs with a heavy

sectoral focus were dropped from this list. For the

IDFs not under the above four sector boards or

eight sector categories, the team used word-

search techniques and added the ones relevant to

the evaluation. Once the list was complete, the

team classified each IDF as PFM, TAX, CSA, or

transparency. The total number of IDFs is 279. Ap-

pendix D (http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/psr/

appendix.html) lists them.

8 0


The Panel believes that the report Public Sector Re-

form: What Works and Why? by the Independent

Evaluation Group (IEG) provides a very competent

and informative analysis of the Bank’s efforts to pro-

mote PSR from 1999 to 2006. The importance of

good governance to development has been well

established in the academic literature at this point;

given the large and steadily increasing amount of

PSR lending by the Bank, evaluation of the Bank’s

efforts in this regard is critical.

The history of the Bank’s involvement with PSR

in the report is very useful, and the four main the-

matic areas highlighted—public financial man-

agement, tax administration, CSA reform, and

anticorruption and transparency—cover the most

important dimensions of PSR. The report appro-

priately recognizes the underlying complexity

and the challenges posed by PSR and is sensitive

to the multivariate and bidirectional nature of

causality in government performance. The Panel

also commends the three-pronged approach of

country case studies, thematic assessments, and

statistical analysis as an appropriate methodology

for an evaluation in this intrinsically difficult area.

The report underlines the importance of per-

forming a broad political economy analysis before

proceeding with PSR and the need for the Bank

to include more noneconomists on its country

teams to help in this effort. We fully endorse this

recommendation.

The Panel feels that the report’s findings could be

strengthened or extended in the following areas:

1. The statistical analysis in chapters 4 and 5 re-

lies very heavily on Country Policy and Insti-

tutional Assessments (CPIA) scores. Although

the CPIA yardstick may be familiar to people

in the Bank, it is not well known outside the

Bank (indeed, CPIA scores for middle-income

countries are not publicly available). This

means that they (unlike, for example, the World

Bank Institute Worldwide Governance Indica-

tors) have not been carefully scrutinized ex-

ternally for possible biases, endogeneity, and

so forth. It may well be, as the report sug-

gests, that no better set of indicators exists, but

it is worth explaining at greater length how the

CPIA scores are derived and their possible

weaknesses.

2. As far as the Panel can tell, the statistical analy-

sis is not based on a full-blown multivariate sta-

tistical analysis that seeks to isolate the degree

of variance in governance outcomes accounted

for by Bank PSR programs. It is therefore not

possible to know with any reasonable confi-

dence the extent to which improvements in

public sector performance result from Bank

PSR operations versus other factors, such as the

intensity of PSR activities, complementary pro-

grams by other donors, or exogenous trends

(such as European Union accession). The Panel

appreciates that it may not be possible to per-

form this kind of analysis given the limitations

of the data, but more explicit recognition of this

problem would have been appropriate.

3. The report makes some scattered allusions to

the importance of stimulating demand for

good governance, an issue that has been under

considerable discussion within the Bank in re-

cent years. However, the conclusions and rec-

ommendations make no reference to a possible

role for the Bank on the demand side.

4. What is most striking about the report is the

finding that public financial management and

8 1

APPENDIX B: STATEMENT BY THE EXTERNAL ADVISORY PANEL

tax administration operations have been rea-

sonably effective in improving public sector

performance in most Bank client countries, but

that civil service reform and anticorruption

efforts have not had a significant impact on out-

comes. Accordingly, the Panel expected a rec-

ommendation that the Bank should focus

much more heavily on the relatively technical

areas of public financial management and tax

administration that it knows best. There is no

such recommendation. Somewhat inexplicably,

the report recommends that the Bank con-

tinue with civil service reform and anticor-

ruption and transparency efforts (albeit

prioritized and based on better analysis), as op-

posed to confronting more forthrightly the

possibility that the Bank may have reached

the limits of potential effectiveness in these

areas.

5. The Panel believes that there are a number of

reasons why this may be so, which could have

been further elaborated in the report. Civil

service reform, for example, is limited by fis-

cal constraints that many countries face and by

the growing mobility of skilled labor and com-

petition from the private sector that have been

brought about by economic development and

globalization. Corruption is often driven by

key political actors (who, on occasion, are

members of governments that are clients of the

Bank and whose behavior may not be cor-

rected by anything that the Bank or other

donors can offer). The report suggests that

civil service reform and anticorruption and

transparency efforts take a long time to ger-

minate; it may be, however, that external donor

interventions are permanently hostage to local

and global conditions over which the donors

have no control.

The IEG report provides an excellent analytical

basis for understanding both the importance and

functioning of PSR. Its evaluation of the Bank’s

recent work in this area is quite frank and sug-

gests important new directions for future strat-

egy. We fully support the Bank’s focus on

anticorruption, transparency, and good gover-

nance more generally.

8 2


Members of the External Advisory Panel

Shankar Acharya

Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations

Francis Fukuyama

School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

8 3

Chapter 11. Updates of the strategy implementation were

produced in 2003 and 2006 and shared with the Board.

2. The European Commission offers the follow-

ing definition: “Governance refers to the rules,

processes, and behavior by which interests are artic-

ulated, resources are managed, and power is exer-

cised in society. The way public functions are carried

out, public resources are managed, and public regu-

latory powers are exercised is the major issue to be ad-

dressed in that context” (European Commission 2006,

p. 14).

3. The evaluation does not cover tax policy, be-

cause that is not directly related to how the government

organizes itself.

4. In the SAP system coding of projects, this is the

category called Anticorruption and Governance. Be-

cause governance also refers to a much wider agenda,

however, including more than just the PSR topics

treated here, and because the topics under the gover-

nance part of Anticorruption and Governance are

mainly about transparency, this evaluation calls the cat-

egory Anticorruption and Transparency.

5. This is similar to the one in the 2006 Public Sec-

tor Strategy Update, table 19.

Chapter 21. The word “governance” was added in 2003, mak-

ing it the Public Sector and Governance Board.

2. “There is growing evidence that money lent for

individual projects is, to some extent, fungible because

it frees up government resources to be allocated else-

where . . . ” (World Bank 2000, p. xvii).

Chapter 31. The primary source of information in this chap-

ter regarding World Bank PSR lending activities has

been drawn from a list of projects carefully identified

by the IEG team. The process used to select these

projects is described in appendix A. These projects

will sometimes be called “PSR projects.” A complete list

of the projects is provided in appendix B (http://www.

worldbank.org/ieg/psr/appendix.html).

2. Of projects approved in 2000–06 that were man-

aged by other sector boards, 89 percent were adjust-

ment loans.

3. Of the 219 adjustment projects from 1998 to

2006 on the IEG list, the Public Sector (and Gover-

nance) Board managed 79 projects, the Economic Pol-

icy Board managed 88 projects, and other sector boards

managed 52 projects.

4. PSR components made up 75–100 percent of 45

projects, 50–74 percent of 157 projects, and 1–49 per-

cent of 201 projects.

5. On average, this is about $42.5 million per loan.

6. The number of PSR projects was the highest in

fiscal 2005, with 59 projects, about 22 percent of all

World Bank projects approved that year.

7. PSR lending per year was $429 million (nominal)

in 1987–99 and $1,983 million per year in 2000–06.

PSR lending was particularly high in fiscal 2002 (espe-

cially via IBRD loans) because of several large PSR loans

to Turkey (two), Pakistan, Argentina, Russia, Mexico, and

the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

8. The AAA section is based on the following eval-

uations: IEG 2007; World Bank 2003b, 2004c, 2005,

2006a; IMF 2006.

9. An Integrative Fiduciary Assessment integrates the

work normally carried out through a PER, CPAR, and

CFAA and may substitute for them. Comprehensive

data on ESW and the PSR part of it are not available for

years before 1999.

10. The Institutional Development Fund provides

grants of up to $500,000 to help countries build capacity

in specific agencies (typically just one per grant) to

plan and implement policy reform and poverty-

ENDNOTES

reduction initiatives, promote sustainable economic

development, and manage external assistance.

11. For IBRD countries, AAA seems to be largely de-

mand driven.

12. There were no obvious differences in PSR pack-

ages between the blend and the full IDA countries.

13. Because IDA resources have a grant component

and the countries have little or no access to market fi-

nancing, the Bank presumably has more leverage with

them than with the IBRD borrowers.

14. For the 21 IDA countries with initial governance

CPIAs below 2.5, a larger share of cases (9) had no

PSR lending. Nonetheless, the Bank stayed engaged at

least to the extent of doing some AAA in all but three

countries.

15. Only 4 of 62 had no PSR AAA or lending: Cen-

tral African Republic, Sudan, Kirbati, and Vanuatu.

16. The number of projects with PFM components

comprising 25 percent or more of the total amount

increased from an average of 6 projects per year over

the period 1990–99 (59 projects) to an average of

22 projects per year over the period 2000–06 (157

projects).

17. If one focuses only on projects with more than

25 percent in the PFM theme, the proportion of PFM

adjustment loans increased from 31 to 67 percent over

the respective periods (see appendix A).

18. The count of conditions here includes only

those that were in projects with at least three conditions

pertaining to the four PSR themes addressed in this re-

port. One should be careful in using these numbers be-

cause the conditions vary in difficulty and importance,

which is not reflected in the simple count of numbers

given here.

19. About 56 percent of these were adjustment

loans in 1990–99, and this increased to about 75 per-

cent during the years 2000–06.

20. This is in contrast with the comparable data for

the PFM theme—where there was a strong increase in

the use of policy-based lending and only a modest in-

crease in investment lending since 2002.

21. As discussed elsewhere in detail, much of the

Bank’s anticorruption “work” is not explicitly focused

on anticorruption, but, instead is via other channels (in-

cluding the other three themes). This discussion refers

only to explicit anticorruption and governance

components.

22. The percentage of PSR projects with PFM, CSA,

and TAX components does not fall after 2000, even

though the percentage of PSR projects with ACT proj-

ects increases significantly.

Chapter 41. The CPIA is an internal World Bank measure of

each country’s present policy and institutional frame-

work, which is created annually by staff for essentially

all countries with the potential to borrow. “‘Quality’

refers to how conducive that framework is to foster-

ing poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the

effective use of development assistance. The CPIA

ratings are used in the IDA allocation process and sev-

eral other corporate activities” (from 2005 CPIA

Questionnaire).

2. CPIA data before 1999 are not comparable to the

current definitions. The World Bank Group has con-

tributed a lot to the production and understanding of

governance indicators (see World Bank 2007c and

Levy 2007 for reviews of this work). Most of the indi-

cators are about the political system, government

stability, and the environment for the private sector—

most of which are not the direct concerns of this

evaluation.

3. The case studies did not include any countries

where the Bank had no lending for PSR, so there is not

solid evidence on these cases. There were examples in

Chile, Guyana, India, Mexico, and Russia, where each

country successfully pursued some important reforms

without lending, but with AAA from the Bank or sup-

port from other donors.

4. The sample is based on the period in which the

projects closed in order to reduce sample selection

problems. If the evaluation had looked at the set of proj-

ects approved 1999–2006 and already closed and rated,

then it would have excluded projects that were de-

layed in execution and extended. Because these would

probably have been lower performing, the average rat-

ing would have been biased upward.

5. Projects are matched to the recipient country’s

CPIA score at project approval (for projects approved

in 1999–2006; for others the 1999 CPIA is used).

6. Since the end of the evaluation period (fiscal

2006), the Mexico team completed an IGR with in-

depth analysis of political issues. The report used local

academic consultants extensively and was an important

8 4


piece to inform the Country Partnership Strategy

progress report and the forthcoming strategy.

Chapter 51. CPIA 14 for revenue administration includes tax

policy and customs, as well as tax administration, which

is the theme in the projects considered here.

2. Recognizes cash transactions only.

3. Recognizes transactions when commitments are

made and accounts for depreciation of capital assets.

4. Audit measuring compliance with laws and reg-

ulations in the use of resources.

5. Audit measuring economy, efficiency, and effec-

tiveness in the use of resources.

6. This approach is under active reconsideration

by the Bank.

7. Public Expenditure and Institutional Review is

now often the title.

8. The PEFA partnership includes the IMF, the Eu-

ropean Commission, the UK’s DFID, the French Min-

istry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Norwegian Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, the Swiss State Secretariat for Eco-

nomic Affairs, and the Strategic Partnership for Africa.

The PEFA secretariat is in the World Bank.

9. Outside the Bank, but used and supported by it,

there is the Open Budget Initiative of the International

Budget Project, which monitors and rates countries in

detail for how well they give out public information on

the formulation and execution of the budget (www.

openbudgetindex.org). PEFA, by contrast, looks at the

process internal to the government, so the two are

complementary.

10. One of the countries, Pakistan, has conducted

PEFAs at the provincial level for three of four provinces:

http://www.pefa.org/about_test.htm.

11. PEFA is intended to motivate improvement in ac-

tual PFM, but this has not happened yet to an extent

reflected in median CPIA ratings, which have not im-

proved 2004–06 (or 1999–2006) for the majority of

countries doing PEFA.

12. For instance, the Guinea-Bissau PER update

(World Bank 2007b) looks extensively at the fiscal di-

mension of civil service reform, with no attention to per-

formance, quality of personnel, recruitment, or public

sector organization.

13. Both these indicators are designed to give cross-

section rankings, so the change over time has ques-

tionable meaning, except in comparison to the coun-

tries with no PSR lending.

14. BEEPS is a Europe and Central Asia–specific

variant of a number of enterprise surveys supported by

the World Bank.

15. Benin, Bolivia, Brazil (Rio de Janeiro), Burundi,

Colombia, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti,

Honduras, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique,

Paraguay, Peru, Sierra Leone, and Zambia. http://web.

worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGO

VANTCOR/0,,contentMDK:20726148~pagePK:64168445

~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1740530,00.html.

16. The Stolen Asset Recovery Project is a new ini-

tiative that the Bank has supported as an action against

grand corruption. It has good potential for bringing

stolen resources back to poor countries, and it has

done so in some cases, such as Nigeria. It is too soon

to judge the effects on corruption. Moreover, moni-

toring what happens with the repatriated assets has yet

to be addressed.

17. Research by Khan and his coauthors has exam-

ined how different forms of corruption or rent seek-

ing have different impacts on economic growth (for

example, Khan and Komo 2000; Khan 2004).

Chapter 61. Hungary and Poland, which joined the European

Union in 2004, did not improve their governance CPIAs

from 1999 to 2006, because they were already high in

1999 because of earlier Bank-supported reforms. The

Czech Republic and Estonia had already graduated

from Bank lending and CPIA ratings by 2006, with high

governance ratings.

2. Other evaluations, of lending to middle-income

countries and of PRSCs, have and will examine the

overall effectiveness of these instruments. This

evaluation considers them only in relation to PSR

support.

Appendix A1. That is, “desired action” conditions were not

included.

2. The team recognizes that the original coding of

these percentages is imperfect in that they represent

an approximation of the actual share of the program

dedicated to PSR at project design and may differ from

implementation.

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8 5

8 7

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Gill, Jit B. S. 2000. “A Diagnostic Framework for Revenue

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Q2O3DQ5EF0.

9 0


1

APPENDIX C: PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PROJECT LIST, FISCAL 1990–2006

2


App

rova

lLe

nTo

tal

%IE

GIE

GIE

Gfis

cal

Proj

ect

Sect

orin

str

Lend

ing

amou

ntPS

RA

CT &

Adm

&Ta

xou

t-B

ank

IDPr

ojec

t ID

Des

crip

tion

Coun

try

Regi

onye

arst

atus

Boa

rdty

pein

str

$M(th

eme)

Gov

ern

CSA

PFM

Adm

inco

me

perf

orm

impa

ct

P000

037

Econ

Fin

Mgm

t IAn

gola

AFR

1991

Clos

edEc

onom

ic P

olic

yI

TAL

2333

1U

UM

ODP0

7220

5AO

-Eco

n M

gmt T

echn

ical

An

gola

AFR

2003

Activ

eEc

onom

ic P

olic

yI

TAL

1743

1As

sist

ance

(Fis

cal 2

003)

P000

105

Agric

. Ser

vice

sBe

nin

AFR

1991

Clos

edRu

ral S

ecto

rI

SIL

1250

1M

UU

MOD

P000

109

Pre-

Inve

stm

ent

Beni

nAF

R19

91Cl

osed

Econ

omic

Pol

icy

ITA

L5

100

11

MS

UM

ODP0

0011

0SA

L II

Beni

nAF

R19

91Cl

osed

Econ

omic

Pol

icy

ASA

L55

721

1S

NR

NEG

P000

116

Econ

omic

Man

agem

ent

Beni

nAF

R19

94Cl

osed

Publ

ic S

ecto

r I

TAL

510

01

MU

UM

ODPr

ojec

tGo

vern

ance

P000

111

SAC

IIIBe

nin

AFR

1995

Clos

edEc

onom

ic P

olic

yA

SAL

400

1M

SS

MOD

P061

577

BJ -

PERA

C Be

nin

AFR

2001

Clos

edPu

blic

Sec

tor

ASA

L10

100

1M

SS

MOD

(Pub

l Exp

end.

Adj

ust.

Cred

it)Go

vern

ance

P072

003

BJ-P

RSC

1Be

nin

AFR

2004

Clos

edEc

onom

ic P

olic

yA

PRC

2033

11

1N

RS

NR

P074

313

BJ-P

RSC

2 DP

L (F

isca

l 200

5)Be

nin

AFR

2005

Clos

edPu

blic

Sec

tor

APR

C30

331

11

Gove

rnan

ceP0

0030

1Pu

blic

Inst

itutio

nal

Burk

ina

Faso

AFR

1992

Clos

edPu

blic

Sec

tor

ITA

L15

100

11

MS

USU

BGo

vern

ance

P058

282

Econ

omic

Mgm

t Ref

orm

Burk

ina

Faso

AFR

1999

Clos

edEc

onom

ic P

olic

yA

SAL

1574

11

11

SS

MOD

P069

165

SAC

IIIBu

rkin

a Fa

soAF

R20

00Cl

osed

Publ

ic S

ecto

rA

SAL

2572

11

SS

SUB

Gove

rnan

ceP0

7210

6BF

PRS

C 1

Burk

ina

Faso

AFR

2002

Clos

edEc

onom

ic P

olic

yA

PRC

4572

11

SS

MOD

P075

378

BF P

RSC

2Bu

rkin

a Fa

soAF

R20

03Cl

osed

Pove

rty R

educ

tion

APR

C35

291

1S

SM

ODP0

7899

4BF

-PRS

C 4

(Fis

cal 2

004)

Burk

ina

Faso

AFR

2004

Clos

edPo

verty

Red

uctio

nA

PRC

6043

1S

SM

ODP0

7690

8BF

PRS

C 3

Burk

ina

Faso

AFR

2004

Clos

edPo

verty

Red

uctio

nA

PRC

5043

11

SS

SUB

P078

596

BF-A

dmin

CB

Burk

ina

Faso

AFR

2005

Activ

ePu

blic

Sec

tor

ITA

L7

801

11

(Fis

cal 2

005)

Gove

rnan

ceP0

7899

5BF

-PRS

C 5

DPL

Burk

ina

Faso

AFR

2005

Clos

edPo

verty

Red

uctio

nA

DPL

6066

11

(Fis

cal 2

005)

P078

996

BF-P

RSC

6Bu

rkin

a Fa

soAF

R20

06Cl

osed

Pove

rty R

educ

tion

ADP

L60

571

P000

208

SAL

IIIBu

rund

iAF

R19

92Cl

osed

Econ

omic

Pol

icy

ASA

L30

01

1U

NR

NEG

P074

602

BI-E

RC (F

isca

l 200

3)Bu

rund

iAF

R20

03Cl

osed

Publ

ic S

ecto

rA

SAL

5438

1M

SU

MOD

Gove

rnan

ceP0

7862

7BI

-Eco

n M

gmt S

upt S

IL

Buru

ndi

AFR

2004

Activ

ePu

blic

Sec

tor

ISI

L26

501

1(F

isca

l 200

4)Go

vern

ance

P000

403

Econ

omic

Man

agem

ent

Cam

eroo

nAF

R19

90Cl

osed

Publ

ic S

ecto

rI

TAL

925

1U

NR

MOD

Gove

rnan

ceP0

3548

1ER

CCa

mer

oon

AFR

1994

Clos

edEc

onom

ic P

olic

yA

SAL

7558

1M

SS

NEG

Ap

pen

dix

C: P

ub

lic

Sec

tor

Ref

orm

Pro

ject

Lis

t, F

isca

l 1

99

0–2

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A P P E N D I X C : P U B L I C S E C T O R R E F O R M P R O J E C T L I S T, F I S C A L 1 9 9 0 – 2 0 0 6

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P035

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1994

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1996

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2005

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1997

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2003

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2002

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2004

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2001

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2002

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1999

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2006

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1996

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1998

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2000

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1992

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1991

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1995

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2002

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2006

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1997

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2004

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2005

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1999

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2001

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2001

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2003

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2004

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1990

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2003

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1999

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n/I

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5333

1Co

mm

unic

atio

ns

Tech

nolo

gy

Note

:Reg

ions

:AFR

= S

ub-S

ahar

an A

frica

; EAP

= E

ast A

sia

and

Paci

fic; E

CA =

Eur

ope

and

Cent

ral A

sia;

LAC

= L

atin

Am

eric

a an

d th

e Ca

ribbe

an; S

AR =

Sou

th A

sia.

Len

ding

inst

rum

ent t

ype:

A =

deve

lopm

ent p

olic

ylo

an; I

= in

vest

men

t loa

n. L

endi

ng in

stru

men

t:DP

L =

Deve

lopm

ent P

olic

y Lo

an; P

RC =

Pol

icy

Refo

rm C

redi

t; SA

D =

Sect

or A

djus

tmen

t Loa

n; S

AL =

Stru

ctur

al A

djus

tmen

t Loa

n; S

IL =

spe

cific

inve

stm

ent l

oan;

TAL

= te

chni

-ca

l ass

ista

nce

loan

. IEG

out

com

es:H

U =

high

ly u

nsat

isfa

ctor

y; M

S =

mod

erat

ely

satis

fact

ory;

MU

= m

oder

atel

y un

satis

fact

ory;

S =

sat

isfa

ctor

y. IE

G B

ank

perf

orm

:S =

sat

isfa

ctor

y; U

= u

nsat

isfa

ctor

y. IE

G ID

impa

ct:

HIG

= hi

gh; M

OD =

mod

erat

e; N

EG =

neg

ativ

e; S

UB =

sub

stan

tial.

Ap

pen

dix

C: P

ub

lic

Sec

tor

Ref

orm

Pro

ject

Lis

t, F

isca

l 1

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00

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tal

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ect

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Des

crip

tion

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try

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onye

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atus

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rdty

pein

str

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eme)

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ern

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PFM

Adm

inco

me

perf

orm

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ct

1

APPENDIX D: PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM—ADVISORY AND ANALYTICAL ACTIVITIES, FISCAL 1999–2006

2


Ap

pen

dix

D: P

ub

lic

Sec

tor

Ref

orm

—A

dvi

sory

an

d A

nal

ytic

al A

ctiv

itie

s, F

isca

l 1

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9–2

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Proj

ect

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alPr

odCo

re re

port

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Des

crip

tion

Coun

try

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arlin

eSe

ctor

Boa

rdPS

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eme

Sect

or 1

Out

put t

ype

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a in

the

21st

Cen

tury

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aAF

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WEc

onom

ic P

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yCE

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emen

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port

P077

959

Desi

gn &

Impl

em. o

f Fin

. Mgm

t. Sy

stem

sAf

rica

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ic S

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r Gov

erna

nce

PFM

Cent

ral g

ovt a

dmin

Polic

y N

ote

P077

578

Parli

amen

tary

Ove

rsig

htAf

rica

AFR

2003

ESW

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ic S

ecto

r Gov

erna

nce

ACG

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

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licy

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8429

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visi

onAf

rica

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2004

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emen

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nt D

ocum

ent R

evie

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2004

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ial M

anag

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n pu

b ad

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oniza

tion

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cal 2

006)

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Proc

urem

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lan

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2002

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2001

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2001

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sec

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rtP0

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ina

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2004

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ic S

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232

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2005

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rt

APPENDIX D: PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM—ADVISORY AND ANALYTICAL ACTIVITIES, F ISCAL 1999–2006

3

P085

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480

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b ad

min

sec

tor

Repo

rtP0

7218

9Er

itrea

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(Do

Not

Use

)Er

itrea

AFR

2002

ESW

Econ

omic

Pol

icy

PSR

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rRe

port

P077

589

Eritr

ea C

PAR

Eritr

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WPr

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sec

tor

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rtP0

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blic

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tor G

over

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peci

fRe

port

P051

449

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Ethi

opia

AFR

2000

ESW

Econ

omic

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icy

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/DPR

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agem

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rtP0

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Exp

endi

ture

Rev

iew

Ethi

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AFR

2000

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ic S

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nce

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mic

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agem

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rtP0

7220

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ublic

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ture

Rev

iew

Ethi

opia

AFR

2002

ESW

Publ

ic S

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r Gov

erna

nce

PSR

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rRe

port

P077

119

Ethi

opia

Exp

endi

ture

Trac

king

Ethi

opia

AFR

2002

ESW

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Gov

erna

nce

PFM

Cent

ral g

ovt a

dmin

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y N

ote

(Tabl

e co

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n ne

xt p

age)

4


P076

163

Ethi

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MGe

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sec

tor

Repo

rtP0

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PAR

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2003

ESW

Proc

urem

ent

PFM

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rRe

port

P077

409

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PER

Ethi

opia

AFR

2004

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educ

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PER

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pub

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925

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2006

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nce

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2006

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rtP0

5145

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301

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AFR

2006

ESW

Fina

ncia

l Man

agem

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adm

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ecto

rRe

port

P076

254

The

Gam

bia

- DPR

Gam

bia,

The

AFR

2003

ESW

Econ

omic

Pol

icy

PSR

Gen

pub

adm

in s

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rRe

port

P080

282

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Gam

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AFR

2003

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ncia

l Man

agem

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PFM

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pub

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ecto

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port

P083

292

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rtP0

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Gam

bia,

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2005

ESW

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nce

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P098

346

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gmt

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rtP0

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)Gh

ana

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2003

ESW

Proc

urem

ent

PFM

Gen

pub

adm

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rRe

port

P077

582

GH C

EM: P

over

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row

th, B

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Mgm

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AFR

2004

ESW

Pove

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educ

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ral g

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rtP0

8387

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n pu

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sec

tor

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rtP0

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2004

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l Man

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2005

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2006

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2002

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Proc

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Gen

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port

P080

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2006

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P072

683

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2006

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pub

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2006

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2005

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259

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2002

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adm

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adm

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urem

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2002

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pub

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port

P051

475

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1999

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tor

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2004

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omic

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pub

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2002

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PFM

Gen

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adm

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port

P076

179

Suda

n Co

untry

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Gen

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857

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2001

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port

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672

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2002

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nce

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Gen

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2003

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2002

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2006

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2003

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2005

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P088

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2005

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2000

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pub

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284

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2001

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2005

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2002

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2003

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2005

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2005

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2002

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2003

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2005

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2005

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MA

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2003

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P078

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Min

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P095

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P074

442

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MSy

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2002

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784

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2000

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2004

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P083

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2004

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P084

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2006

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2003

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2004

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P084

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2004

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2005

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Trip

artit

e Ba

selin

e Su

rvey

Del

iver

yPa

kist

anSA

R20

00ES

WPr

ocur

emen

tPF

M(H

)Non

sect

or s

peci

fPo

licy

Not

e

(Tabl

e co

ntin

ues o

n ne

xt p

age)

P067

836

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Mon

itorin

g, A

naly

sis,

etc

.Pa

kist

anSA

R20

00ES

WPu

blic

Sec

tor G

over

nanc

eCS

RGe

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Repo

rtP0

6837

4PK

-Cou

ntry

Pro

cure

men

t Ass

essm

ent R

evie

wPa

kist

anSA

R20

00ES

WPr

ocur

emen

tPF

M(H

)Non

sect

or s

peci

fRe

port

P070

325

PK: F

inan

cial

Acc

ount

abili

ty A

sses

s. I

Paki

stan

SAR

2001

ESW

Fina

ncia

l Man

agem

ent

PFM

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rRe

port

P070

495

Refo

rmin

g Pu

njab

’s Pu

b. F

ins.

& In

sts.

Paki

stan

SAR

2001

ESW

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Gov

erna

nce

PSR

(H)O

ther

pub

lic s

ect

Repo

rtP0

7496

7De

velo

pmen

t Pol

icy

Revi

ewPa

kist

anSA

R20

02ES

WEc

onom

ic P

olic

yPS

RGe

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Repo

rtP0

7529

5Ta

x Ad

min

istra

tion

Paki

stan

SAR

2002

TAPu

blic

Sec

tor G

over

nanc

eTA

XCe

ntra

l gov

t adm

inIn

st. D

evel

opm

ent P

lan

P079

434

PER

Repo

rt/Di

ssem

inat

ion

Paki

stan

SAR

2003

ESW

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Gov

erna

nce

PSR

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rRe

port

P081

326

Paki

stan

CFA

A-II

Paki

stan

SAR

2003

ESW

Fina

ncia

l Man

agem

ent

PFM

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rRe

port

P078

802

Dist

rict A

sses

smen

ts/D

evol

utio

n Re

port

Paki

stan

SAR

2004

ESW

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Gov

erna

nce

ACG

Cent

ral g

ovt a

dmin

Repo

rtP0

8266

2N

WFP

Eco

nom

ic R

epor

tPa

kist

anSA

R20

05ES

WEc

onom

ic P

olic

yPS

RGe

n in

d/tra

de s

ecto

rRe

port

P091

615

Paki

stan

: Pun

jab

PFAA

Paki

stan

SAR

2005

ESW

Fina

ncia

l Man

agem

ent

PFM

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rRe

port

P097

052

Gap

Anal

ysis

of P

ub. A

&A

Stds

- PK

Paki

stan

SAR

2006

ESW

Fina

ncia

l Man

agem

ent

PFM

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rRe

port

P044

927

PSDP

Rev

iew

(Fis

cal 1

999)

Paki

stan

SAR

1999

ESW

Not

App

licab

leCE

M/D

PRRe

port

P049

366

1999

Eco

n Up

date

Paki

stan

SAR

1999

ESW

Not

App

licab

leCE

M/D

PRRe

port

P056

293

Civi

l Ser

vice

Ref

orm

Paki

stan

SAR

1999

ESW

Econ

omic

Pol

icy

PSR

(H)C

ivil

serv

ice

ref

Repo

rtP0

5944

5Pa

kist

an A

nti-C

orru

pt In

itPa

kist

anSA

R19

99ES

WPu

blic

Sec

tor G

over

nanc

eAC

G(H

)Oth

er p

ublic

sec

tRe

port

P044

930

Fisc

al 2

000

Econ

Upd

ate—

Mis

sed

Oppo

rtuni

ties

Sri L

anka

SAR

2000

ESW

Econ

omic

Pol

icy

CEM

/DPR

(H)E

cono

mic

man

agem

ent

Repo

rtP0

6778

0An

ti co

rrupt

ion

Stra

tegy

Pap

erSr

i Lan

kaSA

R20

00ES

WFi

nanc

ial M

anag

emen

tAC

G(H

)Oth

er p

ublic

sec

tPo

licy

Not

eP0

7213

8Pu

blic

Exp

endi

ture

Not

eSr

i Lan

kaSA

R20

01ES

WEc

onom

ic P

olic

yPF

M(H

)Oth

er e

cono

mic

po

Polic

y N

ote

P076

695

Sri L

anka

CPA

RSr

i Lan

kaSA

R20

03ES

WPr

ocur

emen

tPF

MCe

ntra

l gov

t adm

inRe

port

P077

085

Sri L

anka

: Cou

ntry

Fin

. Acc

t. As

sess

men

tSr

i Lan

kaSA

R20

03ES

WFi

nanc

ial M

anag

emen

tPF

MGe

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Repo

rtP0

7558

3LK

-PER

Sri L

anka

SAR

2004

ESW

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Gov

erna

nce

PFM

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rPo

licy

Not

eP0

8013

1Go

vern

ance

Pol

icy

Not

eSr

i Lan

kaSA

R20

04ES

WPu

blic

Sec

tor G

over

nanc

eAC

GCe

ntra

l gov

t adm

inPo

licy

Not

eP0

8461

4Sr

i Lan

ka D

evel

opm

ent P

olic

y Re

view

Sri L

anka

SAR

2004

ESW

Econ

omic

Pol

icy

PSR

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rRe

port

P078

499

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Ref

orm

TA

Sri L

anka

SAR

2004

TAPu

blic

Sec

tor G

over

nanc

eCS

RCe

ntra

l gov

t adm

inIn

st. D

evel

opm

ent P

lan

P091

367

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Ref

orm

Pol

icy

Not

eSr

i Lan

kaSA

R20

06ES

WPu

blic

Sec

tor G

over

nanc

eCS

RGe

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Polic

y N

ote

P097

054

Gap

Anal

ysis

of P

ub. A

&A

Stds

- LK

Sri L

anka

SAR

2006

ESW

Fina

ncia

l Man

agem

ent

PFM

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rRe

port

P078

500

Sri L

anka

PER

Sri L

anka

SAR

2006

TAPu

blic

Sec

tor G

over

nanc

ePF

MGe

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Know

ledg

e-Sh

arin

g Fo

rum

P044

928

Clos

ed (T

) Une

mpl

oym

ent S

tudy

Sri L

anka

SAR

1999

ESW

Econ

omic

Pol

icy

CEM

/DPR

(H)L

abor

mrk

ts/ e

mpl

Repo

rtP0

5085

6Pu

blic

Sec

tor M

gmt

Sri L

anka

SAR

1999

ESW

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Gov

erna

nce

CSR

(H)O

ther

pub

lic s

ect

Othe

rP0

6001

1An

ti-Co

rrup.

Initi

atSr

i Lan

kaSA

R19

99ES

WEc

onom

ic P

olic

yAC

G(H

)Eco

nom

ic m

anag

emen

tRe

port

Note

:Reg

ion:

AFR

= Su

b-Sa

hara

n Af

rica;

EAP

= E

ast A

sia

and

Paci

fic; E

CA =

Eur

ope

and

Cent

ral A

sia;

LCR

= La

tin A

mer

ica

and

the

Carib

bean

; MN

A =

Mid

dle

East

and

Nor

ther

n Af

rica;

OTH

= o

ther

; SAR

= S

outh

Asi

a. P

rodu

ct li

ne:E

SW =

eco

nom

ic a

ndse

ctor

wor

k; TA

= te

chni

cal a

ssis

tanc

e. C

ore

repo

rt/P

SR th

eme:

ACG

= an

ticor

rupt

ion

and

gove

ranc

e; C

EM/D

PR =

Cou

ntry

Eco

nom

ic M

emor

andu

m/D

evel

opm

ent P

olic

y Rev

iew

; CSR

= C

ount

ry S

tatu

s Rep

ort;

PER

= Pu

blic

Exp

endi

ture

Rev

iew

; PFM

= p

ub-

lic fi

nanc

ial m

anag

emen

t; PS

R =

publ

ic s

ecto

r ref

orm

; TAX

= ta

x ad

min

istra

tion.

2 8


Ap

pen

dix

D: P

ub

lic

Sec

tor

Ref

orm

—A

dvi

sory

an

d A

nal

ytic

al A

ctiv

itie

s, F

isca

l 1

99

9–2

00

6(c

ontin

ued)

Proj

ect

Fisc

alPr

odCo

re re

port

/ID

Des

crip

tion

Coun

try

Regi

onye

arlin

eSe

ctor

Boa

rdPS

R th

eme

Sect

or 1

Out

put t

ype

1

APPENDIX E: PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM—INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUNDS, FISCAL 1992–2006

2


Ap

pen

dix

E: P

ub

lic

Sec

tor

Ref

orm

—In

stit

uti

on

al D

evel

op

men

t Fu

nd

s, F

isca

l 1

99

2–2

00

6

P075

998

3A-ID

F UE

MOA

Pub

Pro

cur R

ef (F

isca

l 200

2)Af

rica

AFR

2002

Publ

ic S

ecto

rCl

osed

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ialm

gmt &

pro

c.

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rGo

vern

ance

P083

765

3A-ID

F W

AEM

U Gr

ant S

uper

visi

on (F

isca

l 200

3)Af

rica

AFR

2003

Proc

urem

ent

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rP0

9714

23A

-IDF

SADC

Pub

Sec

Acc

t Std

s (F

isca

l 200

5)Af

rica

AFR

2005

Fina

ncia

lAc

tive

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ce

ntra

l gov

t adm

inM

anag

emen

tP0

9617

13A

-IDF

COM

ESA

Pub

Proc

ur R

efor

m (F

isca

l 200

5)Af

rica

AFR

2005

Proc

urem

ent

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rP1

0131

93A

-IDF

ABW

A Ac

coun

ting

& A

uditi

ng (F

isca

l 200

6)Af

rica

AFR

2006

Fina

ncia

l Ac

tive

PFM

Stan

dard

s an

d fin

anci

al re

porti

ngGe

n in

d/tra

de s

ecto

rM

anag

emen

tP1

0132

53A

-IDF

FAAG

WA

PS A

cctg

& A

uditi

ng (F

isca

l 200

6)Af

rica

AFR

2006

Fina

ncia

l Ac

tive

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Man

agem

ent

P101

602

3A-Im

plem

entin

g Pr

oc. R

efor

ms

(Fis

cal 2

006)

Afric

aAF

R20

06Pr

ocur

emen

tAc

tive

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

P064

890

BJ-ID

F An

ti Co

rrupt

ion

(Fis

cal 1

998)

Beni

nAF

R19

98Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Clos

edAC

GOt

her a

ccou

ntab

ility

/ant

i-cor

rupt

ion

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rGo

vern

ance

P065

791

BJ-ID

F An

ti-Co

rrupt

ion

(Fis

cal 2

000)

Beni

nAF

R20

00Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Activ

eAC

GN

ot a

ssig

ned

(H)In

stitu

tiona

l dev

Gove

rnan

ceP0

7862

4BJ

-IDF

Pub

Exp

Mgm

t Ref

(Fis

cal 2

003)

Beni

nAF

R20

03Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rGo

vern

ance

P046

128

BF-ID

F N

atl C

ap A

sses

s (F

isca

l 199

6)Bu

rkin

a Fa

soAF

R19

96Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Clos

edCS

RN

ot a

ssig

ned

(H)P

ublic

sec

t mgm

tGo

vern

ance

P083

673

BI-ID

F Pu

b Pr

ocur

Spn

& C

PAR

(Fis

cal 2

003)

Buru

ndi

AFR

2003

Publ

ic S

ecto

rAc

tive

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Gove

rnan

ceP0

8999

8CM

-IDF

Trac

king

CB

(Fis

cal 2

003)

Cam

eroo

nAF

R20

03Fi

nanc

ial

Activ

ePF

MOt

her p

ublic

sec

tor g

over

nanc

eCe

ntra

l gov

t adm

inM

anag

emen

tP0

3628

5CV

-IDF

Acct

& A

uditi

ng (F

isca

l 199

4)Ca

pe V

erde

AFR

1994

Publ

ic S

ecto

rCl

osed

PFM

Not

ass

igne

d(H

)Oth

er p

ublic

sec

tGo

vern

ance

P090

601

CV-ID

F Su

prem

e Au

dit I

nstit

utio

n (F

isca

l 200

5)Ca

pe V

erde

AFR

2005

Fina

ncia

l Ac

tive

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Man

agem

ent

P090

144

KM-ID

F De

c Pu

b Ex

p M

gmt R

ef (F

isca

l 200

4)Co

mor

osAF

R20

04Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Cent

ral g

ovt a

dmin

Gove

rnan

ceP0

7106

4CD

-IDF

Acct

& A

uditi

ng (F

isca

l 200

4) (L

KD)

Cong

o,

AFR

2004

Fina

ncia

lAc

tive

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n fin

ance

sec

tor

Dem

ocra

tic R

ep.

Man

agem

ent

P041

832

CI-ID

F Ci

vil S

erv

Wrk

shp

(Fis

cal 1

995)

Cote

d’Iv

oire

AFR

1995

Publ

ic S

ecto

rCl

osed

CSR

Not

ass

igne

d(H

)Civ

il se

rvic

e re

fGo

vern

ance

P046

126

CI-ID

F N

atl C

ap A

sses

s (F

isca

l 199

6)Co

te d

’Ivoi

reAF

R19

96Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Clos

edCS

RN

ot a

ssig

ned

(H)P

ublic

sec

t mgm

tGo

vern

ance

P070

090

CI-ID

F M

&E

CB (F

isca

l 199

9)Co

te d

’Ivoi

reAF

R19

99Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Clos

edCS

ROt

her p

ublic

sec

tor

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rGo

vern

ance

gove

rnan

ceP0

7948

4ER

-IDF

Inst

& P

rocu

r Ref

(Fis

cal 2

002)

Eritr

eaAF

R20

02Pr

ocur

emen

tAc

tive

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Fisc

alPr

ojec

tPS

RPr

ojec

t ID

Des

crip

tion

Coun

try

Regi

onye

arSe

ctor

Boa

rdst

atus

them

eTh

eme

1Se

ctor

1


3

P050

591

ET-ID

F Ci

vil S

erv

Ref (

Fisc

al 1

997)

Ethi

opia

AFR

1997

Publ

ic S

ecto

rCl

osed

CSR

Not

ass

igne

d(H

)Pub

lic s

ect m

gmt

Gove

rnan

ceP0

9108

4ET

-IDF

M&

E CB

(Fis

cal 2

004)

Ethi

opia

AFR

2004

Publ

ic S

ecto

rAc

tive

CSR

Othe

r eco

nom

ic m

anag

emen

tGe

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Gove

rnan

ceP0

4612

5GH

-IDF

Nat

l Cap

Ass

ess

(Fis

cal 1

996)

Ghan

aAF

R19

96Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Clos

edCS

RN

ot a

ssig

ned

(H)P

ublic

sec

t mgm

tGo

vern

ance

P051

617

GN-ID

F Pu

b Pr

oc R

ef (F

isca

l 199

7)Gu

inea

AFR

1997

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Cl

osed

PFM

Not

ass

igne

d(H

)Pub

lic fi

n. m

gmt

Gove

rnan

ceP0

7482

0GN

-IDF

PRSP

Pro

c &

Pov

Ana

l Sup

t (Fi

scal

200

1)Gu

inea

AFR

2001

Econ

omic

Pol

icy

Clos

edPF

MPo

verty

stra

tegy

, ana

lysi

s &

mon

itorin

gCe

ntra

l gov

t adm

inP0

8677

4GN

-IDF

Stre

ngth

enin

g Fi

duc

Frm

wrk

(Fis

cal 2

004)

Guin

eaAF

R20

04Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rGo

vern

ance

P096

173

GN-ID

F Pu

blic

Pro

cure

men

t (Fi

scal

200

5)Gu

inea

AFR

2005

Proc

urem

ent

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rP1

0095

8GN

-IDF

Acou

ntan

cy P

rofe

ssio

n (F

isca

l 200

6)Gu

inea

AFR

2006

Fina

ncia

lAc

tive

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n fin

ance

sec

tor

Man

agem

ent

P046

048

GW-ID

F N

atl C

ap A

sses

s (F

isca

l 199

6)Gu

inea

-Bis

sau

AFR

1996

Publ

ic S

ecto

rCl

osed

CSR

Not

ass

igne

d(H

)Pub

lic s

ect m

gmt

Gove

rnan

ceP0

6277

3KE

-IDF

Proc

Ref

Enh

anc

(Fis

cal 1

999)

Keny

aAF

R19

99Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Clos

edPF

MN

ot a

ssig

ned

(H)In

stitu

tiona

l dev

Gove

rnan

ceP0

7226

7KE

-IDF

FMCB

for N

CC (F

isca

l 200

1)Ke

nya

AFR

2001

Publ

ic S

ecto

rCl

osed

PFM

Othe

r urb

an d

evel

opm

ent

Cent

ral g

ovt a

dmin

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rnan

ceP0

5604

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n Ba

sic

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ent F

unct

ions

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cal 2

005)

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98Pr

ivat

e Se

ctor

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osed

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r pub

lic s

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r gov

erna

nce

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r soc

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ervi

ceDe

velo

pmen

tP0

7199

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G-ID

F Ta

x Ad

min

istra

tion

CB (F

isca

l 200

0)M

adag

asca

rAF

R20

00Ed

ucat

ion

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edTA

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x po

licy

and

adm

inis

tratio

nCe

ntra

l gov

t adm

inP0

3515

1M

W-ID

F Pr

oc &

Acc

t CB

(Fis

cal 1

994)

Mal

awi

AFR

1994

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ic S

ecto

rCl

osed

PFM

Not

ass

igne

d(H

)Oth

er p

ublic

sec

tGo

vern

ance

P046

124

MW

-IDF

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l Cap

Ass

ess

(Fis

cal 1

996)

Mal

awi

AFR

1996

Publ

ic S

ecto

rCl

osed

CSR

Not

ass

igne

d(H

)Pub

lic s

ect m

gmt

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rnan

ceP0

5031

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F An

ti Co

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au (F

isca

l 200

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iAF

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tor

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ntab

ility

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rupt

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adm

in s

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vern

ance

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874

MW

-IDF

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Pro

fess

ion

Supt

(Fis

cal 2

003)

Mal

awi

AFR

2003

Fina

ncia

l Ac

tive

PFM

Stan

dard

s an

d fin

anci

al re

porti

ngOt

her i

ndus

tryM

anag

emen

tP0

5845

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ren

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Proc

(Fis

cal 1

999)

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iAF

R19

99Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Clos

edPF

MN

ot a

ssig

ned

(H)P

ublic

fin.

mgm

tGo

vern

ance

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690

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IDF

Impr

ovin

g Pu

b Fi

n M

gmt (

Fisc

al 2

004)

Mal

iAF

R20

04Fi

nanc

ial

Activ

ePF

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blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Gen

finan

ce s

ecto

rM

anag

emen

tP0

6356

4M

R-ID

F M

oder

n of

Pub

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c (F

isca

l 199

9)M

aurit

ania

AFR

1999

Publ

ic S

ecto

rCl

osed

PFM

Not

ass

igne

d(H

)Pub

lic fi

n. m

gmt

Gove

rnan

ceP0

9271

5M

R-ID

F Ac

ct P

rofe

ssio

n Su

pt (F

isca

l 200

4)M

aurit

ania

AFR

2004

Fina

ncia

lAc

tive

PFM

Stan

dard

s an

d fin

anci

al re

porti

ngGe

n fin

ance

sec

tor

Man

agem

ent

P080

920

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IDF

Proc

ur R

ef (F

isca

l 200

4)M

aurit

ania

AFR

2004

Proc

urem

ent

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

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9240

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cal 2

004)

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04Pr

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emen

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tive

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ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

(Tabl

e co

ntin

ues o

n ne

xt p

age)

4


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pen

dix

E: P

ub

lic

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tor

Ref

orm

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uti

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men

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nd

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ontin

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them

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ctor

1

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770

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F CB

(Fis

cal 2

003)

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ritiu

sAF

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03Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rGo

vern

ance

P055

408

MZ-

IDF

Gov

& L

ocal

NGO

Sec

(Fis

cal 1

997)

Moz

ambi

que

AFR

1997

Publ

ic S

ecto

rCl

osed

ACG

Parti

cipa

tion

and

civi

c en

gage

men

tGe

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Gove

rnan

ceP0

5106

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F Pu

b Se

rv Tr

ng (F

isca

l 199

7)N

amib

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R19

97Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Clos

edCS

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ot a

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ned

(H)C

ivil

serv

ice

ref

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rnan

ceP0

5260

3N

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F Pu

b Se

rv Tr

ng 2

(Fis

cal 1

997)

Nam

ibia

AFR

1997

Publ

ic S

ecto

rAc

tive

CSR

Not

ass

igne

d(H

)Civ

il se

rvic

e re

fGo

vern

ance

P090

596

NA-

IDF

Nat

l Cap

Ass

ess

(Fis

cal 1

998)

Nam

ibia

AFR

1998

Publ

ic S

ecto

rCl

osed

CSR

Adm

in. a

nd c

ivil

serv

ice

refo

rmCe

ntra

l gov

t adm

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vern

ance

P079

477

NA-

IDF

Pub

Exp

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king

Sur

vey

(Fis

cal 2

002)

Nam

ibia

AFR

2002

Publ

ic S

ecto

rCl

osed

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Gove

rnan

ceP0

7593

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E-ID

F Pu

b Pr

oc R

ef (F

isca

l 200

2)N

iger

AFR

2002

Educ

atio

nCl

osed

PFM

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in. a

nd c

ivil

serv

ice

refo

rmGe

n pu

b ad

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sec

tor

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isca

l 200

3)N

iger

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03Ec

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olic

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l gov

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on F

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273

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03Pr

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ic e

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nanc

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gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

P081

295

NG-

IDF

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Ant

i Cor

rupt

ion

(Fis

cal 2

003)

Nig

eria

AFR

2003

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ic S

ecto

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ACG

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

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min

sec

tor

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ceP0

9633

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gos

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Proc

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cal 2

005)

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eria

AFR

2005

Proc

urem

ent

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ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

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roc.

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pub

adm

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ncia

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pub

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cal 2

006)

Nig

eria

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2006

Fina

ncia

l Ac

tive

PFM

Stan

dard

s an

d fin

anci

al re

porti

ngGe

n fin

ance

sec

tor

Man

agem

ent

P063

056

RW-ID

F Pu

b M

gmt &

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c (F

isca

l 199

9)Rw

anda

AFR

1999

Publ

ic S

ecto

rCl

osed

PFM

(His

toric

)Pub

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r(H

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lic fi

n. m

gmt

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rnan

ceP0

4223

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CB (F

isca

l 199

5)Sã

o To

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and

AFR

1995

Publ

ic S

ecto

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osed

CSR

Not

ass

igne

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lic s

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gmt

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6590

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1999

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5723

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9317

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004)

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ncia

l Sec

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2005

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ncia

l Ac

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PFM

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anci

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2003

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2006

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072

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pr re

form

stra

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ina

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1995

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314

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2004

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2004

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7

P017

591

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ic S

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2004

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9107

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n fo

r Fin

of L

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Gov

(tf0

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ilipp

ines

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1995

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122

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roc.

Law

and

just

ice

P040

822

Pub

Proc

Law

IDF

Alba

nia

ECA

1994

Soci

al P

rote

ctio

nCl

osed

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.La

w a

nd ju

stic

eP0

5060

9Tr

easu

ry/S

tate

Ctrl

IDF

Alba

nia

ECA

1997

Publ

ic S

ecto

rCl

osed

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Gove

rnan

ceP0

8343

9Fi

scal

Dec

entra

lizat

ion

IDF

Alba

nia

ECA

2004

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Ac

tive

PFM

Dece

ntra

lizat

ion

Cent

ral g

ovt a

dmin

Gove

rnan

ceP0

9643

0Go

vern

ance

& F

in A

cct F

rmw

rk ID

FAl

bani

aEC

A20

05He

alth

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ritio

n Ac

tive

ACG

Heal

th s

yste

m p

erfo

rman

ceCo

mp

heal

th fi

nanc

ean

d Po

pula

tion

P036

986

Proc

urem

ent (

IDF)

Arm

enia

ECA

1994

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Cl

osed

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ce

ntra

l gov

t adm

inGo

vern

ance

P072

735

Anti-

Corru

ptio

n St

rate

gy ID

FAr

men

iaEC

A20

01Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Clos

edAC

GOt

her a

ccou

ntab

ility

/ant

i-cor

rupt

ion

Cent

ral g

ovt a

dmin

Gove

rnan

ceP0

8487

7Pr

omo

of Im

prvd

Pub

Pro

c Sy

sts

IDF

Arm

enia

ECA

2003

Proc

urem

ent

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Cent

ral g

ovt a

dmin

P101

066

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Int

erna

l Aud

it ID

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men

iaEC

A20

06Fi

nanc

ial

Activ

ePF

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blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Cent

ral g

ovt a

dmin

Man

agem

ent


9

P048

570

Publ

ic P

roc

IDF

Azer

baija

nEC

A19

97Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Clos

edPF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rGo

vern

ance

P081

235

Strn

gth

Impl

of P

ub P

roc

Law

IDF

Azer

baija

nEC

A20

02Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rGo

vern

ance

P088

893

Acct

& A

udit

Ref I

DFAz

erba

ijan

ECA

2004

Proc

urem

ent

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Cent

ral g

ovt a

dmin

P098

594

E-Pr

oc S

treng

th ID

FAz

erba

ijan

ECA

2005

Proc

urem

ent

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rP0

3698

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blic

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cure

men

t (ID

F)Be

laru

sEC

A19

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blic

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tor

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edPF

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ot a

ssig

ned

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stitu

tiona

l dev

Gove

rnan

ceP0

8333

8Pu

b Ex

pend

Mgm

t IDF

Bela

rus

ECA

2003

Econ

omic

Pol

icy

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Cent

ral g

ovt a

dmin

P071

845

Trea

sury

IDF

Bosn

ia-

ECA

2001

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Cl

osed

PFM

Stan

dard

s an

d fin

anci

al re

porti

ngCe

ntra

l gov

t adm

inHe

rzeg

ovin

aGo

vern

ance

P040

831

Pub

Proc

Law

IDF

Croa

tiaEC

A19

95Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Clos

edPF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Law

and

just

ice

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rnan

ceP0

8225

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reng

th B

udge

t Mgm

t IDF

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tiaEC

A20

03Po

verty

Red

uctio

nAc

tive

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

P043

801

Publ

ic P

rocu

rem

ent I

DFEs

toni

aEC

A19

96Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Clos

edPF

MN

ot a

ssig

ned

(H)O

ther

pub

lic s

ect

Gove

rnan

ceP0

5803

9Pu

blic

Pro

cure

men

t IDF

Geor

gia

ECA

1998

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Cl

osed

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ce

ntra

l gov

t adm

inGo

vern

ance

P093

519

Stre

ngth

enin

g E-

Gove

rnm

ent P

rocu

rem

ent

Geor

gia

ECA

2006

Proc

urem

ent

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rP0

4965

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b Ad

m ID

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ngar

yEC

A19

96Pu

blic

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tor

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edCS

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blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

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ral g

ovt a

dmin

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rnan

ceP0

5534

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ep P

rocu

rem

ent I

DFHu

ngar

yEC

A19

97Pu

blic

Sec

tor

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edPF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

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ral g

ovt a

dmin

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rnan

ceP0

6288

6Ta

x Ad

min

istra

tion

IDF

Hung

ary

ECA

1999

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Cl

osed

TAX

Not

ass

igne

d(H

)Inst

itutio

nal d

evGo

vern

ance

P048

031

Dev

Pub

Proc

urm

t IDF

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khst

anEC

A19

97Pu

blic

Sec

tor

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edPF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Cent

ral g

ovt a

dmin

Gove

rnan

ceP0

8357

5Pu

blic

Exp

endi

ture

Man

agem

ent T

AKo

sovo

ECA

2003

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Cl

osed

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

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rnan

ceP0

5306

8In

st S

treng

th P

ub P

roc

Nee

ds ID

FKy

rgyz

Rep

ublic

ECA

1998

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Cl

osed

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ce

ntra

l gov

t adm

inGo

vern

ance

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625

Reg

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Cen

ter (

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yz R

epub

licEC

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03Pr

ocur

emen

tAc

tive

PFM

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ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

P088

829

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rnan

ce &

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t IDF

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yz R

epub

licEC

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04En

ergy

and

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ing

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her p

ublic

sec

tor g

over

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inin

g &

oth

ext

ract

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ancm

nt fo

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licEC

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05Ec

onom

ic P

olic

yAc

tive

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r eco

nom

ic m

anag

emen

tGe

n fin

ance

sec

tor

P050

521

Stat

e Au

dit O

ffice

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iaEC

A19

97Pu

blic

Sec

tor

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edPF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

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ral g

ovt a

dmin

Gove

rnan

ceP0

7066

4Pu

b Se

ct R

ef &

Cap

Bld

g ID

FLa

tvia

ECA

1999

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Cl

osed

CSR

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ce

ntra

l gov

t adm

inGo

vern

ance

P078

062

Impl

mtn

of G

ov L

aws

IDF

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iaEC

A20

02Pu

blic

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tor

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edAC

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dici

al &

oth

er d

ispu

te re

solu

tion

mec

h.La

w a

nd ju

stic

eGo

vern

ance

P087

998

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gth

Cap

of A

nti-C

orru

pt In

sts

IDF

Latv

iaEC

A20

04Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Activ

eAC

GOt

her a

ccou

ntab

ility

/ant

i-cor

rupt

ion

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pub

adm

in s

ecto

rGo

vern

ance

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e co

ntin

ues o

n ne

xt p

age)

P045

326

Publ

ic In

vest

men

t (ID

F)M

aced

onia

, for

mer

ECA

1996

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Cl

osed

PFM

Not

ass

igne

d(H

)Pub

lic fi

n. m

gmt

Yugo

slav

Rep

ublic

of

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rnan

ceP0

6160

8St

reng

th P

rocu

rem

ent P

rocs

IDF

Mac

edon

ia, f

orm

erEC

A19

98Pu

blic

Sec

tor

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edPF

MOt

her p

ublic

sec

tor g

over

nanc

eGe

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Yugo

slav

Rep

ublic

of

Gove

rnan

ceP0

3699

0Pr

ocur

emen

t IDF

Mol

dova

ECA

1994

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Cl

osed

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Gove

rnan

ceP0

7031

7Ac

ct R

ef fo

r Ent

erpr

ises

IDF

Mol

dova

ECA

1996

Fina

ncia

l Cl

osed

PFM

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ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n in

d/tra

de s

ecto

rM

anag

emen

tP0

4819

1Ac

coun

ting

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rm ID

FM

oldo

vaEC

A19

96Pu

blic

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tor

Clos

edPF

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anda

rds

and

finan

cial

repo

rting

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rGo

vern

ance

P087

893

Pub

Proc

Infra

IDF

Mol

dova

ECA

2004

Proc

urem

ent

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

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ral g

ovt a

dmin

P078

406

Pub

Adm

Ref

IDF

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ndEC

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93N

ot A

pplic

able

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edCS

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cent

raliz

atio

nCe

ntra

l gov

t adm

inP0

6830

8Pr

oc In

fo R

es C

tr ID

FPo

land

ECA

1996

Proc

urem

ent

Clos

edPF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Cent

ral g

ovt a

dmin

P081

960

Stre

ngth

Bud

get M

gmt I

DFPo

land

ECA

2003

Pove

rty R

educ

tion

Clos

edPF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Cent

ral g

ovt a

dmin

P089

150

Acct

& A

udit

Refo

rm ID

FPo

land

ECA

2005

Fina

ncia

l Ac

tive

PFM

Stan

dard

s an

d fin

anci

al re

porti

ngGe

n fin

ance

sec

tor

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agem

ent

P069

155

Capa

city

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g - M

acro

Ana

lysi

s ID

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man

iaEC

A20

00Pu

blic

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tor

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edCS

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her p

ublic

sec

tor g

over

nanc

eGe

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

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rnan

ceP0

9822

2St

reng

th F

in M

gmt C

ap ID

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man

iaEC

A20

06En

ergy

and

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ing

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ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rP0

7183

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b Pr

oc ID

FRu

ssia

n Fe

dera

tEC

A19

95N

ot A

pplic

able

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edPF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

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roc.

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ral g

ovt a

dmin

P078

130

Publ

ic E

xpen

d M

gmt I

DFRu

ssia

n Fe

dera

tEC

A20

02Pu

blic

Sec

tor

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edPF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

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ral g

ovt a

dmin

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rnan

ceP0

5544

2Im

prov

e Pu

blic

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cure

men

t IDF

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ak R

epub

licEC

A19

96Pr

ocur

emen

tCl

osed

PFM

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ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ce

ntra

l gov

t adm

inP0

8206

5Ac

ct &

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it Re

form

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ak R

epub

licEC

A20

03Fi

nanc

ial

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anda

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and

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cial

repo

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finan

ce s

ecto

rM

anag

emen

tP0

8184

3Bl

dg C

ap In

Pub

Acc

t IDF

Slov

enia

ECA

2003

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ncia

l Sec

tor

Activ

ePF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rP0

4914

3Pu

b Pr

oc ID

FTa

jikis

tan

ECA

1997

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Cl

osed

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

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rnan

ceP0

8789

4Pu

b Se

ct A

udit

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IDF

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ista

nEC

A20

04Fi

nanc

ial

Activ

ePF

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blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

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roc.

Gen

pub

adm

in s

ecto

rM

anag

emen

tP0

8941

1St

reng

th C

ivil

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ista

nEC

A20

04Pu

blic

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tor

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eCS

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min

. and

civ

il se

rvic

e re

form

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ral g

ovt a

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ceP0

9042

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ef &

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gth

IDF

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nEC

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04Pu

blic

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tor

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ePF

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min

. and

civ

il se

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e re

form

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pub

adm

in s

ecto

rGo

vern

ance

P079

119

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Proc

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IDF

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eyEC

A20

02Pr

ocur

emen

tCl

osed

PFM

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ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

P090

378

Perf

Mon

itr’g

of L

ocal

Aut

hs ID

FTu

rkey

ECA

2002

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Cl

osed

CSR

Mpa

l. go

vern

ance

& in

stitu

tion

build

ing

Sub-

natl

govt

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1 0


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pen

dix

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ub

lic

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s, F

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ctor

1


1 1

P048

291

Publ

ic P

rocu

rem

ent I

DFTu

rkm

enis

tan

ECA

1997

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Cl

osed

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Gove

rnan

ceP0

4873

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blic

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cure

men

t IDF

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kist

anEC

A19

97Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Clos

edPF

MPu

blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

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ral g

ovt a

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rnan

ceP0

9391

8St

reng

th P

ub S

ect A

udit

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s CA

P ID

FUz

beki

stan

ECA

2005

Fina

ncia

l Ac

tive

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Man

agem

ent

P065

302

AR ID

F An

ti-Co

rrupt

ion

Arge

ntin

aLC

R19

99Pu

blic

Sec

tor

Clos

edAC

GOt

her p

ublic

sec

tor g

over

nanc

eGe

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

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rnan

ceP0

8493

8ID

F Ag

n In

st.C

ap.B

ldg.

-Aud

itor G

en O

ffic

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ntin

aLC

R20

03Fi

nanc

ial

Activ

ePF

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blic

exp

end,

fina

ncia

l mgm

t & p

roc.

Cent

ral g

ovt a

dmin

Man

agem

ent

P048

713

Stat

e Fi

nanc

e ID

FBr

azil

LCR

1997

Publ

ic S

ecto

rCl

osed

PFM

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ass

igne

d(H

)Pub

lic fi

n. m

gmt

Gove

rnan

ceP0

9887

9OC

CEFS

Acc

ount

abili

ty S

yste

ms

Cent

ral A

mer

ica

LCR

2005

Fina

ncia

l Ac

tive

PFM

Publ

ic e

xpen

d, fi

nanc

ial m

gmt &

pro

c.Ge

n pu

b ad

min

sec

tor

Man

agem

ent

P061

684

IDF

Anti-

Corru

ptio

nCo

lom

bia

LCR

1998

Publ

ic S

ecto

r Cl

osed

ACG

Not

ass

igne

d(H

)Oth

er p

ublic

sec

tGo

vern

ance

P090

451

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F Ad

min

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tion

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rmDo

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ican

LC

R19

93He

alth

, Nut

ritio

n Cl

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1

BULGARIA

Alexander Stoyanov Director of Research, Center for the Study of Democracy

Angeliki Votsoglou Public Administration Anti-Corruption and Civil Society,

European Union Delegation of the European Commission to

Bulgaria

Boyan Zahariev Program Director, Governance and Public Policies, Open Society

Institute, Sofia

Dessislvana Terzieva Director, European Coordination and International Cooperation

Directorate, Ministry of State Administration and Administrative

Reform

Dimitrina Zaharinova Director of Internal Financial Inspection Directorate, Ministry of

Finance, Public Financial Inspection Agency

Dobrin Pindjurov Director Budget, Ministry of Finance

Dora Krumova Political Reporting, European Union Representation of the

European Commission in Bulgaria

Evdokya Kyoseva Director of Legal and Methodological Support of the Inspection

Activities Directorate, Ministry of Finance, Public Financial

Inspection Agency

Evgeny Evgeniev Consultant, Private & Financial Sector, World Bank

Ginka Draganinska Director, Ministry of Finance, Public Financial Inspection Agency

Kiril Ananiev Deputy Minister, Ministry of Finance

Manuel M.Fernandez-Figueroa Senior Judge/Legal Adviser in Bulgaria; Spanish Judicial Network

of Experts in International Judicial Co-operation International

Adviser on Justice Affairs

Maria Murgina Executive Director, Ministry of Finance, National Revenue

Agency

Milena Damianova Adviser, Political Reporting, European Union Representation of

the European Commission in Bulgaria

Nikolay Vassiley Minister, State Administration and Administrative Reform

Paulina Stanoeva Public Finance Sector, European Union Delegation of the

European Commission in Bulgaria

APPENDIX F: CLIENTS AND OTHER EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS INTERVIEWED

2


Petia Vassileva Head of Department, Council of Ministers, Department

Economic Policy of European Union and International Financial

Institutions

Snejana Dimitrova Director, Strategic Planning and Governance Directorate,

Republic of Bulgaria Council of Ministers

Sonya Vateva Director of Information Technologies and Communication

Directorate, Ministry of Finance, Public Financial Inspection

Agency

Stoyan Markov Deputy Executive Director, Ministry of Finance, National

Revenue Agency

Temenujka Petkova Director of Organization and Implementation of the Inspection

Activities Directorate, Ministry of Finance, Public Financial

Inspection Agency

Valeri Apostolov Member of the National Audit Office, Republic of Bulgaria

Yoana Vasileva Head of Department European Coordination and International

Cooperation Directorate, Ministry of State Administration and

Administrative Reform

BURKINA FASO Abel Kalmogo Administrateur des Services Financiers, Ministere des Financies

et du Budget

Annette Coly Conseillere au Developpment, Ambassade de la Republque

Federale d’Allemagne

Bepio C. Bado Senior Operations Officer, World Bank, Burkina Faso

Bhanoumatee Ayoung Lead Procurement Specialist, World Bank

Catherine M. Laurent Senior Public Sector Mgmt. Spec., World Bank

Celestin Monga Lead Economist, World Bank

Chris Geiregat Economist, African Department, International Monetary Fund

Docteur Hein Sie Roger Directeur Etudes et de la Planfication, Ministere de la Sante

Emmanuel Nonyara Director General de L’Energie, Ministere des Mines, des

Carriered et de l’Energie

Francois M. D. Zoundi Secretaire Permananet, Ministere des Financies et du Budget

Gilbert Kibtonre Secretaire General, Ministere de l’Habitat et de l’Urbanisme

Gilles B. Alfandari Senior Economist, World Bank

Godefroy Thiombiano Coordonnateur, Ministere des Mines, des Carriered et de

l’Energie

Guira T. Lenard Administrateur Civil, Directeur General des Collectives

territorirals, Ministere de l’Admninistration

Helia Materus Chef de Section Economie et Secteurs Sociaux, Union

Europenne

Jain-Guang Shen Economist, African Department, International Monetary Fund

Jan Gottschalk Economist, African Department, International Monetary Fund

A P P E N D I X F : C L I E N T S A N D O T H E R E X T E R N A L S TA K E H O L D E R S I N T E R V I E W E D

3

Jan Walliser Economic Adviser, World Bank

Jean Marie Vianney Dabire Economiste/Directeur, European Union

Jean Noel Savadogo chef de Service des Resources Humaines, Tresor Public

Karim Taaore Coordonnateur, Secrecretariat Permanent pour les Suivi des

Politiques et Programmes Financiers

Koffi Ekouevi Senior Economist, World Bank

Lars Engberg-Pedersen Chercheur Senior, Danish Institue of Internationl Studies,

Denmark

Leif Jensen Senior Resource Management Officer, World Bank, Washington

Lene Sebgo Director General, Ministere des Financies et du Budget

Luc Vidal Administrateur Directeur General, BICIAB

Lucien Marie Noel Bembamba Directeur General, Tresor Public

Mario Zejan Resident Representative, International Monetary Fund

Mikael Erbs-Jorgensen Premier Secretarire, Ambassade Royale de Danemark

Mme Noelie Tietiembou Directrice des Resources Humaines, Ministere de

L’Enseignement de Base et de l’Alphabetisation

Moctar Zonou Secretaire executif, Reseau National de Lutte Anticorruption

(REN-LAC)

Moumounou Gnankambary Administrateur des Services Financiers/Directeur General du

budget, Ministere des Financies et du Budget

Ouedraogo Marie Francoise Secretarie Permanent, Ministere de la Fonction Publique et de la

Reforme de l’Etat

Pascal Sanaou President de Chamre, Burkina Faso Cour des Computes

Philippe Ospital Conseiller de Cooperation ed de’Action culturelle, Ambassade

de France au Burkina Faso

Pierre Claver Dambia Consultant International, Etude–Conseil–Gestion

Pr. Agr. G. Jean-Ggabriel Ouango Secretaire General, Ministere de la Sante

Renet van der Waals Hoofd Ontwikkelingssamenwqerking, Koninkrijk der

Nederlanden

Ruby Sandhu-Rojon Country Director, UNDP, Burkina Faso

Siaka Coulibaly Economist, World Bank, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Sie Tioye Antoine-Marie Economiste/Directeur, Ministere de L’Economie et du

Developpment

Yemdago Maxime Nikiema Docteur es Sciences Economics, Reseau National de Lutte

Anticorruption

Youssouf Ouattara Secretaire General, Ministere de la Fonction Publique et de la

Reforme de l’Etat

CAMBODIAAgelika Fleddermann German Agency for Technical Cooperation

Alain Goffeau Project Implementation Specialist, Asian Development Bank

4


Angelika Fleddenmann Acting Representative, GTZ

Arjun Goswami Country Director, Asian Development Bank

Beng Simeth World Bank

Charis Wuerffel World Bank

Chhay Vuth Public Procurement, MEF

Chhit Samath NGOF

Claire Moran Country Manager, DFID

Denise Lauwens Coca Cola Plant, Country Manager

Douglas Gardner Resident Coordinator, UNDP

Dr. Chhom Rada German Agency for Technical Cooperation

Dr. Eang Nat Health Prog Group

Dr. Hang Chuon Naron Secretary General MEF

Dr. Lo Veasna Kry Health Planning Gov

Dr. Meng Chour Health Planning Gov

Dr. Phan Phalla Deputy Director, Ministry of Finance

Dr. Sin Somouny Executive Director Medicam

Dr. Sochiet National Health Prog Group

Dr. Sok Saravuth Project Director

Dr. Uy Vengkry Health Planning Gov

E. Chea Chanto Governor, NBC

Erik Illes SIDA

Erin Soto Representative–US Agency for International Development

H.E. Mam Bun Heng SS (Disease control project), MOH

H.E. Ty Norin Elec Authority of Cambodia

H.E. Kem Sithan SS MOC

H.E. Nguon Nouv Director, PPWS

H.E. Im Chhun Lim Ministry of Land

H.E. Sunchan Thol Min. of Public Works and Transportation

H.E. Yim Nolson Deputy Dir General EDC

H.E. Keat Chhon Senior Minister, MEF

H.E. Chhay Than Senior Minister, MOP

H.E. Ek Son Chhan Phnom Penh Water Supply and Sanitation

H.E. Eng Huot SS MOH-HSSP

H.E. Ith Praing Secretary of State, MIME

H.E. Khlaut Randy Project Dir Rural Electrification and Transmission Project

H.E. Ms Kunthea Pavi Minister, MOWA

H.E. Nath Bun Roeun Under Secretary of State–Education for All

H.E. Ou Orhat Secretary General


5

H.E. Sok Chenda Sec General Commonwealth Development Corporation

H.E. Tuon Tavrak Director General, GDP

H.E. Vongsey Vissoth DSG

H.E. Im Sethy Secretary of State (Basic Education), MOEYS

H.E. Pen Siman Director General Customs & Excise

H.E. Veng Sakong SS MOWRAM

Hildegrard Lignau Advisor MOP/GTZ

Jacinta Barins UNDP

James Whitehead Country Director, VSO

John Nelmes Resident Representative–IMF

Julian Hansen Poverty Map Advisor, GTZ

Kem Sokha Anti-corruption, Cambodia Center for Human Rights CCHR

Ken Loo Vice President, GMAC

Keo Sarath Program Manager, BE, Save the Children, Norway

Keut Meach DG of Administration & Finance, Civil Service Reform

Kimiko Uno Representative FAO

Kol Penh Senior Minister, MOEYS

Kurt Bredenberg Advisor, KAPE

Mr Lem Peng Deputy Director, NIS Team

Mr. Chea Chantum Director of Social Planning Department

Mr. Chea Sam Ang Deputy Director, Forestry Administration. Dept of Forestry and

Wildlife, Director of the Forest Concession MAFFFA

Mr. Dean Claland CEO, ANZ Royal Bank Cambodia

Mr. Kim Phalla (Economics) MEF–PFMRP

Mr. Kim Vuthana Ex- Project Director, MRD NE Village Dev Proj, Ministry of Rural

Development

Mr. Lu Chu Chang Cambodian Timber Industries

Mr. Pen Thirong Deputy Dir of Investment & Coop., MEF

Mr. Roger Bednall CADAF Director, AUSAID

Mr. Tunn Chan Dara Deputy of PPWS, MIME

Ms. Kham Sophean Social Fund, SFKC

Ngo Hong Ly Secretary General, CAR

Nida Ouk Infra ADB

Nil Vanna SD

Paulin Van Im Senior Project-Implementation/Programs Officer (Natural

Resources), Asian Development Bank

Peter Linden Mayer AusAid

Phou Puy President, Rice Millers Association

6


Puran Deputy Country Director, Asian Development Bank

Scott Leiper Seila Advisor, MOI

Seth Van Doun PSD EC

Sister Luise Ahrens Maryknoll Sisters

So Ngoun Transportation and Service

Sok Narin DD advisor

Sok Sokunthea Procurement officer, World Bank

Sokheang UNDP

Sophea Mar Programs Officer (Social Sectors), Asian Development Bank

Suy Mong Leang Director of PMU Council, LJR

Tai Tei Pon Lien Thong International investment

Tom Wingfield Governance Advisor, DFID

Youk Sambath Chair, Public Expenditure Tracking and Service Delivery

Working Group

Yves Terracol Representative, AFD

INDIAA. Giridhar, I.A.S. Secretary to Government, Finance Department, A.P. Secretariat

Hyderabad

A. K. Tripathy, I.A.S. Chief Secretary, Government of Orissa

Admiral R. H. Tahiliani (Retired)

C. D. Arha, IAS (Retd.) Chief Information Commissioner, A. P. Information Commission

(Under Right of Information Act)

C.R. Kamalanthan Former Andhra Pradesh Vigilance Commissioner, Special Chief

Secretary to the Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, Secretary to the Govt.

of India, Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources),

Ministry of Information & Broadcasting

Dr. Jayaprakash Narayan National Coordinator, Lok Satta Party, LOKSATTA

Dr. Naresh C. Saxena D. Phil 68 Friends Colony West, New Delhi

Dr. P. K. Mohanty Joint Secretary & Mission Director, Jawaharial Nehru National

Urban Renewal Mission, Ministry of Housing & Urban Poverty

Alleviation

Dr. Rajiv Sharma, I.A.S. Director General, Centre for Good Governance

Dr. Shankar Acharya Member Board of Governors and Hony. Professor, Indian

Council for Research on International Economic Relations

Gopal Chandra Nanda Director-cum-Addl, D.G. of Police, Vigilance & Ex-Officio Special

Secretary to Government

Hiranya Mukhopadhyay Economist, Asian Development Bank

K. Raju, I.A.S. Principal Secretary to Government (RD), Panchayat Raj & Rural

Development Department


7

M.V.P.C. Sastry Principal Secretary to Government, General Administration

(R&IAD) Department

N.C. Nagarjuna Reddy Director of Treasuries & Accounts, Government of Anhra

Pradesh

Naseer A. Rana Adviser, Coordinator Procurement Hub, South Asia Region;

Commission for Governance & Accounting, India

Niranjanlal Deputy Director (Projects) Commissioner, EDS, (e-seva) Dept.

of Information Technology & Communications, Government of

Andhra Pradesh

P.V.R.K. Prasad, I.A.S. (Retd.) Honorary Advisor to T.T.D

Pramode K. Mishra Accountant General, Orissa, Ministry of Finance

Prashant, IAS Director, Ministry of Finance, Dept. of Economic Affairs, Govt. of

India

R.C. Samal, I.A.S. (Retd.) Vigilance Commissioner, A.P. Vigilance Commission

Rahul Sarin Additional Secretary, Department of Administrative Reforms &

Public Grievances, Govt. of India

Rajni Khanna Senior Economist, World Bank

Satya Poddar Partner, Ernst & Young Pvt. Ltd., Global Tax Advisory Services

Surendra N. Tripathi, I.A.S. Commissioner-cum-Secretary; Chairman, Orissa Computer

Application Centre, Government of Orissa, Rural Department &

Information Technology Dept.

V.S. Senthil, I.A.S Joint Secretary (state Finances), Ministry of Finance, Dept. of

Expenditure

Vinod Sahgal Regional Public Fin. Accountability Spec., World Bank

RUSSIAN FEDERATIONAlexey M. Lavrov Director, Budget Policy Dept., Ministry of Finance of the Russian

Federation

Alexndre Roukavichnikov Procurement Specialist, World Bank

Andrew Dobson Key Expert, European Union Project; Management of Sub-

National Public Finance

Andrey Klimenko Vice Rector/Director, Inst. for Public Administration & Municipal

Management, Higher School of Economics

Aziz Manatov Country Sr. Financial Management Specialist, World Bank

Dmitry Golovin Translator, formerly of the World Bank

Galina Kurlyandskaya Director General, Center for Fiscal Policy

Irina Yashina Headmaster, Russian Federation, The Chuvash Republic

Jesus Renzoll Senior Procurement Specialist, World Bank

Konstantin Y. Noskov Deputy Director, Dept. of Performance Budgeting and Total

Financial Balance, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade

of the Russian Federation

8


Leonid E. Limonov General Director, Economics, Doctor of Science, Non-

Commercial Organization ICSER-Leontief Centre

Mikhail Dmitriev President, Center for Strategic Research

Mikhail I. Grishankov Delegate, Chairman of the Anticorruption Commission, The

Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, State Duma

Peter Boulding Team Leader, European Union Project, Management of Sub-

National Public Finance, Russian Federation

Philip Winchell Bottern Expert, European Union Project, Management of Sub-National

Public Finance, Russian Federation

Stefanie Harter Delegation to the European Commission to Russia, Institutional

Reforms, EU–Russian Cooperation Programme

Valery V. Sidorenko, PhD Acting Head of Finance, Department of Tver Region Russian

Federation Tver Region, Finance Department

TANZANIAAlfred L. R. Kabagire Programme Manager Local Gov. Reform Programme, Prime

Minister’s Office, Regional Administration & Local Government

Athanas Pius Principal Auditor, CAG’s Office, Ag. Assistant Auditor General

Office, National Audit Office, Tanzania

Brendan O’Driscoll Chief Technical Adviser, Local Gov. Reform Programme, Prime

Minister’s Office, Regional Administration & Local Government

Dan Craun-Selka Country Director, PACT Tanzania

Dr. Mary M. Nagu (MP) Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Ministry of Justice

and Constitutional Affairs

Dr. Ramadhan S. Mlinga Chief Executive Officer, Public Procurement Regulatory

Authority

Dr. Servacius B. Likwelile Executive Director, Tanzania Social Action Fund, President’s

Office

Eliakim C.J. Maswi Assistant Commissioner for Budget, Ministry of Finance

Gelase Mutahaba Chief Technical Adviser, President’s Office

Gertrude Mugizi Coordinator, Policy Reform, Tanzania

Gier Sundet Chief of Party, Tanzania Governance Noticeboard, REPOA

Hans Raadschilders First Secretary, Local Governance, Embassy of the Netherlands

Ian Shapiro Wamuyu Gatheru Senior Governance Adviser, DfID, Tanzania

Joseph Semboja Executive Director, Research on Poverty Alleviation

Mary Ngelela Maganga Modernization Programme Manager, Tanzania Revenue

Authority

Mohamed Said Muya Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and

Cooperatives

Mr. L.S.L. Utouh Controller and Auditor General, National Audit Office

Mrs. Ruth H. Mollel Permanent Secretary, Public Service Management, President’s

Office


9

Paul Sherlock Development Specialist, Embassy of Ireland, Tanzania

Peniel M. Lyimo Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and

Cooperatives

Per Tidemand, PhD Senior Consultant, DEGE Consult

Rose Mushi Country Director, Action Aid International, Tanzania

Selina A. Mkony Project Accountant/Administrator, President’s Office, Public

Service Management, Public Service Reform Programme

Solanus M. Nyimbi Director of Local Government, Prime Minister’s Office, Regional

Admin & Local Government

Tamadhani Mussa Khijjah Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Tanzania

Theo Macha Senior Program Officer, PACT Tanzania

Thomas Bayer US Agency for International Development, Tanzania

Tobias A. Swai Assistant Lecturer, Faculty of Commerce and Management

WORLD BANKShankar Acharya Consultant

Mark Baird Consultant

Ajay Chhibber Country Director

Roberto Danino

Dennis De Tray

Shanta Devarajan Chief Economist

James Fox Consultant

Francis Fukuyama Consultant

Prem Garg Director, QAG

Alan Gelb Director, Development Policy

Navin Girishankar Adviser

Pablo Guerrero Head, OPCVP

April Harding Sr Economist (Health)

Monika Huppi Lead Economist

Alma Kanani Senior Economist

Daniel Kaufmann Director

Philip Keefer Lead Economist

Gregory Kisunko Senior Public Sector Specialist

Dominque Lallement Consultant

Pierre Landell-Mills

Sarwar Lateef Consultant

Chad Leechor Lead Economist

Brian Levy Adviser

Yasuhiko Matsuda Senior Public Sector Specialist

1 0


Helga Muller Chief Admin. Officer

Ronald Myers Sector Manager

Barbara Nunberg Sector Manager

Selcuk Ozgediz Consultant

Sanjay Pradhan Sector Director

Muker Ranjera

Gary Reid Lead Public Sector Management Specialist

Jeffrey Rinne Public Sector Mgmt. Spec.

Frans Ronsholt Consultant

Randi Ryterman Sector Manager

Francisco Sagasti Retired

Miguel Schloss Consultant

Marcelo Selowsky Consultant

Geoffrey Shepherd Consultant

Michael Stevens Consultant

Vinaya Swaroop Lead Economist

Palu Toomas Lead Health Specialist

Rene Vandendries Consultant

Deborah Wetzel Lead Public Sector Specialist

Willem Rosenboom-Watsan Senior Water & Sanitation Spec

Marie Zenni Information Analyst

public sector reform: what works and...

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