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Public Relations, Professionalism, and the Public Interest Thomas H. Bivins

ABSTRACT. The public interest statement contained in the PRSA Code of Professional Standards is unduly vague and provides neither a working definition of "public interest" nor any guidance for the performance of what most professions consider to be a primary value. This paper addresses the question of what might constitute public relations service in the public interest, and calls for more stringent guidelines to be developed whereby the profession may advance its service goals more clearly.

As the practice of public relations attempts to become the profession of public relations, clarification of its ethical obligation to serve the public interest is vital if it is to accomplish its goal and if it is to be accepted as a legitimate profession by society. The primary question discussed here is: Can public relations, given its various functions as mediator, respondent, aM advocate, serve the public interest? Arid, if so, how?

The question of service to the public or in the pttblic interest is one that has concerned nearly all professions at one time or another. Answers ha~ee ranged from the ideological to the practical, and have taken the form of everything from token articles in codes of ethics to complete programs designed to carry out, what many consider to be, the

Thomas H. Bivins, is an Associate Pr@ssor in the &hool of Jour- nalism at the University of Oregon where he teaches public relations and mass media ethics. He received his Ph.D. in 1982 in telecommunication and taught for three years at the University of Delaware before returning to the U of O. Bivins received a B.A. in Engl#h and an M.F.A. in creative writing and has nearly twenty )~ears of uofessional media experience, including work in radio, television, advertising, public retatiom' and editorial cartoonin 2.

premier obligation of a profession. The question is, how real is the discharge of this obligation?

Kultgen (1988), citing Larson (t977), holds that historical and economic forces have forced a merger of certain antimarket principles (such as service to the entire community regardless of class) with the bourgeois ideol%c¢ of the free market and a classless society. The result, in part, is a "myth" of a service orientation stemming from a "professional ideology" that maintains that "professionals adhere to the ideal of service to all of humanity . . . . They serve anyone in need regardless of monetary reward or the status of the client" (p. 114).

This service orientation has become the keystone among professional values, those commonly held beliefs that serve to cement individual practitioners into a single profession. It is important to note that although serving the public interest is not necessarily a criterion used to define professionalism, it is the most often cited of the values of professionalism. Berhman (1988) cites among his ten characrerisdcs of a profession "a dedication of the profession to social service . . . " and "substitution of service for income and wealth as the primary motivation of members, plus high quality service regardless of fees received." Crabte and Vibbert (1986, p. 107), describ- ing six characteristics of a profession, list a "group commitment to social responsibility." By extension, this would cover the legal profession's respect for law and order and the medical profession's dedication to the general health of society. Grunig and Hunt (1984) cite as their first criterion for a profession to exist, a set of professional values. Primary among these is the belief "that serving others is more important than their [professional's] own economic gain." Cutlip et al. (1985, p. 72) cite "nobility of purpose" emphasizing public service and social responsibility.

Joun, al of Business Ethics t 2:117-- 126, t 993.

© 1993 KluwerAcademicPubtishers. Printed in tfleNetherlands.

118 Thomas H. Bivins

Clearly, then, service in the public interest appears to be a primary value of existing professions. So too, it may be said to be of immediate concern to near- professions as well - those practices which are striving to become professionalized. If they are to be recognized by- society as a profession, vested with the special privileges inherent in the status, they must, at the very least, address the issue of service in the public interest.

Public rdations has, as an additional burden, developed along three, somewhat different lines - fur- ther muddying the question of how a practitioner can, while serving a discrete interest, also serve society.

The purpose of modern public relations

Historically, the role of public relations as a practice has had three major interpretations: controlling publics, responding to publics, and achiexdng mutu- ally beneficial relationships among all publics (Newsom and Scott, 1985). Each of these interpretations has as its focus not roles or functions, but purpose or intent. Within the first interpretation lies the roots of the belief that all public relations is persuasive by nature, thus requiring an advocacy role of the practitioner. Within the last two are the seeds of modern public relations, wherein a practitioner may become a counselor, mediating disparate points of view between parties while still representing one of them.

Grunig and Hunt (p. 66) propose four environ- ments or models in which public relations is usually practiced: press agentry/pubticity, in which the practitioner functions as a one-sided propaganda spe- cialist; public information, in which the practitioner performs a purely journalistic function by carefully disseminating balanced information to the public; two-way asymmetric, in which the practitioner uses social science techniques to gather information on attitude and behavior and then adjusts messages accordingly in order to influence publics; and two- way symmetric, in which practitioners function as mediators seeking mutual understanding between differing parties. Clearly these models fit within earlier interpretations of controlling, responding to, or compromising with publics.

The question of public service, thus becomes a

sticky one when these various functions are factored into the equation. How can a practitioner advocating a discrete point of view serve the interest of the greater public? Does a practitioner acting as mediator serve only the two parties involved in the issue at hand, or is the greater public benefited in some way? As with many other professions and near- professions, formal guidance for practitioners of public relations is sorely lacking, even from their own professional association.

The insufficiency of the code

The largest professional body representing the practice of public relations today is the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA). So far, however, the only formal embodiment of a professional obligation to serve the public interest appears in the Society's Code of Professional Standards for the Practice of Public Relations. Article 2 of the code states that "A member shall conduct his or her professional life in accord with the public interest." Official interpretation of this article defines that interest as "com- prising respect for and enforcement of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States of America." However, no formal guidelines exist explaining how a member should go about conduct- ing his or her life "in accord with the public interest," nor has any formal structure been developed whereby a practitioner may contribute to the public interest on behalf of the profession as a whole.

It is certainly in the best interest of a profession to express its obligations to society in the clearest possible terms. Meyer (1987) has suggested that the main benefit of codes lies in the work of "articu- lating a professional group's values" which, in turn, forces it to think about those values. Not only is the thinking of the members of the profession clarified through this analysis and articulation, but also the group's standards are clarified for outsiders. How- ever, if, as Kultgen has suggested, the service orientation common to most professions is just so much window dressing, then the first indication might be found in the profession's code of ethics. As Meyer has stated (p. 17), "Written codes are often criticized for being of little help in making decisions. The values they list are obvious values, the behaviors enjoined are clearly bad behaviors." Speaking specifi-

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cally of journalism codes, Meyer calls them "lacking in muscle," and "full of glittering generalities" (p. 18).

As noted, the PRSA code gives extremely short shrift to the notion of serving the public interest. In its lone article dealing with service to the public, ambiguity of wording alone obfuscates any inherent meaning. It provides no concrete guidelines by which its members may discharge a professional obligation to serve the public interest. By suggesting that members simply conduct their affairs "in accord with the public interest" we are left with nothing semantically operational. Even if we factor in the "official interpretation" which defines public interest as "respect for and enforcement of the rights of the Constitution," we are still left with a host of ques- tions. Americans, for example, are bound by law to respect the constitutional rights of others. Are Amer- ican practitioners then to assume that by acting within the bounds of Constitutional law they discharge their obligation to public service? As a profession, or a near profession, public relations should, at the very least, assume the service orientation ideal of the traditional professions; however, the opportunity arises here to overcome the shortcomings of other attempts by adequately defining the public interest, and providing guidelines by which professionals may discharge their obligations to society.

As it stands, the PRSA code itself is entirely insufficient in providing either ideological or con- ceptual guidance. Practitioners are left to ponder the complexities of an obligation of service in the public interest while canting out, what many consider to be, the primary obligation of service to the client.

Obligation, by nature, implies restrictions on behavior. Thus, if we accept this obligation to act in the public interest, we voluntarily restrict professional actions by that obligation. However, in exchange for the acceptance of certain obligations, professionals usually expect, and receive, certain privileges associated with their position in society: the privilege of acting autonomously in the decision- making process, free from outside pressure; the privilege of prestige and power associated with being a member of a recognized profession; the privilege of exemption from competition due to the specialized nature of professionalism, etc.

In exchange for these privileges, so avidly sought after by professions and near professions, professionals incur certain obligations - among the most

common is the charge to use their specialized skills on behalf of society for the good of society, or in the public interest.

According to Bayles (1981), professionals in our society are at the top in prestige, wealth and power, and because they frequently make decisions that affect others, they "share responsibility for the realization of liberal values in society" (p. 109). Kultgen (1982) holds that professions themselves attempt to justify the respect with which society holds them and the level of support they in turn command from society by frequently citing several key characteristics, among them that:

[t]he animating purpose of a profession is to contribute maximally and efficiently to human welfare . . . The same purpose (together with great interest in the work itself) is the motive of the true professional, not desire for compensation . . . [T]he professionals' aim is to serve mankind and they are expected to affirm ("profess") this by accepting their professions' codes of ethics (p. 62).

I£ as Kultgen suggests, many codes are simply public relations pieces furthering a professional ideology, then service to society is merely one of the more useful "cloaks" with which professions disguise their primarily self-serving machinations. If any profession, then, would advance from the posturing of ideology to the realm of effective action on behalf of society, a first logical step might be to spell out its duties and obligations to the public interest in terms that are unambiguous enough to provide clear guidance to its members and forceful enough to send a clear signal to society.

The question addressed here, however, is not whether professional ideology is either realistic or applicable, but whether service in the public interest vis-a-vis the practice of public relations can be clearly defined, and whether the current concept is definitionally discreet enough within the existing PRSA code to provide guidance for its realization.

What follows, then, is a survey of several possible paradigms under which the public interest might be sufficiently served by the profession of public relations.


Paradigm I: If every individual practicing public relations acts in the best interest of his or her client, then the public interest will be served

resolved by proposing that the public interest will automatically be served by the simple carrying out of the primary function of service to the client.

Article 2 of the PRSA code and its accompanying clarification suffer, at the very least, from what Kultgen (1988) calls the "utility of vagueness." According to Kultgen, this vagueness, especially as associated with the service function of professionalism, "contribute[s] to the ideological use of functionalist models in the struggle for status" (p. 224). The functionalist model supposes that the various institutions within society function as a whole to serve the needs of that society. Basic to this concep- tion is the belief that professions serve society through the normal discharge of their specialized functions. This "ideal" is best summarized by Cogan (1953):

A profession is a vocation whose practice is founded upon an understanding of the theoretical structure of some department of learning or science, and upon the abilities accompanying such understanding. This understanding and these abilities are applied to the vital practical affairs of man. The practices of the profession are modified by the knowledge of a generalized nature and by the accumulated wisdom and experience of mankind, which serve to correct the errors of specialism. The profession, in service to the vital needs of man, considers its first ethical imperative to be altruistic service to the client.

This postulation is somewhat reminiscent of Adam Smith's invisible hand in which the effective functioning of a capitalistic economy ultimately serves all of society through the discharge of its normal dudes to maximize profits. However, while a successfully functioning economy may benefit as the result of a goal-oriented drive to maximize profits, professionals are generally assumed to be guided by an ethical imperative of service to the client - making the "hand" more visible, but nonetheless operative.

Berhman (t 988, p. 99), like Cogan, maintains that by serving individual interests, the interests of society will also be advanced. Operating from a social contract-type premise, he views professions as bound to provide unspecified amounts of service to society upon request, in return for the special status they enjoy. The ambiguity issue, however, is not

Paradigm II: If, in addition to serving individual interests, an individual practicing public relations serves public interest causes, the public interest will be served

Many practitioners suggest that service to the public can be discharged by balancing pro bono work against that done for individual interests. Bayles (1981, p. 109) suggests that the responsibility for serving the public good can be discharged in part through activities of social leadership, through such practices as pro bono work. A number of professions, most notably the legal and medical, rely heavily on the notion of pro bono work to fulfill this tacitly recognized obligation to insure equal representation; however, as wdll be seen below, even the ABA code admits the shortcomings of relying on individual practitioners to meet this need. Additionally, Bayles 6" 117) argues that such endeavors as lobbying and public interest activity do not fulfill the respond- bility a profession has to act in the public interest because they, in fact, serve some singular interest or another. The public interest cannot be served by professionals working on behalf of a W such singular interest or dient. Professionals (especially those acting as agents) typically assume the role of advocate. Operating from within what Bayles terms the agency model, the agent must cloak him or herself in what Simon (1978) terms the "ideolog T of advocacy." This ideology assumes two principles of conduct: (1) that a professional is neutral or detached from the client's purposes, and (2) that the professional is an aggressive partisan of the client working to advance the client's needs. This implies that the professional, under these circumstances, must remain an interested party, and as long as they serve one side of an issue or another, they cannot serve the public interest.

For example, a public relations professional as- suming pro bono work on behalf of an anti-abortion interest is really acting on behalf of the client, no matter how much that client may believe its actions are in the public interest. In the same way, public relations professionals working on behalf of a pro-

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abortion group espouse their client's position. Both sides certainly are serving an interest, but neither can be said to be serving the public interest. According to Bayles, ouly those assessing particular issues or actions from a position of disinterest are able to recommend the type of reform necessary for a profession to better serve the public interest.

Kultgen (1988, p. 348) suggests that, what he calls, "objective concern" requires a circumscribed yet "deep-seated friendliness" that allows professionals to help people through the rational methods of their practice without establishing the kind of intimacy leading to bias or special interest. Although this is an individual goal, it is broadly applicable to the profession as a whole in that it is the profession that must delineate guidelines sufficient for its members to recognize this obligation, and it is the profession that must take on itself the burden of educating the public as to their needs, as regards the profession, and the availability of services. It is also dear that the profession as a whole must initiate any change that would result iv. movement away from mere lip service to society and toward the reality of public service.

Paradigm Ill: Lea profession or professionals assure that every individual in need or desiring its/their services receives its/their services, then the public interest will be served

Within these interpretations, there are at least t-wo possible ways to approach a discussion of the public interest: from an individual practitioner's perspective, and from the perspective of the entire profession acting within society and for the good of society as a whole. However, as Bayles (1981) states:

Not all responsibilities are those of individual professionals. Some are responsibilities of a profession as a whole and calmot be reduced to obligations of indMdual professionals (pp. 23-24).

These obligations should, instead, be taken on by the profession, representing each member, or by all members together. Of course, in a very broad sense, any profession serves the public interest through its contribution to the well-being of the social system itsdf (the Coge~/Adam Smith model). However, this approach implies that nothing explicit need be done in the public interest in addition to carrying out the normal obligations to the client. Some professions, most notably law and medicine, have accounted for the obligation of service as an obligation of the profession as a whole. For instance, lawyers, individ- ually, may or may not daily serve the public interest; however, the legal system itself is designed so as to provide access to legal representation for every citizen, thus serving, in a global sense, the public interest.

The American Bar Association's Code of Profes- sional Responsibility states this concept several times, initially in Canon 2.

According to Webster's dictionary, the term interest denotes, first, % right, title or legal share in something;" and, secondly, '<welfare or benefit." These two interpretations could be said to be at the heart of the issue of serving the public interest.

If dictionary definitions of"interest," as the opera- rive term in "public interest," are applied, the result is two, somewhat different interpretations: (1) The public interest denotes a right that the public pos- sesses - by virtue of being the primary, generic unit in society - through its relationship with other, more discreetly defined, service-oriented units within the societal framework; and/or (2) The public interest denotes a benefit or benefits derived fi'om the public's relationship with these other units which, in turn, serves to insure the well-being of society as a whole.

The need of members of the public for legal services is met only if they recognize their legal problems, appre- ciate the importance of seeking assistance, and are able to obtain the services of acceptable legal counsd. Hence, important functions of the legal profession are to educate laymen to recognize the problems, to facilitate the process of intdligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available.

This allows for the common dispute over exactly whose interest is being served in any given situation. The point becomes not whose interest is being served, but rather that all interests have an opportunity to be served. The key to any such discussion rests on the notion that a profession represents a amalgam of individual professionals. It is therefore possible for a profession as a whole to serve all of society while allowing for individual actions that


may, at times, seem not to do so. Obviously, there is validity to the argument that money and power often result in the best representation, and that those interests without money and power will not be equally represented.

The functionalist model assumes that part of the definition of a profession is that it serve the welfare of society as a whole. What this usually means, in a utilitarian sense, is that the totality of service provided by a profession ultimately serves the greater good of the greatest number of society's members regardless of aberrant individual actions. Or, in another sense, the raison d'etre of a profession is to provide a service to society and on behalf of society: i.e., the medical profession serves to maintain the overall health of society; the legal profession serves to aid in administration of the laws of society; the clergy serve to minister to the spiritual health of society, etc. Clearly, this implies not only that a profession express certain values (among them, a charge to work in the public interest), but also that its individual members acknowledge and adhere to those values. Again, the ABA code also addresses this issue ha Canon 2.

Historically, the need for legal services of those unable to pay reasonable fees has been met in part by lawyers who donated their services or accepted court appointments on behalf of such individuals. The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer, and personal involve- ment in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a tawTer. Every" lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find time to participate i~ serving the disadvantaged.

However, we should not assume that by serving the majority" (the greater good) through individual actions a profession obviates an obligation of service to all. As the obligation to serve the public interest cannot be discharged by individuals alone, neither can the assurance of service to the greater good replace assurance of equal access for all. The legal profession, in part recognizes that a greater obligation exists and that it must be shared with the profession as a whole.

The rendition of flee legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer, but the efforts of individual lawyers are often not

enough to meet the need. Thus it has been necessary for the profession to institute additional programs to provide legal services . . . . Every lawyer should support all proper efforts to meet this need for legal services.

Which brings us back to the argument of access to equal representation. Again, the legal profession operates from within a strictly codified system of laws. Equal representation, under this system, is supposed to be a reality; however, the operative word here is equal. The law, in fact, allows merely for representation - not necessarily equal representation.

As Kultgen (1988, p. 263), Behrman (1988, p. 100) and Bayles (1981, pp. 117-118) point out, this ideal does not require anyone, even a professional, to care for others beyond his or her means. And, professionals are not realistically expected to serve the public interest to the exclusion, of their ox~m well-being. What is expected is an informed and clear weighing of obligations. Obligation implies a nonconsequential approach to issues based not on expected outcomes but on a complex web of some- times difficult to sort hierarchical interactions.

A Kantian perspective would hold duties such as beneficence (service to others) an imperfect duty, one to which we are obligated only in the sense that we ought to do it. Kant reasoned that, as rational human beings, we would recognize these duties and perform them, but were not necessarily obligated to honor them. Ross (1930), on the other hand, ex- tended the notion of duty to include beneficence as a normative assumption; however, few deontologists would prescribe a duty to aid others if that duty conflicted in such a way as to harm the individual performing the act. For example, Ross's duties are what he terms primafacie - that is, they are normal duties to which we are obligated all other things being equal, tn cases of conflicting primafacie duties, such as beneficence versus self improvement, then some system of moral weighing must take place in order to determine what Ross calls the actual duty. Professions, regarding the sense of this argument, rarely if ever counsel their members to override their own well-being in the performance of service to the public at large.

As pointed out, the legal profession alone pre- scribes service to the public as an individual and joint effort recognizing that before service can be

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universalized, those needing it must be made aware of the fact, suggesting public education as the first step in the process. Implicit even in this seemingly altruistic admonition, however, is still the ideal of autonomy to choose among those in need. The medical profession's code is even more direct in its allowance of its members to be "free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in which to provide medical services."

Exactly what actions are considered to be in the public interest is dearly a changing concept; however, the notion of a profession being obligated, in some way, to serve that interest is not. What is clear is that the mere availability of services is not enough to satisfy the ethical obligation for a profession to serve the public interest. And, since equal service is rarely a reality, professions (including public relations) continue to be aligned with special interests, or worse, continue to be viewed as professions con- stantly aligned with special interests.

Behrman (1988, pp. 100-101) states that the specialized nature of professions is the "basis for society's willingness to let the profession set its own code of behavior vis-h-vis the society." In other words, society" is willing to allow this self-regulation with the understanding that the profession will provide service to its various elements, regardless of rank, when it is needed - upon demand - and with the expectation that each will be charged according to his or her ability to pay.

Where, then, are we left as regards to public interest - much of which is often at odds with more powerful, monied, and highly represented spedal interests? This is an argument at least as old as democracy itself

Can pub l i c re la t ions p rov ide a pub l i c service?

L F. Stone (t988), in The Trial of Socrates, traces the history of western democracy to the living democracy of the Greeks - specifically the Athenians - who valued open discourse above all else. In fact, the idea that human beings had intelligence sufficient to be reached by reasoned argument was so embedded in the Athenian culture that they designed a goddess of persuasion. Stone posits that such a divinity

represented not only democracy, but also the ideal way to achieve it - persuasion through reasoned discourse. To many early Greek philosophers rlletoric implied persuasion. So important was the ability to represent oneself in open debate, that an entire class of teachers of rhetoric evolved (sophists) whose purpose was to teach the methods of rhetorical persuasion to those unfortunate enough not to have been born into the landed aristocracy.

tf we trace the roots of modern democracy to those Greek roots, we can draw a parallel as well between persuasion as a cornerstone of the entire political system and the necessity for providing each citizen a voice in that system, regardless of the issue or political alignment, tt could be said that the provision of such ability serves the public interest in the ideal way - by providing for a free, balanced, and open debate among democratic equals: or, to use a phrase coined by Justice Potter Stewart, by contributing to the democratic "marketplace of ideas."

For another parallel, we can look to the existence of journalism as a profession, at least in the United States. American journalism is based on the belief that the public good is being served through the free expression of its practice. The very notion of a flee press relies on the understanding of how such a device fits into and contributes to the ideal of free speech, which is most often construed to mean a citizen's right of access to all sides of an issue. At the heart of this right is the concept of public interest.

However, as Lasch (1990) has argued, the press today has abdicated its role of a proper forum for public debate by subscribing to the notions for- warded by Lippman that information alone is the proper product of the media. In Lasch's words, "What democracy requires is public debate, not information" (p. 1). He decries the decline of the partisan press of the nineteenth century and pro- poses that the "rise of a new type of journalism professing rigorous standards of objectivity do[es] not assure a steady supply of usable information" (p. i0). "Unless information is generated by" sustained public debate, most of it wili be irrelevant at best, misleading and manipulative at worst" (p. 10).

It could be argued that public relations has arisen as a counterpart to journalism: a method by which every citizen - corporate, governmental, or otherwise - has access to that same right of expression. But, this still leaves us with professionals represent-


ing a special interest in the form of individual clients.

However, the admonition that most, if not all, professional codes contain to act in the public interest or for the welfare of society, if acted upon, implies a complex set of obligations that extend beyond the "normal" client-professional diad. Bayles (1981, p. 19) argues that professionals discharge their individual ethical duties (including a duty to serve society's interests) most fully from within a client- professional model allowing for consideration of all affected parties in any given issue or situation. This ideal client-professional relationship is one in which the professional works as a fiduciary of the client, applying his or her skill and superior knowledge yet recognizing the importance of the client in the decision-making process. In this model, the professional is also aware that third parties are affected by decisions made jointly between client and professional, and that these third parties often have rights that may be infringed by the actions of professionals and their clients. In this case, the rights of third parties also imply an obligation by the professional to, at least, consider their position.

Under this concept, modem public relations could be viewed as a facilitator. In theory, its practice should allow for balanced representation on issues and on behalf of all parties. However, unlike the sophists of ancient Greece, modern public relations practitioners do not usually teach others how to plead their individual cases, rather (and much like the legal profession) they represent these others, but even as representatives (advocates, agents, facilitators) they owe a fealty" to society. And as the legal profession has delineated the roles of adviser and advocate (EC 7-3, 4, 5, 8, 10), so, too, should public relations recognize a dual function of advocate and mediator and the role each might play in furthering the goals of society.

However, Lasch (1990) has stated that:

Increasingly information is generated by those who wish to promote something or someone -- a product, a cause, a political candidate or officeholder - without arguing their case OlX its merits or explicidy advertising it as self- interested material either. ~. 10)

This is a potent indictment, and one that has been consistently leveled at public relations since its inception as a practice. To its credit, the PRSA code

addresses the problem of disclosure of self-interested information in its Article 9.

A member shall not make use of any individual or organization purporting to serve or represent an an- nounced cause, or purport ing to be independent or unbiased, but actually serving an undisclosed special or private interest of a member, client or employer.

And again under its Precepts applying specifically to political public relations:

Members shall represent clients or employers in good faith, and while partisan advocacy on behalf of a candidate or public issue may- be expected, members shall act in accord with the public interest and adhere to truth and accuracy and to generally accepted standards of good taste.

Despite these general admonitions that individuals acting on behalf of clients do so with full disclosure, it is clear that individual practitioners cannot be burdened with the obligation of providing a voice to everyone who needs or wishes to be heard. The onus, therefore, falls to the profession as a whole to address the issue of service in the public interest.

It is my contention that public relations can offer a public service through both the profession as a whole and through the contributing actions of individual practitioners; however, before a mechanism for the discharge of this public service can be de- vised, a clear idea of what that contribution might be must be delineated.

It is also my contention that mere adherence to Article 2 of tM PRSA code will not suffice. As Bayles has argued, codes most often are designed with individual practitioners in mind, and frequently do not address the obligations of the profession as a whole (pp. 23-24). Instead, I would propose a fourth paradigm applying specifically to public relations as a responsible profession.

Paradigm IV: If public relations as a profession improves the quality o f debate over issues important to the public, then the public interest will be served

This would imply that the profession take on the additional task of furthering public debate on issues of current concern. How might this be accom-

Public Relations, Professiosalism and Public lnterest 125

piished? I suggest that it be addressed at two levels - that of the individual practitioner through a strength- erring of the code, and that of the profession through administrative process.

First, the code itself should be strengthened and expanded to include more specific guidance. For example:

A member shall endeavor to serve the public interest through encouraging debate on issues of interest to the public; and, where possible, offering representation when both sides of such issues are not adequately represented so as to foster informed public debate.

Such an admonition might take several forms in practice. As already mentioned in the PRSA code, partisan advocacy does not negate an obligation to act truthfully and with respect for opposing point of view-; however, it is not reasonable to require advocates to represent opposing points of view. For this reason, it might be that practitioners can best discharge their individual obligations to act in the public interest through ensuring that all sides are represented. For example, in cases in which one side of an issue of concern to the public is adequately represented, practitioners might insure that opposing points of view- are aired. This might occur through such means as pro bo~w work (in cases in which one side is not capable of paying for equal representation). However, as stated earlier, pro bono work alone doesn't guarantee that the public interest is being served, nor does it guarantee that unpopular points of view will be given equal opportunity to be heard.

It is necessary- for the profession as a whole to provide for the assurance of information sufficient to stimulate public debate on issues of concern to society" as a whole. Unlike the legal and medical professions, public relations services needn't be provided equally to all, nor should the profession necessarily set about to secure this equal service; however, its services should be equally available to all. This availability does not, however, guarantee equai service nor does it automatically" provide for balanced public debate. Only by deliberately setting about to promote debate on issues of public interest can the profession meet its obligation to society.

Again, this might take several forms. The profession itself could set up mechanisms through which issues of public concern are given voice. This could occur in one of two ways. Where issues of public

concern are already being represented on one side, the profession could insure that the other side is also represented. Clearly, this continues to place public relations in an advocacy role; however, it also helps secure a balance on critical issues. The other method would imply a balanced approach, one that would foster debate rather than advocate a particular side. By identifying issues at a national level that deserve public attention and open debate, the profession itself could establish a two-way communication process designed to present each side of the issue - much the same way that formalized debates are run. Exactly how this process might be constructed is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, such a process would greatly enhance the image of public relations as a contributor to the democratic process.

Finally, the question of representation of unpopular points of view and of provision of service to societal causes on a national scale should be addressed. It may not be necessary for the profession to take on these responsibilities directly. It could, instead, promote private agencies whose mission it would be to represent these causes and, thus, insure balanced debate. It takes only dedicated individuals to found a non-partisan organization such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) or the Advertising Council. The former is designed to represent clients in prescribed areas of law - areas deemed important enough to the welfare of a democratic society to demand insurance of representation. Such an organization frequently serves the unpopular cause, even when individual professionals and the profession itself hesitate to do so. The latter is set up to provide the equivalent of pro bono work at a national level, representing, as it does so, the advertising industey as a whole. While these are more-or-less private endeavors, something similar to them could be, at least initially, sponsored by the profession of public relations.

For, if as Lasch (1990) suggests, the mere provision of information is not sufficient to promote public debate on important issues, and that the press has abdicated that position, then it may be that the profession of public rdations can help fill that void. This would imply that the profession would (1) have to strengthen its code to clarify the public service f~lnction of individuals, (2) set up formal mechanisms by which balanced public debate would be fostered, and (3) encourage the establishment of

126 Thomas H, Bivins

private avenues whereby even unpopular causes may be given a voice, and those causes deemed most important by society may be supported.

Summary

"Public interest" is indeed an amorphous concept, and one subject to change over time; however, that change is one of enhancement and continued definition, each phase of which heightens the expectations of society as a whole as regards the behavior of its various components - including professions and professionals.

If we follow that line of reasoning (that this change in expectations is a positive change), then professionals are charged with recognizing and responding to this heightened awareness on the part of the public; and the onus of acting in the public interest is still on the professional - regardless of the level of expectation. This is especially true of public relations in that the practice ideally turns on the ability to "read" public expectations and respond to them.

In summary, the profession of public relations has done little to formalize the doctrine, common to most professions, of public service. It is left to individual practitioners to discharge what the)' believe to be a tacit obligation to society through either the competent carrying out of their normal functions which will somehow ultimately contribute to the well-being of society as a whole, or by such means as pro bono work which, ahhough admirable, is still service to a special interest. Neither is it practical nor necessary to attempt to provide for equal service to all who need it as do the legal and medical professions. Equal availability, while sufficient, is also not enough to satisfy the obligation to contribute to the public interest. The answer to what might constitute service in the public interest might be found by asking what public relations is really designed to do.

In its dual roles as mediator and advocate, public relations has the opportunity both to engage in and to encourage public debate. By so doing, it also has the opportunity, and the obligation, to lessen the obfuscation often surrounding the mere provision of information. It must develop clear guidelines and formal mechanisms by which the issues important to society are clarified and presented to the public for open, democratic debate.

Public relations cannot shirk the responsibility it will incur once society recognizes it as a profession. This recognition will be based, in part, on the expected return. Public relations will have no choice but to define the public interest in a way that society" will accept. To do otherwise would be to cheat the very public by whose permission it operates.

References

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Cogan, M. L.: 1953, 'Toward a Definition of a Profession', Harvard Educational Review XXIII , pp. 33-50.

Crable, R. E. and S. L. Vibbert: 1986, Public Relations as Communication Mana2ement (Bellwether Press, Edina).

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Lasch, C.: 1990 (Spring), Journalism, 'Publicity and the Lost Art of Argument', Gannett Center Journal, pp. 1-11,

Meyer, P.: 1987, Ethical Journalism (Longman, New York). Newsom, D. and A. Scott: 1985, This is PR: The Realities of

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University of Ore2on , &hod of Journatism Eugene, OR 97403,

U.S.A.

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